

The Statesman.



No. XVI.—SEPTEMBER 30, 1881.

Correspondence.

SIR JOHN STRACHEY'S BOOK-KEEPING.

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE STATESMAN."

DEAR SIR,—Is it of any use calling attention to the importance to England, of possessing the means of exercising a control over affairs in India? I am, with all my advantages, greatly at a loss as to the nature and extent of the preparations reported to have been made by Lord Lytton, long before he actually commenced the Afghan War. The cash balances are the only indications we can use, to show financial results; while the accounts are obviously untrustworthy. On the 31st March, 1876, the cash balances in India were £16,952,494, and on 31st March, 1879, four months after the war broke out, they had fallen to £12,792,153. A year before—that is, on the 31st March, 1878, or seven months before the war, the balances had sunk to £14,498,302.

These balances must be taken in connection with the excess of charges, including the capital for productive public works, which were as follows; and also with the money borrowed.

	Gross Excess of all Charges, Ordinary and Extraordinary.	Total Debt incurred in India and in England.	Total Cash Balances in India and in England on the last day of each official year.	Capital Expenditure for Productive Public Works.
1875-76 ...	£2,601,684	£4,123,022	£17,872,393	£4,270,626
1876-77 ...	5,992,062	4,750,145	15,464,663	3,809,254
1877-78 ...	8,334,139	7,311,394	15,374,959	4,791,052
1878-79 ...	2,347,652	4,236,490	13,910,078	4,331,898
1879-80 ...	4,547,279	3,283,408*	15,300,001	3,518,578
Total ...	£23,822,316	£23,704,459		£20,771,441

Thus the figures show that though the borrowings covered the gross expenditure in excess, yet the cash balances dwindled. It is only fair to assume that the difference must have been used, and not accounted for.

It is quite true, as Sir John Strachey stated, that the cash balances cannot be so used without entailing the necessity of accounting for their use, but the accounting need not necessarily be in the same year; and the same course may be followed the next year, so that the cash balances may always be made to cover unaccounted for outlays.

The figures are the more puzzling, because of the mode in which the

* The borrowings were £12,560,022, but of this £9,576,614 were for the East India Railway.

accounts are made to appear. Assuming that the cash was used, and the charges not brought to account, then the accounts show that even the ordinary expenditure was less than the revenue, as follows:—

	Revenue more than Ordinary Expenditure.	Ordinary Expenditure more than Revenue.	Difference.
1876-76 ...	£1,668,945	...	
1876-77	£2,182,778	
1877-78	3,543,187	
1878-79 ...	2,034,246	...	
1879-80	1,182,949	
Total ...	£3,703,191	£6,903,914	£3,205,723

In the face of these differences, we spent in excess only £23,822,916, but, to cover this, we used up, out of the cash balances, £2,572,392, and borrowed £23,704,459, making a total use of cash to the extent of £26,276,851, to cover the above excess; thus leaving £2,454,031 unaccounted for.

Another mode is to show that we spent in ordinary charges, in excess of revenue, the sum of £3,205,723, and we spent for capital for public works, the sum of £20,771,441; but, as above stated, we used, from borrowings and from cash balances, the sum of £26,276,851; thus again showing that there are £3,071,128 unaccounted for.

But for this guilty war, and its cost of £30,000,000, we might have carried out our desire of freeing India from all import duties, leaving only the export duty on rice, if it were desirable to retain it.

Manchester goods might have been free, amounting to £800,000, with iron and leather, and other articles. We need not have raised the Famine Fund, and, above all, might have spared Madras and Bombay the extra salt tax; indeed, we could have cut down the salt tax in all India by one-fifth.

We could, meanwhile, have made our empire more stable, and made the future base of military operations stronger far than by this unhappy war. B.

INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE.

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE STATESMAN."

DEAR SIR,—Your untiring advocacy of equitable government in India emboldens me to address you on a matter affecting the interests of many Hindus. In the *Times* of August 29th, appeared the following paragraph:—

CALCUTTA, August 28.—The Indian Government has sent home a complete scheme of reorganization of the Medical Department on the principle of unification of the British and Indian services. It is proposed that the latter should be permitted to die out, no new appointments being made, and that the medical officers appointed since 1865 should be amalgamated with the British establishment, which will supply Indian wants, and whence candidates for civil employment will be selected; the whole to be under Directors-General for India. It is expected that some reduction in expenses will thus be obtained. Brigade surgeons and surgeon majors who entered the service before 1860 are to cease civil employment at the age of fifty-five.

This permitting the Indian Medical Service to die out, is interpreted by some Hindu gentlemen studying here, as implying that Natives will no longer be permitted to compete at the examinations for the Medical Service, for which the candidate must, among other qualifications, have "both his parents of unmixed European blood." (See regulations in the *Lancet*, September 11th, 1880.)

Official intimation should be given as to the full purport of this reorganization of the Service.—Yours faithfully,

Edinburgh, August 31, 1881.

JOSEPH MAZZINI WHEELER.

EDITORIAL NOTES.

THE following characteristic paragraph appeared in the *Times* of the 5th inst., in the letter it publishes every Monday morning from its Calcutta Correspondent :—

Some attention appears to have been attracted in England by an allegation in the London STATESMAN for July that a message was conveyed to Sir Salar Jung in 1877 threatening him with deportation, and that he undoubtedly believed this to be intended. I am in a position to state that Sir Salar Jung has informed the Resident at Hyderabad that neither directly nor indirectly did he receive *from the Residency* any threat of deportation, and he has authorized the publication of this statement.

We say that the paragraph is characteristic. For years-past, the Calcutta letters of the *Times* have either been semi-official apologies for the courses pursued by the Indian Government, or enlogistic comments upon whatever it does. Throughout the Afghan War, from its inception, the home public were assured every Monday morning in these letters, that never was war more justifiable than that most wanton aggression, and never Viceroy more exactly suited to the needs of India than Lord Lytton. Let what statements might appear to the contrary in the public press of this country, in particular if they were damaging either to Lord Lytton's personal character or to his administration, the writer was always "in a position to state," as he is now, that there was no foundation for them whatever, and that he was "authorized" to make this declaration. The letters were the theme of incessant ridicule in India itself, Lord Lytton's own hand therein, or immediate connection with them, being known everywhere. We do not blame the *Times* for resolving that its Calcutta correspondent shall always be on the Governmental side. It is apparently a principle of the journal to support our rulers for the time being, whether Lord Beaconsfield or Mr. Gladstone is Prime Minister in England, or Lord Lytton or Lord Ripon is Viceroy of India; and if the rôle were but frankly avowed, no one would, perhaps, have any cause of complaint.

WE do not presume to unveil the personality of the Calcutta correspondent who denies THE STATESMAN's charges in this one special particular, but we say that no importance whatever can be attached to the denial. We have italicized three words in the denial, as the reader will observe; for we never said that Sir Salar Jung received the threat of deportation *from the Residency*. We were careful what we did say, and our statement was as follows :—

When one of these master-strokes of "political" cajolery or coercion is undertaken, the communication is always verbal if possible, or if anything must be written, a private and familiar note from an inferior hand is chosen, and the official form avoided. We are not, therefore, in a position to give absolute proof of the authenticity or authority of this disgraceful threat, the reality of which was widely talked of in Hyderabad; but although we

do not believe the actual perpetration of the outrage to have been intended, Sir Salar Jung himself undoubtedly believed it. Having already been told that a man of the character and antecedents of Wikar-ool-Oomra would be installed, in defiance of the Durhar, without pre-text or warrant, he no doubt assumed that the Resident had full permission to proceed to any extremities, and may well have argued that his duty now lay in submission; for if he resisted until he was made a prisoner, the administrative independence of the State would be utterly destroyed, and the reign of unrestrained reaction and corruption instituted.

It is noticeable that of the many far graver charges made by us against the Resident and against the Ameer-i-Kabeer, no denial whatever is attempted. We might without impropriety, perhaps, construe this challenge of a single fact in our indictment, into a tacit admission that our charges, as a whole, are true. And they are true. Neither Sir Richard Meade nor the Ameer-i-Kabeer dare meet us in the Civil Courts of Law to submit themselves to cross-examination. As little dare the Calcutta officials of the Foreign Department do so. Lord Hartington is compelled by official courtesy and custom, to refer our charges for report to the Government of India, whose servants are implicated so deeply therein, and who will now be asked to "report" upon them. This farce will have, of necessity, to be gone through before the matter again comes before Parliament. Every effort will be made to persuade Lord Hartington that nothing but ruin to the Indian Empire will follow upon any disclosure of what has been going on for years past at Hyderabad. The danger is that Lord Hartington may succumb to these influences, and once more assure the House, as he did a month ago, that the papers are of "so highly confidential" a nature that they cannot possibly be produced. Does any reasonable being doubt what that assurance means? Until Lord Hartington has finally dealt with this scandal, we refuse to believe that he will allow it to be hushed up by a whole year's continued assurances of the Calcutta correspondent that he is "in a position to state" that our charges are not true. *They are true!* Give us the opportunity of putting Lord Lytton and Sir Richard Meade, with or without their tool, the Ameer-i-Kabeer, into the witness-box, and then Sir Salar Jung, before Her Majesty's Judges, and we will *show* that the charges are true. Has Sir Richard Meade not abundant ground to go upon? He prefers to commit the vindication of his character to the hands of the Government of India, and with singular wisdom;—but it is a very old device.

NINE months ago, when we were stopped on the threshold of these exposures, by the Ameer being wisely counselled to enter a criminal suit against us, that effectually shut our mouth until the Attorney-General's fiat again opened it, Sir George Yule, C.B., himself formerly Resident at Hyderabad, sent us the following letter:—

30, CLANRICARDE GARDENS, BAYSWATER,
February 22nd, 1881.

MY DEAR SIR,—It is, I think, of very great importance that the suit which has been brought against you by the Ameer-i-Kabeer, Wikar-ool-Oomra, Co-Regent of Hyderabad, should go to trial. It would be a public misfortune were it to be compromised; for, in common with many others who know the facts, I have long been anxious to see the treatment which Salar Jung has, of late years, received at the hands of the Government of India (particularly in the appointment of Wikar-ool-Oomra as Co-Regent with him) brought to the notice of the Home Government in such a way as to compel it to make a full inquiry.

I have often thought of addressing the Secretary of State myself on the subject, but have been deterred from doing so by several reasons, of which I need mention only two. (1st) The certainty that any inquiry, conducted in the usual way by "officials" of the Government of India, would be abortive, and could result only in making Salar Jung's position worse, if that be possible, than it now is. To be thorough and effectual, the inquiry

must be entrusted to men of high standing, wholly unconnected with the Calcutta Foreign Office; and it is for this reason that I so earnestly hope that the libel suit against you may prove the occasion of showing, in open court, before Her Majesty's Judges, the true character of the Ameer's appointment, and the long course of oppression and insult to which Salar Jung has been subjected by the Government of India for years past. (2nd) My second reason is that it would be hopeless to look for any assistance from Salar Jung himself. Without entering into the general question of the position of Native Princes and their Ministers, it is not too much to say that Salar Jung, from hard experience and especially from his treatment of late years, must have lost all faith even in his right to remonstrate against any proceedings of the Resident, and all hope of his representations being regarded as of any weight by the Government of India. His natural caution and modesty have, under the treatment he has received, become developed, I fear, into absolute fault; and anything like co-operation from him, in these circumstances, is not, I am persuaded, to be looked for.

When, therefore, I saw in the *Times* a brief report of the prosecution entered against yourself by the Ameer, I rejoiced at it as an opening that might lead to the exposure of Salar Jung's wrongs without implicating him, and I resolved to offer you such help as I might feel justified in giving towards exposing the character of the Co-Regent, regarding whom you have, to the best of my knowledge and belief, said in your article nothing but the truth, and even less than you would have been justified in saying. In spite of Sir Salar Jung's repeated remonstrances, we have forced upon him, as his colleague, a man who was notoriously his personal enemy, a man who had heavily bribed others in scandalous intrigues against him, and whose servant had openly tried to murder him. What wonder that these should be "no longer any justice in Hyderabad!" as I also have heard in common with yourself.

Although I have not referred, in this letter, to the other matters discussed in your two articles on the Restoration of Berar, I may say that I believe every word in them to be true, and that the main facts are susceptible of complete proof from the reports of our own officers.

(Signed)

G. U. YULE,
Ex-Resident at Hyderabad.

To R. Knight, Esq.,
"Statesman" Office.

If any man is "in a position to state" what has been going on for years past at Hyderabad, it is the writer of this very important letter. Whom then, will the public trust on the general issue:—Sir George Yule, C.B., or the official apologist who, veiled as the Calcutta correspondent of the *Times*, has been "in a position to state" so much in the last few years that has betrayed the interests of both countries?

FURTHER interpellations as to the charges made in the July number of this journal against the Government of India and Sir Richard Meade, were made in the House of Commons on the 15th inst., and replied to by the Secretary of State as follows:—

Sir G. BALFOUR asked the Secretary of State for India whether he would cause a selection of papers for a long series of years connected with the Government of the Nizam to be laid before Parliament, in order that the real state of the relations of that State with the Government of India might be made known, and that the animadversion on the honour and character of the Indian Government and of Indian officers might be cleared away or substantiated by the publication of these official documents.

Mr. ONSLOW asked whether the noble lord or the Indian Government thought there was the slightest foundation for the allegations against Sir R. Meade.

The Marquis of HARTINGTON said that with regard to the question of the hon. member for Guildford, he could not add anything to the statement he made on Thursday last. In reply to a question which his hon. and gallant friend put to him on Thursday, he said that the largest part of these papers were of a confidential character, and that it was perfectly impossible in the public interest to lay them on the table. Further examination convinced him that that was the case, and although it would be possible to produce some of them, the

great bulk and the most important of them could not be produced. It was, however, the intention of the Government to look at the correspondence, and they might think proper to make some statement with regard to the animadversions on Sir R. Meade.

Mr. Onslow is, we hope, pleased with the answer which his inquiry elicited. Lord Hartington declined, very wisely, to say whether "the Government thought" THE STATESMAN'S charges well-founded or not. Mr. Onslow is very well remembered in India as Sir Richard Temple's private secretary, and what he wanted Lord Hartington to say, was what Sir Richard Temple would have been *sure* to say, had he been Secretary of State instead of Lord Hartington. Sir George Balfour, on the other hand, honestly desires to know the truth. It is noticeable that the Government has not thought proper to make any further statement with regard to our animadversions on Sir Richard Meade. The truth is that Englishmen have to-day a Government that makes a conscience of its work, a Government that will gladly give Sir Richard Meade a full acquittal at the right time, if entitled to one, and not else.

THERE is this peculiarity in the present agitation for Reciprocity or Fair Trade, as it is called in this country, that whereas formerly the demand for the protection of our home industries was the demand of the agricultural classes, it is now the manufacturing industries of the land that seem disposed to lead the movement. In 1845 the two interests were vehemently opposed to each other: the manufacturing classes of the towns being arrayed in a body against the landed classes, the one sternly demanding freedom of trade, the other fiercely denouncing it. To-day the two interests have joined hands. The case of the Fair Trader is plausible enough to command what is popularly called the common sense of the people, and it is only by calm, cogent, exposure of the hollowness of the agitation, that we can set it finally at rest.

There are two ways in which the movement may be successfully attacked. It is essential to show, in the first place, that the facts are against the agitation, and not, as plausibly represented, in its favour. It is not true that "freedom of trade" has injured us as a nation. In spite of the refusal of foreign nations to adopt Free Trade principles, our own adherence to them has indefinitely enriched, and not impoverished us.

Lord Derby's late speech at Southport, and Mr. Fawcett's "Free Trade and Protection, 1878," are admirable illustrations of the way in which this agitation should be encountered, on the ground of facts. On the other hand, Earl Grey's letters, in the *Times*, on the French Treaty indicate, we think, the right way in which to deal with it, so as to cut it up by the roots. Because our foreign trade has been a great source of enrichment to us, there is a sort of popular conviction everywhere, that it is the main element of the national wealth, and that if the development of our commerce with other nations should be arrested by hostile tariffs upon English goods, the great source of the nation's enrichment would be dried up. We believe it to be altogether a delusion, arising from mistaken views of the true sources of a nation's wealth. Far too much importance, we believe, is attached to our foreign commerce in these discussions concerning Free Trade. For ourselves, we saw little cause to regret the suspension of the negotiations for the renewal of the French Treaty. With Earl Grey, we would see England calmly and wisely abandon all idea of Protection, and with it the notion of reciprocity embodied in those commercial treaties. Our language towards all the world should be, "Do what *you* will, levy what duties you please;

our course is plain and simple. We regard restrictions upon commerce as hurtful both to ourselves and you. We should abolish all duties whatever, if we could; and any that we levy will be levied without thought of hostility to you, or of injuring you, solely for purposes of revenue." It seems to us that we shall never make ourselves thoroughly intelligible until we do this, and cease scolding other nations for not following what we hold to be the most profitable course for every people to adopt.

ONCE arrived at this resolution, much that is now difficult would become plain and simple. We might then probably find it wise to settle our indirect taxation upon the following very simple and intelligible principles:—

- I. All necessaries of life to be free of duty.
- II. Raw material of manufactures to be free.
- III. Luxuries: Spirits, foreign wines, tobacco, &c., to be taxed up to the highest productive limit.

Beer might fairly, we think, be regarded as a necessary of life, and the duty thereon abolished altogether. Conventions with other countries for the admission of their wines at low rates of duty, upon the principle of reciprocity, are surely a mistake. Foreign wines are a luxury; while spirits and tobacco may fairly be held to be pernicious, by almost general consent. The principle of taxing nothing that we do not tax up to the highest productive limit, would perhaps be our surest guide in the framing of our tariffs.

It is worth while, we think, to recur, in somewhat categorical form, to the question and answer regarding Indian revenues paid to absentees, which passed between Mr. F. O'Donnell and the Marquis of Hartington, and was commented upon in these pages last month. Lord Hartington remarked that "the only way" in which the payments by India of annuities and furlough allowances could be reduced "would be by the further employment in important positions, of natives of India." This was a good reply, and, from a sincere Secretary of State, is one very likely to have its influence. Instead of this slow-working, though most appropriate, method of reducing India's payments to absentees being "the only way," there is another way obviously open—one more direct, effective, and salutary. Why are these absentee allowances not paid by this country, as the late Sir George Wingate so earnestly insisted they should be? This act of justice would afford direct, immediate, and substantial relief to the Indian Exchequer, lifting the burden off the ryots' shoulders, and reducing the "loss by exchange." It would also be salutary in this respect, that it would bring home to our public men, with a force which none of them now realize, their responsibility for the good and economical administration of India. Until the Home taxpayer has to sustain some appreciable portion of the cost of maintaining the connection between India and England, he will remain ignorant of Indian affairs, and his representatives will be indifferent to the oppressions and financial blunders that are ever-recurring blot on our Indian administration. When our political morality shall have advanced sufficiently to compel Parliament to sanction some regular contribution towards the cost of retaining our connection with India—instead of that cost being borne, as up to this present, by the poorer and weaker partner—there may be some dispute as to what class of Anglo-Indian outlay it would be most proper to defray from the British Exchequer. For our part, we have ever held with Sir George Wingate, that *all* the "Home charges" proper should

be defrayed from the British Treasury. For England to charge herself with the "annuities and furlough pay" alone, would very sensibly "diminish the annual drain on the Indian taxpayer," and afford India immense relief.

THE "Civil Furlough and Absentee Allowances" paid in 1879-80 amounted to £209,860 only, but the "Superannuation, Retired, and Compassionate Allowances" reached the sum of £1,322,185. Of this sum about £500,000 is to the Military Funds of the three Presidencies. It is under the head of "Army: Non-effective," that by far the heaviest portion of pension and absentee allowances appear. The total of this branch of the Home Charges (1879-80) is £2,115,797; but when we glance at charges classed as "Effective"—the total of which is close on £2,000,000—we find that a large proportion of them consists of furlough allowances, sinecure colonels, and recruiting, which last is obviously part of the ordinary garrison expenses of England. Thus the absentee payments to which the member for Dungarvan drew attention, amount to nearer £5,000,000 than £3,000,000. We say nothing, meanwhile, of the cost of the "Home" administration of India, which amounts to nearly £250,000 per annum, including the salary of the Secretary of State for India, which, as being that of a Minister of the English Cabinet, ought to be paid from the same exchequer as the salary of the Colonial or Foreign Secretary, and not exacted, as it now is, from the unrepresented Indian ryot.

THE utterances of some of our leading men upon the conduct of public affairs are so steeped in insincerity that they unavoidably mislead, as they are intended to do, the masses of the people. Sir Stafford Northcote can express himself with the utmost clearness, when he wishes to do so, upon the folly of protective duties. He knows the protective system to be a delusion; but, instead of honestly telling his audience so at Sheffield, he chose to use language that he knew would leave upon their mind a very different impression. Again, there is no public man in England who has a deeper sense of the combative character of the English nation, and of the case with which the war spirit is excited amongst us. When speaking his real views on the subject—that is, when speaking sincerely—his language is free from all ambiguity whatever. The Jingo spirit, the desire of empire, of predominance in the world, is repugnant to his nature, as it is to his convictions. And yet, in the interests of party, he will condescend to hold language upon the subject, to a popular audience, that falsifies every conviction of his mind. He is not a Jingo. He abhors the Jingo spirit, as every one knows who reads his writings. If there were any danger of his language evoking that spirit in an efficient form, he would refrain from it with the utmost care; but if to hold such language will but cast a shade of unpopularity over the administration of Mr. Gladstone, he is ready to use it freely.

WE should like to quote what his real views are, as to that pursuit of empire—which he tells the mob should be the first ambition of an English Ministry. Contrast with his language at Sheffield on this subject, his reiterated deprecations of the war spirit, in his "Twenty Years of Financial Policy," where he tells us that the Crimean War proved the signal for abolishing all further peace in Europe, and set the nations upon the work of arming themselves to the teeth against each other. In his "Policy," he "looks back with regret to the halcyon days of undisturbed peace and peaceful estimates," and forward "to a time when those happy

visions of the past may realize themselves again" (pp. 286, 286). And are such specches as that at Sheffield, the way to teach the masses of the nation to share these regrets and hopes? In his Policy he laments deeply "the moral effect" produced by the war, which he says "had been enormous," and shows how it had "awakened that combative spirit which lies deep in the English character," and had "begotten in us a habit, and even a taste, for expenditure much easier to acquire than to get rid of" (p. 298). But in his "Policy" he was appealing to thoughtful and reflective men; at Sheffield he was addressing the masses. Mr. Gladstone was to be made unpopular with the audience, because he does not share that "combative spirit which lies deep in the English character," and which Sir Stafford Northcote possesses no more than Mr. Gladstone.

ALL this is very unworthy; and we shall let a plain working man rebuke the disingenuous Tory leader. At the great Trades' Union Congress, then, we find Mr. Coulson, of the Operative Bricklayers' Society, as President, addressing the working men as follows:—

In the first place, English workmen were not willing to tolerate any reversion to the old nonsense of protection. He did not think that there was any danger of anything of the kind. If there ever should be, it would be time to be up and doing. They would be prepared to put such a veto upon any return to the system of protective duties as no Government could disregard. Other obstacles, more real, and therefore of a more serious kind, pressed upon industry. First of all, there were the artificial laws which hampered industry, and of these none were more important than those relating to the land. After what had passed this session in regard to Ireland, they could not be silent upon the subject in reference to England and Scotland. Next, and perhaps most important of all, was the question whether they were going again to tolerate the waging of wars by this country against other peoples for the sake of increasing or perpetuating our empire. What interest had they, workmen, what interest had the people of England, in carrying on war for the sake of empire? If their position as workmen was one of independence, they ought to recognize the independence of other workmen and of other nations. It was not merely that these wars did untold injury to the poor and to the working classes by the actual misery they caused by increasing the instability of industry and employment, which was unstable enough without any addition, but these wars were profoundly demoralizing to the country engaged in them, and were crimes of the worst kind.

If the Conservative leaders have no hope of getting into office, but by reviving the cry for "protection," or evoking a "war spirit" in the nation—which seems to be their programme—they will be long in realizing it.

WE have insisted from the first that, instead of £15,000,000 or £20,000,000 sterling being an adequate estimate of the cost of the Afghan War, its last traces would no disappear from the balance-sheet, until the account had run up to £40,000,000. We beg now to direct the attention of our readers to the comparative statement, further on in these pages, of the gross military expenditure of Lord Northbrook's administration with that of Lord Lytton, whom Her Majesty was advised by the late Lord Beaconsfield to promote to an earldom, to cover and screen the guilt of his unspeakable rule. The two periods were marked by the following military expenditure:—

<i>Lord Northbrook's Rule.</i>			<i>Lord Lytton's Rule.</i>		
1872-73	...	£14,596,802	1878-79	...	£17,092,488
1873-74	...	£14,217,390	1879-80	...	£23,383,982
1874-75	...	£14,886,321	1880-81	...	£20,583,864
1875-76	...	£14,262,848	1881-82	...	£19,618,100
Total	...	£57,463,361	Total	...	£90,678,434

It is by comparative statements of this kind only, that Parliament and the public can be made to understand the true cost of the crime that has been committed. The Indian accounts are so manipulated, by the "officials" whose reputation is affected by this war, that every device by which it can be minimized and made to appear less than it is, is freely resorted to. Let some member of the House rise next session, and inquire of Lord Hartington whether the comparative statement we have now made is true or false, and his lordship will tell the House at once, that it is true. Before the army is reduced to its former strength, re-organized, and brought back into its normal condition in garrison, and the arsenals are properly replenished, the war will have cost our full original estimate of £40,000,000 sterling. Independent members of the House should force this fact upon the attention of the Ministry and the country.

In the same way in which the cost of the war is minimized, is the sacrifice of human life therein, dealt with. The Parliamentary Return which appeared last month professed to give an accurate account of the casualties of the war, but the statement was as misleading as it well could be. The return tells us that the casualties were as follows :—

			<i>Killed.</i>			<i>Wounded.</i>
Officers	99	111
Men	1,524	1,252

The figures represent but a fraction of the real casualties. Our camp followers perished by thousands in the war, and the above figures represent the loss of fighting men only, for whose preservation and health the most costly precautions are taken. If we estimate the loss of camp followers at 10,000 to 12,000 men, we shall not be very wide of the mark. This, then, is the general result of our crime : a waste of £40,000,000 sterling, and a loss of 15,000 lives on our own side alone. And we live under institutions so faulty, that, instead of the authors of this great crime being condignly punished, the Sovereign is advised to decorate and reward them. Can we wonder that many thoughtful Englishmen are ready to wish the days of Monarchy amongst us, numbered : for it is the fashion of Monarchs to decorate criminals.

Here is a very nice story, that has reached us in the last few weeks only, the truth of which we find to be undoubted, and that we stumbled upon while in pursuit of the Maharajah Holkar's salt grievance. In abolishing, in 1874, the Southern Salt Ling, which affected the Berars as well as our own provinces, we thought it desirable to close the native salt wells in the former, from which the people of Berar up to that time partly drew their supplies. Now we administer Berar in trust for the Nizam, and we settled in 1873-4 that these salt wells should be closed, and that the Nizam's revenues should be credited £30,000 a year, as his share of the increased income we were henceforward to derive, from the people of Berar being forced to use our heavily excised Bombay salt, imported into Berar by railway. Can it, then, be believed possible, that after crediting the Nizam this amount for a year or two, the credit was quietly ordered from Calcutta to be stopped? And it has been stopped ever since. The order came, we believe, from the Accountant-General. Since 1876-77, and after making the Nizam pay compensation out of his own revenues to the owners of the salt wells we shut up in our own interests, we have appropriated *his* share of the revenue as well as our own. We do not know whether Sir Salar Jung

has remonstrated or not. We did not learn the fact from him, and the story will be deemed incredible by most persons in this country. But it is, we believe, true, for all that. Her Majesty's Secretary of State, of course, knows nothing about it, nor the India Office. Such things are never reported to the India Office. Let Parliament, but appoint a Select Committee next Session to inquire into the circumstances attendant upon the abolition of these Salt Lines, and if it summon but the right witnesses before it, from Sir John Strachey downwards, the true *morale* of British rule in India will come upon the nation as a very unpleasant surprise.

THERE should be a further Committee, to inquire into our execution of the trust we undertook in the administration of the Berars. We affirm its execution to have been marked throughout, by a series of almost incredible frauds. These are hard words, but they are neither intemperate nor ill-considered. Our uncontrolled, irresponsible expenditure of the revenues of Berar, has long since degenerated into the grossest and most open fraud upon those revenues, for purposes of pure jobbery and our own aggrandisement. We cannot enlarge upon the subject, but may note a fact or two of the history. First of all then, we promised the Nizam in 1861, after instituting a formal inquiry by Commission, that the expenses of administering his revenues should not exceed 25 per cent. of their gross amount. We have run it up, upon one pretence or another, to 50 per cent. ! We settled, in the next place, that the cash balances of the province need never exceed £130,000 : we have run it up to £400,000, that we may use the Nizam's money and economise our own. We have so multiplied appointments and augmented the salaries of our European officers in the Berars, that there is to-day a larger and much more costly staff of English officers there, than there was in all three provinces of Nuldroog, the Raichore Doab, and the Berars together, when we entered upon the trust. Now, these are simple facts upon the face of our administration. Our execution of the self-imposed trust is a gigantic fraud, that we may evade paying over to the Nizam's treasury, the surplus revenues of the province. And if the young Nizam's Minister is reckless enough to "kick against the pricks," to remonstrate, or to ask for explanations—let him look out. They know very well at Calcutta how to deal with a Native Minister who ventures to question the justice of their decisions in their own interests, and can always put their hand upon a Sir Richard Meade, if they cannot count upon a Wikar-ool-Oomra, to reduce him to discreet acquiescence in their arrangements. We write bitterly, for we are nearly in despair ; standing, as we have stood for twenty-five years, nearly alone in the demand that England should rule India justly, and in a way worthy of herself.

WHEN the provinces were first taken from the Nizam in 1853, we promised to render him an annual account of their revenues, and to pay over to him any surplus there might be, after defraying the expenses of their administration. The promise was not fulfilled. No accounts were rendered him, no surplus paid to him. Colonel Low had engaged, in 1853, that the expenses of the civil administration should not exceed 12½ per cent. of the gross revenues ; and, in 1861, our own Commission, appointed to report upon the matter, emphatically recorded their opinion that "the civil charges ought never to exceed 25 per cent. on the revenue, and," they added, "we recommend that this rule should be rigidly adhered to." Now, let any member of the House of Commons ask Lord Hartington, next session, what the expenditure has really been, and he will find

that, instead of the promised 12½ per cent. of 1858, or even the rigid limit of 25 per cent. of 1861, the expenditure is 50 to 51 per cent. Let it be remembered simultaneously, that we admit we are administering these provinces as a trust for the young Nizam, and that the Government of India resents the charge that they have in any sense, "annexed" them. Well, so scrupulously is the trust discharged that, while we contrive to keep down the expenses of our own costly civil administration in British territories to 25 per cent., we have quietly run them up in Berar to 50 to 51 per cent. We say quietly, because it is done in that way. There is no one to remark upon it, no one to remonstrate against it. The Indian Press cares nothing about it; the Nizam's Ministers dare say nothing about it; Parliament knows nothing about it, and the India Office shuts its eyes to it, or goes to sleep over it. But how does it arise? Simply enough. The Berars have become a great preserve of patronage in the hands of Calcutta officials; and, as the Nizam unwisely surrendered his right to *limit* the expenses of the administration, under the supplemental treaty of 1860, our officials have gradually got rid of all sense of responsibility in the execution of their trust. The very fact that the Nizam has surrendered to us his right to limit the expenditure, instead of making us more jealous of his interests, has led us to throw all considerations of good faith towards him, to the winds. Appointments for European officers in the Berars, have been so multiplied since 1861, and salaries so augmented, that, although the two districts of Nuldroog and the Raichore Doab were restored to the Nizam in that year, we have to-day positively a larger and much more costly establishment of English officers in the Berars alone, than we had in all three provinces in 1860! Now let Parliament consider this one fact, and let some of its members interrogate Lord Hartington upon the subject. Lord Hartington will be just as much surprised as his interrogators, to find that that what we say is true. And can we wonder that Calcutta tightens its grasp upon the provinces; cows the Nizam's Minister into silence by secret threatenings and open insult, and would fain persuade the world that *THE STATESMAN* is a libellous and incendiary paper, that should be suppressed in the interests of the empire? We are simply trustees of the young Nizam; but we obtained an engagement from his father that he would impose no restrictions upon our administration. There is thus everything in the nature of the trust to awaken a sense of responsibility, and to compel us to exercise the utmost good faith in its discharge; while the bitter libel must be told, that we are acting as utter swindlers towards the Prince, who reposed this faith in us. Is it really not possible to call up a blush of shame upon some man's face in the House, and make him angrily demand if these things be true? We have seen what they have done on the revenue side of the accounts, in quietly diverting £30,000 a-year of his salt revenue from the Nizam's treasury to our own. It is done "quietly," we say. There is no one to speak about it, no one who knows about it, except the knot of demoralized "officials" in Calcutta, and their victim at Hyderabad; and woe to the latter, if he groans loud enough to make himself heard!

THE same officials have quietly increased the strength of the Contingent Force by 1,000 men, and imposed the cost as an additional burden upon the Nizam's revenues. It is not enough that the Force ought long since to have been disbanded or incorporated into our own Army, as useless for local purposes, and existing in idleness from one decade to another, in so far as the Nizam is concerned. Without pretext or provocation of any kind, except the surplus revenues in their hands, they quietly add 1,000 men to the strength of the Force, without the know-

ledge of any one but the few who are personally interested in the new appointments to be made, and the victim at whose expense the wrong is done. The Berars are the richest provinces of the young Nizam's kingdom, and it is to their surplus revenues that his Ministers legitimately look for developing the resources of the poorer ones. But they look in vain: because of our dishonesty. If we had but administered the Berars uprightly, and handed over to Sir Salar Jung every year, the surplus revenues the provinces have yielded for many years past, he would have made the Hyderabad State the model State of India. But *that* is precisely what our Calcutta officials are determined shall not be done. It does not suit them to see our own rule contrasted to heavy disadvantage with that of a Native State. There are thus very complicated motives at work, to make the restitution of the province a hateful idea to the Calcutta official. He will fight to the death to prevent it; and, unless we can interest Parliament in the wrong, he will succeed, unprincipled as his whole course has been. Now, these charges are specific and plain statements. They are either true or false, and Lord Hartington must be pressed for an explicit and categorical reply to each of them, when Parliament reassembles. We seized the provinces in 1853—the very cream of the Nizam's territories—upon the false pretence that the Prince owed us a debt of £400,000. It was false within the knowledge of our own officers, who were the instruments of the wrong. The Nizam owed us nothing. Had the accounts been made up honestly, we were debtors to him and his subjects, pillaged by our extortions to an enormous amount. We professed, however, that he owed us £400,000, and we long since paid ourselves the amount, out of the revenues we sequestrated for the purpose. But having got the territorial guarantee, we are determined, like good and honest men, not to give it back, although there is no pretence of any debt being owing now. On the contrary, and in spite of the most scandalous jobbery of the revenues, we have £400,000 in our hands that we pretend are the Cash balances of the provinces. The Nizam's Minister even offered to pay down a capital sum of money, the interest of which alone would suffice permanently to cover the cost of the Force we have dishonestly imposed upon the Prince; but the Calcutta officials declined to receive even that. It was not the £400,000 that was ever wanted by Calcutta; what they wanted was the territory. It was Naboth's vineyard that they coveted, and having got it, they will hold it at any expense whatever, to the national character and honour.

THE following Memorandum has been issued from the Military Department of the India Office:—The Secretary of State for India in Council has had under consideration the question of revising the scale of military pensions for European commissioned officers of the Indian Army, and a despatch, has been sent to the Government of India instructing them to issue a general order announcing the changes which have been decided on by him. For officers who entered the Staff Corps prior to or on the 12th of September, 1866, and for officers of the late Indian Cavalry and Infantry who have not joined the Staff Corps (commonly known as officers of the local service), both classes being entitled to succeed to colonels' allowances after twelve years of service as lieutenant-colonels, the revised pensions are:—

Years.						Pension.
After a service of 20	£288 yearly.
„ 24	420 „
„ 28	571 „
„ 32	783 „

For officers on what is called the General List—i.e., those who entered the service under new conditions of appointment, and who have not subsequently joined the Staff Corps, and for officers who have entered the Staff Corps since the 12th of September, 1866, both of which classes attain after thirty-eight years' service to a pension of £750 a year, with a further prospect at uncertain dates of succession to colonels' allowances on an establishment of one colonel's allowance to every thirty officers, the revised pensions are:—

Years.						Pensions.
After a service of 20	£250 yearly.
" 24	365 "
" 28	500 "
" 32	700 "
" 38 (as now)	750 "

Furlough service for these pensions will continue to be governed by the furlough regulations under which each officer may be serving. Officers will be allowed, under rules to be hereafter laid down, to commute at any period, on or after retirement, a portion, not exceeding one-third, of their pensions; the capitalized sum being payable in rupees in India, the sterling sum being converted at the official rate of exchange for the year in which the payment is made. Full power is reserved to the Secretary of State to temporarily suspend or limit retirement whenever it may appear to him necessary in the interest of the public service to do so. After the present year, the special terms of retirement for lieutenant-colonels of twenty-eight years' service and upwards will not be renewed. The new pensions come into effect from the 1st of July, 1881. The scale of pensions for officers thereafter joining the Staff Corps will shortly be issued. Regulations limiting the tenure of regimental commands and regimental service will also be notified at a very early date.

Few who read the Inaugural address of the late President of the United States, could have failed to be impressed with the moral stature of the man who has just been borne to his grave, amid the lamentations and mourning of the civilized world. It impressed ourselves very deeply, from the strange contrast which it presented to the ordinary conventional utterances of public men generally, on such occasions. There was true moral grandeur in the speech, an elevation of tone that revealed the deep seriousness of the speaker, and that spoke of his communion with Silence, and with the Eternities before and after us. A man's style, it has been said, is himself; and assuredly was it so in this case. Our people across the Atlantic have lost their King: the great man whom they bore aloft upon their arms, six short months ago. But there is room for neither pity nor sorrow. There were never such obsequies before in history; and the good he has accomplished in his death, to the people of both hemispheres, is literally incalculable. It has sensibly raised the moral standard of the civilized world. "To promote the welfare of this great people, I reverently invoke the support and blessing of Almighty God." Such were the closing words of the Inaugural address. The prayer was heard, but the blessing invoked thereby has been scattered over all people.

HOLKAR AND THE SALT LINE.

EVERY one knows, we suppose, that the Government of India raises a large part of its revenue from a very heavy Customs' duty upon imported salt, and a proportionately heavy excise upon salt manufactured within the country itself. Now the great source from which the Native States of Rajpootana and of Central India used to draw their supplies, were the great Sambhur Salt Lake, in the territory of the Maharajah of Jaipur, and other certain lands in Marwar and elsewhere. The cost of this salt was very small, as there was little or no duty upon its manufacture. To prevent this cheap salt being smuggled into British territory, we drew a vast cordon, or Customs' line, round the Native States, across which no salt was permitted to pass into our territory. The line was a device of our own, to protect our revenue in the neighbourhood of these States, as the excessive cheapness of the Sambhur and other salt would otherwise have driven it out of the market. The Native States were in no way answerable for the line.

Permitting no transit duties in any part of India where, by pressure upon the Native States, we could enforce their abandonment, we were ourselves transgressors of the greatest magnitude against our own principle. We had maintained a great Southern Customs' Line for the same purpose, in addition to the Rajpootana and Central India Line, while we imposed a gigantic transit duty upon the opium manufactured in Malwa, that simply sought right of way through our territory to the port of Bombay on its way to China. It is necessary to understand these facts clearly, as no honest action could be taken in the matter towards the Native States, while ignoring them. *We* were the transgressors. It was for our profit that the lines existed. Vexatious and intolerable as was the evil, and productive of wide-spread demoralization, the Native States were not answerable for it in the least. Permitted by us to levy no transit duties on their own frontiers, where we could prevent it, we subjected them to an almost fabulous transit duty upon any salt they might attempt to import into our territories, or to obtain from our own salt-pans in Bombay; while, on the other hand, we levied the enormous duty of Rs.600 per chest upon any opium they attempted to pass through British territory for shipment to China. We approached, therefore, the question of abolishing these salt lines with hands as dirty as they well could be, and it was the suggestion of simple fairness, the requirement of plain morality, that if sacrifices had to be made to carry their abolition, it was *we*, and not the Native Princes, who should make them. We had done them a wrong, that we should have regarded as intolerable if offered to ourselves; we should not, indeed, have endured it for a moment. We imposed an enormous transit duty upon their opium seeking a right of way to China through our territory, and if we justified it on the ground that it was a poisonous drug, the reply was that we imposed an equally onerous duty upon necessities of life in salt and sugar. No position could be more false, more unfortunate altogether, than that in which we stood. On the one hand, we were constantly denouncing the imposition of such duties

by the Native States, however moderate, as intolerable, and as a violation of good neighbourhood. By incessant pressure upon the Princes, we had suppressed such duties altogether, wherever we had the power, while maintaining transit duties of our own of a weight never before heard of in the world. The Native States did not dare to remonstrate, and in this country the facts were unknown. We have frequently called attention in India to the disagreeable fact upon which we are commenting, but never remember to have seen it noticed, either in India or in this country, outside our own columns. We instance it now to show how profoundly ignorant are Parliament, Press, and nation alike of the facts of our rule. The Southern Salt Line was got rid of in 1874 without very much difficulty. The opium transit duty still exists, and without a thought of abolishing it, the evils incident thereto being reduced to a minimum by the system of "passes," which has long been established for the exaction of the duty. The great Salt Line of Rajpootana and Central India was *the* difficulty to be surmounted, and it is upon the recent abolition of this line that Parliament and the nation have been challenged to admire the administrative skill of Sir John Strachey, and the instruments by whom the measure was carried under Lord Lytton's reign. We have repeatedly complained in these columns, that the departments at Simlah, where most of our administrative crimes are hatched, systematically conceal from Parliament the true character of their proceedings. It has been so in the case of this Salt Line. The India Office, to this hour, has no knowledge whatever of what has been done, although Sir John Strachey's measures have given rise to the deepest resentment throughout the Native States of Rajpootana and Central India; while Parliament is told, with the utmost hardihood, that those measures were carried with the willing consent and co-operation of the Native Princes.

The initiative for getting rid of the Salt Line was taken by His Highness the Maharajah Holkar, in the year 1874, and the proposals submitted by Holkar's Minister, the well-known Sir T. Madhava Rao, were so enlightened and so statesmanlike, that they ought to have commanded instant and full approval by the Government of India. The proposals were as follows:—

MEMO. BY SIR T. MADHAVA RAO.

The system under which Sayer or Customs' duties are levied in these territories is not much in advance of the old Maratha one. It is far from having reference to scientific principles of taxation, and cannot but impede the growth of trade.

2. The system then imperatively calls for reform.
3. It has to be replaced by one better defined, more simple, more uniform, and far more equitable.
4. The subject is engaging my earnest attention, and, though beset with grave difficulties, I hope it may be successfully grappled with under proper encouragement and assistance.
5. I may briefly mention some of the leading principles I aim at carrying out.
 - (a) Food grains to be generally free.
 - (b) Necessaries to be taxed less than luxuries.
 - (c) A few classes of goods only to be liable to taxation.
 - (d) Places of levy to be as few as possible.
 - (e) Rates of levy to be uniform and intelligible.
 - (f) Transit duty to be abolished, only reserving to us the equitable right to levy a toll, fair and moderate, for the use of roads made at our expense and protected by our police.

6. To the extent these principles are approached trade will benefit, and the benefit will not be confined to these territories; it will extend to neighbouring territories also.

7. It is clear, however, that the reform I contemplate cannot be carried out without considerable loss of revenue; and as improved and improving administration has already entailed much additional expenditure on His Highness's treasury, and this expenditure must still increase, I am not in a position to ask His Highness to sacrifice much revenue in the Sayer Department for the sake of the reforms I have in view.

8. Auxious, however, as I am to carry out these reforms, and thereby to bring about the development of trade (especially in reference to the railway approaching completion), I am in need of some external help. I think I may venture to suggest how the British Government may, if it feels disposed, grant us some help.

9. I may promise that, as part of the system to be substituted for the existing one, I would propose to DERIVE A SPECIAL REVENUE FROM SALT.

10. To enable us to derive a special revenue from salt, we must have salt at PRIME COST.

11. The assistance I seek at the hands of the British Government is in reference to our obtaining salt from the Bombay pans at prime cost—at the cost at which Bombay salt is permitted by the British Government to be exported beyond the limits of British India.

12. In other words, the British Government to permit us to purchase salt at the Bombay pans at prime cost, and TO BRING IT INTO OUR TERRITORIES FREE OF BRITISH DUTY.

13. Would the British Government be a loser by this cause? I think not; on the contrary, it would gain. I will endeavour to show how this is.

14. The salt now consumed in these territories does not come from British India, but comes from native territories, such as Marwar, Jeypore, &c. Hence, it cannot be said, that, by the course proposed, the British Government would lose any of its present revenue.

15. As the salt from Bombay would come entirely by rail, there would be no chance of abuses during transit from Bombay to these territories, such as might injure British revenue.

16. We might bind ourselves to sell the salt at a profit NOT LESS than that of the British Indian monopoly. This condition would effectually prevent the return of the salt into British territory, and it might be understood that the railway should not CARRY BACK the salt once brought into our territory.

17. While the British Government would thus not be a loser, I hold it would GAIN.

18. The manufacture of salt at Bombay would feel it an advantage to have a new market thus opened for it in these territories.

19. The railway would gain by the amount of additional work thus given it.

20. The salt revenue of the adjacent British territories would be effectually protected against the encroachment of the cheap salt now in use in these territories, and which comes from Jeypore, &c. Such advantage would be the result of our engaging to equalize our rates of profit on salt with those of British India.

21. It thus strikes me that the assistance I seek might be given by the British Government without difficulty of any kind, and even with positive advantage. The measure seems to promise benefit to all parties. I hope I am not greatly mistaken.

22. I am the more induced to seek this aid because I am at a loss to find

the means of compensation in other directions. I mean compensation for the losses which the proposed reforms in the Sayer (Customs) involve. The British Government already taxes our opium very high, and realizes a revenue of upwards of ten millions per annum. In these circumstances, the aid sought seems comparatively trifling.

23. If, on consideration, the plan generally meets with favour, I should be prepared to discuss it more thoroughly and more in detail with any authorities the British Government may be pleased to refer me to.

24. If the plan in its more matured shape prove acceptable to the British Government and to His Highness the Maharajah, considerable advantage may accrue from the same. I submit my own views here as a mere preliminary.

16th November, 1874.

Now, this memo. was kept back from the Government of India, by the Resident, Sir Henry Daly, but the proposals contained therein seem to have commended themselves at once to Lord Northbrook, when brought to his attention by Holkar himself personally, some time afterwards. The proposals were simplicity itself. The Native States were to make the supply of salt to their subjects, a Government monopoly, raising the price to the same rates that prevailed in the British territories that surrounded them. The Customs' Line would then be unnecessary; the British revenue would remain intact by the Native States imitating its monopoly. But the step was not to be thought of, unless existing taxation in the Native States upon other commodities was remitted to an equivalent extent; and to enable them to do this, they must, of course, themselves receive the revenue arising from the new impost.

Lord Northbrook introduced the matter to the notice of the Legislative Council early in 1875, in the following terms:—

We have been able already to remove the Southern Customs' Line [we shall have something to say about this afterwards.—*Ed. S.*]; but all those who have paid attention to the subject know that the Northern Customs' Line cannot be removed until arrangements are made with the Native States of Rajpootana and Central India, where salt is produced; for if the line was removed without such precautions, salt would be introduced into British territory without having paid the tax [*i.e.*, the immense excise levied upon salt by ourselves.—*Ed. S.*], and our salt revenue—which, in my opinion, is one of the soundest sources of revenue in India—would be seriously affected. I am happy to inform Members of Council that I see hopes—indeed, I may say that I anticipate with confidence—that arrangements may be made which will enable us to overcome this difficulty. One of the most distinguished of the Princes of India, the Maharajah Holkar, is now on a visit to Calcutta. I have had the pleasure of some conversation with His Highness upon the subject, and I am happy to be able to say that so far as the State of Indore is concerned, I believe we shall be able to make a satisfactory arrangement.

We ask the reader to look attentively at the last few words of this extract. Holkar was the first of the Princes to volunteer assistance to us in the abolition of the line; and so pleased was Lord Northbrook with the nature of his proposals that he told the Council confidently, that the Government would be able to make a satisfactory arrangement with his State at all events. We have seen what the Maharajah's proposals really were, and it is impossible to speak too highly of them. The history introduces us, at this point, to a most characteristic incident of our system of rule. Holkar's memo., it will be observed, was drawn up by his Minister in November, 1874, and it is thoroughly characteristic of the whole character of our rule that Sir Henry Daly, the Resident, took no notice of it whatever. It was left to Holkar to bring the proposals himself personally to

Lord Northbrook's notice, months after they had been submitted to the Resident, and by him treated as beneath his notice. At all events, we find Mr. Aitchison, the Foreign Secretary, writing privately from Simlah on the 7th June, 1875, to Sir Henry Daly as follows:—

MY DEAR DALY,—I have received your demi-official of the 14th April last, enclosing a memo. by Sir Madhava Rao, in which he requested to be allowed to purchase salt at the Bombay pans at prime cost, and to bring it into Indore territory free of British duty, as an inducement to the Maharajah to do away with the system of customs and transit dues now obtaining in his dominions. Lord Northbrook thinks that the memo. of Sir Madhava Rao is satisfactory in so far as it shows that there may, under certain eventualities, be a probability of making some arrangement as to the salt duties by which the British Government may be enabled to withdraw its Customs' Line, and the Maharajah to get rid of his transit duties. But such an arrangement must be connected entirely with the Rajpootana salt, and not with that which is imported into Indore from Bombay. To make any arrangements for the distribution of part of the salt tax levied in British territories between Native States into which such taxed salt is imported, would open other questions of taxation in Native States with which the Government of India has no wish to interfere, and would *fetter the freedom of the Maharajah as to his general financial administration*, which the Government of India in no way desires to do. Further communications will be addressed to you on this subject when any proposal can be made which gives promise of success.—Yours sincerely,

Foreign Department, Simlah, 7th June, 1875.

C. U. AITCHISON.

The letter deserves to be preserved in the British Museum, as a specimen of the honourable spirit in which we are to-day ruling India. Conceived in the spirit of that philosophy which teaches us that language was given us to conceal our thoughts, the letter affords a most instructive contrast to the memo. of the native statesman, to which it professes to be a reply. "The proposals of the native Minister were simplicity itself. A child may understand them; but the Indian Foreign Secretary cannot. He so far mistakes them, that he even thinks their acceptance by us, would "*fetter the freedom of the Maharajah as to his general financial administration*," which the great and generous British Government "*in no way desires to do.*" The letter is unintelligible; but it was not meant to be understood. It was intended to bury the native Minister's suggestion in a cloud of untruthful suggestion—that its proposals were impracticable, and would prove hurtful to the independence of the Prince. It is characteristic down to the ground, of what our rule of India has come to be. There is neither manliness nor honesty in any department of it. It is expediency and selfishness throughout.

This most statesmanlike paper had, in the first place, been pigeon-holed by the Resident upon his receiving it. Sir Henry Daly was, of course, too big a man to regard any proposals of Holkar's Minister as worth the notice of "his Residentsip;" and so the memo. was pigeon-holed, we say, "recorded," as they call it—for six months, and would never have been heard of at all, but for Holkar's visit to Calcutta in March, 1875, affording Lord Northbrook "the pleasure of some conversation with His Highness upon the subject." The existence of Sir T. Madhava Rao's memorandum was now heard of for the first time; and on the 14th April, as we learn from Mr. Aitchison's private letter of 7th June above, that great and distinguished man, Sir Henry Daly, discovered it in his office, and forwarded it, not to the Government of India, but to his friend Mr. Aitchison, in that convenient but most mischievous form known as "demi-official" correspondence. And so this most important State paper, that ought to have arrested the attention of the Resident at once, and been brought by him instantly to the notice of the Government of India, was received with contempt, and treated as waste paper. It is this despising of the

people, the treating them as of no account, that makes the iron enter so deeply into their soul. By the side of Sir T. Madhava Rao, Sir Henry Daly is a small man, a very small man; but you will never get insight of *that* order into the breast of the Indian official. The fact that he is Resident makes him wiser, stronger, abler, than the intellectual but quiet native Minister. We are dealing with a serious evil of our administration. Instead of Sir Henry Daly being called upon to report the reasons which induced him to pigeon-hole this most statesmanlike memorandum, he is simply asked by the Foreign Secretary if "he knows anything about it," when it is disinterred from the burial to which he had consigned it, without remark of any kind upon the carelessness and want of insight with which he had viewed it. While this supercilious indifference to, and disregard of, Native opinion is tolerated on the part of our "officials," there can never be any sympathy between ourselves and the people of the country. Sir Henry Daly was too busy contrasting the merits of British rule with the defects, imaginary or real, of Native administration, or dilating upon the personal peculiarities of the Native Princes, to pay the least attention to the merits of a proposal, the very suspicion of its possessing any, being too foreign to his mind to find entrance thereto.

And this unpleasant incident introduces us to another. The careful reader will hardly want his attention directed to the peculiar and unsatisfactory character of Mr. Aitchison's reply. Nothing could possibly have been more simple, more direct, more natural in every way than Madhava Rao's proposals. Not a hint or suggestion of any kind did they convey that the interference of the British Government was courted in the internal administration of the Native States. And yet observe the reply:—

To make any arrangements for the distribution of part of the salt tax levied in British territories between Native States into which such taxed salt is imported, would open other questions of taxation in Native States with which the Government of India has no wish to interfere, and would fetter the freedom of the Maharajah as to his general financial administration, which the Government of India in no way desires to do. Further communications will be addressed to you on this subject when any proposal can be made which gives promise of success.

We read Mr. Aitchison's reply with a feeling akin to despair. It is unintelligible, to begin with; but, worse than that, it is dishonest. With a proposal of the utmost simplicity before him—a proposal which not merely gave "promise of success," but the honest acceptance of which meant unqualified, complete success—Mr. Aitchison sees at a glance that it will not suit the purpose *we* cherished of making the abandonment of the Line profitable at the expense of the Native States. He is not honest enough to say so, and therefore takes refuge in a cloud of words that have no meaning whatever, and concludes by falsely suggesting that the proposal "gives no promise of success." No promise of success to what? To the sinister and immoral purpose of making a gain out of the abandonment of our sin. It is very difficult to write dispassionately upon characteristic disclosures of this order. *We* did not want an honest and upright settlement of the difficulty. What *we* wanted was to throw the net of the British salt excise over the subjects of the Native States; and as Holkar's proposal laid the axe at the root of *that* project, the proposals of his Minister "gave no promise of success," in Mr. Aitchison's eyes. It is most mournful. Mr. Aitchison is a man of pure personal character, and we have sometimes thought that the very worst symptom of our Indian rule, is the way in which it seems to deaden the moral sense of the very best men who are committed to its

administration. Mr. Aitchison is even a religious man, a good man, and in private life everything that is to be respected—a goer to prayer-meetings, an elder of the Kirk, and we know not what else; but he has no moral sense in dealing as an Indian official with the Princes of India. No more harsh, unsympathizing, unjust man has ever filled the Secretaryship of the Foreign Office. He does not seem to know what justice towards Native Princes means. At all events, it is a kind of "justice" unrecognized by that name in Europe. It is justice of the order that Sir Bartle Frere exemplifies so strikingly. Mr. Aitchison's whole course to Holkar, has been one long act of the harshest and most determined injustice. Our hand *must* be laid upon him, because it is *he* who, since his succession to Sir Henry Durand, who trained him, has been its author;—he and no other; while it is most difficult to reconcile its display with that real private worth of character we desire so sincerely to allow.

Sir T. Madhava Rao now left Indore, being appointed early in 1875 to undertake the administration of the Baroda State, under the new Gaikwar during his minority. With his disappearance from Indore, the wise and enlightened policy suggested by him disappeared too. In the next glimpse we get of the negotiations, we see the officials of the Calcutta Government straining every nerve to get rid of the obnoxious Salt Line in *their* honest way—namely, at the expense of the Native States. From Sir John Strachey downwards, there was but one settled idea—to make the abolition of the Line—the abandonment of our own sin—the occasion of a profit to the Treasury. The net of our Excise was to be thrown over many millions of the subjects of the Native States, without compensation to *them* of any kind, by an equivalent remission of other taxation. Now began a long course of hectoring, cajoling, wheedling, bribing—for what *they* thought success, what they call success, and would have us regard as success. Well, if gain is godliness, they have had success; but if the counsels they adopted, and the course they followed, are to be judged by any standard of morals other than Indian, they deserve nothing but unqualified condemnation. Holkar's interest in the affair is an episode only. The papers not bearing to be published, we have striven in vain to get access to them. We applied for them, again and again, before we left India in 1879. They will not bear the light, and are therefore labelled "confidential." If Parliament is moved for their production, there will be the same reply: they are "confidential;" in other words, they are "disgraceful," and therefore cannot be produced.

We are, therefore, at this disadvantage. The information we possess is so fragmentary, owing to the refusal of the authorities in India to publish the "papers," that we cannot lay before our readers a complete history of the negotiations. We knew enough, however, to be quite sure of their general character. The memorandum of Sir T. Madhava Rao was ignored, and heavy pressure brought to bear steadily upon the Native States of Central India and Rajpootana, to compel them to accept, not Sir T. Madhava Rao's enlightened views, but our own sinister and interested policy. That policy was to obtain possession of the principal sources of supply in Rajpootana, from which the people of Central India had been obtaining salt at nominal cost, and to suppress its manufacture everywhere else. The main source of supply was the Sambhur Salt Lake, belonging to the Maharajah of Jeypore. That the steps by which possession of this lake was finally secured to ourselves, were of a character that does not bear to be published, we affirm on the distinct assurance of the late Maharajah, made to us personally, in 1878. The distress of the Prince when narrating to us the story, was, extreme, and we are as sure, as of our existence, that

if Parliament were exactly informed of what was done in *his* case, it would visit every actor in the business with the severest censure. The policy of the Finance and Foreign Departments was to obtain possession of every source of salt supply in the Native States, and to levy our enormous excise at the fountain-head of each, suppressing the minor places of manufacture altogether. This oppressive policy was deliberately adopted, for the honourable purpose of throwing the net of our Excise over all the subjects of the Native States. The subjects of the Indore State had up to this time, drawn their supply mainly from the Sambhar Lake, but matters were so advanced by March, 1876, that we find Holkar in negotiation with the Government of India at that date for the future supply of his subjects from Bombay. From a letter of Sir Henry Daly to the Maharajah, dated 22nd March, 1876, we make the following extract:—

His Excellency (the Viceroy) explained to your Highness that the Government had fixed Rs.2 4a. per maund as the lowest price at which Baragara salt [salt from the Bombay Government.—ED.] could be sold or delivered at Indore. The price is so low, compared with that at which it is sold in British territories, that the Government does not bind itself to sell at this price for a longer period than one year, *that they may see by the result whether this salt can be profitably smuggled back.*

The italics are ours. Holkar naturally inferred, and was plainly intended to infer, that if no such smuggling back resulted from the price being fixed at Rs.2 4a., the supply would be continued at that rate. Sir Henry Daly added:—

The Viceroy was desirous that your Highness, with the rail at Indore, should be the first to benefit by the measure. If you find the profits small, which I can hardly believe possible, of course *your demands will be regulated accordingly.*

The plain inference, from the words we have italicized, again was that the quantity which the Prince might require, or indent for, was a matter to be determined by himself. In strict accordance with this interpretation, the Collector of salt revenue at Bombay had written to Sir Henry Daly on the 13th of the same month as follows:—

I have the honour to inform you that I have now received the sanction of Government to supply salt at the price of Rs.2 4a. to His Highness Holkar, and, as already intimated to you by telegraph, any indents from him will be complied with. As I understand that His Highness's indents are likely to be large, I would request, for convenience, that the salt be obtained in tolerably regular quantities, either daily or on alternate days, or weekly, according to the extent of the demand. Very large indents presented suddenly are likely to embarrass the establishment.

Not a hint of any kind was given that the supply was to be restricted in quantity. The Collector, knowing that the salt was for the supply of the Indore State, believed and expected that the indents would be very large. As a fact, Holkar himself; Sir Henry Daly; the Resident; the Salt Collector; and the Government of India itself, believed and intended that Holkar was to indent for whatever quantity of salt was required by the State at the price of Rs.2 4a. per maund, which price was to be permanent if, at the end of one year's trial, it was found that the salt could not be "smuggled back" into British territory at that price. The year ran out, and on the 13th October, 1877, the next year, we find Sir Henry Daly writing to His Highness from Simlah as follows:—

I am glad to inform your Highness that the salt arrangement will remain in force with your Highness for another year, and I trust at the expiry of that time a further extension may be possible. The only condition attached to the continuance of the arrangement is, that no more salt shall be taken than is necessary for consumption in your Highness's territory. I have great pleasure in communicating this to you.

The arrangement accordingly went on; but the negotiations with the other States, particularly with Jeypore, were now complete, or nearly so, and the screw might consequently be put upon Holkar without his being able to help himself. The British Government had at last, in a respectable and neighbourly way, got possession of every source of supply round him, and so in March, 1878—but six months later—His Highness the Maharajah finds that his supply has been peremptorily stopped altogether. Salt is a prime necessary of life—what of that? His Highness is at last to learn that he is at the mercy of his honourable neighbour; and so, instead of a supply restricted only by the consumption of his subjects, and at the price of Rs. 2 4a. per maund, he finds himself suddenly warned that the Government of India will supply him *this once only* with 33,000 maunds to meet immediate wants, but at Rs. 3 per maund instead of Rs. 2 4a. as heretofore. And on the 6th March, 1878, we find the Government of India writing, by the hand of Mr. Secretary Batten, to the Government of Bombay as follows:—

Calcutta, 6th March, 1878.

I am to request that no further supply of salt to His Highness the Maharajah of Indore at Rs. 3 per maund, or at any other rate involving a reduction of duty below Rs. 2 8a. per maund, may be permitted without a previous reference to the Government of India, *as such a supply might interfere with the arrangements in course of negotiation for taxing Rujpootana salt at the places of production.*

The negotiations with Jeypore, &c., were now complete. Holkar was at their mercy, and the mask could be thrown off. We might enlarge upon the scandalous discourtesy of the proceeding. Holkar had been now for two years dependent upon the Bombay Government for the supply of this first necessary of life to his subjects, when, without notice, warning, or negotiation of any kind, the supply is stopped. With the most cynical and absolute contempt for his interests, or the interests of his subjects, it is avowed, in the words we have italicized, that as the supply might possibly interfere with some interested arrangements of our own, the understanding with him is over and at an end.

We now open the final chapter of the story. On the 18th March, 1878, we find the First Assistant to the Agent at Indore, addressing Holkar's Minister as follows:—

With regard to the rise in the price from Rs. 2 4a. to Rs. 3 per maund, I am desired to draw attention to Sir Henry Daly's letters of 14th and 22nd March, 1876, in which it was clearly explained that the rate Rs. 2 4a. per maund was guaranteed only one year from date, and that the Government of India could not bind itself to sell at this price for more than one year.

The fact is suppressed that the arrangement was made for a year only, simply for the purpose of ascertaining whether the salt could be smuggled back at the price of Rs. 2 4a., and that no such smuggling having taken place, Holkar was entitled to believe the price would be permanent. Not one word, moreover, is said as to any restriction of the supply he may require.

At this point there is a break in the information we possess, and we do not

catch the thread again for two years. But on the 21st June, 1880, we find the Maharajah being addressed by the Resident as follows :—

Indore Residency, 21st June, 1880.

The Agent to the Governor-General has much pleasure in notifying to His Highness the Maharajah that the Government of India has sanctioned a measure for the supply of salt to the Indore State on somewhat similar terms to those proposed by His Highness, and adopted as an experiment during the Viceroyalty of Lord Northbrook.

In consideration of the abolition by His Highness of all dues on salt covered by a pass from the officers of the Inland Customs while in transit through Indore territory, the Government of India will supply annually at Indore 45,000 maunds of salt, or such quantity less than that as may be indented for, at Rs.2 12a. per maund.

A draft of an agreement which will be executed by the Agent to the Governor-General and His Highness, and ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy, is attached, and I am desired to request that you will signify the Maharajah's assent to the terms named.

Sir Henry Daly congratulates His Highness on the advantageous terms offered to him by the Government of India.

(Draft Agreement enclosed.)

In consideration of the abolition by His Highness Maharajah Holkar of all dues upon salt while in transit through his territories, the Government of India agrees to deliver annually at Indore 45,000 maunds of salt, at a cost of Rs. 2 12a. per maund, or such quantity of salt at that price as may be indented for during the year within the limit of 45,000 maunds.

This is the ultimatum to which the matter has at last drifted; and to Sir Henry Daly, its terms seem "somewhat similar to those proposed by His Highness" during the Viceroyalty of Lord Northbrook! Holkar, meanwhile, had reformed his Sayer Department, *on the faith of the revenue he was to derive from salt supplied to his State at Rs.2 4a. per maund.* He is to abolish all transit duty upon salt passing through his territory, while we retain our own gigantic duty of the same order; and, in return for all, he is congratulated on "the advantageous terms offered to him by the Government of India." What wonder that he could not see it! He knows, however, with whom he has to deal, and his Minister replies humbly, as follows :—

Indore, 1st July, 1880.

In reply, I am commanded by His Highness the Maharajah to state that His Highness cannot be sure that 45,000 maunds of salt will fully meet the demand for consumption in our territory. . . . Should the actual quantity required be within this limit, the Durbar will have no occasion to ask for more; but His Highness considers it advisable that in framing the agreement the opposite contingency should not be lost sight of, and I am therefore desired to suggest that the last clause of the agreement may run as follows: "or such quantity of salt at that price as may be indented for during the year; provided always that if the quantity indented for during any year be in excess of the limit of 45,000 maunds, the Durbar shall certify that the same is absolutely required for *bond fide* consumption within His Highness's territories." I hope that this suggestion will meet with Sir Henry Daly's approval.

The Maharajah thus gave way as to the price of the salt. Instead of prime cost, or even Rs.2 4a. per maund, he agrees in his despair to pay the Rs.2 12a., and simply asks that his State may be supplied with the quantity actually required thereby for home consumption, at that rate. What the exact position is to-day we do not know; but, so recently as June last, Sir Lepel Griffin was urging the draft agreement upon His Highness's acceptance without any modification of its terms whatever. And we are everywhere ruling India to-day in this grasping and unworthy spirit. The Government dare not publish the true story of these

salt negotiations. We get glimpses into their true character by accident, now and again, as we have in the present case. Parliament must be moved next session to take the matter up, and insist upon knowing exactly what has been done.

The victims are Holkar's subjects, Holkar being moreover cheated by his respectable and powerful allies. Instead of honestly supplying the Indore State with whatever quantity of salt is required therein, at *prime cost*, leaving Holkar to take the excise under treaty, and *binding him to remit an equivalent amount of taxation, as Sir T. Madhava Rao desired*, our officials determined to make a good thing of it. The cynical disregard shown in it for the interests of the millions of people victimized by these proceedings, is amazing. Contrast Sir T. Madhava Rao's single-minded proposal with the course that has been followed. And Sir T. Madhava Rao is a Hindu statesman. We are Christians!

Holkar is a proud and sensitive Prince, and feels keenly the long injustice of our course towards him in other matters, and the steadfast refusal of the Calcutta Government to undo the wrong which has embittered his mind for the last twenty years. And now this salt business comes on the top of it; and let his opinion of our bad faith be as strong as it may, it is justified by the facts. We are compelling him, by these arrangements, to take the whole supply of salt required by his subjects from ourselves. We bind him to allow no manufacture of salt within his own territories, and compel his people to draw their supply from ourselves, raising the price from the low rates at which they have hitherto been accustomed to obtain it, to an equality with the high rates charged in our own territory. Now it was *he* and his Minister, Sir T. Madhava Rao, who proposed this way of abolishing the Salt Line—that sin of our own against our subjects and his own. But then he accompanied it with the equitable and wise stipulation that we should abandon to *him* the duty upon the salt consumed by his subjects, that he might remit a number of imposts he was levying (after old Mahratta customs) to an equivalent amount. The suggestion was a wise and statesmanlike proposal. All we were asked to do was to make no gain by the abandonment of our sin. Holkar wanted (as did Jeypore) to take burdens off his people, equal to the new salt excise he was to impose upon them to suit our purposes. And they have “jockeyed” him down to this: that for the enormous gain to us of getting the Salt Line done away with, and our excise net thrown over all his subjects, he is to be allowed the privilege of receiving 45,000 maunds a-year of salt from the Bombay Government at the rate of Rs. 2 12a. per maund! [The cost price is about 3 annas per maund.—ED.] Observe his position under this generous arrangement. His people are said to number 650,000, but the estimate must be too low, as his revenue is fifty-five lakhs a-year. However, take it to be the 650,000 of the Census. The consumption in his State will then be—

650,000 × 15 lbs. a year = 115,000 maunds.

To this must be added the quantity required for stock and agricultural uses. Indore being a wealthy State, the consumption of salt is probably not less than 150,000 maunds a-year, and in all likelihood a great deal more. Now what we ought to have done, as honest neighbours and rulers, in asking Holkar to take his salt from us, was to offer him the 150,000 maunds at its actual cost price to ourselves on the Indore border, binding him to charge the same price for it that was prevailing in our territories around him. This would have given *him* the excise, and enabled him to do as he suggested, namely, get rid of a lot of imposts that vexed his subjects, and that might be remitted as an equivalent to them for the immense enhancement in the price of salt.

Instead of this, we cut down the allowance we give him to 45,000 maunds, and instead of charging prime cost for it, or even Rs. 2 4a. per maund, we charge him Rs. 2 12a. And there has been "haggling" for years over the question, Shall the price of the 45,000 maunds be Rs. 2 12a. or Rs. 2 4a.? The Prince has been obliged by steady pressure to give up the idea of relieving his subjects to the extent to which the new impost burdens them, and to confine his efforts to obtaining *one-third* of the supply he requires, at eight annas per maund lower price than they want to charge him for it. And Sir Lepel Griffin, the present Resident, ventures to talk of the Prince having got so much the best of the bargain that it ought to be revised in the interests of the Government of India! This is the spirit in which we are to-day ruling the whole country. Will Parliament continue to tolerate it?

THE MYSORE JEWELS.

Six months have now elapsed since Lord Hartington announced, on the 23rd of March last, in answer to a question put to him by Mr. W. M. Torrens, M.P. for Finsbury, that papers relating to the affairs of the Mysore State were being printed, and would be presented to Parliament. Our latest inquiries give us reason to believe that the Blue-book will make its appearance within a week, but we must confess to some disappointment at not being able to notice its contents in *THE STATESMAN* for this month.

Pending the publication of these papers, which we await with much interest, we may, however, throw some light on the condition of the case, as affected by events and proceedings at Bangalore in the last six months. We have now been protesting against the conduct of affairs in Mysore, and against the arrangements for the Maharajah's installation on attaining his majority, for more than a year, to all outward appearance ineffectually and fruitlessly. Those arrangements have, at any rate for the time being, been carried out. The very peculiar Dewanship, which was in process of incubation all through Mr. (now Sir) J. D. Gordon's incumbency, may not be quite so secure or durable as it looks, or as it was hoped to make it. It may be that our efforts have not been quite so ineffectual, or so fruitless, as they for the moment appear. Reports and explanations accepted and endorsed by very high authority, may strike higher authority still as being inadequate, inconclusive, and illusory, although it may be quite impossible to prefer officious and irregular counsels to official declarations, or for us to do more than indicate manifest defects in the information supplied, and suggest further inquiry.

In our frequent comments on the prevalent scandal regarding depredations in the Mysore jewel-room, and on the nomination of Mr. C. Rungacharloo, for more than ten years Controller of the Palace, to be the Maharajah's Dewan, without any real explanation having been given of the facts to which we called attention, all that we have ever demanded was that there should be a special and independent investigation. There has been no such investigation since we made our first remonstrance in the *Calcutta Statesman* on the 7th of April last year. Twice over, there has been a so-called

explanation and a show of inquiry,—on the 29th of July, 1880, in the form of a joint report by Mr. Gordon and Mr. Rungacharloo; and on the 18th of December, 1880, in the form of a report from the same authorities, fortified by the signature of three subordinate officials. Mr. Gordon himself on the last-mentioned occasion described the principle, if we can call it so, on which the pretended inquiry had been instituted and conducted. He seriously announced that “specific statements as to losses”—that is to say, scandalous rumours as to depredations—having been made, he had met those specific statements by combining all the persons, whom they more or less affected, into a Committee to give them a general and unverified contradiction. The subject of doubt and suspicion being the present value of the jewels compared with their value as estimated by Colonel Elliot’s jury of experts in 1868, this Committee of self-exculpation did not have them valued at all, but galloped in eight days through a task that occupied Colonel Elliot six weeks, and Mr. Gordon in 1872 for two months. The necessity for special and independent inquiry has become more imperative than ever for the Imperial honour.

For, delusive and inconclusive as were the explanatory proceedings of last year, they threw some light on the subject, that has but heightened the conviction in the minds of those who were not purposely hoodwinked, that some real investigation was urgently demanded. Many grounds for suspicion have been confirmed, none dispelled: many admissions unavoidably and unintentionally made. For example, the proceedings of the packed Committee assembled by Mr. Gordon in October last, revealed another important deficiency in that very collection of jewels allotted to the late widowed Ranee, Chundra Vilasa, which was in Mr. C. Rungacharloo’s personal charge, and in which deficiencies had already been detected. A diamond bracelet, recorded in the register of 1868 by Colonel Elliot as of the value of Rs. 5,000, is now discovered to be worth no more than about Rs. 2,000. A deficiency of twenty-four diamonds out of a packet of thirty-eight, is also made known in the report of this Committee.

We have learned, moreover, for a certainty, what we had only surmised before, that the “great number of inaccuracies” in Colonel Elliot’s catalogue, discovered by Mr. Gordon in 1872, was never officially made known by him to any one, until some of them were accidentally detected in 1877. Neither Mr. Gordon’s official note, dated the 5th of September, 1877, in which he mentioned having found a “great number of inaccuracies,” in 1872, nor the joint report of Colonel Malleson and Mr. Rungacharloo, dated the 22nd

of December, 1874, utterly irreconcilable therewith, and declaring that "the accuracy of the original lists" was "remarkably proved by the absence of even a single error in the whole of this complicated property,"—can ever have been communicated to the Government of India.

If there was ever any doubt as to the fact of Mr. Gordon's pregnant note of the 5th of September, 1877, never having emerged from the local records until published by us, it would have been set at rest by certain proceedings of Mr. Gordon that some time ago came to our notice. They are dated Bangalore, 14th March, 1881, and refer to the summary dismissal from the service, after twenty-three years' service, of B. Ramaswamy Iyengar, Sheristadar in the Residency Department of Mysore, on a charge of having "divulged the official records," on which the Memorandum on the Mysore Jewels, which appeared in the *Calcutta Statesman* on the 7th April last year, was founded. We pass by Sir James Gordon's incidental charge against ourselves in the first paragraph of his Order, of having, "with the aid of garbled quotations, attempted to weave for a political purpose a malicious story of spoliation." We had, certainly, and still have, "a political purpose" in these disclosures, but it is neither personal nor "malicious," and is not susceptible of being shaken or weakened by vague vituperation.

Now, in paragraph 12 of the proceedings in this case, we notice that while "copies of Captain Wilson's letter," dated 21st August, 1877, were forwarded to the Deputy Accountant-General at Bangalore, that he might make corrections according to its purport in the list of Palace jewels kept in his office, no copy of Mr. Gordon's important note was sent to him. For "Mr. Gordon's demi-official note of 5th September, 1877," we are told in this paragraph, was "in the Residency office, and existed nowhere else."

As, therefore, it was necessary in September, 1877, to inform the Deputy Accountant-General of the discrepancies that had been found between the estimated and the actual value of the jewels, and to instruct him to correct his list, our statement is completely verified, that in 1872, when Mr. Gordon, in his own words, found "a great number of such inaccuracies," he made them known to nobody. If he had made them known, the corrections must have been made then, which Mr. Hudson, the Deputy Accountant-General, was not required to make until five years had elapsed. Colonel Malleson's letter of 24th December, 1874, shows also that he had never heard, either from Mr. Gordon or from Mr. Rungacharloo, of any corrections having been made, or of any inaccuracies having been discovered.

Of B. Ramaswamy Iyengar we know nothing. On the face of the proceedings, he was condemned and dismissed just before the transfer of the administration to the Maharajah, without one atom of evidence, and simply on a suspicion engendered by an alleged delay of four days—with which no fault was found at the time—in his preparing a draft letter from the papers, which included Mr. Gordon's momentous note of the 5th of September, 1877. These papers he is said to have received from the Chief Commissioner's Office on the 6th of September, while his draft letter was not ready till the 10th. As the 9th of September was a Sunday, and the papers very possibly arrived at a late hour on Thursday, the 6th, the delay to be accounted for, might be reduced to two days. But remembering that the papers, which were, from first to last, in several hands, could have been copied in an hour, the delay of two, three, or four days is a point of utter insignificance. Moreover, the papers, which were of a nature to excite curiosity, are as likely to have been copied, at some time or other, by an English officer, or an East Indian clerk, as by the Sheristadar.

The other principal ground, beyond this bare suspicion, for dismissing this old and respectable public servant, after twenty-three years' service, is that he made, designedly and maliciously, "a very deceptive and incorrect translation of the Canarese statement of Ramakristniiah," one of the writers in the Jewel Office, relating to a deficiency in the value of an article, which casually came to light in 1877. We shall now place before our readers, for the purpose of comparison, (1) the Original Translation, and (2) the Translation preferred by Mr. Gordon.

Original Translation.

Jewel No. 32 had 525 pearls, 42 rubies, and 21 emeralds, when Colonel Elliot examined it in 1868. *When a new bureau was prepared, and the jewels deposited in it during the time Mr. Gordon officiated as Guardian, the pearl necklace appeared small, and its price was estimated at Rs. 600, and a pencil note was made to that effect. Whether Mr. Gordon remembers this or not I am not sure.*

Mr. Gordon's Version.

Jewel No. 32 had 525 pearls, 42 rubies, and 21 emeralds, when Colonel Elliot examined it in 1868. *At the time of placing the jewels in the new bureau prepared under the orders of the Guardian, Mr. Gordon, the pearls appearing small, and the jewel being therefore considered to be worth Rs. 600, the sum of Rs. 600 was accordingly noted in pencil. Whether Mr. Gordon remembers this or not I am not sure.*

The only difference between the two is, that in the original it is said that "the pearl necklace appeared small," and in the revision that "the pearls appeared small." And, according to Mr. Gordon, this is a very great difference, all the difference between

treachery and honesty. In paragraph 11 of the Order summarily dismissing the Residency Sheristadar, the mistranslation is pronounced to have been "evidently designed to mislead." "The mistranslation had the effect of making it appear that Ramakristniah had stated that between 1868 and 1872 the jewel itself had become smaller, and therefore less valuable, whereas the real statement made by Ramakristniah was that the valuation at Rs. 6,000 was incorrect,"—he really says nothing of the sort—"and that the proper value was only Rs. 600, because the pearls were too small for the jewel to be worth more." Ramakristniah does not say that the valuation of Rs. 6,000 was incorrect in 1868. He only says that "the pearls appearing small" in 1872, the jewel was then found to be not worth more than Rs. 600. The pearls and other gems may have been large, when valued by the jury of experts in 1868. Jewel No. 32 may then have been worth Rs. 6,000, and may have been feloniously altered and reduced in value between 1868 and 1872, just as Jewel No. 171 is admitted by the conclave of "gentlemen who had been in charge of the jewellery," in paragraph 4 of their Report, to have been somehow or other brought down from Rs. 5,000 to about Rs. 2,000 in value.

But, as we said before, of B. Ramaswamy Iyengar we know absolutely nothing. We hope he may obtain justice, either from the Maharajah of Mysore or from the Government of India. He seems to us to have been, on the merest suspicion, made a victim to irritated authority, and to an uneasy desire to seem to be doing something, to rebut the heavy case built up in the columns of the *Statesman* by us. The "powers that be" in Mysore, unable to silence or answer the *Statesman*, seem to have been endeavouring, by vindictive and most unjudicial proceedings, such as those now noticed, to punish or intimidate the persons, or the class of persons, from whom, as they erroneously imagine, we have derived our information. They had much better try to explain what so urgently requires explanation: still better would it be for them to challenge an open inquiry by persons of independent standing and high social position. Until they do so, or until it is done for them, the existing scandals, now of six years' notoriety, will be strengthened instead of being extinguished.

Singularly enough, in another of these ill-advised acts of vindictiveness and intimidation, the local authorities have again only succeeded in bringing to the front additional confirmation of the accuracy of our strictures. B. Ramaswamy Iyengar, the Residency Sheristadar, after being some months under suspension, was dismissed from the service a fortnight before the young Maharajah's enthronement.

ment. About the same time, a poor Brahmin named Kanchi Rungachari, formerly a hanger-on of Mr. C. Rungacharloo, and who was in 1874 prosecuted by him for perjury and acquitted, was apprehended at Mysore, brought to Bangalore in custody, held to the excessive bail of Rs. 1,000, somewhat hurriedly tried on the charge of defaming Mr. C. Rungacharloo, and sentenced to a year's imprisonment. Now the defamatory libel consisted in the circulation of copies of petitions to the Chief Commissioner, dated as far back as 1874, embodying the self-same scandals regarding the Mysore jewels which Mr. Gordon, addressing the Government of India on the 29th of July, 1880, says he had never heard of save in the Memorandum published in the *Statesman*! If Mr. Gordon, who in 1874 was Judicial Commissioner, and had recently held the office of Guardian, never heard of those scandals at the time, or at any subsequent period before 1880, his ears were less open to the bazaar gossip of Mysore than those of any other officer in the Commission, which, perhaps, he may consider very much to his credit.

This Mysore question, since we took it in hand, has gone through what we may call most appropriately a typical development, an evolution most characteristic of Anglo-Indian officialism. We called attention to the scandalous rumours that had prevailed in Mysore since 1874, to the effect that the stock of plate and jewels in the Palace, estimated by Colonel Charles Elliot and a jury of experts in 1868 to be worth about £350,000, had been feloniously reduced in value, to a very considerable extent, during the Maharajah's minority—not, as report said, by a diminution in the number of articles, but by their fraudulent alteration, by the abstraction of costly gems, and the substitution of stones and pearls of inferior value. Information to this effect had been given in a petition to the Chief Commissioner, Sir Richard Meade, in 1874, but had been disregarded or lightly treated.

We showed from official documents, that strong confirmation had been given to these scandalous rumours by the casual disclosure, in 1877, of the fact that certain jewels, estimated in Colonel Elliot's catalogue at a very high value, had somehow degenerated into trumpery trinkets.

We called attention to the fact that in 1872, without recorded sanction or official report, the whole stock of jewels and plate had been turned over and rearranged by Mr. J. D. Gordon and Mr. C. Rungacharloo—an operation which occupied them for six weeks.

We cited an official document, signed by Mr. J. D. Gordon, dated 5th September, 1877, in which, when asked if he could explain the deficiencies in value of certain of the jewels, he stated that

during the rearrangement in 1872 he had found "a great number of such errors" in the original catalogue.

We quoted another official document, the joint production of Colonel Malleson and Mr. C. Rungacharloo, dated the 24th of December, 1874, in which *they* declared that there was "not a single error" in the original catalogue.

We asked how these two conflicting statements could be reconciled. We pointed out also that no errors or deficiencies had been mentioned by any one, until some of them had been accidentally discovered in 1877.

Until pressed by the Home Government, the authorities in India saw no necessity for taking any notice of our observations. As it is, there has been the merest pretence of inquiry, and no valuation of the jewels.

But it cannot be said that nothing has been done. An old public officer, suspected of having furnished some of the information that led us to demand an inquiry, has been dismissed the service; the person who in 1874 first called for an inquiry, has been imprisoned for a year; and Mr. J. D. Gordon has been made a K.S.I. After such vigorous measures as these, it is probably assumed at Calcutta that no vestige of scandal can remain above ground, and that the long-delayed Blue-book has become superfluous.

THE COST OF THE AFGHAN WAR.

A PARLIAMENTARY Return, No. 412, of 20th August, 1881, just issued, shows the gross cost of the Afghan War as £24,494,483, which, after deducting receipts and recoveries, as well as the English contribution, amounting in all to £6,082,260, leaves a net cost of £18,412,223. The period over which these charges are spread extends from 1878-79 to 1881-82, but for only two of these years are the Indian accounts closed; the two other years cover the regular estimate of 1880-81 and the Budget estimate for 1881-82. The former estimate may be accepted as fairly accurate, but judging by the deficits in all preceding Budget estimates, the amount £3,159,100, put down in the Budget as the cost of the war in 1881-82, cannot be relied on. Neither can it be hoped that the cost of the war will terminate with the year 1881-82.

The return is intended to show the extraordinary military expenditure occasioned by the war, under the three heads, "War Proper," "Frontier Railways," and "Punjab Northern Railway." The ordinary military charges are excluded. Now this omission is calculated to mislead Parliament as to what the real cost of this war on the North-west Frontier has already been, and yet will be.

It is necessary to look at the military expenditure as a whole, and for different periods, to discern the real cost of the war. To this end, the six years' military expenditure from 1870-71 to 1875-76, the last year for which Lord Northbrook's Administration can be held responsible, should be contrasted with that of the six following years, viz., from 1876-77 to the end of 1881-82; the first year of this last period being that for which Lord Lytton's Government is fairly charged with the responsibility, and, necessarily, for the augmented cost of the army which immediately followed. During the first period of six years, the Indian accounts only show, under one heading, the total military expenditure; but during the second six years the accounts and estimates show the charges for four years, under the additional heads of "War" and "Frontier Railways," besides distinguishing the so-called "ordinary" military expenses.

TABLE, MILITARY CHARGES, 1870-76.

(UNDER LORD NORTHBROOK.)

Years.	Gross Military Expenditure for all Services. £	Dednot Receipts and Recoveries. £	Net Military Expenditure. £
1870-71	16,074,800	982,148	15,112,652
1871-72	15,678,112	944,420	14,733,692
1872-73	15,503,612	906,810	14,596,802
1873-74	15,228,429	1,011,939	14,217,390
1874-75	15,375,159	988,838	14,386,321
1875-76	15,308,460	1,045,612	14,262,848
6 Years' Total	93,168,572	5,858,867	87,309,705

It may be here noted that the military expenditure of 1870-71 and 1871-72 was swollen by the expenses of frontier wars, but the amounts are not distinguished in the above accounts. The ordinary expenditure for the Army of India may, however, be considered to have been brought down to the usual peace cost in 1875-76, and when Lord Northbrook left India, it was about £14,250,000 a year.

In two years of the succeeding six, the military charges are shown in the accounts in lump sums; but in the four following years, the Afghan War charges and the Frontier Railways' outlay profess to be exhibited. The return just issued also adds a new column for "Punjab Northern Railway," of which the accounts and estimates, previously issued by the Government of India, give no indication.

Years.	Ordinary Military Charges. £	Afghan War Charges, as shown in Indian Accounts and Estimates.			Punjab Northern Railway, shown in Re- turn No. 412 for first time. £	Present Total of all War Ex- penditure. £	Grand Total of Ordinary and of War Expenditure. £
		War Charges. £	Frontier Railways. £	Total War Charges. £			
1876-77	15,792,112	15,792,112
1877-78	16,639,761	16,639,761
1878-79	16,416,108	676,380	...	676,380	...	676,380	17,092,488
1879-80	16,896,239	4,816,623	1,334,350	6,150,973	336,770	6,487,743	23,383,982
1880-81	16,412,604	11,386,963	2,199,697	13,586,660	534,600	14,121,260	30,533,864
1881-82	16,459,000	2,271,000	790,000	3,061,000	98,100	3,159,100	19,618,100
Total of 6 Years.	98,615,824	19,150,966	4,324,047	23,475,013	1,019,470	24,494,483	123,110,307

The large sum now shown as the ordinary expenditure for the

Army, for only the kind now first designated "ordinary," to the exclusion of the "extraordinary," is the more confusing by reason of the difference between the amounts for the current six years as compared with those of the years' charges since 1856-57. The highest recorded charge for the Army was in 1859-60, during the Mutiny. It was then £21,826,821. The lowest amount, that in 1863-64, having been £14,763,737. But these sums covered all military expenditure of every kind. In 1865-66, the military charges amounted to £16,763,220, being £2,000,000 in excess of the charge in 1863-64, and mainly owing to the important frontier war at that period. The details of that excess were not, however, shown in the accounts, and comparisons between former and recent war charges cannot be drawn. Now, though several frontier wars have been undertaken since then, yet, until Lord Lytton's government, this charge of 1864-65 had not been exceeded. It is, then, not unreasonable to compare the whole military expenditure of years before Lord Lytton's government with the whole military expenditure of late years, commencing with the year for which Lord Lytton may be held responsible. By so doing, the difficult, and indeed almost impossible, division between the ordinary and extraordinary military expenditure, now attempted for the first time, will be rendered unnecessary.

The above figures show that the portion of the military expenses now designated "ordinary," during the last period of six years, have exceeded *the whole* of the charges of the prior six years to the extent of £5,447,252. Deducting, then, the first grand total of £93,168,572 from the *total* charge of the second six years, as above, £123,110,307, the extra cost for the Army of India in the last six years amounts to £29,941,735 over the total charge of the first six years.

Moreover, the war charges, now for the first time separately exhibited, cannot be accurately analysed, because the details of war military expenditure entered in the Finance accounts of 1878-79 and 1879-80 show that only the small sum of £365,579 for regimental pay and allowances is debited to the Afghan War charge. Now, remembering that about one-fourth—certainly at least one-fifth—of the whole garrison of India was employed on, or in close connection with, these frontier operations, it is obvious that this small sum can only represent a fraction of the amount actually paid to that large portion of the troops in the form of regimental pay.

It is probable that this debit of pay to war charges, may be that portion of the "pay" on account of the additional European troops sent to India in 1879-80 to replace in part the ordinary garrison.

employed on active service. This assumption leaves, however, the increase in the ordinary charges of the Indian Army in 1877-78, and following years, still a mystery. In 1875-76, Lord Northbrook's Administration incurred an outlay in the gross for all military expenditure, of £15,308,460; while in 1877-78, a year before the Afghan War began, Lord Lytton's Administration had already raised the military charges to £16,639,761, being £1,333,301 in excess of the former year. Now, the strengths of the Indian forces, and the number of regiments, battalions, and batteries, were on exactly the same establishment in both years; so that the large augmented cost in the last-named year can only be attributed to other causes, one being the rumoured cost of early preparations for war. On this head many rumours and statements have been put forth about these preparations, and it has been stated that the secret records of the India Office and of the Government of India would reveal very early intentions on the part of Lord Lytton to enter on a great war beyond the Indian frontier. This official mystery has yet to be revealed, and probably it will be locked up until another generation is successful in the search.

The comparison between the total military expenditure of the six years ending with Lord Northbrook's government, with the total of the six years commencing with Lord Lytton's reign, shows the total excess to have been £29,941,735, and this amount may, undoubtedly, therefore be considered as more nearly representing the real cost of the war than the £24,494,483, entered in the return.

A more unfavourable view still of the cost of the war may be shown by assuming a continuance of the military expenditure in 1875-76 of £15,308,460, at which Lord Northbrook's Government left it. On this scale of charge, and with the six years of peace which, we justly assume, might have been maintained, there would have been a total outlay on the Army of £91,850,760, instead of £123,110,307, so that a saving of £31,259,547 on the military expenditure of India, as compared with the actual and expected outlay, might have been effected by a policy of peace.

It may, however, be supposed that, by deducting the recoveries and receipts from the ordinary military expenditure, and the returns and gains from the war expenses, derived from improved receipts of railways and telegraphs, the net military expenditure would show a more favourable balance when contrasting the gross expenditure of the two periods; but this view is not borne out by the figures to any important extent:—

Years.	Gross Ordinary and Total War and Railway Expenditure. £	Recoveries and Receipts shown in Finance Accounts and Indian Statements.			Gain from the Railways and Telegraphs charged to War. £	Total Recoveries and Receipts to be deducted from Total Charges. £	Balance of Net Military Expenditure, Ordinary and Extraordinary, for War. £
		Receipts from Ordinary Expenditure. £	Recoveries from War Expenditure. £	Total Recoveries. £			
1876-77	15,792,112	925,473	...	925,473	...	925,473	14,866,639
1877-78	16,639,761	869,981	...	869,981	...	869,981	15,769,780
1878-79	17,092,488	974,620	161	974,781	118,800	1,093,581	15,998,907
1879-80	23,383,982	929,483	50,499	979,982	312,600	1,292,582	22,091,400
1880-81	30,583,864	1,046,472	291,000	1,337,472	245,700	1,583,172	29,000,692
1881-82	19,618,100	814,000	61,000	875,000	2,500	877,500	18,740,600
Tot. at 6 Years.	123,110,307	5,560,029	402,660	5,962,689	679,600	6,642,289	116,468,018

Now, the total *net* military expenditure of the first period is stated above, to have been £87,309,705, and comparing therewith the total *net* military expenditure of £116,468,018 of the second period, the difference is £29,158,313, leaving £783,422 less than the excess found by contrasting the respective gross totals. On the assumption that the peace of India would have allowed the military net cost of 1875-76 to be maintained, for the six years following, at the rate of £14,262,848, then the total expenditure would have been £85,577,088, against the actual net military expenditure of £116,468,018, being an excess of £30,890,930, or only £358,617 less than the amount found by comparing the gross totals of the two periods.

We have not entered the English contribution, of the two respective sums of two millions, and three millions as a part of the credits in diminution of the total military expenditure, in 1880-81 and 1881-82, because neither of the two amounts has been paid. The last Act of Parliament only authorized the payment of the first instalment of £500,000, and the intention of the Home Government was avowed of making a like payment annually, until the total contribution of five millions is made good. Now, supposing the total war expenditure to be wholly covered by the above figures, and the whole of the English contribution paid up, then the above thirty millions charge of the war will be lessened to *India* by five millions, thereby leaving India saddled with a cost of twenty-five millions, or five times that borne by England; so that, as usual, India bears the unequal burthen so customary in money affairs between the two countries.

SIR BARTLE FRERE'S APOLOGY.

To undertake in these days a serious criticism of Sir Bartle Frere's recently-published apology for the policy he recommended and promoted in Afghanistan and South Africa,* might seem like "slaying the slain." There has been a very full and sufficient exposure in the pages of this Review of the South African proceedings, of the calumnies against Cetewayo by which the Zulu War was promoted, which Sir Bartle renews in this pamphlet; and of the calumnies against the dead Colonel Durnford, by which the disaster at Isandula was excused.† And, but for one consideration, it would be a superfluous task to reply to what Sir Bartle Frere says about Afghan affairs; but if Sir Bartle Frere's revival of the wildest legends and most audacious pretences of the first Afghan War were allowed to pass uncontradicted, they might be passed on to another generation, and rise once more, in company with the newer delusions of the second war, to push us into a third.

Politics and strategics are alike experimental sciences; and the experience of our first Afghan intervention, invasion, and occupation, ought to have taught us something of the country, of the people, and of their external relations, their sympathies and their antipathies. Under the guidance of Lords Beaconsfield, Salisbury, and Lytton, we were made to act as if we had learned nothing. In 1838, whether we believe in the delegation of Vitkovitch to the Court of Dost Mohammed with regular official sanction, or not, there was, in his person at least, a real Russian intrigue at Kabul; there were apparent symptoms of a hankering after influence in Afghanistan on the part of the Russian Envoy to Persia. But if anything is clear to

* "Afghanistan and South Africa." A Letter to the Right Honourable W. E. Gladstone, M.P. By the Right Honourable Sir Bartle Frere, Bart., G.C.B., G.C.S.I. John Murray, 1881.

† *Statesman*, December, 1880, p. 644: "The Zulu King and People;" *Statesman*, February, 1881, p. 846: "Colonel A. W. Durnford." See also an excellent letter by Mr. F. W. Chesson, in the *Spectator* for September 3rd.

us now—and it was clear to Sir Alexander Burnes then—there was not the slightest danger of Russian intrigue being successful in dominating Afghan policy. The mission of Vitkovitch was an utter failure from every point of view—a failure for him, as we know from his committing suicide; an Imperial failure for Russia, if the Russian Government had any hand in his proceedings, as we know from the treatment the unfortunate man received on his return to St. Petersburg.

But there was really some ground for the complaint of Russian intrigue in 1838. There was none in 1876 and 1877. Vitkovitch was a Russian officer beyond question; but there was not even a rumour of Russian intrigue in Afghanistan in Lord Lytton's time, more alarming or more authentic than the ridiculous and pointless tale he communicated as coming from an owner of "baggage animals" at Kandahar. There was no Russian Envoy or officer of any description in Afghanistan during Lord Northbrook's, or during Lord Lytton's term of office, until General Stolietoff arrived, although the appellations of "Russian," and of "Envoy," are often most improperly applied by Lord Lytton to common Bokharan messengers bearing insignificant letters from General Kaufmann.

General Stolietoff's Mission was, as is admitted, a legitimate step in the expectation of war. Had not Lord Lytton made room for it by removing our Agent, and made a sort of demand for it by "isolating" and threatening the Ameer, the Russian legation would never have got into Kabul at all. We now know that General Stolietoff's Mission was reluctantly received, that the Russians were secluded all the time they were at Kabul, just as our delegates, the Lumsdens, were secluded at Kandahar in 1857. And although the Ameer Shere Ali got promises of aid in some form from the Russian General, which were never fulfilled, and never seem to have been recognized by the Russian Government, the ostentatious mission of Stolietoff in 1878, was obviously as utter a failure as the ambiguous mission of Vitkovitch in 1838. It is true that Stolietoff, whether he intended it or not, led Lord Lytton and Lord Beaconsfield's Government into a trap, which, in case of a war with Russia, would have locked up half our Indian resources; but he gained no direct advantages, he made no useful engagements for Russia, he obtained no hold over Afghan resources, no control over Afghan independence. Neither the proceedings nor the results of his Mission can have enhanced the Afghan estimate of Russian power or of Russian faith.

Although Sir Bartle Frere plaintively protests against it, Mr. Gladstone was perfectly right; and showed remarkable insight, when

in St. Andrew's Hall, at Glasgow, on the 5th of December, 1879, he pointed out Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Henry Rawlinson as the two persons who, more than any other living men, were authors of the unprincipled persecution of the Ameer Shere Ali, and of the bloodshed and misery that had ensued. "There are two gentlemen," he said, "men of distinguished names, who supported the Indian policy of advance into Afghanistan—Sir Henry Rawlinson and Sir Bartle Frere. These were the two great authorities. Sir Henry Rawlinson is a great Oriental scholar. He is a scientific man, and a man of high character and of great ability. Sir Bartle Frere, also, deserves the ascription to him of all these qualities in the highest degree, but neither the one nor the other gentleman has ever been in a position of responsibility." Of course, Mr. Gladstone meant that they had not given their advice in Afghan affairs from a position of responsibility, which is perfectly true. Sir Bartle Frere has, unquestionably, some reason to complain—as he seems inclined to do—that the Beaconsfield Government should have tried to improve their own case by publishing his irregular and unofficial papers on the subject, just as the controversy was becoming warm. But Mr. Gladstone certainly did not mean to say, as Sir Bartle Frere assumes, that neither he nor Sir Henry Rawlinson had ever been in high or responsible positions. Sir Bartle Frere enumerates the important offices he has filled, including that of Governor of Bombay, and says that "on Sir Henry Rawlinson were laid the gravest responsibilities for the safety of General Sir William Nott's army, and for the maintenance of our rule at Kandahar."*

Sir William Nott was solely responsible for the safety of his army at Kandahar, and was fully equal to the burden. But of that more anon.

Sir Bartle Frere says, more than once, that he has always been for "a just, conciliatory, and neighbourly policy" towards Afghanistan, but it is not easy to discern those attributes in the policy which he actually recommended.

"We ought to let the Ameer Shere Ali, of Afghanistan," he says, "see that we fully appreciate the danger which threatens ourselves as well as him from Russian advance." And then he proposes "active measures, essential for our present purpose," of checking Russian advance in that direction: the first, being the occupation of Quetta; the second, that "well-selected English agents should be placed at Herat, Kabul, and Kandahar." "I would let no small obstacle," he goes on to say, "hinder our placing a British officer, not neces-

* "Afghanistan and South Africa," p. 8.

prepared to act accordingly," and that we must "clear for action." If this does not mean war, there is no meaning in words.

Though Sir Bartle Frere was not quite decided about placing an Envoy actually at "the capital," he had no doubt or hesitation about Herat. Here our "neighbourly" and "conciliatory" policy was to be applied in full force. Afghanistan was to be entered by the back-door at Herat, and the treasonable projects of the Governor of that province, the Ameer's troublesome son, Yakoob Khan, encouraged for our purposes.

"With regard to the present state of affairs at Herat, I would immediately depute from the Persian side an intelligent and scientific military officer, with three or four good assistants acquainted with all arms of the service, and if the ruler of Herat could be induced to receive them, I would establish them there permanently. This, no doubt, in the present state of affairs would give umbrage to the Ameer of Kabul;"—it probably would not, in fact, have been considered by him either "neighbourly" or "conciliatory,"—"but I would let him clearly understand that we could not sit by while he quarrelled with the ablest and most popular of his relations, and possibly successors; that we must recognize the actual state of affairs in Afghanistan, and would not countenance a repetition by him of the process by which his father wasted his own life and the resources of his kingdom in establishing his direct rule over Herat."

This policy of intrigue for the purpose of destroying the "direct rule" of the Ameer over Herat, and of gaining influence over his undutiful son and rebellious lieutenant—not exactly moral or magnanimous on the face of it,—is entirely inconsistent with Sir Bartle Frere's assurance that what he desired was "entire abstinence from all meddling with the internal government of the country." He goes on thus:—

"In the event of his persisting"—i.e., in the event of the Ameer persisting in asserting his sovereignty over Herat, and his authority over his own son—"I would inform him that we should withdraw all countenance from him, and reserve to ourselves full liberty to treat as we might think proper with the ruler of Herat. On the other hand, I would offer our good offices to both parties to effect such a formal reconciliation as should save the Ameer's nominal sovereignty, adjourning all further questions to the indefinite period of the next vacancy of the throne. Nothing, of course, but extreme pressure will induce the Ameer to acquiesce in this course, but the pressure ought, I think, to be applied."*

* "Afghanistan and South Africa," p. 35.

The Ameer probably would not have acquiesced either in "the pressure," or in the "good offices" that were to convert his "direct rule" into a "nominal sovereignty," to maintain the treasonous pretensions of his son, and to settle who was to be his successor at "the next vacancy of the throne." Sir Bartle Frere, however, protests that his policy towards the Afghan State was always just, "neighbourly and conciliatory," and conceived "in the interest of peace and good neighbourhood."*

Both Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Henry Rawlinson give their counsel under the characteristically vain-glorious notion that any one of the Anglo-Indian service is quite sure to be regarded with admiration and awe, if not with love, by all persons of Oriental origin. "The native gentleman we now employ," says Sir Bartle Frere, in his Note of November, 1875, "must be different from any one of the same class I ever met with, if the Ameer would trust him as he would trust an English gentleman. A man in the Ameer's position knows that he can trust almost any English officer who comes to him as representative of the English Government."†

Sir Henry Rawlinson was even more confident as to the security and acceptability of English officers at Kabul; for after the arrival of the unfortunate Sir Louis Cavagnari in that city, and about a month before the massacre of the legation and its escort, Sir Henry wrote as follows, in the *Nineteenth Century* for August, 1879, quite complacent and cheerful as to the Treaty of Gundamak: "Practically, British officers at Kabul will, I believe, under the new arrangements, associate with the Afghan chiefs very much as Russian officers associate with the Beys of Khokand and Bokhara—regarded, no doubt, occasionally as troublesome interlopers, but not exposed to any special danger." Far from expecting danger, or even suggesting a strong escort, he adds: "British political officers are, as a rule, soon encircled with a halo of personal affection, which, as far as they are individually concerned, is a better safeguard than sabres and bayonets."

The cases of Sir Alexander Burnes, Sir William Macnaghten, Connolly, Stoddart, Loveday, and others, to which we must now add that of Cavagnari, Jenkyns, Kelly, and Hamilton, are, doubtless, looked upon by Sir Henry Rawlinson as mere exceptions that prove the "rule."

A few months before the general insurrection and his own assassination, Sir William Macnaghten wrote: "From Mookoor

* "Afghanistan and South Africa," p. 23.

† "Afghanistan and South Africa," p. 61.

to the Khyber Pass all is content and tranquillity, and wherever we Europeans go we are received with respect, and attention, and welcome."*

While Macnaghten was laying this flattering unction to his soul, and while Rawlinson's eyes were dazzled with that "halo of personal affection" which seems to have blinded him ever since, General Nott, the brave and able soldier who saved the military honour of Great Britain in the old capital of Afghanistan, was giving a very different opinion: "The conduct of the thousand-and-one Politicals"—we know the "one" he knew most of—"has ruined our cause, and bared the throat of every European in this country to the sword and knife of the revengeful Afghan and bloody Belooch."† Rawlinson, like most of the Politicals, compelled to work through native assistance, became the dupe of one special adviser, whom he subsidised and trusted. "Rawlinson," says Durand, "clever man as he was, and a good soldier, was no match in cunning for a man in whom he placed some confidence, and of whose ability and subtlety he had a just appreciation—Meerza Ahmed." In the very crisis of the outbreak, when the news of Macnaghten's murder and of "the abject conduct of our military leaders at Kabul was passing with electric speed through the country," Rawlinson, "encircled by a halo of personal affection," furnished his trustworthy Meerza Ahmed with a lakh of rupees (£10,000) to raise a body of partisan Dooranee Horse for our service. Of course, when General Nott sallied forth from Kandahar to attack the enemy, this body of Horse was not arrayed in our ranks, but manœuvred in our front. "The ready and clever Meerza Ahmed was, however, with them, and he persuaded Rawlinson that he had brought the Dooranee Horse to co-operate with Nott. The latter was consequently prevented from attacking them, and thus lost the opportunity of defeating both Uktur Khan and Meerza Ahmed on one and the same day. Meerza Ahmed forthwith joined the insurgents."‡ Such were the "effectual measures" of Rawlinson, Todd, and Pottinger, which Sir Bartle Frere, in 1874, only with too much success, called upon Lord Salisbury to revive and to set in motion.

Again, Sir Bartle Frere, in his Note, dated the 11th of January,

* "First Afghan War," by Sir Henry Durand, p. 314.

† "The First Afghan War," by General Sir Henry Durand (Longmans, 1879), p. 315.

‡ "The First Afghan War," by Sir Henry Durand, p. 408.

1875, says: "I should consider the first necessity at Kabul to be an English officer as Envoy and representative of the Viceroy."*

Lord Lawrence, in the following passage of his Memorandum, dated November 4th, 1874, commenting on Sir Bartle Frere's letter to Sir John Kaye, had deprecated any delegation of English officers into the Afghan territories:—

I do not think that the Afghans as a nation would tolerate the presence of British officers in Afghanistan, directing their politics, giving their chiefs advice, drilling their troops, and the like. I am afraid that the advice which Sir Bartle Frere suggests would in the end lead to war, and would at any rate turn the Afghans against us. A discontented party could easily bring the ruler of the country into disgrace with us, by causing the assassination of some of our officers, or even by attempting it.†

Lord Lawrence is here merely admitting the essential and fundamental objection consistently and continuously maintained by the Ameer Dost Mohammed and his son, Shere Ali, and to the soundness of which Sir Louis Cavagnari and his brave companions were soon to testify by their tragical fate. Lord Salisbury and Lord Lytton made light of that objection, doubtless encouraged by Sir Bartle Frere having treated it, in his Note of rejoinder to Lord Lawrence's Memorandum, in the following free-and-easy fashion:—

On former occasions, when this step was urged on the Government of India, it was resisted on the ground that our Envoy and his *attachés* would not be safe from attacks on their lives by fanatical or ill-disposed persons, and that the Ruler of the country could not guarantee their safety.

I have never believed in the validity of this objection, and I should consider it quite chimerical, unless it were formally stated by the Ruler himself. In that case, I should point out to him the absurdity of his calling himself the Ruler of a country where he could not ensure the safety of an honoured guest. I should decline to communicate with him, save through a representative accredited like our Envoys at other Asiatic Courts, and I should state clearly the impossibility of our talking of friendly relations with a nation where our representative would not be welcomed.

"Of course," he continues, "there is always some danger to every British or other civilized Envoy at an Asiatic Court, where the life of an Asiatic sovereign is not always safe."

Yet he has just declaimed on the danger as "chimerical," and on the "absurdity" of "an Asiatic Sovereign" suggesting such a danger, or calling himself a Ruler where such danger existed.

"But this has been," he goes on, "and ever must be"—

* "Afghanistan and South Africa," p. 61.

† "Afghanistan and South Africa," p. 50.

then it is not such an "absurdity," or so "chimerical," after all,—“the normal condition of our Envoys to semi-civilized Powers, and we may at once leave India if we cannot find qualified Envoys who will undertake the duty without thinking more of the risk of assassination than they would of fevers at Rome, or of consumption at Munich.”*

Any number of "qualified Envoys" could be got to-morrow to go, as poor Cavagnari went, fortified with the Star of India, and a salary of £4,000 a-year. That may prove the gallantry and devotion of our public servants, but it does not prove the wisdom of Sir Bartle Frere's policy. One would really imagine that in Sir Bartle Frere's political creed the blood of Envoys was the seed of empire. We do not send out Envoys for the purpose of getting killed, but to be alive to what is going on. Experience tells us that in Afghanistan and Central Asia this work can be better done by an Indian Moslem than by a Christian Englishman. Lord Lawrence, in his Memorandum in reply to Sir Bartle Frere's letter, gives the following very decided opinion on this point: "The employment of Natives beyond our frontier is, I consider, a far more safe, and at least an equally effective mode of obtaining information, and is free from the risks of employing Englishmen in such places. We have acted on this principle with fair success for the last twenty years."†

In the House of Lords, on the 15th of June, 1877, Lord Lawrence explained that the Mission of the two Lumsdens to Kandahar in 1857, was an utter failure:—

The old Ameer, Dost Mohammed, received two British officers in 1857, and allowed them to go to Kandahar, where they remained, so long as they could do so with safety. But the elder of them, now Sir Harry Lumsden, assured me that owing to the espionage practised on him at Kandahar, less information was attainable there than could be got, without difficulty, at Peshawur, where travellers and traders from all parts of Central Asia met, and talked freely without fear of interference.

The fact is that, "as a rule," English Envoys in such situations, instead of being "encircled with a halo of personal affection," have failed in gaining influence or getting intelligence, and have got themselves killed. Native Envoys have got all the information we wanted, and have not got themselves killed.

* "Afghanistan and South Africa," p. 62.

† *Ibid.*, p. 53.

Sir Bartle Frere, and many others, were, and it is to be feared many people are still, under the delusion that great things were accomplished by some of our "Politicals" during the first Afghan War, between 1839 and 1842. In that same letter to Sir John Kaye, while explaining his honourable scheme for intriguing at Herat with Yakoob Khan, one of his father's provincial governors, Sir Bartle Frere says: "I would not attempt to hold Herat by a force of our own troops—at least, not until we had tried the effect of such measures as Todd and Pottinger and Rawlinson proved could be so effectual in like cases." He talks of the costly gossip of Todd, Pottinger, and Rawlinson as "effectual measures." Not one of these men, except Rawlinson, so far as he collected supplies at Kandahar, did anything but mischief. The "political" functions of these gentlemen consisted in distributing black-mail to one set of our worst enemies, and in collecting false reports from another set. The late Sir Henry Durand having been chief engineer to Shah Shuja, at Kabul, in immediate communication with Sir William Macnaghten, afterwards enjoyed, as Private Secretary to Lord Ellenborough, peculiar facilities for obtaining correct and full information as to these matters. He tells us that during the siege of Herat, "Pottinger's advice was seldom asked, and still more seldom taken, by the defenders, who viewed his presence as a political, rather than as a military advantage."* As to Pottinger's successor, D'Arcy Todd, he was "grossly duped" by Yar Mohammed, the actual ruler of Herat, into drawing large bills upon the Government of India to purchase his neutrality. At last, when Dost Mohammed had surrendered to Sir William Macnaghten, Todd began to refuse the demands of Yar Mohammed, and limited his subsidy to £2,500 a month. "In the course of one year," says Durand, "an outlay of upwards of £150,000 had been incurred by Todd at Herat; and the expenditure initiated by Pottinger, instead of being diminished, had been carried to an extravagant excess without any resulting advantage. So far from British influence being thereby strengthened, Macnaghten, alarmed by the reports received from Todd, had repeatedly urged the necessity of moving British troops to Herat."† Then came the outbreak at Kabul, the murder of the two Envoys, and the destruction of the British force; Yar Mohammed, of course, encouraged the insurgents, and Todd—by no means "encircled," as, according to Rawlinson, he ought to have been, "with a halo of

* "The First Afghan War," by General Sir Henry Durand (Longmans, 1879), p. 59.

† *Ibid.*, p. 298.

personal affection"—was fortunate in escaping with his life. These are what Sir Bartle Frere calls "effectual measures."

D'Arcy Todd was at Herat from June, 1839, to February, 1841. When he left the place upwards of £200,000 had been expended in subsidies, more properly called "black-mail," to Yar Mohammed,—besides the expense of the Mission—with no visible or imaginable advantage to Great Britain or to India.* Yet, in 1874, Sir Bartle Frere, with these facts available for his instruction, wanted this degrading extravagance to be re-instituted for the benefit of a paricidal traitor.

Todd, placed in this absurd situation, could not uphold the honour and dignity of the British Empire. He was not only a dupe, he was treated with ridicule and insult. We will quote Sir John Kaye's explanation of Todd's resolution to leave Herat.

Shah Kanran had told an officer of the Mission that but for his intervention they would all have been murdered and their property pillaged. That this might any day happen was still only too probable. What, then, was it best in such circumstances to do? If the officers of the British Mission were murdered at Herat, it would be necessary to despatch a British Force to chastise the murderers, and most embarrassing political complications would have arisen. It appeared, therefore, to D'Arcy Todd that, in the interests of his Government, his best and wisest course was to withdraw the Mission. So, on the 9th of February (1841) he departed.†

A few extracts from an official letter, about that date, to his immediate superior, the Envoy at Kabul, Sir W. H. Macnaghten, will give Todd's own justification of his retirement.

I did not feel myself authorised to make the large advances required by the Wazeer without the promise of an adequate return. An immediate payment was required, and, on my refusing to accede to this demand unless convinced that the money thus advanced would not be employed against us, I was told that I could not be allowed to remain longer at Herat.‡

My departure from Herat may appear to you unnecessarily precipitate, and it is possible that I might have remained for a few days longer, but had I done so I should have exposed the officers of the Mission to certain insult and danger.§

We have had a most providential escape from the hands of Yar Mohammed, who was urged by his confidential advisers to seize and plunder us, and our journey to this place, with nearly the whole of our property, was almost miraculous.||

* Kaye's "Lives of Indian Officers," Vol. III., pp. 65 to 72; Durand's "First Afghan War," p. 297.

Ibid. p. 67. † *Ibid.*, p. 67. § *Ibid.*, p. 68. || *Ibid.*, p. 69.

Such were the "effectual measures" of D'Arcy Todd, as brave a soldier as ever stepped, and in every respect "well qualified" for the impossible task assigned him. Sir Bartle Frère, in 1874 and 1875, recommended recourse being had again to similar "effectual measures," with no more regard to "the risk of assassination than to that of "fever at Rome or consumption at Munich."* His advice was taken, with a result to Sir Louis Cavagnari and his eighty companions with which we are acquainted.

It is very natural that Sir Bartle Frère and Sir Henry Rawlinson should try to clear themselves from the discredit of having contributed by their counsel to the sanguinary and ruinous results of the Afghan policy they recommended. Their best protection is that which Mr. Gladstone charitably extends to them, and which Sir Bartle Frère pettishly declines,—the plea that they were not in a position of official responsibility.

Sir Henry Rawlinson published an article in the *Nineteenth Century* for February, 1880, which is full of inconsistencies and self-contradictions. In one passage, doubtless by a defect of memory, he made a statement most strangely inaccurate, in his desire to exculpate himself from having given any advice that could have led to "tho fatal catastrophe" that befell our Mission at Kabul. With regard to this deplorable incident, "it is a poor consolation to me, personally," he says, "that I always protested against meddling with such a hornets' nest as Kabul; that I counselled, indeed, bestowing our undivided attention upon Western Afghanistan, while we left Kabul and Ghuznee, the scene of our old disasters, to struggle on in isolated anarchy." And he refers to a *Quarterly Review* article of 1865, reprinted in his "England and Russia in the East." Now, it is very true that he did formerly recommend that our interference with Afghanistan should be confined to the occupation of Kandahar and Herat—if possible, with the Ameer's consent; but in case of "his perversity," by force of arms; and that this beautiful scheme was included in Chapter VI. of his "England and Russia in the East." When our Native Agent from Kabul visited Lord Lytton at Simla in 1876, he informed the Viceroy that the Ameer Shere Ali had been much alarmed and irritated by a translation of Sir Henry Rawlinson's book, the publication of which had already much annoyed the Government of Lord Northbrook. But there is another document of greater weight than a review article contained in the volume above mentioned—

* *Ibid.*, p. 69.

Sir Henry Rawlinson's Memorandum of 1868, to which Lord Beaconsfield's Government gave a prominent place in the "Afghan Papers" of 1878. In this Memorandum, Sir Henry Rawlinson by no means warns the Government off Kabul as a "hornets' nest." On the contrary, he says: "If she" (Russia) "establish a Mission at Kabul—and she can hardly do less, *should we fail to pre-occupy the ground*—the effect of such an establishment will be at once perceptible in India." It may, he says, be necessary to provide Shere Ali with "arms and officers." "Whatever the price, it must be paid; of such paramount importance is it to obtain at the present time a dominant position at Kabul, and to close that avenue of approach against Russia. Whether the time is come for the re-establishment of a Mission at Kabul, charged with the distribution of the subsidy and the direction of our quasi-protectorate of the country, is a question that can only be decided on the spot." His own opinion is plainly enough avowed. "*It is a position that we must inevitably occupy, sooner or later, unless we are prepared to jeopardise our Indian Empire.*" In summing up "the remedial measures" that are advisable, he says that "Shere Ali should be subsidised and strengthened at Kabul, our position at that capital being rendered as secure and paramount as would have been Burnes's position at the Court of Dost Mohammed in 1837, if he had been supported by the full weight of Lord Auckland's authority and resources." *

No protest against the "hornets' nest" here: not a word about danger. In his utter delusion, he reads backwards the very records before him of our most recent experience of a British Mission in Afghanistan, says there would be "no great risk attached to it;" and cites, in support of these views, "the success of Major Lumsden's Mission to Kandahar in 1856"—that Mission having been in a position of "great risk," although, like Stolietoff's Russian Mission at Kabul in 1878, kept in seclusion, amounting to confinement, all the time it remained in the Afghan city. In the opinion of the Lumsdens themselves, as Lord Lawrence tells us, their Mission was not a success at all; and both of those distinguished officers are known to have been opposed to the policy and proceedings of Lords Salisbury and Lytton. Sir Henry Rawlinson is equally inaccurate and imprudent in his reference to the facts of the Mission to Kandahar in 1856, and to his own counsel in connection with the Mission to Kabul in 1879.

When he gets into his own preserve of Kandahar, Sir Henry Rawlinson is wonderfully confident. "Here," he says, "whether

* "Afghan Papers" 1878, pp. 38, 39, 41.

we are acting rightly or wrongly"—the question of right or wrong in such a policy being naturally a matter of indifference—"the horizon, at any rate, is clear." Here, he says, we ought to remain in sovereign possession. It is the old story over again. In 1841 and 1842 Captain Rawlinson, safe as political officer, under a competent General commanding a strong force, was the dupe of every Afghan chieftain and adventurer who could make out a plausible case for pay, pension, or black-mail. He wants the old game to be revived. "Local levies," he says, "both horse and foot, composed of Hazarehs, Belooches, and Parsiwans, will replace the greater part of our Indian garrison" at Kandahar, and in those regions.* Had Sir Henry Rawlinson quite forgotten the "local levy" he raised for co-operation with General Nott, in 1842, under the guidance of the astute Meerza Ahmed—the local levy for whose equipment he paid £10,000 in advance, and which turned against us at the first opportunity? Is the breed of Meerza Ahmeds extinct? A garrison for Kandahar, and an army for the occupation of South-Western Afghanistan, composed of 20,000 or 30,000 of these gentlemen, recruited and guaranteed by "influential chieftains, well disposed towards British interests," would soon make "our administration self-supporting" with a vengeance. Soon after Sir Henry Rawlinson's article, we had another opportunity of seeing how British pay and British patronage ensure the fidelity of Afghan troops, and secure allegiance to the chieftains we select. The local levies recruited for the support of Sher Ali, our ephemeral Wali of Kandahar, turned against him as soon as they had a chance, and fought against us at the battle of Maiwand.

There are as good fish in the sea as ever came out of it. In common justice to Sir Richard Sandeman, Sir Lepel Griffin, Dr. Bellew, Major St. John, and their fellow-labourers, we are bound to say, without making invidious distinctions, that, on the whole, their achievements will bear comparison with those of Todd and Rawlinson, and that the "measures" that were taken from 1878 to 1881, have been as "effectual," and, from every point of view, quite as beneficial, as were the measures taken by the "thousand and one Politicals"—Rawlinson included—from 1839 to 1843. But before any of the Politicals of the Lytton period fall into honourable retirement, into that limbo of enforced leisure and fond reminiscence, where the phantoms of past exploits and abortive plans frequently take a literary form—we think it advisable to point out how much the false estimates, the false expectations, and the false morals of

* *Nineteenth Century*, February, 1880. p. 200.

our latest Afghan enterprise were based on the irresponsible counsel and volunteer advice of demi-official Notes and inspired Review articles. The survey we have made of the "effectual measures" of Todd and Rawlinson, which Sir Bartle Frere held up to the admiration of Lord Salisbury, may, perhaps, prevent the "effectual measures" of St. John and Bellew being too readily accepted on some future occasion as ample encouragement for entering once more on "a friendly and neighbourly advance" into Afghanistan.

IRELAND AND THE LAND ACT.

ENGLISHMEN, whilst differing greatly as to the meaning and merits of the Land Act, agree in condemning the present attitude of a portion of the Irish people. To the Tory—whose creed it is that the Irishman is incapable of gratitude, that the only way to rule him is by the rod, and that any concession to Irish sentiment is a step in the wrong direction—there is nothing surprising in the fact that he remains sullen and suspicious. But Liberals are irritated, and, like the Prophet, they think they do well to be angry. Last year they were surprised to find that the return of Mr. Gladstone to power failed to allay agitation, the troubles of the autumn disgusted them, and now that outrages continue to be common, after Parliament has passed a measure which concedes more than O'Connell ever asked for, and all that Mr. Butt ever claimed, they, or many of them, are tempted to despair of a people they deem incapable of gratitude. But with the Royal signature upon the Bill scarcely dry, it is premature to speak of its effect, and it is surely unreasonable to blame Irishmen for hesitating to believe that the latest attempt of the British Parliament to meet their legitimate demands will be more successful than its forerunners. The people of Ireland are being constantly told that for half a century England has been engaged in righting the wrongs she inflicted upon their country in earlier times, and they are told again that Mr. Gladstone's past achievements entitle him to the confidence and the gratitude of every Irishman. But how does the account really stand? Where are we to find these many measures that testify to the anxiety of England to do her duty to the sister island? If we confine ourselves to the land legislation of the last forty years, to the action of Parliament on the most vital of all questions to the bulk of the Irish people, where are we to look for the statutes for which the tenant should be grateful? Since 1840 there have been thirty-six Acts passed or renewed, which in one way or another have infringed the liberty of the subject. But what about remedial legislation?

Forty years ago the condition of the Irish tenant was thus described by Gustave de Beaumont: "I have seen the Indian in his forests and the Negro in his chains, and I thought that I beheld the lowest term of human misery; but I did not then know the lot of Ireland. . . . Irish misery forms a type by itself, of which there exists nowhere else either model or imitation. In seeing it one recognises that no theoretical limits can be assigned to the misfortunes of nations." What has England done to alter this state of things, to deserve the gratitude of which we hear so much? Between 1840 and 1850 we search in vain for any Bill passed in the interests of the tenants, but in the latter year an Act was passed for the relief of the *landlords*. We allude to the Encumbered Estates Act. Whatever economical advantages may have been obtained by the operation of this Act, it worked cruel wrong upon the tenant. It deprived him of all compensation for his improvements. Estates were bought by speculators whose one object has been to sell them again at a handsome profit; or where they have been retained, to exact the highest rent that can be got by reckless competition. The tenant right has been ignored, and the result over a fourth of Ireland has been wholesale evictions and widespread misery. Should the Irish people be grateful for this? Ten years passed, and then came the Act of 1860, which fortunately in a large measure proved abortive. It consolidated all the previous measures that had been passed in the interests of the landlords, and made them many degrees worse than they were before. "If the act had been successful," says Mr. Finlason, the able Editor of Reeve's "History of English Law," "it would have destroyed any claim of the tenant even for *future* improvements, unless in accordance with some contract, express or implied; and although a *usage* might be evidence of an implied contract, still it would have been necessary to prove contract. And as to the past, it contained no provision whatsoever. Neither did it contain any provision calculated to promote security of tenure or right to compensation." Is it strange that the Irish were not grateful for this? Another decade passed, and the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1870 became law. It sought to give the tenantry security of tenure, to encourage the making of improvements throughout the country, and to create a peasant proprietary. It failed to do any one of these things, and it left the tenant in a worse condition than it found him. It did not even make the amusement of evicting tenants the monopoly of the wealthier pro-

prietor. True, where the tenant was evicted he might claim compensation, but what he wanted was not compensation, but security of tenure; and he continued, where the chance was given him, to submit to a rack-rent rather than leave his holding. But often he has been compelled to leave. Consolidation has gone on apace, for directly rent fell into arrears compensation could not be enforced, even under Clause 9, without the greatest difficulty. For some years after the Act was passed, the price of land continued to advance, and the competition for it grew keener. The compensation for eviction was paid, when paid at all, by the incoming tenant, who undertook also to pay an increased rent. The small farmer without capital looked in vain for a new holding, and when bad seasons came, those who had been content to give rents the land would not bear, found themselves in debt to the bank, and in debt to the shopkeeper, without the means to pay their rent, unable to borrow, absolutely at the mercy of the landlord, and with the certain prospect of being evicted without compensation. Where was the room for gratitude here?

But, it may be said, all this relates to the past. The present Administration is responsible for none of these failures; it is the author of a great and generous measure of reform. Yet, whenever there is an election, the Irish are told to vote against the Government; and if the people are grateful for the Land Act, they are at least careful to hide their gratitude. The complaint is a plausible one, but is it much more? When Ministers took office, they found Ireland prostrate from famine. As time went on it became evident that over a large portion of the country the farmers were unable to pay their arrears of rent, and that the landlords were bent upon eviction. Ireland, to use the Premier's words, was within a measurable distance of civil war, and to avert so terrible a calamity, the Government introduced, and carried through the House of Commons, a Bill to give the tenant temporary protection from disturbance. The Lords threw it out with every mark of scorn, and the Cabinet accepted their defeat. They had admitted the law to be unjust, yet they continued to enforce it; they promised to deal with the Land Question in the following year, but they would not say how; the people had asked them for bread, and they gave them a stone. What followed had been foreseen. The Land League stepped in between landlord and tenant, and it would be futile to deny that during last winter it saved thousands of families from eviction. We are no apologists for many of its proceedings. Its leaders often failed to denounce outrages in the plain language required of honest

men ; but it must never be forgotten that the accounts of the condition of Ireland which appeared in English newspapers were often gross exaggerations. Nor is it true to say that the League advocated at that time, whatever Mr. Parnell may say now, a general strike against rent. What it really did was to attempt, in a rough and ready way, to fix a fair rent, and it took as its standard the Poor Law valuation—a valuation which, although made by Sir R. Griffith thirty years ago, has been annually corrected since. It is not very easy to see how a fairer general rule could be laid down, once it is admitted that there was any justification for not paying the full rent. But the country continued disturbed, and Mr. Forster was led to believe that nothing could be done without a stringent Coercion Act. In an evil hour the Government consented to act upon his advice. The powers given to the Executive under the ordinary law were amply sufficient to preserve order if there had been any willingness on the part of persons of position to take responsibility upon themselves. But the Executive was paralyzed, the Magistracy sullen, the landlords panic-stricken. One and all cried out for their old familiar friend Coercion. The Government yielded. They did more, for they introduced and finally carried a measure, for a parallel to which we must go back to 1802. The Act of 1870 was said at the time to be the most stringent submitted to Parliament since 1833 ; but it at least secured to the accused some kind of examination before he was committed to prison ; and it guaranteed him a trial at the next Quarter Sessions, where he had to be proved guilty of the offence imputed to him if he was to be kept in custody. But the Act of the present year gives the Executive the power to arrest any and every man in a proclaimed district upon “reasonable suspicion,” and to keep him in gaol without trial of any kind until the Act expires. Under it some two hundred and fifty persons have been confined in Kilmainham and other gaols, and still the arrests continue. Mr. Forster told the House, before the measure became law, that it was to be employed only against the “dissolute ruffians” and “village tyrants,” who have incited to outrage. He was doubtless sincere in that declaration. Unfortunately, it has not been acted upon. Most of the men in Kilmainham are respectable tradesmen or farmers, men who may have said, and probably did say, rash things at local meetings, but who are neither ruffians nor tyrants ; who, if they have offended against the law, should be tried and punished if found guilty, but not kept in gaol without trial for any number of months on the unsupported testimony of the village constable, or a magistrate bitterly incensed against the class to which the accused belong. The way in which the Government have worked the Bill cannot be

better shown than in the re-arrest of Davitt, the real founder of the League. Why was he sent back to penal servitude? Mr. Forster has recently told us. Because he was "very reprehensibly the main conductor of an agitation that endangered life and property, perhaps more than he intended." That is because he was a Land Leaguer. But a few days before Mr. Forster "absolutely denied that the Act had been used against any member of the Land League because he belonged to that organization. When it had been used against members of that body, it has been used against those who have incited to violence." But Davitt never tired of denouncing violence. From the moment he landed in Ireland until the day of his arrest, he never ceased to tell his countrymen that in resorting to violence they damaged their cause with all right-thinking men. The re-arrest of Davitt was a big blunder. Next to the Peace Preservation Act itself, it has done more than anything else to confirm his countrymen in their estrangement. It might have been forgotten or condoned if only the Government had joined mercy to justice, and offered the Land Act to Ireland in company with political amnesty. This they have refused to do on grounds that may and do commend themselves to Englishmen, but will assuredly not be accepted as sufficient in Ireland. The case for the release of many of the *suspects* is unanswerable, and whilst the men whose labours enabled and compelled the Ministry to pass the measure of reform for which they now take credit are kept in gaol without trial and without accusation, we ought not to be surprised if the Land League continues to flourish; nor should we speak lightly of such ingratitude whilst it has yet to be shown that the Land Act gives more than a paper security against the evils it is intended to cure.

Does it give more? How far is it likely to remedy the admitted evils of the Irish Land system? Will it give the farmer security of tenure during good behaviour, guarantee him a fair rent during occupation, and secure him adequate compensation in the shape of free sale when he makes way for a nother? It professes to do all this. The fundamental idea running through the Act is that it is desirable that the occupier should own the land he tills, either absolutely or subject to certain fixed payments and the performance of certain statutory conditions. It seeks to establish fair rents; it recognizes, under certain limitations, free sale; and it gives conditional fixity of tenure. Further, it assists the tenantry where they are anxious to become proprietors by advancing three-fourths of the purchase-money, and, to a limited extent, authorizes a State-aided emigration from the poorer and more populous districts. The Bill, as it left the Commons (said

Sir Gavan Duffy), was the completest, and, indeed, the only really complete act of justice the Imperial Parliament ever proffered to Ireland. It was mutilated by the Lords, but Ministers have been careful to say that, as it passed into law, it was substantially the Bill they wished. That it is intended to confer great benefits upon the Irish tenantry no one who has read it can deny; but it remains to be seen whether landlords will be able to make it a dead letter as they made its predecessor. We do not believe that they will be able to do this, but they will try. It was one of the cardinal errors of the authors of the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1870 that they assumed that the landlords would accept it loyally. But, from the Duke of Leinster downwards, they contrived to contract themselves out of it; and if they do not do the same again it will not be from want of will. In introducing the Bill, Mr. Gladstone went somewhat out of his way to say that the landlords of Ireland have been tried and acquitted. If that statement was accurate, there could be no justification for the Bill that has just become law. But we venture to say that it is not accurate; that the evidence collected by the different Commissions that have sat during the last forty years leads to an opposite conclusion. Even the Richmond Commission felt constrained in their Report to admit that a Rent Court was necessary to protect the tenantry from injustice, and the evidence taken by the Bessborough Commission teems with proofs of the rapacious conduct of Irish landlords. We may rely upon it, therefore, that they will do their best to defeat the intentions of the Legislature. It remains to be seen whether they will succeed.

The Act professes to concede "the three F's"—Fair Rents, Free Sale, and Fixity of Tenure; but whether the tenant will enjoy them must at present remain doubtful. Upon the action of the Court almost everything depends. It will have to decide what is fair rent. The Act is silent on the point, except that it directs the Court to have "due regard to the just interest in the holding of the landlord and tenant respectively;" but this gives no assistance in determining what interest belongs to the landlord and what to the tenant. Assuming, however, that the apportionment of interest will be made to the satisfaction of both parties, how is the Court to decide what is the actual letting value of the land? It must necessarily rely upon valuers for the data upon which it gives its judgment. But is it likely that the cursory inspection of a farm by a professional valuator will enable him to determine the rent that a solvent and responsible tenant could afford to pay? Judge Longfield, than whom few are more competent to give an opinion

on the Irish Land question, dwells upon this difficulty, and gives figures which show how widely valuers differ. Thus, in one instance, we find a farm valued by a Civil Engineer and by the Ordnance Valuation respectively at £120 and £57; in another, at £8 10s. and £2 5s.; in a third, at £40 and £3; and these instances might be multiplied indefinitely. If there is anything like these wide discrepancies in the valuations of the Court, it is certain that there will be considerable discontent. The Bessborough Commission, in their Report, state that in every district of Ireland men may be found whose reputation for fairness and practical knowledge is established, who possess the confidence of both landlords and tenants, and who have lived on the land and studied it. The Archbishops and Bishops of Ireland had these men probably in mind when they suggested that two assessors should be chosen by county electors to sit with the Assistant Commissioner; but it is to be gathered from the wording of Clause 45 that professional valuers are to be employed. When the Commissioners themselves are appealed to, there is no reason to doubt that their award will give satisfaction; but they are to act rather as a Court of Appeal than a Court of first instance. It will be the Sub-Commissioners who will really work the Act—men of the class who are now appointed to the Civil Bill Courts, and who have so conspicuously failed to win the confidence of the people. Unless greater care is taken in the selection of the Sub-Commissioners, the Land Act will remain barren and fruitless of good result. The outcome of leaving a large discretion in awarding compensation for disturbance under the Act of 1870 is well known. But the discretion given to the Court under the present Act is infinitely wider, and, if we are to judge by the past, the Sub-Commissioners will be apt to look through landlord spectacles. It is true that the Act gives the tenant the right to refuse to have his case decided by the inferior Court, and, if he is aggrieved by any order of a Sub-Commissioner, he may appeal to the full Court; but whilst the decisions on appeal may establish some few general principles, they cannot revolutionize the mental attitude of men whose sympathies are all with the landlord. It remains to be seen, too, whether competition will induce tenants to give a price for the right of occupancy which the farm will not bear. Mr. Gladstone, in his introductory speech, seemed to lean to the opinion that it was necessary to protect tenants against the compulsion of competition by fixing an official value upon the tenant right. "If," he said, "a Court is to be called on at the will of a tenant to limit the annual receipt of the landlord, and to fix what we in this Bill have

called a judicial rent, then I do not see upon what principle you shall say that the tenant right of the tenant is to be subject to no similar and analogous limitation." But the best answer to the proposal to fix the price of tenant right, is the impossibility of preventing a purchaser paying a higher than the regulation price. The Ulster landlords have endeavoured, by means of Estate rules, to prevent the price of tenant right from going beyond three or five years' purchase of the rent fixed. But these rules have been largely evaded. If, then, when the tenant had at law nothing but a bare yearly tenancy to sell, it was difficult to limit sale, an almost penal code of fines and forfeitures would be required to repress it now. It may be, as some fear, that undue competition will force up the value of a tenant's interest to an unnatural extent; that, in addition to the value of the tenant's improvements, a further and excessive sum will be given for the "goodwill." Should this come about, then rack rents will continue—for excessive rent does not cease to be excessive because it is paid to two persons instead of to one, or because it consists of two portions, one representing interest on the capital of the occupier sunk in buying out the outgoing tenant, and the other representing interest on the capital of the landlord. But we are inclined to believe, with the Bessborough Commission, that farmers will soon learn, like other people, to take care of themselves when they have been placed in a position of security by law. However that may be, it is a very different thing for a man to invest a capital sum which, subject to conditions, he can realize at any time, and to give an equal sum, scattered over a series of years, to a landlord in the shape of rack-rent. Many of Lord Downshire's tenants have given forty years' purchase for the tenant right, yet they are among the most contented in Ireland, and it has never been said that Lord Downshire does not receive a fair rent. If only the Court succeeds in defining "fair rent," free sale will take care of itself.

That is, where it is allowed—for the Act is contradictory on this point. Clause I. provides that the occupier may sell his tenancy "for the best price that can be got for the same," but it goes on to give the landlord the right to purchase the tenancy for such sum as may be agreed upon, "or, in the event of disagreement, may be ascertained by the Court to be the true value thereof." The tenant is to be allowed to sell for the best price he can get. This is free sale. But the landlord can purchase the tenancy at a price to be fixed by the Court. This is not free sale; but, as Lord Dunraven has put it, only the right of one man to sell his tenancy to another at a price fixed by a third person. Suppose the landlord exercises his right,

will not the tenant have just cause for complaint? It is but fair that the owner of the soil should have a right of pre-emption at the highest price offered by a *bonâ fide* purchaser in open market. But how is the Court to determine what is the value of the tenant's interest? This can only be done by appealing to public opinion, which can be tested only by free sale. Again, with regard to the third F, it is assumed by many that the Act gives fixity of tenure. It really offers a lease of fifteen years to a certain proportion of the tenantry. Of course, no kind of perpetuity of tenure is given to those who do not go to the Court; and, in the opinion of the Government, most people will keep away from it. But is perpetuity of tenure given even to those who go to the Court, whose application is approved by the Court, and who receive from the Court a judicial rent and a statutory term? Mr. Gladstone's authority on this subject is not likely to be disputed, and what does he say: "A present tenancy may cease on any and every of the occasions when the tenant right is transferred; and when the landlord exercises his right of pre-emption, a future tenancy is entered upon which does not reserve to the tenant the right to apply to the Court, though it does reserve to the tenant his interest in his holding, and places certain restrictions on the rent. But that is not all. It would 'be no perpetuity of tenure if a man were not free to hand it over to some one else; but so far from being able to do so, the tenant under this Act will be subject to the landlord's right of pre-emption, and to his right of objecting to the vendee of the tenant's interest in the holding. But even that is not all, because while the tenancy continues in the hands of the existing tenant, it is liable to the landlord's right of resumption on reasonable and sufficient grounds." We have, we think, said enough to show that even where the tenant is free to take advantage of the Act time alone can show to what extent he will be allowed to benefit by it. One of the great drawbacks of the measure is its extreme complexity. Every provision is so hedged round with limitations and exceptions and qualifications that it might and will puzzle many a skilled lawyer. This may have been unavoidable, but it is none the less unfortunate.

The mischievous amendment of the Duke of Argyll excludes from the benefit of the Act the tenants of estates where the improvements have been made, and "substantially maintained," by the landlord. In the opinion of Ministers, the limitation is not an important one, and if Mr. Shaw Lefevre is correct, it should be inoperative, for he maintains that there is not a single estate in Ireland managed on the English system. That as it may be, it is evident that where the landlord has made the improvements the

tenant has but little to sell. But he has something, for he has the right of occupancy, and why should he be prevented from selling his interest, whether large or small? The right of assignment is rooted in the general law; it is a right which the people have exercised in spite of the law; and if the tenants on certain estates are forbidden to exercise that right, the result will be endless heartburnings and evasion of the law. The Land Act acknowledges the principle of free sale, the right of the tenant to sell whatever interest he has in his holding; and to take two or three cases in one county and another, and to say that the Act is not to apply to them, is to create an invidious distinction that will, we fear, work unmixed evil. It may be doubted, too, whether it was wise to give the landlord the right, on the expiry of a lease, to take over what land he may desire to cultivate himself, or for the purpose of a "home farm;" but the question of arrears is by far the most important. The Government have recognized the necessity of making an attempt to deal with this matter, for it is plain that if the Act is only to apply to tenants who owe no rent, it will be a dead letter over a large portion of Ireland. They have sought, therefore, to induce the landlord to come to terms with his tenants; and, assuming that the arrears now due do not extend over more than three years, and that the tenant can, when he will, pay his rent for last year, the Government offers—when the rent for 1880 has been paid, when two years' rent remains to be paid, and when landlord and tenant join in the application—to advance to the landlord fifty per cent. of the arrears due; this advance to be repaid by him in fifteen annual instalments, the tenant consenting to allow these payments to be added to the rent. In this way the landlord, by sacrificing half his claim, would get the balance without trouble, and the tenant would be protected from eviction for non-payment of long-standing arrears. This compromise, if it can be carried out, is a reasonable and fair solution of a difficult question; but it is not to be compulsory, and it is to be limited to holdings of a rental less than £30 per annum. The second condition shuts out upwards of 30,000 tenants; and we fear that the landlords to whom the Act applies will not be so ready as Mr. Forster believes to accept the terms offered. The Chief Secretary thinks that they will jump at a proposal which will secure them two-thirds of the rent due. They would do so quickly enough if they saw no way of getting the whole, and some, hard pressed for money, will no doubt be glad enough to accept the offer; but we question whether many will who are free agents. In the discussion on

the clause, Mr. Forster reminded the House that the Act puts every tenant against whom his landlord proceeds for recovery of rent in this position—that he would not lose the benefits of the Act, since he would be enabled to sell his holding as a present tenancy. But will not many landlords look upon this as a reason for insisting upon the payment of their full claims? The justification of the Bill is that Irish landlords take advantage of exceptional circumstances to act unfairly by their tenants. If landlords, many of them, see any chance of wringing the last penny from their tenants, they will do so, and all the more readily now that the tenants are soon to be taken out of their power. Nor must this be forgotten. By exacting these arrears, landlords will generally recover possession of their holdings, for tenants must sell. Clause V. is very explicit on this point. It runs: "Nothing in this section contained shall prejudice or affect any ejectment for non-payment of rent instituted by a landlord, whether before or after the commencement of a statutory term, in respect of any rent accrued due from the holding before the commencement of such term." The tenant who owes a couple of years' rent will not venture to appeal to the Court to fix a judicial rent, since the landlord would answer by distraining for arrears; or, if he does venture, the Court will be unable to give him the security he seeks until he has satisfied his landlord, which in many cases would be only possible by the sale of the tenant right, when the landlord might step in and require the Court to fix the price of it. We cannot but think that it would have been better to have adopted the suggestion to be found in the Declaration of the Bishops, and to have given the Court power to adjudicate in all cases of arrears with a view to their equitable adjustment in accordance with the principles of the Bill, and to stay proceedings in evictions for non-payment of rent on such terms as, under the circumstances of each case, might appear proper to the Court.

The Government have been blamed for not having instituted a huge system of State-aided emigration. No doubt a re-adjustment of the ratio between population and production is necessary in certain districts. The peasant who lives on a barren patch of three or four acres in the west of Ireland would remain the most miserable of beings if his land belonged to him. But if the Act works as it is intended to work, capital will rapidly flow into Ireland, providing for her sons other industries besides those connected with the soil. Within the last thirty years the population of Ireland has diminished by one-third, and still the exodus continues. Under the Land Act

the Commission will have authority, on being satisfied that a sufficient number of people in any district desire to emigrate, to enter into agreements with any state or colony, public body or public company, with whose constitution and security they may be satisfied, for advances by way of loan to facilitate the emigration of families. The annual sum spent in this way is to be limited to £70,000, and will not go far in relieving local congestion of population; but Parliament is not likely to object to vote any extra money that may be needed should experience show that it is desirable to give larger assistance. It would be impolitic to encourage the idea that by pressure from without, the Irish people were induced to leave their native land. We look with greater confidence to Clause 24, which seeks to encourage the growth of a peasant proprietary. This clause authorizes the Commissioners to advance sums of money to tenants for the purpose of enabling them to purchase their holdings, provided the tenants themselves are prepared to put down one-fourth of the purchase money; and Clause 26 authorizes the Court to purchase estates for the purpose of re-selling to tenants where three-fourths of the whole number of tenants on the estate, or, in certain cases, one-half, are able and willing to purchase their holdings. The Purchase Clauses of the Act of 1870 failed, not from any want of desire on the part of the tenants to purchase, but owing to difficulties in the working of the Act, and principally owing to the refusal of the Landed Estates Court, acting in the interest of owners and incumbrancers, to arrange lots so as to suit the convenience of purchasing tenants. The Church Disestablishment Act of 1869 was worked very differently, the result being that of a total of 8,432 holdings, 6,057 have been sold to tenants for £1,674,841, being an average of £276 10s. each. The price thus obtained has averaged 22½ years' purchase of the rental, which is higher than the average of estates sold during the same period in the Landed Estates Court. We gather from the report of the Bessborough Commission that of the whole number of 6,057 only 388 were in arrear at the close of 1880, and it is not expected that any portion will be eventually lost. When this percentage of 6 per cent. is compared with that which represents the arrears now outstanding on most of the estates occupied by small holders, it will be seen that the experiment has successfully stood a test of more than usual severity. That a portion of the tenant purchasers have assigned their right, for the most part as security for the balance of the purchase money, to others, is admitted, and several have succumbed to the pressure of recent bad harvests, and have parted with their holdings as well as with their proprietary right. But "the fact remains that these

transactions have led to no breaches of the law, and produced no concerted refusal to pay what the purchasers, from old habit, still call "the rent." It is much to have converted 6,000 tenants into proprietors, and we may reasonably hope that under the new law a very much larger number will be changed from agitators into peaceful citizens by the sense of proprietorship. Sir Gavan Duffy fears that the eagerness of the people to become owners in fee, and the facility of obtaining the purchase money, may induce them to consent to a price which, in the end, may not be reproductive. But the Church lands were not sold at exorbitant prices, and the Court may be trusted to refuse to make the necessary advance where the sum offered is manifestly in excess of the value of the property. It has been contended, too, that the State should advance a larger sum than three-fourths of the purchase money, but the Government did well to stand firm on this point. It might even have been wiser, if practicable, to have insisted upon the fourth part being other than borrowed money. A farmer who, by exceptional industry and skill, has laid up a portion of the money necessary to purchase his farm is likely to prosper as a small proprietor. Every one must desire that he should be assisted as far as possible in obtaining that position, and the landed proprietor must rejoice more than others, since a new class of competitors for landed property would increase its value, and an increased number of proprietors its security, the pyramid becoming consolidated as its base became extended. But to place a man in the position of proprietor by Act of Parliament alone would be very doubtful policy, for, as has been well said, "to the disciplined and the resolute the 'magic of property' is the strongest inducement to improve, but to those of a soft temperament, unaccustomed to enterprise, even when not deficient in industry, and with but slight knowledge of agriculture, it would be the strongest inducement to sloth."

If we have sought to point out some of what seem to us the weak points of the Act, it has been with no desire to speak grudgingly of this great measure of constructive statesmanship. In framing the Act, Mr. Gladstone had to consider not so much what was theoretically best as what was practically possible. It may be safely said that no one but himself could have induced Parliament to pass such an Act. It confers great benefits upon the Irish tenant, and it should go far to make him in course of time more contented with his lot. We are told that it is a retrograde step, because it limits the sphere of contract, and enlarges the operation of positive law. Contract cannot be destroyed or restricted where it has never existed. Positive law is indispensable when, in the words of Pro-

fessor Cairnes, "we cannot otherwise secure an end which cannot but be regarded as among the legitimate ends of Government—the coincidence in an important field of human activity of the individual with the general well-being." No act of Parliament can be expected to provide at once peace and prosperity to an unfortunate people. The habit of agitation, to which the existence of just grievances has given a plea, cannot be unlearned in a day. And it must be expected that flaws will be discovered in the working of the measure which will need the attention of Parliament. Even if the Act does all that its authors expect, it would be a grave mistake to suppose that it will settle the Irish question. It is a step, and we hope a long step, towards a better understanding between the two countries, but much remains to be done before loyalty can take the place of discontent. Mr. Parnell's dream of an independent Ireland is an impossibility, at all events in our time, but Ireland has a right to ask that she should be left to manage her own internal affairs. Compare her position with that of Scotland. To quote from an excellent pamphlet written by Mr. Kinnear, Scotland keeps "her own laws, her own courts, her own institutions, her own administrators, her own systems of religion, land law, family law, mercantile law. If in any point Englishmen think her wrong, they leave her to her blunders. If in anything Scotchmen want a change, they ascertain among themselves on what side the majority lies; that majority proposes the change, the minority submits, and English members simply look on. Sometimes English votes may delay or hasten a measure for a few sessions, but at most they only turn a wavering scale, and Scottish desire, when clearly manifested, is never resisted." How different the treatment of Ireland! What Government would think of making an Englishman Lord Advocate? what Ministry would dream of making an Irishman Chief Secretary? Whenever are Irishmen consulted as to what is best for Ireland? "You do not suppose," said Mr. Bright the other day in the City, "you do not suppose that the fourteen members of the Government spend days and weeks in the consideration of a measure such as the Irish Land Bill, without ascertaining, in connection with it, everything everybody else can know." Mr. Bright would have been ready to say much the same of the Act of 1870. Yet, had the Government listened at that time to the warnings of Irish members, to the pleadings of Sir John Gray, Sir Patrick O'Brien, Mr. Maguire, and many others, they would not have required an amending Act to-day. What was Mr. Gladstone's declaration immediately after the intro-

duction of the Bill of this year? That he could not consent to alter it, however united Irish members might be in asking for certain changes. Yet the Irish members—we do not allude to the extreme party—had no part in framing it. Does anybody suppose that this or any other Government would venture to place Scotland at the mercy of a Coercion Act such as that which is now in full force in Ireland? We prate of equality, and here is a proof of it. There are 129 magistrates in Tyrone. One is a Quaker, one is a Baptist, two are Roman Catholics, two more are unascertained, ten are Presbyterians, and 111 are Episcopalians. How stands the population? In round numbers it may be put at 216,000. Of these 42,000 are Presbyterians—they have a magistrate for every 4,000 of them; there are 49,000 Episcopalians—they have a magistrate for every 432 of them. There are 120,000 Catholics—they have only one magistrate in every 60,000 of them. Yet we marvel that Ireland is discontented! We complain of chronic agitation, but when have our statesmen listened to Irish grievances that were not backed by clamour? We have it on the authority of the Duke of Argyll, that when the present Ministry took office they had no intention of dealing with the Irish Land Question. What caused them to take it up? Not famine, for the famine was over, but the Land League. How comes it that the Healys, the Biggars, and the Finigans are the representatives in Parliament of a considerable portion of Ireland? Because Irish gentlemen, who would not stoop to obstruction, were unheeded. Sooner or later Home Rule, or something very like it, will be conceded. Ireland will be allowed to manage her own local affairs, and English statesmen will see the reasonableness of it. But not until agitation has opened their eyes. “Agitate, agitate,” said the Marquis of Anglesea to O’Connell, “and you will succeed.” What has Ireland ever won from England that was worth the having that she did not get by agitation? Yet we are surprised and indignant that with many a grievance still unredressed, she continues to employ the one weapon that leads Ministers to listen to her complaints, and at times to act upon her representations!

THE IRISH LAND ACT.

THE following summary of the benefits conferred on Irish tenant farmers by the new Land Act, has been drawn up by the Commissioners under the Act, for popular information. Its publication may prove useful, we think, as a declaration of the intention of the framers of the Act, particularly in India, where this Land problem is constantly pressing upon our attention.—[Ed.]

BENEFITS CONFERRED ON IRISH TENANT FARMERS BY THE LAND ACT (IRELAND), 1881.

The new Land Law effects a great and most beneficial change in the position of Irish tenant farmers.

The benefits it confers may be briefly stated as follows:—

Fair Rent.—Every existing tenant from year to year in Ireland, of an ordinary agricultural or pastoral holding, is entitled to have a fair rent fixed for his holding either by the County Court Judge or by the Land Commission, or it may be settled by agreement with the landlord, or by arbitration.

Security of Tenure.—Whenever a fair rent is fixed, either by the Court or Commission, or by agreement, or by arbitration, the rent cannot be raised or altered for fifteen years, nor can the tenant be disturbed during that period. In the last year of the fifteen years the tenant can again get the rent settled, and a new term of fifteen years granted, and so on. It is not, therefore, merely a term of fifteen years which the tenant gets, but practically a term renewable every fifteen years. It amounts to this, that the tenant paying a fair rent and treating the land in a proper tenantable way, and not subdividing or subletting his farm, will be safe from eviction or arbitrary increase of rent, and his rent cannot be increased by reason of his own improvements.

Sale of Tenancies.—Every tenant may sell his tenancy to one person at the best price he can get, but the landlord is to have first the right of buying, at a price either agreed on between the parties or to be fixed by the Court.

Acquisition of the Holding Out-and-Out by the Tenant.—There are provisions in the Act authorizing the Land Commission to advance money to tenants to enable them to purchase their holdings and become absolute owners of them.

Fixed Leases.—There are also provisions enabling tenants for life and other limited owners to give leases in perpetuity to tenants.

These provisions will now be explained more in detail.

“FAIR RENT AND SECURITY OF TENURE.

Every tenant from year to year, whether he holds under written agreement or not, has acquired the following rights:—

1. If the landlord demands an increase of rent, however small, the tenant may adopt any of the following courses:—

(1) The tenant may agree to the increase, and then he is entitled to hold for fifteen years (called a statutory term), during which term the rent cannot be increased, and during the last twelve months of the time he may apply to have a fair rent fixed and get a fresh term of fifteen years, and so on from time to time.

(2) The tenant may decline to pay the increase, and may at once apply either to the Civil Bill Court or the Land Commission to fix a fair rent, and he thereby gets a statutory term of fifteen years at the fair rent so fixed, with the like right to a fresh term if he pleases to apply at the end of the fifteen years at a fair rent to be then fixed, and so on from time to time.

(3) He may refuse to agree to the increase, and may not care to go to the Court to have a fair rent fixed, in which case he may either (a) sell his interest in his holding, or (b) if compelled to quit, he will be entitled to compensation for disturbance, which has been largely increased from what it was in the Land Act of 1870.

2. But, although the landlord may not demand an increase of rent, the tenant may consider his present rent too high, or the landlord may consider it too low. In such case (1) the tenant alone, or (2) the landlord and tenant together,

or (5) the landlord, after demanding an increase of rent, or after failing otherwise to agree with his tenant, may apply to the Court to fix the fair rent, and in such case the tenant will acquire the statutory term with the like benefits as before. It is to be always remembered that by "the Court" is meant either the Civil Bill Court or the Land Commission, at the choice of the person applying.

The fair rent when fixed is called a judicial rent, and it is to be ascertained after hearing the parties, and having regard to the interest of the landlord and tenant respectively, and considering all the circumstances of the case, holding, and district. No rent is to be made payable in any proceedings under the Act in respect of improvements made by the tenant or his predecessors in title, unless the tenant has been paid or otherwise compensated by the landlord for such improvements. Thus it follows that—

No tenant can have an arbitrary increase of rent put on him, and that

No tenant can have his rent increased by reason of any improvements he or his predecessors may have made, unless he has already got the value of them from the landlord.

No tenant can be disturbed in his holding during a statutory term so long as he pays his rent and observes the statutory conditions.

Every tenant can sell his holding for the best price.

The Court may require the tenant to sell his holding, or a part of it, to his landlord, receiving full compensation as may be agreed on, or, if necessary, fixed by the Court, when it is required for the good of the holding or estate, or for building ground, or for labourers' cottages, or for places of religious worship, schools, dispensaries, or residences for clergymen or schoolmasters.

The statutory conditions on which the tenant is to hold his farm during the statutory term are the following :—1st. The tenant must pay his rent. 2nd. He must not commit persistent waste. 3rd. He must not, without the consent of the landlord, subdivide or sublet, or erect additional buildings. But manured conacre or letting the grass of lands is not to be considered subletting. 4th. He is not to do an act whereby his holding becomes vested in an assignee in bankruptcy. 5th. He is to permit the landlord to enter for the purpose of mining or quarrying, cutting timber, &c., on the terms of the landlord paying for any damage done to the holding. He is also to let the landlord and persons by his authority come on the lands for sporting purposes. 6th. He is not to open a public-house on the holding without the consent of the landlord.

If he fails to pay his rent, the landlord may bring the ordinary ejectment for non-payment of rent, but the tenant will have the usual right to redeem for six months after the actual execution of the decree.

The observance of the above conditions will be of the utmost importance whether the tenant has a statutory term or not, as, if he is obliged to sell by reason of non-payment of rent or not observing any of the other conditions, the purchaser from him will not have the right to have a fair rent fixed, but may hold on for the rest of any existing statutory term.

If he violates any of the other conditions, the landlord may serve notice to quit, but the Court has power to stop any proceedings on such notice to quit, allowing the landlord damages merely for any injury done him.

As has been stated, the tenant may proceed to have his case heard in the Civil Bill Court before the Chairman; or, if he prefers, he may go to the Court of the Land Commission in the first instance; moreover, if the landlord takes the tenant into the Civil Bill Court, the tenant may apply to have the case referred to the Court of the Land Commission. And it is always open to landlord and tenant

to settle the fair rent between themselves, or by arbitration, with all the ensuing advantages of security of tenure.

ARREARS OF RENT.

Provision is made in the Act (sec. 59) to help tenants who owe arrears of rent. They must be tenants of holdings valued at £30 or under.

If they pay or settle with their landlord for one year's rent to the gale day prior to the 22nd of August, 1881, the landlord and tenant may jointly apply to the Commissioners, who may advance one-half of the previous arrears (the advance not exceeding a year's rent). All other arrears which may be due beyond the amount advanced will be thereupon swept away.

For the sum advanced the landlord must pay interest to the Commissioners for fifteen years, at the rate specified in the Act; and the interest during that term is added to the rent. After the fifteen years are out, then no further payment of interest is required.

This provision, which is intended to free tenants from old arrears and enable them to start afresh, applies also to tenants who have been evicted for non-payment of rent since the 1st of May, 1880, where the landlord agrees to re-instate them in their holdings.

All applications must be made before the 28th of February, 1882, under this section.

PENDING EJECTMENTS.

In all cases where ejectments have been brought by landlords, prior to the 22nd of August, 1881, and which are still pending, or in which decrees have been before that date obtained against the tenant, the tenant may sell his interest:—

Provided he does so before the decree has been executed, in the case of ejectments founded on notice to quit, or in case of ejectment for non-payment of rent; provided he does so before six months elapse from the execution of the decree, and the Court may extend the time in fit cases for sale or redemption.

When the decree of judgment in ejectment has been obtained before the 22nd of August, 1881, and has not been executed, or even if executed, in the case of non-payment of rent if the six months have not expired, the tenant may apply to the Court to fix the rent. The effect of this will be to preserve to the tenant his tenancy.

In cases where proceedings are pending to evict a tenant, whether taken before or after the 22nd of August, 1881, and before judgment has been obtained, the Court may suspend the proceedings to enable the tenant to have the fair rent fixed.

When a tenant has once obtained a statutory term by having his rent fixed, if the landlord serves a notice to quit or brings an ejectment in consequence of the tenant violating any of the statutory conditions, then the tenant may apply to the Commissioners, and the Court has power to stay the proceedings if the conduct of the tenant be fair and reasonable, compensating the landlord for any damage he may have suffered.

LEASEHOLDERS.

Tenants who hold under lease will be entitled, on the expiration of the lease—provided the lease expires within sixty years from the passing of the Act, that is, before 1941—to hold on as present tenants, and thus to have all the rights of the Act.

UNFAIR LEASES.

Where leases have been taken by tenants since the passing of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1881, and the rent is more than 20 per cent. above the fair rent, the tenant may apply to the Court to have the rent reduced. In such cases the Court may also order the landlord to pay the costs of the proceedings.

and Tenant Act, 1870, containing unreasonable or unfair provisions, and such leases were accepted by the tenant under threat of eviction, or through the undue influence of the landlord, the tenant is entitled, at any time before the 22nd of February, 1882, to apply to the Court to be relieved from the lease, and to hold as present tenant, with all the rights and privileges of such tenant.

Henceforth no tenant holding a farm valued at less than £150 can contract himself out of the Act by written agreement or otherwise.

JUDICIAL LEASES.

Provision is made whereby a landlord and tenant may agree, the one to grant, and the other to accept, a lease for any term of years exceeding thirty-one years, on such terms as they may agree upon. The lease must be settled by the Court, and unless it be for a term over sixty years, the tenant, on its expiration, will be a present tenant, and have all the rights of free sale, fair rent, and security of tenure conferred on a tenant from year to year.

FIXED TENANCIES.

The landlord and tenant may also agree that a tenancy may become a fixed tenancy—that is, that the tenant shall hold for ever, either at a rent agreed upon once for all, or also, if the parties wish, subject to revision every fifteen years.

The lease must be approved of by the Court where the landlord is only tenant for life, or otherwise a limited owner.

LABOURERS.

The Court may sanction the resumption by the landlord of part of the holding for the benefit of labourers in respect of cottages, gardens, or allotments, on such conditions and terms as it may think right, including full compensation to the tenant.

A tenant may, after notice to his landlord, let any portion of his land not exceeding half an acre for each labourer, and not exceeding one letting for every twenty-five acres of the tenant's holding, subject to selection and arrangement as to rent by the Court, with or without dwellings, to labourers employed on the holding.

In fixing the judicial rent, the Court may require cottages to be built and allotments made, and determine the rents to be paid for same, for labourers.

Tenants will be entitled to apply for an advance of money for the purpose of building dwellings for labourers, under the Landed Property Improvement Acts.

ACQUISITION OF LAND—PEASANT PROPRIETORS.

1. A tenant may agree to buy from his landlord his holding. The agreement may be negotiated and completed through the Commission at a fixed price. The Commission may advance three-fourths of the purchase-money, and the landlord may agree to leave the remaining one-fourth due upon the security of the premises.

2. If a competent number of tenants on an estate are able and willing to purchase their holdings, the Commission may purchase the estate, and sell the holdings to the tenants, and advance three-fourths of the price, which shall cover all expense.

3. All advances must be repaid by an annual sum for thirty-five years, at 5 per cent. At the end of that period the holding will be the tenant's property for ever, rent free. The tenant may pay off the sum due to the Commissioners more rapidly on terms favourable to himself if he find it convenient.

4. So long as any holding is subject to any advance made by the Commission, the proprietor must hold it subject to the following conditions :—

(a) He shall not subdivide or sublet it without the consent of Commission, but he may sell.

(b) If he becomes bankrupt, the Commission may sell the holding.

(c) On death of proprietor, if the holding should become subdivided by devise or intestacy, the Commission may require same to be sold.

EMIGRATION.

When a sufficient number of persons in any district may desire to emigrate, the Commission has power to advance money to assist emigration, especially of families from the more thickly populated districts. The Commission will secure the satisfactory shipment, transport, and reception of the emigrants, and will see to their proper care and comfort in all cases in which they give assistance for the above purpose.

The above are some of the great advantages conferred on Irish tenant farmers by the Land Act (Ireland), 1881, which provides for all security in their holdings, the fixing of fair rents, and the right of free sale ; and affords the opportunity to occupiers to become the owners in fee of their holdings.

It is not intended by the foregoing statement to set forth or include all the provisions of the Act, but only to afford a general view of its more important provisions.

Any person requiring information, can apply (by letter) to the Secretary, Land Commission, 24, Upper Merion Street, Dublin.

THE DIVORCE LAW OF INDIA: ITS DIVERSITY.

IN a previous article* the diversity which exists in the marriage laws and customs of the various communities which people India was cursorily dealt with, and it was shown that, whilst amongst a certain class the bond which united man and woman was looked upon as sacred, and assumed for religious purposes, by another it was regarded as merely a civil contract; whilst amongst a third, and, happily, a small section, the relations which existed between the two sexes amounted almost to indiscriminate intercourse. On an examination of the divorce law applicable to the various heterogeneous classes which make up the population of India, it will be found that the diversity is as great. Amongst those who look upon marriage as a sacred institution, the bonds which unite husband and wife can never under any circumstances be severed, whereas to those who regard it as a mere civil contract, divorce is more or less freely allowed; whilst it naturally follows that amongst those communities which entertain lax notions of the relations which ought to exist between a man and a woman, a separation from each other presents but few obstacles. In our discussion of this subject, it will be advisable to pursue the same order that was adopted in the article on the "Marriage Laws"—viz., by examining first the law of divorce which applies to the Christian population of India, and then taking up in order of time, the consideration of the rules and customs of those communities which preceded the English in India. I may be permitted to remark here that this article does not, any more than the previous one, deal with the question involved, in a critical point of view. Such an object could not be attained in one short paper summarising the whole of the divorce law of India. What is attempted here is merely a sketch of the various rules and

* STATESMAN for July, 1881: "Diversity in the Marriage Law of India."

customs which regulate the relations existing between a husband and wife, after they have once been united to each other. How these rules or customs might, whether by legislation or by force of public opinion, be improved, is no doubt a matter of vast importance, but one for separate consideration.

CHRISTIAN LAW.

In a general way, it may be stated that the law of divorce as it prevails in India, is very similar to that which governs the Divorce and Probate Court at Westminster. There are some minor differences which will be hereafter pointed out, but in the main the laws of the two countries substantially agree with each other. The divorce law applicable to Christians in India is embodied in Act IV. of 1869, and the various kinds of relief it affords an injured party are—(a) dissolution of marriage, (b) nullity of marriage, (c) judicial separation, (d) restitution of conjugal rights, (e) protection orders. Before proceeding to consider the grounds under which relief can be obtained under the Act, it may be as well to point out the classes of persons who come under its operation, and the conditions under which its protection can be claimed. It will then be found, in the first place, that the benefit of this Act can only be obtained by a petitioner who professes the Christian religion, and resides in India at the time of presenting the petition. This provision, therefore, embraces within its scope Christians of all denominations, regardless of creed or nationality. Thus a Roman Catholic may seek relief under it, though divorce is prohibited by his religion; and so might a Frenchman, who in his own country could not have availed himself of a similar remedy for a conjugal wrong committed against him. A convert to Christianity may also obtain a divorce under this Act, if the marriage which is the subject of the petition was solemnized subsequent to his or her conversion. If, however, it was contracted previous to the adoption of the Christian religion, the English Courts would refuse to grant redress. This was expressly ruled by the Allahabad High Court in a case* in which, a Mohammedan and his wife having become Christians, and the wife having subsequently to that committed adultery, the husband applied for a divorce, with the result that the petition was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. By the terms of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Courts in India seems, in a sense, more extended than has hitherto been considered to belong to the Divorce Court in England. Following the law as it prevails in Scotland, mere residence at the time of presenting the petition is considered sufficient to entitle a petitioner

* Zuberdust Khan v. his Wife, 2 N.W.P. High Court Rep., 370.

to seek relief under the Act, whether he be a foreigner, or domiciled in India or not; whereas in England it has been invariably held that the Court at Westminster can only exercise jurisdiction in cases where the parties (not being English subjects and not having been married in England) are *domiciled* in this country. But in a case * recently decided by the Appellate Court, where a marriage was solemnized at Gibraltar between a Frenchman and an Englishwoman, the husband resided for several years in England, but being a consul for France, he retained his domicile of origin. The wife having presented a petition for a divorce, alleging adultery committed in England, and desertion, the husband raised the plea of non-jurisdiction, it was held, reversing the decision of Sir R. J. Phillimore (by Lords Justices James and Cotton, Lord Justice Brett dissenting), that the Court had jurisdiction to grant a divorce. This is an innovation, but it is in accordance with the law that prevails in most countries, and, it is to be hoped, will become the settled law of the land.

Dissolution of Marriage.—Besides the conditions which require a petitioner to be a professing Christian, and to be residing in India at the time of presenting the petition, there are others which must be fulfilled before he can obtain relief under this Act. No decree of dissolution of marriage can be made unless one at least of the undermentioned conditions is fulfilled: (a) where the marriage has been solemnized in India, (b) or where the adultery, &c., has been committed in India, (c) or where the husband has, since the solemnization of the marriage, exchanged his profession of Christianity for the profession of some other form of religion. The necessity of this last clause will be explained further on. The ground on which a husband may obtain a divorce is simply, that his wife has been guilty of adultery since the solemnization of the marriage; but the wife petitioning for a dissolution of her marriage must prove, at least, one of the following facts: that since her marriage her husband (a) has exchanged his profession of Christianity for the profession of some other religion, and gone through a form of marriage with another woman; (b) has been guilty of incestuous adultery, or of bigamy with adultery, or of marriage with another woman, with adultery; (c) or of rape, &c.; (d) or of adultery, coupled with cruelty; (e) or of adultery, coupled with desertion, without reasonable excuse, for two years or upwards. It will thus be seen that the grounds on which a marriage is dissolved in India are very similar to those upon which a

* *Niboyet v. Niboyet*, 4 Law Rep. Probate Div., p. 1 (decided Nov. 8, 1878).

like relief can be obtained in England; the only difference being that in the former country a woman may obtain a divorce from her husband on the ground of his renouncing Christianity and marrying another woman. This clause was inserted in the Divorce Act owing to a decision of the Madras High Court to the effect that a Christian convert from Hinduism who had relapsed to his former religion, was justified in contracting a polygamous marriage. The relief here given has, strangely enough, been availed of by two English ladies whose husbands (Englishmen),—one a barrister in Madras, and the other a member of the Covenanted Civil Service of Bombay—became Mohammedans, and in the forms prescribed by that religion went through the ceremony of marriage with other women.

From what has been stated above it will be patent to the most superficial observer that in respect to the grounds on which a husband or a wife can obtain a divorce one from the other, the latter occupies a most unequal position as compared to the former. Whereas a husband can obtain a divorce from his wife on mere proof of her adultery, she must in each case, besides the misconduct of her husband, establish the existence of some aggravating circumstance, such as cruelty or desertion. Amongst all the nations, except England, which allow or have allowed a dissolution of marriage, a woman has been placed on a footing equal to that of the man. Thus the Romans permitted a divorce to take place at the mutual consent of the parties, or at the instance of one party for the misconduct of the other; the Scottish law allows the marriage to be sundered on proof given, whether by the husband or the wife, that the other has been guilty of adultery or desertion for four years; whilst the law of the United States decrees a dissolution of marriage for the adultery of either party, and the Prussian Courts for mere incompatibility of temper. All the various codes, however, invest the wife with the same rights as the husband, and it is certainly as great a hardship as it is an injustice that she should not have been granted the same privileges by the Indian Code. The reason, however, why the Legislative Council passed the law in its present form was the desire that it should correspond as nearly as possible to the English law, so that there might at least be a probability of the decree of the Courts in India being recognized by the English Courts. That this object has been attained is, however, a doubtful question. According to the most approved authorities, three conditions seem to be essential before the Courts at Westminster will recognize a foreign divorce between English subjects: (a) the dissolution of marriage must have been granted on grounds which would be sufficient to enable an English Court to divorce the

parties; (b) the husband must have been domiciled in the country which granted the divorce; (c) such divorce had not been obtained by collusion or fraudulent evasion of English law. In *Reg. v. Lolley*,* which is the leading case on the point, the prisoner, a domiciled Englishman, having obtained from the Courts in Scotland a dissolution of his marriage, contracted an alliance with another woman, it was unanimously held, by a Court consisting of twelve judges, that he was guilty of bigamy. And numerous cases have been decided supporting this judgment. In *Shaw v. Attorney-General*,† which is of a more recent date, Lord Penzance arrived at the following conclusions: (a) *Lolley's* case has never been overruled; (b) in no case has a foreign divorce been held to invalidate an English marriage between English subjects, where the parties were not domiciled in the country by whose tribunal the divorce was granted; and he concluded with the following suggestive remarks: "Whether, if so domiciled, the English Courts would recognize and act upon such a divorce appears to be a question not free from doubt; but the better opinion seems to be that they would do so if the divorce be for a ground of divorce recognized as such in this country, and the foreign country be not resorted to for the collusive purpose of calling in the aid of its tribunals. To my mind, it is manifestly just and expedient that those who may have permanently taken up their abode in a foreign country, resigning their English domicile, should, in contemplation of English law, be permitted to resort with effect to the tribunals exercising jurisdiction over the community of which, by the change of domicile, they have become a part, rather than that they should be forced back for relief upon the tribunals of the country they have abandoned." Admitting even that the English Courts were willing to be guided by the principle laid down here, they could not yet avoid coming into collision with the Courts in India, which are empowered to grant a divorce if the petitioner at the time of presenting the petition be merely *residing* within their jurisdiction, whether or not he be domiciled in India. There are grounds, however, for hoping that the English Judges may relax the rule insisting upon this condition, which requires a person to be domiciled in the country in which he applies for a divorce before such divorce can be recognized in England; and it was, perhaps, the knowledge of this fact that induced the Indian

* *Russell and Ryan, Crown Cases Reserved*, 237.

† 2 *Law Rep., Probate and Divorce*, p. 156.

Legislature to give the Courts in that country jurisdiction to entertain petitions presented by those who only resided there. In a case* decided recently by the House of Lords, Lord Colonsay was of opinion that proof of "*bonâ fide*" or "*real*" domicile was not necessary, but that mere residence ought to be regarded by the English Courts as giving jurisdiction to a foreign Court. Taking the case of Scotland, he said: "If the parties have been resident there for a considerable time, though not so as to change the domicile *for all purposes*, and then suppose that the wife commits adultery in Scotland, where the witnesses reside, and where his own duties detain him, and that he proves his case, and obtains a decree, which decree is unquestionably good in Scotland, and would, I believe, be recognized in most other countries, I am slow to think that it would be ignored in England because it had not been pronounced by the Court of Divorce here." After the expression of this opinion, and considering also that the English Courts have in a way extended their own jurisdiction by entertaining petitions from parties not actually domiciled in England (*Niboyet v. Niboyet*, cited previously), it is to be hoped the Courts of Westminster will be more indulgent towards foreign tribunals, which exercise jurisdiction on proof of the mere residence of the party petitioning them, and thus avoid the scandal which necessarily occurs, when two people are considered husband and wife in one country, and not in another, whilst their marriage is held lawful in one and bigamous in another.

It might here be remarked that so far as English subjects in India are concerned, a manifest absurdity is likely to occur in the decisions of the English Courts, if they rigidly insist on the condition of domicile, as regards divorces granted in India. In accordance with a large number of decisions,† all civil, military, or other officers who have entered the Covenanted Service of the late East India Company, and now of the Government under Her Majesty, are held, for the reason that they have entered into obligations which may require them to make India their home, to have acquired an Anglo-Indian domicile. A divorce granted to one of such persons, by the legally constituted Courts in India, will, therefore, most probably be recognized in England, whereas the dissolution of the marriage of, say, a barrister or a merchant would be ignored by the Courts here, for it has been held that this change of domicile will not apply "to a person who becomes the servant in a private estab-

* *Shaw v. Gould*, 3 Law Rep., Eng. and Ir. Appeals, p. 55.

† *Lord v. Colvin*, 7, W.R., p. 661; *Moorhouse v. Lord*, 10, House of Lords' Cases, p. 272, &c., &c.

lishment abroad, or who goes abroad for the purpose of acquiring a fortune, with the intention of returning, at some undefined period, when his object has been attained." * The strange anomaly thus created will speak for itself.

Nullity of Marriage.—Any husband or wife whose marriage has been solemnized in India may present a petition praying that his or her marriage may be declared null or void, on any of the following grounds: (a) That the respondent was impotent at the time of the marriage, and at the time of the institution of the suit; (b) that the parties are within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity or affinity; (c) that either party was a lunatic or idiot at the time of the marriage; (d) that the former husband or wife of either party was living at the time of the marriage, and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force. By another section of the Act, a very useful provision has been made in favour of children born of parents whose marriage is thus declared void on account of a previous and still existing marriage, or the insanity of one of the parties; such children are entitled to succeed, in the same manner as legitimate children, to the estate of the parent who at the time of the marriage was competent to contract. Of course, any marriage entered into by means of the fraud or force of one of the parties, may be set aside under the ordinary contract law of the land.

Judicial Separation.—This is the name given to that form of divorce which in England is called "*divorce a mensâ et thoro*." Any husband or wife may obtain a decree for separation on the ground of adultery, or cruelty, or desertion without reasonable excuse for two years or upwards, of the other. After such a decree, a wife is enabled to contract or to acquire property as if she were married, and should she die intestate, the property would devolve as if her husband had been dead.

Protection Orders.—Any wife not otherwise protected by the Indian Succession Act may obtain an order from the Court, to protect any property she may have acquired, or may acquire, on the ground that she has been deserted by her husband. So long as this order remains she will be in all respects, with regard to property and contracts, as if she had obtained a decree of judicial separation from her husband.

Restitution of Conjugal Rights.—Any husband or wife may obtain an order for the restitution of such rights, against the other where such other has withdrawn his or her society without reasonable excuse. No excuse will be considered valid unless it form a

* Jopp v. Wood, 11 Jur. N.S. 53, &c.

ground for a suit for judicial separation, or for a decree of nullity of marriage.

MOHAMMEDAN LAW.

The Mohammedan code, similarly to the Christian law, looks upon marriage as purely a civil contract. Facilities equally great, and perhaps even greater, are provided for entering into it; but whilst the one law has framed regulations for the protection of the wife from the misconduct or oppression of the husband, the other law has elaborated a set of finely-drawn rules which, though laying down minute directions as to how, when, and under what circumstances a husband may put away his wife from him, do not afford her a corresponding remedy. At the same time, it must be admitted that the position of a Mohammedan wife is superior to that of a Hindu; for the former does, at any rate, possess a few privileges, and is able, under certain circumstances, to extricate herself from an unworthy husband, whereas the latter, as will be shown hereafter, once given in marriage to a man, can never by any means sever her connection from him.

Mr. Baillie, in his Digest, states: "There are thirteen kinds of *firkut*, or separation of married parties, of which seven require a judicial decree, and six do not." As it is not our purpose to enter into a detailed examination of the law of divorce, we shall allude to those provisions only which are likely to interest the general reader. Whether this can be easily accomplished will, perhaps, be questioned by those who are aware of the complex and intricate condition in which the Mohammedan law is presented to us, owing to its having been so elaborately discussed by its various commentators; but the subject may be simplified by dividing it into a few leading heads, and giving a summary of the law bearing on each. In pursuance of this view, the law may be considered under the following heads:—

1. Who may grant a divorce?
2. On what grounds a divorce may be granted?
3. In what manner a divorce may be granted?
4. What are the legal effects of a divorce?

Who may grant a Divorce.—It will, no doubt, appear strange to a reader unacquainted with Mohammedan customs—yet it is the case—that every man who professes that religion has the power, at any time he pleases, to divorce his wife from him, and that without even the assistance of any judicial authority. As a general rule, every husband of sound understanding, and of mature age, may separate his wife from him by a divorce; and even the repudia-

tion of a dumb person is effectual if it be expressed by positive and intelligent signs, because, says the *Hidayā*, "the signs of the dumb are authorized by custom, and are therefore admitted to stand in the place of speech in the present instance, in order to answer the necessity of him who makes them." But the generosity of the law towards the male sex is still more extended; for even the repudiation of a drunken man, whose intoxication is produced by drinking any fermented liquor, is recognized as valid, and, strange to say, even a divorce granted by one acting under compulsion. A very curious case* came before the Calcutta High Court in reference to this point. A woman brought a suit against her husband for the restitution of conjugal rights, in the course of which it was proved that the man had been assaulted by his relatives, and forced by them to execute a deed of divorce against his wife. This deed was held as conveying a valid divorce by Justices Glover and Jackson, who made the following remarks: "We are not at liberty to substitute for the express rules of Mohammedan law, as expounded by the best authorities, that which, according to our opinion, might be a more enlightened and proper rule of law." But, though a divorce given under compulsion is effective, yet, rather inconsistently, a compulsory acknowledgment of repudiation is not considered valid. As to whether a man who is an apostate from his religion may repudiate his wife, it is laid down in the "*Futva Alamgiri*" (Vol. I., pp. 497 and 499) that he loses his right to do so, if he has joined himself to the *Darul-Harb*, or a foreign country; but that, should he return (as a Muslim) to the territory while his wife is still in her *idutt* (probation), a repudiation previously made by him would be effective. A husband may divorce his wife on his death-bed, but in such a case the law will not deprive her of her inheritance, and she will be reckoned among the legal heirs.

On what grounds a Divorce may be granted.—A husband may divorce his wife from him without any misconduct on her part, and without assigning any reason, but he will in such a case be bound to give her the dower agreed upon at the time of the marriage. Should he charge her with adultery and disclaim the paternity of a child, the matter may be investigated by a Kazi (judge), and if he should grant a separation, it will be reckoned an irreversible divorce. So far, however, as a divorce at the instance of a wife is concerned, she can never obtain it without the consent of her husband. But, says the *Hidayā*, "whenever enmity takes place between husband and wife, and they both see reason to apprehend that the ends of marriage

* Ibrahim Mulla (Plaintiff) v. Enayat-ul-Rahman (Defendant), 4 B.L.R.A.C. 13.

are not likely to be answered by a continuance of their union, the woman need not scruple to release herself from the power of her husband by offering such a compensation as may induce him to liberate her, because the Word of God says, 'No crime is imputed to the wife or her husband respecting the matter in lieu of which she hath released herself;' that is to say, there is no crime in the husband's accepting such compensation, nor in the wife's giving it." A divorce thus obtained by the wife is called "*khoola*," in contradistinction to "*jalak*," which proceeds from the mere arbitrary act of the husband. A "*khoola*" divorce is at once complete and irrevocable from the moment the husband repudiates the wife, and a separation takes place. Slightly differing from this form of divorce is another called "*Mobarat*," which is a sort of mutual release given by a husband and a wife; and whereas in a "*khoola*" a man may demand the payment of any amount of compensation from his wife, he cannot in this form take from her anything more than what he had given her by way of dower. If the husband be a lunatic, leprous, or scrofulous, she can obtain no release from him; but should he be a eunuch or impotent, the Court is authorized to grant her a divorce after a certain specified procedure has been gone through.

In what manner a Divorce may be granted.—It has been noticed above that a divorce amongst Mohammedans may take place without the interposition of any Court of Justice; in a general way, it is brought into operation at the mere will of the man, and by his addressing his wife, whether in writing or orally, "Thou art repudiated," or in similar terms. These may either apply to the present time, or refer to a time in future; and although they be uttered in sport or jest, or by a mere slip of the tongue, they will be considered effective. There are two modes by which a man may grant a divorce to his wife: first, the *Soonnee*, or that which is agreeable to the Sunnat, or tradition; secondly, *Budace*, which is the new, or the irregular form. In the former, the conditions as to the number and the time of the use of the repudiating words, have to be strictly fulfilled. Thus, before a divorce becomes irreversible it should be repeated three times, and between each time a month should have intervened; or, what is considered better still, after a husband has once addressed the repudiating words to his wife, he should let the three months of *idutt* (probation) elapse, when the divorce will *ipso facto* become irreversible. This is considered the *Ahsan*, or best kind of divorce. In the *Budace* form, the husband divorces his wife by three declarations at once; that is, he either repeats the words, 'Thou art repudiated,' thrice, at the same time, or within one month. This, though allowed, is not generally approved of, for no sooner have

the repudiating words been pronounced for the third time than the divorce becomes irreversible, previous to which it had been within the power of the husband to revoke his words and retake his wife to himself. In the Ahsan form, however, a man has the whole of the period of the *idutt* before him, during which time he can reconsider his decision to put away his wife from him. And "this method is, moreover, the least injurious to the woman, as she thus remains a lawful subject of marriage of her husband, even after the expiration of the *idutt*, which leaves a latitude in her favour, unrebated by any of the learned" (*Hidaya*, 72). A man may repudiate his wife through the instrumentality of an agent or a messenger, and should he go to her and deliver the message, repudiation would take place. She herself may be constituted the husband's agent to carry out the divorce; but this delegation of authority may be limited to a particular time or place, or be allowed to take effect only under certain specified contingencies. It may, however, be absolute, and non-user for any length of time will not be regarded as militating against her right. Thus, where a husband had entered into a private agreement with his wife, authorizing her to divorce him upon his marrying a second wife during her life, and without her consent, Justices Jackson and Mookerjee held, "that the Mohammedan law sanctioned such an agreement, and that the wife, on proof of her husband having married a second time without her consent, was entitled to a divorce."* A divorce may be pronounced by a man in the absence of his wife, and will be considered valid. In a case † where a man residing in Trichinopoly went to the Kazi there, and made a declaration that he had divorced his wife then living in Tinnevely, and repeated the divorce three times successively,—it was held by the High Court of Madras that it was a valid divorce.

The ingenuity of the compilers of the Mohammedan law in inventing various modes by means of which a husband is enabled to repudiate his wife, has been exercised in a most remarkable manner. Not satisfied with investing him directly with the authority to pronounce a divorce at will, they have devised various indirect means whereby the same object can be achieved. Thus, a vow of abstinence made by a husband, and maintained inviolate for a period of four months, amounts to an irreversible divorce; and should he "compare his wife to any member of his mother, or some other relation prohibited to him," it will be considered a species of

* *Badrulnissa Bibi v. Mafiaballa*, VII., B.L.R., p. 442.

† *Sherif Saib v. Usanu Bibi*, 6 Mad. H.C. Rep., 452.

reversible divorce, which may be expiated by emancipating a slave by alms, or by fasting.

What are the legal effects arising from the granting of a Divorce?—

One of the direct consequences arising from a man divorcing his wife from him is that the dower fixed at the time of the marriage, or that portion of it which remains unpaid, becomes immediately due. Much of the laxity which prevails as regards a husband repudiating his wife at pleasure is restrained by this dower being fixed at a sum extravagantly large, often beyond his means to meet if payment were demanded. The principle on which so excessive a sum is settled, constituting as it does the only check on a man putting away his wife from him when he pleases, is recognized by the British Courts, which refuse to set aside a claim for dower merely by reason of its largeness; and in a case where this plea was relied upon, Justices Bayley and Shumbhoo Nath Pundit made the following observations: * “It may be that the sum claimed and deposed to, as agreed upon and customary, is a very large sum; but the Mohammedan law books, and the decided cases, and also the experience of the country, show that it is a fact, that sums so apparently beyond the means of the parties are fixed as dower amongst Mohammedans from the lowest to the highest.” Another effect of a Mohammedan divorce is the obligation on the wife to keep her *idutt*, or term of probation, which is incumbent upon a woman in consequence of the dissolution of her marriage, whether by divorce or the death of her husband. This is a period which usually ranges from three months to four months and ten days, in accordance with specified rules, and during this time the woman cannot lawfully contract another marriage; being, of course, at liberty to act as she pleases after the expiry of this term. But the most extraordinary of all the consequences following upon a divorce is that after it has become irrevocable, a man cannot take back the woman who was once his wife, except under certain conditions. She must, before such reunion can take place, have been married to another man, and separated from him either by his death, or by being divorced by him. In the palmy days of Delhi and Lucknow, when the Zenana system was in full force, and often the dignity and position of a person were estimated according to the number of ladies in his harem, it was, I believe, no unusual thing for an irate husband, in the heat of passion, to divorce from him an intractable or offending wife, and when his anger had cooled down, and he had relented from the step, he adopted the following method of reunion. The ceremony of marriage was performed between her and some servant

* *Beebee Jameela v. Muleeka, &c.*, 5, Suth. Weekly Reporter, p. 23.

or retainer in the household, who, after he had enjoyed her, which seems to have been an indispensable condition, divorced her according to the ordinary procedure, when she was rendered eligible for re-marriage to her husband. A practice so outraging womanly modesty, and so repugnant to good taste and purity of feeling, affords a curious commentary on the claim which in some quarters has recently been put forward as to the superiority of the legal status of a woman under the Mohammedan code.

A question which has sometimes occupied the serious consideration of missionaries in India is the legal effect upon the marriage of a man or woman professing the Moslem religion, who becomes a convert to Christianity. The most approved opinion is that the marriage is immediately cancelled, on the apostasy of one of the parties,* but should they change their religion simultaneously, the marriage tie is not dissolved. The missionaries, however, in both cases, do generally, and ought always, as a matter of precaution, to perform the marriage ceremony over again according to the Christian procedure. Another question, and interesting in another point of view, has reference to the legal status of European women married in a Christian country by Mohammedans. I cannot do better than cite Mr. Bailie's opinion given in a foot-note on page 176 of his Digest: "Such marriages are valid, . . . but should the husband return to the *Dar-ool-Islam*—that is, to any Mussulman country—leaving his wife behind him in her own, a separation (equivalent to a divorce) would take place by reason of the difference of the *dar* (country). This, and the fact that Mohammedans are frequently married in childhood, and are allowed a plurality of wives, and may probably have left wives living in their own country, ought to render Englishwomen cautious how they enter into such connections."

HINDU LAW.

It might perhaps be thought somewhat remarkable, and with good reason, that, amongst two classes of people living in the same country, and whose intercourse with each other has extended for centuries, there should exist such divergencies in respect to their social institutions as is the case with the marriage and divorce laws of the Mohammedans and Hindns. With the one, as has been shown above, marriage is merely a civil contract, into which a man may or may not enter as he pleases; whilst with the other it is a religious ceremony, partaking of the nature of a sacrament,

* *Vide Dur-ool-Mooktar*, p. 216.

and constitutes a condition of life which every Hindu, as much by the sanctions of his religion as by the usages and customs of his class, finds it obligatory upon him to assume. Then again, whereas amongst the followers of Islam every facility is given to a husband to obtain a divorce from his wife, with the Hindus, the nuptial knot when once tied is indissoluble, notwithstanding the existence of grounds, however valid, which with other nations are held to justify the granting of a divorce. What makes the existence of such a law the more objectionable, is the fact that it unduly presses upon the weaker sex; for whereas a woman once married cannot by any means sever the connection with her husband, however much she may be injured or wronged, the husband practically has the power to set her aside, and though nominally she does not cease to be his wife, yet to all intents and purposes she is, as it were, dead to him. And not more than about a quarter of a century ago, even the death of the husband did not dissolve a tie formed in his lifetime, for with the utmost rigidity was the injunction carried out which prohibited widows to re-marry. Although now, by Act XV. of 1856, this terrible disability has been removed, yet the fact that its provisions are so seldom availed of by those for whose benefit they were framed, shows how averse the Hindu community at large is towards adopting an innovation which, however conducive to its welfare, is found to run counter to its social and religious prejudices. Yet it is in reality a moot point whether the Hindu code does prohibit widow marriage; at all events, the valuable pamphlets published by the late Iswara Chandra Vidyasagar have not only thrown considerable doubt on the subject, but by some are believed to prove conclusively that the *Shastras* do not prohibit widow marriage, and that gradually and imperceptibly the pernicious system grafted itself on Hindu society, which placed widows under such a disability.

With respect, however, to the divorce law of the Hindus, it will be found, by reference to the *Vedas*, and some of the earlier commentators of Manu, that in the primitive stages of Hindu society, marriage was looked upon in a light different to what it is now, and that its being considered indissoluble under any circumstances, is an innovation on ancient law and customs. The text of Manu, which is in these days looked upon as containing the ancient law of the Hindus, no doubt sustains the view of its indissolubility, for it says: "Neither by sale, nor by desertion, can a wife be released from her husband;" and again, "Nor is a second husband allowed in any part of this code to a virtuous woman;" whilst the fact that strict injunctions are given to a man to marry only a virgin

indicates that such an idea as that of a woman marrying again was never contemplated. But by reference to other authorities, and some of a period anterior to that in which the present text was written, a great discrepancy is found to exist in the law bearing on the point. Thus Parasara says: "If the husband be missing or dead, or retired from the world, or impotent or degraded, in these five calamities, a woman may take another husband;" and Narada, whose text is admittedly of an earlier date than the abridgment of Manu, says: "There are five cases in which a woman may take another husband—her first husband having perished, or died naturally, or gone abroad, or if he be impotent, or have lost his caste." And Devala, in a similar strain, enjoins: "Eight years let a woman of the sacerdotal class wait for her absent lord, or four years if she has borne no children; after these periods she may unite herself to another man;" and "for women of the servile class no period is ordained, nor do they violate their duty by an early second marriage; but for those especially who have borne no children the settled rule prescribes one year" (Dig. IV. 153). Thus there can be no doubt that the present view of the indissolubility of a marriage tie is a manifest innovation on the Hindu law, as it originally existed. How the contradiction in the various texts came about is, however, more a matter of historical interest, than calculated to answer any practical purpose, so far as the scope of this article is concerned.

But though a marriage, when once contracted, is considered indissoluble according to the Hindu law, yet practically, so far, at any rate, as one party to it—the man—is concerned, all the advantages which might follow from the law being otherwise than what it is, do in reality accrue to him. And this, no doubt, is the reason why a Hindu is so indifferent as to the existing state of the marriage law, and cares little whether it is amended or not. For, whilst a woman may on no account take to herself a second husband (though the first probably died while yet in his infancy, and before the marriage was actually consummated), it is permitted to a man to put away his wife from him, and to supersede her by another. This may be done in two ways: first, by the consent of the wife; second, for legal causes; and amongst these may be enumerated want of chastity, barrenness, intemperance, bad temper, production of daughters only, or for committing any sin in the first degree (such as killing a Brahmin, drinking forbidden liquor, stealing gold, &c.), for which offence she was liable to be excommunicated. Practically, however, the supersession of a wife generally takes place at the mere will of her husband. This right to supersede her appears not to have been enjoyed by the Hindus in

the earliest ages, for monogamy was the prevailing rule then.* It is a strange anomaly in the Hindu law that permits a man, with or without reason, to put away his wife, whereas, however infamous his life, and however much his unfortunate partner may have been wronged or injured by him, yet she cannot sever the connection, or refuse to him the duties of a wife, without bringing upon herself the vengeance of the law. It is to be hoped that, even amongst orthodox Hindus, a disposition will be shown to mitigate, to some extent, the hardships of her lot. But, though a husband is allowed to supersede his wife, the idea of the indissolubility of the marriage tie is carried out in so far, that he is bound to maintain her under all circumstances. Where she is set aside without any disqualifying cause on her part, she is required to be maintained in a suitable style; but, should she have been superseded by reason of her unchastity or excommunication from caste, she can only claim what has been styled starving maintenance—"the lowest bed, the meanest food, the worst habitation." Of course, it need scarcely be said that even this is not allowed her if she continues to live an unchaste life.

But though a wife is not permitted by the Hindu code to separate from her husband for his cruelty, inconstancy, or profligacy, there are certain circumstances under which she may lawfully desert him without the marriage tie being by any means dissolved. In the earlier days of Hinduism, as has been shown, a wife was, under certain circumstances, not only permitted to leave her husband, but also to marry again. When, however, the right of remarriage was taken from her by the Hindu code, the reasons which permitted her to desert her husband were considerably circumscribed, owing, no doubt, to a great extent, to a want of inducement on her part to do so; so that at the present time, according to modern writers, the only grounds which would justify her desertion of her husband, are his degradation and loss of caste. The English Judges have, however, very materially relaxed the rules in her favour; and in cases where a suit has been brought against a wife for the restitution of conjugal rights, they have given her protection against a husband guilty of cruelty, or who is impotent, or a lunatic, or suffering from a loathsome disease. Another reason which would justify the desertion of a husband by the wife, would be the change in his religion. By renouncing his religion, he, as it were, removes himself out of the pale of Hindu law and Hindu society, and consequently finds his marital rights considerably altered. The case of a Hindu of, either

* See STATESMAN for August; Article, "Diversity in the Marriage Laws of India," p. 564.

sex becoming a Christian is provided for by Act XXI. of 1866;* and in a case where a Hindu widow adopted the Mohammedan religion and married a Mohammedan, the Calcutta High Court held "that the Hindu law disentitling a widow to inherit on remarriage, did not apply to her; for, according to the principle laid down in sec. 3, Act XXI. of 1858, and sec. 9, Reg. VII. of 1832, conversion does not involve forfeiture of inheritance.† In certain cases a marriage is considered void *ab initio* by the Hindu law: first, when there is a difference in caste; and, secondly, when the parties belong to the same gotra—*i.e.*, are related within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity. The husband, under these circumstances, has no other alternative but to repudiate his wife, though he is bound to maintain her. She cannot, however, remarry, although she may have been repudiated before the consummation of the marriage. But the English Courts do not strictly carry out the provisions of the Hindu law where it operates with manifest injustice against the weaker sex. Thus, in a case‡ in which a girl five years of age was abducted by her brother-in-law, and forcibly married by him, the mother of the girl brought a suit in a civil court to declare the marriage invalid; and it was held that "a civil court must have jurisdiction in such suit to declare the marriage void if procured by fraud or force, and celebrated without the consent of the necessary parties, or without the formalities necessary to render it a binding marriage according to Hindu law."

CUSTOMARY LAWS.

It has been shown in a previous article§ how the Hindu law in many parts of India has been superseded by local customs and usages, and in no relation of life is this better exemplified than in the rules relating to marriage and divorce. Ordinarily, a Hindu, when once married, cannot obtain a dissolution of his marriage for any cause whatever; but this general rule is varied in some parts by what may be called the customary law prevailing amongst particular castes and particular families, the validity of which law has been recognized by the Courts in India. Thus it has been held "that a divorce is permitted to a wife, according to the

* See STATESMAN for August, 1881, p. 561.

† Gopal Singh (Plff.) v. Dhangazee and others (Defdts.), "Sutherland's Weekly Reporter," Vol. III., p. 206.

‡ Angona Dasi (Plff.) v. Prahlad Chandra Ghore and others, Bengal Law Rep., Vol. VI., p. 243.

§ STATESMAN, August, 1881, p. 568.

Kansara caste, in case of ill-treatment,"* and that "a divorce will be granted to a woman on account of her husband's dissolute life and bad character, if it be proved to be permitted in such cases by the caste, though the Shastras do not admit of divorce under any circumstances."† And where a member of a Gandharva caste having married a second wife, the first wife sued for a divorce, or a repudiation of the second wife, the Court, while admitting that unless there was good cause, *natra* (second marriage) was not permitted amongst them, held, "if both the wives agreed, he might keep them both; but if not, the husband must grant a divorce to the dissenting one. The Court therefore granted a divorce to the first wife."‡ In Western India, chiefly amongst the lower classes, divorce is allowed by consent under certain circumstances. Mr. Steele, who is an authority as to the local usages prevailing in that part of India, says: "Those circumstances are, if the husband prove impotent, or the parties continually quarrel; if the marriage were irregularly concluded; if by mutual consent the husband break the wife's neck ornament, and give a *chor chithi* (leave to go). After which divorce, with the concurrence of the caste, the wife may perform *pat* (inferior marriage) with another man, and sometimes even without their concurrence. And if, after twelve years' absence, a husband continue unheard of, his wife may perform *pat*; but should he afterwards return, she may go back to her first husband, or live with either at her option, the party deserted being reimbursed his marriage expenses."§ Amongst the Santals, the custom of a husband and wife divorcing themselves by tearing a pan-leaf in the presence of witnesses is still commonly practised; but what will be considered somewhat astonishing is the fact that this procedure is in vogue amongst even the Christians of those parts of India, with the consent of the missionaries residing there. It need scarcely be said that this mode of separation between a husband and a wife, belonging to a class to whom the Indian Divorce Act (IV. of 1869) applies, would not be recognized as legal by the Courts of the country; but the missionaries have been reluctantly led to adopt or sanction this course rather than see native Christian men and women cohabiting with persons to whom they have not been married. The expenses attending any proceedings taken under the Divorce Act are so great, as to be far beyond

* *Kasiram Kriparam v. Unant Rao Harichand*, 1 Bor., p. 387.

† *Kasi Dhoolab v. Rattan Bace*, 1 Bor., p. 410.

‡ *Morashunker Khooshal v. Mussnet Dootan* and others (cited in "Morley's Digest," p. 289).

§ Steele on "The Laws and Customs of Hindu Castes in the Deccan," p. 168.

the means of these poor Christians, who probably earn no more than 3d. or 4d. a day. Thus, where a man has been deserted by his wife, or has been found unfaithful to him, he would either have to obtain a divorce through the regularly constituted Courts, which is altogether beyond his means, or simply get another woman to live with him to look after his house and children. In preference to this latter course, the missionaries, in some parts of the Santal country, sanction an arrangement of their own, which they call "an ecclesiastical marriage, or marriage of divorced parties, or of separated parties, according to the teachings of Christ." Says one of these missionaries: "When either of the parties are Church members, as has thus far been the case, the Church engages to accept this, and to regard the parties as truly man and wife, though not so in the eye of the law. I am aware that this course might lead to mischief in questions of property; but the class to which this refers are not likely to be troubled by any such questions. If it be objected that this course is irregular and injurious, my answer is that we have only to choose between this and cohabitation without any form or idea of marriage, which would, of course, exclude the parties from our Christian communities."*

As regards, however, the customary law prevailing in various parts of India, the English Courts discourage, as far as they can, an indiscriminate use of this right of divorce, and refuse to recognize it as valid unless obtained with the consent of both parties. Thus, where a woman of the Sampoorra caste of Brahmins, amongst whom *natra* (remarriage) is allowed, had married again in the lifetime of the first husband, without his consent, the Courts declined to regard her as the lawful wife of the second husband.† And, again, where by a custom of the Talpakoli caste a woman was permitted to leave the husband to whom she had been first married, and to contract a second marriage with another man during the lifetime of the first, and without his consent, the Bombay High Court held such marriage to be invalid, as being entirely opposed to the spirit of the Hindu law; and also that it was "void by reason of its taking place during the lifetime of such husband."‡

In bringing to a conclusion this article, want of space will not permit more than an allusion to the fact that within recent years the

* *Indian Evangelical Review*, April, 1881, p. 415.

† *Khunkhor (widow of Rangbeer) v. Umashunker Ranchor*, 10 Bom. H. C. Rep., p. 381.

‡ *Reg. v. Karsan Goza*, 2 Bom. H. C. Rep., p. 117.

Indian Legislature has passed a Divorce Act (XV. of 1865) applicable to the Parsees, which is framed on nearly the same lines as the Indian Divorce Act (Christian), which latter Act has also been made operative as regards the Reformed Hindus. See 17 of Act III. of 1872.

ALFRED NUNDY.

Lincoln's Inn.

THE SEASON AND THE CEREALS.

[From the TIMES.]

ESTIMATES of the crops in advance may be fallacious when venturing into elaborate details, yet reliable if limited to the general character of the harvest and the probable degree of productiveness, as compared with that of past years; and, naturally, the soundest view of the outturn of wheat, barley, and other corn crops grown this year in the United Kingdom is to be gathered from the valuations of practised observers, collected over the widest available area, rather than from the limited personal survey of any single authority, however competent he may be. Hence conclusions drawn from the returns procured by the *Agricultural Gazette* and the *Mark Lane Express* early in the harvest period have always been found approximately near to the more accurate determinations arrived at later, after a considerable proportion of the produce has been thrashed and sent to market; while it frequently happens that individuals who generalize from a restricted field of observation are compelled to amend their first estimates as erroneous. This year we are furnished with three sets of returns—namely, those of the two agricultural journals just mentioned, and those of M. B. Estienne. The latter comprise reports from a large number of growers in all the chief corn districts of Great Britain; the *Mark Lane Express* has published returns from 353 correspondents in every county of England and Wales; and the *Agricultural Gazette* reports from 296 correspondents, in nearly all the counties of England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland. The estimate of M. Estienne is that the wheat crop of Great Britain is 10 per cent. below an average, barley 10 per cent. above an average, and oats 20 per cent. below an average. The *Mark Lane Express* summarizes the wheat crop as inferior to that of last year and much below an average; barley as above an average; and oats very much below. And the *Agricultural Gazette*, confirming this conclusion, says that, while the "under average" reports of wheat are as numerous as in 1880, they represent yields not so much below the average line; the whole effect being to bring the total nearer to a standard average crop than was the wheat of last year. Mr. James Caird infers from the detailed information that on two-thirds of the wheat land an average crop will be made up by fineness of quality, while on one-third, even with that aid, the deficiency will be at least 10 per cent. Barley is the best crop of the year, but has not ripened equally; and oats are extremely deficient, especially in the southern counties. A time of rain, stopping harvest operations and seriously damaging all corn in the field, has since lowered this apparently fair and just estimate. Mr. Caird expects our total wheat produce to reach about 9,600,000 quarters; M. Estienne puts the quantity at 10,000,000 quarters. The optimist of the season is Mr. H. Kains-Jackson, who, early in the present month, expressed his opinion that the wheat of the kingdom would yield an average of 30 bushels per acre, and the production exceed by 3,000,000 quarters the poor crop of last year. This view, however, was subject to our having a reasonably fair month for in-gathering.

A consideration of the general law of wheat production in Britain—namely, that the yield is proportional to the summer temperature, with the modifying

conditions of rainfall, prevalence of cloud, character of the weather at blossoming time and during harvest, and the state of growth of the plant at the commencement of the summer—would be enough of itself to preclude any estimate of this year's wheat crop as a full average, even though the general inference as to deficient quantity is partly counterbalanced by boldness of the grain. This governing influence of a high or low thermometer is established by the observations of many years, as may be seen from the table (page 674), giving the number of degrees of mean temperature above or below the average for the two principal months of filling or ripening the wheat-ear during a series of years ending in 1841, and including some years in the last century which were remarkable for cereal abundance or deficiency. The character of the crop, and remarks as to circumstances which varied or intensified the effect of temperature, appear in the last column.

It will be seen that the eight years of temperature above an average—that is, 1775, 1779, 1818, 1822, 1825, 1826, 1834, and 1835—had good harvests; while the nine years of temperature below an average—namely, 1789, 1792, 1795, 1799, 1809, 1810, 1811, 1812, and 1816—were distinguished for inferior yields. The greatest wheat crops were in 1779, 1818, and 1826, when the temperature was from 2·3 to 4·3 degrees above the average. Similarly, the years of greatest deficiency were 1789, 1795, 1799, 1810, 1812, and 1816, when the heat of July and August was 2·0 to 4·8 degrees under the average. In exceptional years a temperature about the average produced sometimes inferior, sometimes fair crops, according to other influences, as in 1791, with temperature 0·5 degrees below, the harvest was good owing to the dryness of the season; and in 1800 a temperature 0·7 degrees above the average brought only a bad crop, because of the excessive rains. In those years for which we have not given the figures the general record as to the heat or coldness of the summer agrees with the plentiful or defective character of the harvest.

For the last thirty-five years, ended 1880, we give in the next table the difference of the July and August mean temperature from the average of a hundred years, and also the excess or deficiency in the rainfall compared with a fifty years' average:—

Year.	Mean Temperature of July and August. Difference from the average in degrees Fahrenheit.		Rainfall in July and August. Difference from the average. In inches.		Character of the Wheat Crop.
	Above.	Below.	Above.	Below.	
1846	2·3	—	1·88	—	Over average.
1847	2·0	—	—	2·40	{ Over average. Quality damaged by mildew and red-gum.
1848	—	1·3	2·19	—	Under average. Latter part of August was wet.
1849	0·4	—	—	0·55	{ Over average. Nearly average temperature, with fine weather.
1850	—	1·4	—	0·64	Under average. Great losses by mildew.
1851	0·6	—	1·16	—	Average crop. Late harvest.
1852	2·7	—	1·29	—	{ Under average. A very fine crop was injured by excessive rains and high temperature together, in two weeks of August, causing mildew.
1853	—	1·4	2·28	—	Very much under average. Excessive rainfall.
1854	—	0·9	—	0·09	{ Average. Scanty rainfall. Some mildew and sprouting.
1855	0·5	—	3·05	—	Under average. Beaten down by heavy rain in July.

Year.	Mean Temperature of July and August. Difference from the average in degrees Fahrenheit.		Rainfall in July and August. Difference from the average. In inches.		Character of the Wheat Crop.
	Above.	Below.	Above.	Below.	
1856	0.5	—	0.08	—	Over average. Small rainfall.
1857	1.7	—	0.63	—	Much over average. Moderate rainfall.
1858	—	0.8	—	0.69	Over average. The plant had suffered from unusual drought in spring and summer.
1859	1.8	—	—	0.93	Under average. Injured by too rapid ripening in July, and the heavy crops were much laid by storms.
1860	—	4.6	2.50	—	Very much under average. Remarkably cold and rainy summer.
1861	0.3	—	—	2.14	Under average. The crop suffered from excessive thinness of plant.
1862	—	2.6	—	0.15	Much under average. Storms beat down the crops before the grain was fully formed.
1863	—	1.4	—	1.76	Much over average. Summer specially dry, with bright sunshine at and after blooming time.
1864	—	2.2	—	2.86	Much under average.
1865	—	1.0	2.31	—	Very much under average. Moderate heat, but excessive rainfall.
1866	0.1	—	—	0.07	Under average.
1867	0.0	0.0	1.95	—	Very much under average. Average heat; rain more than average. Thin plant.
1868	4.1	—	—	2.71	Much over average. Very hot and dry summer.
1869	—	0.4	—	2.57	Under average. Inferior plant. Heat neutralized by excessive cloud. The crops storm-broken and mildewed.
1870	0.7	—	—	1.00	Over average. Very fine, sunny season; fine blooming time and hot harvest.
1871	1.2	—	—	0.52	Under average; cold and wet July; crop heavily laid by storms and mildewed. The August heat was too late.
1872	1.3	—	0.2	—	Much under average. A defective plant; crop severely injured by storms in July. August cold and cloudy.
1873	1.9	—	0.1	—	Much under average. Bad seed time, defective and sickly plant. Cold June, suddenly changing to heat. Frosts at blooming time.
1874	1.3	—	—	0.9	Over average.
1875	—	0.3	2.6	—	Much under average. Cold July, with double the usual rainfall; but August warm.
1876	3.6	—	—	1.15	Under average in quantity, but quality fine. The crop defective, owing to an unprecedentedly bad seed time, and excessive wet and cold in spring and early summer. Ears imperfectly filled, from late frosts.
1877	—	1.0	0.3	—	Much under average. Storms and heavy rainfall in part of July and August.
1878	1.2	—	0.7	—	Over average; but sudden heat in August, following a cold and wet June and July, caused imperfect setting of the ear.
1879	—	2.8	4.0	—	Very much under average. Exceptionally low mean temperature. Incessant rains, with unprecedentedly total fall. A disastrous harvest-time.
1880	1.0	—	0.2	—	Under average. July temperature 2 deg. below average, though not so cold as in 1879, but a heavier fall of rain. August temperature 0½ deg. above average, and rainfall, 0.25 in. below.

Year.	Mean Temperature of July and August. Difference from the Average, in Degrees Fahrenheit.		Character of the Wheat Crop.
	Above.	Below.	
1775	1·2	—	Plentiful harvest.
1779	2·3	—	One-fourth above an average.
1789	—	2·0	Very deficient.
1791	—	0·5	Abundant crop, owing to dry season.
1792	—	1·6	Inferior harvest; much injury from wet.
1795	—	2·2	Very defective crop.
1799	—	2·3	Wet, cold summer. Much grain destroyed.
1800	0·7	—	Bad crop, from excessive rains. Harvest only partially saved.
1809	—	1·3	Deficient crop. Wheat suffered from mildew and sprouting. Long-continued rains.
1810	—	3·7	Bad, scanty crop. Much mildew.
1811	—	1·7	Five-eighths of an average. Mildew.
1812	—	3·8	Very defective crop.
1816	—	4·8	Very great deficiency in quantity and quality. Heavy rains and cold all the summer. One of the worst harvests known.
1817	—	—	Deficient harvest. Very cold and wet July and August.
1818	4·3	—	Most abundant crop. Scarcely any rain for four summer months.
1819	—	—	Fine crop of wheat. Very fine, hot summer. August intensely hot.
1820	—	—	Productive crop. Fine summer.
1821	—	—	Inferior crop. Cold and showery summer, with a few hot days. Great rains during harvest.
1822	2·2	—	Full average, and good quality.
1823	—	—	Deficient harvest. Cold, wet summer. Rain fell on every day in July except one.
1824	—	—	Average wheat crop. Moderately fine and warm.
1825	2·0	—	Early and good harvest.
1826	4·0	—	Remarkably early harvest. Crop very great. Hottest and driest summer known.
1827	—	—	Good crop. Hot and dry.
1828	—	—	Bad harvest. Immense rains and flood in July and August.
1829	—	—	Inferior crop. Cold stormy summer.
1830	—	—	Under average. Cold and wet.
1831	—*	—	Fair crop. Warm, showery.
1832	—	—	Under average. Medium weather.
1833	—	—	Abundant harvest. Very fine summer.
1834	2·5	—	Very productive. Early harvest. Fine, hot summer, but heavy rains in July.
1835	2·6	—	Good crop, but much laid by June rains. Hot and dry in July and August.
1836	0·3	—	Medium crop in England; inferior in Scotland. Rain in July and August. Harvest very backward.
1837	—	—	Harvest deficient. Average summer weather after a severe spring.
1838	—	—	Late unproductive harvest. Cold, wet summer.
1839	—	—	Harvest damaged by very heavy, incessant rains.
1840	—	—	Fine yield of wheat. Warm summer, with intense heat in August.
1841	—	—	Under average. Wet and cold in July and August.

In the thirty-five years, those of mean temperature above the average were marked by wheat crops correspondingly good, with exceptions which are explained by reference to the modifying causes stated under the head "Remarks." And similarly the years of low mean temperature in the July and August period brought inferior harvests, with exceptions in which the modifying influences were known and observable at the time of reaping or before it.

The wheat crop of the present year began its summer period with a remarkably backward and thin plant. June brought a growing time, followed by cold. The intense day temperature in July, with extreme cold and even frosts at night, made the mean low excepting in one week; and all three weeks of August have been excessively low in temperature. The third week and later still have inflicted upon us the calamity of a thoroughly wet harvest for all but a few early districts. The figures for June, July, and August (down to the week ended the 22nd) appear in the following table, and are averaged for England and Wales from the weather statistics published daily.

1811. Week ended	Mean Temperature. Difference from the Average, in Degrees Fahrenheit.		Rainfall. Difference from the Average in 10ths of an Inch.	
	Above	Below.	More.	Less.
June 6.....	2	—	4	—
June 13	—	8	—	2
June 20	—	2	3	—
June 27	—	3	—	0 1-6
July 4	—	1	—	4
July 11	—	1	3	—
July 18	3	—	—	5
July 25.....	—	2	—	3
August 1.....	—	4	5	—
August 8.....	—	0½	0½	—
August 15	—	6	1	—
August 22	—	4	5	—

The mean temperature of July was below an average. In August, so far, it has been 3 degrees below the average, and the rains have been so excessive that in the week ended August 22nd the amount which fell was *50 per cent. more than an average; and by inference the wheat crop cannot but be deficient, though barley is good in quantity. If the estimates quoted at the opening of this article should have to be materially amended, it will be by subtraction, on account of the inclemency of the elements to which the farmers' property at this moment lies exposed.

PERIODICITY OF RAINY AND DRY YEARS.

M. DE PARVILLE has published in the *Journal des Débats* a paper on the temperature of the present year, which at Paris has risen to a height exceeding all previous authentic records. On July 5th, at the Observatory in the Park of St. Maur, the Centigrade thermometer registered 35·6 degrees, and on July 15th, 37·8 degrees. The highest temperature previously recorded during the present century was 36·75 degrees on July 31st, 1803. Higher temperatures have been recorded,

but their authenticity has been questioned. Thus, Cassini has recorded 40 degrees for August 17th, 1701; but it is believed that the true temperature was only 36·85 degrees. So, also, the temperatures set down by Messier of 39 degrees in 1763, and 40 degrees in 1765, are attributed to errors of observation, and should be corrected to 36·6 and 37·5 degrees respectively. M. de Parville passes on to ask whether the dryness of the present summer could have been foreseen, and he answers in the affirmative. Having referred to the influence of solar action on the atmosphere, he says: "A very long series of observations has also shown that the moon, which passes every month from one hemisphere to the other, influences the direction of the great atmospheric currents. The changes in those currents, in consequence of the prevailing moisture or dryness, are intimately connected with the relative position for the time being of the sun and moon. The distance of the moon from the equator—that is, the inclination of the moon's path to the plane of the equator—varies every year, passing from a *maximum* to a *minimum* limit; and the meteorological character of a series of years appears to be mainly dependent upon the change of inclination when those extreme limits have been touched. Observations prove that the rainy years, the cold winters, and hot summers return periodically, and coincide with certain declinations of the moon. In our latitudes the rainy years occur when the moon's declination has touched its extreme limits of 28, 26, or 18 degrees respectively. They are separated from each other usually by periods of about three years and then six years. The following table traces backwards this connection between the rainy years and the moon's declination:—

Rainy Year.	Greatest declina- tion of Moon.				Rainy Year.	Greatest declina- tion of Moon.			
	Deg.					Deg.			
1879	26	1819	28
1876	28	1816	26
1872	26	1810	18
1866	18	1804	26
1859	26	1800	28
1856	28	1798	26
1853	26	1792	18
1845	18	1787	26
1836	26	1785	28
1828	18	1783	26
1821	26					

The severe winters, as a rule, coincide, at least within a year, with the same declinations:—1879, 1875, 1871, 1867, 1859, 1857, 1853, 1846, 1837, 1835, 1830, 1829, 1822, 1819, 1818, 1815, 1812, 1809, 1804, 1801, 1798, 1792, 1788, 1785, 1782. The dry summers come naturally in the middle of the period which divides two wet years, thus—1874, 1869, 1863, 1857, 1854, 1849, 1842, 1832, 1825. Applying the rule which this experience suggests to the summer of 1881, we find that the next wet year ought to coincide with the declination of 18 deg., therefore, with the year 1884, as the last was 1879 with the declination of 26 deg. Consequently the dry summers should come about the middle of the intervening period between those two years—that is, they should be 1881 and 1882. It might, therefore, have been foreseen that, beginning with 1880, we were proceeding towards a *maximum* of dryness."

THE CRISIS IN EGYPT.

THERE seems a fair prospect of Egyptian affairs being tranquillised, for the time, without the two controlling Powers—Great Britain and France—being obliged either to land troops, or to adopt the still more questionable expedient of calling for a military occupation by the forces of the Sultan. Strong and apparently well-founded suspicions of the Porte's complicity in the revolution, strengthen the obvious objections to the employment of Ottoman forces, or to any formal invocation of the Sultan's suzerainty. The settlement that has been made under the influence of Sherif Pasha is evidently only provisional, and regular government cannot be re-established until the Khedive is in a position to assert his lawful supremacy over the military conspirators who have set executive authority at defiance, and installed a new Ministry of their own choice. Great Britain and France combined will, of course, utilize the time thus gained for deliberation, so as to preclude the recurrence of Pretorian anarchy, and to promote more progressive institutions. But might there not be called into existence, by the initiative of Liberal statesmanship in Paris as well as in London, a combination for the control and administrative reform of Egypt, more powerful, and, therefore, more peaceful, than even that of Great Britain and France? We mean the concert of Europe. To our mind, the most hopeful and pleasing incident accompanying the Egyptian crisis—although it may not be so well founded as we could wish—has been the apparent interest in the question taken by the Government of Germany, as indicated in the semi-official journals of Berlin. French popular jealousy, and French officialism of the commonplace order, have been agitated and irritated at the notion of Prince Bismarck busying himself about Egypt. Several of our own Imperialistic, and would-be "patriotic," papers, also, have taken the alarm, and pronounce the reports as to the admission of German counsels in Egyptian affairs, to be "most disquieting rumours." They declare that it is much against our interest and our dignity that the Egyptian question should be converted from an Anglo-French into a European concern. This is exactly what we cannot see. We can see no reasonable objection whatever to thus extending the consultative circle; and we can see very much to commend such a course. We can conceive no policy more pacifying, more conciliatory, and, we will add, more constructive than that of inviting not Germany only, but Italy and Spain, to join in a conference for a decisive settlement of the entire Egyptian question.

We could understand, though we do not approve, a policy of exclusively British domination in Egypt, as recommended by Mr. E. V. Dickey, and more lately by Sir Julian Goldsmid, whether enforced by military occupation or not, and whether exercised by means of annexation or under the forms of a protectorate. Such a policy was open to us during the eclipse of France, for some years after the war with Germany, and up to the Treaty of Berlin, shortly before which time Prince Bismarck is reported to have suggested some such course to Lord Beaconsfield, and to have promised it his "moral" support. It was declined, probably because Lord Beaconsfield had then fixed his affections on Cyprus, and wished to make sure of it first. The attitude of the French and Italian representatives at the Berlin Conference proved that one such brilliant stroke was quite enough at a time, and reduced Lord Salisbury to the necessity of bargaining with France for divided control in Egypt, and even to acquiescence

in the French appropriation of Tunis. It was another instance of the utter incapacity of Lord Beaconsfield and his half-reluctant Lieutenant and successor, to master the details of business; to measure the means, or to count the cost of their rash schemes and enterprises, in Europe, in Afghanistan, and in South Africa. Just as the speeches and the circulars, the naval manœuvres, the credit of six millions, the expenditure of that sum and of much more, the calling out of the Reserves, and the expedition of Sepoys to Malta and back again, ended in Russia getting all she had ever claimed, and in the partition of Turkey being aggravated by the loss of Bosnia and Herzegovina; so our seeming triumph over France and aggrandisement as a Mediterranean Power, positively made the Queen a tributary vassal of the Porte in Cyprus, while *carte blanche* was given to France in Tunis without that vassaldom, and equal partnership with ourselves in Egypt. Such were the real results of the pseudo-Imperialistic demonstrations of the late Ministry.

We could, as we have said, appreciate, without approving, a plan for exclusive domination in Egypt; as we could have appreciated, without approving, a war with Russia for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. But the policy of irritating, without intimidating or even impeding Russia, and of at once championing and abandoning the Porte, was as feminine as humiliating to the nation. Nor can we approve or appreciate in the least—though it may be tolerated as a temporary expedient—the dual control in Egypt. So long as that control continues to depend on the harmony and mutual forbearance of the French and English officials on the spot, while exposed to the intrigues of Constantinople and Cairo, there *must* be danger of complications and even of collision. More than once, there have been symptoms of divergence between the representatives of the two Powers. The intervention of France in Tunis, for which we are indebted to Lord Salisbury, and no other, and the threatened intervention in Tripoli, evidently put a strain on the Egyptian partnership. Two great and jealous Powers, exercising a divided control under any circumstances, and under critical contingencies that are easily conceivable, *must* run the risk of being pushed into the attitude of open rivals, and even of antagonists. On the other hand, there would be little danger, we think, of a united European control splitting up into rival parties, or degenerating into a mass of disputants. Such a balanced and well-ordered control for Egyptian administration in general, and not merely for finance, appears to us to be what is required. What does Great Britain want from Egypt, but simple security for uninterrupted passage through the Suez Canal? And in what way could that be more surely placed beyond danger of disturbance, than by the concert of Europe, which would signify an assurance of the neutrality of Egyptian soil? It would, in our opinion, be a real triumph of Liberal statesmanship, if the Anglo-French control of Egypt could be converted into a European coalition for the same objects. The “disquieting rumours” as to Prince Bismarck’s desire to take a part in Egyptian affairs are, we fear, too good to be true. That able and astute, but narrow, statesman has not hitherto shown himself apt to assume any external responsibilities not clearly and palpably conducive to German profit and advantage, if they seemed likely to involve the possibility of any demand on Germany either for coin or conscripts. The aim of our diplomacy should be to convince him that the majestic force of united Europe would extinguish at once both rivalry and intrigue, and would make its every fiat respected without the expenditure of either gold or blood. Great Britain and France, as the Powers most directly interested, might well retain the burden, much lightened by the European coalition, of having to subdue, at their own cost, any local resistance, in the event of such a necessity arising.

THE FRENCH TREATY OF COMMERCE.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE "TIMES."

SIR,—The abrogation of the Treaty of Commerce with France would be much to be regretted, though the policy which it initiated is doubtless liable to grave objection. In my "History of British Commerce" I remarked that the conclusion of such a treaty was a departure from the right principle of independent action which marked Sir Robert Peel's legislation; that, on financial as well as commercial grounds, such independence was especially desirable; and that it seemed most unjust for France to demand equivalent concessions from England for the small modicum of reforms she was about to introduce, when for years she had been enjoying in England the advantages of her freer commercial tariff. Nevertheless, the justifications for the conclusion of the treaty were reasonable and well founded. As was said, let us once get the removal of the prohibitions of imports, and the diminution of those import duties which now disfigure the French tariff, and we shall have a large increase of trade between the two countries, certain to lead to further and greater reforms, and to the ultimate establishment of sound commercial principles on both sides of the Channel. And the results have more than verified such expectations. The commerce between France and the United Kingdom, within the last twenty years, has increased as follows:—

Years.	Imports from France. £	Exports to France. £	Total Trade. £
1859	16,871,000	9,561,000	26,432,000
1869	33,527,000	23,277,000	56,804,000
1879	41,970,000	27,991,000	69,961,000

IMPORTS. Principal Articles.			
		1860.	1880.
Articles of Food—			
Animals	No.	7,620	8,151
Butter	cwt.	99,020	531,649
Eggsgt. 100	1,364,050	3,151,158
Potatoes	cwt.	302,018*	1,792,574
Sugar	cwt.	605,277	1,701,714
Spirits and Wine—			
Brandy	galls.	2,222,265	2,856,833
Wine	galls.	2,445,151	6,996,314
Manufactures—			
Artificial Flowers	£	113,018	427,015
Silk Manufactures	£	2,273,430	9,588,000
Woollen Manufactures	£	1,049,347	3,165,000
Gloves	pairs	5,224,248	13,277,472

EXPORTS. Principal Articles			
		1860.	1880.
Materials for Manufacture—			
Coal	tons	1,552,018	3,715,762
Cotton yarn	lbs.	533,931	4,954,500
Linen yarn	lbs.	572,585	947,100
Machinery	£	171,020	695,678
Painters' colours	£	34,082	98,267
Manufactures—			
Cotton manufactures	yards	10,371,407	56,380,400
Linen manufactures	yards	1,299,379	3,437,600
Woollen manufactures	yards	4,491,216	53,986,360
Earthenware	cwt.	7,377	103,794
Caoutchouc manufactures	£	13,472	158,612
Hardware	cwt.	15,063	174,161
Apparel	£	44,418	161,036

What can be more satisfactory than these figures? Evidently both countries have given much, more largely to one another of their produce and manufactures than they were wont to do previous to the conclusion of the Treaty of Commerce, and so far the object of the treaty has been fully attained. Why, then, disturb a policy so beneficial? Where are our French economists? Are the successors of Horace Say, Michel Chevalier, and Wolowski silent when economic questions of such supreme importance are being discussed, and the economic interests of the country imperilled? Are the interests of the nation or the interests of a class to be paramount? French manufacturers still think that the importation of foreign merchandize into France is only an intrusion into their own domain, and they count, if not upon prohibition, at least upon high duties for shutting it out altogether. But what is the effect of such a policy on the nation? It draws labour and capital from the most to the least profitable investment; it increases the cost of every commodity; it limits the choice of market; it restricts trade and shipping; it shuts out the thousand employments which trade brings in its train; in short, it impoverishes the people as a whole in order to benefit a class. Nor is a close privileged market of any real advantage to the manufacturers themselves, for in the end they must share either in the prosperity or declensions of the whole nation. What is bad for the people cannot be good for themselves.

In your leader on Friday you say that "the end of the French Commercial Treaty will probably be the signal for a new protectionist outcry in the country." I scarcely think that any man of sense will advocate the reversal of the free-trade policy—the policy of free imports of the principal articles of necessities of life, of free imports of the raw materials of industry, aye, of free imports of manufactured goods also. Clearly, England wants all she can get from foreign countries. The more she imports, the more she exports. The richer she becomes, the more she requires and she is entitled to get from abroad. And if some countries will throw hindrances to the importation of British manufactures, surely the world is open for all she can make. To attempt any policy of restriction or prohibition as a measure of retaliation or of threatening, in order to compel other countries to adopt a more liberal policy, would be quite out of the question, as most illiberal and most dangerous.

Having regard not only to the trade between England and France, but to the whole European trade, which is bound up with it, the abrogation of the Treaty of Commerce must be considered as a decided calamity. On the other hand, since the only justification for the same was the introduction of more freedom in the relations of commerce with France, clearly, unless such freedom is maintained to the full, the very *raison d'être* for such a treaty disappears, and it will be much better for both nations to recover their independence of action.

I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient servant,

LEONE LEVI.

5, Crown Office Row, Temple, August 3.

HOME AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE discussions in Parliament upon the Irish Land Bill are bearing their foreseen and legitimate fruits. The landlord legislation of the past, both in England and Scotland, has been under a verdict of condemnation for years past, and is about to be called up for judgment. At a numerous meeting of the General Committee of the Farmers' Alliance, held at Clement's House a few days ago, Mr. James Howard, M.P. in the chair, the following resolutions were adopted :—

I. That owing to the prolonged depression in agriculture, followed by another disastrous harvest, the introduction of remedial measures into Parliament is imperatively called for; and it is therefore resolved that a Land Bill for England and Scotland should be at once prepared by a special committee of the Farmers' Alliance.

II. That a conference of members of the Alliance shall be held during the first week in November, when the Bill prepared by the Committee shall be discussed; and that the Chairman in the meantime should ask the Prime Minister to receive a deputation.

III. The Committee, having carefully considered the present cry for "reciprocity" or "fair trade," desire to express the opinion that any concerted action between the farmers of the kingdom and those manufacturers who are seeking to revive protection would be most unwise upon the part of the farmers. The Committee believe that if it were possible by united effort to reverse the national policy of free trade and to restore protection, the first interest to be sacrificed would be that of agriculture; that if duties upon corn could be reimposed, they would be repealed at the first moment of difficulty, and this whichever party happened to be in power. The Committee cannot, therefore, but look upon the agitation for "fair trade" as a delusion and a snare—a delusion because, while there is not the remotest chance of the nation listening to any proposal to tax its food, duties on farm produce, even if allowed, would not only be of no permanent benefit to the tenant-farmer, but would prove injurious to his interests by raising the price of foreign corn now so largely required for stock feeding; a snare, because the proposal is an expedient for keeping up rents and for staving off agricultural reforms, which are the only true remedies in the hands of Parliament or restoring prosperity to the farming interest.

IV. The Committee hereby express their sympathy with the farmers of Aberdeenshire in the efforts made to obtain a reduction of rents and a Land Bill for Scotland, and thank them for the spirited action they have taken at recent meetings. The Committee learn with pleasure that a branch of the Alliance is to be formed in Aberdeenshire.

Disastrous as the last four seasons have been to the farmer, the conviction is becoming general that it is not in a change of seasons, but in a change of laws, that the hope of a reviving and successful agriculture lies for this country. No one asks, no one desires, a revolution in the land system of the country. Those of our readers who would understand the merits of this question, and the nature of the changes that have long been imperative, would do well to study the late Mr. Joseph Kay's "Free Trade in Land" (C. Kegan Paul and Co., 1879). We have arrived at this pass, that the landlord is as vitally interested in the reforms which Mr. Kay

specifies as the farmer, and the nation itself. We must carry these reforms, or see our agriculture destroyed, and with it our commercial supremacy, for it is a delusion to suppose that the one would survive the other.

In a letter to the *Times*, which we republish elsewhere, Professor Leone Levi shows how little reason there is for the French people to be dissatisfied with the results of the Commercial Treaty entered into with them by ourselves, under Mr. Cobden's management, twenty-one years ago. For ourselves, the objections to these engagements seem so important in principle, that we regret that the negotiations for the renewal of the Treaty, which had been suspended, are renewed. The French Government have agreed to the prolongation of the treaty for three months after the 8th of November next. We commend to our readers' attention the admirable letters of Earl Grey on this subject, published in the *Times*. The *Manchester Examiner* thinks Lord Grey unjust when he says that all we gained by the Treaty was "'a comparatively slight diminution of the duties charged upon some British goods imported into France.' The change was anything but trifling. But to do full justice to the Treaty, we must remember that it had political as well as fiscal objects. Just before it was negotiated, the relations of France and England were profoundly disturbed. One of our periodical invasion panics was in full swing. The Commercial Treaty brought the two countries together. Warlike apprehensions vanished, and for twenty years there has been peace." This is no-doubt true, and has its weight even now. We should be glad, however, we confess, if the Ministry saw its way to stand upon the simple principle of free trade with all nations. Our Customs' tariffs should be settled purely upon considerations of the *fisc*, other nations being left to follow our example or not, as they pleased, without being either coaxed or scolded to imitate it.

While Sir Stafford Northcote takes care to stand aloof, in Parliament, from the absurdities of Mr. Ashmead Bartlett, he does not scruple to play the rôle of that gentleman when addressing a Sheffield mob, to whom he laments that the present Ministry has not "the courage of Lord Beaconsfield" in its pursuit of empire. The spread of education amongst our working men is rapidly entombing tactics of this order, with the dead past. The *New York Herald*, representative of the great working man's Republic across the Atlantic, may well be permitted to reply to the affectation of the Conservative leader. "There is nothing," says the *Herald*, "for which we are disposed to give Mr. Gladstone higher commendation than for his magnanimity and firmness towards South Africa. Mr. Gladstone has risen above all other considerations, and has recognized the justice of the claims of the Transvaal for independence. He has ended a humiliating and disgraceful war by conceding to this people their undoubted right to govern themselves. The act will be criticized in England, but it will be remembered by conscientious and civilized people throughout the world to the honour of the Minister who was bold enough to attempt it, and to the lustre of the Crown which he serves with so much genius and fortitude."

Were Sir Stafford Northcote sincere in professing to lament the want of spirit shown by the present Government in the conduct of our foreign relations, we might remind him that it required far more courage—as the great American paper discerns, though Sir Stafford Northcote cannot—for the Ministry to act justly in South Africa, than to persevere in the course of aggression and violence to which the late Government committed the nation. The man must be insincere to the core who professes to be in any doubt as to the judgment of other nations upon the course of the present Ministry both in Afghanistan and in South Africa. Sir

Stafford Northcote cannot point to any part of the civilized world to-day which does not recognize the moral greatness of that course, and contrast it with the conduct of the late Ministry, to the disadvantage of the latter. No surer course could have been taken to rehabilitate the English people in the respect of mankind, than the total discredit into which the Jingo spirit has so rapidly fallen in our midst; and these unworthy efforts to revive it—not that it is believed to have been wise of wholesome, but for “party” purposes alone—will injure the Conservative leaders far more than it will the great Minister whom they regard with so much jealousy and fear. We hear a great deal at times of the Conservative working man; if he exists, as no doubt he does, he must find himself ill at ease with the great Trades’ Union Congress in London emphatically approving the course of the Ministry, and still more emphatically condemning the conduct of its predecessors both at home and abroad. The Farmers’ Alliance and the Trades’ Unions reject the interested Conservative cry for “protection” at home and a spirited foreign policy abroad, and the programme will have to be changed before there is any chance of a Tory Ministry again assuming office.

In the present crisis in Egypt, occasioned by the military rising at Cairo, the nation has good reason to congratulate itself that the late Ministry has no longer the guidance of the nation. If anything is likely to disarm French jealousy of our action in Egypt, it is the fact that a Liberal Ministry is now in office in this country. There is no danger whatever of any quarrel with France concerning Egypt, but such as arises from that selfish desire of predominance, the disappearance of which from our policy abroad, Sir Stafford Northcote affects to lament. We should not tolerate the assertion of any such predominance on the part of France, and it is hard to see why France should be expected to acquiesce in the assertion of our own. Right feeling and upright intention are all that is needed to surmount the difficulty that has arisen, by the joint action of the two Powers. Meanwhile, the French elections are over; the Republicans, or peace party, having beaten the Imperialists and Monarchists hopelessly, both Bonapartism and Legitimacy may, happily for the world, be deemed extinct. All eyes, meanwhile, are fastened upon Gambetta. But France has had enough of Dictators, and if we understand M. Gambetta’s character, none knows this better than he.

The conduct of our relations with the Native Princes of India has been marked of late years by such utter unscrupulousness, that Parliament would certainly put an end to it if it but knew the facts. But the India Office itself knows nothing of them. Our relations with the Native Princes are guarded with the utmost jealousy from the knowledge not merely of Parliament, but of the very India Office itself, lest the Secretary of State should get to know what is going on. We speak after having ascertained the fact, when we say that the India Office has heard nothing whatever, and knows nothing whatever to this hour, of the terms made with the Nizam, in 1873-4, for the abolition of the Southern Salt Line, and of the complete violation of those terms when our purpose was served, noticed by us elsewhere, any more than it does of the wide-spread resentment and disaffection created in the States of Central India and Rajpootana, by the injustice and oppression with which they have been treated in the abolition of the Northern Salt Line. Although these negotiations are of the utmost importance, and have been actively going on for years past, until now almost settled, the India Office, which means H.M.’s Secretary of State for India, knows nothing whatever about them. Not a line, we are told, has ever been communicated to the India Office as to their inception, nature, and progress. Commonly talked of in India, and notorious as was the fact of the wide-spread disaffection they had created, all knowledge of them

has been kept from the Anglo-Indian public and, as we now learn, to our astonishment, from H.M.'s Secretary of State at the India Office itself. Now this independence of all control is what the Indian official perpetually assures the people of this country is essential to a wise and just administration of the affairs of our great Indian Empire. Parliamentary check or interference of any kind would be fatal, they tell us. It would be to introduce "party" politics into the government of India; and so the safest thing to be done is, not to let Parliament know anything whatever about our administration that can be kept from its knowledge. The same audacious tactics are adopted towards the India Office and the Secretary of State himself, the pretence in this case being that India must be ruled from Calcutta, or that forcing-house of crime, in the Hills, Simlah. To attempt to rule India from Downing Street, although it is practically to-day as near India as Simlah, would be to subvert the empire. The result of this system is that our Indian officials administer what is practically a despotism tempered neither by epigrams nor by public opinion, and that is practically responsible to no power on earth whatever. The pretence was made, in 1876, of appointing a Press Commissioner with the Government of India to communicate freely to the nation, through the Anglo-Indian Press, what the purposes and course of the Government really were in its administration. But the whole tone and spirit of the administration have become so demoralized, that neither the real purposes nor the action of the Government bear to be disclosed. This Press Commissionership became at once a mere organization for misleading the nation, and disseminating falsehoods of the Lytton stamp, that led it into the Afghan War. We applied, over and over again, to the Press Commissioner, before we left India in 1879, to inform us what the Government was doing in the matter of these salt negotiations. From their nature, it was impossible, we thought, that there should be anything to conceal, and there *ought* to have been nothing to conceal. We found out, at last, that the proceedings were of an order that did not admit of publication, and so they have been deliberately kept from the knowledge not only of Parliament and the nation, but from the Ministry itself. Lord Hartington has never seen a line about them, any more than did Lord Cranbrook or Lord Salisbury before him.

The lamentable famine in the North-west Provinces in 1878, was concealed from their knowledge precisely in the same way. Now, if this state of matters is to last, we should, for common safety-sake, be consistent, and instead of suppressing merely the Vernacular Press of India, we ought to gag the whole Indian Press in a body. Freedom of the Press is a dangerous absurdity, under a system of secret and irresponsible administration such as to-day exists in India. There was hardly an English journal in India that did not accuse THE STATESMAN of being un-English, because it saw and denounced the folly and wickedness of the course which the Government of India, with Lord Lytton at its head, was bent upon pursuing, after Sir Arthur Hobhouse and Sir Henry Norman left India. The Anglo-Indian prophets prophesy falsely, and the priests, the official hierarchy, bear rule by their means, and the masses of our English people there, love to have it so. There is no public opinion amongst Englishmen in India, pure enough or powerful enough to hold the Government in check; and in this country the course of that Government is quite unknown, even by the Secretary of State himself. For the administration to do a wrong to a Native Prince, or Native State, is not half so bad in the eyes of most Englishmen in India as for the journalist to expose and denounce the wrong. There are, of course, noble exceptions to this ignoble but too general attitude, amongst our countrymen. Our missionaries, chaplains, and educational officers, nearly all, to their

honour, are found amongst these exceptions, with some few military men, and civilians both official and non-official. The system continues because there is no public opinion in India strong enough to break it down, and because in this country no one knows anything about it.

POSTSCRIPT.

If not always consistent with itself, the *Bombay Gazette* is entitled to the praise of being one of the most independent of the Anglo-Indian papers, and in its issue of 6th September it notices the charges made against Sir Richard Meade in our July number, as follows:—

The Editor of THE STATESMAN is no anonymous slanderer, and the passionate conviction that speaks in every line of his paper, suggests the welcome thought that he has allowed his zeal to get the better of his discretion. . . . But if Mr. Knight is no anonymous slanderer, Sir Richard Meade, on the other hand, is all that the Marquis of Hartington claimed for him—a very distinguished officer, hitherto of unblemished character; and it must be obvious that while the charges, if sustained, will undoubtedly affect Sir Richard Meade personally, the gravamen of the indictment, in everything but the charge of personal corruption, which Mr. Knight ought not, in our opinion, to have referred to, if he was not prepared to vouch for it, or disclaim it, lies against the high officials from whom Sir Richard Meade took his orders. Sir Richard Meade must not be permitted to be made the scapegoat of a policy which he did not initiate, and for which he cannot be held personally responsible. With this proviso, we confess we think it for the public interests that the charges against the Calcutta Foreign Office which underlie the whole of this article, should receive a full and open investigation. The Marquis of Hartington, in reply to the question put to him by Mr. Richard, stated that Sir Richard Meade, who was on the Continent, had informed him that with regard to the charges made against himself, he thought his proper course would be to place himself in the hands of the Government of India, desiring them to take such steps as they might think proper to ascertain what grounds there were for the imputations that had been made against him. . . . The line thus marked out for himself by Sir Richard Meade is, of course, from his point of view the proper one. . . . We have, however, excellent authority for stating that when the reference to the Government of India has been completed, the Secretary of State, whether that step may be recommended by the Indian Government or not, will permit or invite Sir Richard Meade to take the whole matter into a public court of justice, by bringing an action for libel against Mr. Knight. Every facility—including what sanction may be required for the issue of a commission to take evidence in Hyderabad itself—will be given to the two parties to the suit. We shall hope to find that Mr. Knight—as indeed he admits may be the case—has fallen unwittingly into error, and more especially in those parts of his statement of which Sir Richard Meade has most reason to complain. . . . But whatever the issue to Sir Richard Meade and Lord Lytton may be of the proceedings which are in contemplation, the public interests, whether of the Paramount Power or of the Hyderabad State, must be advantaged by a full disclosure of all the facts of this long, bitter, and most unfortunate controversy.

We need hardly say that our determination to give publicity to the charges made against Sir Richard Meade, and to the rumours that are everywhere current in Hyderabad concerning his administration, was not arrived at without very great anxiety and long deliberation. Rightly or wrongly, and we believe rightly, we resolved to present them in a shape that could not possibly be ignored by H.M.'s Secretary of State for India. One of the gravest of the charges, in our own eyes, was our statement that, under Sir Richard Meade's administration, the young Nizam had been utterly ruined, by the management of the Palace having been handed over to the Amcer-i-Kabeer (Wikar-ool-Oomra), and by the enforced retirement of the Minister, Sir Salar Jung, from all influence and control in the administration of affairs. Let the reader now observe how some "hanger-on" or other at the Residency justifies every word we wrote as to the fact of the

young Prince having been completely debauched under Sir Richard Meade's rule; and then note, further, the attempt made in the following letter, published in the *Bombay Gazette* of 30th of August, to suggest that it is neither Sir Richard Meade nor the Ameer that is to blame, but Sir Salar Jung!

HYDERABAD, August 21.—His Highness the Nizam is now enjoying excellent health and strength, and is more lively than he has been for a long time past. The weakness was owing, not to any feebleness of constitution, but to the want of careful supervision over His Highness's domestic habits on the part of those to whose guardianship the young Nizam's mental, moral, and physical training was entrusted. In consequence of this neglect, and through the influence of evil associates, the youthful Prince had, unfortunately, acquired some dissipated habits. Free access to the Zenana and a *penchant* for the wine cup, in a lad of fifteen years of age, necessarily did great mischief to a constitution not naturally robust; and the result was, such a change for the worse in the appearance of the young Nizam, that it was noticed by the late Resident, Sir Richard Meade, and others at a public entertainment. The Resident made careful inquiry into the causes of such physical deterioration, and having found them out, reported the matter to the Government of India, by whom it was brought to the notice of the Secretary of State.

Such laxity of supervision on the part of H.H.'s guardians was certainly without excuse, and most reprehensible, when it is remembered that besides their Excellencies Sir Salar Jung and the Ameer-i-Kabeer (who, I believe, are his chief guardians, the latter noble being also nearly related to H.H.), there is a very highly paid staff of Englishmen in the Government employ who are retained for the special superintendence of His Highness's moral and physical training, as well as for his scholastic advancement. There are a Superintendent of Education on Rs. 3,000 a month, a tutor on Rs. 1,200, and a host of learned *Moulvies* on high salaries; yet with such a staff of supervision, so great had been the laxness of all concerned, that had it not been for the prompt action taken by Sir Richard Meade so soon as the feeble condition of His Highness had come to his knowledge, it is not too much to say that H.H.'s health might soon have been so much shattered, that recovery would have been almost hopeless. Fortunately, Sir Richard dealt with the case very summarily; he insisted on the young Nizam's immediate removal to a separate palace far removed from the Zenana, and saw that efficient arrangements were made for the proper care and training of His Highness at his present residence, the "Poorana Havailee." The Government having thus been aroused to a sense of their duty, bestirred themselves, and the male and female servants who had surreptitiously supplied the Prince with intoxicating liquors were sent away twenty-eight miles from Hyderabad, and imprisoned in the fortress of Boughere.

To these salutary measures on the part of Sir Richard Meade must be attributed the wonderful change in His Highness's health I have noted above. His Excellency the Minister relieved himself of some of the onus of the charge of laxness by throwing a portion of the responsibility upon the Co-Regent, the Ameer-i-Kabeer, who, it is stated, in times past, had more than once placed obstacles in the way of carrying out arrangements proposed by the Minister for the better training of His Highness. Had Lord Lytton still governed India, the severest notice would doubtless have been taken of the great injury done to the young Nizam by the gross laxness of his guardians. As matters stand, however, the Minister and all connected with H.H.'s training have been taught a lesson which, it is hoped, they will not readily forget. Both the Marquis of Hartington and Lord Ripon have expressed to the Hyderabad Government their grave displeasure at what has happened, and have further observed that as the Minister and all concerned seem at last to have been aroused to the responsibilities of their duties in regard to the care of the young Prince, the Supreme Government would refrain from inquiring too strictly into past neglects, but they gave a warning that any future dereliction of duty would not be so easily overlooked.

At the critical age of twelve years, Sir Richard Meade handed the Prince over, practically, to the Ameer-i-Kabeer, and woke up alarmed—when too late—to the knowledge of what he had accomplished. In their fixed determination to punish Sir Salar Jung for his fidelity to the young Nizam's interests, our officials have committed this terrible crime against the Nizam's subjects—that they have ruined the young Prince who is to be their future ruler; and the blame is now laid upon his tutors, and upon Sir Salar Jung.

AUSTRALASIAN COLONIES.

[The Standard.
Sept. 30, 1893]

STATISTICAL RETURN showing the relative positions and aggregate importance of the Australasian Colonies at the close of the year 1879

NAME OF COLONY	Area in Square Miles.	Estimated Mean Population of 1879.	Revenue of 1879.	Proportion of Revenue of 1879, raised by Taxation.	Rate of Taxation per head of Population.	Value of Imports for 1879.	Value of Imports per head of the Population.	Value of Exports for 1879.	Value of Exports per head of the Population.	Total Value of Trade, Imports, and Exports.	Value of Trade per head of the Population.	Miles of Railway Open, 31 Dec. 1879.
New South Wales	310,937½	714,012	4,475,059	1,272,721	1 15	14,198,847	19 17	13,086,819	18 6	27,285,666	38 4	736
Victoria.....	88,198	888,500	4,621,520	1,730,088	1 19	15,035,538	16 18	12,454,170	14 0	27,489,708	30 18	1,125
South Australia	380,070	255,087	1,662,498	526,366	2 1 3	5,014,150	13 11	4,762,727	13 18	9,776,877	38 6	559
Queensland	669,520	214,180	1,461,824	631,289	2 18 11½	3,080,889	14 7 8½	3,494,084	16 0 8	6,514,928	30 8	508
Tasmania	26,215	111,208	375,367	236,404	2 2 6	1,267,475	11 7 11½	1,801,097	11 13 11½	2,568,572	23 1 11	172½
Western Australia	1,000,000	28,668	196,315	88,390	3 1 7½	407,299	14 4 1½	494,888	17 5 3	902,182	31 9 4½	72
Total	2,474,940½	2,211,655	12,792,589	4,485,198	2 0 8½	39,004,198	17 12 8½	35,538,730	16 1 8½	74,537,928	38 14 0½	3,167½
New Zealand.....	105,842	448,124	3,134,905	1,441,838	3 4 4	8,374,585	16 18 9	5,748,126	12 16 8½	14,117,711	31 10 0½	1,171
Total for Australasian Colonies	2,580,282½	2,659,779	15,927,488	5,927,036	2 4 8½	47,878,788	17 16 8	41,276,856	15 10 4½	89,655,689	33 6 7½	4,388½

^a For the financial year ended June 30, 1879. ^b This rate has been calculated according to the mean population of the financial year ended June 30, 1879 (878,243).
^c Population on December 31.

AUSTRALASIAN COLONIES—(Continued).

[The Statement,
Sept. 30, 1881.]

NAME OF COLONY.	Miles of Railway in course of Construc- tion, 31 Dec., 1879.	Miles of Telegraph Lines Open, 31 Dec., 1879.	Miles of Telegraph Wire Open, 31 Dec., 1879.	Miles of Telegraph in course of Con- struction, 31 Dec., 1879.		No. of Acres under Crop in 1879.	No. of Horses in 1879.	No. of Cattle in 1879.	No. of Sheep in 1879.	No. of Pigs in 1879.	Estimated Popu- lation on 31 Dec., 1879.	Public Debt on 31 Dec., 1879.	Rate of Indebtedness per head of Popula- tion.
				Length of Lines.	Length of Wire.								
				Miles.	Miles.							£	s. d.
New South Wales	286	7,517 $\frac{1}{2}$	12,426	497 $\frac{3}{4}$	497 $\frac{3}{4}$	635,641	360,038	29,14,210	29,043,392	256,026	734,282	14,937,419	20 6 10 $\frac{1}{2}$
Tasmania	74 $\frac{1}{2}$	3,155	5,786	28	47	1,698,275	216,710	1,129,358	8,651,775	144,733	899,883	20,050,758	22 5 10 $\frac{1}{2}$
Victoria	252 $\frac{1}{2}$	4,393 $\frac{1}{2}$	5,934	850	1,010	2,271,058	180,052	266,217	6,140,896	90,548	259,287	6,605,750	25 9 6 $\frac{1}{2}$
Queensland	305	5,871	7,891	101,052	163,088	2,800,693	6,065,034	64,686	217,851	10,196,150	46 16 0 $\frac{1}{2}$
Western Australia	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	781	949	14	14	156,184	24,578	129,091	1,834,441	88,312	112,469	1,786,800	15 17 8 $\frac{1}{2}$
Eastern Australia	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,568 $\frac{3}{4}$	1,580 $\frac{3}{4}$	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	7	65,491 $\frac{3}{4}$	32,411	60,617	1,109,860	20,897	28,668	861,000	12 11 10 $\frac{1}{2}$
Total	987 $\frac{1}{2}$	28,236 $\frac{3}{4}$	34,510 $\frac{3}{4}$	1,888 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,575 $\frac{3}{4}$	4,917,701 $\frac{3}{4}$	926,872	7,300,126	52,844,898	614,702	2,251,890	53,937,872	23 19 0 $\frac{1}{2}$
New Zealand	...	8,605	9,800	32,218,782	197,768	578,490	13,069,388	207,987	463,729	23,958,911	51 13 8 $\frac{1}{2}$
Total for Aus- tralasian Co- lonies	987 $\frac{1}{2}$	26,841 $\frac{3}{4}$	43,816 $\frac{3}{4}$	1,888 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,575 $\frac{3}{4}$	7,136,483 $\frac{3}{4}$	1,064,640	7,878,556	65,914,236	822,089	2,715,619	77,896,188	23 18 8 $\frac{1}{2}$

d Includes 1,405,018 acres after having been broken up, including such as in hay, but exclusive of 1,936,281 acres of grass-sown lands, which had not previously been broken up.
e According to the Returns of March, 1878.



The Statesman.

No. XV.—AUGUST 1, 1881.

Correspondence.

THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON AT COOPER'S HILL COLLEGE.

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE STATESMAN."

SIR,—The speech delivered on July 29th at the Engineering College, Cooper's Hill, of which what seems a tolerably full report appeared in the chief daily papers of Saturday, the 30th, is so interesting and important, that I crave to make a few comments thereon, it having been in the way of my duty to watch the Indian Public Works question for a much longer period than it has been under the cognizance of the noble Marquis himself. Nothing could be better expressed, or more thoughtful in tone, than this address; it is to the practical conclusions and policy described in its latter half that I venture to take exception, and that most emphatically. "Prudential and financial reasons have compelled the Government of India," says his Lordship, "to limit its own operations in this direction"—that of the energetic prosecution of public works, more especially of railways. Now, the noble Marquis speaks with all the authority of the present dominant advisers of the India Office behind him; but I venture to submit, to men who are sufficiently conversant with the subject, these contrary propositions: 1. That the so-called "prudential reasons" are, though sincere and well-intentioned, little better than weak, timid, and short-sighted excuses, such as, in the conduct of other large business operations or trusteeships, would be equivalent to loss of time and profit, waste of opportunities and resources. 2. That the "financial reasons" are utterly wrong, and proceed on misapprehension and misconception—in a word, are "penny wise and pound foolish" to an enormous extent, and in a direction most mischievous to India and its people.

Pressure on your space forbids my here supporting these propositions—convictions gathered during many years' observation—with more than bald and meagre evidence. But sufficient proof can be supplied from his Lordship's own speech. Thus, for my No. 1, take his remark: "India requires extension of its public works, not only like other countries for the full development of its resources, but *more than any other country*, because on the full development of its resources depends, to a very great extent, the protection of that vast country from the constantly recurring calamity of famine."

Then, for my No. 2, take his Lordship's own gratifying avowal, which I consider to be well within the mark: "I believe it can be satisfactorily established that all capital invested in Indian public works is now yielding a good return." Thus, I submit, one half of the India Office's false position on this vital question is disposed of involuntarily, but effectually, by the Secretary of State himself.

There is apart from this branch of the subject, the profitable results of productive works, one other and far wider financial consideration that tells heavily against the recent retrograde public works policy of the India Office. I allude to the open secret, that, by so largely restricting during the last seven or eight years its borrowing of the cheap funds of Europe for the prosecution of productive public works, the India Office has abnormally and enormously aggravated the exchange and silver difficulty, at which, nevertheless, it never ceases to groan. Proof of this proposition with references to other ends directly traceable to this erroneous course cannot be brought in here, but, in common with yourself and a few other writers, I have dealt with the whole subject elsewhere.*

But it is only fair to the Marquis of Hartington to frankly look at the counterpart or other half of his arguments at Cooper's Hill the other day. Briefly, it is that by as much as the Government of India withdraws from the prosecution and direction of public works, by so much private capitalists may, and probably will undertake them. His Lordship's expression is: "There is no reason why that should not occur which has occurred in other countries, why private capital, private enterprise, and private energy should not step in," &c., &c. Necessity of compressed expression compels me to make the blunt reply that "there are many reasons why the exploitation of public works by private capitalists, *without subsidies or guarantees*, are not likely" to yield sufficiently remunerative return to induce capitalists to invest funds in such undertakings to an extent at all commensurate with those pressing necessities of India to which his Lordship so forcibly alluded. It is impossible to explain those reasons here; but the records of the India Office for the period, say, from 1860 to 1866, when this problem was hopefully, and, on the whole, fairly faced by the Government of India, will supply his Lordship with a "hatful" of reasons why this renewed appeal to and dependence on the private capitalists and promoters of Europe is likely to result in failure, disappointment, and embarrassment to the Government of India itself. General R. L. Strachey, of the India Office, was present the other day at Cooper's Hill, and that might be supposed to imply his approval, more or less pronounced, in favour of the new policy of appealing to European promoters and engineers for supplying the most urgent material want of India. But no one is better able than is that gallant and skilful Engineer officer to look up and produce that evidence against this course to which I have referred. He could show his Lordship what were the disastrous results of the great (Back Bay) "Reclamation Company" of Bombay, of the Orissa, and the Madras Irrigation Companies; to say nothing of the several well-designed but (as it proved) abortive tramway projects, promoted by Sir Macdonald Stephenson and supported by Sir William Denison, himself an able Engineer officer. Then there is the still later example of the Elphinstone Reclamation and Dock Company of Bombay, which, after doing well and to the utmost what could be done by private enterprise, had to be taken over by the Government of India, and has since had to be completed under State control and heavy financial assistance, and of which the fine but costly Prince's Dock, and the purchase of all the other wharfe property in Bombay Island have been the outcome.

True, we may be reminded that the Marquis of Hartington, with that sagacity which characterizes his public utterances, uses the expression—"step in to the assistance of the Indian Government in the development of public works." This is a very different proposition from the general conclusion to which his Lordship's

* See "The Fall in Silver and Public Works Finance:" a Letter to the Marquis of Salisbury. H. S. King, 1876.

exposition of the India Office's present public works policy would tend. Take the necessities of India as regards railway, harbour, and irrigation works—the practical urgent necessities—as represented by the figure 20; that “assistance” from outside capitalists which his Lordship invokes cannot accomplish more than equal to 2 or 3. Even that moderate extent of assistance should, I fully admit, be encouraged and accepted on the most liberal terms compatible with the interests of the populations immediately affected by the operations of joint-stock companies, and with the financial obligations of the Government of India. But do not let the British public be misled into the easy-going belief that this course can even approximately provide for that “full development of India's resources” which, as the Secretary of State so justly remarked, “India needs more than any other country.”

The only approach to argument suggested by the Secretary of State for the Government of India now shrinking from one of the most obvious and pressing of its vast obligations is thus concisely stated: “A Government Department may become too large, responsibilities even in undertaking beneficial works may become too heavy.” To this reply can be given with similar conciseness thus: The Indian Public Works Department is only “too large” because of that which is still the bane of Indian administration, *undue centralization*; and the cost of its establishments could be largely reduced by the wise and fruitful method of liberally utilizing the indigenous capacity of the people of India in responsible positions as surveyors, builders, and engineers. As to public works finance becoming “too heavy” for the Government of India, that is a mere bugbear, and a costly one. For the financial credit of that Government, when properly directed, is fully two per cent. better than of all private capitalists combined; and the practical recognition of that fact involves an economy of millions on millions. In this direction Continental administrators are adopting a policy diametrically contrary to the mistimed and short-sighted doctrines of our present India Office financiers.

Yours, &c.,

W. MARTIN WOOD.

Notting Hill, August 6th.

EDITORIAL NOTES.

WE have delayed the issue of the present number of *THE STATESMAN* that we might include therein the action taken in Parliament on the disclosures made in our last number as to Sir Richard Meade's administration of affairs at Hyderabad, during the last four years. •

THERE is always difficulty in getting interpellations made in the House on Indian subjects. The difficulty arises partly from the very slight interest taken in such subjects, and partly from the natural and wise reluctance of members to introduce to the notice of the House, matters on which they doubt if they are themselves thoroughly well informed. But there is another difficulty still. It has ever been the tactics of the Indian official body to ignore criticisms upon their administration by the public press, and to discredit every movement in Parliament of the same order by suggesting the suspicion that it may be safely attributed to interested motives. It matters not how notorious, in well-informed quarters the wrong-doing may be, the stock official device is either to ignore the exposure altogether, or to attribute it to unworthy motives. It is time that these tactics were discredited; and we feel that we owe much to Mr. Richard and to Sir David Wedderburn, for the action taken by them in the House on the disclosures made in our last issue as to the history of affairs at Hyderabad.

SIR DAVID WEDDERBURN, Bart., moved, on the 9th inst., for the following Returns:—

A return of all the amounts either in cash, or as annual revenues from territories, permanently ceded or permanently or temporarily assigned to the British Government by the Hyderabad State, which have been received by the British authorities in India as consideration for the pay and maintenance of two separate Military Forces for the service of that State, known respectively as the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force and the Hyderabad Contingent.

A return of the number of officers and men of all arms which constituted these two forces respectively, from year to year from their establishment, up to the latest date readily available.

A return of the active military services rendered by each force respectively to the Nizam in maintaining the internal tranquillity of the Hyderabad State, with the nature and dates of such active services, and the numerical strength of the bodies of men who took part therein.

The return was unopposed. Mr. Richard gave notice, on the 8th inst., of the following questions:—

Whether the attention of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India has been called to an article in the July number of *THE STATESMAN* entitled "The Restitution of Berar," and to the statements made in that article as to the conduct of the Ex-British Resident at

Hyderabad, Sir Richard Meade, forcing on the Nizam's Minister, Sir Salar Jung, of one Wikar-ool-Oomra—an alleged enemy of that Minister and of the British Government—as his colleague in the Regency; and whether the Government will state the reasons which dictated the appointment.

Whether also the Secretary of State for India has perused THE STATESMAN'S narrative in the same article, of the conduct of the said ex-British Resident in supporting alleged spoliations and violent proceedings of this man since his appointment, amounting to a state of civil war in the Nizam's country.

Whether Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India will cause a full enquiry to be instituted by independent persons into the facts alleged in the article.

REPLYING to these questions on the 11th inst. the Marquis of Hartington said:—

It was impossible for him to give anything like a complete answer to the statements contained in the article which he had seen, and which related to a very complicated matter. . . . With regard to the specific point referred to in the question, the conduct of the ex-British Resident, Sir R. Meade, in the appointment of the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra as co-Regent with Salar Jung, that appointment was made, not by Sir R. Meade, but by the Government of India, whose proceedings were approved by the Secretary of State at the time. It was impossible for him to enter into an account of the reason of the appointment, which was the subject of a very full report, but he might briefly say that the main object was to adhere to the spirit of the arrangement which was come to in 1869, when it was decided to associate with the Regent, who was a very distinguished representative of the official class at Hyderabad, a representative of the Hyderabad nobility. Whether what was done was done rightly or wrongly, it was done undoubtedly by Sir R. Meade, but not upon his responsibility, and he could not be held personally responsible for it. With regard to the alleged spoliations and violent proceedings of the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra since his appointment, those allegations appeared to be made entirely on the foundation of a memorial which had been presented to the Indian Government by nephews of Wikar-ool-Oomra. He had never seen the memorial. It was, no doubt, in the possession of the Government of India, and the Government of India would, if necessary, make a report upon it. The article contained imputations which were very grave on the character of the ex-British Resident, Sir R. Meade. It charged him in a manner scarcely disguised with misconduct and actual corruption. Sir R. Meade was a very distinguished officer, and hitherto of unblemished character. He was at present on leave, and had practically retired from the Indian service. He was on the Continent, and this article had only just reached him. He had heard from him on the subject. He said that many of the statements contained in the article were falsehoods, and that others were gross misrepresentations. With regard to the charges against himself, he said he thought his proper course would be to place himself in the hands of the Government of India, desiring them to take such steps as they might deem proper to ascertain what grounds there were for the imputations that had been made against him. He had accordingly addressed the Government of India. It would be highly improper for him (the Marquis of Hartington) to take any steps in the matter until he knew what the views of the Government of India on the subject were.

In answer to some remarks by Sir G. Balfour, Lord Hartington added:—

It was impossible to say whether any and what papers on the subject could be laid on the table. There were certainly a great number of papers. Some were of an extremely confidential character, and he had no hesitation in saying it would be impossible to lay them on the table.

The reply, being necessarily provisional only, is perhaps all we had a right to expect from Lord Hartington at this stage of matters, and until he has communicated with the Government of India on the subject. It is as well, however, for us to direct attention to the vicious circle in which every inquiry concerning our administration of India, is made to move. Charged with very grave

offences before the English public and Parliament, Sir Richard Meade "puts himself into the hands of the Government of India, desiring them to take such steps as they may deem proper to ascertain what grounds there are for the imputations made against him." The Government of India meanwhile is heavily implicated in many of the charges we have made against Sir Richard Meade. Lord Hartington says truly that it was the Government of India and not Sir Richard Meade who forced Wikar-ool-Oomra as co-Regent upon Sir Salar Jung. Sir Richard Meade was simply the too willing instrument of their immoral policy. It was the Government of India—Lord Lytton's Foreign Office—that determined to gag the Nizam's minister, and directed Sir Richard Meade to force the Ameer upon him. The Government of India is itself under the brand of the offence, and to suppose that it will condemn Sir Richard Meade for the zeal with which he carried out his orders is of course preposterous. Observe again that "with regard to the alleged spoliations and violent proceedings of the Ameer," Lord Hartington tells us that the Government of India is in possession of a memorial upon the subject, and would if necessary make a report upon it." It is because the Government of India *has had that memorial before it for more than a year past*, and has taken no notice of it whatever, that we resolved to bring it to the notice of Parliament. The spoliations and violent proceedings of the man are notorious in India, and the connivance of the ex-Resident therein, and the silence of the Government of India upon the subject. And we are now told that, "if necessary, the Government of India will report upon the memorial." We are obliged to reply that not a word from the Government of India on the subject, or upon any part of the charges preferred in our last article, can be trusted. Lord Hartington must necessarily make this appeal to the Government of India, but as that Government is answerable for the general course of wrong-doing exposed in our last issue, Parliament will know what weight to attach to its representations when they come. We can do nothing more at present than point out that any attempt to rescue Sir Richard Meade from the charges we have made against him by assurances of the Government of India, in the usual stereotyped form, that "there is no ground for them," will not be successful; nor will Lord Hartington, we are convinced, himself accept them.

MR. O'DONNELL asked the Secretary of State for India, a few days ago, whether it was the fact, as stated in THE STATESMAN of the 1st July, that during the year 1878-9 more than three millions sterling were paid from the revenues of India to persons not resident in India, as annuities and furlough pay; and whether the Government would take any steps to diminish this annual drain on the Indian taxpayers. The Marquis of Hartington is reported to have replied as follows:—

The sum mentioned in the question was accurate, but he must point out that, in the case of covenanted servants, a large portion of the pensions had been paid by the persons who received them in the shape of a percentage of 4 per cent. upon their incomes during the whole period of their service. The only way in which this charge could be hereafter reduced would be the further employment in important positions of natives of India. Instructions had been forwarded to the Government of India by the Home Government impressing the importance of this upon them, and he had every reason to believe that those instructions were being carried out.

Lord Hartington made a perfectly true reply, and yet the answer illustrates very forcibly what we complain of, as the sincere-insincere character of official statements emanating from India. The reader will observe that it is a sum of

£3,000,000 sterling a year that is in question, while the answer of Lord Hartington (an answer prepared, of course, for him by Indian officials, either at Simlah or in Downing Street) suggests that the vastness of the sum is to be accounted for by the fact that "covenanted civilians" in India are required to provide about half the amount of the pensions they draw upon retirement, by an annual tax of 4 per cent. levied upon their incomes while they are in active service. The suggestion, therefore, is that a large part of the £3,000,000 sterling a year consists simply of deferred pay, that was due to the covenanted civilian while he was serving actively in India. Lord Hartington states the fact, but the suggestion it is made to cover is utterly untrue. We have not the figures to guide us, but will assume that there are 300 covenanted civilians in receipt of the pension of £1,000 a year, and that they themselves were required to provide £500 a year of the amount, by deductions from their pay while in active service in India. But the fact will account for no more than £150,000 out of the £3,000,000, while it is put forward in a way to give a very different impression. Lord Hartington, of course, is not responsible for it: it is a characteristic of Indian official reports that they cannot be treated as conveying truthful impressions to the reader or hearer.

THERE is a directness and simplicity, however, about Lord Hartington's speeches generally, concerning India, that make them refreshing reading to men wearied to death of the interpellations and orations of the Ashmead-Bartletts of the House. Parliament must tolerate, we suppose, as inevitable, the class of speeches to which we refer; but if this morning papers were wise they would leave the task of reporting them to Hansard. It is enough to understand once for all, that Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett chooses to believe every step of the advance of Russia in Central Asia to be a curse, instead of a blessing, to the regions which she is believed by others to be redeeming from the kidnapper and the plunderer; and that the advance would have no attraction for her whatever but that each step brings her nearer to her ultimate destination, which Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett believes to be India. Instead of worrying Lord Hartington and wearying the House with interpellations upon the subject, why does not Mr. Bartlett set about the conversion of Lord Salisbury to his own enlightened views? The Marquis would tell him perhaps to buy a bigger atlas than he has been using hitherto.

BUT Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett probably believes as little in the nightmare as Lord Salisbury himself. The whole object of his speech was to suggest that our retirement from Kandahar had led to the victory of Ayoub Khan, and that the defeat of Abdurrahman Khan showed the unwisdom of our withdrawal therefrom. Lord Hartington's reply was as complete and simple, as a plain statement of the truth could make it:—

We have never pledged ourselves or our policy to the success or to the ability of Abdurrahman Khan to overcome his rival. On the contrary, I remember perfectly well that in the observations that I made to the House in the debate I stated distinctly that the question of his supremacy in Afghanistan could never be decided until there had been an appeal to arms, and that it was impossible to foretell what the result of that appeal would be. No doubt we have given some support to Abdurrahman Khan; but, if so, we have done nothing more than to discharge what we considered to be a debt to the people of Afghanistan rather than an act in our own interests. We have undoubtedly inflicted a very great injury and mischief on Afghanistan. We have destroyed whatever existed there in the form of Government and we have replaced it by the state of anarchy in which it was before Sher Ali succeeded to the throne. That may have been necessary or it may not; but no doubt great injury was thereby

done to the people of Afghanistan. We decided that it was not necessary in the interest of England that we should permanently occupy and undertake the administration of Afghanistan. Having decided to retire from that country we considered that it was our duty to its people to give them, at all events, a chance of re-establishing for themselves settled Government. Whether we selected the best candidate or not, what was done was done not so much in our own interests as in discharge of a debt to the people of Afghanistan, and to give them the opportunity of restoring, if they thought fit, a settled Government, such as existed before we destroyed it.

Our readers will remember that we insisted from the first upon the error made by Lord Lytton and the officials around him at Simlah, in inviting Abdurrahman Khan to ascend the musnud. There was no sufficient reason for deposing Yakoob Khan, and our withdrawal from Kabul should have been preceded by his reinstatement on his father's throne. And this course would have been taken by the present Ministry, but that the Simlah officials, who, with Lord Lytton, were the authors of the war, refused to undo the wrong they had committed. It is to these officials that Lord Hartington referred some months ago, when he declared the Ministry simply to have followed the advice of "the highest authorities" in the elevation of Abdurrahman Khan. While the Home Government continues to pay the complete deference it does to the representations of these "highest authorities" concerning India, there will never be an end to these costly mistakes. It was well enough known in India, that Yakoob Khan was the only Chief in whose rule all parties were likely to acquiesce. But had not Simlah pronounced his deposition, and made him a State prisoner at Mussorie! And what was the hope of establishing settled rule at Kabul, compared with the maintenance of men's belief in the "infallible officials" of the Hills? And so the fatal error was made, Lord Ripon bowing to the "highest authorities" left him as a legacy by Lord Lytton.

If the House of Commons were more deeply influenced by the religion of which its members make such vehement lip professions in excluding Mr. Bradlaugh, the speech of Sir Wilfrid Lawson, two months ago, on the motion for voting the thanks of the House to the officers and troops engaged in the Afghan War, would have emptied the House of half its numbers. We are glad that neither Mr. Bright nor Mr. Chamberlain sanctioned the vote by their presence, and that, in addition to the small minority who openly voted against the motion, many members on the Liberal side of the House refused to take part in the division. It is time that these votes were either put an end to for good, or reserved for those great occasions where the daring valour of the army has saved the nation from manifest peril, and invested the vote with the solemnity, earnestness, and enthusiasm awakened by a deliverance like that of Waterloo. It was a contemptible and hollow farce that was played, in both Houses on the 6th of May. Instead of this Afghan War closing with a shower of honours, decorations, and pensions, its authors ought to have been impeached for the scandalous course of lying, by which they betrayed the nation into its guilt. The army did its duty, as English soldiers always do their duty, but as everyone knows, of fighting properly so called, there was none. There was hardly an action from beginning to end of the war that would even have been chronicled in such contests as we have seen on the Continent in the last twenty years. It is to cover our army with ridicule, to glorify it and solemnly to thank it for such campaigns, while it stimulates the passion for such wars by the worst and meanest of human motives.

SIR WILFRID LAWSON spoke with admirable truth and sense when he said :—

The House was responsible for the soldier's doings. He did his best, and generally went to fight for us in a wrong cause, for most of our causes in the last century had been wrong. He did not always win, and then he did not get thanked. If we were to have thanks given to those great commanders for doing what were called brilliant deeds, let them have some censure passed on those who did deeds worthy of censure. If one thing was right the other was right. His doctrine was that they all did their duty courageously, and fulfilled their contract. We ought to fulfil our contract with them, and not make this invidious distinction of proposing thanks to those who happened to be lucky, and nothing to those who brought us into disaster and disgrace. It was better to assume that all did their duty. Why were the forces to be singled out in this way for votes of thanks for doing their duty?

Who does not feel that this is more just and reasonable than the hollow and ridiculous parade of the marchings and achievements of small bodies of troops, armed with all the modern implements of war, to disperse the half-armed levies of Afghan tribes, whom no European army would count it any glory to encounter? The speaker did well to remind the House that it had—

declared by an almost unanimous vote that the Afghan War was a useless and unnecessary war. They were told that in that war more men were hanged than were shot; and it seemed to him that wars carried on in that way were not wars which the House should be asked to pass votes of thanks for. He protested against this military spirit, and did not see the glory of this destruction of our fellow-creatures.

Sir Wilfrid must have the respect of all parties for this unflinching reminder of unpleasant truth. The speech has not been in vain. In writing thus, we have no intention whatever of making the soldier responsible in any way for the rectitude or otherwise of those who ordered him into the field. We protest only against the mischievous practice of indiscriminately glorifying the troops, for the discharge of their most ordinary duties, in the case of a great empire like this. The practice is thoroughly unhealthy. It makes the army impatient of inaction and in India is always potential war. Honours and rewards are prostituted to purely mischievous uses when distributed, as they have been in this war, in pursuance of a hollow and conventional routine that has nothing whatever to recommend it, but is the direct parent of inestimable evils. The pensions with which the mulcted peasantry of India are now to be saddled for this abominable crime, should make every Englishman blush at their mention. If they were to be given at all, they should have been given by the Crown out of the English Treasury. Our professions as a nation of the Christian faith are outraged by such transactions, but our public men have got so accustomed to them as not even to feel their shame.

WE placed before our readers in our last issue, a true history of the circumstances under which the Calcutta Government seized the Berars from the Nizam in 1853, with the provinces of Raichore and Nuldroog. The story has never before been told in this country. Should it but awaken the nation to the true character of our rule in India, our main purpose will have been accomplished. Our secondary purpose was to insist upon our responsibility as a people to see that rule reformed. There is but one way, we believe, to accomplish it, which is by insisting upon a formal reversal of the wrong that has been done. While Her Majesty's Ministers permit the Government officials, who rule India from Calcutta, to conceal not only from Parliament, but from the Crown itself, the real character of their proceedings, in the despatches in which they profess to disclose

them, there will never be any reform. We are ruling India by an oligarchy that is nominally responsible to the Home Government, but in reality to no one. Calcutta officials do whatever they please. The art of concealing facts, and of evading the orders of the Home Government, has been practised with such complete impunity and with so much success, that the very last thing an experienced official at Calcutta would do, would be to set himself to obey orders. He is accustomed to give orders, not to obey them. And woe to the Prince or potentate who fails to recognize the fact. He may have any number of Secretaries of State with him, or political friends in both Houses;—Calcutta never yields, never despairs.

THE Hyderabad Contingent—in its insidious origin, and in its forced maintenance—is a fraud on the protected state, and a reproach on the Imperial power. If we rightly estimated the political value of moral mastery, we should see that the British Government reaps no more real advantage from that illegitimate Force than from the costly civil establishment called the Berar Commission, through which its pay is provided. The Commandants and the Adjutants of the one, the Commissioners and the Assistants of the other, enjoy, it is to be hoped, their salaries and their savings, but the British Government gains nothing from all this expenditure, in comparison with what the Nizam's Government loses. The restitution of Berar, and the removal of the Contingent, would bring a perceptible accession to Imperial influence and authority, not in Hyderabad only, but throughout the allied and protected states. It is in this direction that we should look for the cheap defence of the empire, not in that of the jobbery and the patronage, the overbearing intrigue and the supercilious subterfuges that have characterised for so many years the method of the Indian Foreign Office and of its provincial agency.

It is almost beyond hope or reasonable expectation that unbiassed opinion or even unadulterated information as to these matters should be drawn through what are called the authorised channels. We need not look for self-depreciation, or a self-denying ordinance from the officials of the Berar Commission, from the officers of the Hyderabad Contingent, from the Residency Staff, or from the Secretaries and Councillors of Calcutta. This is pre-eminently a problem—as is every first-class Indian problem—that can only be satisfactorily solved by an imperial statesman, free alike from local prejudices and from professional interests. Let him not be deterred by a few strange names and terms from relying on his own judgment; let him be well assured that human motives and social energies are much the same all the world over. Whatever questions he may ask, he should be prepared, after full consideration of all the replies he may receive, and of all the facts and arguments before him, to give his own answer, and to give it with decision.

THERE are two questions at present unanswered. The first is whether we can justly insist on the Hyderabad Contingent being maintained; the second is whether we can justly persist in holding the Berar provinces—in short, what pretext or excuse there is for trying to make the assignment perpetual that was expressly declared to be only for a time? The Nizam's claim is really unanswerable. Not even a plausible reply can be made to it. And if the Anglo-Indian officials are asked, "Why, then, do you resist the restitution of these districts?" only one honest answer can be given to the question. "We want salaries out of

the Nizam's revenue for our friends and fellow-countrymen." But for the retrogressive and obstructive influence of the Ameer-i-Kabeer, promoted and seconded by Sir Richard Meade's unaccountable partisanship, the administration of the provinces under the Nizam's rule would be quite as good, and, even as it is, the population is quite as prosperous as under the complex and costly system of the Berar Commission. But the Bengal Civilians in the Calcutta Council and Secretariat, who work the executive machine, and who are constantly corresponding demi-officially and privately, on the one side with the chief provincial incumbents, and on the other with old friends at the India Office, have the same objections to what would be, in their professional faith and creed, "losing Berar," as their predecessors had in 1867 to "losing Mysore." They have before them the very unpleasant prospect of losing a rich field of jobbery and patronage, and of their sons, their brothers, their nephews, and their sons-in-law, who are now peacefully browsing therein, being turned adrift and making a run on pastures already overstocked. If ominous inquiries as to the restitution of Berar were to be made, it would be as hard for them to give an unprejudiced answer as it was for the officials in 1866, when they were pressed as to the restoration of Mysore. The Government of India protested vehemently at that crisis against the Maharajah of Mysore being permitted to adopt a successor, and against any plan for restoring native rule, which, they said, "would be tantamount to the collapse of order, and a rapid return to the state of confusion, and of insecurity of life, honour, and property, from which in 1831 the people of Mysore were rescued." * We have not lately heard any such inflammatory exaggerations. No reasonable person, inside or outside the official ring, professes now to dread any such rapid catastrophe in Mysore, even under the administration of Mr. C. Rungacharloo. Nor has any well-informed person any real apprehension as to the administrative or political results of restoring Berar to the Nizam. But it is by no means inconceivable that a very imposing manifestation of public-spirited alarm and humane solicitude for the people of Berar, might be conjured up at a critical moment; and it is as well, therefore, that those for whose misguidance it would be devised should be reminded of previous manifestations of the same character, which have been invariably dispersed to the four winds when brought to the test of practical experience.

In the second of our former articles on the Restitution of Berar we quoted the great authority of the late General Sir James Outram as to precautions that ought to be scrupulously observed at every Residency and Political Agency to prevent the suspicions and scandal regarding the corruption of English officials, which have undoubtedly from time to time prevailed in various parts of India. † The most important of Outram's warnings was directed against the appointment, promotion, or favourable notice of "persons known or suspected to have been corrupt." He urged that "all, whether Princes or their subjects, who dared to contemplate bribing British officials, must be considered hostile to the Government." ‡ We pointed out that, by the unjustifiable appointment to the highest place in the state of a person "found guilty" of having "contemplated bribing British officials," Sir Richard Meade, as Resident at Hyderabad, had roused that class of suspicions, and created those very scandals that Sir James Outram combated and

* "Mysore Papers" (112 of 1866), p. 59.

† THE STATESMAN, No. 5, October, 1880, p. 466.

‡ "Guicowar Papers" (560 of 1852), pp. 1280 and 1301.

suppressed. We said that "very bad rumours" and "aspersions against British officers" were "current in the streets of Hyderabad." We may add that so widely spread were these rumours and aspersions, that General A. W. Macintire, C.B., commanding the Subsidiary Force at Secunderabad, felt himself constrained, by his military seniority, to suggest to Major Euan Smith that, his name being freely mentioned in the mess-houses of the cantonment in discreditable association with the affairs of the Ameer-i-Kabeer, he ought to consult the Resident on the subject of these defamatory reports, with a view to some vindication of his character. Whether Sir Richard Meade was thereupon consulted by his Assistant, and whether any steps were taken to trace out and confute the stories in circulation, had not become known to the General, or the military circle of Secunderabad, when the connection of Major Euan Smith with the Residency was broken off in July, 1879. He went away from Hyderabad on three months' leave, and was then appointed Assistant-Resident at Muscat in the Persian Gulf. Until his departure, the Assistant had been under the Resident the chief arbitrator in all the coercive attempts at settlement during the spoliation of the Ameer's nephews. Subsequently the whole burden of direct and detailed communication with the Ameer-i-Kabeer in these matters was assumed by Sir Richard Meade himself.

During the long and wearisome contest against "Khutput" in Bombay, which Colonel Outram, as Resident at Baroda, carried on at great personal risk and loss to himself, although with ultimate success, he brought no charge of corruption against any British officer. But he showed that many officials in the Political Department, and in the Government of Bombay, had, by neglecting the most essential precautions, and by unaccountably espousing the cause of corrupt persons, established a belief in their own corruptibility. And this is exactly our complaint against the course pursued and the practices permitted by Sir Richard Meade, as Resident at Hyderabad, from 1877 to 1881. He unaccountably espoused the cause of a corrupt person; he overlooked some very peculiar movements in members of his own family, and thus not merely neglected the most essential precautions, but invited scandal and provoked suspicion.

It has ever seemed to us an unworthy feature of modern journalism that it never admits itself to have been mistaken. The journalist is just as fallible as his fellow-men; and once convinced that he has erred, whether in the statement of fact or opinion, it is his duty, we think, to his readers and to morality to admit the error. We owe it then, we think, to Mr. Forster to say frankly that we regret the strictures made upon him in this journal a few months ago, for his coercion policy. We admitted these strictures into our pages, not without misgivings at the time they were made; and we wish to withdraw them. The task which Mr. Forster consented to undertake in assuming the Secretaryship for Ireland, was so difficult and so invidious as to entitle him to the most generous and forbearing criticism in its discharge, while the patience and temper with which he has addressed himself to the thankless and almost hopeless effort to solve the Irish difficulty, must sooner or later command general recognition. At all events we wish, for our own satisfaction, to withdraw the strictures made upon him in the March number of this Journal in connection with his task, and to say frankly that we regret they were ever made. Whether the Irish policy of the Ministry succeed or fail, few even of its opponents now doubt that it is inspired by honest and generous purpose. The two great measures in which it has found expression, have been passed in the teeth of an Opposition, seldom

honest in its course, and often factious and unprincipled. The quiet perseverance of the Ministry, and the moderation and temper they have preserved throughout have been full of instruction to younger men in the House. Let us hope that some early reform in its procedure will prevent a recurrence of the unedifying spectacles which the conduct of the "Obstructives" has too often presented to the country during the debates.

THOUGH the Irish landlords as a class were as considerate towards their tenants as their apologists declare them to be, the fact remains that under the existing laws, of which the landlords have been the framers, they possess an almost unlimited power of oppressing them, and of confiscating to themselves the fruits of their industry. It is idle to say that it is only a minority of the landlords who use these powers to the impoverishment of the tenant and their own enrichment. It is sufficient to reply that no class ought to depend upon the mere forbearance of others in this way. There is but one remedy, namely, to deprive the landlord of the legal right which he possesses to do wrong. Those landlords who have abstained from exercising the powers which the existing law gives them, from a sense of its injustice, will lose nothing by being deprived of powers the unrighteous though strictly legal exercise of which by a minority necessitates this Bill. The framers of the Bill have no wish whatever to interfere with the freedom of contract, for which so much admiration has suddenly been discovered in the Conservative ranks. It is because the tenant has no freedom in Ireland in his dealings with his landlord that legislation in his behalf is necessary. Let the details of the Bill be defective as they may, it is conceived in the right spirit, and is animated by an honest desire to remedy evils that everyone acknowledges, and the reform of which, however attempted, must be hateful to the men whose selfish inconsiderateness has necessitated it.

THE question has ceased to be a mere dispute between landlord and tenant, and has become one of moment to all classes. The very bonds of society in Ireland are dissolved by the passions which the contest has awakened, and every prudent man recognizes the necessity of Governmental interposition. The Bill makes no pretensions to be a reform of the Land Laws of the kingdom, and is addressed only to a particular evil which has been developed under these laws into a positive danger to the nation that can no longer be safely ignored. The ingenious Tory host who complain that their attitude is always misrepresented, and that none desire reform so earnestly as they, can never of course reconcile themselves to so confused and complicated a measure as is proposed to them. It is reform in the abstract that they so ardently admire. The moment it takes practical shape, and the axe is laid at the root of selfish privileges, reform becomes a synonym for confiscation, and a cry is raised for compensating the landlord for the withdrawal from him of powers conferred by himself upon himself in times of past ignorance and misrule. As dear Lord John of the laurels and lilies sings :—

Let arts and commerce, law and learning die,
But leave us still our old nobility.

The younger manhood of the old nobility are happily of a different spirit; and the Ministry find some of its most eminent supporters in the class of nobles whom the Marquis of Hartington leads with so much true moral greatness.

From the very nature of things, if we will but consider it, no legislation of this nature in former times can possibly be binding, either in morality or in common sense, upon the present generation of men. If the existing generation of men in any country, respect and give the force of present law to the dispositions of past generations concerning the occupancy or enjoyment of the land, which land belongs to them and to them only, that sanction can be given only upon the presumption, or in the belief, that it is for the welfare of the existing generation that it is accorded. Such phrases, therefore, as "the wisdom of our ancestors," the "rights of property," or the "sacred principles of the Constitution," which are invoked for the maintenance of existing laws concerning the land, when those laws are seen to work harmfully to the present generation, are the outcome either of the ignorance or the self-interest of classes, or the mere flattery of their apologists. In the nature of things, each generation as it arises must possess the absolute right of determining for itself, what dispositions shall be made for the occupancy and cultivation of the soil. The State or Commonwealth of to-day has not only the absolute moral right to sweep away all such dispositions and regulations, by whomsoever made, concerning the occupancy and cultivation of the land, as are declared by the general intellect and conscience to be hurtful to the people, but is under the direct obligation of duty to do so. The right is paramount, absolute, and indefeasible; the duty of the living as opposed to the dead Legislature clear and binding. The living generation is to hold itself bound hand and foot, it seems, by the selfish laws of past and gone generations of men, whose remains we "toss about with spades, to give breadth to broccoli, or aid the vernal eruption of asparagus."

Apply these simple axioms to the Irish Land Bill, and the interminable discussions to which almost every line of it has been subjected. Has there been a single proposal made by the Ministry, that has been at variance with the axioms we have laid down? The Bill seriously curtails the powers of the landlord class, but this cannot be construed into "confiscation," unless it can be shown that the powers themselves vest in the landlord by natural and inherent right. Are we to-day to sustain, or to redress, the wrong-doing of previous generations? The very fact that what is plainly unjust has endured so long is an overwhelming argument against its further continuance, instead of being a plea for its toleration and endurance. We have been constantly reminded in the debates of the landlords' rights, but those rights are but the creation of laws devised by the landlord class themselves. After a century of political economy we have at last the prospect of a law being enacted, the pervading principle of which is that the landlord shall claim no share in the fruits of the cultivator's toils. Still recognized as owner of the soil, the landlord is to be paid a fair rent for the use of that soil as it comes into the cultivator's hands. As there can be no high cultivation while the landlord has the power to evict the cultivator at will, he is deprived of the power—a power that he ought never to have conferred upon himself, and that he has been allowed to retain far too long. The measure is a great expression of wisdom and justice, and its passing into law will constitute an epoch in our history. What the economist has so long demanded from the cultivator, has at last been conferred upon him, and men will presently begin to wonder how it should so long have been withheld.

It was with regret that we expressed our fear a month or two ago, that President Garfield's quarrel with Mr. Conkling was likely to prove prejudicial to the

cause of Civil Service reform in America. It is very difficult to get a true insight into the domestic politics of the States; and we are glad to see that the President's course seems to have commanded full approval on the part of the great body of earnest reformers in the country. Strong in the sympathies of a people roused to indignation and horror by the great crime of his attempted assassination, President Garfield will, on his recovery, it may be hoped, find himself strong enough to accomplish what he might otherwise have deemed it unwise even to attempt. Should this great and noble man succeed in purifying public life in the States from the corruption that now makes the best American citizens shun all connection with it, his name will go down to posterity with those of Washington and Lincoln as the founders of the great Republic that seems destined to overshadow half the globe in less than another half century of time.

So far back as 1833 an Act of Parliament declared that the people of India were eligible for all offices, civil as well as military; and this declaration was emphatically repeated in the Royal Proclamation of 1858, in which her Majesty was pleased to say that all her subjects, of whatever race or creed, were to be "freely and impartially admitted to all offices the duties of which they may be qualified by their education, ability, and integrity duly to discharge." Two or three years before this, the Covenanted Civil Service of India was thrown open to general competition, but the examinations being held in London placed Indian candidates at a considerable disadvantage. A few Indian youths (not exceeding nine or ten altogether) succeeded from time to time in entering the service through the door of competition, but, unfortunately, about four years ago the Marquis of Salisbury, then Secretary of State for India, reduced the maximum age for candidates from twenty-one to nineteen. The result of this alteration has been to place an insuperable obstacle in the way of Indian candidates, by making it necessary for them to come to this country at the early age of fifteen or sixteen, for the mere chance of passing a most difficult examination conducted in the English language, with which, at that age, they are necessarily very imperfectly acquainted. The change naturally caused considerable dissatisfaction in India, was protested against in public meetings, and petitions from all parts of the country have been presented to the House of Commons on the subject. In July, 1879, her Majesty's Government, in pursuance of an Act of Parliament passed in 1870, issued certain rules, with a view to facilitate the admission of Indians of "approved merit and ability" to the public service. Observe the wording. The rules empowered the Government of India to frame a scheme whereby a certain number of appointments—not exceeding one-fifth of the total number annually made from this country—were to be made on the nomination of the local Governments, subject to the approval of the supreme Government. In accordance with these rules, a scheme was brought forward by Lord Lytton towards the end of 1879, which declared, contrary to the spirit of all previous declarations on the subject, that no person was to be appointed merely by reason of his "education, ability, and integrity;" but that the local Governments were to be guided in their selection, by considerations as to the birth and family connexions of the candidates. The new scheme has also given to the "Native Civil Service," as it is called, a distinctly lower status than that of the ordinary "Covenanted Civil Service." The scheme has but intensified the dissatisfaction which is felt in India in reference to the subject. It is regarded as a retrograde step, amounting practically to a revocation of the pledges which have been given to the people of India, both by her Majesty and by Parliament. The difficulty, it is believed, cannot be satisfactorily

solved by the creation of an inferior service, which scarcely differs, except in name, from the subordinate executive and judicial services to which Natives of India are ordinarily admitted. The reforms which the people demand are : 1st, That the maximum age for English and Indian candidates for the *London* competitions should be replaced at twenty-one ; and, 2nd, That the rules [1879] under the Act of 1870 for the admission of Natives in *India* to the Covenanted Civil Service should be amended, so as to throw it open to Natives who have established a character for integrity and ability in the subordinate department of the service, as well as to those who have distinguished themselves in the exercise of the legal profession.

In addition to these reforms, the time has, we believe, come when the Government should take some step towards giving to the people of India a voice in the administration of their own affairs. An experiment might be safely made in this direction by admitting elected representative members to the Supreme and Provincial Legislative Councils, in a certain proportion to the nominated members. At present, each local Government nominates two or three Native gentlemen to serve as members of the Council, but they are often officials, and, with few exceptions, are selected more on account of their rank and wealth than for their fitness or capacity. Although some of these gentlemen have from time to time rendered useful service to the State, it is obvious that so long as they are nominated by the Government, however carefully the selection may be made, the Native members so appointed cannot feel, or be credited with, that independence which it is essential they should enjoy, nor can their opinions possess the weight and authority of representatives elected by the people. There would be no difficulty, we think, in finding constituencies to which the privilege of sending representatives to serve in the Councils might be properly conceded. The presidency towns and other important cities already possess the municipal franchise ; and the electors, who evince a growing interest in the municipal elections, could not fail to cherish, and to exercise with wisdom, the higher privilege of selecting representatives to serve in the national councils of the Empire. The presidency towns, and such other towns in each presidency as possess the municipal franchise, might be empowered to send members to serve in the Legislative Council of the presidency to which they belong. The principle of representation should also be extended to the Supreme Legislative Council, so that a proportion of its members may be the elected representatives of the different presidencies. A reform in this direction would bring an enormous accession of strength to the Empire, as there would be a recognized means of ascertaining the real wants and opinions of the people, enabling the Government to secure for its measures the sanction and support of Native opinion in India.

ERRATUM.

We have been requested to correct an error into which the shorthand writer had fallen when reporting the proceedings before the Attorney-General in Chambers, and which were printed in the July Number of this Magazine. It is there stated that Messrs. Newman, Dale, and Stretton were the Firm of Solicitors by whom Mr. Gorst, Q.C., was instructed ; it should have been Messrs. Newman and Co., of Draper's Gardens, E.C.

CEYLON.

A CONTRAST TO INDIA.

THE Island of Ceylon is in many respects a model colony, and is surpassed in prosperity and development by Java alone, among all tropical countries. Ceylon, like Great Britain, owes much to the "silver streak" which divides her from the neighbouring continent, and may congratulate herself upon enjoying political as well as geographical separation from India. Under British protection Ceylon is safe from external aggression; possessing a truly scientific frontier, her resources are not squandered in efforts to extend her territory, and so loyal and contented are the Natives that a few companies of Europeans are more than sufficient for the garrison of an island containing two and three quarter millions of inhabitants. A remarkable proof of the confidence felt by the Government in the peaceable and loyal disposition of the Ceylon people was recently exhibited when the island was almost denuded of its slender European garrison, during the struggle with the Transvaal Boers, who are kindred in blood to many of the Burgher population. But these very Burghers, far from being a cause of weakness or danger to the British Government, have been brought by generous and fair treatment into harmony with the ruling race.

The entire military expenditure of Ceylon only amounts to £100,000, a figure calculated to arouse the envy and astonishment of Indian financiers and taxpayers. Similar feelings may be excited in India, by a consideration of the public works and public debt of Ceylon. The railways now open produce a large balance of receipts over expenditure, and a sinking fund for debentures which will extinguish all debt on their account within a very few years.

For railway extension, for harbour works, and for the water supply of Colombo, a debt has been sanctioned, the annual charge of which, for interest and sinking fund, will amount to a little more than £140,000, when all the projected works are complete. This annual charge will then be the only burden upon the colony for general and municipal purposes, but the estimated receipts from these public works give a very large balance of profit, and the past experience of Ceylon seems to justify a sanguine estimate.

It thus appears that Ceylon is at present practically free from public debt, and possesses remunerative public works, constructed

mainly out of current revenue, all other expenditure having been met out of profits and receipts, which amount in the case of the Colombo and Kandy Railway to something like 10 per cent. on the original outlay.

Besides the public works above mentioned there are excellent roads throughout Ceylon, also canals, and tanks for irrigation, all made and maintained out of taxation, general and special. But the total taxation of Ceylon, including what is raised by municipalities, local boards, and village councils, does not amount to one million sterling, the balance of revenue being made up from land sales, railway and postal receipts, &c. Under these prosperous and easy financial conditions it is not unreasonable that strong pressure should be brought to bear upon the Ceylon Government in order to obtain still further railway extension and improved means of communication, but the demand on the part of European speculators, engineers, and contractors for the development of colonial resources is one that must generally be regarded with suspicion by those who are responsible for colonial finance.

In India the system of mortgaging the public revenue to British capitalists, by a government guarantee of 5 per cent. upon the cost of constructing railways, has proved to be extravagant and unsatisfactory to all except the investors of capital, who have received good interest with excellent security at the expense of Indian taxpayers. Even in the self-governing colonies serious burdens have been placed upon the community by impatient attempts to develop prematurely the resources of the country, and stagnation rather than progress has frequently been the result. A costly and useless railroad, constructed for political rather than commercial reasons, is less mischievous indeed than a frontier war, but it may involve as heavy an outlay.

The constitution of Ceylon is that of a Crown colony, and the Governor is responsible only to the Secretary of State, although he is aided in his administration by an Executive as well as a Legislative Council. The Executive Council consists of five high officials, besides the Governor, and the working of our colonial system is illustrated somewhat remarkably in the antecedents of the gentlemen who are the existing councillors. The Governor himself, Sir James R. Longden, K.C.M.G., held no less than five successive appointments as Governor in the West Indies, and was transferred from British Guiana to Ceylon after fifteen years' service in tropical America. The Colonial Secretary comes from the Straits Settlements, and the Queen's Advocate has recently arrived from the Bahamas. The General commanding the troops is, of course, a military officer, and not an experienced administrator, and the same

may be said of the Auditor-General, who has been a Commissariat officer. The Treasurer is the only one of the six councillors who, before appointment, had any personal acquaintance with the affairs of Ceylon, and even his experience has been chiefly limited to the city of Colombo. With a Council so constituted it is astonishing that the administration of the colony should not have broken down, and it is quite reasonable that a demand should be made for reform of the Executive Council by the appointment of members thoroughly acquainted with the languages, customs, and wants of the Ceylon people. In the ranks of the Ceylon Civil Service, either in the judicial or revenue branch, such men can easily be found.

The Legislative Council consists of sixteen members, only six of whom are unofficial, and the ten officials include the six members of the Executive. The concurrence of non-official members is not necessary to the validity of any ordinance, which may become law even if all the unofficial seats are vacant. At present the six non-officials, all of whom are nominated by the Governor, may be regarded as, to a certain extent, representative of the principal races and interests—three being Europeans, one Sinhalese, one Tamil, and one "Burgher" or Eurasian. It is evident, however, that the representation of the Natives is quite inadequate; and to increase the number of Asiatics in the Legislative Council would be a simple measure of justice, even if it be considered premature to introduce a more genuine mode of representation by means of popular election. As matters stand, each unofficial European M.L.C. may be said to have 2,200 constituents, while the Burgher has 15,500, the Tamil nearly 600,000, the Sinhalese more than 1,800,000, and the numerous Mussulman inhabitants (nearly 200,000) have no representative at all. There can, indeed, be little doubt that in Ceylon some modified form of direct popular representation would work beneficially, and would render the Legislative Council a more useful and efficient machine of government. The Sinhalese are an intelligent race, and have already under British rule a certain amount of experience in self-government in municipalities, local boards, and village councils. The Burghers, who are persons of European descent, chiefly Portuguese and Dutch, are well entitled to have a direct voice in making the laws under which they live, and the same may be said even more forcibly with respect to the non-official European residents, planters, &c., who bear a large share of the taxation.*

* The financial difficulties which render it so desirable that the voice of the Indian taxpayer should be heard, do not indeed exist in Ceylon. The revenue

Many men of wide Indian experience have recently given expression to the opinion that the time has arrived for conceding to the people of India some modified form of political representation and self-government. But if this be true of India, or any portion of that empire, how much more is it true of Ceylon? The island is prosperous and peaceable; it is peopled by various nationalities, living together in a state of amity, such as is rarely seen where great differences of race, language, and religion exist; there is a numerous community of Europeans independent of the Government, and there is, in the Burgher or Eurasian population, a valuable connecting link between the European and the Asiatic races. Since 1834 a Legislative Council has existed in Ceylon, and the claims of the people to have a voice in legislation have been recognized by the concession of seats in that Council to six unofficial members, but being nominated by the Governor, not elected by the people, these six members are not truly representative. They have nevertheless done much to give effect to public opinion in controlling expenditure and modifying legislation.

During the time which has elapsed since the creation of the Legislative Council the progress of Ceylon has been most remarkable, and the contrast between the statistics of 1834 and 1875 is characteristic rather of the New World than of any country in Asia. In forty years the population more than doubled, the revenue increased more than fourfold, the tonnage of shipping increased more than fourteenfold, imports in the same proportion, and exports far more largely. While the number of scholars increased more than fivefold, the military garrison was reduced to little more than one-quarter of its former strength. A country which has thus advanced within recent experience surely merits an extension of those political privileges, the first instalment of which was conceded when the Legislative Council was established.

The change involved in the transference of Ceylon from the list of "Crown" colonies proper to that of "Representative" colonies would be by no means revolutionary. It is not now proposed to bestow upon Ceylon the privileges and risks of "Responsible" government, such as is possessed by the third and most important class of British Colonies in America, Australia, and elsewhere. The

has nearly quintupled within forty years, although various taxes and monopolies have been abandoned, and the taxation only amounts to four rupees per head of the population. There is no land tax proper, but tithes are still levied upon grain, as under the Native rulers. There are no export duties, except a small one upon plumbago, and a royalty of Rs. 200 upon every elephant.

present proposal is to place Ceylon in the intermediate class between these and the Crown Colonies, along with such countries as Natal, Barbadoes, and British Guiana, where a certain amount of popular control is exercised, through representatives, upon matters of finance and legislation, while the Colonial Office retains the power of appointing all executive officers, besides the exercise of a legislative veto. Even among the so-called "Representative" colonies, there exists a considerable amount of variety as to constitutional details, resulting from their various conditions, and the circumstances under which they were originally acquired. British Guiana is doubtless the Representative colony which bears the closest analogy to Ceylon, having been acquired by the British from the Dutch, and, being a tropical country, peopled by various coloured races, with a considerable European and half-caste element in the population.

Possibly some useful hints as to the working of a limited form of popular representation in a country so circumstanced may be obtained from the case of British Guiana, but at any rate it furnishes a precedent, and obviates in the case, of Ceylon the objection that such a constitutional reform would be a new and untried experiment. Just half a century ago, in a "Report on Judicial Establishments and Procedure in Ceylon," it was maintained that "the peculiar circumstances of Ceylon, both physical and moral, seem to point it out to the British Government as the fittest spot, in our Eastern dominions, in which to plant the germ of European civilization."

That germ has been planted, and is now springing up with considerable vigour, but the surrounding conditions are unfavourable to its free development, and to ameliorate these conditions is the duty of British statesmen. In an article entitled "An Oriental Crown Colony ripe for Representative Government" Mr. W. Digby, writing four or five years ago in the *Calcutta Review*, sums up thus the complaints of Ceylon: "The interests of the island suffer grievously from the necessity of referring everything to Downing Street, London, for decision. Full justice is not done to the island, because those most acquainted with its wants are denied a proportionate share in its government."

The first of these complaints may be heard from any colony under the direct authority of the Colonial Office, but in the case of Ceylon it has been rendered more emphatic by the mode in which the patronage of that Office has been exercised of late years: outsiders have persistently been appointed to offices of the highest trust and emolument, while Ceylon Civil Servants have been dis-

appointed as to the advancement naturally due after many years of local service and experience. In this way also the second complaint has been aggravated, but those best acquainted with the wants of Ceylon are the permanent inhabitants of Ceylon, and through their representatives only can the Government ascertain those wants.

Since the Ceylon Rifle Regiment was disbanded there has been no Native soldiery in Ceylon, unless a mere handful of Hindu gunners can be so considered, and the regular police now discharge most of the duties which formerly fell to the Ceylon Rifles, furnishing guards for prisons and escorts for treasure, and being instructed in military drill. The cost of this force, amounting to Rs. 630,000 for 1,500 men, may therefore be to a certain extent regarded as military expenditure. It would probably be well if this fact were distinctly recognized, and if the regular police were divided into two separate bodies; one for the discharge of military duties, and the other for the detection and prevention of crime.*

The Civil Service of Ceylon is on a somewhat different footing from that of India, and affords evidence that competent European officials are willing to serve within the tropics at rates of salary far lower than those prevailing in the Indian Covenanted Civil Service. The number of European Civil servants in Ceylon is, however, very considerable in proportion to that of the people whom they govern.

The Native headmen occupy positions of dignity and authority under Government, both in matters of revenue and of police, and the position of a Kandyan Ratemahatmaya resembles (on a humbler scale) that of a Javanese Native Regent. The general success of Ceylon administration, especially as regards economy, is due in a great measure to the association with the Government of the natural chiefs of the people. The Dutch govern Java through the Native chiefs, controlled and supervised by European Residents and their assistants. The British govern India through high European officials directly, and the ranks of the Native subordinate officials are not recruited from the natural aristocracy of India, but from a lower bureaucratic class. In Ceylon, which has been a Dutch colony, the Dutch system has been to a certain extent pursued, and in this respect, as in many others, the island affords an example worthy of imitation to its less prosperous continental neighbour.

The formal announcement has been recently made in the House

* Offences against property are frequent in Ceylon, especially in the planting districts. About 65,000 crimes and offences are annually reported, and the annual committals to gaol are about 10,000, but one-third of these are merely tax defaulters.

of Commons, that the Ecclesiastical Subsidies will be discontinued in Ceylon. This is an act of disestablishment and disendowment which will remove a grievous scandal, and furnishes an excellent precedent for carrying out a similar policy in India. Hitherto all ideas of religious equality have been outraged in Ceylon by the payment, from the public exchequer, of the clergy who minister to the wealthiest section of the small Protestant community. Only 10 per cent. of the total population are Christians, and of these nearly 80 per cent. are Roman Catholics. Again, the Wesleyans, Baptists, Congregationalists, &c., constitute a large proportion of the Protestants, and none of these denominations obtain any share of the Ecclesiastical Subsidies, all of which go to the Episcopalian clergy, excepting payments to a few Presbyterian chaplains.

This seems like a *reductio ad absurdum* of the notion of a State Church, when the community is taxed for the benefit of a religious sect numbering barely one per cent. of the population among its nominal adherents, and well able to afford payment for its own spiritual wants. From this injustice and absurdity Ceylon will in future be free, and it may fairly be hoped that what is done in Ceylon to-day will be done in India to-morrow.

As a Crown colony, Ceylon has become the most prosperous and progressive of the British possessions within the tropics, but a constitutional change seems now essential to her continued prosperity and progress. The time has come for giving to the people of Ceylon a distinct voice in the administration of their own affairs, through their own elected representatives, and an opportunity is now presented to the British Government for an act of prudent and farsighted statesmanship, the ultimate benefits of which would not be restricted to the shores of Ceylon.

DAVID WEDDERBURN.

MONEY.

THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE STATE IN CONNECTION THEREWITH.

THE distinction between "money" and every other instrument of payment, requires to be kept prominently in mind in all discussions concerning the currency, while it seldom is so. Money is the instrument of payment recognized by the law, and is therefore called legal tender. The tender of everything else in payment of debts may be refused. It is the distinguishing character of "money" that no one can refuse to receive it in payment of a debt. Nothing will do in its place: Rothschild's cheque on the Bank of England is not money. But the use of money has long been restricted in wealthy commercial nations to the payment of daily or weekly wages to the artisan and labouring classes, to the small daily purchases made by customers of retail shops, the payment of coaching or railway fares, taxes and rates, postage, telegraph, and bill stamps, weekly rates, pay of the soldiery, police, and servants. For all such payments in England, the sovereign or £5 note is the largest denomination of money employed, the mass of such payments being made in the subsidiary or token coinage of silver and copper.

For the settlement of the larger transactions in the country, instruments of credit only are employed, in the shape of cheques, bills of exchange, promissory notes, &c. Now, it is clearly the duty of the State, when enacting what shall be the money or legal tender of the community, to provide that money in such quantities as are required by the wants of the people. A scarcity of either copper, silver, or gold money, in any community in which their use is required by law, is an act of tyranny on the part of the ruling authorities. The State, which prescribes what alone shall be legal tender, is bound to issue that tender in quantities sufficient for the work which it has to discharge.

In prescribing that the gold sovereign shall be the legal tender of this country, silver the legal tender for amounts of less value than the sovereign, and copper for the subdivisions of the silver shilling,

the State is bound to coin and maintain in circulation, ample quantities of each denomination. The State in this country professes to allow the obligation, but timidly evades the open and direct acknowledgment of it. It admits practically that, whenever there is a manifest scarcity of either silver or copper coinage in the country, it is its duty at once to purchase silver and copper, and to coin them and throw them into circulation in such quantities as the public convenience demands.

The State practically, we say, admits that having prescribed certain silver and copper coins as the only tender by which debts can be discharged, it is its duty to supply the nation with the quantity of silver and copper coins required for the purpose.

Our statesmen admit the obligation, however, in a timid and evasive way only. Instead of directly and fearlessly avowing the obligation which the State is under, they offer to the State the bribe of a heavy profit upon the coinage to induce it to do its duty, instead of commanding it to do so by express law.

But, the State is under the very same obligation with reference to the gold sovereign, or pound sterling of the country. Having prescribed that the pound sterling, or sovereign, shall be the only legal tender for the discharge of debt in the country, the law should declare it to be the obligation of the State to see that the nation was at all times provided with sovereigns to the full extent of the public requirements thereof.

Instead of this, our legislators have refused to face the obligation, have pottered with it, and made an evasive compromise with the duty, by enacting that any one who pleases may convert gold bullion into gold coin or legal tender, the expense being borne by the State. Our statesmen have thus, from sheer timidity, or cowardice, evaded the State obligation, and thrust it upon the shoulders of the world, offering as a bribe, to test, assay, and coin whatever gold bullion they may like to send us, without charge.

Our legislation erroneously assumes that the bribe will be sufficient, not merely to attract gold to the country in sufficient quantities for all purposes of our home currency, but *to keep it here*. Here is the fatal delusion under which the whole school of Sir Robert Peel labours. Their legislation assumes that the inducements offered by the bribe of testing, assaying, and coining gold without charge, would not only attract the metal in ample quantities to our shores, but would suffice to keep it here. Why should it? When we have once conferred upon the bullion importer the service we Quixotically offer him, what inducement is there for him to keep the gold here, when there is a more profitable demand for it abroad. We

have done for him all he wanted, without charge. We have tested, assayed, and put the imperial stamp upon his gold for nothing; and whether it now remains with us, or goes abroad, is entirely a question of the urgency or otherwise of the foreign demand for the metal. The result is that the nation is sometimes flooded with gold—that is, with money or legal tender—in quantities for which there is no use whatever; while at others the whole mercantile body is thrown into convulsions, and trade brought to a standstill by the disappearance of this gold, through the foreign drain upon it.

Instead of the Legislature declaring it to be the first duty of the State itself, to see that the nation is provided at all times with such quantity of money or “legal tender,”—be the commodity what it may, gold, silver, copper, or paper—as is required for the facile conduct of the internal exchanges of the country, our legislators have refused to look the obligation in the face. They practically acknowledge it in the case of the subsidiary coinage, but evade its recognition in the case of gold, and attempt to get the obligation discharged by others, offering them as a bribe to coin, free of charge, whatever gold is offered for the purpose. They refuse to make it a matter of State discretion, counsel, and intelligence, what quantity of legal tender is required by the nation, lest they should perchance create more or less than is wanted, and prefer to leave the supply to be determined by a pure accident—namely, the urgency or otherwise of the demand for gold in other lands. No more cowardly or insane legislation could be inscribed on the Statute Book of a civilized people.

II.

A vague undefined notion seems to be entertained that the State is under no obligation to supply the nation with money; that its duty is confined simply to the declaration of what shall be “legal tender” for the discharge of debts; and that it is the business of private persons to provide this “legal tender” in sufficient quantity for the wants of the nation. Erroneous and absurd as this notion is, it has got fast hold of the minds of English writers. Having decreed what the standard of value shall be, in other words, the money or legal tender of the country, it is a State function and obligation of the most simple and direct order, to provide the nation with this standard of value, in quantity sufficient for the work to be discharged thereby. The obligation is very reluctantly admitted in this country, even in the case of the subsidiary coinage. The Government will allow the coinage both of silver and copper to remain so restricted in amount, at times, as to occasion great public

inconvenience, while any effort to prevent the abstraction of the coinage from circulation for the melting-pot, or for export, is regarded as an exploded tradition of the past.

It is not our predecessors who were in error in this matter, but ourselves. The making and unmaking of the money or legal tender of a nation should be an act of State discretion, to be determined intelligently, upon cause shown, for the increase or decrease of what is called the circulation of the country. The English law is an expression of the utmost fatuity throughout. Under it, the Government does venture to exercise a timid discretion as to the subsidiary coinage, and to levy a seignorage upon both silver and copper coin to prevent their abstraction from circulation. But in the case of gold it is positively afraid to assert any discretion whatever. The State itself will neither make nor unmake a pound sterling upon any consideration whatever, and at the same time insanely leaves it to all the world to increase or diminish the quantity of gold in circulation in the kingdom, at its pleasure. The thought that the State has any function to discharge in the increase or decrease of the legal tender of the kingdom, beyond that of coining it without charge, never enters the minds of English statesmen. Our law proceeds upon the assumption that the State has nothing to do with the quantity of money in circulation, and that, under wise legislation, the quantity will ever be determined by the quantity of gold bullion that may happen to be in the country. Under this system, were corn our standard of value instead of gold, the quantity of corn in the country would represent the quantity of legal tender therein, the value being sometimes 60s. a quarter, and sometimes 40s. This complete abnegation of the State of all responsibility for the maintenance of the standard, by guarding it against the market fluctuations of the commodity in which it is expressed, is the radical error of our whole legislation on the subject. The error was embodied in Sir Robert Peel's famous definition of the pound sterling, as so many grains of gold of a certain given weight and fineness. The definition was fatally defective, and was the embodiment of his whole error. The pound sterling is a certain quantity of gold of a given weight and fineness, but with the Queen's image and superscription thereon; that image and superscription signifying that the gold on which it is impressed is gold at the normal price of the metal—namely, 77s. 9d. per ounce, and not gold at the casual market price sometimes of 70s. per ounce, and at others of 90s. Not the least precaution of any kind is taken under Sir Robert Peel's legislation to prevent our gold coinage, in other words our standard, from

fluctuating in value incessantly, while we have no means of determining what the fluctuations are. We know that at times they are extreme, finding them palpably reflected in the prices of other commodities so as to awaken even the dullest mind to the fact.

That gold fluctuates in market value as all other commodities do, by the accidents of supply and demand, is admitted, while our statesmen and publicists assume that the fluctuations, in the case of gold, are so unimportant that we may safely ignore them. The magnitude of the error will probably never be generally discerned until the adoption of a wiser system reveals how important and how ruinous to trade are the fluctuations so lightly dealt with. The gold coinage, being our standard of value, ought to be placed out of the reach of all market fluctuations in the value of the metal, precautions being taken to make the standard reflect steadily the normal or enduring price of the metal—say, 77s. 9d. per ounce—as opposed to the fluctuating market price, which vacillated during the early part of this century, as is well known, from 78s. to 110s. per ounce. If Sir Robert Peel's definition of the pound sterling is correct, the market price of gold has only to fall by some accident 20 or 30 per cent. as that of silver has done in the last six years, for our standard of value, the pound sterling, to represent 13s. to 16s. instead of 20s. This is precisely what has happened in India, while the Government in its indifference as to what becomes of that great empire, apathetically tolerates this state of matters. Does any one for a moment believe that if the sovereign had sunk in value from 20s. to 15s. or 16s. since the year 1876, a legislative remedy would not have been found for so total a vitiation of the terms of every contract in the kingdom? The profound error of Sir Robert Peel's legislation would have forced itself upon the mind of everyone. His famous definition of "the pound sterling" as simply so many grains of gold bullion would have been flung to the winds, with the market price of the metal down to 60s. per ounce instead of 77s. 9d., and everyone would have discovered for himself, that the "standard" of value must necessarily be the normal or enduring price of the metal, as opposed to the market aberrations therefrom. The affairs of India being of no consequence whatever, her people are abandoned to a "standard" rupee of 1s. 7½d. What does it matter? they are only Natives, and their interests are not of so much consequence as our own.

PURITY AND FREEDOM OF ELECTION :

A RETROSPECT IN WESTMINSTER POLITICS.

[*Chiefly from the unpublished MSS. of FRANCIS PLACE.*]

AFTER all these centuries of parliamentary government and free institutions, it may seem strange that a high-spirited and self-governing people like the English should, at this late period, be still in quest of purity and freedom of election. The inquiries following upon recent election petitions have revealed a very debased political morality in certain constituencies, and have indicated grave suspicions of wider corruption and lower depths not sounded. These cases are gross and palpable ; but there is a subtle form wherein the poison of bribery is almost universally administered without recognized breach of law or morality. The fatal result appears in restricted freedom of election. The time-honoured address to "the free and independent electors" is certainly not on every occasion a purely conventional mode of speech. But it is too obvious to require argument that not more than an insignificant fraction of the House of Commons is elected by the really free and independent choice of the electors. The area of selection is extremely narrow ; and the selection is oftener determined by the candidate's money-bags or rank, than by any more relevant qualifications. The grosser forms of influence may be repressed by legislative enactment ; but every form of undue influence is very largely at the mercy of the more earnest men among the electors themselves. As soon as the constituencies awaken from the extraordinary hallucination that their representation costs them nothing, they will take a very decided step towards a fundamental reform. Already there is a dim recognition in some quarters, that landlords and other privileged persons are not the most fitting champions to select for the redress of popular grievances. The following example of self-reliance and determination may help to strengthen the conviction that, if the

electors would be really free, they must strike the blow with their own hands.

Francis Place, "the Radical Tailor of Charing Cross," from whose MSS. the present paper has been drawn up, is probably not even so much as a name, to the younger politicians of to-day. Yet Francis Place well deserves to be held in respectful and kindly remembrance by every Liberal, and especially by every advanced Liberal. For a long series of years he interested himself actively in all movements, political and social, that tended to the freedom and elevation of the masses. He professed uncompromising Radical principles, and stood by them faithfully, through very much evil report. Many of the views that he upheld more than half a century ago, are no longer stigmatized with misleading and opprobrious names, but are accepted as commonplaces by the most timid of Whigs. For the rest, Place was fully prepared to adopt the most advanced Liberal programme of our time. The glimpse that is obtained of him here will convey some idea of his character, and may, perhaps, help to revive some part of his influence. There is no Liberal Association that is likely to be called upon to make head against such serious difficulties as the "Friends to Parliamentary Reform" encountered in "the frauds and perjuries and all the old villainies of a Westminster election." Nor is there one that may not be expected to contain as good a Liberal and man of business as Place was, and, by standing firmly shoulder to shoulder, to achieve and maintain a success no less distinguished than what is recorded below.

Up till 1803, Mr. Francis Place had devoted his energies exclusively to the conduct of his business, giving no heed whatever to the course of politics, or the opinions of political persons. He shut his shop duly at nine, and read till he went to bed at twelve or later. "In fact," he says, "I almost ceased to have any acquaintance with any person whatever."

About the middle of 1803; however, he "became acquainted with his next door neighbour, Mr. Thomas, the butcher," who was "for some time almost the only man with whom he at all associated." It was not till 1805, when his business was well established, that he "permitted several respectable and well-judging men to come and gossip with him occasionally. They were, most of them, electors of Westminster. Mr. Thomas and one or two others of them, were members of the 'Whig Club,' and great admirers of Mr. Fox, Mr. Erskine, Mr. Sheridan, &c." Place, on the contrary, "never had any respect for either Fox or Sheridan, and not much for Erskine."

He "was satisfied that they were trading politicians, Tories out of place, who cared little for the people further than they could be made to promote their own interests, whether those interests were popular or pecuniary." His Whig friends "maintained that Fox and his partisans were all 'good men and true,' and, if an opportunity occurred, would redeem in the most perfect and complete way all the pledges they had ever given to the people." But Place was confident that the sun would never rise on the day of such redemption.

By the end of January, 1806, the coalition "between the Foxite Whigs and the Grenvilleite Tories"—"a second scandalous, not to say infamous, coalition"—justified the political foresight of Place, and furnished him with a congenial text to discourse from to his small knot of friends. "Meanwhile," he says, "my opinions of these Whigs and Tories, and more especially of the conduct of the Whigs, were, of course, shown only to the few with whom I conversed. I was wholly unknown in Westminster, and knew next to nothing of the electors." Presently, however, there occurred an opportunity for him to extend his influence beyond his immediate associates. Mr. Fox accepted the office of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and a meeting of the electors of Westminster, with a view to his re-election, was held in Westminster Hall on the 10th of February. Eulogiums would be freely lavished on the Whigs; and Place shrewdly suggested to his Whig friends that "one of the resolutions should declare that the electors relied on the many promises made to them on the subject [of Parliamentary Reform], and that they trusted the great and important object would continue to receive the support of Mr. Fox and his friends." This suggestion was put before Mr. Fox, through the agency of a common friend—"Mr. Wishart, the tobacconist, of Coventry Street, who was an old member of the Whig Club, and what is called a close friend of Mr. Fox"—but Mr. Fox did not at all like the idea that any allusion should be made to Parliamentary Reform at the meeting, "as a separate meeting could be held on the subject." At the meeting, accordingly, the Whigs were glorified, and Mr. Fox was proposed; but no subsequent "separate meeting" on Parliamentary Reform was held. On the 14th Mr. Fox was returned for Westminster without opposition.

On the 13th of September, Mr. Fox died. "His death had been expected for some days, and nobody was therefore taken by surprise." The Westminster wire-pullers had time to arrange their plans for the election of a successor. "There was at this time no public in Westminster; the suffrages of the electors had long been

divided between the Whig and Tory factions, and it was reasonably concluded that any bold impudent rogue might turn the political circumstances to his own account. Two such, and a foolish lord, soon came forward to mock the silly electors, and to cheat them and one another." The two "bold impudent rogues" were Sheridan and Dennis O'Brien, "both notorious profligates, as well morally as politically"; the "foolish lord" was Earl Percy. "Thus," says the insulted and indignant Place, "there were to have been three candidates, neither of whom was worth the trouble of going to Covent Garden about at any time or for any purpose, much less to assist in making a member of Parliament of him." There was roguery in the wind, and Place detected it with infallible scent.

A meeting of the electors for the purpose of considering of a proper person to represent the City and Liberty of Westminster was called by an advertisement signed by twelve electors. The place of meeting was to be the Crown and Anchor Tavern, in the Strand, and the intention was to propose Sheridan, with whom the promoters of the meeting were in secret league. There was a "good" attendance, "the Great Room being two-thirds filled." Place was present, full of virtuous indignation "at the roguery he understood was about to be transacted."

Wishart, the old well-practised sycophant, was put into the chair, and, to the surprise of nearly all who were present, he, instead of proposing Sheridan as was expected and was intended by those who had assisted to call the meeting, of whom he was one, suggested Earl Percy as the proper person. Dennis O'Brien, who had proposed himself, in the hope of turning his own nomination to account, [and] had, it was reasonably believed, and as circumstances which soon transpired left no doubt, been bought off by the Duke of Northumberland, got up to take part against his friend Mr. Sheridan, which he would not have done without his consent and the consent of those who were called his friends, not to propose himself, as he had already done, but to set himself and Sheridan aside. . . . A more barefaced piece of roguery and insult never was practised; it was seen through at once, and a great clamour ensued. . . . Sheridan eventually rose and declared, what everyone knew was a gross falsehood, that the fear of losing the good opinion of his friends at Stafford must induce him to decline becoming a candidate for Westminster, and then fairly turned the electors over to Lord Percy.

"Let the reader, if he can," exclaims Place, in the fervour of honest disgust, "find in the proceedings of any but the Whigs such a system of shameless trickery." A portion of the meeting, not instructed beforehand in the devious course intended, appear to have sympathised with Place, for the nomination of Lord Percy was rejected by a large majority. A committee was appointed to select a proper person, and the meeting

adjourned for a week, till September 27th. The committee, however, "did not wait until the meeting was held and then report to it, as an honest-committee would have done," but "took upon themselves to decide for the electors, and put Lord Percy in nomination three days before the meeting was held." Naturally the meeting of September 27th "became exceedingly clamorous; it was justly offended, but it could do no more than show its resentment by making a noise. This answered the purpose" of Lord Percy's supporters; "they knew well enough that no serious opposition could grow out of the tumult." Mr. Curran was proposed, however, on the supposition that Sir Francis Burdett's connection with Middlesex would prevent him from coming forward; and "many independent and spirited men," not brooking "to be basely tricked," resolved "to open a public subscription to defray the election expenses of either Sir Francis Burdett or Mr. Curran." Resolutions were also passed rejecting Percy and censuring the committee for betrayal of trust; but "the proceedings were all too late to effect any present purpose."

Had not Westminster been degraded to the lowest point, had not the electors submitted in the most despicable way to the two political factions, such a series of tricks, such scandalous and fraudulent conduct, such barefaced contempt of everything which was decent, could not have taken place—would not have been attempted. The contemplation of the mean and base roguery of public men in the concerns of the people makes the heart sick. The time will come when men, in other respects honest and honourable, will cease to be atrocious rogues towards the public.

I was a stranger wholly unknown; none seemed to have much confidence in themselves, none seemed willing to make business of the matter, and go to work in a straightforward determined way. All was abroad, and it was plain enough to me that nothing of any moment would be attempted. A committee was, however, appointed; it was necessarily a strange mixture of persons entertaining different opinions, having different views and different interests, and, worse than all, having no one man of business among them. Both Mr. Curran and Sir Francis Burdett declined to stand. Curran was a trickster, and would have been a partisan of the coalition against his own constituents; there was no loss in not having him. Burdett would have stood up for the people against both factions. It would, however, as it regarded the electors, have been a point gained to have set up any man at their own expense, and supported him by their own exertions, whether they succeeded, or not in carrying him into Parliament.

"On the 7th of October, Earl Percy was attended to the hustings by a considerable number of mean and hungry Whigs, and some despicable Tories. Whitbread proposed, and Elliot"—"a brewer, a rank Tory, and Colonel of the Westminster Horse Volunteers"—seconded the nomination; and no other candidate appearing, Lord Percy was returned.

A scene of riot and blackguardism now took place in the demolition of the hustings, which had been unnecessarily put up as an emolument for the High Bailiff, and a treat to the ruffians who tore them to pieces, and as one among many contrivances to keep up the degradation of the electors. But the scandalous scene of destroying so large a building as the hustings was as nothing to that which immediately followed. "On the arrival of Lord Percy at Northumberland House," says the Whig sycophant, James Perry, in his *Morning Chronicle*, "*Porter and bread and cheese* was distributed among the populace with the most liberal profusion," and, of course, there was an abundance of guests ready to avail themselves of this "*hospitality*." What the notions of great men were respecting the people may be easily gathered from this short narrative of proceedings in a single case. But thus it ever has been: keep the people as ignorant as you can, make them as brutal as possible, and you will never want excuses for coercing them; make them as base and keep them as base as you can, and you have the best possible security for bad government, the greatest obstacle to good government. It was thus the Whigs on all occasions sought to degrade the people; bribery, cajolery, riots of the most scandalous kind, producing even wanton wilful murder in the streets, were countenanced by both factions. The meanest, most scandalous and infamous acts were constantly resorted to and practised by leading public men.

My indignation was greatly increased when I saw the servants of the Duke of Northumberland, in their showy dress liveries, throwing lumps of bread and cheese among the dense crowd of vagabonds they had collected together. To see these vagabonds catching at the lumps, shouting, swearing, fighting, and blackguarding in every possible way—women as well as men, all the vile wretches from the courts and alleys in St. Giles and Westminster, the Porridge Islands, and other miserable places—to see these people representing (it was said) the electors of Westminster was certainly the lowest possible step of degradation, except indeed, if it be possible, to hear it said, as it was said, that "the electors of Westminster had been treated by the bounty of the Duke." Some who mingled in the mob were ashamed of the proceedings, and, as the mob pressed round the butts which contained the beer, suggested that the best way would be to knock in the heads as they stood up on end. This was done immediately. The heads were beaten in, and the coalheavers ladled the beer out with their long-tailed broad-brimmed hats; but, the mob pressing on, the butts were upset and the beer flowed along the gutters, from whence some made efforts to obtain it. It may be possible to imagine something like the disgraceful scene, but it is not possible either to describe it or to excite in the reader the almost uncontrollable feelings of a spectator.

I was not the only one who felt indignation; almost every man I knew was much offended with the whole of the proceedings, and with all who were concerned in them. I therefore suggested the propriety of looking out for a proper person to represent Westminster, to open a subscription when such a person was found, and to persevere until he or someone else should be returned free from all expense to him. My mind was made up to watch circumstances, to take advantage of them, and never to desist until Westminster had, by returning one member in the way proposed, shown its power and importance, driven away the factions as far as was possible, and made the way clear to return both its members by the sole exertions of the electors.

I now enlarged my acquaintance among the electors, and constantly maintained, not only that the people had the power to do themselves justice as electors,

but that no more was necessary in the first instance than that a few men of business and spirit, no one of whom had any sinister interest, should act together and hold themselves ready for action when an opportunity offered. Many concurred with me, but no one was willing to act. . . . It therefore appeared almost hopeless to expect that people would be found in Westminster willing to do their duty to themselves. I did not, however, despair, but took every opportunity that occurred to inculcate the necessity of an independent mode of thinking, hoping that in time it might be turned to account. At this time Cobbett's *Register* was in high repute, and his remarks on passing subjects were eagerly looked for. In several letters addressed to the electors of Westminster, he clearly pointed out their duty to them, and in his fourth letter he ably commented on the conduct of the Whigs, and reproached the electors with meanness and ignorance. The letter was much read and was very useful; it produced shame in many and a desire to do something on another occasion, but it did not remove from them the notion which long practice had confirmed, that a contested election could only be carried on by money—money in immense sums, and this prevented me from expecting that any extraordinary exertions would be made by the electors for themselves at the expected General Election.

On the 25th October, 1866, Parliament was dissolved, and two days later Earl Percy took leave of the electors, knowing that he had no chance whatever of re-election. Sir Samuel Hood and Mr. James Paull announced themselves as candidates. Sheridan also was in the field. Meantime, Place stood aloof.

On the 28th Sir Francis Burdett published his celebrated address to the freeholders of Middlesex, in which he said to them—"A double imposture is attempted to be passed on you. The watchword of one party is 'The best of Kings,' the watchword of the other is 'The best of Patriots;' but neither of these parties will descend to particulars and inform you what the 'best of Kings' and 'the best of Patriots' have already done or will do for you. What they have done for themselves we know and feel; what further they will do for us we can only conjecture."

"This gave great offence to both parties. Burdett was called a traitor, a miscreant, and everything indeed which implied infamy. He had lately been toasted at the Whig Club and at Sheridan's dinner as the wished-for representative for Middlesex, but now he had not only forfeited all claims to the countenance of the Whigs, but had incurred their inveterate hatred." On the 2nd of November Sir Francis nominated Mr. Paull on the hustings. But Sir Samuel Hood came in at the top of the poll, with Sheridan second. Still, Mr. Paull had many plumpers, and "*if each elector had had only one vote—and no elector ought to have more—Mr. Paull would have been returned by a decided majority of electors.*" This was very encouraging; "it showed very plainly that there was a good public feeling and much independence among the electors, which under proper management might be turned to good account." Besides, "Paull according to his means was willing to bribe and

hire ruffians," but his means were not large; and he had some men on his committee that put down their foot on those proceedings as far as they could. His cause also suffered from want of business management and organization. At this time Mr. Place "had never once spoken to" Sir Francis Burdett.

Mr. Paull now got seriously involved in money matters, and his committee melted away. On April 27th, 1807, Parliament was dissolved.

The conduct of the Whigs in taking office, and the manner in which they had behaved whilst in office, tended greatly to induce numbers of persons to distrust both parties to an extent they never before were distrusted, and the reasons for this change in their opinions were so cogent that they were sure to retain their force, and, however slowly, yet not less certainly, to increase the number of those who were not likely to rely on either party. This it was which laid the foundation of the successful resistance to both the parties in Westminster, and the decrease of their power everywhere. It has taken many years, however, to bring this feeling to its present state; it will take many more before the absurd notions which have been successfully taught will be wholly eradicated.

Having learnt on Sunday that the dissolution was to take place next day, Place at once called a meeting of his associates. "We concurred in opinion that by means of an active canvass and a systematic mode of proceeding we could carry an election for Sir Francis Burdett and Mr. Paull at a comparatively small expense." There were doubts, however, of the propriety of running Mr. Paull with Sir Francis, owing to the "discreditable tricks" he had played them, as well as from his not being sufficiently known to them as a Parliamentary Reformer. For it was on this latter ground that "we were resolved to act, if we acted at all, because we had objection to a man spending his fortune in election contests, and because we had hope that the electors would subscribe as much money as would pay the expenses of an election." After discussion, it was resolved to adjourn till the afternoon of next day, Monday, and meantime ascertain the sentiments of Sir Francis on the subject. Place learnt from Paull, who professed to know, that Sir Francis would stand along with Paull if solicited by a numerously-signed requisition, and would be willing to take the chair at a public meeting of the electors. Paull was in favour of a dinner meeting at the Crown and Anchor Tavern, which he thought "would be more likely to produce a right feeling among the electors, and enable them to appoint an efficient committee to conduct the election. He would (he said) write to Sir Francis immediately and advertise the dinner." It is too long a story to follow the windings of the negotiations that ended in the duel between Sir Francis and Paull, the unauthorised use of Sir Francis's name in the advertise-

ments announcing the dinner being the immediate cause of quarrel. Place roundly denounces Paull as a "liar and shuffler," and records how he resolutely dropped all intercourse with Paull from this time forward.

The conduct of Mr. Paull, and the consequences to Sir Francis Burdett, filled my coadjutors with indignation. My resolve was taken, and I communicated it to them. I observed that Paull's contest for Westminster was supposed to have cost £6,000; that, as they knew, I had long felt indignant at the way in which Westminster had been disposed of by the Whig and Tory factions; that Paull's attempt had shown that a large number of the electors were really independent men, who would follow the course they thought right; that, spite of the influence and corruption of both factions, and of the stupid prejudice which many still entertained, that they were under particular influences when, in fact, there was no real influence operating on them; that, spite of the baseness of those who would take a bribe or permit the payment of their parish rates, spite of the many arts used to degrade the electors, and spite of all that could be done by the nobility and gentry and men in office to intimidate tradesmen and others, I would undertake to manage an election contest for Sir Francis Burdett without spending £1,000; that, as Paull had taken himself out of the way, we ought to attempt the return of Sir Francis.

We had a long discussion, in which I put the matter in every form in my power. I offered to give up every other thing, and attend wholly to the election till its close, if they would undertake to assist in carrying on of an election for him free from all expense and personal trouble to him. After some time Mr. Brooks and Mr. James Powell [a "gentleman" and "member of the London Corresponding Society"] agreed to give the whole of their time, and several others agreed to give a considerable portion of theirs. Summons were immediately issued to some thirty persons, who had been active at the last Middlesex and Westminster elections, to meet at six o'clock in the evening at the Ship Tavern, Charing Cross.

At the time appointed twenty persons responded to the summons. Place records the names and quality of them all, with the exception of but two or three. Only two of the whole company are designated "gentlemen" (that is to say, "not tradesmen"). Mr. James Powell, already mentioned, and Mr. J. P. Harris, "a Berkshire gentleman." There is a Dr. Maclean—of course, "a gentleman." Besides Place himself there is another tailor; there is a mercer, a broker, a wine-merchant, a bootmaker, a shoemaker, a watchcase-maker, two curriers, and other tradesmen. Four are specially mentioned as members of the London Corresponding Society.

We were all of us obscure persons, Place goes on to explain, not one man of note among us, not one in any way known to the electors generally, as insignificant a set of persons as could well have been collected together to undertake so important a public matter as a Westminster election against wealth and rank and name and influence. I again went over the topics I had urged in the

morning; said I would not only undertake the management, but also whatever might otherwise be necessary which others might dislike because it was disagreeable; that, as Mr. Brooks had allowed his name to appear in public as chairman and treasurer, no other name need be mentioned in any of our proceedings which anyone desired should not appear; that we could not be of any importance as individuals, and it was therefore incumbent on us to make the matter clear to the understandings of the electors, to call upon them to do their duty to themselves, and to leave display and exhibitions of consequence to others; that, if we proceeded openly and acted honestly, failure, either from want of money or from the electors not coming forward to the poll, would be no disgrace to any of us. It was finally agreed to undertake an election for Sir Francis Burdett, and to carry it on as long as our money lasted, and if that failed us to withdraw from the contest.

Fifty pounds was subscribed on the spot, and Messrs. Simpkin and Jackson, the landlords of the Crown and Anchor Tavern, promised the use of their great room, free of expense, for a public meeting at noon on the following Monday, the 4th of May. It was now Saturday when this resolution was come to. In the meantime the meeting was to be advertised in the Sunday and Monday papers, and 500 bills announcing it were to be posted on Sunday morning.

On Sunday evening "we again assembled, and were joined by Mr. William Frend and Mr. Joseph Clayton Jennings, the barrister. I produced a plan I had with much care prepared for conducting the election. It was carefully discussed and adopted. Resolutions to be proposed at the General Meeting were also prepared, and we adjourned till eleven o'clock the next morning at the tavern.

"We fully expected to be assailed at the General Meeting. We knew the men opposed to us, and were sure that Gibbons, the auctioneer, could send a number of such men as usually attend sales and take possession of men's goods under executions, to make a riot; and this was done, but it was done with much care and judgment. As soon, therefore, as we entered the room, one of these men attached himself to each of us, and never left us. When any one of us attempted to address the audience, the man who had been planted for the purpose bawled out 'Paull! Paull!! Paull!!!' and all the others joined in the cry, which was taken up again by others for fun or mischief, and thus the voice of the speaker was instantly drowned. I know no word so well calculated to confound an audience as the open sound 'Paull!'" An imprudent hint to unscrupulous obstructionists in public meetings.

No business was transacted, and the meeting broke up abruptly. Place and his friends, however, were too astute and determined to permit themselves to be bawled down in this fashion. They quietly retired to another room, which they had provided in anticipation of failure in the great room, and, having elected a fresh chairman proceeded to business.

Several persons came into the room and joined us, to the amount altogether of fifty-four. The resolutions which we had intended to propose to the public meeting were read and discussed, and voted one by one; a committee of as many

as would consent to serve was appointed, and the subscription was increased to £84; and with this sum to defray the expenses already incurred and those to be incurred, we forthwith determined to proceed to an election contest in a place where no candidate who had any chance of success had hitherto stood a contest at an expense of less than £6,000, and where as much as £60,000 had been expended.

The first two resolutions, passed unanimously, expressed dissatisfaction with Mr. Paull's conduct and withdrew support from him, while they characterised the conduct of Sir Francis Burdett as "frank, honest, and manly," at the same time regretting that "his valuable life should have been put to hazard when he stands almost alone the devoted and intrepid friend of humanity, of England, its people, and its laws." The third resolution was "That Sir Francis Burdett, Bart., at this critical juncture, in withdrawing from Parliament in despair of the public cause from the general corruption and venality of the times, could not have recollected that, when to control bad government, and to guard the public liberty becomes difficult, the duty increases with the difficulty; and it is therefore more necessary, more urgent, and more important that we should recur to the old principles of English freedom, and call upon him to serve us in Parliament, to correct the abuses of administration, and guard the constitution." The fourth resolution was: "*That it would be to the immortal honour of the City of Westminster, and afford a great and glorious example to the electors of the United Kingdom, that they should return Sir Francis Burdett to Parliament, free from every sacrifice and expense to himself, upon independent principles, consonant to the genuine spirit of the constitution of England, which declares that election shall be free and without corruption.*" The committee was to sit daily at the Ship Tavern, Charing Cross.

It was resolved that, excepting such statements as might be made to our prejudice by Mr. Paull and his friends, we would neither reply to any charges made against us, nor attack anyone who might become a candidate, either in writing or printing or by speaking. That we would stand on the merits of our case and trust to the sense of the electors.

A sufficiently innocent course, forsooth, in the view of the professional electioneering agent, but one that has succeeded frequently since then, and, indeed, the only course that is at once consonant with the dignity of the candidate and with the respect due to "free and independent" electors.

So very contemptible did we and our proceedings appear in the eyes of the Whigs at this time, that they merely laughed at us for what they considered childish imbecility. *Not a single daily paper was on our side*; every one of them was opposed to us. Whig and Tory equally despised us at first, and when they

found that our proceedings were likely to be of some importance, they abused us in the vilest manner, accused us of committing the most scandalous actions, and imputed all manner of evil conduct to us. We took no notice of them in any of our publications, but went on with our business steadily and judiciously to the end.

At first the Whig and Tory papers told the public that we never contemplated going on with an election, that all we meant was to disturb the public peace, to create riot and confusion, that we knew we had no chance whatever of success, and should soon disappear from the stage altogether. We had resolved that, as far as lay in our power, there should be no tumults, that there should be no treating, paying of poor's rates, or compelling people to vote; and we gave notice accordingly to the High Bailiff and the magistrates, and cautioned them to have the peace kept.

"The committee resolved to sit permanently, and in the evening Mr. Lemaitre informed us that Mr. Horne Tooke would subscribe £100. The total amount of the subscription was now therefore nearly £200. The election commenced on the following Thursday, May 7th."

The sums paid for assistance at Westminster elections were enormous: common messengers had half a guinea a day, poll clerks a guinea, committee clerks two guineas, inspectors (who were generally rate-collectors) five guineas a day; attorneys, barristers, canvassers were paid at a prodigiously high rate. Printing was ordered capriciously, and charged higher than on other occasions, and advertisements frequently cost from £50 to £100 a day; stationery was used and wasted as if the purpose was to contrive to get rid of money. We, as far as we were concerned, put an end to all these extravagant charges, and the shameful one of feasting those employed and they [those] who called themselves friends of the candidates.

We paid nobody but clerks, door-keepers, and messengers, and the highest sum we gave to anyone was half a guinea a day. All other offices were filled with volunteers as well as we could fill them; we laboured under one disadvantage in consequence of not having paid inspectors. The only check on bad and on false votes when tendered were the parish rate-books, and as these were in the hands of the collectors who were paid five guineas a day by two, if not three, of the candidates, they let anyone who pleased poll against us, however bad their votes, if they divided them between Lord Cochrane and Mr. Elliot, and in many instances when they gave one vote to Sheridan and the other to either Cochrane or Elliot. We paid £45 in advance for committee-rooms at the Britannia Coffee House in Covent Garden, as they were the only rooms we could obtain of sufficient size and number without paying upwards of £100 for their use, which must also have been paid in advance. When we had made the necessary arrangements, provided the books, without which we could not carry on the election, and set aside a sum of money to pay the clerks and messengers for one day, we were almost penniless.

The High Bailiff had purchased his office for £3,000, and, as he afterwards informed a committee of the House of Commons, [that] he calculated on the election of members to serve in Parliament for Westminster as a principal source of emolument. It had been usual to admit all his charges, for the candidates to pay them, and to give him a handsome gratuity. Why any more should be paid to the High Bailiff than he could legally demand was what we could not under-

stand; we doubted much that he could legally demand anything, and we resolved therefore not to pay any of his charges until the legality of the demand was established. We thought, from what we had heard, that it was probable the Dean and Chapter of Westminster were bound to take the poll at their own expense. The civil government was in their hands; they had large emoluments arising from it, and it was said they did in former times provide, at their own expense, for taking the poll. Of this we gave the Bailiff due notice, and demanded admittance to the place of polling on equal terms with those who were candidates. This the Bailiff refused to do, and we resolved, if he persisted, to take the poll ourselves outside the hustings. We, however, determined to proceed cautiously, and therefore gave him notice, *demanded* admittance to the place of polling, and informed him we would hold him legally responsible for his conduct. He then consented to give us the accommodation we demanded.

At the moment the election commenced some of my coadjutors were exceedingly depressed; we had scarcely any money, nobody had joined us, and we appeared as forlorn as the Whigs and Tories had predicted we should be. Some among us who had borne abuse very well could not bear being laughed at, and the ridicule which was cast upon us almost disabled them from acting. Some of us knew well enough that, in all such matters as those we were engaged in, there needed no more to direct them than three or four determined active industrious men, that in fact all such matters were conducted by a very few persons, and that unless they were so conducted they never were and never could be conducted well. We had among us several able well-disposed men, and some three or four who, as they devoted themselves to it, were as many as were necessary; all beyond this small number, however useful in some respects, were subsidiary. They, then, in whom the management really resided were not to be put from their purpose by any event however untoward, nor to relax in their efforts for one minute under any circumstances."

At the hustings Sir Francis Burdett was nominated "by Mr. Francis Glossop, a wax and tallow chandler, . . . on the part of the people of Westminster who were immediately interested, and not as a candidate on his own account." Mr. Paull was nominated by James Gibbons, the auctioneer with the redoubtable myrmidons. Lord Cochrane and Mr. Elliot were also nominated. Sheridan's friends were prepared to nominate him; but neither he nor Paull at the moment became candidates, because there was no friend to give the necessary security to meet the inevitable expenses. Placo and his friends refused to give the High Bailiff any security "for the payment of what he might choose to call his expenses," but they "handed him a written paper on behalf of certain electors, saying that we did not desire him to forego any legal demand, but that we would enter into no engagement to pay him anything, and we cautioned him at his peril to refuse taking the poll."

The figures at the close of the poll for the first day stood thus: Lord Cochrane, 112; Mr. Elliot, 99; Sir Francis Burdett, 78.

This indicated uncommon apathy; nothing like it had ever before been known; the electors, by the small number who came forward to poll, seemed to

say they had no interest in the issue—most of all it was regarded by us in this light. We had done everything we could do to make a show on the poll-books, and all of us who had votes polled early in the day, still at the close no more votes were registered for us than 78.

At the close of the day we found we had money sufficient to pay our expenses the next day; and, notwithstanding some among us, taking the small number polled as a bad omen, were desirous to abandon all further proceedings, others were willing it should proceed, and they who had the principal management were determined to go on as long as they had any money to pay expenses; they thought it probable that as much money would be subscribed before Saturday night as would pay the expenses of that day; and we resolved therefore to go on as if upon a certainty for Saturday, and to take chance for Monday.

Mr. Brooks was a remarkably ignorant man, but a clever man of detail in business. He was generally imbecile—"Mr. Place is an infallible judge, and too stornly regardful of truth to swerve one hair's-breadth out of charitable weakness for a friend—" Mr. Brooks was generally imbecile, but on particular occasions he was quite the reverse. On the present occasion he not only stood firmly by me, but he volunteered to pay all the expenses of the election for Monday if subscriptions were not raised. He was a man of figures, punctual, precise, and indefatigable—a most useful man for us in our situation. At the close of the poll everyone went to the hustings to hear the speeches, and then to their dinners. Mr. Brooks and I stayed at the committee-rooms, got a hasty dinner in my room, kept the clerks hard at work posting the poll-books, arranged everything for the General Committee at six o'clock, and made suggestions for all sorts of useful purposes.

No expense of any kind, however small, could be incurred unless ordered on a printed check, filled up and signed by the chairman of the committee, the treasurer, and the secretary. And the accounts were so arranged that we could at any time in a quarter of an hour ascertain the state of our finances. . . . Mr Jennings undertook to represent the committee on the hustings, and he acquitted himself to our satisfaction. He came every day about an hour before the close of the poll, and received from me such information as was necessary to enable him to speak on the proper subjects.

On the third day of the poll, Saturday, the total numbers stood thus: Cochrane, 476; Elliot, 407; Burdett, 309; Sheridan, 87; Paull, 45. Sheridan and Paull had at last got a start.

It was now evident that the electors had not determined on the course they should take. It was strange that, notwithstanding the renown of Lord Cochrane, [and] the active canvass carried on for him as well as by himself, [that] he should have polled so small a number; that Mr. Elliot, who was supported by the Minister and the aristocracy, whom most of the parish vestries favoured, should have polled a still smaller number; that only 309 should be found willing to come to the hustings to poll for Sir Francis; and most of all strange that Sheridan's Whig friends should have so completely deserted him, and that the efforts of the daily press in his favour should altogether have done so very little among the electors for him.

It was plain that the contest must be between us and one at least of the two candidates who headed the poll. Money had come to us in the course of Saturday beyond our expectation; there were symptoms everywhere of the commencement of activity among the electors, and the most desponding among us

now became elated, and the committee resolved to hang a large flag out on a pole from the committee-room window. They also hired three or four ponies, put decently-dressed bugle-boys on them, gave each of them a dark blue silk cap, and sent them about the streets to animate the people, and distribute handbills.

This lands us in a ridiculous anti-climax, but, being in the heat of a Westminster election, we must not be over-particular.

Sunday intervening was employed in making arrangements in the different parishes, and in canvassing. I went into some of the courts and laues in Westminster and canvassed for about two hours and a half; this was the only time I ever canvassed.

Whether from the unique canvassing of Place or not, the votes for Sir Francis came in full tide on Monday, and from that day till the close of the poll "we headed both the candidates, excepting on the ninth day, when Cochrane polled one more than we did." Place and his coadjutors were triumphant. "At the close of the poll on the fifteenth day, the numbers stood thus: Burdett, 5,134; Cochrane, 3,708; Sheridan, 2,645; Elliot, 2,137; Paull, 269. Burdett received 1,672 plumpers, which was as many, within seven, as all the rest of the candidates taken together polled.

Mr. Paull declined the contest on the ninth day, and Mr. Elliot did the same on the eleventh. Sheridan was so far behind that he had no chance of outpolling Cochrane, and, as he begged hard to be permitted to make as respectable a show of numbers as he could, *Lord Cochrane took his inspectors away, and Sheridan polled whom he pleased, and the same man over and over again as many times as he pleased.* And this was how he made what he was pleased to call a respectable show of numbers.

The expenses up to the close of the poll were £780 14s. 4d. The items were as follows:—

(a.) Advertisements, printing, bill-sticking, books, stationery, clerks, messengers, committee-rooms, candles, incidental expenses, and coach hire, £627 9s. 6d. "The charge for coach hire," Mr. Place is careful to explain, "was occasioned by the conveyance of some twenty sick and lame persons, who, being desirous to vote for us, sent to the committee-room to request conveyance."

(b.) Flags and music, £75 19s. 1d.; an expense "incurred to please some of the committee and a large number of electors who did not like that all the noise should be made by our opponents."

(c.) High Constable's charges, £77 5s. 9d. "It was found that, unless we paid our share of the charge for constables, instead of facilitating the approach of our voters to the hustings, these peace-officers would be the means of obstructing them, and thus, by producing riots, deter numbers from coming to poll. This was one remain of the old system of corruption."

Mr. Place had worked for three weeks from seven in the morning till after twelve at night, to the total neglect of his business.

No one will be so dull to the eternal fitness of things and the habits of free and independent English electors, as to imagine for one moment that such a glorious victory could possibly be appreciated to the full without the aid of a dinner. A dinner accordingly was resolved upon, at the Crown and Anchor Tavern. Music was provided, and the festive victors marched in gay procession from the committee-rooms to the tavern. Not Placo, however. "In this I took no part," he sternly records, "as I thought both the procession and the expenso for music unnecessary." He admits, however, that "the procession was as splendid as absurd;" in which case, the reader will perceive, it must have been a very brilliant affair indeed. "The expense was £69 17s. 8d." Against the dinner, however, he utters no complaint. Still there remained money in their coffers, and £48 12s. was spent in circulating some 10,000 copies of certain resolutions "which Mr. Cobbett* had brought from the country with him to the dinner meeting." The "enemies of the freedom of election" had been misrepresenting the circumstances under which the candidature of Sir Francis Burdett had been undertaken; and the resolutions consisted of "a record of those circumstances, and also of the progress of our efforts, together with a declaration of the principles by which we have been and still are actuated."

The chairing of the member—"an excessively absurd proceeding, but the people wanted a show, and much money was speedily subscribed to procure one"—cost £365 18s. This was the occasion of "an unusual display," as to the propriety of which Mr. Place acknowledges himself "in the honourable minority of one." The expenses "were still further increased by a verdict obtained against Sir Francis Burdett at the suit of the High Bailiff," and by the costs of defending three other actions at law.

"Every sort of expenso which the election occasioned amounted to £1,756 7s."

When, as has before been mentioned, the majority on the day's poll was in our favour, we were grossly reviled; we were now nothing but cheesemongers and tailors, mere miserable creatures, the paid tools of Burdett, whose purse was open for the election; our voters were corrupted and bribed in every possible way; we were miscreants to whom baseness was familiar; but as their accusations did not diminish the comparative numbers on the poll, it was our turn to laugh at their feeble efforts. It was said that our expenses were upwards of

* In the *Political Register* Cobbett records his own share in "that great and holy work, the demolition of the Aristocratic influence in the City of Westminster." It is unnecessary to say that "I, who am deemed the prime apostle of Radicalism," estimate it on a characteristically large scale.

£1,000 a day; and so often was this repeated that persons who knew how expensive elections for Westminster had been could not conceive the possibility, and could not therefore believe that a few obscure tradesmen could really carry on a successful opposition to both Whigs and Tories by the voluntary subscription of persons who were at all likely to furnish money to them. Almost everybody believed that funds to carry on the contest were furnished by Sir Francis; and Lady Holland, some time after the close of the election, said, in a company at her own table, that *she knew* the election cost him upwards of £20,000.*

"The election was made by the electors themselves for themselves, and a very honourable proceeding it was, as well to them as to those who conducted it. Not a single act was committed by any of us, nor have I ever heard of one being committed by anyone else on our part, which any man need be ashamed to acknowledge."†

Appended to a statement of accounts from May 1st, 1807, up to February 23rd, 1811, which was circulated among subscribers, and which invited inspection of the books and vouchers, is the following note, signed by the auditors:—

The City of Westminster, by returning a representative to Parliament without personal expense, has demonstrated the power of the people when acting for themselves. The example of the first city of the empire, if followed, will assuredly drive out the borough faction, and accomplish a substantial reform. The various meetings held for the attainment of this desirable object have done much towards convincing the people of the necessity of obtaining it, as the only

* The same unfounded assertions were repeated, "propagated with incessant industry, that Burdett's money was the cause of all the success which attended the popular cause" at the elections in 1818 and 1819. James Mill, in the first volume of his "Common-place Book" (now in the London Library), refers to this notorious fact in sufficiently energetic terms. There certainly was "good evidence that not one farthing was spent but what was all accounted for;" and probably every one will now agree "that bribery would not be practised on the great mob of Westminster, and continue a secret."

† Compare the return of Cobbett and his colleague, Mr. Fielden, as members for Cidham at the General Election of December, 1832. "At this election," writes Cobbett, "not one single farthing's worth of victuals or drink was given to anybody for any services whatsoever. The committee, composed of sensible and sober manufacturers and tradesmen, paid for the printing that they had done, and paid all the expenses of the hustings, polling places, clerks, &c. They paid also for the entertainment of the candidates at the hotel; and even the carriages to and from Manchester that I went in [Cobbett was a candidate for Manchester at the same time], I found paid for; and not a man nor woman in this excellent town attempted to obtain from us either money, drink, or any promise to do anything for them in their private concerns. This was *purity of election* indeed. It is an honour, indeed, to represent a people like this. Neither of us ever canvassed in any shape or form, either individually or collectively; neither of us ever asked the people to give us a vote; but we contented ourselves with saying that if they chose us to represent them we would be their true representatives to the utmost of our power. . . . *This election ought to become an example to every borough and every county in the Kingdom.* Not a disturbance of any sort; not a blow given in anger; scarcely any abusive words from one person to another; not a single drunken man to be seen about the streets; much singing, much playing music, much joy, much triumph; but all was peace and decorum from the beginning to the end."

means of preserving their liberties. This has been effected with a small sum voluntarily subscribed by the Friends of Reform, with the exception of a trifling balance due to the treasurer"—namely, £186 13s. 10d.

Though this note may seem not so clearly and fully applicable now as in 1811, very little modification and explanation would really be needed to accommodate it to the present situation. But to continue.

"Some of the charges," says Place, "include numbers of pamphlets containing accounts of proceedings, which were sent all over the country, advertisements, fees, and payments of all kinds. The whole sum (£2,682 14s. 8d.) was so incredibly small that it was not believed to be correct. It was for the three years, including a contested election, a foolish but magnificent charring, unusual law suits, and other usually expensive matters, not a tenth part of the actual expenses of some elections. But it was really the whole cost for the time specified. Of this sum £381 3s. 2d. was paid by subscriptions as for a feast,* and might be omitted as a charge on the political proceedings of Westminster. It was a general assembly."

We do not propose to follow in detail the further course of action of the "Friends to Parliamentary Reform" in Westminster. But a summary of the position after twenty years' exertions is fortunately preserved in a retrospect published by the treasurer in 1827,† and this we anticipate will not be without considerable interest. In case the achievements of 1807 should appear in the light of a lucky spurt at a favourable moment, the course of twenty years may be acknowledged as a sufficient stretch of time to test the qualities and conduct of the Westminster Radical leaders. The following is the document:—

To the Electors of Westminster, Friends to Parliamentary Reform.

FELLOW CITIZENS,—The last election for the City and Liberty of Westminster cost £155 7s. 4d., and that sum being now paid, there is not, I believe, a shilling due to anyone for any public act connected either with Westminster elections or Westminster meetings. This being the case, the following brief statements may not be uninteresting to you:—

You took the management of your public affairs into your own hands in April, 1807, now nearly twenty years ago. You then put an end to the tumults, the bribery, corruption, and profligacy, which the Whig and Tory factions had for many years promoted and practised, and now mark the consequence:—

* Grand Parliamentary Dinner, May 1st, 1809.

† The state of affairs up to 1817 is shown in a very striking summary printed in Bentham's Works, Vol. III., pp. 472—4, 478, note to "Plan of Parliamentary Reform (Introduction)." We cannot doubt that "the source from whence the information came" to Bentham was Francis Place. And, in that case, the channel it came through was, to a certainty, James Mill.

In 1807 you had a contested election, when Sir Francis Burdett was elected.

In 1812 Sir Francis was re-elected, and Lord Cochrane was elected.

In 1814 Lord Cochrane, after his expulsion, was re-elected.

In 1818 you had a contested election, when Sir Francis was again re-elected.

In 1819 you had a contested election, when Mr. Hobhouse was defeated.

In 1820 you had a contested election, when Sir Francis was re-elected, and Mr. Hobhouse was elected.

In 1826 Sir Francis and Mr. Hobhouse were re-elected.

Thus you have had six elections.

Six actions have been tried in courts of law.

There have been upwards of thirty public meetings.

Expenses have been incurred at twenty-four public dinners.

Expenses have also been incurred on three Petitions to the House of Commons.

Expenses of advertisements, sundry publications, &c., &c.

And yet all these and every other matter and thing in which you have been engaged have not cost the sum of £10,000, a smaller sum for public business in twenty years than the two parties who opposed you in 1818 expended on that occasion.—I am, your obedient servant,

THOMAS DE VEAR, Treasurer.

Lisle Street, Feb. 23rd, 1827.

Although the circumstances of modern constituencies differ in many respects from those of Westminster in the early years of the century, the example of Place and his associates is still widely applicable. There is abundant scope for the energies of earnest practical men with definite convictions faithfully maintained. Associations and hundreds now form a nucleus for public opinion, and organize means for giving it effect; and inside these, as well as outside, a man may do much by extending the circle of his personal influence, by sternly resisting corruption in the subtler as well as in the grosser forms, and by watching steadily to turn circumstances to favourable account. "Lumps of bread and cheese" are not now flung to the crowd by lackeys in splendid liveries, nor is the beer now "ladled out in long-tailed broad-brimmed hats" by coal-heavers. We have got beyond that stage. Still, constituencies will unsuspiciously place their political power in the hands of men whose class-interests, whose very personal interests, are in the most obvious and direct antagonism to their own. Constituencies rejoice in an unpaid representation, and are taxed to some purpose for their innocent rejoicing. If some greatly daring members would claim writs *de levandis expensis*, they would probably make a surprising contribution towards purity and freedom of election.

A. F. MURISON.

SIR HENRY NORMAN ON THE MADRAS ARMY.

For many years it seems to have been an undisputed point among all military authorities not personally connected with the Madras Presidency, that the Tamul and Telugu speaking races of the South of India are a feeble and spiritless folk, and that the Sepoys of the Madras Army do not possess much warlike aptitude. During the conferences of 1870 as to the Indian military expenditure, General Sir Henry Norman, in a minute dated the 18th of June in that year, laid it down as "a fact, which no amount of disputing can disprove, that the martial spirit of the Madras Cavalry and Infantry has not unnaturally died out to a great extent. Generations of peace usually do destroy martial feeling in Asiatics, and the Madras Army, I do not think, is an exception." Sir Henry Norman partakes of the Anglo-Indian tendency to hasty generalisations, especially of the scornful order, as to "Asiatics," when there is, in truth, no evidence or excuse in the matter for considering them as distinct in character or capabilities from the human race in Europe. The warlike spirit and military qualities of nations and tribes unquestionably vary in degree, with some relation to climate and to the circumstances, material and moral, of the time. But there is no reason to assume that "generations of peace" are at all more likely to soften or enervate the Asiatic than the European. Soon after the date of his minute the startling events of 1870 may have revealed to Sir Henry Norman, as they did to many other military experts, that their long Algerian training, and their triumphs in Italy and the Crimea, had conferred no patent of success on the French, while two "generations of peace" had not "destroyed martial feeling" or capacity in the Germans. Not that we mean to compare the Sepoys, either of the Deccan, Hindustan, or the Punjab, with the stalwart recruits of Pomerania or Brandenburg, or to suggest that the 7,000 Indian troops paraded in Malta by Lord Beaconsfield in 1878, at an expense of a million and a half sterling, were of a quality to cope with the Russians who had forced the Shipka Pass. We only mean that there

is no reason whatever to suppose that the enlisted men of the Madras Army, or the population from which its ranks are filled, have any more degenerated of late years than the Prussians did between 1815 and 1866. Sir Henry Norman says that the Madrassesees are "physically inferior to the Northern Asiatics," and that "no one could think of pitting them man for man against Sikhs, Punjaubees, Afghans, Goorkhas, or probably even up-country Hindustanis."* Some slight discrimination would be necessary before accepting this comparison as either strictly accurate or conclusive—for example, so far as regards the ordinary Bengal Sepoy, the man of Oude or Behar, we can acknowledge no superiority in him but that of a more imposing aspect. The exigencies of Lord Lytton's Afghan war sent Madras Sepoys across the "scientific frontier" among "the snows of Afghanistan," where they are not understood to have suffered more than other Native troops, but where Sir Henry Norman, very naturally, does not seem to have considered it possible they should serve at all.

There has, in short, never been any good reason for suspecting the Madras Sepoys of physical softness or weakness, or of any lack of martial spirit. No trace can be found of any admission or suspicion of their inferiority in the days when the heaviest demands were made on their prowess. Sir Thomas Munro, Governor of Madras, himself a tried soldier, who had seen the troops of all three Presidencies in action, wrote, as follows, when a proposal was reported for relieving the Subsidiary Force at Hyderabad with Bengal troops:—

Where troops are in all respects equal, there is still an advantage in having those who are to act together drawn from one, and not from different establishments; but the Coast troops are perhaps in some respects superior to those of Bengal. They are more regular, more tractable, more patient under privations, and they have been more accustomed to military operations. If this is true, the argument against employing Bengal Sepoys in the Deccan becomes so much the stronger, for why bring them here when we have better on the spot?†

Sir Thomas Munro knew the Madras Army well; he knew also the distinguishing qualities of the Dravidian races, from which, balanced by an almost equal admixture of the Mussulman element, its battalions were and are still recruited. He had full knowledge and some experience of the hard fighting that had taken place in the tropical districts of Southern India, and of the heroes—chiefly

* Blue Book, "Indian Military Expenditure" (467 of 1871), p. 344.

† "Life of Sir Thomas Munro," by Gleig (1830), vol. iii., p. 195.

"Company's officers"—whom no *vates sacer* had commemorated. Where, in the annals of the British Army, are the two fights of 'Punjalum-coorchy' recorded—fights which testify to the stubborn courage of the Tamul-speaking people? In the end of 1800 and the beginning of 1801, the rebellion of the Southern Chieftains—the Polygar war, as it was called—was carried on most obstinately; and some of the most desperate fighting took place about the time that the scheme for depriving the Nawab of the Carnatic of power was being finally settled in correspondence between the second Lord Olive and the Marquis Wellesley.

The little Fort of Punjalum-coorchy in the Tinnevely district was attacked on the 31st March, 1801, by a force under Major Macaulay, consisting of two Companies of the 74th Foot and five Native Battalions; and, although the defenders are said to have been armed for the most part with pikes, the attack completely failed, with a loss on our side of 17 officers and 74 European soldiers, and 229 Sepoys killed and wounded. Reinforcements having arrived to the extent of a Company of Artillery with six guns, a Regiment of Cavalry, the 77th Foot, and two more Native Battalions, the place was stormed with success on the 23rd of May, 1801. The storming party was formed of four Companies of Europeans (two of the 74th, two of the 77th) and eight Companies of Sepoys, and their loss in one hour's hard fighting amounted to 9 officers and 95 Europeans (or about one in three of those engaged), and 120 Sepoys killed and wounded. Upwards of 450 of the enemy were killed inside the Fort, which is described by a very competent eye-witness who was present at the assault as "a mere dog-kennel."*

This event was not observed with indifference by the Government of India. Henry Wellesley, writing from the Governor-General's household at Calcutta to Colonel Arthur Wellesley at Bombay on the 22nd of April, 1801, says:—

I am sorry to tell you that we have met with a great loss in the Tinnevely country against the Fort of Punjalum-coorchy; upwards of 300 men killed and wounded, and the Fort not taken.†

The affair evidently made a considerable impression on the future Duke, for in a letter dated the 28th of the same month, from Cannanore on the Western Coast, to the Governor of Bombay, he gives

* General Welsh's "Military Reminiscences" (Smith and Elder, 1830), vol. i., pp. 62 to 78.

† "Wellington's Supplementary Despatches," vol. ii., p. 364.

the following account of it, from which we gather some additional details :—

The Polygars in the Southern Provinces of the Carnatic have contended most successfully, as I am informed, against a detachment of our troops under Major Macaulay. It is said that he lost, in some attack which he made on Punjalum-coorchy Fort, above 70 out of two Companies of Europeans, and about 250 Sepoys out of five Battalions, and failed to carry the Fort. The Polygars assembled and attacked his camp in the night, and his detachment on their march on the next day but one, and on both occasions were repulsed with difficulty, and with some loss on our side.

The detachment in the Southern Division of the Carnatic has been reinforced by the 77th Regiment from Malabar, and by other troops from different parts.*

On the 21st of June, 1801, Arthur Wellesley writes from Seringapatam to Sir David Baird as follows :—

To the southward matters have been going on very badly indeed.

He then gives a full account of the first unsuccessful assault on Punjalum-coorchy, mentioning the names of several officers who were killed and wounded, and continues thus :—

The Fort has since been attacked and carried, with much loss on our side and great slaughter of the Polygars. The head Polygar escaped, and he has been joined by others in the southern countries, and even by the Collieries, all of them excited to insurrection by the misfortunes of our troops at the commencement of the contest. Within these few days they have again opposed the troops in the open field, and, I am informed, have stood with great firmness, and that the result of the contest, although favourable to us, was not unattended by loss on our side.†

This almost forgotten affair of Punjalum-coorchy, with others that might be adduced in a chain coming down to the year 1846, may serve to dispel a very prevalent notion that the only warlike races in India are to be found in the north. Aurungzebe found out his mistake of despising "those mountain rats," as he called them, the Mahrattas.

The following extract from a memorandum by the late General John Briggs, whose name occupied a place in the Madras Army List for seventy-five years—from 1801 to 1875—gives some interesting details as to the casualties of Indian warfare, and incidentally brings to our recollection some instances in which Madras troops,

* "Wellington's Supplementary Despatches," vol. ii., p. 389.

† "Wellington's Supplementary Despatches," vol. ii., pp. 460, 461.

even when unsupported by Europeans or by artillery, have maintained the honour of our flag with exemplary devotion :—

I do not believe [he says] that it is generally known how severely our troops in India have suffered when they have come in contact with the armies of Native Princes provided with trained artillery, and having disciplined infantry to support it; or, on the other hand, how comparatively small has been the loss when we have had to contend against Native armies of great numerical superiority, but weak in guns, or when their guns were unsupported by regular battalions.

The severest loss ever experienced in a general action in India was at the battle of Assaye, fought on the 23rd of September, 1803, by General Wellesley (afterwards Duke of Wellington) against the Mahratta disciplined army of Dowlut Rao Scindia. The British force, of which about one-third were European soldiers and the remainder Madras Sepoys, on that occasion lost one in three of its numbers. Of the regiments present, the 74th Highlanders alone had 401 killed and wounded, and thirteen of its commissioned officers were buried the next morning in one grave.

In the gallant affair of Seetabuldee, close to Nagpore, where Colonel Hope-toun Scott's little force of 1,200 Madras Sepoys was surrounded by the Arabs and Mahrattas of Appah Sahib, and beat them off, our loss was 350, or more than one in four.

At the battle of Mahidpore, fought on the 21st of December, 1817, by the late General Sir Thomas Hislop against Holkar's army, there were only seven Companies of British Infantry and a squadron of Dragoons besides the Artillery. The remainder, about 4,000 men, consisted entirely of Madras Sepoys. On that day the Madras Rifle Corps, numbering only 240 rank and file, lost 140; and every English officer but one was either killed or wounded, and the one who came safely through the battle had his horse shot under him.

Compare these two cases with the battle of Meeanee, so gallantly and skillfully fought by Sir Charles Napier in 1843 against the odds of nearly ten to one, his force numbering about 2,800, of which a third was European. The conflict was bravely and obstinately contested hand to hand, but the Artillery of the Scinde Ameers and their Boloochee Infantry not being regularly trained and organised, the loss was less than might have been expected, amounting to only 256, or one in eleven.

The following table shows the loss sustained in some memorable Indian battles as compared with the loss at Waterloo, one of the most sanguinary contests on record in Europe :—

		Number engaged.	Casualties.	Proportion to strength.
1815	Waterloo	72,000	11,960	1 in 6
1803	Assawaree	6,500	900	1 „ 7
1803	Assaye	4,500	1,541	1 „ 3
1817	Mahidpore	4,800	800	1 „ 6
1843	Meeanee	2,800	256	1 „ 11
1846	Moodkee and Ferozshahar	16,500	3,287	1 „ 5
1848	Chillianwalla	12,600	2,263	1 „ 6

These comparisons are interesting and instructive—first, to indicate what an Indian Army, largely composed of Natives, has endured and achieved, and is, therefore, if properly organised and led, capable of doing in the future; secondly,

to remind us that the races born on Indian soil, from North to South, with whom we have to deal as enemies or as auxiliaries, are not unworthy of grave consideration if viewed in either capacity.

Above all, we would add in conclusion, let there neither be misgivings with regard to the martial spirit of any section of the Indian Army, nor undue reliance on the submissiveness of the population in any part of India, based on Sir Henry Norman's very unsound speculation as to the enervating and mollifying influence of one or more "generations of peace." The cankers of such a calm world as that do not betoken content, or promise quiet. Peace, of the description that exists in India, neither deadens the human intellect, nor extinguishes human passions. But it creates *ennui*, which, as Auguste Comte points out, is the great cause of political convulsion and change. A Hindu statesman once observed that when a man had been lying for a long while on one side, the time always came when he wanted to turn over on the other. Possibly he might at last wish to sit up and look about him, or even to stand upright.

SIR CHARLES TREVELYAN ON MYSORE.

Our leading statesmen, in and out of office—as we have often had occasion to observe and deplore—generally seem to appreciate very imperfectly the historical and recorded conditions of British domination in India, and the political and social forces by which it is peacefully maintained. Although comparatively free from the contemptuous taint of our covenanted and commissioned officials, they are yet mainly instructed by that class, and are, more or less, infected by them with an undue reliance on military strength and administrative tidiness, and an indifference to compact and equity. The Duke of Argyll, shortly before becoming Secretary of State for India, published a little book, in which Indian “Treaties”—the word being always derisively printed between inverted commas—are described as documents which “expressed nothing but the will of a Superior imposing on his Vassal so much as for the time it was thought expedient to require.”* The Government of India tried, in a despatch dated the 14th of February, 1867, to explain away the phrase in the preambles of many Indian treaties, to the effect that “the engagement shall be binding ‘as long as the Sun and Moon shall endure.’” “The wording of the original Persian,” said Sir John Lawrence in Council, “is ‘*ta-aîâm-i-quaiâm Shams o Kamar,*’—literally, to the times of the enduring of the Sun and of the Moon. The Government Persian officer, at the time the treaty was written, affected a quasi-rhythmical style of diction much admired by Oriental scholars, and this may have had something to do with the selection of this particular conjunction of sounds”—sounds, in short, without sense. But the sense is clear enough, and the citation of “the original Persian” is inexcusably misleading. The original was not Persian, but English, and “the Government Persian officer” was a mere translator. All our Indian treaties were drafted in English, “the wording” being settled by the Governor-General in

* “India under Dalhousie and Canning” (Longmans, 1865), p. 11.

Council, not by a linguist or moonshee, and with reference to sense, not sound. "The phrase," continues the Viceregal despatch, "is certainly nothing more than a rather poetical form of an hyperbolical expression," "and placed where it stands in the preambles of the treaties, it can hardly be held to import more than the promise of 'perpetual amity and friendship' to be found in the same position in many European treaties; nor is it as solemn as the invocations by which those promises are frequently confirmed."* Apparently the writer of this preposterous rigmarole considers that "the promise of perpetual amity and friendship," which nothing but a formal declaration of war can interrupt, is of no importance at all, and that promises, even when "confirmed" by "solemn invocations," are not of much account. The insensibility to moral considerations in dealing with Native States—the tendency to deprecate every appeal to justice as sentiment or cant—which characterises the typical Secretary and the model Commissioner, can only be explained as the complex result of national pride and professional interest. Those who are naturally regarded as past masters in Indian administration appear to be totally devoid of the true Imperial spirit. Everything conceded to a Native State seems to them as if it were improperly taken away from the Empire; everything taken, rightly or wrongly, from a Native State is put down by them as a gain to the Empire, the Empire, if their thoughts could be analysed, being identical with "the Service." The reduction of a lucrative post for an English officer—more especially if paid by a protected State, as with the Mysore or Berar Commission—never appears to them as a saving, but always as a dead loss.

This imperfect sympathy, and impaired sense of right and wrong in matters relating to the allied States, to mediatised Princes and chieftains, and, indeed, to Natives of every class, is sapping the foundations of British power in India. The re-establishment of moral supremacy can only be the result of ministerial and parliamentary statesmanship. Unfortunately, the highest authorities at home, though personally quite unbiassed, are fettered by the necessity of accepting official statements, and acting on their assumed accuracy. Written without much fear of publicity, with little expectation of ever being exposed to a reply, or to any but official strictures, Calcutta despatches are too often vitiated, not only by perverse arguments, but by the false light thrown on facts by distorted information, and by information improperly withheld.

* Papers, "Cession of Berar" (29 of 1867), p. 4.

With no fear of contradiction by appellant or opponent, and with reliance on a lack of general interest in the controversy, official attention is concentrated on the object or end in view, and the shortest road by which it can be reached is chosen as the best. Thus, in the Imperial metropolis, the judgment of executive power and of public opinion is constantly poisoned and perverted. If written documents, minutes, and despatches, to which Viceroy, Councillors, and Secretaries have attached their names, frequently convey a very wrong impression regarding the facts of important cases—as we have before now shown, and may soon have occasion to show again, in these pages—how much more likely are facts to be misrepresented and wrong impressions conveyed in those conversational utterances which contribute far more than any printed words to create public opinion? The retired official who “has served with distinction in India,” becomes the oracle of a circle, more or less extensive, and more or less influential, he being, in fact, almost invariably a prejudiced and interested person, whose doctrines and whose testimony as to Indian affairs ought to be received with the utmost caution. As an example of what we mean let us take the evidence of an Indian expert, Sir Charles Trevelyan, before a Parliamentary Committee—a grave statement, which may be considered intermediate in its nature between the formality of an official despatch and the familiarity of a private conversation. The deponent will be recognised as above the average of his class in repute and ability; the subject was one with which he ought to have been well acquainted, on which he professed to be peculiarly well informed, and all the details of which were easily accessible. Yet the replies on this topic, which he gave with perfect confidence, and which were hailed with much respect, were, from first to last, full of inaccuracies.

Sir Charles Trevelyan, who, as a young man had served twelve years in the Bengal Civil Service, and who, we may add, was from 1863 to 1865 Financial Member of Council at Calcutta; came out to Madras as Governor in 1859, it having been arranged before his departure, between himself and Sir Charles Wood, the Secretary of State for India, as a special incident of his term of office, that the Mysore Commission was to be placed under the immediate control of his Government, as a preliminary step to the incorporation of Mysore with the Madras Presidency, on the demise of the Maharajah. The dream of acquiring this fine province, with the agreeable and salubrious town of Bangalore as the head-quarters of the Southern Presidency, had inspired a succession of Madras officials for many years before the sequestration of 1831, and had much to do with

promoting and prolonging that unjustifiable measure.* The proposed transfer and the anticipated annexation, checked in 1861, were finally frustrated in 1867 by the recognition of the Maharajah's adopted son as his successor in 1867 by the Secretary of State, Sir Stafford Northcote, in spite of the vehement remonstrances of the Government of India. It was with respect to the maintenance of the Native State of Mysore that some questions were put to Sir Charles Trevelyan by the Select Committee on Indian Finance in 1873. The indignant disappointment with which Sir Charles Trevelyan saw his bright vision of an enlarged, enriched, and embellished Madras Presidency vanish in 1861 seems to have possessed him so completely and so persistently ever since, as to have not only rendered what he calls the "sentimental considerations" hateful to him, but to have confused in his mind the very facts of the case. In his answers to the Select Committee he completely misstates the ancient and recent history of the Mysore State, and the conditions of existing treaties. The finance of Mysore seems in his mind to be confined to gross revenue. His regret at the supposed relinquishment of that revenue by the recognition of the late Maharajah's heir in 1867 is so lively, that he imagined himself to have an additional right to complain from having taken an impossible part in the sequestration of 1831. So, at least, it would appear from a statement he made before the Select Committee of the House of Commons on Indian Finance, on the 21st of February, 1873. In the proceedings of that day (Q. 461) Sir Charles Trevelyan was asked by the Chairman, "Will you give us your views with reference to the arrangement made for Mysore?" To this question he gave the following remarkable answer:—

"I will not enter on the general question. I have a strong opinion. I may say I have a right to an opinion, because I drew the original despatch of Lord William Bentinck's Government ordering the sequestration of Mysore. I was Deputy Secretary in the Political Department at the time, was cognizant of all the discussion that took place, and knew the whole thing."†

And then Sir Charles Trevelyan went on to explain what his "very strong opinion" was. He said that "the true thing would have been to have absorbed" that "noble country; to have added the million a-year, which is the revenue of Mysore, to the Madras revenue." "That," he repeated, "would have been the true thing."

*We may take an early opportunity of proving from official documents how utterly unjustifiable it was.

† First Report of the Select Committee on Indian Finance (179 of 1873), p. 27.

That Sir Charles Trevelyan should have placed, as we shall presently show, a very untrue thing regarding the revenue and finances of Mysore before the Select Committee may not, perhaps, appear so surprising when we find that his memory was entirely at fault as to "the whole thing." He did *not* draw "the original despatch," and he was *not* "Deputy Secretary at the time." On this point the late Mr. H. Thoby Prinsep, then a Member of the Indian Council, in a private letter to a friend, dated 20th January, 1877, wrote as follows :—

Sir Charles Trevelyan must have been under the influence of some strange delusion if he ever asserted that he had anything whatever to do with the despatch issued from Simla in the year 1831, directing the assumption by British officers of the administration of the Mysore territories. I was the Secretary by whom, and in whose Department the whole correspondence was directed. My Deputy at the time was Edward Ravenshaw, and Sir Charles Trevelyan was not connected with the Secretariat in any capacity. He was appointed my Deputy in succession to Ravenshaw, and joined the camp and entered upon his duties at Delhi. So far as I can remember, he was never at Simla at all in that year, and therefore could have had nothing to do with the drafting of any despatches there. But with respect to the particular despatch referred to, I have special reasons for recollecting my own share in the preparation of it, for when I had sent it to the Governor-General, it was returned by Lord William Bentinck, not with the usual initials in token of approval, but with the words, "Very much approved." It was the only compliment I ever received from Lord William Bentinck, for we did not well agree. I can positively assert that I do not think I ever signed a single draft prepared by Sir Charles Trevelyan and issued it as my own. I have never seen the evidence given by Sir Charles Trevelyan. If I had done so, I certainly should have considered it my duty to have corrected it. Where and when was it given, that I may get the Parliamentary paper and look into it? I daresay there are more errors needing correction. There cannot be one more flagrant.

We need not rely on the authority, or on the memory, of Mr. Thoby Prinsep to check the defective recollection of Sir Charles Trevelyan. Official dates and documents demonstrate his error. The letter from Lord William Bentinck to the Maharajah, and the despatch to the Madras Government, announcing and "ordering the sequestration of Mysore," were dated at Simla on the 7th of September, and the orders were actually carried into execution on the 18th of October, 1831. Mr. Trevelyan's appointment as Deputy-Secretary to Government in the Political and Secret Department was gazetted at Calcutta on the 26th of December, 1831, and he did not join head-quarters until the early part of 1832; and then at Delhi, not at Simla. It is therefore clear that he can have had no cognizance whatever of the original discussion, or of the original despatches ordering the sequestration of Mysore, until some months after those orders had been executed.

But it is equally clear that he had no cognizance whatever of the

affairs of Mysore, as they actually stood, when he was before the Committee, or of our transactions with that State, since its reconstruction in 1799. It may be supposed that he was not professing to speak by the card, but only to make a general survey, and to give a general impression. It was not so by any means. He entered into particulars as to past and as to present obligations and conditions, and was wrong in every one of them. He was called upon to give his views as an expert; he professed to speak as an expert, "having a right to an opinion," because he was "cognizant of all the discussions," because "he knew the whole thing," because he "drew the original despatch ordering the sequestration," and had "watched it since from time to time."

Although he professes to have "watched" the affairs of Mysore "from time to time," and treats the whole question chiefly from a financial point of view, he apparently knows nothing of the tribute paid by that State, which since the commencement of the century has amounted to more than twenty millions sterling. He ignores the tribute entirely, makes no allusion to it, and virtually denies its payment on the one hand and its receipt on the other. "The true thing," he says, "would have been to have absorbed Mysore, to have added the million a-year, which is its revenue, to the Madras revenue." But where is the million a-year? That is, indeed, the gross revenue; but a quarter of a million is annually paid as tribute, and has been punctually paid for the last eighty-one years, the Mysore State being liable also, under the supplementary treaty of 1807, to maintain 4,000 Horse at the disposal of the Imperial Government. Sir Charles Trevelyan seems to have heard of this Cavalry Contingent, though he erroneously antedates to Lord Wellesley's time the obligation to maintain it. This is the principal passage of his evidence on these matters:—

"Assuming for the moment that it was proper not to absorb Mysore, even so I maintain that it was a very extravagant arrangement financially; for the peculiarity of Mysore is that it is a glorious tract of fertile country entirely surrounded by our country, so that they partake to the full of the advantages of our military protection. . . . and a good many other advantages, so that even supposing the Native Government had been revived, we ought to have made a new arrangement suited to the new circumstances. There was an old arrangement made in Lord Wellesley's time, by which they had to maintain a certain number of Irregular Horse—that was all. That was suited to the circumstances of the time; but if we choose to revive the Native Government of Mysore under the entirely new circumstances of the present time, we ought to have made a new financial arrangement, and have taken a proportion of the Mysore revenue, suited to the advantages which they derive from us."*

* First Report of Select Committee on Indian Finance (179 of 1873), p. 27.

There is not a word of the tribute here, a tribute amounting to one-fourth of the gross revenue of a million. "They had to maintain a certain number of Irregular Horse—that was all." And this "old arrangement," which was made in 1807, he dates back to "Lord Wellesley's time." The original stipulation made by Lord Wellesley in Article III. of the Subsidiary Treaty of 1799 was that, in addition to the fixed annual tribute, the Mysore State was to contribute for military purposes, "such a sum as shall appear to the Governor-General in Council to bear a just and reasonable proportion to the actual net revenues of His Highness the Maharajah;" in short, the Mysore State was to be *taillable et corvéable à discrétion*. This "old arrangement" was seen to be so arbitrary and open to dispute, that by the subsequent Treaty of 1807 the unlimited military obligations were commuted into the fixed charge of maintaining 4,000 Horse. As that number of Irregular Horse would cost annually about £100,000, the total contribution for which the Mysore State was and is liable by treaty amounts to £350,000 a-year, not a very small "proportion" of its revenue. And after that, where is to be found the million a-year which Sir Charles Trevelyan said ought to have been added by Mysore to the revenue of Madras?

We have not space at present to expose the series of errors in Sir Charles Trevelyan's examination as to the history of Mysore, as to "the artificial nature" of that State, and as to the administration of Poorniah during the late Rajah's minority. Finance is professedly his *forte*, and the errors into which he fell in that particular aspect of the subject are enough to show the danger of trusting to the confident assertions of even the most distinguished expert in Anglo-Indian administration. He says that the resuscitation of the Mysore State was a merely "sentimental" affair, and that "the people of England did not understand the subject: they thought it a very fine thing to be self-denying, and give back what we had taken and so on." It was honest to give back what had been unjustly sequestered, but there was no self-denial. As a mere matter of finance, without any consideration of honour or Imperial policy, the annexation of Mysore and its transfer to the costly system of Madras regulations would have been an enormous mistake. A large loss in net revenue would have been inevitable.

THE WESTERN FARMER OF AMERICA.

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CHAPTER I.

THE golden rule for successful trading is "to buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market." Strange to say, the American farmer* reverses this rule. He sells in the cheapest and buys in the dearest market. For what he raises he gets a lower price, and for what he consumes he pays a higher price than the land-tillers get and pay in any other country in the world. This is a very singular state of things, and is well worth thorough examination.

While the Western farmer himself neither receives nor seeks any legislative "protection," he is compelled by law to supply his wants, not from the cheapest sources, but from certain privileged establishments to which he has to pay extravagant prices. While he requires no State subvention, because his occupation is of itself a profitable one, he is heavily taxed to support unprofitable manufactures in the Eastern States, and has to make good their losses out of his profits. That this is hard upon him everybody must admit, but no one can realize how really hard it is, or how vast a sum is year after year wrung from him in this way, without resorting to figures and setting it forth in dollars and cents. This we shall proceed to do as accurately and as briefly as we can.

For this purpose let us inquire—

1. How much is actually taken yearly out of the pockets of the American farmers by compelling them to buy dear, instead of allowing them to buy cheap, goods.

2. What becomes of the enormous sum that is yearly drained from them in this way.

3. How this dreadful and wanton waste can be avoided.

* The word "farmer" will be used throughout these pages as meaning the producer of all articles derived from the cultivation of the soil, whether grain or cotton, meat or tobacco, &c.

II.

HOW MUCH IS ACTUALLY TAKEN (YEARLY) OUT OF THE POCKETS OF THE AMERICAN FARMERS BY COMPELLING THEM TO BUY DEAR, INSTEAD OF ALLOWING THEM TO BUY CHEAP, GOODS.

By the census of 1870 the population of the United States was found to be 38,600,000; and the number over ten years of age was 28,229,000. Of these, 12,506,000 were engaged in various kinds of occupations, the rest being women, young persons of both sexes, idlers, &c. What were the respective employments of these 12,506,000 workers? According to the census returns there were—

5,922,000	persons engaged in agriculture.
2,685,000	„ „ in professional and personal service.
1,191,000	„ „ in trade and transportation.
654,000	„ „ in mechanical trades and mining.
2,054,000	„ „ in manufactures.

12,506,000

In round numbers, there were 2,000,000 of persons engaged in manufactures, and these were exclusively privileged to supply nearly all the physical wants (except food and lodging) of the other 10,500,000 workers and their families.

As in these pages we only profess to represent the case of the American farmer, we must confine our attention to the 6,000,000 persons and their families who are engaged in the cultivation of the soil. It is quite true that the remaining 4,500,000 engaged in professions, in trading, in mining, and in personal service, are sufferers to quite a proportionate extent, but they do not come within the scope of the present inquiry.

Now let us see what is the actual amount which the farmers (that is, soil-workers generally) spend yearly on the goods produced by the manufacturers.

In the first place, the 6,000,000 agriculturists of 1870 must by this time have increased to at least 7,500,000, as will no doubt be seen by this year's census. To be within the mark we will call them 7,000,000, nearly all of them having wives and children. Now, what is the average annual expenditure on all articles of consumption, except food and drink, of each of these families? On careful investigation, and consultation with conscientious inquirers and with persons most competent to judge, we feel confident that we are within the mark in computing such annual expenditure at 200 dollars per family, including within that average the small minority of unmarried men among the 7,000,000 agriculturists. It must be borne in mind that this amount includes: 1. Woollen, cotton, linen,

and silken fabrics, and, therefore, every species of clothing for male and female, as also sheets, curtains, blankets, carpets, &c. 2. Iron and steel manufactures, and therefore all iron-work, wire, cutlery, tools, farming implements, farriery, agricultural machinery, as well as railway conveyance on iron, which cost very much more than it would have cost had it been imported from abroad. 3. Leathern fabrics, and therefore boots and shoes, saddlery, gloves, &c. 4. Earthenware and crockery, tinware and glass, and numberless other household necessities, all of which come under the price-inflating influence of the Customs tariff. It is on these objects that the greater portion of the agriculturist's outgoings is expended, for he is but at little expense for his food. Moreover, this yearly average of 200 dollars per family comprises a large number of rich and well-to-do persons, and it may safely be assumed as rather under than over the reality.

Having now cleared the way thus far, it is easy to calculate the total sum annually spent on manufactured goods by the farmers and agriculturists generally of the great Central and Western States. The amount being 200 dollars to 7,000,000 families, is, therefore, 1,400,000,000 dollars in the aggregate.

The next step is to ascertain what portion of that amount the Western farmers would save if, by the abolition of import duties, they were left free to supply their wants from the cheapest market, wherever that might be, whether in America or in Europe, whether in New England or in Old England. This question is easily solved, as, fortunately, we have the guidance of positive facts supplied by the official returns of the United States Government. From these we learn that prices are so high in America and so low in Europe that, in spite of the enormous duties levied on them, considerable quantities of European goods are imported into the United States, where they must, of course, leave a profit to the senders, or they would not be sent. Let us enumerate some of the leading articles imported in the year 1878, stating their amounts and the rate per cent. of duties which they had to pay:—

Articles Imported.	Amount in Dollars.	<i>Ad valorem</i> Import Duties paid on them, according to sorts.
Woollen Manufactures ...	\$24,604,000	54, 57, 66, 70, and 77 per cent.
Cotton " ...	15,458,000	35, 45, 57, and 63 per cent.
Linen " ...	14,384,000	30, 35, and 40 per cent.
Silk " ...	20,103,000	50 and 60 per cent.
Iron and Steel " ...	6,554,000	30, 35, 45, 48, and 50 per cent.
Leather " ...	6,906,000	20, 25, 35, and 50 per cent.
Earthenware and Crockery	3,978,000	40 and 45 per cent.
Tin Plates and Ware	9,874,000	27 per cent.
Hemp and Jute Fabrics ...	1,605,000	40 per cent.
Window Glass ...	675,000	68 and 72 per cent.

\$103,541,000

What do these figures mean? They mean that the prices which the Western farmers (and the American people generally) now pay for their woollen cloths and stuffs are so excessive that the British woollen manufacturers can afford to pay from 54 to 77 per cent. import duties for the admission of their goods into the States, and still get a profit. That is to say, that (taking the average duty at 66 per cent.) the Western farmer could, if he were allowed to buy where he could buy cheapest, get the same quantity and quality of woollen and worsted stuffs for 12 dollars for which he now has to pay 20. Eight dollars out of twenty thrown away!

They mean that the prices which the Western farmers now pay for their cotton and linen goods are so excessive that the British makers of the same goods can afford to pay from 30 to 63 per cent. import duties for the admission of their manufactures into the States, and still get a profit. That is to say, that (taking the average duty at 50 per cent.) the farmer's wife could, if she were allowed to buy where she could buy cheapest, get the same articles for 6 dollars for which she now has to pay 9. Three dollars out of nine thrown away!

They mean that the American railways are constructed of iron which costs so dear that the British makers can afford to pay 30 to 50 per cent. import duties for the admission of their goods into the States, and still get a profit; so that the railway companies are compelled to charge the Western farmer a proportionately excessive rate for the conveyance of his produce to a market. The burden of the difference, of course, falls on the patient back of the Western farmer!

Those figures mean, in short, that the same enormous artificial inflation of natural prices runs through every article (except food) with which the farmer has to provide his family.

The American has extraordinary advantages over the British farmer. He has, first, a soil so fertile as to produce freely with cheap tillage and no manure; second, a climate highly favourable to agricultural operations; third, abundance of land so cheap that the fee-simple costs less than is annually paid for rent in England. But, on the other hand, the British farmer enjoys for the present one decided advantage: he sells his produce in the dearest, and buys his clothing, implements, &c., &c., in the cheapest market in the world.

Let us, however, continue our inquiry as to the total annual amount taken out of the pockets of the Western farmers by exorbitant protective duties. These duties have a very wide range. They are as low as 10 per cent. on diamonds which the Western

farmer does not use, and as high as 93 per cent. on cleaned rice which he does use. They are levied on no less than 1,600 different articles, some of them yielding less revenue than it costs to collect it, and the whole producing a complexity which gives comfortable employment to swarms of clerks, &c., at every seaport. The heaviest per-centage rates are those imposed on articles of general and necessary consumption by the people, which accordingly contribute very nearly three-fourths of the total amount collected. But let us strike an average. By a careful comparison of the total value of the chief dutiable foreign articles imported in the year 1878, with the total amount of duties levied in that year on the same articles, it has been clearly ascertained that the average rate of duties paid on their value was $42\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. Were the average confined to the articles named in the table at page 543, it would no doubt much exceed $42\frac{3}{4}$ per cent., but, to be within the mark, we will adopt the general average. This average then ($42\frac{3}{4}$ per cent.) is the measure of the difference between the prices which the Western farmers now pay for what they consume, and those which they would pay were foreign articles admitted duty free. The prices which the manufacturers in the Eastern States make the American people pay for their goods are not, and cannot be, less, but are, and must be, something more than $42\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. in addition to British prices, or else how could the Britisher pay an average of $42\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. duties, and still make a profit on what he sends to America? If the prices paid by the Western farmer to the manufacturers of the Eastern States only exceeded British prices by, say, 25 per cent., no British goods, having to pay $42\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. import duties, could possibly be sent to the United States. The very fact of large imports being poured in, year after year (as shown in table at page 543, for 1878), in spite of the $42\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. duty for admission, makes it clear that the prices in America must be at least 50 per cent in excess of those current in England, or else those sendings would leave a loss, and would be discontinued. Those importations, be it noted, are not fitful or intermittent, but are, though fluctuating in amount, constant in their recurrence. The continuous overflow, however slight, of a tank is clear evidence of its being full; and, in the same way, the continuous importation of goods burdened with a $42\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. duty is clear evidence that the ordinary prices of such goods in the importing country must keep sufficiently high to make such importations profitable.

However, to err on the side of caution, we will, instead of 50 per cent. or $42\frac{3}{4}$ per cent., take 40 per cent. as the overcharge which the Western farmers have to pay for the goods which they require

to supply their wants. Now we have shown at page 543 that their annual expenditure on the supply of those wants amounts in the aggregate to 1,400,000,000 dollars. Let us see what proportion of that sum is unnecessarily squandered. If the American farmers were allowed to buy, as they could buy, for 100 dollars what they are now compelled to pay 140 dollars for, it is clear that they could buy for 1,000,000,000 dollars what they now pay 1,400,000,000 dollars for, and consequently they would save 400,000,000 dollars every year. In other words, by being left free to buy where they could buy cheapest, they would benefit to the extent of 400,000,000 dollars, which they now lose by the operation of the protective duties.

Truly a startling sum ! A stupendous sum ! That such a pile of wealth should year after year be unnecessarily and wantonly flung away and wasted seems utterly incredible, and yet it is literally true. "What !" we can imagine a Western farmer exclaiming, "do you mean to say that we farmers, our class alone, are every year, out of our hard earnings, needlessly and heedlessly throwing away 400,000,000 of dollars, and that we could, if we would, save in our yearly expenses a sum large enough to defray the whole of the national expenditure nearly twice over?" "Yes, sir," we reply, "it is a fact. We have clearly shown that the same articles of consumption that you could get from the Britisher for 100 dollars you have now to pay 140 for. Now, if you, one with the other, rich and poor, spend 200 dollars a year on such articles, the common rule of three shows that but for your heavy Customs duties you need only spend 143 dollars for the same things instead of 200, and that, while living just as comfortably, you would on an average, save fifty-seven dollars a year. Now, as there are 7,000,000 of you agriculturists, multiply that number by the fifty-seven dollars which each would save, and you will find it comes to 400,000,000 dollars. The fact is, that you never realized the amount of your loss—never put it into figures. It is so mingled up in small doses with your daily spendings that, though enormous in the gross, it does not strike you in the detail. You go on paying thirty cents for a knife instead of twenty ; or fifty cents for a piece of canvas instead of thirty ; or ten dollars for woollen clothing instead of six ; or your wife buys a printed calico gown for three dollars instead of two, and so on throughout the whole range of your requirements ; but you do not stay to inquire how much you are overcharged at each step. Now, this has been calculated for you. For every seven dollars which you now spend you ought only to spend five ; the other two dollars are simply thrown away in consequence of your import duties."

It has been said the American farmers actually prefer paying seven dollars to the Eastern States manufacturers to paying five dollars for the same thing to the Britisher, especially as the extra two dollars do not go out of the country. Well, if the two dollars do not go into another country, they at all events go into another pocket, and surely the farmers can hardly be persuaded that it is the same thing to them whether they pay seven dollars to a man in Massachusetts, or five dollars for the same article to a man in Lancashire. We believe, on the contrary, that the hard-working Western farmer prefers getting as much as he can for his money. But, if we are wrong, and if it be really true that the farmers are content, knowingly and voluntarily, to pay out of their pockets a yearly contribution of 400,000,000 dollars as a free gift to the Eastern States' manufacturers to enable them to carry on a losing business, which, without that assistance, would have to be given up, we can only admire and wonder. And we wonder all the more as this immense sacrifice is made in vain, and is of very little or no benefit to any one. This we shall show in the next chapter, when we examine what becomes of the 400,000,000 dollars which the farmers lose.

At all events, the farmers ought surely to have a voice in the question, whether they really do (as it is stated they do) prefer losing, or whether they prefer saving, the 400,000,000 dollars.

Again, it is said that the American farmers have flourished and prospered; that they have profitably extended, and are still extending, their operations, and that, therefore, they cannot have suffered the yearly loss alleged. That does not at all follow. No one contends that an average loss of 57 dollars per annum sustained by each agriculturist could turn the scale and make farming a losing business. It does not destroy the farmer, but it sweeps away so much of his profits. By the census of 1870 the total value of (cereal) farm productions amounted to 2,448,000,000 dollars. Out of this farmers could afford to throw away a certain portion, and still thrive and make money. But that is no reason why they should persist in throwing that portion away. A man with an income of 2,500 dollars may live on 1,000 dollars, muddle away 500 dollars on rotten speculations, and still lay by 1,000 dollars a year; but he would certainly be richer if he did not muddle away the 500 dollars. A waste of 57 dollars a year multiplied 7,000,000 times does none the less amount to 400,000,000 dollars in the aggregate.

Again, it is said that the prices of some of the Eastern States' manufactures are not so much higher than those of the foreigner as we make out. But if so, why keep up such heavy import duties?

And again, if so, how is it that, in spite of those heavy duties, foreign goods can still afford to come in? The Western farmer might say, "Come, I do not mind paying 10 per cent. dearer to you than to the foreigner. Reduce the import duties, therefore, from an average of 42½ per cent. to 10 per cent. If your prices are, as you say, moderate, surely with a bonus of 10 per cent., besides freight and charges, you can withstand foreign competition! But if not, and if the condition of your existence as manufacturers is an import duty of 42½ per cent., which means that we farmers as a class are to subscribe out of our earnings 400,000,000 dollars a year to keep you gentlemen of the East pegging away at a losing business, we protest against it. It is paying far too dear 'for a whistle.' We will withdraw from a game in which we are to find the stakes (and heavy ones too) for others to win, and we will go in for buying where we can buy cheapest."

It should further be observed that the more freight the Western farmer has to pay to get his produce delivered into the European markets, the smaller the net residue that comes to him; for the European buyers' prices include freight. Cheap freights from America to Europe, therefore, mean large profits to the farmers, and dear freights small profits. But as the enormous American import duties prevent heavy and bulky goods, such as iron, coal, &c., from being freely sent from Europe to the United States, and as ships must make a certain amount of freight on the round or cease running, what happens? They make up for getting little or no freight from Europe to America by charging nearly double freight on the cotton, grain, and other farmer's produce which they convey from America to Europe. This surcharge of freight from, to compensate for the absence of freight to, American ports amounts in the aggregate to a very large sum, which comes out of the pocket of the Western farmers, and constitutes another heavy burden inflicted on them by the present oppressive tariff.

But the mischief done to the American farmers by heavy import duties is not confined to the immense direct losses inflicted on them. Their interests are also vitally injured in another way. The very essence of their prosperity depends upon their having large and increasing outlets abroad for the large and increasing amount of their produce. They grow far more grain, meat, cotton, &c., than their own country can consume, and must look to their foreign customers to take off the surplus. But the protective duties step in to thwart, cripple, and restrict the farmers' dealings with their foreign customers. How are the farmers to export if the manufacturers will not allow of imports? "What is the foreigner to pay you in," we

would say to the farmer, "if you refuse to take his goods? Will it be in gold and silver? No such thing. It is now well established and universally admitted that debts between nation and nation are not paid in specie (beyond the merest fraction), but in commodities, and that all commerce is substantially barter. If you will only take from the foreigner such of his goods as he can make a profit on after paying 42½ per cent. import duty, you limit his power of buying from you, and consequently your own power of selling to him. It becomes a necessary condition of your dealing with him that you should get so low a price for your produce and give him so high a price for his goods, that the margin shall make up for the 42½ per cent. import duties. These, therefore, cut against you both ways. Not only you pay more for what you consume, but you get less for what you produce. You may not feel the pinch so much just now, but average harvests in Europe would make it absolutely necessary for the United States to secure free sales by making free purchases. If you aspire to feed the world, you must take in payment what the world can give you."

Let us now look at another branch of the subject.

III.

WHAT BECOMES OF THE 400,000,000 DOLLARS YEARLY TAKEN OUT OF THE POCKETS OF THE AMERICAN FARMERS?

THE amount of Customs revenue which the United States Government derived in 1878 from duties on foreign goods imported was 130,000,000 dollars. To this amount the agriculturist, being rather less than half of the total population of the country, contributed about 60,000,000 dollars. This was, therefore, the proportion of the 400,000,000 dollars overcharged to the American farmers on their annual expenditure, that went to the legitimate purpose of national revenue; and, so far, 60,000,000 dollars of the total is satisfactorily accounted for. But what of the remaining 340,000,000 dollars? Who are the lucky men whom this mighty sum, drained year after year out of the farmer's earnings, goes to enrich? Strange and incredible as it may appear, careful examination and analysis will show that all this money has been, and is being, absolutely wasted, squandered, and spent as uselessly as it would be in hiring an army of men to dig holes and fill them up again. It has neither enriched nor even benefited anybody. While it has to that extent impoverished the farmers, it has only served to fill up the gap and make good the losses occasioned by the misapplication of

capital and labour in the Eastern States to the wrong kinds of production.

Let us trace where these 340,000,000 dollars go. They form the extra sum paid annually to the manufacturers of the Eastern States over and above what the farmers would have had to pay for the same articles were they allowed to make their purchases from abroad. If the Eastern manufacturers were able to produce their goods as cheaply as the foreigner, all that money would be saved to the farmers; but as they cannot, the farmers are made to pay the difference. Nothing whatever is got by anybody in return for those 340,000,000 dollars; and that sum is simply thrown away and sacrificed to make up for the want of skill, or of capital, or of whatever else it may be, by reason of which the Eastern manufacturer makes no more profit by selling an article at 140 dollars than the Britisher does by selling the same article at 100 dollars. If, indeed, the Eastern manufacturer could produce the article for 100 dollars, and if he did get 140 dollars for it, he would be benefited and enriched; and it might be some consolation to the farmers for their loss of 340,000,000 dollars a year that it went to form large accumulations of wealth in the pockets of their fellow-citizens in the Eastern States. But this consolation does not exist, and we shall presently show that, in spite of the enormous sum overcharged to the farmers, the profits of the Eastern manufacturer are precarious, fluctuating, and by no means above the average of other occupations. His charge of 140 dollars for what the Britisher can afford to sell for 100 dollars, only leaves him a bare living profit, because it costs him 40 dollars more to produce the article than it costs the Britisher. Why this should be the case we cannot here stay to inquire, but such is the fact. Indeed, how else could British goods be largely imported into the States in spite of the 42½ per cent. import duties which they have to pay?

It is these 40 dollars uselessly spent, out of 140, which, added up, form the 340,000,000 dollars which the farmers of America are called upon to throw away every year without any benefit to themselves or to anybody else. It is sheer waste; just as it is sheer waste to pay one man exorbitantly for doing the same work (no more and no better) which another man, more expert, will do cheaply;—just as it would be sheer waste to go on thrashing with a flail instead of using a machine, merely because the man with the flail was a neighbour, and the machine maker was a stranger. We can fancy a shrewd Western farmer saying, “A man down East makes an article which he can’t afford to sell me under 140 dollars, while a man over the water offers me the same article for 100 dollars.

I want to deal with the latter, but to prevent that they clap 40 dollars duty on to the 100, and then tell me that, as now, in either case I shall have to pay 140 dollars for the article, I may as well buy of the man down East, because he's a kind of brother, whereas the man over the water is only a cousin. All I see in it is that I am done out of 40 dollars."

That the Eastern manufacturers only make the average profit, and their men the average wages, of other occupations, is the necessary result of internal competition. No trade can for any length of time maintain higher rates of profit or of wages than the average, because people soon flock from other trades into that, and thus they all settle down to about the same level. There does, indeed, at intervals occur a sudden spurt of demand, causing for a brief period high prices, high profits, and high wages, but these bright, short flashes of prosperity cost the manufacturers and their men very dear. Fresh capital and fresh labour are thereby freely enticed into the trade, and when the spurt is over, there is not sufficient vent for the increased supply. The result is, ruin to many, loss to all. Such a spurt occurred in 1872-3. In 1874 the reaction came, and there followed five years of commercial depression and suffering. An immense body of American workmen were thrown out of employ, and in the course of these five years (mostly in 1877 and 1878) upwards of 600,000 persons left the East to seek a living in the West. During those five years a large number of industrial establishments closed their doors, and in the iron trade alone 250 blast furnaces were blown out, and 60 to 70 rolling mills ceased work. In the six years 1873 to 1878, the average number of commercial failures in the United States per year was 7,866, against an average of 2,889 the previous seven years. In short, those five years were the worst that American commerce had ever experienced. Yet during all that time the farmers were yearly disbursing 340,000,000 dollars to support the manufacturers. So far, however, from enriching them, this large sum was engulfed in their losses, and was squandered in vain. It is abundantly clear that, as we said at page 550, "the profits of the Eastern manufacturers are precarious, fluctuating, and by no means above the average of other occupations."

Just now (1880), the iron manufacturers are enjoying another temporary spurt, owing to the wealth created by the farmers and the consequent necessity for more railways; and this leads to another question of vast importance to the farmers. At what cost are those new railways to be constructed? Is the farmer's produce to be conveyed to the sea-board on cheap rails at a fair rate, or on

dear rails at an exorbitant rate? Are the railway-makers to pay Pennsylvanian prices or British prices for their rails? If the former, the cost of the required iron and steel will be nearly twice as much as if the latter.* Now, as the rates of freight must be in proportion, every one who may use the railways about to be constructed will have to pay high fares and freights for ever, because the legislature interdicts cheap iron and artificially makes it dear! Surely this would be an enormous evil, and all the less excusable as it could so easily be avoided!

At first glance it appears almost impossible that so vast a sum as 340,000,000 dollars should be lost in the mere diversity of value between what two different sets of men in two different countries can produce by the application of the same amount of capital and labour. And yet the explanation, when sought for, is soon found. To take a man away from what he can do well, and set him to do what he can only do badly makes an immense difference in the result of his labour. A baker would earn poor wages indeed as a tailor; and a clever carpenter would starve on his performance as a watchmaker. A Western farmer produces excellent and cheap crops, but if he were to set up as a woollen manufacturer he would soon come to grief (unless indeed his neighbour subscribed handsomely to make good his losses and bolster him up). The difference between what men produce who are expert and what men produce who are inexpert, constitutes a very large percentage on their production, and a large percentage on the total production of the world means a sum to which 340,000,000 dollars is a trifle. As things are, to take the world at large, the human race do not produce perhaps the hundredth part of what they might produce if their labour were properly and intelligently applied. The greatest creator of wealth at the smallest cost is division of labour, and whatever interferes with it is an obstruction to human productiveness. Every man ought to be allowed to do the work which early education, long experience, natural aptitude, peculiarity of position, or other circumstances enable him to do best; and that legislature is sadly mischievous which shunts him off from the right on to the wrong line, and compels him to lay aside the work which he can do well and take to that which others can do better.

It may perhaps be asked, "How are the Eastern manufacturers and the workmen they employ to live if the farmers withdraw the yearly subsidy, which is their only support?" The answer is easy. The increased imports which the abolition of Customs duties would

* The import duty on steel at this time amounts to 120 per cent.

bring about would necessitate increased exports to the same amount to pay for them ; for there can be no additional import without a corresponding additional export. There would arise a brisk demand for fresh capital and labour to produce those increased exports, and that demand would absorb whatever capital and labour might be set free by the diminished consumption of the Eastern States' manufactures. It is quite an exploded notion that if you import what you made before, workmen are thrown out of work. It is not so ; they are merely thrown on to other work to supply the articles that will be exported to pay for the new imports. The same amount of American capital and labour would be employed as before, with this difference, that then their operations would be remunerative, whereas before they were not. No doubt this transference of capital and labour from one kind of business to another is attended with temporary inconvenience and delay to the parties interfered with, but not more than was the introduction of steamboats, railways, electric telegraphs, and other improvements which largely benefited the many, while they were for a time displeasing to a few. Indeed, it would not be long before the owners, both of the displaced capital and of the displaced labour, would feel and recognise the advantage of being engaged in industries which were self-supporting, instead of industries which were dependent for their very existence on a national subvention revocable at any moment at the will of the people.

The manufacturers of the Eastern States "object to their trades being called losing trades, because they and their workmen live out of them." But they do not live out of them ! They mostly live out of the 340,000,000 dollars which the farmers yearly pay to those trades over and above what they need pay if they dealt with others. They live out of that, and of as much more paid to them in the same way by the rest of the American people. We believe that many trades would thrive better unassisted, but by clinging to Protection they proclaim their dependence on it. Were it otherwise, why keep up such heavy import duties, and how is it that, in spite of those heavy duties, foreign goods can still afford to come in ? Surely those must be "losing trades" in which 140 dollars' worth of capital and labour are spent to produce 100 dollars' worth of goods. Such trades depend for their maintenance, not on their own merit, but on other people's help. They are private establishments supported by public involuntary contributions.

We feel sure, however, that the manufacturers of the Eastern States underrate their own strength, and that they would soon walk alone if they were deprived of the go-cart of Protection. Under

the wholesome stimulus of open competition, the energy, activity, and shrewdness of their race would rapidly enable them to recover the ground they had lost under the enervating influence of the coddling system. We would venture to say to them, "Why, gentlemen, should you not, with raw cotton at your doors, compete with the Britisher, to whom it goes across the ocean? Yet, whereas in 1860 your export of cotton manufactures was 11,000,000 dollars, it was only 11,500,000 dollars in 1878, a paltry increase of 500,000 dollars in eighteen years! In England the increase within the same period was 60,000,000 dollars. There is no doubt that had you been left unencumbered by the fatal boon of Protection, you would have made infinitely greater progress, and you might by this time have proved formidable rivals to the Britisher in neutral markets. Again, in the three years 1866 to 1868 agricultural exports formed 74 per cent., and manufacturing and other exports 26 per cent. of the total exports. In the three years 1876 to 1878 the agricultural exports formed 80 per cent., and the manufacturing and other exports only 20 per cent. of the totality. No doubt that, but for the fatal boon of Protection, you would not have lagged behind in the race, and that your relative proportion of exports would have shown an increase instead of a diminution. Again, in spite of the vast expansion of the world's commerce, the tonnage of the United States mercantile navy is actually less now than it was twenty years ago. From 1855 to 1863 it was upwards of 5,000,000 tons; from 1874 to 1878 it was little more than 4,000,000. English tonnage in 1861 was 4,350,000 tons; in 1877 it was 6,115,000. Within the last twenty years English tonnage has increased by 2,000,000 tons, while yours has diminished by 1,000,000. Formerly your mercantile navy shared the carrying trade of the world with England; now, not only that is lost, but your own produce is carried away from your own ports in foreign bottoms. Is it that the American of to-day has degenerated in energy, skill, or enterprise? Not a bit of it. But here, also, Protection has shed its baneful influence. Iron has superseded wood in the construction of large ships, and your tariff makes iron nearly twice as costly to the American shipbuilder as it is to his British rival. Abolish your import duties, and you will speedily see your mercantile marine restored to its former splendour."

To sum up, the vast amount yearly wrested out of the earnings of the American farmers is simply a useless and wanton waste. It makes them by so much the poorer, without making others one whit the richer. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that we have in these pages only calculated that share of the general loss which

accrues to the agriculturists. These barely form half of the total population of the United States, and the other half suffers a fully proportionate loss on their yearly expenditure, from the same causes and with the same results. What steps should be taken to put a stop to these extravagant and unjustifiable losses shall be examined in the next chapter.

IV.

HOW TO PUT A STOP TO THE INTOLERABLE LOSSES WHICH ARE YEAR AFTER YEAR INFLICTED ON THE FARMERS OF AMERICA.

FORTUNATELY, great as is the grievance, its removal is easy. The remedy is in the farmer's own hands. It lies in the exercise of his voting power. It is simply this: let the American farmers give their support to no candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives who does not pledge himself, if elected, to propose, or at least to vote for, "*a reduction of 5 per cent. every successive year on the import duties, till the whole are abolished.*" Never mind what party he may belong to. The relief of the farmers from an intolerable burden is not, cannot be, and must not be, a party question. It is a paramount and inevitable measure which comes before, overrides, and casts into the shade all party distinctions. To refuse the abolition of the tariff is to refuse justice to the agriculturists. It amounts to a persistence in the iniquity of confiscating the farmer's property. Up with the tariff means down with the farmer!

If it be said that abrogation of the tariff would suppress one of the sources of State revenue, the Western farmer's ready reply would be, "Out of the 400,000,000 dollars yearly taken from us, only 60,000,000 dollars go to the revenue. There are plenty of ways of raising 60,000,000 dollars of revenue without resorting to the clumsy, wasteful, roundabout process of inflicting on us a loss of 400,000,000 dollars to enable the State to get 60,000,000 dollars. You might as well say that there is no other way of roasting a pig than by burning down the house. We shall be all the better able to pay the taxes necessary to replace the import duties if our earnings are left with us intact."

The farmers, by insisting on justice being done to themselves, are at the same time fighting the battle of the American community at large. All are sufferers from the same fiscal absurdity, and all ought to join the farmers, heart and hand, in enforcing the redress of a common grievance.

Every farmer should hold this language to the candidates: "I will

only vote for you if you will vote for me; and voting for me means voting in the House for *a reduction of five per cent. every successive year on the import duties till the whole are abolished.*" If this were done pretty generally, the tariff, in its present shape, would not survive the first sitting of Congress. The voting power of the farmers is overwhelming, and will further increase after the next census. They hardly know their own strength. They are the backbone of the great American Republic. They own most of its soil, they have created most of its wealth, and they form the most numerous and influential body among its population. The exercise of their voting power would forcibly influence the commercial policy of the Government, and if they choose to exercise it, an end will be put for ever to the yearly exactions from which they are now suffering. In other words, they have but to signify unmistakably by their votes that they wish to be freed from the unjust burdens laid upon them by heavy import duties, and those duties will speedily cease to exist. Is it possible to imagine that they should feel the evil, know the remedy, and hesitate to apply it?

It is doubtless true that many, perhaps most, of the American farmers are unaware of, or have given little attention to, the facts set forth in these pages, and hence their silent endurance. But if every farmer who reads this, and concurs in our views, would order from the nearest town ten or twenty copies of this little paper, and would distribute them by hand among his neighbours, or by post among his friends at a distance, a spirit of inquiry would rapidly be roused, and a definite expression of public opinion would soon be elicited. By such means each man would contribute to the good work, and, with little trouble and little expense, the exact state of the case might be laid before every farmer in the Union. It would be for him, after obtaining a knowledge of facts so interesting to his class, to decide whether he would continue to endure the grievance or insist on its removal.

Meanwhile, all honour, Western farmers of America, to the brave and blessed work which your indomitable energy and brawny arms are accomplishing! While in Europe millions of able-bodied men are dragged from the plough and the loom to be trained to bloodshed and destruction, you are pursuing your beneficial conquests over nature, and converting barren wastes into orchards and corn-fields. Surely the least that you can demand in return is that your earnings should not be wrung from you by unjust laws, and that you should be allowed to enjoy undividedly the fruits of your unremitting toil.

IT IS FOR YOU TO DECIDE, AND ENFORCE YOUR DECISION.

APPENDIX.

IN order to ensure all possible accuracy in the estimate of the yearly expenditure of the American farmers and their families, the writer printed and distributed among those persons whom he deemed most competent to judge, fifty copies of the following memorandum:—

ESTIMATE OF EXPENDITURE IN AMERICA.

It would greatly assist the undersigned in the completion of a little work on which he is engaged, if you would kindly give him the best estimate in your power in relation to the following subject.

By the census of 1870 there were in the United States of America, out of a population of 38,600,000, a total of 12,506,000 persons engaged in various occupations. Of these 5,922,000 were engaged in agriculture, which number has by this time (1880) increased to at least 7,000,000.

An estimate is wanted of the average annual expenditure of each of these 7,000,000 persons (most of whom have families) on all articles of consumption, except eatables and drinkables. Those articles would comprise every description of clothing, household ware, tools, agricultural implements, railway conveyance, &c., &c.

Of course, strict accuracy is unattainable, and all calculations must necessarily be conjectural and approximative.

It may be noted—

1. That by "agriculturists" are meant, not only the cereal farmers, but the producers of all articles derived from the soil, whether grain or cotton, meat or tobacco, &c., &c.
2. That there are in the United States 2,600,000 farmers who, most of them, own the soil which they till, and whose annual expenditure must be considerable.
3. That the wages of farm labourers in the North and West range (see an article in the *Times* of 26th August, 1879) from 19 dollars 69 cents monthly (236 dollars per annum) to 38 dollars 22 cents monthly (458 dollars per annum). In the South, under the competition of negro labour, wages are only 15 dollars monthly (180 dollars per annum).
4. That, as food and lodging cost the farmers and labourers but little, most of their expenditure falls on the articles of consumption comprised in this inquiry. The question therefore is, "What is the average yearly expenditure on such articles of each of those 7,000,000 persons in the United States of America, who are engaged in agricultural pursuits, some of whom are single, but most of whom have families?" It will be esteemed a favour if you will address a communication at your earliest convenience to

A. MONODIEN,

Author of "Free Trade and English Commerce."

Forest Hill, near London,
8th March, 1880.

The answers received (and they were not many) ranged from 150 dollars per annum up to 5 dollars per week (260 dollars per annum). In the work we have taken 200 dollars as a fair mean. But, even upon the lowest estimate, the sum is so vast that it really matters very little which valuation is adopted. If any reader thinks that 200 dollars per annum is too high an estimate, let him boldly strike off 25 per cent., and the balance will still be found amply large enough to justify all our conclusions.

For our American statistics we are chiefly indebted to that valuable compilation, "The American Almanack for 1879," by Mr. A. R. Spofford, to which we beg to refer those who may doubt the accuracy of our figures.

AUGUSTUS MONGREDIEN.

DIVERSITY IN THE MARRIAGE LAW OF INDIA.

IN a country like India, with a population of 250,000,000, and where so many heterogeneous classes meet together, the existence of a variety of laws in respect to so important a relation of life as marriage, need excite no surprise. When, in two countries so closely connected as England and Scotland, with a common religion and language, and social habits not very dissimilar, there is a wide gulf between the laws which bear on this subject, can it be wondered that among a people diversified in origin, in habit, as well as in religious sentiment and practice, such divergencies should exist as are to be found in India? The population of India is composed of various races, castes, and clans. The Hindus, though popularly believed to be settled in that country from the most ancient times, are not by any means its original inhabitants, but are in reality of Aryan origin, having emigrated from Central Asia at a period which has not been exactly ascertained, but which was certainly very remote, and perhaps long anterior to the exodus of the Israelites from Egypt. The Hindu emigrants brought with them an Indo-Germanic language, they subjugated the aborigines they found in the country, and established throughout India their own laws and social institutions. Of the aborigines there are still traces to be found, but these must be looked for amongst the inaccessible hills and lonely valleys of the country, which afford shelter to scattered tribes, amounting to some millions, in a condition of barbarism equalled only among the savages who people the isles of the Pacific. To the Hindus succeeded long afterwards the Mohammedans, who in their bigotry and fanaticism tried hard to force on the people they found in possession of India, not only the religion of the prophet of Arabia, but their own peculiar habits and customs. Yet another wave of conquest had to pass over the troubled surface of a country rich in vicissitudes, and the English conquerors brought with them laws and institutions which threaten to swallow up all other canons and regulations however ancient.

The marriage laws of India if treated fully, would occupy more space than could be afforded within the circumscribed limits of this article, but it will be interesting to ascertain what are the

laws or the customs which at present regulate this important relation of life in different parts of India; for married life in that country presents almost every possible form of conjugal relation, from the grossest form of promiscuous intercourse to the purest and most rational system which enjoins the union of one man to one woman. The various relations which bind persons of the opposite sexes together in India, may admit of classification under four heads:—

1. The union existing between one man and one woman.
2. The union between one man and two or more women, commonly called polygamy.
3. The union between one woman and several men, otherwise called polyandry.
4. The union existing among a certain number of men and a certain number of women, amounting to promiscuous intercourse.

In the examination of the laws and customs which regulate the various kinds of conjugal relationship it will perhaps be more convenient to consider them in the reverse order of time of their being introduced in the country; that is, by treating first upon the English constitutions on the point, and going down to the customs of those known as the aborigines, or earliest inhabitants of India.

THE CHRISTIAN LAW.

The marriages of Christians in India, including under this class both Europeans residing there and their descendants, as well as native Christians, are regulated by Act XV. of 1872 of the Legislative Council of India. This Act purports to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the marriages of Christians in India, and on the whole is based on the principles of English law bearing on that subject. The prohibited degrees of consanguinity are the same, and the marriage contract can either be entered into by merely making a declaration before the marriage registrar, or by going through a religious ceremony, which if performed by a clergyman of the Church of England must take place in a consecrated church, unless there be no church within five miles of the residence of either party to be married, or the clergyman has received special licence from the Anglican bishop of the diocese authorising him to solemnize the marriage in a private dwelling. Should the marriage be celebrated by or in the presence of a registrar, the parties must, in the presence of at least two credible witnesses in some part of the ceremony, declare as follows, or to the like effect: "I solemnly declare that I know not of any lawful impediment why I, A. B., may not be joined in matrimony to C. D." And each of the parties shall say to the

other as follows, or to the like effect: "I call upon the persons present here to witness that I, A. B., do take thee, C. D., to be my lawful wedded wife" (or husband).

The difference between the marriage law of England, and that which applies to Christians in India, relates chiefly to matters of minor importance. One point in respect to which the law in India is in advance of that in force in England has reference to the hours during which the marriage ceremony may be solemnized, and this has, I think, judiciously been allowed to extend from six in the morning to seven in the evening, without prejudice to the right of a clergyman of either the Church of England or the Church of Rome to perform the ceremony at any other time under special licence obtained from their bishops respectively. Another slight difference in the laws applies exclusively to native Christians; who being permitted to attain their majority at the age of eighteen are by right entitled to enter into the contract of marriage at the completion of that age, whereas European British subjects under the age of twenty-one cannot marry without the consent of their natural guardians.

And here, I think, it may be interesting to notice a very curious enactment that the Government of India found necessary to pass for the purpose of regulating the marriage of native Christian converts from Hinduism. Many of these had already been married before they adopted the Christian faith, and as their wives refused to follow them, they in many cases contracted other marriages. It was therefore found expedient to pass an Act (XXI. of 1866) for the purpose of legalizing "under certain circumstances the dissolution of marriage of native converts to Christianity, deserted, or repudiated on religious grounds by their wives or husbands." This Act provides that if a native husband, other than a Mohammedan or Jew, change his religion for Christianity, and if in consequence of such change his native wife for the space of six continuous months desert or repudiate him, he may sue her for the restitution of conjugal rights, and should the respondent on appearing before the Court refuse to rejoin the petitioner on the ground of his change of religion, the judge shall make an order adjourning the case for a year, and direct that in the interim the parties shall have opportunities of meeting each other in the presence of such persons, being females, as he shall appoint, with the object of ascertaining whether or not the respondent freely and voluntarily persists in such refusal. After the expiration of the adjournment, the parties shall again appear in Court, and if the respondent, on being interrogated, again refuse to join the petitioner, she shall be taken to have finally deserted or

repudiated him, and the judge shall thereupon by decree declare that the marriage between the parties is dissolved. A similar right has been given to the wife as against her husband, in case she be the party who has been converted to Christianity, and been deserted by her husband. Another section of the Act provides that "if a petitioner, being a male, has at the time of the institution of the suit two or more wives, he shall make them all respondents, and if at any stage of the suit it be found that he is cohabiting with one of such wives as man and wife, or that any of such wives is ready or willing to cohabit with him, the Court shall pass a decree dismissing the suit, and stating the ground of such dismissal."

THE MOHAMMEDAN LAW.

The Mohammedan law looks upon marriage as merely a civil contract. One of the greatest blots on that law is that it recognizes polygamy; for, as is well known, a Mohammedan is permitted to marry four wives at one and the same time. Of late, some apologists have come forward to affirm that Mohammed in reality did neither initiate nor direct the adoption of the principle of maintaining a plurality of wives, which is so common now; but that, as the Arabians of his time were very abandoned and dissolute in their habits, he, to check the abuses that then prevailed, restricted the number of wives a man might lawfully marry to four, without in any way enjoining his followers to make polygamy the rule of their lives. There can be no doubt that the state of society during the time of the prophet was as bad as it is described to be; but, at the same time, bearing in mind his own social life, and looking to the text of the Koran which says, "Ye may marry whatsoever women are agreeable to you, two, three, or four," we cannot be surprised that those who now resort to polygamy should cite their Scriptures, and appeal to their prophet in support of their practices. What was before unlawful has now to them been made lawful, receiving, as it did, the sanction of their last and great teacher and guide.

Among the Mohammedans the prohibited degrees of consanguinity and affinity are, with the exceptions hereinafter noticed, much the same as those recognized by Jewish and Christian law. A man is, however, forbidden to marry his foster-mother or foster-sister, and all such as are related "by milk in any of the degrees which would preclude his marriage with her if she were similarly related to him by consanguinity." The foster-mother in reality takes the place of a mother to him, and he cannot marry any of her relatives whom he could not have married had she actually been his own mother. Nor can a man marry at the same time two women who stand in

such a degree of relationship to each other, that if one had belonged to the opposite sex, they could not have intermarried. Thus, though a man may marry his wife's aunt or niece after his wife's death or divorce, he cannot marry her while she is living or undivorced. The Mohammedan law permits a man to espouse his deceased wife's sister; in fact, such marriages are usually encouraged, subject, of course, to the restriction that two sisters cannot be the wives of one person at the same time.

The marriage of infants under the authority of their kindred is usual among Mohammedans, but it may be repudiated by either party when they attain the age of puberty, with this restriction that a girl can only decline to be bound by the contract if it was entered into by a guardian other than her father or grandfather. Should it have been carried out by either of the latter, she has no option, but is bound to make the best of her position. A free, sane, and adult woman cannot, however, be given in marriage without her consent being obtained. This, on her being questioned (unless she reply in the negative), is inferred, if she either remain silent, or smile, or laugh, or weep; and her subsequent ratification of a marriage contracted in infancy, is obtained in the same manner. A man, however, cannot be bound by a marriage entered into by his guardians, unless he gives verbal acquiescence to it. Ordinarily a girl is given in marriage by her parents, but should she have attained maturity, and not been married, she is at liberty to make her own choice, and if the match be equal, the guardian will have no right to interfere; but no objections are allowed to be raised after a woman has once borne a child to her husband.

Among the Mohammedans no special ceremony is necessary to constitute a legal marriage, and the law bearing on this subject seems to be very similar to that which prevails in Scotland, for a simple declaration of the parties before two witnesses that they have taken each other for husband or wife, is held sufficient to legalize and complete the contract of marriage. And even further, if there be continued cohabitation and acknowledgment of parentage, the law will presume the existence of wedlock, and the legitimacy of the child. It is, however, considered both proper and laudable that a man should give publicity to his marriage, and with this object in view, the commentators of the Mohammedan law recommend that the "contract be entered into by a sensible man in a *musjid* (mosque) on a Friday, in the presence of competent witnesses, and that the bridegroom should once see the bride previous to the marriage."

One of the essential points necessary to constitute a legal marriage amongst the Mohammedans, is the naming of the dower; and

even if it is not mentioned in the contract, the law will presume it by virtue of the engagement entered into. Dower is an effect of the marriage contract, and imposed by the law on a husband as a token of respect for its subject—the woman, as well as a consideration for the nuptial. The amount to be fixed is generally regulated by what has usually been received in the family of the woman's father, making allowance, of course, for age, beauty, fortune, understanding, and virtue. It varies necessarily according to any difference in these circumstances.

THE HINDU LAW.

Amongst the Hindus, marriage holds a very high position. It is not merely a civil contract, but a sacrament. It is a religious duty performed for religious objects and ends, and affects the religious state of man both here and hereafter. For the obsequies of a man can only be performed by a male descendant; and to those who profess Hinduism, and rest their hopes of future happiness on the strict observance of the various ceremonies it enjoins, the absence of male issue is an unspeakable calamity, since the disembodied spirit depends for salvation on the regularity with which *shrad* (funeral rites) is solemnized on earth by the surviving progeny of the deceased. Hence the desire for offspring assumes a peculiar degree of intensity in India; and if a Hindu is disappointed in male issue, the law permits him to supersede his wife, or to resort to adoption, which is an institution exercising a vast and powerful influence over the social life of the Hindus.

It would be wrong, however, to entertain the notion that the Hindu law encourages polygamy indiscriminately. It, in fact, prohibits it, and merely allows a husband, under certain circumstances, to supersede his wife. These circumstances may arise in the case of the wife's infidelity, bad temper, barrenness, or production of daughters only; or it may proceed from the wife's consent, without any disqualifying cause on her part. It has, no doubt, become the fashion among some classes, the Kulin Brahmins of Bengal, for instance, to indulge in polygamy pure and simple; but it is an abuse of the privileges permitted them by law, resting on an unwarrantable interpretation of the *Shastras* (Hindu Scriptures). In ancient times there is abundant proof that monogamy was the universal rule. The various legends in the "*Mahabharatha*," a long and elaborate epic poem, which gives us an insight into the Vedic period of Indian history, point to the same conclusion; and coming down to the time of Manu, the celebrated legislator of the Hindus, passages may be

cited from his "Institutes" supporting this theory. There are other passages, it cannot be denied, which recognise a plurality of wives; but these a leading Indian jurist accounts for by assigning the second and subsequent wives a position just a little superior to concubines, and somewhat similar to the handmaids of the Jewish patriarchs. And here I cannot refrain from quoting a few lines from the marriage ritual of the Hindus, which in themselves furnish proof that, whatever the practice now, the rule was in a previous age for a Hindu to have no more than one wife at a time. While the marriage ceremony is being performed, the priest, speaking on behalf of the bride to the bridegroom, says: "The bride says to you, 'If you live happy, keep me happy also; if you be in trouble, I will be in trouble too; you must support, and must not leave me when I suffer. You must always keep me with you, and pardon all my faults; and your *poojahs* (worship), pilgrimages, fasting, incense, and all other religious duties you must not perform without me; you must not defraud me regarding conjugal love; *you must have nothing to do with another woman while I live*; you must consult me in all that you do, and you must always tell me the truth. Vishnu, fire, and the Brahmins are witnesses between you and me.'"

To this the bridegroom replies, "I will all my life do just as the bride requires of me, but she also must make me some promises. She must go with me through suffering and trouble, and must always be obedient to me. She must never go to her father's house unless she is asked by him, and when she sees another man in better circumstances or more beautiful than I am, she must not despise or slight me." To this the girl answers, "I will all my lifetime do just as you require of me; Vishnu, fire, and Brahmins, and all present, are witnesses between us." From this quotation it is evident that in the earlier days of Hinduism, when it prevailed in its purity, a husband was allowed no more than one wife. In these days, however, though a man take to himself two or more wives, if he do not supersede the woman first married, for some legal cause, she enjoys precedence over the others. She is considered the head of the family, and is entitled to many privileges. She superintends the household affairs, sits by her husband at marriage and other religious ceremonies, and is entitled to adopt a son on her husband's death without male issue. If, however, she be superseded, whether justifiably or not, she must be provided for, and if set aside by her husband without any disqualifying cause, will be entitled to inherit; and in a divided family, where the husband dies without male issue, she succeeds as heir, simply maintaining the other wives, who inherit in their own turn on her death.

The circle within which a Hindu is permitted to marry is perhaps more contracted than in any other nation in the world. There are two great rules which regulate the selection of partners in life : first, they must be chosen outside the family ; secondly, they must be selected inside the caste. The prohibited degrees of consanguinity seem to have a wider operation amongst the Hindus than amongst any other class of people, and include all such as are descended from the paternal or maternal ancestors within the sixth degree, and are not known by the family name to be of the same primitive stock either on the father's or the mother's side. These conditions, however, apply mainly to the three higher or twice born classes, and have been adopted by the Sudras in some parts only of the country. At the same time, of late these rules have been considerably relaxed, and often only paternal and maternal uncles and their descendants are viewed within the prohibited degrees. The second restriction, that a man must marry within his own caste, is, however, rigidly carried out, though its introduction is not of very ancient date. In former times, intermarriage between various castes was legally recognized so far that a man of a higher caste was permitted to marry a woman belonging to a grade lower than himself, though a woman could not be given in marriage to any person who was not of an equal or superior caste.

A Hindu girl is always married before she attains the age of puberty, and usually before the age of eight years. To this unmitigated and grievous evil may be attributed, to a great extent, the degraded position which women in India occupy. Married in their infancy, and scarcely emerged into womanhood, they are called upon to undertake all the duties and responsibilities of a mother. Need we wonder they become prematurely old ? With their minds steeped in ignorance the most dense, and superstition the most demoralizing, their fate is indeed pitiful. If for three years after a girl has reached the nuptial age, her father or natural guardian has neglected to get her married, she may choose a husband for herself. Such an event, however, rarely happens, for it entails serious consequences. The father incurs the reproach of all around him, which in a community where individual members are so dependent on one another as amongst the Hindus, is no light matter ; and the girl is usually put out of caste, and in some instances only readmitted upon the payment of heavy penalties, and the performance of severe penances. Indeed, so anxious are parents to get their daughters settled in life before they reach the age of womanhood, that to their inability to do so, owing to the heavy expenses attendant on a marriage ceremony in India, the practice of infanticide,

which once considerably prevailed, may, to a great extent, be attributed. As a general rule, boys and girls in a family are married according to priority of age; but it often happens, if the parents are unable to meet the heavy expenses of getting them all married that they postpone the marriage of the boys, and get the girls settled first.

Marriage among the Hindus consists of two ceremonies. The first is the *Betrothal*, which in reality is the marriage, and takes place generally during the infancy of the parties; and as marriage is not a civil contract only, but a religious ceremony, the performance of which is absolutely necessary, the consenting mind is not required, and its absence from infancy or incapacity is immaterial. In a civil point of view, the only conditions required are the gift of the girl by the father, and acceptance by the husband. If to this be added the ceremony called *Sapthapathi* (seven steps), which consists in the bride and bridegroom walking seven steps hand in hand during a particular recital, the marriage is irrevocable and complete. The *Consummation*, which is the second ceremony, takes place some years after, when the parties have attained the age of puberty; but it is in no way essential to the validity of the marriage, for, should the infant husband die subsequently to the betrothal ceremony, the girl will, to all intents and purposes, be and remain a widow. And here it ought to be remarked that the privilege allowed to Mohammedan girls, under certain circumstances, of repudiating a marriage contracted in infancy, is not bestowed on their unfortunate Hindu sister, whose position was rendered still more painful from the fact that, though her husband might have died before she reached the age of womanhood, yet she was compelled to live a widow, and pine away in seclusion, neglect, and misery. But, happily for her, under the British Government, Act XV. of 1856 has given her a legal right which it cannot but be regretted is not made use of more frequently.

Among the ancient Hindus, eight kinds of marriages were recognized. The *Brahma* and three others were appropriated for the Brahmins, and were based upon disinterested motives; the *Asoorah*, in which a pecuniary consideration was received by the father, was peculiar to Vaisas and Sudras; the *Gaudharva*, founded on "reciprocal amorous agreement," required no ceremony, and could be proved by any word or deed on the part of the man; and the *Paischa*, that which was accomplished by fraud and circumvention. At the present time, however, the *Brahma*, which is the disinterested marriage, prevails generally amongst all the different classes; but the *Asoorah*, for a pecuniary consideration, is resorted

to by needy and unscrupulous parents, and to a certain extent by the Sudras in South India. It is, however, held in universal reprobation, and is gradually dying out.

THE CUSTOMARY LAW.

Though the general principles of Hindu law prevail, more or less, in all parts of India, amongst those professing that religion, yet in many places custom has contributed to modify the law to a considerable extent. It is astonishing to observe how vast and powerful is the influence that local usages have exercised, and do still exercise, over the social condition of the Hindus. In the earliest times Manu, the eminent Hindu legislator, enjoined kings to observe "rules drawn from local usages," inasmuch as immemorial custom is transcendent law, approved in the sacred Scriptures and in the code of the divine legislators; and coming down to later times, we find the weight and authority of customary law has in no material degree become weaker, for even the British Courts deem it incumbent on them to recognize and enforce its ordinances. The English judges, however, will not enforce a custom which is injurious to the public interests, or opposed to morality; and very recently the Bombay High Court held that caste customs authorizing a woman to abandon her husband and marry again without his consent, were void through immorality.

In connection with the marriage law of India, questions of local usage may arise in three different ways: first, as regards such races as strictly carry out the ordinances of Hindu law and religion; secondly, in respect to those who in the main profess to follow that law, but have admitted certain doctrines entirely opposed to it—e.g., Sikhs and Jains; thirdly, in reference to such races as do not come at all under the operation of the Hindu law, being the aboriginal inhabitants of India. As regards the local usages to be found existing among the followers of Hinduism in its entirety, these will admit of classification under two heads: first, the custom of particular families; and secondly, local or caste usages. In reference to family usage, Justice West, at Bombay, has laid down the dictum that "family custom is entitled to be recognized, irrespective of the position and rank of the family." The British Courts, however, discourage attempts made by a single family to assert a special law for itself, except it be in the case of rajahs and chiefs, with whom family custom is in each case permitted to regulate the succession or inheritance to property, as well as the rights which legalise marriage in individual cases. Thus, in the *Tippurah Raj*, family usage has legalised a marriage in which the

chief ceremony consists in the worship of the goddess Tripura, and the taking of *santi* (holy) water. Among the Uriah chiefs and rajahs marriage with the girl of an inferior caste is permitted, and this is contracted by the ceremony of putting a garland round the neck of the bride, or by exchange of garlands.

But the customs which wield by far the greatest influence, are those which regulate marriages according to local, tribal, or caste usages. These in various parts of India differ considerably. Thus, among the agricultural classes of Assam the "interchange of the *pan*-leaf (betel) constitutes the ceremony of marriage, and the tearing of a *pan*-leaf by the husband and the wife indicates dissolution of the union." The Sonthals, again, have marriage customs entirely divergent from those of the Hindus. Intercourse among the two sexes is freely permitted, child marriage not usually resorted to, and girls are allowed a voice in the selection of their husbands. Their marriage rites are of a peculiar kind, the chief element among them being the painting of the bride's brow with vermilion, and her partaking of the family meal, after which she becomes a member of the husband's family. This method of formally inducting the wife into her husband's household, by sharing with her the family meal, may also be noticed among many of the tribes of Chota Nagpore, with this difference that amongst some of these, the drinking out of the same cup of the ordinary fermented liquor is the chief marriage ceremony. Among the Khonds in Orissa monogamy seems to be the universal rule; and Dr. Hunter says, "So long as a wife remains true to her husband, he cannot contract a second marriage, or even keep a concubine without her permission." The Jats of the North-western Provinces permit the marriage of a widow with the younger brother of a deceased husband, and the children born of such marriages are considered legitimate; while in the Punjab a marriage solemnized in the infancy of one of the parties, is revocable under certain circumstances before consummation. In the Bombay Presidency, among the Sudras and the lower classes generally, the prohibited degrees vary considerably from the ordinary law; and among several castes no objection is raised to the marriage of cousins. Divorce and re-marriage of a separated wife under the *pat* form are permitted under certain circumstances, whereas a widow is usually allowed to marry again, in express opposition to the principles of the Hindu law. *Pat* is a species of marriage which is inferior to the first marriage of a woman, and when it is contracted she is compelled to give up to her husband or his representatives her children, except infants in arms, together with any property or jewels she may be possessed of. A widow's *pat* is, however, considered more honorable

than that of a divorced wife. Among the caste of dancing girls, a daughter may either be married to a Mohammedan or a Hindu, or be introduced at once to her profession, at her parent's pleasure.

It is, however, in South India that the influence of customary law is most widely felt; and this may be easily accounted for. When the Hindus first entered India from the north, the vanquished aborigines fled before them, and took shelter either on the unfrequented hills of the country or in the extreme south of the peninsula. Here they were followed, in course of time, by the Hindus, and the continued intercourse of centuries resulted in the formation of a class of people who are the descendants as much of the aborigines of the country as of the Aryan conquerors of India, and who, while preserving to a great extent their primitive customs, have adopted, in a modified form, many of the social institutions of the Hindus. Among some of the inferior classes in South India, the marriage of a man with a woman who has lived in concubinage with him is permitted, and, in strict analogy with the law of Scotland, children born before wedlock are legitimised on the marriage of the parents. The marriage of a widow with the brother of her deceased husband, is also allowed among the Ideiyars, a pastoral race; while the re-marriage of widows and the divorce of wives are favourably looked upon by all classes generally.

Having treated so fully about the customs of the Hindus, but a short sketch of the usages of those who, if I may say so, are but partially Hindus, can be permitted. The Sikhs are a community chiefly to be found in the Punjab, in North India, and their existence dates from the fifteenth century. Their marriage laws are different from those of Hindus in general, and the chief ceremony with them consists in the recantation of a certain text called the Anand text, which may be celebrated even with a concubine. The Jains are to be found principally in the Upper Provinces, but they may also be met with in Guzerat and the north coast of the Malabar. They are an offshoot from the Hindus, with whom they have still many observances in common as regards their religion and laws, but they deny the divine origin and authority of the Vedas. Though in North India they are all of one caste, and in South India divided into two, yet they recognize a number of families between which no intermarriage can take place. Their wedding ceremonies are somewhat similar to the Hindus, but, of course, the Vedic *mantras* are omitted.

The foregoing pages contain, as far as is possible within this short sketch, a description of the two forms which chiefly characterise the conjugal relations of the two sexes amongst all classes in India.

That monogamy is only the exception and not the rule is, unfortunately, too true, and it will require centuries of earnest and patient labour to root out polygamy, which, in its varied forms, prevails more or less throughout the greater part of India. Yet whatever the evils attendant on the system which sanctions the principle of maintaining a plurality of wives, they cannot be so degrading as the customs of certain scattered tribes who have not yet risen high enough in the scale of civilization to recognize the sanctity of a marriage tie, which, if it exists at all, exists merely in name, and amongst whom the relations between the two sexes border almost on promiscuous intercourse. Among the aborigines of India, polyandry prevails to a considerable extent, sometimes regulated by certain fixed rules, sometimes leaving a woman free to dispense her favours to whomsoever she pleases. Among the tribes inhabiting the Himalayan mountains, four or five brothers marry a single woman; and the artisan class of the Nayars of Malabar allow brethren and male relations of blood to have a joint marital interest in a woman. The girls amongst the Tudas of the Neilgherries marry two or three husbands, and retain as many lovers as the husbands permit them to contract engagements with. A man may only contract marriage with one woman, but be the recognized lover of many. The Nayars of Cochin are married nominally to girls of their own class, when the latter are ten or under ten years of age, who, however, live with their mothers, and receive as many lovers as they please, provided they belong to the Brahmin or the Nayar class. When a lover receives admission into a house, he usually gives his mistress some ornaments and a piece of cloth, and when the lady returns the cloth it is a sign the gentleman must cease his visits. As may naturally be supposed, where polyandry prevails no man knows his own children. Hence succession to property devolves in the female line, and goes accordingly to the sister's son; and this applies even to the Raj of Cochin and Travancore. The origin and extent to which polyandry prevails in India form a subject sufficiently interesting and curious to deserve separate treatment; I will not, therefore, enlarge further upon it here.

Before bringing this article to a conclusion, I would just allude to a class which has come into existence within a comparatively recent date, and is a necessary consequence of the introduction into India of English education and European civilization. The Brahmos are a sect founded by Rajah Ram Mohun Roy about fifty years ago, who have renounced Hinduism and adopted a faith which bears a close analogy to that of the Unitarians in England. At their own request,

a law (Act III. of 1872) was passed by the Government of India, regulating their marriages, the chief provisions of which are :—that no man be permitted to marry who has not completed his eighteenth year, and no woman before the expiration of fourteen years of her age ; while neither party can marry without the consent of his or her guardian, before they have attained the age of twenty-one years. The marriage may be solemnized before a registrar ; and no man marrying under this Act is permitted to have more wives than one at the same time. Another Act of the Government of India (XV. of 1865), to which a passing allusion may be made, has reference to the Parsees, the followers of Zoroaster, and originally the inhabitants of Persia, from which country they were driven by Mohammedan persecution and intolerance. They are the most enlightened and enterprising of the Queen's subjects in India. Anything relating to their social institutions would possess considerable interest ; but the limits assigned to this article restrain me from dwelling on their marriage laws. Under the above-mentioned Act, a man is restricted to one wife, and no marriage will be considered legal unless "solemnized, according to the Parsee form or ceremony called 'Aservad,' by a Parsee priest, in the presence of two Parsee witnesses, independent of such officiating priest ; and unless, in the case of any Parsee who shall not have completed the age of twenty-one years, the consent of his or her father shall have been previously given to such marriage."

In writing the above, I have intentionally abstained from dwelling on the divorce law applicable to the various sections of the community in India. This is a subject of considerable importance in itself, and could not have been dealt with to any purpose within the contracted limits of this article.

ALFRED NUNDY.

Lincoln's Inn.

HOME AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE passing of the Irish Land Bill of 1881 is a very striking episode in the history of modern legislation. Its opponents complain of its violation of all principle; and the charge is true, if we understand thereby the principle upon which English legislation upon the subject of the land has hitherto been guided, under the control of the landlords. For centuries past, the interest of the State or Commonwealth on the one hand, and the interest of the cultivator on the other, have been so dealt with by the landlord legislators of the country, that the interest of the Commonwealth in the soil of the country has disappeared altogether, and become extinct; while the interest of the cultivator has become a matter of the mere sufferance or good will of the landlord. The bill is undoubtedly a violation of every principle of landlord legislation in the past. Before the measure was brought in, we said (March 1st) :—

The landlords may count with confidence upon a larger share of general sympathy and support than they can fairly lay claim to; and the one fear is that the new Land Act will be inadequate to the actual need of the country. The landlords have held on by their traditions and inheritance as long as it was possible to do so. They have steadily resisted and resented all equitable and reasonable consideration of the claims made upon them, and unwisely insisted upon "concessions" being dependent upon their personal discretion, instead of consenting to see those concessions enforced by law. The time has now come when the people refuse to be dependent upon such concessions any longer. They claim their natural and inalienable rights as the existing race of possessors of the soil; they claim that the cultivator of the land—the *husband*—shall have *his* claims recognized as preferential, in the nature of things, to the landlord's claims; and the everlasting laws saying Yea to this, the claim will have to be allowed. No one wants to see the landlord destroyed or impoverished, if that can be avoided. We are a Conservative race by instinct, but we are a practical race too; and the conviction is all but universal that landlordism in Ireland must undergo such a modification of its claims as will permit the husbandman to till his fields in hope instead of with despair. We speak with moderation, of set purpose, but none the less firmly. The Liberal Ministry must rise to the occasion, and do all that it is possible for it to do to reform matters.

We shrink from speaking of Mr. Gladstone personally in connection with the great measure which has just passed the Lower House. Formal eulogium would be ridiculously out of place, and the reader would be as impatient, we believe, of scanning it as we certainly should be of printing it. It is the few simple, broken expressions of emotion of member after member of the House, on the night of the third reading of the bill, alone give satisfactory expression to what most men feel upon recalling the session to memory. There has been nothing like it in history, nothing approaching it; but instead of dilating upon the astonishing display the nation has seen of the aged Premier's depth and range of powers, it is wiser to remember from whom those powers come, and by whom they are conferred upon individual men, now and again, in a nation's history, for its redemption:

THE most important of the principles to which the Bill gives expression is perhaps contained in one of the last Amendments moved by the Government itself in Committee, depriving the landlord of all power of raising the rental on the ground of improvements made by the tenant. Founded as the principle is in common justice, it has taken a century of discussion to get it admitted within the scope of what is called practical statesmanship. Economists have been pointing out for many years past that any increase in the "letting" value of a holding that arises from the expenditure or labour of the tenant upon the holding, should in common justice belong to the tenant, and not to the landlord. The landlords who in times past made the law that has enabled them to appropriate to themselves the fruits of the tenants' toil and outlay, declare it to be "confiscation," and a "violation of all principle," to change this law and enact that this ancient time-honoured robbery of the poor by the rich shall cease. That it is a violation of the selfish principles of which the existing law is an expression is certain enough; but is it really "confiscation" to decree that the landlord shall no longer enter into the enjoyment of the fruits for which the tenant has toiled? Our land laws are an expression of the intensest selfishness, having been made from time immemorial by the landlord class. On the one hand, these laws have enabled the landlord to take what by the Divine law is not his, and never can be his; while, on the other, they have been so framed as to enfranchise him from those duties and obligations to the State or Commonwealth, which were the conditions of the original grant to him of the landlordship, or ownership, on which he now rests his pretensions.

ON the night of Thursday, the 28th ultimo, we received the intelligence of the decisive victory of Ayooob Khan at Karez-i-Atta, on the 26th, over the forces of Abd-ur-rahman, a victory which involved, as its consequence, the immediate loss of Kandahar, and probably portends the speedy loss of Kabul, where he is known to be unpopular, by the Ameer whom Lord Lytton selected as our oandicate, whom he recognized, and whom he largely assisted. The news was, of course, no surprise to us, nor does it seem to us to justify any regret. It affords an additional proof that the Afghans, high and low, understand their own affairs much better than we do; that Lord Northbrook was quite right in trying to impress on Lord Salisbury that the Ameer Shere Ali had made wonderful progress in consolidating his power, in reforming his administration, and in generally continuing the efforts of his illustrious father, Dost Mohammed, for the formation of an Afghan kingdom out of conflicting interests and tribal immunities. Herat, which the oracular scribes at Calcutta, such as Sir Honry Durand, J. W. S. Wyllie, and Sir J. U. Aitchison, and the advocates of overbearing intrigue who volunteered their pernicious advice here, Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Henry Rawlinson, declared incapable of being incorporated with Kabul, has repeatedly of late years formed the base of operations on behalf of a centralized kingdom. In the midst of his desperate struggle, between 1864 and 1868, Shere Ali never lost his hold on Herat; it was there that he organized the campaigns, including the last successful one, which finally enabled him to regain supreme power over united Afghanistan. It was at Herat he had concentrated his forces and elected to make his principal stand when assailed by Lord Lytton's invasion. It is in Herat that his son, Ayooob Khan, has upheld continuously the claims of his branch of the family, and thence he has sallied forth twice, not without gaining substantial and creditable results for their vindication. If carefully observed and analysed, the relations of Herat with Kabul and

Kandahar during the last three years will be found to furnish in themselves a remarkable exposure and reprobation of the shallow and retrogressive policy of the true Anglo-Indian expert school, which thought that the free Afghan state could easily, and as might from time to time appear most convenient, either be reduced into a submissive dependency, or be cut and carved, like a Christmas cake, into disconnected provinces. After thousands of brave lives have been lost, and twenty millions of money thrown away, we may now begin to estimate more accurately the wisdom and dignity of these abortive plans. But what does it matter? Lord Lytton is an Earl; Sir Frederick Roberts has his pension; Sir Henry Rawlinson is still regarded as a pontifical authority on Central Asian affairs; and Sir Bartle Frere is equally honoured at Court and in Exeter Hall.

With the experience of the last fifty years, an open book before us containing the record of two abortive Afghan Wars, the ridiculous Persian War, and the war in the Crimea, all alike begotten of national jealousy of what we call the Russian advance in Asia—an advance as inevitable as the tides, it is difficult to express adequately the sense we have of the unwisdom of the metropolitan press in ministering as it does to public sensitiveness upon the question. It is a sensitiveness begotten partly of the morbid concentration of two or three individual minds upon the subject of the advance, such as the essays of Rawlinson and Vambéry display, and partly of the idleness of our own military men at the Capua of the Indian Hills, acting upon the national susceptibilities and the national ignorance of every fact concerning the so-called “advance” of this supposed rival power to our empire in India. What the Russians or the Turkomans are doing at this moment in Merv, or in the regions near it, is of no more importance to this country, or our Indian empire, than what is taking place in the planet Jupiter. Will no one acquainted with the facts, and having some pictorial power, try to show the nation what the Russian dominion in Turkestan really is, and its potentialities? What is it that we suppose Russia really contemplates against India, that makes us watch the movement of every Cossack boot in the regions of Central Asia with an interest that never tires? We seem to think it impossible that these movements should be incidental to the position which Russia already occupies in these regions, and insist upon it that there is some unavowed and sinister purpose against ourselves therein. Well, what is it? If we reduce these speculations to a practical shape, we shall find that they take the form of attributing to Russia the intention, sooner or later, of doing one or other of two things. She is moving then, small bodies of her soldiers about these remote regions, not for the purpose of reclaiming them from the barbarism which has characterized them from the dawn of history, but for creeping nearer and nearer to India every year, so that she may by and by be in a position, we say, to do one of two things: To make a raid upon British India, similar to that of Nadir Shah in last century for the mere sake of plunder: or to invade India with the design of overthrowing our empire therein and setting up her own. The most robust Russophobic will hesitate to attribute to her statesmen any thought of an invasion of the former—the diabolic order. Bad as the world is, no sane person will believe that even Russia can contemplate an invasion of British India of the Nadir Shah order. If she has any designs against it at all, they are not of that order, at all events. In fact, if we watch closely the popular writings on the subject, we shall see that they are pervaded by the belief that Russia is creeping towards India, with the purpose of by and by invading it by its north-west frontier, overthrowing our own rule thereof, and setting up her own in its place. If Russian statesmen

have any purpose at all, we say, of the nature our public writers attribute to her, it is, at all events, not of the diabolical, but of the human order. She does not want to plunder India, and devastate it with fire and sword after the manner of Nadir Shah, but wants to rule in place of ourselves, believing, perhaps, that she could rule better than we do.

Having got thus far, and ascertained what the general nature of her hostile intention *must* be if she cherish any such intention at all, we say that no rational man ever sat down to study the Russian position in Turkestan, the extent of Russian resources, and the true character of the adventure attributed to her, without coming quickly to one of two conclusions: either Russian statesmen are mad in thinking such an adventure possible, or the English people are mad in attributing such intentions to them. Dismissing, we say, the notion of a Russian raid upon British India of the diabolic or Nadir Shah order, the alternative is an invasion upon such a scale, and with such resources accumulated, in the wild and desperate regions in the neighbourhood of Merv, as would be reasonably sure to overthrow British rule in India, and to set up Russian rule in its place. The man who can persuade himself that such an adventure is possible, must either be profoundly ignorant of what such an enterprise would necessitate, or must be a fool. As a fact no Russophobist, compelled to examine into the possibilities of such an adventure, ever upholds it, but begins at once to tell us that it is not "invasion" that he fears so much as the mere neighbourhood of Russia. It is her neighbourhood, he says, that is dangerous to us. At Herat she is at our gates; at Kabul she would be at our windows, and her whispers would disturb every part of the empire. No one would deny that, were Russia really ruling at Kabul, she might by the intrigues of her agents breed trouble for us in India, but at Merv and Herat she is as far off for any purpose of the kind as at St. Petersburg. The true solution of the matter lies in the cultivation of *good* neighbourhood with her and friendly relations. Strange and mournful is it that our publicists cannot discern it. Instead of ministering day after day to the delusions of the people as to Russian designs upon us, true wisdom suggests to our statesmen and publicists that we should make full and generous acknowledgment of the services to humanity which the Russian advance into Central Asia has accomplished, and is every day consolidating. That advance is as irresistible as the tides, as all men may see who do not close their eyes. Our attitude towards it is unworthy of a great and generous people; while it has betrayed us, under the incitement of the public press and the misrepresentations of our statesmen, into wars of the utmost wickedness. Were our publicists wise they would taboo the subject of the Russian advance altogether, or treat it precisely in the same spirit as they do the opening up of Central Africa to our knowledge.

The Statesman.

No. XIV.—JULY 1, 1881.

EDITORIAL NOTES.



ON the 30th of December last, the Editor of this journal was summoned to the Bow Street Police Court on a charge of libel, preferred by unknown prosecutors, but at the instance, as was alleged, of the Ameer-i-Kabeer (great lord), Wikar-ool-Oomra, of Hyderabad. The case was, very improperly, as many thought, committed for trial before the Central Criminal Court by the sitting magistrate, Sir James Ingham, who ought never to have issued a summons upon such information as was before him. The article complained of appeared in the October number of this journal, under the title of the "Restitution of Berar," and it was alleged by the prosecution that it contained two libels: the first, a libel upon a foreign sovereign, for the purpose of stirring up a war between Great Britain and the State of Hyderabad; the second, an ordinary libel on the Ameer-i-Kabeer. That personage was a man of notoriously bad character, forced upon Sir Salar Jung as Co-Regent with him of the State during the minority of the young Nizam, for no other purpose whatever than to coerce that Minister—to whom Englishmen owe what they can never repay—to stop all further remonstrances from the Hyderabad Court on the subject of the restitution of the Berars. The appointment of the Ameer was an utter scandal even in India, his unfitness for the high office to which he was appointed being notorious throughout the empire. In disclosing the facts to the nation, we commented, as it was our duty to do, with severity upon the antecedents of this Co-Regent as revealed in the published official records of the Indian Government itself, and it was this part of the article that was complained of as libellous. We need not tell our readers that the Ameer-i-Kabeer was himself a mere stalking-horse in the matter; and the procedure adopted showed this clearly. Had the Ameer been really anxious to clear his character of the aspersions cast upon him—not by ourselves, but by our officials at Calcutta in their own published reports of bygone years—he would have been advised to proceed against us by civil action, when the charges made against him by these gentlemen could have been sifted to the bottom. Trusting to the ignorance which prevails in this country as to what goes on in India, they had rehabilitated the man for no other purpose whatever than to use him as an instrument for giving check-mate to the unanswerable remonstrances which Sir Salar Jung was making on the young Nizam's behalf, on the subject of the Berars. We have now to ask our readers to peruse with attention the full exposition we have given further on in these pages, of the history of this question. They will read it, we feel sure, with the astonishment, indignation, and shame with which a knowledge of the facts long since filled our own mind. We pledge ourselves to the complete truth-

fulness and accuracy of every statement we have made. Where we have erred, if we *have* erred, it has been honest, unconscious error. Our whole conduct towards the Hyderabad State has been an infamy, and not less infamous has been the treatment to which Sir Salar Jung has been subjected in 'tho last few years for simply doing his duty to the Nizam. We are resolved that tho matter shall not rest where it is, if it is in our power to prevent it. The Attorney-General has issued a fiat prohibiting the further prosecution of the criminal suit against us; for the object of the prosecution was not to elicit the truth, but to prevent its being disclosed to the British nation. The Ameer-i-Kabeer was wanted, and has simply been used as a tool, to destroy the power of Sir Salar Jung; and it was hoped that he would prove not less effective in the destruction of THE STATESMAN. The prosecution is a testimony to the utility of the work done by us in these pages, and a strong encouragement to proceed fearlessly in the task we have undertaken. THE STATESMAN is the first systematic attempt that has been made to reveal to the nation the dark and unknown places of our Indian Administration; and the Indian Bureaucracy is well aware that these places will not bear to have light let in on them. If the conductors of this paper were ignorant slanderers, the secret promoters of this prosecution were sufficiently astute to understand that by a statement of the truth its slanders would be made impotent for evil. But they knew that it had spoken but the truth; and therefore it was that, instead of fair discussion, tho law was invoked in order, if possible, to close our lips. It was not merely an attempt to gag the Press, but an effort to hide from the nation facts which it is of the utmost importance it should know. In so far as the Ameer was concerned, the case is over, to our own disappointment and that of the large body of gentlemen—some of them in India, and others in this country—who knew or gravely suspected the truth of our allegations, and that we had not disclosed the worst aspects of the case. The Attorney-General having stopped the prosecution, we considered carefully what we should do, and at last made up our minds. The real prosecutor in the case was never disclosed. He kept carefully in the background. It was not the Ameer with whom we had to fight. We knew that all along. It was a more powerful foe. It was tho man who had forced the Ameer upon Sir Salar Jung, as Co-Regent and colleague, to reduce the Minister to submission and silence. The instigator and author of the suit was himself the foremost actor in the transactions of the last four years at Hyderabad, which will be found described in the latter part of our article on Berar in the present number, and was no other than the ex-British Resident. We lay our hand upon him unfalteringly, as having, by his proceedings, made the British name an infamy in Southern India. Those are heavy charges to bring against an old officer of the State, and we know well their gravity. We let the Ameer go. He is not worthy of further pursuit. The true offender is our own officer, Sir Richard Moade, now hero in England. His deputy in tho task of forcing the Ameer as a colleague upon the Minister, and his demoralizing presence upon the young Nizam, was Major Euan Smith, also in England. We appeal solemnly to the nation to insist on the cause between us and these men, being adjudged with the gravity that such an impeachment calls for. Were the occasion not one of overwhelming importance both to this country and to the people and Princes of India, we should have allowed it to pass away. As it is, we can do no other than what we have now done, and we await the result. In the meantime, let our readers peruse attentively the tale of shame we have narrated, further on in this issue.

WE wound up our article of October last for which we were prosecuted, with the sentence: "We charge Lord Lytton's Foreign Office with this crime, and we demand an inquiry into the facts." The words were carefully chosen. This is no question of party. It matters not what the Home Government is, or what the politics of the Secretary of State, or the Viceroy and Governor-General. Whig or Tory, it is all the same. The bureaucracy is too strong for them all. Whether the Viceroy is Lord Northbrook, Lord Lytton, or Lord Ripon, it is the same. It is simply impossible for the Viceroy to make himself master of the subjects that come before him, by his own personal study and research. He has to depend upon the records, the files of the bureaucratic departments, from which everything is eliminated that gives any view of the case other than that to which the Calcutta officials are committed. The India Office knows nothing—literally nothing—of what goes on in the country. It is dependent entirely upon the system of reference to, and reports from, the very officials whose conduct and course are questioned, and everything that tells against either, is systematically kept from the knowledge of the Secretary of State. It is for this reason that we despair of all appeals to the India Office, or to the Ministry.

IN wading through the Opposition speeches of the Wartons, Chaplins, Churchills, *et hoc genus omne*, to the Land Bill, we find it difficult at times to convince ourselves that we are not listening to the Noodle's oration of the witty Dean. Listen to Noddedom, the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever:—

If this, Sir, were an ordinary measure, I should not oppose it with so much vehemence, but the proposals are new. It is the first time such proposals were ever heard in this House. I am not prepared, Sir—this House is not prepared—to receive them. Give not, then, your sanction to this measure; for, whatever be its character, if you do give your sanction to it, the same man by whom this is proposed will propose to you others to which it will be impossible to give your consent. I care very little, Sir, for the ostensible measure; but what is there behind? What are the honourable gentleman's future schemes? If we pass this Bill at his dictation, what fresh concessions may he not require? What further ruin is he planning for his country? Talk of evils to be remedied [in our landed system]—look, Sir, to other countries, study other aggregations and societies of men, and then see whether the laws of this country demand a remedy or deserve a panegyric. Was the right honourable gentleman, let me ask him, always of this way of thinking? Did he speak so in 1870? Do I not remember when he was the advocate in this House of very different opinions? I not only quarrel with his present views, Sir, but I declare, frankly, I do not like the party with which he acts. If his own motives were as pure as possible, they cannot but suffer contamination from those with whom he is politically associated. This measure may even be a boon, but I will accept no favour from such hands. (Loud cries of "Hoar, hear," from Sir Drummond Caff.) I am not afraid, Sir, to profess myself an enemy to change and innovation. I am satisfied with things as they are. Nobody is more conscious than I am of the splendid abilities of the right honourable gentleman, but I tell him at once his scheme is impracticable. It is Utopian. It won't do in practice. ("Hear, hear.") The business is one of the greatest intricacy and importance, and there is need of the greatest caution and circumspection. It is impossible to foresee all the consequences of this measure. Everything should be gradual; and instead of reforming the State, let each man reform himself. (Loud cheers.)

It is a little hard, perhaps, to have this great oration renewed day after day in the House, when we learned it all by heart sixty years ago from the lips of the Edinburgh Reviewers. The opposition to this great measure has been most ~~disingenuous~~ throughout. Afraid openly to reject it, Sir Stafford Northcote permits his followers to express their real feeling towards the measure, in a

course of half-organized obstruction, as pertinacious and as effectual for delay as open parliamentary faction could desire. The country is not likely, we think, to forget the last five months of our parliamentary history, nor the impudent pretence of the factions, who have made the period so largely frustrate, that it is the fault of the Ministry that it is so. Never has a Ministry laboured with more simplicity and integrity of purpose, for what they believe to be an essential measure on behalf of the oppressed, and never did opponents pursue a more determined or more disingenuous course to thwart their action, by bringing the business of the House into a position of perpetual dead-lock. And these men venture to talk—as though the world were blind, and had no eyes—of the loyal support they have given to the Ministry. Their course would have been infinitely more honest, and entitled to respect, had they taken their stand upon “coercion,” and met the Land Bill with open and determined hostility. They hate it, root and branch, tip to tail, and would oppose its every clause, if they had not the fear of the hustings before their eyes. And then it is Mr. Gladstone’s fault that the session is being so lamentably wasted. We shall know well enough where to lay our hand for the blame, when the time comes. The Bill has to force its way through the triple phalanx of needledom, landed interests, and faction, and it will be a miracle if it gets through at all.

We have noticed further on, the costly character of our Indian Administration, from our systematic exclusion of native agency from all its highest posts. Thus we learn from a recent Parliamentary Return, that in 1878-79 there were nearly 600 English Civilians in India in receipt of salaries of Rs. 20,000 to Rs. 90,000 a year each; not one Native amongst them all. The figures are as follows:—

Covenanted Civilians—

20 with average salaries of Rs. 90,000 a year each.

24 with salaries of from „ 50,000 to Rs. 60,000.

449 do. do „ 20,000 to „ 50,000.

Uncovenanted Civilians—

6 with salaries of Rs. 30,000 upwards.

39 do. do. „ 20,000 to Rs. 30,000.

There is not one Native in the whole list, and but two Eurasians. Administering India as foreigners, we are excluding the people of the soil from all positions of emolument, that we may engross them ourselves. After all the protests and admissions of the last fifty years, that this state of matters was a reproach to us, and after the repeated promises of the Crown that it should be changed, we are just where we ever were, and the people too. Instead of lessening the number of European appointments, we have been increasing them throughout the whole period of these protestations and promises. We engross all positions of emolument, and exclude the people from them absolutely. And we do it upon a pretence that is not true; for, instead of administering the country better by our costly agency than the people could by their own inexpensive machinery, it is dawning upon unprejudiced minds everywhere, that the exotic agency we have substituted for the native is a failure. These are not the random assertions of the journalist, but the settled convictions of “officials” whose lives have been passed in the impossible task we have set ourselves. From Her Majesty’s Judges in India and the Members of Council downwards, the testimony is concurrent; while the official admission that upwards of 5,000,000 of the people under our rule died of starvation in the years 1877 and 1878, lends an awful significance to what their testimony means.

THAT our failure is complete should not surprise us, and need not necessarily humiliate us, for we undoubtedly meant well at starting. Our reproach is that we permit our own interests as a race, to blind us to the wrong of persisting in our present course. If they had had their way, the officials at Calcutta would never have given back Mysore to Native rule, in spite of the truly horrible culmination of own own rule therein in 1877-8. Every one knows with what determination they fought successive Secretaries of State upon the subject; while even now that the Native Raj has been restored, they are keeping an extensive Executive of our own in the State, simply for the emoluments attached to the appointments. They have been permitted moreover to fasten upon its straitened treasury a burden of "compensation annuities" to the men who have been compelled to retire from the province to which their presence has proved so fatal. In the same way, these officials will move heaven and earth to retain their hold upon the Berars, and when forced to let them go, will demand "compensation annuities" for our own Executive that was introduced by absolute fraud, and is being maintained by offences against the Nizam's State and subjects that ought to lead to the impeachment of every participator therein. To retain the Berars, we have deliberately done our best in the last four years to introduce anarchy, misrule, and lawlessness into the State, by the appointment of the Ameer-i-Kabeer to rule it. And when finally foiled, and the Berars have to go back to the Prince from whom they filched it, they will demand, we say, "compensation annuities" for the whole body of officials who will have to retire therefrom, and give place to a Native Executive upon one-fourth of their pay.

THE absentee annuities and pensions alone under our system of government, drain the people of India of nearly £3,000,000 sterling a year, as is pointed out by Sir David Wedderburn in these pages further on. Quoting from the Parliamentary Return, he shows that in the year 1878-9, but three years ago, there were some 2,400 absentee Civilians draining from the Indian Treasury the following pensions, annuities, or salaries:—

	Average over
700 Covenanted Civilians	£800 a year.
327 Military Civilians... ..	500 "
800 Europeans not resident in India	460 "
497 Uncovenanted Civilians	300 "

Again there is no Native in the list. The allowances go to a body of gentlemen who are all "absentees" from India. The system is fatal. Not only do we make the people pay our costly Executive four or five times the remuneration of native agency, but this Executive renders, on the average, an active service of not more than twenty-two years, and has then to be pensioned off in the costly way we see. Under this system, the people have to renew our Executive every twenty years, pensioning off its predecessors upon immense "absentee" allowances. Now, Sir Richard Temple, and the class he represents, will tell the nation that nothing could be more healthful, and that nothing could work better for the well-being of India, than the continuance of this system. The result of it is that the masses of its people are in a state of wretchedness too abject to be described. But then, as Sir Richard will tell you, the people have ever been accustomed to starvation. Like the eels, they have got used to skinning.

THE extent to which we have carried our efforts to exclude the people from all part in the management of their own affairs, is strikingly shown by the fact disclosed in the same Return, that out of the 16,500 subordinate appointments to

which salaries of from Rs. 1,000 a year to Rs. 20,000 are attached, we have contrived to monopolize no less than 6,341 for ourselves. We need hardly say that these 6,000 English appointments out of the 16,500 include nearly all the higher and more valuable of them. Every one who has lived long in India knows that the people are *never* thought eligible for an appointment when the salary happens to be a good one. For an appointment of Rs. 500 or Rs. 600 a month, the Native is practically out of the running. Now, Indian reform means a grapple in earnest with the selfishness that has set up this system, and that will maintain it to the last. It is idle to look for any reform from the Indian Government itself. Stringent action in this country will be necessary to overthrow it. Instead of parliamentary reports and resolutions, statute law must change the system altogether. In particular should the nation insist that no more native territory should be annexed and brought under this direct and blighting rule. Wherever possible, territory should be given back to Native rule, under proper precautions. Calcutta will resort to extremities to prevent it, for it means the loss of patronage and that mysterious thing which they call prestige. *

THE comments of the English Press upon the annexation of Tunis by the French might well induce a stranger to suppose that nothing could be found to resemble it in our own conduct towards neighbouring States weaker than ourselves. We are to put no more faith, it seems, in French moderation or French promises. France under the Republic is still what she ever was. . Unscrupulous, overbearing, and determined to extend her borders, she made up her mind that Algeria wanted "a scientific frontier," and that the Bey should furnish it. We cannot say that this indignant sensitiveness is out of place; we share it ourselves; but knowing as we do how infinitely worse has been our own course in India to the Native Princes of that country, we wince a little when we read these uncompromising denunciations of our French neighbours.

THERE is nothing but utter ruin before the people of India under our present administration. Every one knows, professes to lament, and even to regard with alarm, the constant increase of the Home Charges. The Afghan war—the cost of which we unhesitatingly throw upon the people of that country, who had no more to do with it than the man in the moon, will increase the Home Charges by a full million sterling a year. The authors of the war admit that it is to cost about £20,000,000, of which sum Mr. Gladstone has resolved that this country shall contribute £5,000,000. But these £20,000,000 represent only the immediate, palpable, direct, outgoings from the Treasury, in the prosecution of the war. Before the army is reorganized, the arsenals replenished, and the vast expense which follows upon great military operations, in bringing the departments back to their normal condition in peace, the war will have cost nearer £40,000,000 than £20,000,000, as the former war did. The money has been virtually borrowed from the capital of this country, at 4½ per cent. If we take the official estimate of £20,000,000 as the real cost, the people of India have now plainly £1,000,000 sterling a year permanently added to the already exhaustive drain of the Home Charges. If Lord Lytton received his real deserts for this war, he would be impeached, in common with the leaders of the ex-Ministry. As it is, its authors dare stand up in Parliament to defend the crime, there not being enough moral earnestness in our political life for their successors to demand their punishment. And that admirable Council of fifteen in Downing

Street, whose part in the solemn farce of our rule is to protect the Indian Treasury from the ceaseless robbery that goes on, consents not only without protest to the fastening of the cost of the war upon the wretched people, whose material sufferings therefrom have already been so cruel, but positively "ornaments" the wrong by voting "life pensions" out of the Indian taxes, to the military leaders of the great raid. It is impossible to speak in too scathing terms of such a transaction, while not a voice is raised against it in Parliament. Hypocrites that we are, even our religious men can see nothing wrong in robbing the miserable people of India in this way to save the English Exchequer, while they are shocked to death that the Government should ease the burdens laid upon the people, by making Chinese vice contribute thereto, through our excise upon opium. .

If the people of England desire, as they undoubtedly do, that the relations of the Empire with the independent or semi-independent Powers that lie along the borders of its colonies and dependencies, should be purged of the stain which now rests upon them in all directions, there is but one way of effecting the reform. Instead of permitting the Crown to decorate and reward the officials who come home with their skirts full of the blood which they have made the nation shed in their criminal enterprises, the people will insist upon their being impeached, in every case where there is *prima facie* ground for charging them with having misled the nation. What well-informed man to-day has any real doubt of the long course of practical deception followed by Lord Lytton to persuade the nation that Shere Ali was impudently defying the Government of India to hostilities, and actively intriguing with Russia to attack us on our north-west frontier? The falsehood was as absolute as it was possible for human speech to be. Himself bent upon extending our empire to the Oxus, and reducing Shere Ali to the position of a feudatory Prince, he systematically concealed his course from the nation, and plunged it into war.

In the same way, Sir Bartle Frere and his accomplices in the Zulu, Basuto and Boer Wars deliberately deceived the nation by their despatches; and it is only in the lurid light of war that we find out the utter injustice of their proceedings, and the deception they have practised upon their country. Until such men are visited with something more than recall from their appointments only to be petted by the Court, we shall never see the end of these crimes, nor of the sacrifices and sufferings they entail upon ourselves and the races subject to us.

On the subject of the Home Charges and the silver difficulty, we can well understand some of our readers thinking that the difference between "drawing" and "remitting" could not possibly effect what we affirm it would. They forget that the change would be accompanied by the India Office negotiating the remittances, as every bank and merchant does his and its own, without taking the world into its confidence as it now does. It is a forced and unnatural procedure altogether for the Government to put up to auction in London every fortnight, half a million sterling of "coined" silver, to compete with the supply of billion that comes from America in the ordinary way of trade. If the Government has silver to sell, it should sell it in India, where it is in urgent demand, and not here, where there is no demand for it at all, but what is artificially created by the operations of the India Office and the Indian Exohango banks. We are right in this matter, and our readers will forgive our dogmatism about it. The greatest exchange authorities we are acquainted with personally, speak as positively as ourselves of the effects

of the present mode of financing upon the exchange value of the rupee. A wiser and a natural mode of remittance would change the aspect of the market at once. It must be remembered that silver was driven down below its normal price for generations, by the flooding of the market in 1876-77 by Germany. To enable it to rally, the Indian Government should go out of the London market (silver) altogether. It ought never to have gone in. How can any one, upon reflection, think it wise for the Secretary of State to offer his coined silver for sale in the cheapest market, deliberately forsaking the dearest one, which is India? This is the first obvious error. The second is the doing unintelligently, as by steam, a work that requires much attention and technical skill to effect it economically. Practical exchange operations require skill and experience for their successful conduct. We do not even attempt to make these vast remittances with care, but throw the work mechanically upon the exchange dealers, by offering at auction every fortnight what we have to sell at the other end of the world.

We say once more that had the counsel we gave the Government of India in January, 1876, when the fall occurred, been adopted, there would have been no silver difficulty at all, an opinion endorsed before we left Calcutta in 1879 by its whole banking interest. The India Office has not merely thrown away £10,000,000 sterling, at the least, by its want of financial capacity, but inflicted an amount of injury upon private interests that is incalculable. By its unwise inaction, it has vitiated the terms of every lease and contract in India, and stricken down the incomes of a multitude of men to a point at which they can barely subsist. To understand the wrong, we have only to suppose the Government of this country to have reduced the value of the Funds from £800,000,000 to about £640,000,000, and every other fixed source of income in the same way, by some perversity on the part of the Chancellor of the Exchequer!

THE AMEER-I-KABEER v. "THE STATESMAN."

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S FIAT STOPPING THE PROSECUTION.

OUR readers are aware that the Editor of this journal was being prosecuted for libel by the Ameer-i-Kabeer (Wikar-ool-Oomra) of Hyderabad, for certain statements concerning him, in our second article on the "Restitution of Berar," published by us last year, in the October number of this review. The suit was removed from the Central Criminal Court by *certiorari* to the Court of Queen's Bench in February last, Lord Chief Justice Coleridge and Mr. Justice Bowen expressing their surprise, when the writ was moved for, that a criminal suit should have been filed in the case at all, as the prosecutor was residing abroad, and out of the jurisdiction of the Court. The prosecution had good reasons for their course. They wished to evade the issue of a Commission to India to examine witnesses, while it was by means of such a Commission only, that we could possibly establish the truth of our allegations. We were advised, therefore, to memorialize the Attorney-General to stop the proceedings by a writ of *nolle prosequi*, and so compel the prosecutor to proceed by civil action, if at all. The grounds on which the application was made were stated by Counsel in the Attorney-General's Chambers on the 2nd April last; and as the case is unprecedented, and of great public importance, we now lay an abstract of the proceedings before our readers, with the Attorney-General's fiat in the case.

Saturday, 2nd April, 1881.

(Before the ATTORNEY-GENERAL.)

REGINA v. KNIGHT.

(*Transcript from the Shorthand Notes of Messrs. Marten and Meredith.*)

Counsel for the applicant (defendant), Mr. WADDY, Q.C., and Mr. BESLEY, instructed by Messrs. Shaen, Roscoe, and Co.

Counsel for the respondents (prosecution), Mr. GORST, Q.C., instructed by Messrs. Newman, Dale, and Stretton.

Mr. WADDY: I appear, Sir, in this case in support of a memorial presented to you by the defendant, a copy of which I believe has already been sent to you.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Yes, I have read the memorial and the indictment, and I have read the article in THE STATESMAN also, and I think you had better state the grounds upon which you support the *nolle prosequi*.

MR. WADDY: As you have seen these documents, I will simply say that this is an indictment for libel against Mr. Knight for an article published in THE STATESMAN reflecting on the conduct and character, it is said, of a person of the name of Wikar-ool-Oomra, a Co-Regent of Sir Salar Jung's, at Hyderabad. On the part of Mr. Knight, there is not the slightest desire to escape from the responsibility of the article which was published in a magazine of which he is editor and proprietor. He does not want to escape from the responsibility of any one single thing that is said in it, because there is not a single thing in it which is not only capable of abundant proof if the proper means were given to prove it, but which is not, in point of fact, notorious at this moment in India, and has not been printed, I believe I shall be in a position to show, and published throughout India. I believe that I shall be able to show that there is not a single thing in this article that has not been published by the Queen's Government itself in India in official documents. If, therefore, the persons, whoever they may be (and it is difficult for us to find out who they are), who have instituted this prosecution, will only have the goodness to give Mr. Knight a fair opportunity, nothing will delight him more than to prove every word of this statement for which he is now indicted.

What I complain of in this matter is that it is a deliberate attempt to abuse the criminal procedure of the country, for the purpose not of getting at the truth, but for the purpose of keeping back the truth. If there had been a civil action brought, Mr. Knight would then have had an opportunity of proving the truth of the article for the benefit of the English public. Under these proceedings he has not got that opportunity. If there is a *bonâ fide* desire on the part of the persons behind this prosecution to get at the real truth in the case, why on earth was there not a civil action? That is a question which has been asked already in court by higher authorities than myself, to which I will refer in a moment. I can see many reasons why there should not be a criminal action; I can see none why there should not be a civil one. The difference between a civil action and a criminal one, as you know very well, Sir, is, first, the fundamental one that in a civil action I, on the part of the defendant, should be forced to prove that the publication is matter of public interest. Can there be any difficulty in that matter in this case? Not the slightest. You have read the article, and it is clear that if the statements there made are accurate and true, it is for the public interest that they should be published to the world. Nothing could be more for the public interest than that if such a shameful state of things as is described in this article exists, this country should be made alive to the fact. Therefore, that cannot be the reason why the civil remedy has been abandoned, and the criminal one has been chosen.

But there is a very good reason from their point of view why they have abandoned it, and why they have chosen the criminal form of action—but a very bad one in the interests of justice—and it is this: If they attack Mr. Knight civilly, he can prove the whole of his case; by attacking him criminally, they know that it is impossible for him to do so, and they have chosen the criminal indictment, in preference to the civil action, for that purpose and for that purpose alone. I have no hesitation, Sir, whatever in stating that that is my conviction, and I believe that I shall make it out in a very few words indeed, to your satisfaction.

Before I come to that, however, there is one further question to be asked with regard to their choice of the criminal instead of the civil form of remedy. It is well established law that you have a right to take that form under certain circumstances—namely, if that which has been published (the alleged libel) is calculated to provoke a breach of the peace. That is the foundation of the law upon the whole subject. It is only the other day that Lord Coleridge was laying this principle down in the clearest possible terms. In the case of *Lawson v. Labouchere*, the other day, Lord

Coleridge demanded: "Must not libel in a criminal prosecution appear to be intended or calculated to produce a breach of the peace?" Sir H. Giffard said he thought not. It was only the reason given for the law of criminal liability for libel, not a definition of its nature.

Lord Coleridge replied, that "it was given as the only reason for the criminal liability for it."

And then afterwards, in his summing up, he said:

"The law upon the subject is clear. Historically, no doubt, the reason why defamatory observations, whether in writing or by word of mouth, by one private person against another, have been held the subject of indictment, is that they tend to a breach of the peace, and the indictment in the present case concludes, as all such indictments must, by alleging that the libel was published contrary to the peace. The reason why such private libels are allowed to be subjects of criminal inquiry is not that they are in themselves matters for the criminal law, but that they tend to a breach of the peace, which makes them of public interest, and the public interest is represented by the Crown; and so the prosecutor in such a case has a right to avail himself of the forms of a criminal prosecution in a case which, except for that reason, would be left to the Civil Courts to adjudicate upon."

Now, Sir, I need hardly point out that here there is not a shadow of pretence that we are likely by a libel in this country to provoke a breach of the peace between my client and friend, Mr. Knight, and the Ameer of Hyderabad. There is not much danger of that. The way in which it is put is this, I understand: "But you are likely to provoke a breach of the peace between this country and Hyderabad." Now, if it were possible to discuss that pretext with a grave face, the case would stand upon a very different ground. If that be the real danger, then, Sir, the motion or action should have been through you, and not through a private policeman, as is the case in this prosecution. Because, when we come to look at the prosecutors in this case on behalf of the Wikar-ool-Oomra, of Hyderabad, you will be surprised to hear that the prosecutors (the only names they dare give us) are, first, a clerk in the solicitor's office; secondly, the policeman who was made use of to serve the summons; and, thirdly, to his very great astonishment and surprise, our own printer, called as a formal witness, and then bound over to prosecute. And these positively are the nominal prosecutors in this case, on behalf of Wikar-ool-Oomra, Ameer-i-Kabeer of Hyderabad! Of course it is perfectly obvious that it is not a *bonâ fide* prosecution. I will now strengthen what I was saying a moment ago by the fact that when the *certiorari* was moved for, Lord Coleridge immediately put his finger upon this very point.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: You have no shorthand writer's notes, I suppose, of what Lord Coleridge said?

MR. WADDY: I have tried my very best to get them.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Were you present?

MR. WADDY: I was not; but my friend Mr. Besley, who is with me, was.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Are those the words Lord Coleridge used?

MR. BESLEY: I believe they were the exact words he used.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Was anybody present on your side, Mr. Gorst?

MR. GORST: Unfortunately, my friend who is with me, and was present, is not here.

MR. WADDY: That is the report in the *Times*.

MR. SHAEN: I applied to Mr. Finlayson, who is the *Times*' reporter, and I find that no shorthand note was taken beyond what appears there.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: This is Mr. Finlayson's note.

MR. WADDY: But Mr. Besley was present, and I remember the matter being mentioned immediately afterwards, and there is no doubt, I believe, that the *Times* reports exactly what Lord Coleridge said. But, Sir, the case is stronger than that. I do not need the authority of Lord Coleridge upon the point. The fact is, that this

is simply an attempt to abuse the course of justice. In a report with which you are very familiar, and which I may take to be a document with the greatest possible authority, emanating as it does from some of the most learned men in the country (I mean the Report of the Royal Commission on the Amendment of the Criminal Law), I find it laid down that "a defamatory libel is matter published without legal justification or excuse, designed to insult the person of whom it is published, or calculated to injure the reputation of any person by exposing him to hatred, contempt, or ridicule." And then there is this side note—"This is the existing law, *the criminality of libel* depending upon its tendency to produce a breach of the peace."

So that there is not the slightest doubt in the world about it. It has been held by the authorities over and over again, and is the ground laid down by the Commissioners, Lord Blackburn, Mr. Justice Stephen, Mr. Justice Lush, and Mr. Justice Barry; and, therefore, is a statement about as authoritative upon the subject as anything can be. We are, therefore, in this position: there is no reason that can be suggested why a civil action should not have been taken in the case, because they can get all the remedy they want by that means; unless, indeed, their anxiety is to stop Mr. Knight's mouth by putting him in prison—which they are not likely to effect; whereas in civil action he could give evidence to prove the justification which he pleads.

MR. GORST: He could not give evidence, because he knows nothing about it himself.

MR. WADDY: That is an exceedingly clever way of putting it, but it is not quite accurate. There is a good deal that Mr. Knight could give evidence about; but, in the second place, my friend has hit one of the very points in the case to which, Sir, I expressly wish to call your attention. This course has been adopted, we say, not only for the purpose of shutting Mr. Knight's mouth, but for the purpose of rendering it impossible for him to give any evidence at all. You have read the papers.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: I have read the article in THE STATESMAN; that is all.

MR. WADDY: Yes, you have seen that. Now I hold in my hand a document.

MR. GORST: I must intervene if my friend is going to put in evidence, because he is really asking you to try the case. If he is going to put in evidence to prove before you the truth of the libel, of course I must go into evidence to prove its falsehood, and this would be a lengthened inquiry.

MR. WADDY: I am not going to do so. One of the statements in the libel is that something which had been done with regard to the Wikar was a sentence amounting to one of complete political extinction. You may possibly remember those words.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Perfectly.

MR. WADDY: Now the question is, how can that be proved in this country? I happen to hold in my hand the official report, published in Hyderabad, by the "Resident's Press," from which those words are taken verbatim.

MR. GORST: They are put in quotation in the libel itself.

MR. WADDY: I know; and they form part of the libel complained of in the indictment.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: What is your point upon that?

MR. WADDY: That we cannot show in this country the truth of our statements. We happen to have this particular document here, but it is not published in England, and we could not prove it here; but it is capable of the simplest proof in India, because those documents are in the Government offices there.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: But what is this?

MR. WADDY: It is an official report published by the English authorities at Hyderabad, and circulated all over India by the Government of India, and seen by everybody.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: That may be a privileged communication; but supposing it is not true?

MR. WADDY: I then come to my next point, that I could prove in India—the facts upon which the report is founded. They know that I can prove it in India; they know I cannot prove it here. They know that in a civil action I could prove it, because we could obtain a Commission for the purpose. They know I can get no Commission in a criminal case. If it were a civil action, we could send out a Commission and examine witnesses at Hyderabad, and have the proofs brought to this country, when they would be admissible as evidence. But they know perfectly well that the things which it is necessary for me to prove in order to substantiate my plea of justification in this particular matter, I cannot prove in a criminal trial, because I cannot have a Commission. For instance, it would be necessary to take the evidence of Sir Salar Jung; how can I get him here? I cannot. Supposing *he* was even willing to come, or supposing that any of the other witnesses whom it will be necessary to subpoena from the highest places in India were required to give evidence; your subpoena does not run in India. Take it step by step, and you will find there is not an inch of ground upon which we are not met with difficulties, not one of which would arise in a civil action, on which account alone this oppressive course has been taken. You cannot run your subpoena in India; and if you did, you could not compel the witnesses to come; while, if you did compel them, it would require, I am afraid to say how many thousands of pounds to bring them. We cannot, therefore, possibly get to this country the witnesses who are necessary to prove that which is, every tittle of it, perfectly true and perfectly capable of proof. While, on the one hand, they can get all they want, if they are honest, by a civil action, and try the truth or falsehood of this matter; on the other, they know perfectly well that by a criminal action the truth cannot be brought before the Court. I say that they cannot justify the course they have taken in bringing a criminal action, for there is no possibility of a breach of the peace; therefore they cannot justify it on that ground; neither can they justify it on the ground that this is not a matter of public interest, for it obviously is. There is no ground, therefore, whatever upon which they can claim the right to bring a criminal indictment instead of a civil action; while there is every ground for a civil action instead of a criminal indictment. But that is not all. I have pointed out that, even if you could get these people over, the costs would be so frightful (I was going to say they would amount to £20,000, but it is impossible to estimate the sum) that they know well Mr. Knight would be unable to bear the expenditure. There is something else, as I have already pointed out, in this case. If it were a matter of public concern, the prosecution should have been taken up by the Government itself. But who is it that has taken it up? Nominally we know, and I may say that really we know, although, of course, we cannot prove it; but I suppose nobody in his senses believes that this prosecution is really moved by the policeman and the solicitor's clerk. Yet they give us no other names; they give us no security for costs, nor can we get any. There is no means by which we can.

MR. GORST: You did not ask for it.

MR. WADDY: We did not ask for it, because I say we cannot get it, and I say that this is another reason why this form of procedure has been chosen.

MR. GORST: If you did not ask for it, do not say that we will not give it you.

MR. WADDY: I say you will not, because you know we cannot ask for it; and I say that you have chosen this procedure on that very ground; and that this is the reason why you have set up a policeman and your solicitor's clerk, whom, of course, we do not ask, because they cannot give any security for costs. On the other hand, you get security for costs from us, to the extent already of £600, and then having done that, whereas we cannot get any, we are in this position: suppose we were to prove our case, from whom are we to get our costs? I have been pointing out that the costs would be positively frightful. Where are we to get them from in a criminal action? We cannot get them from anybody, and so somebody or other is fighting against us from behind a hedge.

MR. GORST: I do not know whether it will relieve my friend at all if I say that these proceedings have been directed by the Ameer-i-Kabeer himself, through his Indian solicitors. I can prove that, if necessary.

MR. WADDY: Forgive me; there is a very grave doubt about that; and forgive me also for saying that until I have that on affidavit I do not believe it, nor does anybody else.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: You must not say that, because I am sure Mr. Gorst does.

MR. WADDY: Yes, I dare say they have persuaded him, but nobody else who has not the sweet and trusting nature of my friend would believe it for a moment. In point of fact, it is not the fact, as we believe; but if it be the fact, look how much worse that makes it. I will take it that the Ameer is the real prosecutor. Is he coming over here to be cross-examined? Does any human being believe that he will come? Does my friend Mr. Gorst undertake to produce him?

MR. GORST: I am surprised, but I will not interrupt you.

MR. WADDY: The idea that he will come here to be cross-examined with regard to these charges is preposterous. He is Co-Regent of Hyderabad. He will not come over here, and we cannot compel him to come, and shall never see him. But if we had a civil action, we should be able to do two things. We should know who our opponent really was, and we could compel him to give security for costs. That is one thing we could do, and that is just. The second thing, which is bare justice to us, is that we should be able to have our commission go out to examine him and our own witnesses, and to bring our documents and to get our defence in order, and when that is done we are safe and they know it.

There is no precedent, Sir, for such a case as this. There is no attempt here to instigate the subjects of this Ameer-i-Kabeer to revolt against him, because there are two of them Co-Regents, and Sir Salar Jung is the senior of the two, and is spoken of in terms of the highest praise in the article. With regard to the bad character of this other man we shall do him no harm here, because there is not a word in the article that has not been printed throughout India, and we do not provoke a popular disturbance against him, so that that does not meet the point of law.

On these grounds we say, Sir, that you ought to interfere in the exercise of your discretion and authority. We say that the name of the Crown is being used for oppression and to stifle justice. We say there is not a single thing that can be got by this criminal suit which could not be got by means of a civil action. But it is impossible for the case to be tried upon the lines upon which they are now endeavouring to fight it, and I only ask that you should refer them to their proper remedy, not for the purpose of stopping the proceedings (although I believe it will have that effect, as they will not go on when we can fight them fairly), but solely for the purpose of enabling us to get before the Court, whichever it may be, that shall try this case, the whole of the facts, for the purpose of substantiating the truth of every word in this article.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: This is a case in which I think the defendant ought to have an opportunity of pleading justification, and of proving his plea if he can. Now if a civil action were brought he could, and he could get a commission issued. But with an indictment he cannot. What is in my mind is that by taking one course you deprive the defendant of all practical opportunity of proving his plea; taking the other, you afford him a reasonable, though expensive, mode of doing it. Will you direct your observations to this point: what is the advantage of the indictment over the action?

MR. GORST: Very well, Sir. My friend says why do you not bring an action? My answer is, it will give us no redress. We cannot get damages from Mr. Knight. We do not want damages.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: I suppose the Ameer does not want revenge?

MR. GORST: No; what he wants is to put a stop to the repeated publication in a

journal, like this STATESMAN, of libels which he believes are calculated to produce a breach of the peace in India.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: But surely if Mr. Knight had a verdict given against him in an action and had to bear the costs, they would be in themselves a tremendous fine in an action of this kind. How do you say he could prove the truth of his libel in this case in an indictment, asking you, of course hypothetically, to assume the possibility of proving it, where are the means?

MR. GORST: There are two principal allegations in this libel. One is an allegation that the Ameer was guilty of procuring an attempted assassination—that is to be found at page 461. Mr. Knight says: "On the 15th of March, 1859, as Colonel Davidson, the Resident, was leaving the Nizam's durbar, arm in arm with the Nawab Salar Jung, a Rohilla named Johangeer Khan discharged a carbine loaded with slugs at one of them, fortunately without effect on either the one or the other, though one of the Minister's retinue was wounded, and then rushed forward with a drawn sword. Captain (now Colonel) Hastings Fraser, one of the Resident's assistants, drew his sword and threw himself in front of Colonel Davidson, but the assassin was almost immediately cut down by the Nizam's Guards. As he was killed on the spot, his secret perished with him. All that was known about him was that he was a retainer of the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra. In this case nothing more can be said than was expressed by the Viceroy, Lord Canning, in the message of serious admonition which he conveyed to the Nizam in a letter to the Resident, dated the 2nd of April, 1859, No. 1,511. 'The criminal is beyond the reach of justice. It may be that he was a single fanatic without instigators or accomplices.' It may be so."

Now take that example. The defendant says, "I will prove that; I will prove it with the insinuation contained in the indictment."

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Yes, assuming that it means all that.

MR. GORST: Assuming that it insinuates that he incited this fanatic to murder the Resident, the defendant says, "I can prove that," and he has put a plea of justification on the record. Colonel Hastings Fraser, who was present and probably can give as good evidence as anybody upon the subject, is in England, and could be called, and if called, I venture to say he would absolutely prove the falsehood of that statement.

MR. WADDY: Yes; but supposing the defendant says, Yes, but all that I have said is that he was a retainer of the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra. Colonel Hastings Fraser does not know anything at all about that. We should have to prove that by the person who employed him. I do not know that Mr. Fraser would know that the dead man was a retainer of Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra.

MR. GORST: As a matter of fact he was not a retainer of the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra. He was a retainer of his son. He was not a retainer of the Wikar's at all. All these facts are set out in official documents accessible to Mr. Knight, and which, if Mr. Knight had read before he wrote this article, he would have known that what he was about to say was false.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: But look at the position I am placed in. Of course your view is that these statements are untrue. On the other hand, the defendant has a right to assume the other view, and to say, "I wish to have a chance of proving my innocence, and of proving therefore that these statements are true." I think you will admit that is his right, although he may fail; and on reading through this article there appeared to me some things of which the proof only could come from India. How is he to prove his case then?

MR. GORST: Ought he then to write these things that he is not in a position to prove?

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: But what is in my mind is, that he is or may be in a position to prove them if you would give him the legal means of proving them. You have said that Mr. Waddy's application is exceptional, but you must please

recollect it is a very exceptional thing for a Sovereign to go to a police-court, and put a man on a criminal charge. I am sure it would be repugnant to your mind that a man should not have an opportunity of proving his innocence in consequence of the method of procedure. I agree on the other hand it is a strong thing to stop a prosecution.

MR. GORST: Supposing he found himself in that position when this prosecution was preferred against him, ought he not to have thought of all this before he put on the record a plea of justification?

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: No, because on the hypothesis he thinks it is true. He would admit moral guilt if he said, "I admit this is untrue;" and he says, "If I do not say it is true, I shall admit it to be false." You would scarcely expect any man, however wanting in morality, to do that; and you are assuming against the defendant that he is a person who would take that course. I rather appeal to your sense of justice to assume that he is an enthusiastic man, who has written a political article, and who says, "I think it is true, and I will undertake to prove it." Then a criminal charge is brought, and then he says, "Now I am prevented from proving my plea, because I can have no commission; nor can I have any subpoena which will enable me to bring the witness by which I say I can prove my plea of justification."

MR. GORST: My idea is that no commission would be of any service even in a civil action, because you could not enforce any subjects of the Nizam of Hyderabad to obey a commission from any of the English Courts.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Yes, but the commission could go to India, and could, of course, examine any European and volunteer witness.

MR. GORST: But how can you get the evidence of any subject of the Nizam of Hyderabad to give evidence? and still less, how can you get the Ameer himself? they are completely outside the jurisdiction of the Court.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: I do not know that, if the Ameer was a party on the record, because the Court would not permit the action to go on if he refused to give evidence.

MR. GORST: Possibly. However, the Ameer says that these articles are absolute falsehoods.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Although there is a reporter present I am speaking very frankly to you and telling you what is in my mind. I am very unwilling, on the one hand, to exercise a power which is almost an arbitrary power, and one involving great responsibility; but, on the other hand, I am almost appealing to you whether you would wish to deprive the defendant of any fair opportunity of proving his case, and for this reason: What is the victory to the Ameer in a case of this kind if the result is that you take a course in which there is no possibility of raising the issue fairly on the part of the defendant?

MR. GORST: Quite so; and I am most anxious in any way that could be pointed out to remove that difficulty. I would, on behalf of the Ameer, give the defendant that opportunity if I could, but then I think it is a defect in the English criminal law, which cannot be avoided. I am sorry for it, but how can I help it? If I could allow official reports to be read that would be another matter, but I cannot.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: May I make the peace almost between you in this way, although I have no power to carry it into effect. Supposing the defendant here gives an undertaking, which will amount to that which you have said is your object, namely, to stop those articles being written—if he gives you an undertaking that he will not write any more of these articles until any action that you think right to bring is tried, will you undertake to bring a civil action?

MR. GORST: I do not think the Ameer would consent to bring any civil action from what I know of him.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: I mean what is the difference between that and going into a police-court? Why not agree to bring a civil action?

Mr. Gorst: I do not think there is any precedent for your exercising a jurisdiction of the kind that you are asked to exercise in this case. I find the general reason for *nolle prosequi* being entered is that there is a civil action pending for the same case, and then the Attorney-General does not enter the *nolle prosequi* without calling the parties before him, and putting them to their election as to whether they will go on with the civil action or the criminal action. There are also cases where the Attorney-General has entered a *nolle prosequi* because it is clear that the indictment is not sustainable against a particular defendant. As, for example, indicting a surgeon for refusing to be a constable; also where repeated vexatious indictments for the same cause have been brought by the same prosecutor against the same defendant. There was a case in Sir William Blackstone, page 545, which was a prosecution by a French ambassador.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: But do you not find in the books the general statement that *ex debito justitie* the Attorney-General has the power, if he thinks injustice would be done by employing the criminal law, to enter a *nolle prosequi*?

Mr. Gorst: I think he has almost absolute discretion, but I do not think there is any precedent for such a use of that discretion as this in principle. The Attorney-General's discretion is absolute. You might enter a *nolle prosequi* even in the case of a murderer who was sent for trial to the Central Criminal Court, and nobody could prevent it.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Yes; but although that is possible, still that is not an exercise of the discretion in the sense of what is within the bounds of propriety. I should like to have the authorities brought before me, if you could search for them (if not, I will search for them), with regard to what the principle is upon which the Attorney-General with propriety can proceed to enter a *nolle prosequi*. No doubt Mr. Gorst is right that the Attorney-General is lord of the position, and that even in a case of an attempt to murder the Queen he could enter a *nolle prosequi*, but that is not a practicable exercise of the power. I myself think that the Attorney-General has the power whenever he believes that it would be a violation of justice to allow the criminal proceedings to proceed. Then what is the difference in causing parties to be put to their election between criminal proceedings or civil action, and saying "I find you have a remedy by civil action which is a just, and that the remedy by indictment, is an unjust one?"

Mr. Gorst: I do not think there is any precedent for it. The principle upon which *nolle prosequi* is entered is that it is vexatious to pursue a man by two different remedies at the same time. Then the Attorney-General cannot stop the civil action, but he can stop the criminal one, and therefore he does so. I must say that so far from being an abuse of the criminal process, I think the Ameer has proceeded strictly according to the law of England, and if there be a hardship about it, it is not brought about by the Ameer, but by the law itself.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: I do not know how the law is to blame. How can the law issue a commission in a foreign country in any criminal case?

Mr. Gorst: There are cases in the books where a person has been prosecuted for libelling the Emperor of Russia, and in another case for a libel on Marie Antoinette. Lord George Gordon died in prison for that.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Yes, poor fellow, he did; but it was a cruel murder—he was eight years in prison.

Mr. Gorst: He was, and he died there. Then the Editor of the *Courier* newspaper had a fine of £100 and six months' imprisonment for libelling the Emperor of Russia.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: But were not all those cases commenced with the sanction of the Government?

Mr. Waddy: Was it not an incitement to assassination?

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Was not that done in vindication of an alliance be-

tween one Government and another? I think you will find that the case of Lord George Gordon was.

MR. BESLEY: In this case, looking at the depositions, I find that the only summons before Sir James Ingham was for an ordinary charge of libel.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: My impression is that, in these cases where the head of a foreign state is concerned, the indictments have always been instituted at the instigation of the Government.

MR. WADDY: And this case differs from them all, because it is conceded that the same publication has taken place in the Amcer's own country in India, and the Amcer does not proceed in his own country.

MR. GORST: That is not conceded. It is not conceded that Mr. Knight has published this in India.

MR. BESLEY: I thought you said just now that you had a telegram directing this prosecution, in consequence of the arrival of THE STATESMAN in India, and its publication there.

MR. GORST: I think it has been said before: Why do not we prosecute in India? My answer to that is: How can we prosecute Mr. Knight in India when he is residing in this country?

MR. WADDY: No; but you said the object of the Amcer in instituting this prosecution was to stop the publication of this libel in India.

MR. GORST: No. We say we want to stop this libel, and to punish the man who wrote it.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Well, I believe I understand what both you gentlemen say, but I shall be glad if you can, in writing, give me a little assistance as to the precedents—I mean where this duty on the part of the Attorney-General has been recognized. I think, if you will look at these cases you have mentioned, you will find they were all instituted on the part of the Government. If you can find any case where, I will not say a Sovereign, but any one at the head of the State, or any one in high political position, has ever proceeded by way of indictment on his own motion in an English Court, I shall be glad to see it. Then, I think, we must take it that what Mr. Waddy says is true. By Lord Campbell's Act, the person who supports a charge of libel has to give security for costs.

MR. GORST: He has to pay costs.

MR. BESLEY: If he is a foreigner he has to give security.

MR. GORST: If that is so—if Mr. Besley will take out a summons for security for costs—we will give security the next day.

MR. WADDY: How can we do that, we have nobody before us.

MR. GORST: As far as the question of costs go, if anybody will point out how he is to do it, the Amcer will give the most abundant security for any amount of costs. If my learned friend will only point any way in which it can be satisfactorily done, the Amcer will give any amount of security for costs in the event of your being acquitted.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Why were these persons bound over to prosecute—the policeman and the others?

MR. GORST: It was done by the people at the police-court. They must bind over somebody, and there was no one else they could get hold of.

MR. WADDY: And so bound over a man, the solicitor's own clerk, who, upon cross-examination, said: "I know nothing as to who inspires this matter."

MR. WADDY: I find the only ground on which this indictment was granted was nothing at all with regard to stirring up war, but simply that it was a false and defamatory libel.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: What is that you are reading from?

MR. WADDY: The recognizances. And the prosecution has really imported all this about stirring up war since they were before Sir James Ingham.

MR. GORST: I can tell my friend that he is totally wrong. I was there myself and I raised this point.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: If it is a committal on the ground of stirring up war, I should be more disposed to grant a *nolle prosequi* than if it were not, because if it is for stirring up war, a private person should not proceed for that purpose, but the responsibility of such an indictment as that should rest upon the Government. Therefore, I should argue against you both in that sense,

MR. BESLEY: But here is the charge on the indictment. There is the record, and on the record they have put in that for which they got the committal, and then they add to it a count for which the Government alone can interfere.

MR. GORST: Then I will strike out that if the Attorney-General likes.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: I have told you what is in my mind, namely, that it is exceptional to put a defendant in the position where he cannot call these witnesses who reasonably would be supposed to be necessary in order to support his case. The consequence would be this, that directly the jury came to the conclusion that it is a libel, he would be placed in this position, that he must be found guilty. If you gentlemen would kindly give me in writing any precedents on the matter, I will endeavour to give my decision upon it. I can only say it is a responsibility I wish I had not to bear.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S WRIT.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.—QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.

THE QUEEN v. ROBERT KNIGHT.

WHEREAS, on the 12th day of January, 1881, a Bill of Indictment was proffered against Robert Knight, of No. 11, Haroldstone Road, Earl's Court, and No. 332, Strand, both in the County of Middlesex, Journalist, for having on the 1st day of October, 1880, unlawfully and maliciously written, printed, and published, or caused and procured to be written, printed, and published in a certain publication, called THE STATESMAN, a certain scandalous, malicious, and defamatory libel, entitled "Restitution of Benar," containing in a certain part thereof divers scandalous, malicious, and defamatory matters and things of and concerning Wikar-oal-Oomra, Ameer-i-Kabeer of Hyderabad, a certain independent Indian State in friendship and union with our Sovereign Lady the Queen, and under her protection as Empress of India;

AND WHEREAS, on the 12th day of February, 1881, the said indictment was ordered to be removed by *certiorari* from the Central Criminal Court into the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice;

AND WHEREAS the defendant has prayed me to exercise the discretion vested in me by law of directing a *nolle prosequi* to be entered upon the said indictment;

AND WHEREAS I have been attended by counsel for the parties who have caused the indictment to be preferred, and by counsel for the defendant, and having duly considered the various documents and matters which have been laid before me, it appears to me not to be necessary for the ends of justice to continue the prosecution;

THESE ARE, THEREFORE, to authorise and require you forthwith to enter, or cause to be entered, a *nolle prosequi* in my name upon the said indictment, in order to discharge all further proceedings thereupon against the said Robert Knight, and for so doing this shall be your warrant.

Dated this 3rd day of June, 1881.

(Signed)

HENRY JAMES, Attorney-General.

To F. COCKBURN, Esq., Her Majesty's Coroner and Attorney, in the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice.

SIR COLIN CAMPBELL AND THE PUNJAB CAMPAIGN, 1848-49.

COLIN CAMPBELL, Lord Clyde, may be considered as the last of the many distinguished officers brought up in the school of Sir John Moore. Sir John Moore was a soldier who laid his country under numerous and heavy obligations, but chief among them, perhaps, was the creation of the regimental system. When this country entered upon its long contest with the French Republic, the British Army had fallen into an almost incredible condition of indiscipline and confusion. There was no system of drill common to the whole Army. Regiments were manoeuvred on parade according to the taste and discretion of the individual who chanced for the time being to be in command. And when two regiments were required to exercise together, their commanding officers had to meet the day before and agree upon the movements and the words of command. The first attempt to rectify this singular state of things was made by Sir Henry Dundas, who was, for a brief period, Commander-in-Chief of the Army. He compiled a drill-book, which, at the time, was considered a great achievement, and is referred to in language of high commendation by Thomas Graham (afterwards Lord Lynedoch) and other distinguished soldiers. But the system of manoeuvres in this book was found, in practice, to be so difficult to master and so complex in execution, that some simplification was indispensable. For this purpose a standing camp was established at Shorncliffe, of which Sir John Moore was placed in command, and which, for several years, was the training ground of the whole British Army. Moore introduced ease and simplicity into Dundas's drill-book, and created the British Army which, subsequently, Wellington made use of to drive the French out of Spain.

In the camp at Shorncliffe [we learn from the author of Lord Clyde's biography, recently published] Sir John had introduced a system of instruction and interior economy such as had produced in the regiments serving under his command an excellence which had borne the test of trial in the varied phases of the great Peninsular struggle, and had left a permanent mark on the service at

large. The existing regulations of the Army are founded on the principle of Sir John Moore's system; and it is not too much to assert that any body of British troops, instructed and commanded in like manner, will assuredly produce the same rich return for the care bestowed upon them, as did the noble regiments which had the good fortune to be trained under the hero of Corunna at Shorncliffe. Their traditions and *esprit de corps* survive to this hour, a fitting tribute to the memory of that accomplished soldier. There was no secret in his method. The officers were instructed, and shared their duties, with the soldiers; and, by the development of the company system, under which the captains and subalterns were brought into intimate relations with the non-commissioned officers and privates, and a feeling of confidence engendered between the several ranks which, far from producing familiarity, had the effect of creating an interest on the part of the officer in the soldier, and of calling forth a responsive and willing obedience from the latter, who soon learned to look upon his officer as the protector of his interests and his best friend.

An anecdote recorded of Sir Colin Campbell in this biography may be cited as evidence that the foregoing description of the results of Sir John Moore's system is no exaggeration of the facts. In the spring of 1857, Sir Colin Campbell being then Inspector-General of Infantry, the incident occurred.

While [so runs the narrative, in Sir Colin's own words] I was inspecting the dépôt at Chichester, I noticed that an old man, evidently an old soldier, though in plain clothes, was constantly on the ground, and apparently watching my movements. At the end of the inspection, as I was leaving the barrack-yard, he came towards me, drew himself up, made the military salute, and with much respect said, "Sir Colin, may I speak to you? Look at me, sir; do you recollect me?" I looked at him, and replied, "Yes, I do." "What is my name?" I told him. "Yes, sir; and where did you last see me?" "In the breach of St. Sebastian, badly wounded by my side." "Right, sir." "I can tell you something more. You were No. — in the front rank of my company." "Right, sir." I was putting my hand into my pocket to make the old man a present, when he stepped forward, laid his hand on my wrist, and said, "No, sir; that is not what I want; but you will be going to Shorncliffe to inspect the dépôt there. I have a son in the Inniskillings' quartered at that station, and if you will call him out, and say you knew his father, that is what I could wish."

It requires no great strength of imagination to realize what a tremendous power for confronting danger and adversity there must have existed in knowledge thus intimate and enduring between officer and man. And to the close of his military career no characteristic is more marked in Lord Clyde than his anxious care for the lives and the well-being of the men under his command. No selfish desire to win distinction as a dashing leader, nor even the certainty of being taunted and censured for over-caution by those above him, ever led him to sacrifice the life of a single soldier when such sacrifice was not imperative. And there are very few generals of whom this can be said with truth.

We do not propose, at present, to follow Sir Colin through his long and honourable career. For that we must refer our readers to Lieutenant-General Shadwell's biography, only expressing our regret that one, who knew Sir Colin so well, should have allowed us to learn so little of the man, as General Shadwell has done. As a rule, a soldier is the very last man who ought to be entrusted with the composition of a biography. Introspection is a practice which he never practises. He is capable of strong friendships, but if asked to explain why he liked this man or that man, the probability is that he could give no better explanation of the faith that was in him than that the man was "a good fellow." General Shadwell passed years in the most intimate relations with Lord Clyde. He was for many years in the same regiment; he was with him in China; he was on his staff in the Punjab Campaign, and again in the Crimea; and yet there is not a line in the whole of his two volumes which is stamped with the impress of personal knowledge. An entire stranger to Lord Clyde might have produced this biography of him. In the narrative of the Punjab Campaign, this self-effacement of General Shadwell is especially to be regretted. The battles of Chillianwallah and Goojerat were two of the best-contested struggles we have ever been called upon to encounter in India, and a narrative of them from an eye-witness could not fail to be supremely interesting. It is a curious circumstance that of this second Sikh War there exists no satisfactory history. A narrative of the military events was written shortly after the war by Lieutenant Thackwell, but of the political causes of the war there is no connected narrative anywhere. The student of Indian history has to piece them together from Blue-books, articles in the *Calcutta Review*, private letters and autobiographies.

The future Commander-in-Chief of India had nearly completed forty years of service, and was still only in command of a regiment, when he first landed in India. He was then fifty-five years of age, and he viewed the future with a feeling of extreme despondency. "Another year!" he enters in his journal on the 1st January, 1847. "How my heart has daily wished and wearied for release from my present life!" He hoped to be able to save a little money in India, and then retire from the service for good. Almost immediately after his landing in India, he received intimation that it was the intention of the Governor-General to appoint him to the command of the British troops at Lahore, with rank as a Brigadier of the second class. The campaign on the Sutlej had not long been terminated by the decisive victory of Sobraon, and the experiment was being tried of governing the Punjab under the titular sove-

reignty of Dhuleep Sing, the infant son of Maharajah Runjeet Sing, but actually by an English Commission, of which Sir Henry Lawrence was the chief. Unhappily for the Punjab and for this country and all India too, this experiment had never fair play given to it. It was held to have failed when the second Sikh War broke out; whereas, had there been any real insight of statesmanship in Lord Dalhousie, he would have perceived that this second war gave to the experiment a far fairer promise of success than it previously possessed. In its inception it was premature, because the Khalsa Army did not admit that they had been fairly beaten in the campaign on the Sutlej. The Sikh soldiers knew that at the battle of Ferozeshuhur, at least, it was the treachery of one of their own sirdars—Tej Sing—and not the prowess or skill of their adversaries, which had snatched victory from their hands; and it was all but inevitable that they should, once again, test conclusions on a battle-field. After the second Sikh War, if the independence of the Punjab had been preserved, not only should we have escaped both the Indian Mutiny and the recent war in Afghanistan, but we should have founded in the Punjab an independent State, trained and exercised under our superintendence in the practice of self-government, which, in profession at least, is the ultimate goal of all we desire to accomplish in India. But Lord Dalhousie was a man in whom the instinct of Imperialism was strong, and the power of imagination extremely weak. He argued as so many Indian administrators before and since his day have argued.. The English have proved their capacity for government by making England the great country which she is; the Hindustances have proved their incapacity for government by the reduction of India to the state in which we found her; if, therefore, we are to make India prosperous as England is prosperous, we must replace the government of the Hindustanee by the government of the Englishman. Lord Dalhousie and his admirers carried their reasoning no further than this, or they would have perceived the absurdity of their argument, that because Great Britain, under a free government which left untrammelled the energies of her people, had become prosperous, therefore an inflexible despotism worked by English agents in a foreign country would accomplish similar results. This is the great and grievous fallacy which underlies all our reasoning with regard to British rule in India. No rational person imagines that the greatness and wealth of these islands are products manufactured by the Crown and the Houses of Parliament, and in which the people have had no active co-operation; yet in India we imagine, and Indian administrators would fain delude us into believing, that greatness and wealth can literally be

manufactured by an alien despotism without the co-operation of the people at all. But that there is among us an obstinate determination to shut our minds against the truth, we should credit the stuff which is talked to us about India by Indian administrators and official apologists, no more than we credit Andersen's Fairy Tales, or the stories in the Arabian Nights. The latter are not one whit more in defiance of nature and possibility than the former. The entire spirit and practice of our government of India hitherto has been, not merely that her people are ignorant how to govern themselves, but that they are incapable of learning—that they must be regarded as children in arms, and that we alone understand their wants, and know how to provide the things that they need.

When Brigadier Campbell took up his command at Lahore, there was little thought among the English residents that a storm was rapidly brewing around them. The able Indian administrator, although extremely proud of what he calls his knowledge of the people, rarely achieves sufficient knowledge of them to anticipate their actions by a single day. And the reason of this ignorance is, that the able Indian administrator knows nothing whatever of the people of India, and by his position in the country never can know. The only people he knows are native officials, who are hardly less ignorant than himself of what is stirring in the hearts of the non-official world, and who, if they did know, would rarely communicate their knowledge to their English superior. In addition to these officials, all that an Indian Civilian sees of the people of India are the criminals brought before him to be tried, and the dozen or twenty men in each district who think they can obtain some personal advantage by calling upon the "burra sahib." Whatever there is of manliness and independence among the people of India, whatever of genuine worth and patriotism, these never find their way to the presence of an English official, and would be utterly out of place if they did. The fact which more than any other impresses a thoughtful Englishman in India is our stupendous and irremediable ignorance of what is moving in the hearts of the people. Surrounded though he may be by myriads of his native fellow-subjects, the Englishman, apart from other Englishmen, dwells in a solitude like that of a desert. Colin Campbell, like most men when first they come to India, was more awake to the insecurity and peril of our position than those with whom familiarity had dulled the sense of danger. He found the troops in the citadel of Lahore distributed with as much disregard to a possibility of attack as if they had been in a London barrack. "The 10th Queen's Regiment," he notes in his journal, "officers and soldiers, were completely at the mercy of

the Sikh troops in the citadel, in which there were always 1,000. They might come down upon the 10th, and all within the Hazara Bagh, any night they pleased, and butcher the whole corps, officers and men, when in bed." This he proceeded to rectify at once. "I found that, with scarcely any expense or trouble, the place might be converted into a very strong post," and before the end of a week the conversion had been effected, and the Brigadier is "quite at his case."

The outbreak for which Brigadier Campbell had made his preparations was not long in coming, although Moulton, and not Lahore, was the scene of its commencement. On the 19th April, 1848, the rabble of that city assaulted and cut down two English officers—Mr. Vans Agnew, a Bengal Civilian, and Lieutenant Anderson, of the Bombay Fusiliers—as they left the citadel of Moulton after the ceremony of handing it over to Moulraj, the Governor of the Moulton Doab. This incident marks the beginning of the second Sikh War. Brigadier Campbell at once recognized its significance, and saw that unless the revolt was crushed at once, it would spread all over the Punjab. The "able Indian administrator," as is habitual with that long-sighted functionary, anticipated nothing of importance. Sir Henry Lawrence was then in England, and Sir Frederick Currie was acting in his stead.

Sir F. Currie [Brigadier Campbell notes in his diary] was of opinion that the citadel of Moulton, described by Mr. Agnew in his report as the strongest fort he had seen in India, would not be maintained by its garrison upon an English force presenting itself before it, but that the garrison would immediately abandon Moulraj. I was not of this way of thinking, feeling sure that a force without the means (artillery) of taking the place would be laughed at by the garrison, and that our troops must either remain inactive until those means arrived from Lahore . . . or retire upon that place until a more suitable season for carrying on operations had arrived; that either result would have a bad moral effect, and encourage all the idle vagabonds of disbanded Sikhs to swarm to the standard of Moulraj, and crowd round the British force thus isolated.

On the 24th July, General Whish left Lahore at the head of a small force to undertake the reduction of Moulton. Campbell saw that the force was insufficient for the work, and predicted a failure—a prophecy which was speedily accomplished. We quote from his diary:—

12th to 21st September.—Heard on the 14th, by express, that the front of our approaches had been cleared by an attack in two columns, consisting of half our force. Attack successful; but from the private accounts, it would seem that the enemy were in no wise dismayed or discouraged by it. On the contrary, they came out and assailed in small parties our advanced position, just gained at the point of the bayonet. Beyond this position, and between it and the town, there

was still an intrenched camp to be carried, behind which rose a high round mound, formerly a brick-kilu, upon which were mounted six field guns (six-pounders), which completely covered and overlooked their intrenched camp. On the 14th, Rajah Shere Sing, with his troops, went over to the enemy. This event led to the raising of the siege; but without the defection of the Rajah, the siege must have been given up, from our numbers being inadequate to carry on the duties in the trenches, and from the natural difficulties outside being far greater than we had expected to find them. . . . This suspension of the siege will give great encouragement to the enemy, and the desertion of Shere Sing will, no doubt, be followed by the troops of the Durbar at Bunnce, Peshawur, &c., &c. There is evidently the commencement of a nice little war in the Punjab.

The revolt spread rapidly. The policy we pursue in India of attempting to govern the country without the aid or co-operation of the native nobility and gentry—the men of influence and position—reduces our Government to a complete nullity in the presence of popular disaffection. The fact is that we do not and never have governed in India; we are only in military occupation of the country, and from time to time are driven to recover that occupancy right by the sword. The people who really “govern” India are the heads of the native populations, whether in our own territories or in the (so called) independent States. If these men were to declare against the Government, the British bureaucracy would not possess one iota of authority except what it could enforce by the bayonets of the British regiments. In the Punjab in 1848, the Sikh sirdars declared against us, and, in little more than a month after the suspension of the siege of Multan, the whole country, with the exception of the city of Lahore, had passed out of our control.

It was not until the month of November that the British troops were in a position to take the field, and even then the campaign did not open favourably. On the 22nd November there was a severe cavalry skirmish at the village of Ramnuggur, in which Colonel Havelock, Colonel Curton, and many other officers and men lost their lives. This was followed on the 3rd December by the indecisive action, or rather cannonade, of Sadoolahpore. And on the 13th of the same month was fought the murderous battle of Chillianwallah—perhaps the severest check which our arms have ever sustained in India. It was considerably past mid-day when the British army—fourteen thousand strong, and under the command of Lord Gough, the Commander-in-Chief—confronted the Khalsa army, under Shere Sing. It was strongly posted, with its flanks well protected, and its front covered by a thick belt of jungle which made it impossible to ascertain its numbers or the weight of its artillery. As the British forces approached the village of Chillianwallah, a

scattering matchlock fire was opened upon them from the neighbouring jungle, but was speedily silenced by our heavy guns. Lord Gough was a soldier whose splendid courage and frank, simple manners made him the idol of the soldiers whom he commanded. He was an officer of large and varied experience of war, and wanting neither in the knowledge nor the ability to plan a campaign or a battle. But he was also a hot-blooded Irishman. In his younger days, while still but a major in the army, he had commanded the 87th Royal Irish at the battle of Barosa, and there was a legend current in the army, that when closing with the French, the regiment, inspired and stimulated by their commandant, had converted their muskets into shillelaghs, and with a free use of the butt-ends, carried panic and confusion into the ranks of the enemy. The story, whether true or not, was quite in keeping with the character of Lord Gough. The sight of his enemy acted upon him like the tail of a coat dragged along the ground on one of his inflammable countrymen at Donnybrook Fair. He forgot his plans and his tactics, and thrust his troops into action, regardless only of one thing—to get at the enemy with the least possible delay. On the fatal day of Chillianwallah Lord Gough was at first as prudent and rational as any one could wish. He at once recognized the impropriety of attacking the enemy's position when the day was declining, and when the ground to be traversed before that position could be reached had not been reconnoitred. The Quartermaster-General accordingly received orders to mark out the encampments for the various divisions and brigades, and the men had fallen out from their ranks, understanding that there was to be no battle that day. At this moment some shots from a concealed Sikh battery fell near the inflammable chief and his staff. In a moment the blood of the old soldier was aflame. It was an insult he would not brook—a challenge he was bound to accept. The bugles sounded “the assembly” all along the line; the brigades were hastily formed up, and regiment after regiment was hurled blindly into the belt of jungle with such consequences as may be easily divined. The intricacies of the jungle destroyed the cohesion not only of brigades, but of regiments. The assault upon the Sikh position became, in point of fact, a series of disconnected attacks made by disorderly crowds of armed men, which were mowed down by round shot, grape, and musketry as they cleared the belt of jungle and entered the strip of open country which lay between it and the Sikh entrenchments. A brigade in those days was usually composed of an English infantry regiment, supported by two Sepoy regiments. The latter were no match for the stalwart soldiers of the Khalsa army. They were cowed by the terrific fire

they were called upon to face, and holding back, the single English regiment was left to carry out the assault alone. The Sepoys did not actually run, but they could not be got to fight; and when their English comrades, outnumbered and exhausted, were driven back from the works they had endeavoured to carry, the Sepoys, though not sufficiently near to support and assist, were quite close enough to suffer heavily in the rush of the victorious Sikhs.

At Chillianwallah, Campbell commanded the division which formed the left of the British line, the right brigade in this division being under the command of Brigadier Pennycuick, the left under Brigadier Hoggan. The nature of the ground compelled these two brigades to act in complete independence of each other, and the movements of Hoggan's brigade only were directed by General Campbell himself. Pennycuick's brigade consisted of H.M.'s 24th Regiment—the same that was cut to pieces on the field of Isandhlwana—and two native regiments. The English regiment was in a state of magnificent discipline, and went into action more than eleven hundred strong. They entered the jungle, rapidly outstripping the native corps with whom they were brigaded. The jungle broke up the line into sections and files, and grape and canister from an unseen enemy spread terrible havoc in their thinning ranks. But they pressed onward with unabated speed, cleared the jungle, crossed the open country, and, breathless and exhausted though they were by the long advance, their final rush was so impetuous that the Sikhs abandoned their defences, and for a few moments their guns were in the possession of the 24th. It was for a few moments only. The Sikhs, recovering from a momentary panic, saw how weak in numbers were the men who had penetrated their lines. Sword in hand, they swept down upon the devoted regiment; there was a fierce hand-to-hand struggle, the tulwar against the bayonet, and the relics of the 24th were swept out of the entrenchments they had so gallantly won. As they retired across the open ground, a heavy fire was opened upon them, and not only the 24th, but the whole of the brigade, must have been annihilated, if at this moment the pursuit of the Sikhs had not been stayed by the arrival of Hoggan's brigade on their right flank. As it was, the 24th Regiment was more than half destroyed. Thirteen officers were left dead on the battle-field, and ten were wounded; of the non-commissioned officers and the rank and file, 203 were killed, and 266 wounded. Better fortune attended the advance of Hoggan's brigade, under the personal superintendence of General Campbell. This consisted of the 61st Queen's and two native regiments. The latter proved to be of no service. The fire of the Sikh artillery threw them into

disorder almost immediately after they came within range. They could not be induced to re-form, but took to firing in the air and talking together, so that orders could not be given or attended to. Campbell continued his advance with the 61st alone, and captured four guns which had been keeping up a heavy and well-directed fire on the brigade.

After the capture of the second two guns, and dispersion of the enemy, we proceeded rolling up the enemy's line, continuing along the line of their position until we had taken thirteen guns, all of them at the point of the bayonet by the 61st. We finally met Brigadier Mountain's brigade coming from the opposite direction. During our progress we were frequently threatened by the enemy's cavalry, who had followed us, retaking the guns we had been obliged to leave behind us, our force not having admitted of our leaving a detachment for their protection.

In this dangerous service Campbell headed the 61st through-out, receiving a deep sword-cut on his right arm from a Sikh gunner, who, with the habitual devotion of the native artilleryman, had stood by his gun to the last. His horse also was wounded in the mouth. A bullet had broken the hands of his watch, and a second one would have finished the General's career altogether, but that its course was stayed by a pocket pistol which one of his staff had slipped into the General's pocket that morning. On the right of the line the battle had been as fiercely contested, and for the British hardly less disastrously. The cavalry under command of Brigadier Pope, seized with unaccountable panic, had, when advancing against the enemy, suddenly wheeled about, and in the wildest confusion galloped over Christie's troop of horse artillery, over their own field hospitals, crowded with wounded and dying men, and far away to the rear of Chillianwallah. A few Sikh horsemen, following hard upon their traces, got in among the guns before they could be fired, sabring officers and men in the midst of their own artillery. This heavy disaster and disgrace could hardly be said to be retrieved by the splendid courage exhibited by the 2nd Bengal Fusiliers in Godby's brigade, and H.M.'s 29th Foot in Mountain's brigade. These regiments did all that men could do in the face of tremendous odds, but they were too few in number to achieve any enduring success, and their losses were very heavy. The battle in all lasted but two hours and a half, but in that brief space the English army lost six guns and several stands of colours; while their killed and wounded amounted to 89 officers and 2,357 non-commissioned officers and privates. It was well for the shattered British army that Shere Sing and his soldiers were unaware of the deadly blow they had dealt it, or had suffered too heavily themselves to press their advan-

tages further. Had the Sikhs ventured upon a night attack, they would have found the wearied regiments under Lord Gough in no case to offer a resistance. Lord Gough was anxious to hold the ground his brigades had won, both for the purpose of securing the captured guns and for collecting the wounded. But the want of water rendered this impossible. The troops were withdrawn to the village of Chillianwallah. About eight o'clock a drizzling rain began to fall, and the men, destitute of other shelter, found what protection they could from the inclemency of the weather in the huts of the village. There was for the time an army in existence no longer. Soldiers of different regiments were huddled confusedly together. Officers know not where to look for their men; men knew not where were their regiments and brigades. A night attack would have instantly produced the wildest confusion and terror throughout the British encampment. Our artillery, crowded up with masses of infantry, could not have opened fire; the soldiers, parted from their officers and their colours, could not have been thrown into any formation, and must have been slaughtered like sheep. But an Oriental army rarely knows how to take advantage of a partial success, and, happily for Lord Gough and his troops, the Sikhs at Chillianwallah did not prove an exception to the general rule. The night passed quietly away.*

* The broken and detached character of the fighting at Chillianwallah is clearly shown in the following narratives of personal experiences. Brigadier Mountain, in a letter to Lord Dalhousie, thus describes the operations of his brigade:—

"We then formed up, and a head-quarter officer told me in passing 'Major Mackeson has persuaded the Chief not to attack to-day,' and our baggage was ordered up from the rear; but about half-past one the Sikhs opened the hall with artillery; our heavy guns were then thrown forward and replied. My brigade was lying down in line. . . . After a time the Chief passed down and said, 'Advance!' so up and forward was the word. We had what is the severest trial for infantry, to charge against grape through jungle. The Sikh had brought his field-guns into the jungle, dug trenches which were evidently fresh for his matchlock men, and supported them by cavalry. *I had not gone 100 yards before I lost sight of any superior officer, as well as of any support; but we pushed on till we had taken the last gun in our front on the skirt of the jungle. . . . After a time I got an order to move to my left to support General Campbell; thus the guns that we had taken were left to be carried off by others. I can give no account of the whole, as in such a jungle each brigade, and in some cases each regiment, had to act for itself.*"

Out of a total strength of 2,401 men, Mountain's brigade lost 840 in killed and wounded. A "subaltern" of the 2nd Bengal Fusiliers describes the part his regiment bore in the fight as follows:—

"On crept our brigade, and gaining an open space in the jungle, the whole of the enemy's line burst on our view. . . . The enemy's bullets whizzed about our heads; the very air seemed teeming with them; man after man was struck down and rolled in the dust. But a passing glance was all we could give them. And onward we went, bearing on their line with a steadiness which nothing could resist. They fired a last volley, wavered, and then turned and fled, leaving the ground covered with dead and wounded. . . . We halted, and began to collect our wounded; when all of a sudden a fire was opened upon us in our rear. A large body of the enemy had turned our flank in the jungle, and got between us and

The day after the battle, and the day after that, the rain poured in torrents, and all military operations were impossible. Our wounded, abandoned on the field of battle, were killed and mutilated by the people of the villages round and the scoundrels who follow, like vultures, in the wake of an army. At the time, these barbarities were attributed to the brave soldiers of the Khalsa army, and in consequence no quarter was given at the battle of Goojerat. The English soldiers slew every wounded man they could get at. But the charge is now known to be false. The Khalsa soldier was too courageous a fighter to stoop to such cruel cowardice as this. "Two of the 9th Lancers," says the "subaltern" from whose "journal" I have already quoted, "who were taken prisoners the other day (*i.e.*, at Chillianwallah) were sent back this morning with Shere Singh's compliments. They seemed rather sorry to come back, as they had been treated like princes, *pilawed* with champagne and brandy to the masthead, and sent away with ten rupees each in his pocket. . . . *The Sirdars are a fine set of fellows enough; it is only the rabble that perpetrate all these atrocities.*"

At daybreak on the morning after the battle, the ground was marked out for an encampment, and the army was drawn up in order. The Chief rode all along the line, and congratulated the troops on their success. "We gave him," says the "subaltern," "three enthusiastic cheers; caps flew up in clouds, and the fine old fellow, with his grey hairs uncovered to the rain, passed on along the troops, speaking kindly to all, and one wild ringing cheer went down from one end to the other." Enthusiasm, however, could not restore the shattered regiments to their first strength, and a second Pyrrhic victory like that of Chillianwallah would, have left us without an army to carry on the war. So it was determined that until Moulton had fallen, and the besieging force had joined the Commander-in-Chief, no active operations should be undertaken.

For nearly a month the Sikh and British armies continued to confront each other, with the field on which the recent battle had

the rest of the troops; another party were on our left; and we found ourselves with one light field battery, completely surrounded and alone in the field. . . . Captain Dawes' battery was the saving of us. As the cavalry were bearing down, the brigadier (Godby) shouted, 'A shower of grape in there!' and every gun was turned on them, the men working as coolly as on parade; and a salvo was poured in that sent horse and man head over heels in heaps. *If it had not been for that battery, we should have been cut up to a man. . . . This is only what happened in our part of the field. . . . The thickness of the jungle prevented our seeing what was going on anywhere else.*"

Here we find that a light field battery in support saved the 2nd Bengal Fusiliers from the destruction which overtook H.M.'s 24th Regiment. A like arrangement had been made in the case of the latter regiment; but at the moment of their advancing against the enemy, a staff officer rode up and directed the officer commanding the guns to move with them to another part of the field. The name of this staff officer was never discovered.

been fought lying between them. Entrenchments were thrown up round the British camp, as a precaution against surprise, and the Sikhs worked with unwearied assiduity, and no small degree of skill, at the fortifying of their position. Had the British army been required ultimately to storm their camp, a second and far bloodier contest would have rendered the field of Chillianwallah for ever memorable in Indian and English history. But want of food—a more relentless enemy than Lord Gough and his battalions—compelled the Sikhs to evacuate their position and move to a richer part of the country before we were in a position to attack them. The withdrawing movement was accomplished with such skill and celerity, that the British Commander had no intimation of it until the Khalsa army was beyond striking distance.

In the "Subaltern's Journal" of this campaign there is the following entry on the 12th February :—

The Sikhs have all of a sudden abandoned their strong position at Russool, and gone off to the right. The only reason that can be supposed for their evacuating a place of such great strength is that they were unable to procure sufficient supplies for their immense army. As soon as they were off, General Gilbert and a lot of officers from our camp galloped over to see it; and from all accounts it is a good thing for us that they abandoned it; as, if resolutely defended, it could not have been carried without fearful loss. First, there was a long breastwork dotted with batteries, extending for a good mile. In front of this there was a deep ravine; and close on the trench an immense barrier of thorns, which must have brought up our infantry for a time; whilst a heavy fire would have been poured into them from the very muzzles of the guns; that gained, there was ravine after ravine for a quarter of a mile, with only one or two narrow paths, and the whole raked by their guns on the heights. The sides of the ravine were all scarped down so as to be insurmountable; and to have toiled through those obstacles, all the time exposed to their murderous fire, would have been terrific work. At last came the village of Russool, on the summit of a crag some sixty feet high, sheer perpendicular on all sides, and covered with batteries; only one narrow pass up to it, where scarce eight men could walk abreast; and this could have been destroyed by them in a short time. *Of course, we should have taken it if we had attacked it; but there would have been few to rejoice at the victory.*

This last remark is not quite the idle boast which it appears to be. It would be ridiculous to deny the weight of the arguments in favour of the short-service system of enlistment; but it is equally absurd to shut our eyes to its disadvantages from a purely military point of view. Under the long-service system the regiment in which a soldier enlisted was his home for life. His regiment became the soldier's second self—even his better self—whose honour and glory and reputation for courage were dearer to him than his own life. A soldier's military career, then, was not merely a brief episode in his life, but the main purpose of his existence, and he

brought to the discharge of its duties in the presence of an enemy, a reckless spirit of devotion and self-sacrifice which cannot be expected under the present conditions of the service. The recruit now enters the Army as a stepping-stone to some more lucrative career when the brief period of his service has terminated. In the Army he obtains advantages which probably he could obtain nowhere else—good schooling, the opportunity and the means of learning some profitable handicraft—and all without expence to himself. All this is most excellent, and far be it from us to cavil at aught which humanises and brightens the life of the British soldier; but you cannot give a soldier interests and aspirations lying outside his regiment, and at the same time retain the unstinted devotion to his regiment which animated him when he never looked beyond it. Our modern infantry soldier, regarded as a man or a citizen, would, in all probability, be a much more respectable person than the great majority of those “seven thousand unconquerable British infantry” who scaled the hill of Albuera, but as a soldier, he is not worthy to be compared with them.

The evacuation of their camp at Russool sealed the fate of the Sikh army. Their artillery was far inferior, both in weight of metal and in construction, to that which Lord Gough had under his command. And the Sikh leaders had themselves acknowledged that if the British General availed himself properly of this arm, their troops would be unable to resist. Even Lord Gough, notwithstanding his Irish inflammability of disposition, could hardly repeat a second time the wild no-tactics of Chillianwallah. When again the two armies were face to face, before the British infantry was brought into action, the Sikh resistance would be crushed by the overwhelming weight of the British artillery. And so it happened. On the 21st February was achieved the crowning victory of Goojerat. At seven o'clock in the morning the British army was under arms, and the Commander-in-Chief cantered down the line, receiving the cheers of each regiment as he passed. It was a glorious morning. The sun shone bright, but not hot; against the sky line the snowy range of the Himalayas rose clear and beautiful, and the level country, rich and green as England itself, was one sheet of waving crops. The Sikh army was encamped in and around the town of Goojerat. The ground in front was a dead level, and the British army advanced as if upon parade. At nine a.m. the British artillery opened fire. Eighteen guns of battering calibre and sixty-six field-pieces tore to pieces the ranks of the Sikh army. To this avalanche of destruction the Sikhs could reply from only sixty guns of far inferior capacity. But

these they served with truly heroic constancy, and their fire did severe execution among the British guns. Two Troops of British horse artillery—Anderson's and Fordyce's—were all but annihilated.

Fordyce's Troop [writes the Subaltern] suffered dreadfully. Every shot pitched right into them; and the gallant manner in which they worked their guns is beyond all praise. Twice had they to retire to the rear for fresh horses and men, and each time as they came up again, and passed through our line, we gave them a hearty cheer; and the fine fellows waved their caps and dashed on again in advance, as if death was a joke to them.

For the space of two hours this artillery duel continued. Then the Sikh fire was all but subdued. Tumbrils had been blown up, guns dismounted from their carriages, and the gallant Sikh artillerymen were lying in torn and mangled heaps around the guns which they had served so manfully and so well. The British infantry now advanced in one long line, their bayonets gleaming in the sun, and the Khalsa army broke up and fled in confusion before them. "Two hours of *jehannum* (hell), and then ten miles of infantry," was the epigrammatic description of this battle given by one of the Sikh Sirdars who bore a part in it. It was more than mortal man could bear. The only point where the Sikhs resisted with any degree of firmness was the village of Burra Kadra. And here the fighting was very severe, the defenders scorning to surrender, and inflicting heavy losses upon the 2nd Bengal Fusiliers and the native regiments which stormed the village. Colin Campbell thus describes his own part in the engagement:—

I formed my two brigades, commanded by Carnegie and M'Leod, in contiguous columns of regiments, with a very strong line of skirmishers in front; the artillery in line with the skirmishers. When we arrived within long range of the enemy's guns we deployed into line. The Bombay column conformed in all respects to what I did on their right. In this order the artillery, twelve 9-pounders, in line with the skirmishers, and the infantry in line close in rear, advanced, the whole of them as at a review; the artillery firing at the masses of infantry and cavalry formed beyond the nullah, who gradually melted away under the effects of this fire and took shelter in the nullah. As we advanced, an effort was made by some of the principal chiefs to bring forward their cavalry to attack the advancing line; but it was evident from my position, from whence the movement could be seen in flank, that the willingness was confined to but a few hundreds. These were in front, following their chiefs who were leading. The horsemen in rear of this more willing body evidently went forward reluctantly. The infantry, who had taken shelter in the nullah, accompanied this movement in a very disorderly and tumultuous manner. These latter were in vast crowds. I caused the artillery of my division to be turned on the flank of this advance of the enemy, while the Bombay troop of horse artillery fired direct to the front. This double fire in front and flank caused them to waver, and finally to give way.

They retired across the nullah, some of the infantry stopping under cover of its banks, from whence I finally dislodged them by my own artillery, which enfiladed the nullah, and which was moved forward and placed in position for that object. I received orders to storm this nullah, but to have done so with infantry would have occasioned a very useless and most unnecessary sacrifice of life. And seeing that this end could be obtained by the use of the artillery without risking the loss of a man, I proceeded on my own responsibility to employ my artillery in enfilading the nullah; and after succeeding in driving the enemy out of every part of it, I had the satisfaction of seeing the whole left wing of our army, including my own division, pass this formidable defence of the enemy's right wing without firing a musket or losing a man. This was a very great and exceeding satisfaction to me. We had too much slaughter of human life at Chillianwallah without due precaution having been taken to prevent it by the employment of our magnificent artillery. Having felt this strongly, and having expressed it to the Commander-in-Chief in warm terms, I determined to employ this weapon against the enemy to its fullest extent whenever we should again come in contact with them; and I did so, accordingly, in the battle of Goojerat. The discomfiture of the enemy was complete. All arms, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, left the field in the greatest disorder and confusion. The rout of the enemy was too complete to admit of the reunion of any very large number of the enemy in anything like order.

The "very great and exceeding satisfaction" which General Campbell felt at the bloodless character of his movements at Goojerat is a trait of character whereby he remained honourably distinguished through life. Those who served in the Indian Campaigns of 1857-59 will remember not only the care which he himself took of the lives of his men, but the stringent instructions given to officers in command of detached columns, that they would be held responsible for every soldier sacrificed without a clear necessity. Many an ardent fire-cater of those days, eager for distinction, and little regardful of the price which others would have to pay for his V.C. or C.B., fretted at the restrictions in which Lord Clyde's sleepless humanity had bound him.

On the 14th of March the routed remains of the Khalsa army laid down their arms to General Gilbert. Colin Campbell describes this closing scene:—

They were without food, and also without ammunition—not above five or six rounds per gun. The high priest, or Gooroo, who took the chair on the right of the General (Sir Walter Gilbert), after laying down his arms, said to him in a loud and firm voice: "The injustice of the English drove me to take up arms. They confiscated my property in the Jullundhur Doab, amounting to five lakhs annually. Poverty, starvation, and want of ammunition, have obliged me to surrender. These wants have brought me here. But for these wants, we should have again tried the fortune of war." I do not regret what I have done; and I would do the same to-morrow if it were in my power." There was nothing cringing in the manner of these men in laying down their arms. They acknowledged themselves to have been beaten, and that they gave in because they were starving.

They were without money, food, or ammunition. There was nothing offensive in their manner in saying these things. Each man, as he laid down his arms, received a rupee to enable him to return to his home. On receiving this money numbers were seen to go to the bazaar to buy food, without which they had been for some days. The greater number of the old men especially, when laying down their arms, made a deep reverence, or salaam, as they placed their swords on the ground, with the observation, "Runjeet Sing is dead, or has died to-day." This was said by all of them with deep feeling. They are undoubtedly a fine and brave people.

"A fine and brave people, undoubtedly"—a people who might, under wiser guidance than we have given them, have been by this time moulded into a vigorous and progressive nation. But the "able Indian administrator" descends like a blight on every soil that is afflicted with his presence. According to *his* political quackery, the first indispensable requisite for the improvement of an Indian province is to throw the bodies and souls of the people into a degrading thralldom.

"Strong hand, high heart, are useless here."

This, so far as the people are concerned, is what British rule in India is to them; and so the very possibility of human progress is cut off at the outset by the conditions under which the "able Indian administrator" tries to persuade himself and others that he will bring it about. This functionary mistakes machinery for vital force, and neither experience nor reasoning is sufficiently potent to enable his mind to distinguish between them. If a naked Red Indian were seized and forcibly attired by a West-end tailor in a suit of fashionable clothes, the naked Red Indian, according to the official faith and practice of the Indian administrator, would be converted into a new man, inwardly as well as outwardly. When he speaks of "progress" in the Punjab and elsewhere, what he means is, that a highly-paid Government official has constructed a canal or opened a dispensary in a district where formerly there was neither. But, meanwhile, all those qualities which "mould a nation's soul" are perishing of inanition. The rich among our native subjects, deprived of a worthier object in life, are fain to seek in sensual enjoyments a relief from utter vacancy; the able and ambitious, with no work for their hands to do, are eating away their hearts in secret wrath and bitterness; while the great body of the people rise up early and late take rest, and eat the bread of carelessness, in order that a few English officials may gather the harvest of their labours, and enrich therewith the wealth of a distant land. Years ago, writing on another subject, I had occasion to refer to the effects of British rule in India, and in the remarks

I then made I had the Punjab specially in my mind. "What," I said, "we have done for India is to convert it into a gigantic prison, and until a prison is found to be an effective school for the inculcation of virtue, and a gaoler a successful evangelist, it is folly to expect the regeneration of India. Reports on her material and moral progress will, of course, continue to be written, but if we estimate the effects of British rule, not by trade statistics, but by its results on the spirit of man, we shall find that the races of India have declined in courage and manliness and all those qualities which produce a vigorous nation, in proportion to the period they have been subjected to the blighting influence of an alien despotism. There is no human power which can avail to arrest the progress of decay in a people bereft of political freedom, except the restitution of that freedom. This sentence of doom glares forth from the records of all past history, like the writing of fire on the wall of Belshazzar's palace. It is an hallucination to suppose that British rule in India is a reversal of the inexorable decree."

ROBERT D. OSBORN, Lieut.-Colonel.

EAST INDIA SERVICES.

IMPORTANT and interesting returns, as to the composition and emoluments of the various Public Services in India, have recently been presented to Parliament. The principal return gives the number of persons employed in any Civil capacity or service receiving salaries, pay, fees, pensions, or grants of public money in the official year 1878-79 from the revenues of Her Majesty's possessions in India, the amount of which is not less than £100 or Rs.1,000 for each person. This return enters into minute details, furnishing even the names of all the persons in question; but the really important documents are the Abstracts of Statements as to the salaries and pensions of persons resident in India, and the annuities and furlough pay of persons not resident in India.

These abstracts show those who belong respectively to the Covenanted Civil Service, the Uncovenanted Service, and the Army, distinguishing the Europeans, the Eurasians, and the Natives of India. A separate return gives a similar abstract as to persons employed by the Guaranteed Railway and other companies receiving pay, pensions, or other allowances chargeable on the revenues of India in the official year 1878-79, the amount of which is not less than £100 or Rs.1,000 for each person. According to the last-mentioned return the companies in question employ 567 Natives at an average annual salary of Rs.1,500, 780 Eurasians at a slightly lower average rate, and 2,593 Europeans, whose average salaries are rather more than double those of the Natives. Besides these employes resident in India there are 77 non-resident Europeans, drawing upwards of £20,000. It may, therefore, be said that the cost of an employe in the higher grades of the Indian Railway Service is equal as regards a Eurasian and a Native, the cost of a European being at least double. When we come to consider the statistics relating to the more dignified and highly-paid branches of the regular Civil Service, the disparity in the salaries payable to the various classes of public servants is far more remarkable. Drawing salaries above Rs.1,000 and under Rs.20,000 there are enumerated 7,571 Natives, 2,593 Eurasians, and 6,341 Europeans. The Eurasians

all appear in one class, but Europeans and Natives alike are divided into three classes: viz., Covenanted Civilians, Uncovenanted Civilians, and Military in Civil employment. In both cases the Uncovenanted class is by far the most numerous, but among the Europeans there are 548 Covenanted Civilians, among the Natives only ten, while the Military Europeans in Civil employment number 1,441, and the Natives only thirty-two. No Native employed by the Government of India is in the receipt of a salary higher than Rs.20,000 per annum, but two Eurasians receive a little more than that sum, as do thirty-seven Uncovenanted Europeans, while six others of the same class have salaries exceeding Rs.30,000. As drawing amounts between Rs.20,000 and Rs.50,000 annually appear 333 Covenanted European Civilians, and 166 Military Europeans in Civil employ. At rates between Rs.50,000 and Rs.60,000 are returned twenty Covenanted Civilians, and four Military men, all, of course, Europeans. Above Rs.60,000 all classes vanish, except that of Covenanted Europeans, and twenty of these exalted officials draw salaries averaging Rs.90,000 in amount. If we take the average of the amounts payable to individuals in each class of Civil employé specified in this return, we find that there are four different scales of pay, and that the Eurasian and the Uncovenanted Native are remunerated upon a similar scale, each receiving upwards of Rs.2,000 per annum. The Uncovenanted European receives on an average rather more than double the amount paid to a Eurasian, and Military Natives in Civil employ are remunerated on a similar scale, but are so few in number as to be unimportant. Again, the Military European in Civil employ receives more than twice as much as an Uncovenanted European, and draws an average salary of Rs.10,000, while the Covenanted Native Civilians receive rather less, and are only ten altogether. The fourth and highest scale of remuneration is that of the Covenanted European Civilian, who in his turn draws about double the amount of those in the grade beneath him, and has an average salary of nearly Rs.20,000. Of European Covenanted Officers, Civil and Military, at least 12 per cent. were absent on leave in 1878-79, and of European Uncovenanted just half of that percentage. The costliness of European service, as compared with Eurasian or Native, cannot, however, be fairly estimated from a consideration of the pay or salaries received by persons in active employment, and it is only after examining the statements as to pensions and annuities that we can realise to the full extent the price paid by India for the privilege of being administered by Europeans. In the list of pensions and annuities payable to persons resident in India we find 1,250 Natives, each receiving nearly

Rs.2,000 (on the average), and 171 Eurasians receiving also Rs.2,000; also twenty-five Covenanted Europeans, each receiving Rs.9,100, and 120 Uncovenanted receiving Rs.2,600.*

But there is a much more formidable pension list, viz., that of persons not resident in India, whose pensions in 1878-79 were paid at the rate of 1s. 9d. to the rupee. During that year more than three millions sterling were paid from the revenues of India to persons not resident in India as annuities and furlough pay, but of this vast sum £2,142,883 were paid to officers in a military capacity, numbering nearly 6,000. The remainder is paid to 700 Covenanted Civilians at a rate slightly exceeding £800 each, to 497 Uncovenanted Civilians at a rate slightly exceeding £300 each, and to 327 Military in Civil employ at £500, all being, of course, Europeans. Besides the above-mentioned payments a sum amounting to £403,800 was paid in the form of salaries, pensions, and grants to 865 Europeans not resident in India, including the Home Establishment.

In round numbers the averages resulting from an examination of these figures may be stated thus :

The Covenanted European Civilian	has a salary of	Rs.20,000,	with pension of	£800.
The Military European in Civil employ	„	Rs.10,000	„	£500.
The Uncovenanted European	„	Rs.5,000	„	£300.
The Eurasian or Native	„	Rs.2,000	„	Rs.2,000

Thus it appears that the European receives as pension, when he returns to his own country, approximately the moiety of the pay which he has received in India; while the Asiatic, when he is fortunate enough to get any pension at all, receives an amount just equal to that of his pay.

When the enormous disparity between the different rates of pay is considered impartially, it seems quite incredible that a large saving in Civil Service expenditure cannot be effected, without any serious loss of efficiency, by the extended employment of Eurasians and Natives, of whom more than 10,000 are already employed in the Indian Civil Service at salaries above Rs.1,000. The figures given in these returns speak for themselves, and scarcely require any comment.

DAVID WEDDERBURN.

* Besides these it is stated in the Abstract that pensions of Rs. 6,000 and upwards are received by some 160 Natives, half of whom draw Rs. 10,000 and upwards, but their names do not appear in the nominal list of pensioners, and no explanation is given as to their identity. They are described as "*Political*," and clearly are not ordinary Civil employes of Government.

RESTITUTION OF BERAR.—III.

A TALE OF SHAME.

The faith of treaties is basely prostituted by studying to overreach those with whom we treat, and to out-do them in cunning and duplicity. Let the man who excels in these arts boast of his happy talents, and esteem himself a keen negotiator; but reason and the sacred law of nature will class him as far beneath a vulgar cheat as the majesty of kings is exalted above private persons.—*Vattel on International Law.*

THE attention that has been attracted to our previous articles* on this subject, in consequence of the criminal suit instituted against the Editor, in the Court of Queen's Bench, on a charge of libelling the Amoer-i-Kaboor of Hyderabad, a suit which has just been quashed by a writ of *nolle prosequi*, issued by the Attorney-General, makes it desirable, we believe, in the public interests, that we should state, as succinctly and as clearly as we can, the circumstances out of which our burning quarrel with the Nizam concerning his Berar Provinces arose. The truth is, that the question is simply the outcome of a long course of fraud and violence; and the man is no lover of his country who, knowing the facts, would keep them from the knowledge of the nation. Nothing could be more satisfactory than our professions as to our rule in India; nothing more disgraceful than our conduct. If our own actions towards the Princes and people of India were not hidden from us by a thick veil, we should not dare to open our mouths in this country concerning Russian diplomacy, or French aggression in Tunis.

PART I.

THE HYDERABAD SUBSIDIARY FORCE, THE HYDERABAD CONTINGENT, AND THE TAKING OF THE BERAR DISTRICTS.

In the early years of last century, the Mogul Emperor, Aurungzebe, found it necessary, as is well known, to convert the more distant provinces of his overgrown dominion into semi-independent

* THE STATESMAN, No. 2, July, 1880, pp. 162—185; and No. 5, October, 1880, pp. 448—466.

Libut.-Governorships. Of these provinces, the Deccan, Carnatic; and Coromandel—territories about as large as Franco, Prussia, and Austria—were assigned to Asuf Jah, a distinguished soldier of the Mogul Empire. Eleven years later, in the break-up of the empire, Asuf Jah achieved his independence in a succession of victories over the Imperial forces. Dying in 1748, he left his vast kingdom, with his title of “Nizam of the Deccan,” to Nassir Jung, his second son. Our war with France in Europe had extended to India, where a fierce struggle was maintained for the mastery. The French had captured Madras from us, and by their ascendancy in the Deccan, had succeeded in placing their own nominees, Mozuffor Jung and Salabut Jung, successively upon the throne of the Nizam. Salabut Jung by way of return conferred large privileges on them, and assigned to them five important districts, about as large as Ireland, for the support of their forces. So real a factor had the Nizam become in the relations between the two European Powers, that an acknowledgment of his independent sovereignty over the Deccan stands as Article XI. of the Treaty of Paris, signed by Great Britain, conjointly with France, in 1763. On the renewed outbreak of the war in India, the French were driven out of the five districts, and in 1766 we induced the Nizam to sign a treaty under which he assigned these districts to ourselves under the name of the five Northern Circars. In return, we bound ourselves to pay to the Nizam a *peishcush*, or quit-rent, of £90,000 a-year for the districts. But the Nizam sought to secure from us by the treaty something of more importance than a money payment. He wanted a pledge from us which would be to him a most valuable right. The pledge was given in these words:—

The Honourable East India Company do hereby promise and engage to have a body of their troops ready to settle the affairs of his Highness's Government in everything that is right and proper, whenever required.

“Such, in return for five broad and fertile districts,” says the Resident of Hyderabad,* “was the origin of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force in its present form.” The proviso was most satisfactory to the Nizam, as it clearly plodged the British Subsidiary Force to uphold his power, and to preserve internal tranquillity in his provinces; thus supplying the most pressing want of his administration.

A breach occurred between the two Governments in the next year; but in 1768 a fresh treaty of “perpetual friendship and

* Hyderabad Administration Report, 1869-70, p. 124.

alliance," declaring "the onemies of either to be the enemies of both Powers," was executed between them. Under it, the Company retained the five districts, and renewed, with trifling modifications, the engagement to furnish to the Nizam a Subsidiary Force whenever he required it, the expense of which he was to defray. The quit-rent of the districts was reduced by the new treaty from £90,000 to £70,000 a-year.

Twenty-one years passed away, during which the Company's possessions were threatened with no formidable danger, and the importance of the Nizam's alliance was less keenly felt. During this long period, he does not seem over once to have received the assistance of the Subsidiary Force for the preservation of the internal tranquillity of his State, although he had applied for it. On the other hand, the quit-rent for four out of the five districts in possession of the Company had been paid with extreme irregularity, and had fallen greatly into arrears by 1789. The execution of the treaty had thus proved to be entirely one-sided; but no attempt, probably, would have been made to rectify it, had it not been for the rising of a serious danger on the horizon of the Company. Tippoo Sultan of Mysore was ostentatiously preparing for that fierce war with the Company which broke out in the following year. The assistance of the Nizam now became a matter of vital moment to us, and the Governor-General promptly undertook the settlement of his two grievances. He had been denied the services of the Subsidiary Force when he had urgently required them; and the quit-rent of the Ceded districts, the Northern Circars, had been withheld from him. Finding that both charges were established against the Company, Lord Cornwallis wrote the Nizam a letter, dated 7th of July, 1789, which was to be "deemed of equal force with a treaty," in which His Lordship declared it to be his "firm intention to discharge the balances" of the quit-rent, and gave a distinct pledge that, in future, the aid of the Subsidiary Force should be granted, without reservation, "whenever His Highness should apply for it." The Nizam congratulated himself that his three several treaties of alliance were at last, after much trouble and delay, beginning to operate for his benefit, as he would now be able to command the very moderate amount of military aid which he required for regulating the internal affairs of his Government.

Tippoo invaded Travancore. The Nizam responded to our call, and a new "tripartite-treaty of offensive and defensive alliance" was entered into in 1790, between the Company, the Nizam, and the Mahrattas, by which the previous treaties were confirmed, and the war against Tippoo provided for. The Company's and the Nizam's

troops fought side by side in the war for two years, the Mahrattas rendering dubious assistance. Tippoo was vanquished, and in terms of Article VI., the territory conquered from him, was "equally divided" between the Allies in 1792.

But the Nizam's resources had been severely strained by the war, and his prostration in 1795 tempted the third party to the alliance, the Mahrattas, to invade and plunder his dominions. The Nizam now pleaded urgently his general rights under the Treaty of Alliance with us dated only five years before, and also his right to the aid of the British Subsidiary Force, which was at that moment within his dominions, drawing its pay from his Treasury. He demanded, justly, that this force should help him to repel the invasion of the Peishwa's plundering hordes. But he pleaded in vain. The Mahrattas disastrously defeated the Nizam's forces at Kurdla, while, consulting our own interests only, we stood by while he had to cede a third of his dominions, pay an enormous indemnity, and even give his Minister as hostage for the fulfilment of other conditions so humiliating that they were kept secret. The Mahrattas, with a touch of real humour, ended by binding the unhappy Nizam to dismiss from his service and dominions the British Subsidiary Force, that had played the part of a disinterested bystander when he was in his extremity.*

They were troublous times, and the Nizam was quickly wanted by us once more as an ally—this time under the most serious circumstances. Tippoo Sultan was again preparing for war, and he now announced that his intention was nothing less than to drive the English into the sea. He had sent ambassadors to the Isle of France, and French auxiliaries had landed at Mangalore with the avowed object of helping him to drive us out of India. The Nizam meanwhile had fulfilled his pledge to the Mahrattas, and dismissed our Subsidiary Force. He had substituted a body of troops under French officers in its place; and Lord Wellesley feared with reason that this force would join their countrymen in Tippoo's service. The resources of the Company were, moreover, at the lowest ebb. The prospect of fighting Tippoo single-handed, led Lord Clive, Governor of Madras, to write in September, 1798, to the Governor-General, and to the Court of Directors simultaneously, as follows:—

The prospect of a war with Tippoo Sultan, when contrasted with the means this country possesses of meeting such an event, is the point which has chiefly absorbed my attention since my arrival, and which, indeed, presses with

* See Malcolm's "Political History of India." Vol. I., Chap. 3; also Duke of Wellington's Memorandum on the Treaty of Bassein, dated October, 1804.

the greatest urgency. . . . The finances of this settlement are in a far more distressing condition than I had any conception of. Our credit nearly gone, and our Treasury empty.

The Governor-General minuted regarding a previous despatch of Lord Clive on the same subject, in the Secret Department at Calcutta (12th August, 1798), as follows :—

The letter of the Governor of Fort St. George, of the 10th July, proceeds far beyond the limits of any opinion which I had ever formed or heard with respect to the difficulty of restraining the hostility of Tippoo. It is difficult to describe the pain and regret which that letter occasioned in my mind, nor could it occasion any other emotions in the mind of any friend to the British interests, or to the honour of the British name in India. If the facts and arguments of that letter be correct, it must now be admitted that the glorious successes of the last war, have terminated in no better result than to render Tippoo's power absolutely invincible, *and to place the disposal of our fate in his hands.*

The very men who had told the Nizam in *his* extremity, that the Treaty of 1790 had ceased with the peace of 1792, at once proceeded in their own distress in 1798 to urge this very treaty on the Prince, as an engagement in full force. The Mahrattas' co-operation was asked and refused. The Nizam's assistance was invoked, and again given.

It is important to observe and to remember, that it was to enable the Nizam to give us efficient aid in the approaching war with Tippoo, that the new Treaty of 1st September, 1798, was pressed upon him. The dismissal of his French Subsidiary Force was a life-and-death necessity to us. He had established it because of our own failure to aid him to withstand the Peishwa's exactions. We were compelled, therefore, in our own interest, to promise him a force that would discharge the same duties as the French one which we asked him to dismiss. It was to be a force that would fulfil, and not evade, its obligations; that would render him real, and not mock military service, in maintaining internal tranquillity in his dominions, and defending them against unprovoked outside aggression. The Nizam accepted the new treaty. He dismissed his French auxiliaries, and received into his service once more a British Subsidiary Force, consisting of 6,000 Sepoys, besides European Artillery. And the whole cost of this force, £240,000 a-year, he agreed to defray from his own Treasury. This new alliance was far more urgently needed by ourselves than by the Native Prince, and yet we contrived to make him purchase it at its full money value. However, he did not consider that he was altogether a loser; for he had secured pledges (Articles II. and III.), that the Subsidiary Force should be permanently stationed in his dominions, that its strength should never be

diminished below the above-named figures, and (Article V.) that its duty should be paramount to defend his State against outside aggression and internal disturbance. It was to "be ready at all times to execute services of importance, such as the protection of the person of His Highness, his heirs and successors, from race to race, and overhauling and chastising all robbers or excitors of disturbance in the dominions of the State." The anticipated war with Tippoo broke out in February 1799, five months after the Nizam's alliance and co-operation had been secured. The Nizam's troops, "consisting of 12,000 infantry, and a large body of cavalry, actually arrived at Chittoor in a state of preparation for the field, before General Harris (the British Commander) was ready to proceed on his march from Vellore."* By the united arms of the Company and the Nizam, the forces of Tippoo and his French auxiliaries were routed at Seringapatam, where Tippoo himself fell, fighting bravely, on the 4th of May.

The Subsidiary Force had hardly returned to the Nizam's capital from the war, when a secret design was formed to abuse its power. The Nizam fell ill in October 1799, when orders were at once issued to the Resident† to prepare another treaty altogether, containing most important concessions to ourselves, for the acceptance of the eldest son when his father's life should be despaired of. If the eldest son refused to sign it, the Resident was to *change the succession*, relying on the bayonets of the Subsidiary Force (which, it was suggested, should be placed reasonably near the Nizam's palace on the occasion), and to place upon the throne whichever of the Nizam's younger sons would agree to sign the new and onerous document. This nice scheme was spoiled by the recovery of the Nizam, who consequently never knew of this indication of the Punic character of his ally's faith, though he lived to see from other instances how little we cared for his treaty rights when his aid was no longer needed by us.

The two great and dangerous enemies of our power in India—Tippoo and the French—were thus at last destroyed. The Nizam's sword had turned the scale, and decided that a British and not a French Empiro was to arise in Hindostan. Lord Wellesley gladly proclaimed this ten months after the conclusion of the war, when he wrote to the Court of Directors that the Treaty of 1798 with the Nizam "was, indeed, the source of all our recent success in India."‡

* Governor-General to Court of Directors, 20th March, 1799.

† Lord Wellesley to Resident, 6th November, 1799.

‡ Letter to the Right Honble. Henry Dundas, 5th March, 1800.

The Nizam's "equal share" in the spoils of the war, to which he was entitled by the treaty, was, however, to be denied him. On his side, he had shown no unworthy fear or jealousy, that the ruin of Tippoo and the removal of the French would make the Honourable Company too powerful; but the Company did not reciprocate the feeling. They feared that the new acquisitions of territory to which the Prince was entitled, would unduly aggrandize him. The plan was therefore hit upon, of creating a new and independent principality of Mysore, under a Hindu prince, to deprive the Nizam of one-half the acquisitions he would otherwise receive; while he was required to surrender to the Company his remaining share in the spoils, as well as the districts which had fallen to his share after the previous war of 1792. The Company had resolved to take them to itself, upon a valuation of £630,000 a-year, which sum (after defraying the costs of collection) it was estimated, would suffice to pay the British Subsidiary Force in the service of the Nizam, which was to be augmented from 6,500 to 9,500 men. The Nizam was not blind as to the extortionate nature of this bargain; but he submitted, as the Force was at last to be charged with the undisputed duty of providing for the tranquillity of his State against all foes, external and internal, without any reservation whatever.* He congratulated him-

* The following quotations show the absolute nature of our guaranty of the tranquillity of the Hyderabad State by means of this Subsidiary Force, thus to be paid for in advance under the Treaty of 1800 :—

Lord Wellesley to Resident, 15th June, 1800.

"It is my determination not to grant the Nizam *the complete protection and support* which he solicits on any conditions less advantageous to the Company than those comprehended in the new treaty."

"The augmented revenue" (of the districts to be ceded) "might justly be claimed by the Company" on various grounds.

"Because an acknowledgment is due to the Company for *the inestimable advantages of protection and security acquired by the Nizam under the general guarantee.*

"Because this treaty grants to the Nizam, without any specified equivalent, *the new and extraordinary benefit of the Company's aid in repressing the refractory spirit of such tributaries and dependants as owe a mixed allegiance to him and to the Mahrattas.* In this view it may justly be expected that the resources of the territories retained in his Highness's hands may be improved to an amount proportioned to any excess in the produce of the countries to be ceded to the Company."

"The British Government is entitled to require such an equivalent as shall not only preclude any pecuniary loss on account of subsidy, but in some degree defray the extraordinary charges of defending his Highness's country against all enemies."

self on being at last in possession of an efficient British force of 9,500 men, even at the cost of his ceding to the Company all his conquests. He had borne his full share of the charges in both wars; and now their recompensing spoils, the districts of Bellary and Cuddapah on his southern boundary, went in 1800, in payment of the Subsidiary Force, just as the Northern Circars on his eastern frontier had gone for a similar purpose in 1766. Yet, if the Subsidiary Force should but fulfil its promises, the Nizam would not regret the sacrifice. The solitary reward which the Prince had received for his steady adherence to our alliance, and for the cost of the wars in which he had assisted us, was the guaranty by the British Government, under treaty, of perpetual and complete military support against outside aggression and internal rebellion. There could be no further claim on his Treasury for this service, as the pay of the Subsidiary Force had

"He" (the Nizam) "will be enabled, without any pressure upon his finances, to command the services of a large British force."

Memorandum of Conversations between Meer Allum (the Nizam's Minister) and Colonel Wellesley on 26th September, 1800 (Wellington Supplementary Despatches, Vol. II., page 180).

"Colonel Wellesley then asked Meer Allum what was the strength of the Nizam's army. Meer Allum said, after the territory would be ceded, and the Jaghiredars would have discharged their troops, the Nizam would have no infantry and only about five thousand horse; that he would depend upon us for protection not only against his foreign enemies, but against the host of discontented and idle people created by the late treaty" (of 1798), "and by his having already disbanded nearly all his troops.

"He said that he had always looked upon a treaty such as that about to be concluded as very impolitic for both parties; that it deprived the Nizam of territory, reputation, and power, and gave the English nothing but the burden of defending their ally against the Mahrattas, and against his own discontented subjects."

Article XVII. of the Treaty of 1800.

"If in future the Shorapore or Gudwall zemindars, or any other subjects or dependants of his Highness's Government, should withhold the payment of the Circar's just claims upon them, or excite rebellion or disturbance, the Subsidiary Force, or such proportion thereof as may be requisite, after the reality of the offence shall be duly ascertained, shall be ready, in concert with his Highness's own troops, to reduce all such offenders to obedience. If disturbances shall at any time break out in any part of his Highness's dominions, contiguous to the Company's frontier, to which it might be inconvenient to detach any proportion of the Subsidiary troops, the British Government in like manner, if required by his Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah, shall direct such proportion of the troops of the Company as may be most conveniently stationed for the purpose to assist in quelling the said disturbances within his Highness's dominions."

been provided in perpetuity by the revenues of the ceded provinces. He had got what he so much desired and needed, and he had paid in advance for all.

The Subsidiary Force was stationed in cantonment at Hyderabad. As events turned out, it might as well have been 5,000 miles away, for any adequate service it rendered to the Prince who had paid so heavily for its presence. The Calcutta Government, in a recent despatch on the subject (1875), admit that, after the first two years of its residence at the capital, it was so completely withdrawn from the service for which it was stationed there, that the Nizam could not make his authority respected even in the precincts of his own palace. Our Calcutta officials began to explain away their obligations, or to evade them, almost instantly; and in reply to his repeated and urgent applications for the assistance of the Force, the Prince was at last unblushingly told that it was stationed at his Capital merely "to contribute to his influence, by the imposing effect which its presence alone was calculated to produce," but that "it never was the intention that it should be employed in reducing his refractory zemindars, or quelling partial insurrections," and that "the British Government were not responsible for the security of his Highness's dominions against the evils of internal commotion."

Nothing, however, was better known at Calcutta than that some efficient military Force was urgently needed by the Nizam at that period to reduce his refractory zemindars and feudatories to obedience; and the purpose that dictated the keeping of the Subsidiary Force idle was soon revealed. He was told that he must allow a fresh Force to be raised, commanded by British officers, and paid from his own Treasury, to do the work. This was the origin of the now notorious Hyderabad Contingent Force, that was about to be bound upon the Nizam's shoulders: a force that became an utter scandal for the extravagance of the pay of its officers, and of every arrangement connected therewith. The world never before saw a body of armed men paid with such extravagance. The long future of agony that awaited the Hyderabad State from the imposition of this incubus upon it, had no higher object than to furnish appointments to British officers. No delicacy was observed in indicating that this new force was to be provided at the Nizam's expense, to relieve ourselves of the duties of the Subsidiary Force. The Calcutta Government had determined to call this new and rich field of patronage into existence, and that the Nizami should pay for it. That it was a fraud upon the Prince, Lord Hastings unconsciously admitted in his Minute of 19th November, 1819, when he affirmed that it was

imposed upon the Nizam "to subdue his refractory zemindars,"—an obligation of our own, expressly specified in the 17th Article of the Treaty of 1800 as incumbent on the Subsidiary Force. The British Resident himself, in a recorded letter to the Government of India, dated 22nd June, 1810, in which he proposed the creation of the Contingent at the Nizam's cost, recommended it on the ground that it would "save the British Subsidiary Force the labour" of preserving the tranquillity of the Nizam's country: and, minuting in the Secret Department, in 1822, Lord Hastings threw off the mask altogether, and deemed it consistent with British honour to write to the Resident (25th October, 1822) as follows, regarding what he conceived to be the functions of the Subsidiary Force:—

When, for our private views, the Nizam was constrained to support a body of our troops to be stationed near his capital, the then Government disguised the interested oppressiveness of making him pay a portion of our army for holding him in thralldom, by a sturdy declaration that his Highness had spontaneously sought the aid of a Subsidiary Force to secure his person and territories. The measure, however, really placed him at our mercy. It was hardly to be imagined that our advantage would not be abused; and it was abused. The independence which the very conditions of the compact recognized and pledged us to respect, was set at naught.

Against the imposition of this fresh force upon him, in flagrant breach of treaty and of the laws of common honesty, the Nizam protested as much as he dared. He flatly refused in 1803 to sanction our first insidious proposal to raise a body of Silladar Horse for him. He pointed to the huge Subsidiary Force idling in its camp, except when employed in the Company's own wars, and naturally demanded that it should be used to maintain the tranquillity of his State, for which it had been already paid by him in advance. We had no answer to give, but we had a weapon ready that would effect our purpose. We could reduce the Nizam to a cipher, exclude him from all share in the rule of his own kingdom, and set up a creature of our own as his Minister, to pay us out of the public Treasury what he himself had refused to pay. Two advantages would thereby result. We should get from his Treasury all the funds we wanted; while he would be ostensibly responsible for whatever misery might follow. The scheme was carried out in the same year. During the first few years of its operation, it was thought advisable to pay the Minister we had ourselves set up, a salary from our own Treasury, in addition to what he got from the Nizam's Government, the better to insure his fidelity to ourselves

against his nominal master.* The Nizam vigorously remonstrated against the spoliation of his State for the support of the new and extravagant Force we were imposing upon him, and he was thereupon solemnly declared to be hostile to the British Government. For the Calcutta officials construed "the maintenance of the alliance" to mean, that we had free liberty to reduce the Nizam to beggary by our exactions.

The first of our creature-Ministers died in 1808. The Nizam was again set aside, and a noble called Mooncer-ool Moolk was next appointed; but as the new incumbent, in common with all other respectable nobles, refused to make his master drink to its very dregs the cup of humiliation prepared for him, this Minister was in his turn reduced to a cipher, and a person named Chundoo Loll, a clerk in a Revenue office, was appointed by us "Deputy Minister," with the full powers of office; "so that," as Metcalfe described the position, on 13th May, 1829, "in addition to its sovereign Prince being excluded from all concern in the management of his affairs, in consequence of our interference, the State of Hyderabad now had a Prime Minister in the same predicament, as another effect of the same cause."

The device of thus getting access to the Nizam's Treasury to furnish salaries for British officers, having been once hit upon, all idea of moderation soon disappeared. A general extravagance was indulged at the Nizam's expense, that in private life would be called by no other names than fraud, and shameless breach of trust. The new force, this Hyderabad Contingent, consisted of 8,000 men, the strength of an ordinary brigade in our own army; while no less than five brigadiers and five brigade-majors were appointed to it, with other staff and regimental officers in proportion, for no other purpose than their own enrichment. And this preposterous staff was kept up throughout the thirty-six years of profound peace that followed. The British officers alone of this small force received £130,000 a-year, which is £95,000 a-year more than the officers of the very same force are allowed at this moment. Even our own creaturo-Minister (Chundoo Loll) at last winced at what we were expecting of him. He even wailed to the Assistant Resident of our exactions, during certain reported conferences in April, 1842, the perusal of which records occasioned the late Colonel Sykes, a member of the Court of Directors, such "painful feelings."† For forty years did the Cal-

* See Sir Arthur Wellesley's letter to Colonel Close, dated 5th August, 1803.

† Minute by Colonel Sykes, dated 19th November, 1851.

cutta officials keep up these extortions simply for the sake of the provision which the Force made for their friends and relations. One-third of the whole amount of the Nizam's revenues was taken every year from his Treasury, to pay this Force. So utterly out of proportion was the expense of it, compared with the means of the State, that Colonel Low, when acting as Resident in 1848, warned the Government of India (20th July) that if this "constant drain" was not at once reduced from £400,000 to £200,000 per annum, "it would bring the whole machinery of the administration to a standstill." A paper published in the *Calcutta Review* in 1849, based on a History of the Contingent written by Sir John Malcolm, tells us that the expenditure of the British Government on the Contingent was so flagitious that it had become a proverb to explain it, by pointing out that "Poor Nizzy pays for all."

As if to show how high Calcutta consciences could pile the wrongs heaped on this miserable State and its Prince, others were added. On the one hand, our Subsidiary Force of 9,500 men—the force already paid for in perpetuity—was not only relieved of its obligations, but was reduced one-fourth in numbers, without any part of the consideration money for its services being returned to the Nizam. On this subject, Major Moore pertinently inquired in the Court of Directors on the 7th of November, 1853: "By what right have we received payment for troops we did not furnish?" And alluding to a sophistical defence of the reduction which had been put forward at Calcutta, he added: "Is it becoming on our part to endeavour by specious arguments to show that 'eight regiments of 1,000 firelocks' meant, in spirit, eight regiments of 750?" On the other hand, the second Force (the Contingent), raised and paid directly from the Nizam's Treasury, ostensibly to discharge the duties which really devolved by treaty upon our own Subsidiary Force, was, in its turn, set aside from doing the Nizam's work, just as the Subsidiary Force itself had been. The *pro humanitatis causa* argument was at hand, as a cover for this further act of dishonesty. It was promulgated at a very early date as a "rule of the service, that the Nizam's army" (the Contingent), "so long as it shall be officered by British subjects, is not to obey the requisition of the Minister until the Resident has first satisfied himself that its services are to be required in a just cause."* Colonel Sykes recounts † how under the operation of this rule, the services of the Contingent were refused "when the Nizam's interests

* Sir H. Willock's Minute, dated 19th November, 1851.

† Minute of 19th November, 1851.

demanded their employment." He instances five separate and at the time recent occasions when its services were so refused, at the very time when the insatiable demands for its pay, by ruining the Nizam's people, were causing the very disturbances which the Government of India refused to quell, and when the arrears of its pay, charged against the Nizam, were building up the very alleged debt to us for which the Berar districts were taken shortly afterwards.

In 1851, Captain Meadows Taylor was deputed by Lord Dalhousie to report on the districts most eligible to be taken from the Nizam for the support of this Contingent.* That officer reported that the Nizam was unable to obtain the tribute due to him from the Gudwal Rajah, as neither the Subsidiary Force nor the Contingent troops were allowed him for the purpose, and his own irregular levies were unequal to the task. The Nizam's country thus furnished the edifying spectacle of three armies maintained to do the work of one, and yet the work not done!

Strong means were meanwhile taken to prevent the Nizam making his voice heard, while British officials were engaged in fastening this vampire Contingent on the throat of his unhappy State. Sir Charles Metcalfe, when Resident, writing on the 14th of August, 1826, explained the Nizam's position, and why he had refused to make advances from his privy purse for the pay of the Force, when the Treasury was dry:—

His view [the Nizam's] could scarcely be otherwise, considering that he has so long been excluded from any share in his Government; that every attempt which he has made to assert his sovereign rights has been crushed; and that the Prince is merely a State pensioner in his own dominions. His mind, although not naturally, perhaps, incapable of fulfilling the duties of his station, must have been affected by long depression and seclusion. Nevertheless, he is more "sinned against than sinning;" and I can hardly imagine a situation more entitled to pity, or more calculated to disarm censure, than that of a Prince so held in subjection by a servant supported by an irresistible foreign Power.

The subserviency of the Minister at Hyderabad has rendered this kind of force [the Contingent] in the Nizam's territories a sort of plaything for the Resident, and an extensive source of patronage at the Nizam's expense.

The Governor-General virtually confessed that this breach of solemn treaty, and this inhuman conduct to an old and faithful ally had only the sordid object of securing access to the State Treasury, for the support of the Contingent against the will of the sovereign, when he wrote to the Resident on 26th October, 1819, instructing him that "the maintenance of the Contingent is the essential for us," and that the Resident was to support Chundoo

* Papers "The Nizam," 1854, p. 26.

Loll (our creature-Minister) "until these troops, which we owe to Chundoo Loll shall have *taken such root* in the establishments of the country, that eventually there will be no hazard of any endeavours to reduce them." The Court of Directors had protested against the Force from the beginning, had refused to sanction its existence, and resolutely insisted on its disbandment,* averring their conviction that it was unjust, contrary to express treaty provisions, and certain to become an intolerable burden to the Hyderabad State. But the bureaucratic authorities in Calcutta were all the more resolute in their determination to maintain the Contingent. So nervous were they lest this, the very cream and efflorescence of their patronage, should, somehow, slip from their grasp, that they feared the Nizam even in his enforced seclusion; while they steadily supported Chundoo Loll in his long series of crimes against the Nizam and his subjects. On 25th October, 1822, Sir Charles Metcalfe, as Resident, was officially informed, that it would be "the deepest stain on British honour were Chundoo Loll left to the ruin which must follow the discontinuance of our plighted support" of him, against his own master! Surely the men who dared thus talk of British honour being pledged to the betrayal and pillage of an ally, and to the ruin of a State with a population of 12,000,000, should have been made to stand at the bar of Parliament to answer for the outraged honour of the nation. Twenty years later (26th July, 1842), General Fraser, as Resident, reported that the Nizam, being treated more mildly about that time, was showing symptoms of desiring to act for himself, and he warned the Calcutta Government that the first thing he would probably do, "if allowed to feel that he is really independent," would be to demand "the disbandment of the Contingent to which he is known to be averse, and neither the original creation nor maintenance of which is provided by any existing treaty." General Fraser's letter awakened great alarm in Calcutta, and on 1st October, 1842, under colour of communicating the news of the success of the expedition to Afghanistan, the Nizam was solemnly warned that he and the Minister must "act according to the counsels of the Resident, as it would be a great pity if anything contrary to friendship between the two Governments should occur."

Of course it was known to be impossible that a clear third of the gross revenues of the country could be appropriated to an utterly useless object for a long series of years, without ruin and misery to the unfortunate inhabitants. On 24th November, 1819,

* See their letter to India, dated 21st January, 1824.

the Resident at Hyderabad, Mr. Russell, describing the effects upon the whole country of the extraordinary expenses incurred, had written to the Calcutta officials :—

Extraordinary expenses must be met by extraordinary exactions. This is the sole and entire cause of the difficulties of the Nizam's Government, and the source of every oppression that is suffered by its subjects. The officers of the revenue, being required to pay to the Government more than their districts can afford, are obliged, in their turn, to oppress the inhabitants by plunder and confiscation.

Ten years later (13th May, 1829) Metcalfe indignantly denounced our creature-Minister, after twenty years' experience of his rule :—

Chundoo Loll's main object, from the establishment of his power, was to retain it. The instrument most serviceable in his view for this purpose, was money. He had money for any one whom he thought capable of aiding him. Chundoo Loll's views were not confined to English influence. Whoever could aid him at Hyderabad, whoever could injure him, all found access to the Treasury. To make friends, or to buy off enemies, was managed by the same process. All were in pay. And many who might have been active disturbers of his administration, seeing little or no hope of effecting his removal, were kept quiet by a share of the public money.

The revenues were insufficient to meet such excesses; and the expenses of a year of war, added to the increasing cost of the Force commanded by British officers, augmented embarrassment. Extortion and borrowing were had recourse to unsparingly, and to the utmost practicable extent. The former was augmented by the effects of the latter. Extortion and oppression went hand in hand. Desolation followed.

On the 20th June and 31st August, 1822, Metcalfe wrote from the Hyderabad Residency to Lord Hastings :—

There never, I suppose, was elsewhere a territory so entirely abandoned to the pillage of extortioners, seeking no end but their own illicit gain. There never can have been an administration of Government less paternal, or more careless of the good of the people and the interests of the sovereign. . . .

The power remained in his [Chundoo Loll's] own hands without check, and he had continued to abuse it without remorse. The revenues had greatly fallen from excess of exaction; the population in considerable numbers had emigrated; no confidence existed. The very resources of extortion were nearly exhausted.

Sixteen years later, this creature, nominated by ourselves, forced upon the Nizam by ourselves, and supported by ourselves, still retained the helm of affairs, when the Court of Directors commenting on the position at Hyderabad, felt themselves forced to confess (letter to India, 28th March, 1838), that Chundoo Loll's administration might "be said to exist only by plunder."

Chundoo Loll retained his office, under the determined support

of the Indian bureaucracy, five years after the above verdict had been passed on the character of his administration; and he only resigned it in 1843 after he had depleted the State by every conceivable expedient, to sustain the exactions of his British masters. It is recorded that he plainly told the Resident, "I have not tendered my resignation in consequence of the infirmities of age, but solely in consequence of the want of money;"—money to carry on the Government anyhow, and at the same time to meet the inexorable demand of £35,000 monthly for the pay of the Contingent. If any evidence can heighten the picture we have thus traced, let it be supplied by the following passage from the Minute already quoted, written by Major Moore, a member of the Court of Directors, who had been an eye-witness at Hyderabad of the occurrences of which he speaks, as Military Secretary to this very Contingent, and who ascribes all the evils in the State to this single cause. Writing on 7th November, 1853, Major Moore says:—

I well know to what shifts the Nizam's Ministers have had to resort, to meet our inevitable demand for the monthly pay of the Contingent: what evils it has been the cause of! Loans from money-dealers at exorbitant interest; farming of districts at ruinous loss; forestalling of revenues, and a host of attendant miseries!

Upon the final break-down and retirement of Chundoo Loll, the Calcutta officials, to evade the responsibility of the position which their own exactions had produced, solemnly transferred to the Nizam the privilege so long withheld from him of choosing a Minister—a privilege which now meant nothing else than the finding of an agent to accomplish the impossible feat of paying the Contingent without money. The Prince was himself to make the bricks, now that there was no straw. One after another of his nominees resigned, because of the impossibility of the task the Indian Government was itself shirking. One of these unhappy Ministers told the Resident (2nd November, 1849), after attempting the duties of the office, that in the condition to which everything was reduced "an angel from heaven could do nothing."

An attempt was now made to induce the Nizam to find money for the Force by dismissing his own levies, on whom—as neither the Subsidiary Force nor the Contingent were allowed to assist him—really devolved all the detailed military duties of his State. He was reminded that, although the Contingent *did* consume a full third of his revenues, there were still two-thirds left; so he had better dismiss his Irregulars, which formed the only force at his disposal. The experiment was tried. Three thousand men were thrown on the

country, destitute and homeless. An alarming mutiny was the result, and the scheme had to be abandoned.

The orange of the Hyderabad State was now sucked nearly dry. The Treasury was empty. Loans from the native bankers, for which 2½ per cent. interest was paid, were then suggested. The last of these was for the sum of £340,000, the whole of which was paid over to the Resident on 18th July, 1851. And now the credit of the State, as well as its funds, was exhausted. The Prince had, however, some private funds. He was next pressed to give up the money reserved in his palace, to furnish pay for this Contingent. All else had gone. Only the last resources of his family remained. In the extremity to which we had reduced him, he finally threw these also into the gulf. Goaded early and late by the Resident, the Minister, having repeatedly and urgently pleaded with his master, was at last able to write to the Resident on 1st November, 1851, as follows: "Praise and thanks to God for his goodness; the amount of 30 lacs of rupees (£300,000) from His Highness the Nizam's private property, for the debt due to the British Government, has to-day been received by me."

The inexorable claim might, however, still be met for a little while, if the Prince could only be induced to pawn his household valuables. He was accordingly encouraged (as the Resident tells our Calcutta officials on the 5th December, 1851) to give up the "jewels and gold and silver articles" in the recesses of the palace, "accumulated by his ancestors during the course of nearly a century past," which were to be pledged to local money-lenders for £80,000, to supply the pay of the Contingent for about two months longer! And he gave them up.

From necessity, the Nizam must, it was now feared, make a desperate appeal for the disbandment of this Force. No argument would now be strong enough to prevent his doing so, unless, indeed, he were to be told that the British Government held that the maintenance of the Contingent was a treaty obligation! Accordingly, in this crisis of his embarrassments, a very offensive letter was addressed to him personally by Lord Dalhousie, dated 6th June, 1851, in which, among much else that was very irritating and threatening, the falsehood was directly proffered in these words: "The efficient maintenance of this Force is a duty imposed on the Government of Hyderabad by the stipulations of existing treaties." Lord Dalhousie no doubt believed what he at the time said; but the character of the entire system is shown by the fact that when he afterwards himself discovered the untruthfulness of the statement and recorded in the Minutes of the Council Chamber (30th March

1853) that the averment was one which, "as an honest man," he could not instruct the Resident to make, even verbally, to the Nizam, he took no steps to withdraw the letter, in which he had himself urged it on the Nizam in 1851.

The next step in the Nizam's long agony was one that ended his Job-like patience, and at last brought him to bay. It takes much to surprise an Indian potentate out of the calm courtesies of ceremonial intercourse. The Resident may hector; the Governor-General may threaten; but the Prince will cling fast to that amenity of tone and control of temper which he considers indispensably becoming to his own dignity. When Lord Dalhousie wrote the famous letter of 6th June, 1851, which became a scandal in this country for its indecently telling the Prince "that the Government of India could crush him under its feet, so that neither name nor trace of him should remain," the Nizam, in replying to the cruel and abusive document, conventionally acknowledged it as a "letter filled with kind expressions," and "completely fragrant with joy." But his equanimity was to be more severely tried. His Treasury was bankrupt, his credit gone, his private purse emptied, his jewels pawned to satisfy our demands; but his kingdom still remained, although his subjects were in beggary. The Calcutta Government now voluntarily proceeded to pay the Contingent for a while from their own Treasury, to make the Nizam ostensibly their debtor. They advanced about £400,000 in this way, meanwhile purposely avoiding giving credit to the Nizam for *much larger counter-claims*, in respect of certain excise revenues of his of which they had the collection as trustees, and which they had quietly paid into their own treasury. Then, upon the strength of this alleged debt, they peremptorily demanded the Berar Provinces and the Raichore and Dharaseo districts from the Prince, for the arrears and for the future support of the Contingent.

As the unhappy Prince ran over, one by one, the items of the account between himself and his ally, it became impossible for him to control his emotion. The broad lands of his feudatory, the Nawab of the Carnatic, had been taken from him without even the courtesy of an acknowledgment. The kingdom of Mysore had been created for no other purpose than to deprive him of his share in the spoils of an expensive war. The Northern Circars on his eastern boundary, £1,666,000 in redemption of their quit-rent*, and then the Bellary and Cuddapah districts on his southern frontier, had been taken, all on the same plea of providing for the internal

* See THE STATESMAN, July, 1880, p. 109.

tranquillity of his State. Fourteen millions sterling had been directly appropriated from his State Treasury. The loans that had been taken up at 24 per cent. interest from the native bankers had also gone. Lastly, he had parted with his own private treasure, and even his household valuables. And a demand was now made upon him for his remaining frontier provinces on the north and on the west, under the selfsame plea of providing for the tranquillity of his State; a tranquillity that for forty years had never even been seriously threatened, despite the extortionate exactions of our creature-Ministers. At the interview in which this final demand was made upon him, the Nizam turned upon the Resident, and cried "in a tone that indicated anger in no ordinary degree":—

God forbid that I should suffer this disgrace! Gentlemen like you cannot understand my feelings in this matter. I am a Sovereign Prince, born to live and die in this kingdom, which has belonged to my family for seven generations. I have heard that one gentleman of your nation considered that I ought to be quite contented and happy, if I were put on the same footing as you have put my feudatory Prince, the Nawab of the Carnatic, to have a pension paid to me like an old servant, and have nothing to do but to eat, and sleep, and say my prayers. But I tell you I should lose my honour, by parting with my territory.

The firmness of the Prince, and his passionate refusal to cede the provinces, led to the modified proposition—that the districts should be "assigned" to the British Government "merely for a time, to maintain the Contingent, as long as the Nizam should require that Force."* Even to this modified proposal, he could not be induced to agree by any fair means. To assign territory at all, with even a temporary object, would, he held justly, be a disgrace to him; while for his oppressors to demand it for such a purpose as to provide the pay of the Contingent, he felt to be a scandalous injustice. The injustice was the more obvious inasmuch as while requiring him to maintain the Contingent, and even to assign new provinces to pay for its support, the treaty that was now demanded from him positively provided that one-half the Subsidiary Force, which he had paid for already in perpetuity to do the same duties, was to be withdrawn from his dominions, the consideration he had paid for it, namely, the lands of Bellary and Cuddapah, being retained by ourselves!†

A mock offer to disband the Contingent was now made to the unhappy Prince, the offer being coupled with the threat

* Resident to Government of India, No. 71, of 4th May, 1853, para. 28. Papers, "The Nizam," 1854, p. 118.

† These lands now yield the British Government £812,000 yearly.

that his country would then be allowed to become the theatre of "scenes of lawlessness," the Resident proceeding to prevaricate with him as to the treaty obligation resting upon the Subsidiary Force to maintain his rule, and plainly intimating to him that this British force, 9,500 strong, would stand idle and refuse to put down disturbances, if the Contingent were disbanded.* It was well known (and it was anticipated by Lord Dalhousie†) that it would be impossible for the Nizam to accept the offer of disbandment made on such terms, particularly in the condition to which the country had been reduced. There was no real risk of the Force—the cost of which had dragged the Hyderabad State down to ruin—being disbanded under such conditions; and yet the Nizam was now made to appear as its voluntary supporter. The Machiavellian proposal was, however, deemed a master-stroke by the diplomatists at Calcutta. By such thinkers; the words of the great international jurist, Vattel, with which we have headed this essay, might be profitably studied: "The faith of treaties is basely prostituted by studying to overreach those with whom we treat, and to out-do them in cunning and duplicity. Let the man who excels in these arts boast of his happy talents, and esteem himself a keen negotiator, but reason and the sacred law of nature will class him as far beneath a vulgar cheat as the majesty of kings is exalted above private persons."

The Nizam steadfastly and honestly represented that it was equally impossible for him to elect the disbandment of the Contingent, when disbandment was deliberately coupled with an iniquitous condition, relative to the Subsidiary Force, which was incompatible with the common instinct of self-preservation, or to assign territory for its support. Exasperated by a persistency that was the dictate of despair, the Resident at last resorted to language which his successor, who was present at the interview, characterized as "objurgations and threats;" but without effect. The Prince refused to sign the treaty that was to dismember his kingdom, and to sanction *post facto* our long-continued exactions upon his State.

A new expedient was then resorted to, an expedient of such a nature that it has no parallel, we hope, in our diplomacy. Major Davidson, the Resident's chief Assistant, with his knowledge and approval, addressed to the Nizam's Minister a letter to be shown

* See Resident's Minute of a private conference with the Nizam, dated 12th March, 1853, para. 9, and his letter to Government of India, No. 74, of 10th May, 1853, para. 11.

† Minute of 30th March, 1853, paras. 46 and 49.

in original by the Minister to his master.* That letter the reader shall now see :—

My Dear Nawab,—I believe the Resident requires your attendance this evening, to inform you that his negotiations with the Nizam are at an end, and that he applies to the Governor-General to move troops by to-day's post.

Indeed, I have a letter from my nephew at Poona, mentioning that the 78th Highlanders and 86th Regiment H.M.'s troops have received orders to be in readiness to march to Hyderabad. Don't suppose military operations will be confined to the districts. If you are a friend of His Highness, beg of him to save himself and his dignity, by complying at once with what the Governor-General will most assuredly compel him to accede to.

(Signed) CUTH. DAVIDSON.

Hyderabad, 14th May, 1853.

The statement in this letter that "orders" had been issued to the troops was absolutely false, as also was the other statement that the Resident "applied to the Governor-General to move troops by that day's post." The weapon of deceit was not, however, deemed by the British authorities sufficiently reliable of itself to compass the end in view. It was necessary that these alarming representations should be impressed on the Nizam's mind as truths by one of his own trusted advisers. It was necessary for this purpose to bribe some confidential servant to betray his master. Driven to distraction, and, as it proved, to death a few days later, the Minister found the required traitor. He told the Resident his plan, "with a smile on his countenance, seeming rather proud of his achievement." The Resident at once approved;† and on the 14th May, and in a subsequent letter of the 19th, that officer reported to Calcutta that his "hope" of finally carrying the negotiation rested very principally upon the fact that a confidential aide-de-camp of the Nizam, named Booran-ood-deen, had, with the Resident's knowledge and approval, been bribed "by pecuniary donations and promises of more" to betray him who was at once his master and his sovereign. Duped, coerced, and betrayed, the Nizam's final surrender is recorded by the Resident in the following terms‡ :—

* See Colonel Low's letter to Government of India, No. 81, of 10th May, 1853, paras. 2 and 3, wherein he states that the above letter expressed his own "urgent request," and that its object was "to impress the mind of the Nizam with the belief that further unnecessary delay in settling the matter one way or other would not be permitted by his Government."

† See Resident's letters to Government of India, No. 79, of 14th May, 1853, para. 9; and No. 81, of 19th May, 1853, paras. 7, 8, and foot note; Papers, The Nizam, 1854, pp. 128-9.

‡ See Resident's letter to Government of India, No. 81, of 19th May, 1853, para. 19.

In the evening of Sunday, the 15th, I received a note from the Minister, stating that the Nizam had at last consented to the treaty. The Minister in that note wrote as follows: "Booran-ood-deen and I persuaded him to accede to it. This was done when we were alone."

Here, then, is the true story of the Hyderabad Centingont, and of the Treaty of 1853, under which the Berar Provinces passed into the hands of the British Government.

We have called it a tale of shame.

PART II.

THE NIZAM'S EFFORTS AFTER RESTITUTION.

It need excite no surprise that seen after the Berar districts had been taken from the Nizam, under the circumstances above narrated, whenever, in fact, the echoes of Lord Dalhousie's "threats and objurgations," menaces of military coercion, and pretences of treaty right had died away, the Nizam took for granted that the British authorities would be very glad that the blot on the escutcheon of our Indian Empire, caused by the Berar assignment, should be removed, particularly as the assignment had been taken on a "formal announcement" that it was to last "merely for a time, to maintain the Centingont Force as long as the Nizam might require it." Between 1853 and 1858 two successive Nizams, accordingly, six times applied for the restoration of all the districts. Salar Jung, who had succeeded to the office of Minister, a few days after the humiliation of the assignment of Berar had resulted in the death of his predecessor, wrote to the Resident as follows, on 19th December, 1857: "The late Nizam was anxious on this point, and repeatedly urged me to submit the question. The present Nizam is no less importunate on the subject." And on the 8th March, 1858: "His Highness, from the period of his accession, has repeatedly desired me to endeavour to get back the districts. Their restoration would be an act of liberality and consideration worthy of the British Government." On the 4th February, 1859, the Nizam caused his Minister to make "renewed efforts" for restitution, as "a matter which His Highness has very much at heart," and about which he felt "great anxiety." On the 18th of the same month, the Minister notified to the Resident that the Nizam had summoned him to the palace, and blamed him for "lukewarmness" in the matter; "otherwise it seemed unaccountable that nothing had been done as yet." And the Minister proceeded: "As His Highness is so earnest and anxious on the subject, I trust you will have it fully settled." These early applications, were made without any attempt at con-

troversy as to the merits, the Nizam simply asking to have the districts restored, and undertaking "to make satisfactory arrangements for the punctual monthly payment of the Contingent." All these proposals were contemptuously rejected without, apparently, even the formality of regular replies to the Minister's letters.

As a consequence, however, of the vital services rendered to us by the Nizam and his Minister during the revolt of 1857-8, the Indian Government was for a time really touched by a sense of obligation and by an instinct of common interests. It was a healthy change on both sides, and, if it could only have lasted, might have proved most beneficial, as, indeed, in its establishment and extension throughout India, lies the best hope in the future for the prosperity of the protected States and the stability of the Empire. The first suggestion of emphatically marking the sense entertained of the invaluable aid rendered by the Princes of India, will be found in a despatch dated July 28th, 1858, from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors—Lord Stanley, now Earl of Derby, being President of the Board of Control,—to the Governor-General, calling for a list of those "Princes, Chiefs, and others," who had rendered valuable service to the British cause, suggesting that "territorial grants" would form the "most acceptable mode" of reward for such service, and expressing his assurance that the names of "the Nizam and his able and influential Minister, Salar Jung" would, with some others, be found "high on the list."

A very little study of the map, and a glance at the records of the time suffice to remind us of the vital support rendered us by the Nizam, and of the good reasons Lord Stanley had for placing him "high on the list." The obedience of the Madras Army and the allegiance of the South of India, depended on a word from the Nizam. In tone and spirit, as to a great extent now, the Madras Army was then essentially a Mohammedan army, looking up to the Nizam as Pontifex Maximus as well as Prince. Nor was the political and spiritual influence of the Nizam confined to the Deccan and the Carnatic: it extended all over India. A very distinguished officer, of long Eastern experience, General Sir Sydney Cotton, who in 1857 commanded at Peshawur, the frontier station of the Punjab, states that "intercepted letters reached him from Hyderabad in the Deccan, addressed by Sepoys of one of the re-armed corps at Peshawur to brother Mussulmans in the Nizam's territory, in which the most seditious expressions towards our Government were used, and calling on the Mussulmans generally to rise, and make an effort to rid themselves of their common enemy." A little further on he says:—

The Natives of the upper class of the North-west Frontier repeatedly assured the author, up to the very last moment of his sojourn there, that there will be, some day or other, a general rising of the Mussulmans of India against our Government. Since the removal of the descendants of the Great Mogul from Delhi, they look to the Nizam in the Deccan, as the great Head and Chief of the Mussulman cause.*

The exigencies of space will not permit us to multiply, as could easily be done, independent as well as official testimony to the invaluable assistance given to us by the Hyderabad State in the terrible days of 1857. The same necessary restriction must be put on our citation of evidence as to the services of the Nizam's great Minister. We shall give but one extract. In a letter to the Government of India, dated 29th of March, 1858, Colonel Davidson, the Resident at Hyderabad, says:—

The unhesitating energy and promptitude with which the Nizam's Minister assisted the English Government were beyond all praise. . . . From his [the Nawab Salar Jung's] open and avowed determination to assist us at all hazards, he became most unpopular, and was almost outlawed by the Mohamadan population; but no invectives, threats, or entreaties ever made him swerve from the truly faithful line of conduct he had from the first adopted. His assassination was planned a dozen times, and I believe he was fully aware of this; but neither dread on that account, nor for a time the continued intelligence of repeated reverses to our cause in the North-west, shook him for a moment. Every contingency, and every requisition made to him by me, was met with the same firmness and consistency; and the resources of the Nizam's Government were, as far as lay in his power, placed unhesitatingly at my disposal.

The most liberal interpretation of Lord Stanley's suggestion of a "territorial grant" in favour of the Nizam to which the Calcutta Government could rise after two long years of consideration, was that embodied in the Treaty of 1860, whereby a small part of the districts which had been taken from him in 1853 for the liquidation of a debt that he did not owe, and for the payment of a Force that had been fraudulently imposed upon him for our own benefit, and which part of the districts, as it furnished funds in excess of the requirements of the Trust created by the said Treaty, the Resident confessed "we had no pretext for retaining,"† was restored to his Highness's administration. The transfer was destitute of the features of an act of grace. Still it was a partial restitution very satisfactory to the Nizam. It was something gained which was very much desired.

The Nawab Salar Jung must have considered as one of the

* "Nine Years on the North-west Frontier." by Lieut.-General Sir Sydney Cotton, K.C.B. (1868), p. 305, 307.

† Resident to Government of India, No. 26, dated 27th June, 1862, para. 141.

greatest advantages of this partial restitution that it afforded him the means of practically disproving the *pro-humanitatis-causa* argument so skilfully employed by Indian officials to cover the dark suggestions of self-interest and love of patronage. The districts restored to the Nizam in 1860, after seven years of British administration, did not deteriorate, but continued to improve under the Nizam's sway. He had, however, while accepting back a part of his territory never in any way waived his right to the restitution of the whole. Accordingly, in 1867, a fresh application was submitted, in which the Nizam's Minister went a step in advance of the former appeals; for he ventured to urge his reversionary claims to the Mysore State which the Calcutta bureau was then moving heaven and earth to annex. The intended annexation was, however, defeated by the Home Government, and the appeal for the Berars could not be renewed on that particular line.

But the Calcutta Secretariat had now become fully aware of the change that had come over the spirit of the Hyderabad Court; and from the year 1867 may be dated the determination to break that spirit, and to put down this unwonted vivacity. The Nizam's Minister no longer spoke with bated breath and whispering humbleness. He presumed to argue, and sometimes even to get the best of the argument. He was told, therefore, that he "took too much upon himself," and that his petition must be "rejected with censure," and he was warned in future to be more "serious and circumspect."

Nothing could be more serious or more circumspect than the next application. Although not silenced or intimidated by the hard words with which his overtures had been met, it would probably be too much to say that the Minister was not hurt or discouraged. The extreme resentment betrayed in the reply to his last appeal at a suggestion—identical, by-the-by, with one made by the Resident—"that there was a time when the British Government was less disposed than now to do strict justice to the Princes of India,"* Sir Salar Jung may well have calculated that the interests of his master would not be advanced by a direct attack on the origin of the Contingent, or on Lord Dalhousie's operations. He may well have felt a conviction that the Calcutta Government, as then constituted, would not be persuaded, on any grounds of magnanimity, generosity, or even abstract justice, to give up, without an equivalent, anything that it actually held. Even in the harsh criticism of his proposal, founded on the expected lapse of Mysore, there was no repudiation

* Papers, "Cession of Berar" (29 of 1867), p. 11; compare Colonel Davidson's para. 13, p. 28, of Papers, "Hyderabad Assigned Districts" (938 of 1867).

of "some satisfactory arrangement" that might be made "for the payment of the Hyderabad Contingent from another source." On the contrary, there was almost an invitation to seek for some satisfactory arrangement in the remark that, "as the alternative source of payment suggested had no existence, the restoration of Berar remained an impossibility."* The Government of India had repeatedly stated that its only object in retaining Berar was to have "a material guaranty" for the payment of the Contingent, territorial security not being declared to be indispensable.† In 1853, beyond all question, the Nizam could have given no other security; but the finances and credit of the State had so improved under the administration of Sir Salar Jung, that in 1872 he was able to suggest "an alternative source of payment," and to propose "a satisfactory arrangement," against the feasibility and permanence of which no objection could be urged. The proposal was to deposit the capital sum of £8,000,000 sterling with the British Government, from the interest of which the Contingent was to be paid, the Berar Provinces being restored to the rule of their own Sovereign. But this would never do. What was to become of the Berar Commission, that stock of good appointments? In a despatch dated 24th September, 1873, one year after the offer was submitted, it was declined by the Calcutta Government on the ground that "a territorial guaranty was the fundamental principle" of the Treaties of 1853 and 1860, and that a large loan from English or other capitalists by the Nizam was highly objectionable.

This adverse decision was then reported to the Home Government. Some strong dissents were recorded in the Indian Council, notably by Sir George Clerk and Sir John Kaye, which exposed the principles on which the Government of India were acting. The former officer scathingly quoted an officially recorded "Resolution" of that Government in 1867, that "Treaties entered into fifty years ago are no longer binding on us, now that India has its Legislative Councils," and that Treaties with a native State were "mere courtesies of fifty years ago," containing "a poetical form of an hyperbolic expression," and "a selection of a particular conjunction of sounds."! Sir John Kaye marshalled against the Government of India the grievances that they had supplied to all the leading native States, by a course which has convinced them "that the policy which we enunciated when weak" (by the Queen's Proclamation of 1858) "is now to be repudiated when we are strong;" and

* Papers, "Cession of Berar" (29 of 1867), p. 20, para. 46 of despatch.

† "Hyderabad Assigned Districts" (338 of 1867), p. 9 (para. 6), p. 11 (para. 4), p. 16 (para. 18), p. 20 (para. 5).

he concluded by prophesying the "the danger to the Empire from such conduct, which my experience of twenty years in my present appointment makes me see so clearly before me." But the Secretary of State (Lord Salisbury)—who, it may be observed, had only been a few weeks in office—was very naturally unprepared to reverse a judgment already communicated to the Co-Regents of Hyderabad. In a despatch dated the 19th March, 1874, he adopted the views of the Indian Government, that a large loan was objectionable, that "a territorial guaranty was the main object" of the Treaties of 1853 and 1860, and was "equally paramount at the present day." But the Secretary of State, when he signed that despatch, was not in possession of the prompt reply sent four months previously by Sir Salar Jung and his colleague to the despatch from the Viceroy, which had, for the first time, blocked the claim to restitution by alleging that Lord Canning's word "material" meant "territorial." In this reply, dated 24th November, 1873, which they begged might be forwarded to the Secretary of State, the Regents argued against the security for the pay of the Contingent being necessarily territorial, and against the Hyderabad State being under any obligation to keep up the Contingent at all, that Force, being illegitimate in its origin and engendered solely for our own benefit, the debt of 1853 being fictitious, and the treaty of that year extorted under a combination of threats and formal assurances by the Resident, Colonel Low, that the territorial assignment was "only for a time, so long as the Nizam might require the Contingent." But "their desire being to meet the wishes of the British Government," and the Viceroy having objected to their proposal to capitalise the pay of the Contingent, because it might necessitate a large loan by the Hyderabad State, they offered to furnish a "material guaranty" to the extent of two, three, or more years' payments, to be deposited in advance—which would have amounted to not more than £1,000,000 sterling—a fund which they could supply and maintain without any extraordinary effort or external aid.

Even Lord Dalhousie, when commencing a course of pressure on the Nizam, declared that he only asked for an assignment of lands in default of payment, or of other good security. There could have been no real doubt in 1874 that the Hyderabad Government was well able, in the way suggested, to make such a satisfactory provision as would have contented Lord Dalhousie, and to furnish that "material guaranty," which Lord Canning required, in the most substantial and tangible form.

This was, in short, far too reasonable and businesslike an offer,

while the exposure of the transactions of 1853 and 1860, and the disavowal of any moral obligation to keep up the Contingent, were too cogent in their reasoning to be laid before the Secretary of State without some special accompaniment. The Co-Regents' reply of November 24th, 1873, was, therefore, accompanied home in April, 1874, by the Calcutta Foreign Secretary, Mr. (now Sir) C. U. Aitchison in person, who brought with him all the materials for managing Lord Salisbury. At the same time, viz., on the 22nd of May, 1874, the Nizam's Government was served with the Secretary of State's decision of the 19th of March on the former offer of depositing capital to the amount of £8,000,000.

For the whole of 1874, a year of critical controversy, the Home Government was always kept in arrears of the Nizam's appeals, and in advance of the Viceroy's adverse views. The Secretary of State was left in ignorance of the Nizam's latest pleadings, while the Nizam's representatives were led to suppose that the Secretary of State's decision was given with full knowledge of all their strongest points. They were led, but not actually brought, to that conclusion. The dates, when they could get hold of them, could not fail to tell the truth.

There can be no doubt that one great cause of these cross-questions and stray answers, and of the gradual development of the Nizam's full case, was the aversion of the Co-Regents to put on record anything like a railing impeachment of the past. The full case, every merit of which was a demerit to the Government of India, was drawn out of them, against their inclination, by the disingenuous dialectics and tortuous action pursued by the Calcutta Foreign Office.

In a secret letter, dated 16th June, 1874, intended still further to add to the effect of Mr. Aitchison's visit, the Indian Government urgently pressed upon the Secretary of State the nature of the reply they wished given to the offer of a material guaranty made by the Co-Regents in their memorial dated 24th November, 1873. The Secretary of State was urged to give a reply which should be "final," and "as stiff as would be consistent with politeness." The materials brought home by Mr. Aitchison, and the powers of exposition and persuasion that he was able to bring to bear upon the India Office, together with the severe official spur applied by the Indian Government's secret letter of 16th June, sufficed to obtain a letter from the Secretary of State, dated the 17th July, 1874, declining to accept the last offer made by the Regents, or to give up the Berars. But Lord Salisbury was not so easily or so completely managed as had been hoped, for the letter

was not of that degree of "stiffness" that was wanted; and, moreover, another despatch of the same date, far from treating the question as finally settled, asked for any *real answer* the Indian Government might have to the Nizam's claims, and particularly inquired if there was any reply to the strong statement in the memorial under reply to the effect that the very basis of the Treaty of 1853 was a "formal announcement" by the British Plenipotentiary that "the assignment was to last merely for a time, to maintain the Contingent as long as the Nizam might require that Force." All knowledge of the existence of this second despatch was, of course, carefully concealed from the Nizam's Minister by the Indian Government, and even the terms of the Secretary of State's first despatch of same date not being "stiff" enough, were not communicated to the Co-Regents.

It was highly inconvenient, according to the official ethics and tactics in vogue at Calcutta, to communicate the Secretary of State's despatch of 17th July, 1874, to the Nizam's Government, not only because its terms were not anything like "stiff" enough to terrorise and silence, but because its *date* would at once have contradicted the pretence of its being "final;" for on the 6th of that same month—July, 1874—Sir Salar Jung and his colleague, convinced by the only despatch from the Secretary of State that was shown to them (dated 19th March) that a half statement of their case would not do, had submitted that important and exhaustive letter of 124 paragraphs which we described at some length in a previous article.* In that letter the whole question was fully argued, and they claimed for the Nizam the restoration of his provinces, irrespective altogether of the acceptability of that material guaranty in cash for the support of the Contingent which they still offered. If, however, that material guaranty were refused, they then declared themselves entitled and compelled to demand complete territorial restitution and the disbandment of the Contingent, which was not, and never had been, of any use to the Nizam, which Lord Dalhousie had acknowledged must be broken up, if the Nizam insisted on it, while the British Plenipotentiary, Colonel Low, had formally declared that the assignment must cease whenever the Nizam ceased to require the Contingent. The complexion of the case was entirely changed by the submission of this letter, which the Secretary of State had never seen, and of the existence of which he was not aware, when he gave, under the urgent pressure of Mr. Aitchison's presence, and of the secret despatch from the Viceroy

* THE STATESMAN, No. 5, October, 1880, pp. 456-7.

dated 16th of June, his decision of the 17th of July, 1874. That decision was now quite inapplicable. It was no answer to the case put in by the Nizam's Government. It was most unfair to the Secretary of State to use it as his decision on the case, without first letting him know that the entire case had not been laid before him. Yet this is what was done, and the very shallow and unworthy device by which it was done was probably considered equally judicious and ingenious. It was impossible to do more than *speak* of the Secretary of State's decision as "final;" it was not possible to *write*. A copy of the despatch could not be given, because the date would have betrayed its insufficiency. Lord Salisbury's despatch of the 17th of July was therefore kept until it was old enough, the date being concealed, to serve at all events as a telegraphic answer to the letter from the Nizam's Government of the 6th of July, and its purport was then, suddenly and without any warning, sprung upon Sir Salar Jung and his colleague, in verbal harangue, as the "final" decision of the Secretary of State on all their memorials, care being taken to use language which gave no hint as to whether the said decision had been received in India by letter or by telegram. This transcendent effort of "political agency" was carried out, as we have described,* at a breakfast given by the Resident, Mr. C. B. Saunders, to the Regents and principal nobles of Hyderabad on the 21st of August, 1874, and was in every respect, as it deserved to be, a signal and most undignified failure. The plan chosen on this occasion was so transparent as to be at once detected, and was implicitly confessed by the Resident when, in a letter dated the 22nd of August, 1874, he refused, in reply to an application from Sir Salar Jung, to furnish a copy of the Secretary of State's communication, and abstained from mentioning its date. No copy of that despatch has, it would appear, ever been communicated to the Nizam's Government.

Although the breakfast-table harangue failed completely to silence Sir Salar Jung, it marked the initiation of the process for harassing and hampering him by local intrigue and corrupt antagonism, which has within the last three years been pushed on by Sir Richard Meade to what he, we presume, would call a large measure of success. The real character of Mr. Saunders's breakfast-table demonstration will be understood when we call to mind the fact that his own annual report as Resident for 1869-70 expressly stated that the rancour and suspicion of the nobles with regard to Sir Salar Jung and the Co-Regent formed "an element

*THE STATESMAN, October, 1880, p. 403.

in the political atmosphere of Hyderabad," and that "it was not thought just to the Minister, or safe to the stability of his administration, that anything approaching to freedom of intercourse should take place between the Resident and the other nobles," and that "one of the latter" (Wikar-ool-Oomra) "having been pronounced guilty some eight years ago, of lending himself to an intrigue, the object of which, it was believed, was to procure for himself the office of Minister, had been prohibited, under the order of the Supreme Government, from appearing on any public occasion, the Nizam's own Durbars not excepted, where the British representative was present." Yet to that same Wikar-ool-Oomra significant attentions were paid by Mr. Saunders on and about the 21st August, 1874. In his Administration Report of 1869-70, Mr. Saunders had sympathetically observed that the constant thwarting of the Minister's policy by intrigues "made his" (the Minister's) "office doubly difficult to fill," and "his burden a doubly heavy one to bear;" so much so, that, to the Resident's knowledge, Sir Salar Jung "felt at times inclined to withdraw from the struggle altogether; only there was none at Hyderabad who was fitted to relieve him of duties which he performed so admirably." But in 1874, in order to check the appeal for the Berars, these very intriguers were specially summoned to the Residency, to witness the humiliation of those whom they had for years regarded with "rancour and suspicion," and to hear the representative of the British Government appeal to them to use their influence against Sir Salar Jung and his colleague.

Some time before the remarkable breakfast-party of the 21st of August, 1874, Mr. Saunders is understood to have taken an opportunity of reminding Sir Salar Jung, in the most friendly manner, that a very little encouragement from the British Residency would renew the days when his administrative duties were constantly impeded and harassed by hostile intrigues, and when his very life was in danger. The Minister, whose faith as to the standard of fair dealing, dignity, and propriety accepted among us may have been somewhat shaken by this warning, can hardly have been so much alarmed by it as was probably expected. He cannot have been unconscious of the strength of his position, based on so many years of administrative progress, on the confidence and support of several Residents and Viceroys, on the local reputation he had won by the partial restitution of 1860, and, above all, on the loyalty of his colleague. Even Sir Richard Meade, though more fitted for the work than Mr. Saunders, and armed with a general license for the purpose, could not, three years later, have gagged and fettered Sir Salar Jung but for

the death of the other Regent, the Ameer-i-Kabeer, in April, 1877. Mr. Saunders, in 1874, tried in vain to give importance to the Co-Regent's younger brother, Wikar-ool-Oomra, and the other disaffected nobles. They were useless as weapons of offence so long as the head of the house of Shums-ool-Oomra, the Ameer-i-Kabeer, went hand in hand with Sir Salar Jung. The breakfast-party lecture and the attempt at reviving faction, failed entirely for the time.

Mr. Saunders had concluded his breakfast-table address, which he read off in the Hindustani language from a written paper, by declaring that he would not "receive any further communications on the subject of the Berars for transmission to the Government." In the letter dated 22nd August, 1874, with which he forwarded, at Sir Salar Jung's request, a copy of this address, he said that it must "be considered as bearing all the force necessary in any assurance or intimation which his Highness the Nizam's Government can possibly require to receive from ours." "Force" was the right word certainly. In spite of the Resident's threat not to receive any more letters on the subject, Sir Salar Jung and his colleague, convinced that their duty to their Sovereign was imperative, forwarded another despatch, dated 29th September, 1874, in which, adverting to the breakfast harangue, they pointed out that "the present reply amounts to a simple refusal to discuss whether the claims are just or not, with an endeavour forcibly to suppress them, while their validity remained unquestioned." They also pointed out that the decision of the Secretary of State which was invoked on that occasion, and asserted to be "final," must have been arrived at "without the Secretary of State having before him the principal document in which the claims are described;" and that his decision had been, in fact, framed upon a former letter, which was of quite a different character altogether. This despatch of 29th September was returned to the Minister by the Resident, in a letter dated 2nd October, 1874, in which he stated that "the Viceroy's distinct instructions precluded him from submitting it to the Government of India." The Minister, in the most courteous language, replied on the 5th October, 1874, that it was simply impossible for him and his colleague, "consistently with our solemn duty to the State, to accept as final a decision which does not even purport to deal with the merits of the claims set forth," and "prior to his Lordship the Secretary of State having had before him the chief document in which the claims are described." Sir Salar Jung for these reasons returned the originals to the Resident, requesting that they might be forwarded to the Government of India, "for

submission, along with our letter of the 6th of July last, to the Right Honourable the Secretary of State, to be laid before Her most gracious Majesty in Council."

The next day, the 6th October, 1874, the Resident again returned all the documents to the Co-Regents, declaring that "determined perseverance in a course of this kind would not for one moment be tolerated in private or social intercourse," that it could have "no good result in the conduct of public affairs," and that it "might have the direct effect of lessening the cordiality of those relations which the Government of India anxiously desires to preserve, both with the Ameer-i-Kabeer and yourself, during the minority of the present youthful Nizam."

Assuredly this rude game of battledore and shuttlecock was highly objectionable, but it was the Resident's own invention. After the second return, the Regents took no part in it. They had acted hitherto according to constitutional rule and precedent, and it was only under actual compulsion that they now took the unparalleled step, on the 17th of October, 1874, of directly addressing the Secretary of State for India. Lord Salisbury did not join in the rough horse-play of throwing despatches back in the face of a Prince or Minister, which Mr. Saunders "considered as bearing all the force necessary." The Secretary of State accepted the appeal, but was no doubt puzzled how to dispose of it, without openly censuring the Resident and the other authorities in India for producing this extraordinary dead-lock by a course of abortive insult and intimidation. He held over the appeal, and again urged the Government of India to supply the full information and counsel for which he had asked on 17th June. That information was at length furnished in the shape of a conglomeration of relevant and irrelevant matter, extending to such a length, as to put it out of the power of any Secretary of State even to peruse it himself. And this again was covered by a despatch dated 1st January, 1875, extending to 79 paragraphs, in which were condensed more numerous and more audacious mis-statements than official persons would commonly venture to put their signatures to. Thus the anxious wish of Lord Salisbury personally and promptly to dispose of the matter was defeated, and it almost necessarily was forced back to the pigeon-holes of the permanent officials, where, no doubt, the Calcutta authorities deemed it much safer than in Lord Salisbury's hands. A very characteristic instance of the policy of elision of an ugly fact or argument was here shown. Lord Salisbury had, when calling for the information thus tardily furnished, specially demanded a report on the Regents' important argument based on the "formal

announcement" of the Resident that the assignment of Berar was to be "merely for a time, to maintain the Contingent as long as the Nizam might require it." This argument is the only one which the Calcutta Government omitted all reply to in the correspondence furnished, excusing themselves (letter of 1st January, 1875, para. 68) for the omission by saying that they have already shown the argument to be "without foundation" in a certain "secret" letter dated 2nd October, which, when in its turn examined, is seen to demonstrate nothing of the kind.

In the meantime the memorable tour of the Prince of Wales through India was being arranged. Hyderabad, the capital of the largest and most important of the allied States, and even in population the fourth city of the Indian Empire, would naturally have been one of his Royal Highness's halting-places. On the strength of an apprehension regarding the personal safety of the Prince within the Nizam's dominions—so very ill-founded that one cannot help, under the circumstances, attributing it to a desire to slight the Regents, and to discredit them at their own Court—Hyderabad was excluded from the Royal programme. Moreover, between July and October, 1875, the Resident (Mr. Saunders) had involved himself, with the demi-official countenance and support of the Calcutta Foreign Office, in a correspondence with Sir Salar Jung, having for its object to force the young Nizam, then about eleven years old and of a very delicate and nervous temperament, to take, contrary to the best medical advice, a railway journey of five hundred miles, and to undergo all the fatigue and unwonted excitement of receiving the Prince of Wales at Bombay. The correspondence, which was curiously weak in style, and even worse in taste on the side of the Resident,* down to the point of his giving way at last before the opinion of the Residency surgeon, Dr. Wyndowe, is understood to have been made the subject of illustrious consideration, and to have raised feelings of mingled sympathy and indignation at the petty annoyance to which Sir Salar Jung had been subjected. Very much, it is believed, to the consternation both of the Hyderabad Residency and of certain Calcutta officials, though it was of course impossible to remonstrate, a gracious invitation to visit England was given to the Nizam's Minister. All that could be done was to exhort and entreat Lord Salisbury, who had the Regents' direct appeal still unanswered before him, not to allow Sir Salar Jung

* This correspondence was the subject of a very amusing article in the *Pall Mall Gazette* shortly after its occurrence, which is credited with having caused Lord Salisbury to order the removal of Mr. Saunders from the Residency of Hyderabad.

to enter on any political discussion during his stay in London. The Nawab was consequently requested to place himself under that restriction; but before his departure from England the regular channel, so improperly closed at the Residency, was reopened for him by the Secretary of State giving him leave to submit a complete statement of the case for the restitution of Berar on his return to Hyderabad. To save appearances in favour of the Government of India, bygones were to be bygones, and in the new statement no allusion was to be made to previous correspondence.

This new statement was presented in December, 1876. The Resident, not having, we must assume, been formally apprised of the permission that had been given to Sir Salar Jung at home, professed ignorance of it as long as possible, and began by refusing to receive the memorial. Both the Resident and the Minister were then on the point of starting for Delhi, in company with the young Nizam, who, as *facile princeps* among the Native rulers of India, was about to assist at the Imperial Assemblage which took place in the first week of January, 1877. On their way to Delhi, they were met by a deliberate intimation from the Calcutta Foreign Secretary that they would not be received in the Assemblage unless the Regents would sign a declaration abandoning the Treaty status of their master as a Sovereign Prince. This scheme was abortive; the Nizam and Sir Salar Jung being after all *perforce* admitted, without the required concession. The Viceroy, Lord Lytton, when a personal application was made to him, as to the submission of the new Berar memorial, acknowledged the instructions that had been given by the Secretary of State; and the new appeal for the Berars, when again tendered, was accepted, but with a miserable manifestation of ill-will against the Regents for submitting it.

The Government of India forwarded the new appeal, after the lapse of about four months, to the Secretary of State, with the copy of a reply to it, which they said they were prepared to send at once to the Hyderabad Regency. *It has not, however, been sent up to the present day.* One cannot help concluding, with such experience as we have acquired of the ways of the Calcutta Foreign Office, that this draft reply was never sent, because it would have been too quickly and effectually answered; while a suggestion of its being sent very soon was furnished for home consumption, in order once more to impress the Secretary of State with a belief that unless he perversely plunged into disaccord with the Viceroy in Council, the malcontent Regents would be easily reduced to silence. The Government of India, moreover, regardless of the unfairness of alluding to the arguments contained in their previous correspondence, which the

Regents were expressly debarred from refuting, excused themselves from traversing the Regent's claims by a statement that "the previous correspondence which has passed dispenses with the necessity" of doing so. But the great object, as usual, was to gain time; and, from the official point of view, this plan was very successful. In the time that was thus gained—in the twelve months during which this last appeal was left unnoticed—Sir Salar Jung's honourable colleague, the Ameer-i-Kabeer, died, and the question of a successor to the post of Co-Regent became exclusively dominant.

On the choice that might be made of a colleague for the Nawab Sir Salar Jung depended the cause of internal peace and progress within the Nizam's territories. In twenty-three laborious years, this able and enlightened Minister had raised the Hyderabad State from financial ruin and moral anarchy into an unexampled condition of prosperity and good order. Administrative, and especially judicial, reform, involving the suppression of privileges and the restraint of arbitrary power, did not at any time commend itself to the great body of nobles, military vassals, and other men of weight at the Nizam's capital and in the provinces. Without direct assistance, which might have aggravated suspicion and mistrust, but with constant moral support from the Imperial Government, up to the time when his application was made for Berar, Sir Salar Jung had been able to retain the confidence of two successive sovereigns, and to overcome gradually all opposing factions. But by the time that Sir Richard Meade succeeded Mr. Saunders as Resident at Hyderabad, the great "political" problem of the day was not how to help Sir Salar Jung in the work of administrative reform, but how to check him in his demand for an answer to the Nizam's unanswerable claims. The Berar agitation must be stopped, even if good government in the Nizam's dominions were to be stopped with it. The Nawab Wikarool-Oomra, notoriously incompetent and reactionary, without either character or influence, without one qualification that could possibly recommend him to the Resident's notice except his inveterate hostility to Sir Salar Jung, was violently forced upon the Minister as Co-Regent of the State, on the express condition that in return he would secure that the Berar question was put upon the shelf. And this is the way that it was done.

The Ameer-i-Kabeer Shums-ool-Oomra died on the 14th of April, 1877. He had been called to the place of Co-Regent in 1869, on the accession of the infant Nizam, by the unanimous choice of the Minister and the principal nobles, which the British Government approved, without advancing any claim to regulate the judg-

ment of the Durbar in this or any other appointment. It was admitted by the Viceroy in Council, that the independence in all its internal affairs secured to the State of Hyderabad by treaty had suffered no diminution in consequence of the Prince being a minor. This was officially notified in the following passage of a despatch from the Government of India, No. 394A, dated the 22nd of March, 1869: "It is not the wish of his Excellency that the representative of the British Government should, for the future, possess more direct control over the internal affairs of the State than has lately been exercised." But though the Government of India could not claim any direct control over appointments to any office, even the highest, in the Hyderabad State, it might well have claimed an indirect or negative control, to the extent of disapproving, or even of forbidding, any appointment that was injurious to its dignity as the protecting Power. If, for example, the Minister or the Durbar had proposed to appoint as Co-Regent a nobleman who, "having been pronounced guilty," after a careful inquiry by the British Resident, of "lending himself to an intrigue, the object of which was to procure for himself the office of Minister, had been prohibited from appearing on any public occasion, the Nizam's own Durbar not excepted, when the British representative was present," the British Government would naturally have objected to such an appointment as an unfriendly and offensive act. The Administration Report of the Resident, Mr. C. B. Saunders, for 1869-70, tells us that there was such a nobleman at Hyderabad, and that the verdict of "guilty," and a "sentence of complete political extinction," had been pronounced against him, after a careful inquiry at the Residency, by the Government of Lord Canning. This nobleman was Wikar-ool-Oomra, half-brother of the Ameer-i-Kabeer. But in 1877 there was another Resident, Sir Richard Meade; there was another Government, that of Lord Lytton. A great deal had happened since 1869, including the development of the Berar appeal into the unanswerable stage.

In 1869 the Government of India did not claim to dictate or direct the choice of a Co-Regent. In 1877 the Government insisted on nominating a Co-Regent, without consulting or considering the nobles and notables of the Hyderabad Durbar, and in absolute defiance of the Regent-Minister, their leader and representative.

In 1869 the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra, though readmitted, as an act of grace, to his place in the Durbar on ceremonial occasions, was not allowed to be "officially connected with the Government," and was considered so utterly ineligible for office that the son of his half-brother, the Nawab Busheer-ood-Dowlah, was, with the full knowledge

and consent, if not, indeed, at the express request of the Government of India, placed under a course of administrative training, with a view to his succeeding his elder uncle, the Ameer-i-Kabeer, should any casualty remove or incapacitate him.* During the absence of Sir Salar Jung in England, Busheer-ood-Dowlah had acted for him as Co-Regent and Minister, and had received the thanks of the Government of India for the propriety and ability with which he had fulfilled his duties. He was universally regarded as the destined successor to his uncle, the Ameer-i-Kabeer, until 1877, when the Co-Regent's decease, just as the Berar perplexity had risen to its height, suggested the noble policy of hampering the Minister by compelling him to take a colleague with whom he could not work.

In 1869, and down to 1877, the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra was utterly ineligible. In 1877 he suddenly became eligible; and not only so, but the most eligible and the only eligible person. No one nominated him, no one chose him, no one recommended him but Sir Richard Meade, the Resident, and yet he was the only eligible person. It was quite forgotten, or quite thrown into the shade, that he had been found "guilty of lending himself to an intrigue" of a peculiarly disgraceful nature, that he had been "sentenced" by the British Government to "complete political extinction," and that he had never purged himself or been absolved from the crime, although the sentence was, after eight years' enforcement, partially remitted. Sir Richard Meade did not even think it necessary to whitewash this bankrupt in character, before forcing him as a partner on a statesman of illustrious antecedents and stainless reputation.

Immediately after the decease of the Ameer-i-Kabeer, the Nawab, Sir Salar Jung, informed the Resident that, notwithstanding the honourable and conciliatory disposition of his late colleague, there had been some practical inconveniences in the semblance of a dual executive, which, under less favourable circumstances, might become very serious. It was his opinion, therefore, taking also into consideration the youth of the four noblemen occupying places in the Ministry, and certain objections applying to each of them, that it would be more for the public good in every way if he were able to consult them all on an equal footing as councillors, than if he were obliged to single out one of them to be Co-Regent. The Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra was considered, as a matter of course, to be quite ineligible. But by about the middle of May, 1877, it became evident that

* Paragraph 10 of letter from the Government of India to the Resident, No. 324, dated 22nd of March, 1869.

he was to be set up by the Resident as being alone eligible. Sir Salar Jung doubtless never dreaming that the Resident would seriously push the candidature of such a nominee, abstained as long as possible from going fully into the question of his character and conduct. He chiefly dwelt at first on Wikar-ool-Oomra's utter incompetence, and on the incompatibility of the views and practices he had constantly promoted with those of the existing administration. He reminded the Resident of the fact, easily verified by inquiry in the right quarters, that so notorious was Wikar-ool-Oomra's evil disposition, that he had no respectable adherents, and that even in the Palace household, where his relationship gave him such advantages, he had no influence whatever.

As the Resident's object became more clearly defined, and his determination to effect it more evident, Sir Salar Jung recalled to his recollection the strong opinion as to Wikar-ool-Oomra's unfitness always expressed by the late Amcer-i-Kabeer, his elder half-brother, even to the last act of making a will bequeathing, so far as he could dispose of matters requiring sovereign decision, his title and estates to the nephews whom he had adopted as his sons, and nominating one of them—Busheer-ood-Dowla, grandson of one Nizam and brother-in-law of the reigning Prince—to succeed him as Co-Regent. This nomination was made in accordance with the despatch of the Government of India, No. 394, dated 22nd March, 1869, all the injunctions of which were in fact neglected or violated by Lord Lytton's Government in 1877. If we add to the tried and approved qualifications of Busheer-ood-Dowla, the possession of an unsullied character, his known loyalty to both Governments, and the certainty of his harmonious co-operation with the surviving member of the Regency, it will seem very strange that he should have been summarily set aside—by the British authorities of all people, in favour of his half-uncle, who was remarkable only for every opposite quality, and for every possible disqualification. It will not, however, seem so strange on the supposition, of which we shall soon make a certainty, that harmonious co-operation was exactly what the Resident did not desire, that what he wanted was not a colleague for the Minister, but a clog.

Sir Richard Meade, when recommending Wikar-ool-Oomra for the position of Co-Regent, was fully acquainted with that nobleman's previous history, with the proscription from which he had been but partially relieved in 1869, and with very recent instances of his incurable hostility to the cause of good order and to the first principles of regular government. The more serious and unequivocal instances of Wikar-ool-Oomra's misconduct were on

record in our own archives; the plot for the personation of the Resident's wife by the woman Murray in 1861, with all its incidents of bribery and deception, had been judicially investigated at the Residency. It was on being "found guilty" of this corrupt and nefarious intrigue, that the sentence of "complete political extinction" had been pronounced against Wikar-ool-Oomra. Moreover, the records of Sir Richard Meade's own office accused Wikar-ool-Oomra of having been closely connected with Moulwee Ala-ood-deen, who organized the attack on the Residency in 1857, which, had it been successful, would have spread the flames of the Mutiny over all Southern India; of having, in 1858, harboured and comforted mutineers and rebels against the British Government, and of having on several other occasions been suspiciously allied with disaffected persons and even with dangerous criminals. For example, the Resident was reminded that, even as late as the previous year, 1876, when a body of 1,000 Pathans were expelled from the city of Hyderabad because some of them were implicated in the assassination of the young Nizam's religious teacher, Wikar-ool-Oomra sent for two of the reputed ringleaders, took them under his own protection, in his own household, and actually had one of them privately presented to the Nizam, without the knowledge and expressly in contempt of the Minister. When at length it was reported that others of the same fanatical band were about to be brought into the Palace, under Wikar-ool-Oomra's patronage, to present their homage to the young Nizam, Sir Salar Jung, was obliged to interfere, and to warn all concerned in these proceedings that Wikar-ool-Oomra, in spite of his rank and position, had no public functions or authority in the State.

In case the Viceroy in Council should express a decided opinion that the Minister ought not to remain sole head of the Executive Government, Sir Salar Jung had declared that he was willing to associate Busheer-ood-Dowla with himself in the Regency, or to establish a Council of State. But the Viceroy in Council expressed no decided opinion at all, and made no direct communication on the subject of the Regency from the death of the Ameer-i-Kabeer in April until the 28th of August, 1877, when the Resident suddenly wrote to inform the Minister that he had received the "final" orders of the Government as to the new scheme of administration, and that Wikar-ool-Oomra, now to be entitled Ameer-i-Kabeer in succession to his half-brother, must be appointed Co-Regent. Of course Sir Salar Jung declined to take any part in such an appointment, or to accept any responsibility for it whatever; whereupon the Resident angrily threatened that he would, in the name of

the British Government, summon the nobles of the Hyderabad State to assemble, and would announce to them that the Ameer-i-Kabeer was appointed to be Co-Regent. Such a blow at the internal independence of the Hyderabad State, was clearly contrary to the stipulations of existing Treaties.

At this very critical conjuncture (about the 22nd of September, 1877), Sir Richard Meade took a trip by railway, to a junction-station about 120 miles from Hyderabad, to pay a flying visit to Lord Lytton, who was on his way to Mysore. On the Resident's return, a message was conveyed to Sir Salar Jung, we may be sure by an indirect channel, to the effect that, full powers having now been obtained from the Viceroy, if he again refused to acquiesce in the "final orders," *his arrest and deportation to Madras* by a special train, on the Nizam's own State railway, would follow. When one of these master-strokes of "political" cajolery or coercion is undertaken, the communication is always verbal if possible, or if anything must be written, a private and familiar note from an inferior hand is chosen, and the official form avoided.* We are not, therefore, in a position to give absolute proof of the authenticity or authority of this disgraceful threat, the reality of which was widely talked of in Hyderabad; but although we do not believe the actual perpetration of the outrage to have been intended, Sir Salar Jung himself undoubtedly believed it. Having already been told that a man of the character and antecedents of Wikar-ool-Oomra would be installed, in defiance of the Durbar, without pretext or warrant, he no doubt assumed that the Resident had full permission to proceed to any extremities, and may well have argued that his duty now lay in submission; for if he resisted until he was made a prisoner, the administrative independence of the State would be utterly destroyed, and the reign of unrestrained reaction and corruption instituted. The calculation on which the menace was hazarded proved to be correct. The Minister gave in. He intimated that, as the Resident had taken upon himself to inform the Ameer-i-Kabeer that he was to be Co-Regent, he would endeavour to act with him, but he disclaimed all responsibility for the appointment, or for the conduct of the Residency nominee after his elevation to power. The Ameer-i-Kabeer was installed at a Durbar in the Palace on the 29th of September, 1877, in the presence of the Resident and of the youthful Nizam.

* See Captain Davidson's Note threatening military occupation, *ante* p. 445, and compare the letter which Captain Grey was made to write for Lord Lytton in the hope of deluding the Ameer Sher Ali to come to Delhi.—"Further Afghan Papers" (c. 2,191 of 1878), p. 9.

Only a short time elapsed before the true and only object of this retrogressive and violent intervention was triumphantly displayed. A paper was prepared at the Residency pledging both the Regents neither to agitate the question of the Berars and the Contingent, nor to solicit more specific replies to the claims yet unanswered, until the young Nizam should have attained his majority. This paper—we may be sure, already signed by the Ameer-i-Kabeer—was presented for acceptance to Sir Salar Jung. He seems to have signed it, if not without reluctance, at least without hesitation. He could not act alone in a Regency of two, or rather as a minority in a Council of three. He was now chained to a colleague who was the Resident's creature; but he still possessed one element of strength in the person of his English private Secretary. This gentleman, the son of Colonel Oliphant, formerly Chairman of the Court of Directors, was alike by his own character and the traditions of his family above the faintest suspicion of intrigue or disloyalty against our Government; but he had rendered himself obnoxious to the Resident by certain acts of honest duty to his own employer. He had helped the Minister to prepare his Berar appeals. He had successfully resisted an attempt made at the Delhi Imperial Assemblage, to extort admissions from the Regents of a nature at variance with the solemnly recorded treaty rights of the Hyderabad State. He had rendered clerical aid in conducting the Minister's case against the appointment of Wikar-ool-Oomra; and, lastly, he had ventured to send copies of some letters on these topics to several high-placed friends in this country. So determined was the Resident to cut off Sir Salar Jung from the possession of even literary assistance that—throwing not only treaty rights, but even common decency to the winds—he peremptorily ordered the Minister to dismiss his Secretary, and dismissed he was.

And now the Resident was fully prepared for the arrival from the India Office, of the reply to the complete statement of the Berar case which, under the sanction of Lord Salisbury, had been submitted to the Viceroy after the Delhi Imperial Assemblage. The Secretary of State kept it by him for about eight months, but being urged to pass a draft disposing of it before he moved from the India Office to the Foreign Department, and not to leave it to his successor, a despatch dated the 28th of March, 1878, prepared by the permanent officials, was addressed to the Government of India. In this despatch the specific request that the Contingent should be abolished, which formed the whole subject matter of the prayer in the Nizam's memorial, was not even alluded to. The omission was glaring, and would have called forth a

rejoinder under any ordinary circumstances, as a matter of course. The only practical suggestion in this letter, harmonized with the terms already imposed by the Resident, viz., that the consideration of all the claims of the Hyderabad State should be postponed until the Nizam came of age. As the Minister was now effectually fettered by means of the appointment of the Amcer-i-Kabeer and the dismissal of Mr. Oliphant, the communication of this despatch to him in May was almost a superfluous form.

On what principle of public law, or on what moral grounds, the Regency of Hyderabad could be asked to suspend, during the Nizam's minority, the appeal for the Berars, or how the Government of India could be justified in refusing, during the same interval, to answer or to hear that appeal, has never been explained, and still demands explanation. It could hardly be right for the Minister to be negligent because the Nizam was a child. It could hardly be right for the Government of India to be unmindful or intolerant of a claim to justice, because the claimant was very young. At all events, to attain the ends in view by dragging from his well-merited obscurity to the highest post of political power in the State a man possessed of every disqualification save the single one that he was willing to do our bidding in shelving for a time an unanswerable claim for justice, is to admit that we are prepared to sacrifice our most loyal friends, and the interests and safety of a whole people, by the help and for the profit of the disloyal, the moment that some ignoble and temporary advantage can be gained by doing so.

PART III.

THE BRITISH RESIDENT.

It might reasonably have been hoped that the circumstances attending the appointment of this Wikar-ool-Oomra to the office of Co-Regent of the State, would have made the British authorities exceedingly cautious and watchful as to his discharge of its powers. He had been taken by them out of obscurity for a distinctly immoral—but special—purpose, and placed in a position which, Sir Salar Jung had warned them, “he would at once attempt to abuse to his own advantage.” Knowing what would follow, Sir Salar Jung distinctly and formally warned the Resident that he (Sir Salar Jung) “must not be held responsible for the Amcer’s acts.” Had it been even justifiable for the Resident to bring forward as candidate for the Co-Regency, a man whose hostility to Sir Salar Jung was notoriously his sole recommendation in the

eyes of our officials, common prudence suggested the propriety of looking well after him when he was once installed. He was appointed only to silence the remonstrances of Sir Salar Jung on the subject of his sovereign's alienated districts. To suppress these remonstrances, the British Resident had condescended to hector, and prevaricate, and deceive the old and tried Minister, our faithful friend, with threats of dpositing and even imprisoning him—threats which even the Government of Lord Lytton would not have dared to carry into effect, as to have done so would have at once produced that exposure of their policy which they dread, and which we have resolved to make. The appointment having accomplished its specific purpose, common prudence suggested, we say, that the Co-Regent should have been suffered to do no more. To permit him to follow his own bent, and disclose those bad features of his character with which the Resident well knew he was credited, seemed purposeless and insane. There was every inducement, one would have thought, to show that, as Co-Regent, he would be made by the Resident to do the ordinary work of his place, with the minimum of public scandal. The Resident's own honour, as well as the character of the Supreme Government, required that the man should be carefully prevented from abusing his newly acquired power for his own aggrandizement. The Resident had given solemn and reiterated assurances both to Sir Salar Jung and to the Ameer's nephews (the heirs of his deceased half-brothers) that if they would waive their superior claim to succeed to the title of "Shunis-ool-Oomra," and to the office of Co-Regent, in the Ameer's favour, he would lay no claim, on the ground of title or office, to any part of the property or estates in their possession as his half-brothers' heirs. It was the younger of these nephews, the nobleman who had acted as Co-Regent during Sir Salar Jung's tour to Europe, and was Minister of Justice, who ought to have been selected by us (if any); but then he would have been of no use for the special purpose that the Resident had in hand.

It is necessary to explain here that Wikar-ool-Oomra is the last survivor of three brothers. They were, all three, sons of the same father, who was the premier noble of the Hyderabad State, and whose first wife was a daughter of his Highness the Nizam, and of her were born, in regular marriage, the two elder brothers of the present Ameer. The Ameer himself is the son of a woman of inferior rank altogether, and was consequently half-brother only to the two elder deceased sons. The eldest of the three was Co-Regent, and colleague of Sir Salar Jung, who died in 1877. He left no issue, but had adopted the sons of his younger brother, who had pre-

deceased him. The family now consisted of the present Ameer, and the two sons left by his second half-brother. These two young men are of superior rank altogether to their half-uncle, the Ameer, and inherited the vast estates and possessions of his two elder brothers both by descent and adoption. Their revenues amounted, it is believed, to about twenty lakhs annually. The Amoer, Wikar-ool-Oomra, possessed simply his own estates, but these also were very large, yielding an income of about £100,000 a year.

Very soon after the Ameer's appointment, his power to sway Sir Richard Meade became evident. Confident of the Resident's support, and intoxicated with the power conferred upon him, he quickly determined to wrest from his nephews the very property inherited by them from their father and uncle, which Sir Richard Meade had pledged himself should be respected. The young men urged these pledges upon the Resident, and upon his assistant, Major Euan Smith. The Resident was bound, they pointed out, to make the Ameer respect his pledges, for he was a party to them in the way we have already described. They had withdrawn their own candidature, and their opposition to the Ameer's appointment to the Co-Rogency, on the faith of the Resident's assurances that no attempt should be made by the Ameer on their possessions. In defiance of all these pledges, the Ameer shortly after his appointment made a demand upon them, for which he did not even allege a pretext, for the transfer to himself of estates yielding a revenue of £25,000 a year; and the Resident urged the nephews to let him have their property "for the sake of not creating strife."* Wo make no comment upon the transaction.

The success of his first operation opened the Ameer's eyes to the full value of a British Resident whom he could thus use to disarm resistance against his exactions. He now asserted that he was want of ready money, and straightway made a requisition† of £50,000 upon the young men for the "support of his dignity." The Residency screw was again applied‡ on his behalf, and the money paid, in the vain hope that exaction would be carried no further without being finally stopped by a British officer of the high rank of the Hyderabad Resident, holding the blue ribbon of the Indian political service.

But the robbery of the £50,000 was hardly effected than another demand followed. The claim now made upon his nephews' inherit-

* See their Memorial, para. 12.

† See Memorial, para. 12 (b).

‡ See Memorial, para. 12 (b).

ance was for the magnificent suburban house and grounds, with hanging gardens, artificial lakes, and labyrinths, called the Jehan-nooma—the most attractive place of Hyderabad. Incredible as it must seem, the Resident supported the monstrous exaction, and once more had the hapless nephews to submit. Two conditions, however, were now distinctly stipulated, viz.: First, that the Jehan-nooma should be possessed by the Ameer only as an appanage to the title of “Shums-ool-Oomra; and secondly, that this so-called “voluntary assignment,” but actual robbery, should be the last of the Ameer’s claims upon them, and that he should make no attempt upon “the other estates in the possession of his nephews.” Major Euan Smith, the Assistant Resident, was “virtually the arbitrator” in this precious “settlement,”* under the control and responsibility, of course, of the Resident. The Ameer’s representative in these delicate negotiations with the Residency, was the son of a Parsee shopkeeper, one Shapoorjee, who had suddenly sprung into great favour at the Residency,† and the *pourparlers* on these matters occupied the first six months of the Ameer’s reign as Co-Regent, from September, 1877, to the end of March, 1878. The Resident may at last have hoped that his *protégé*, the Ameer, would be satiated with the success attending the despoiling of his nephews, and that Major Euan Smith’s arrangement with him that there were to be no more exactions upon them, ratified on the 9th April, 1878, would be respected. Sir Richard Meade may be credited with sincerity when he piously exclaimed, “Alhamd-ool-Illah!” (God be praised) upon being informed to this effect by the Ameer himself.‡

But Wikar-ool-Oomra divined that his power to use the British Resident was by no means exhausted. His appetite “grew by what it fed on.”§ The Resident was to be a party to complicity in outrage on a grander scale. Two of the principal estates remaining to the nephews, yielding a rental of £40,000 a year, were in charge of one Mahomed Shookoor, their servant. In January, 1879, the Ameer seduced this man from his allegiance, and concerted measures with him for the transfer of the entire territory to his own possession. The districts, almost as large as provinces, could be seized only by military force, and the very magnitude of the robbery inspired his nephews with a belief that the Resident would interpose to veto the spoliations, now that they were approaching to civil war.

* See Memorial, para. 13.

† See Memorial, para. 13.

‡ See Memorial, para. 13.

§ See Memorial, para. 15.

When, therefore, a proclamation was issued in the districts, in the name of the Ameer, that the property was his, and he began to send out large bodies of mercenary troops and "large quantities of arms and ammunition,"* the nephews did no more than communicate the startling news to the Minister, Sir Salar Jung, and then to the Resident by letter, dated 11th June, 1879, which stated that "the matter is placed officially before the Resident, so as to prevent bloodshed." The reply of the infatuated officer, dated 13th June, consisted of a direct refusal to receive their representation on the subject, thereby simply giving a *carte blanche* to the Ameer to do what he pleased. The nephews at last ordered a body of troops to advance to the imperilled districts. Sir Salar Jung, unable to contend against the coalition between his hostile colleague the Ameer, and the Resident, was powerless to prevent the wrong, but afraid of a civil war, which would have been set down at once to the discredit of the State, instead of the Resident, he, sorely against the grain, but wisely, counselled the nephews to halt their troops. The Ameer advanced and seized everything. No word of remonstrance was uttered by the Resident, who was saved having to answer for a disaster that might have kindled a wide-spread flame, by the rare moderation of the aggrieved party, whom he was permitting the Ameer to despoil.

The inhabitants of the districts thus overrun by Arab and Rohilla mercenaries, knowing well that it was only with the Resident's support that the Ameer could have dared for one moment to enter on such proceedings, addressed an urgent petition to the Resident, representing the state to which they were reduced by the incursion. The Ameer's troops were "pulling down their houses for firewood, foraging their horses on their harvests, looting their principal buildings, ravishing their women shamefully, and without distinguishing between respectable women and those who are not such;" and adding, "At present one or two women are in a dying state from the harsh usage committed on their persons by the Rohillas."

To this memorial, Sir Richard Meade replied by an endorsement, but not until five days after its receipt, as follows: "Petitioners are informed that they can make their own representations to his Highness's Government, or the several Nawabs named by them. The Resident cannot interfere, as he has no knowledge of the facts."

This was again a *carte blanche* to the Ameer; for, as Sir Richard

* See Memorial, para. 20.

† Memorial, para. 28.

well known, he had himself made the Ameer "his Highness's Government." Petition after petition was sent in to Sir Salar Jung, entreating that the Resident might be called on by his Highness's Government to interfere; but as the Ameer and the Resident were practically "his Highness's Government," Sir Salar Jung could not move, and "his Highness's Government" declined to put one of its two members on trial before itself.

The reply of the Resident to the cry of the villagers having been received, the way to further spoliation was easy. The next month, another body of mercenaries was sent by the Ameer to seize other estates, yielding a revenue of about £12,000 per annum. Taught by experience, the nephews could now trust to the sword only, to defend their remaining possessions. They at once occupied the threatened districts in force. An attack was made by the Ameer's mercenaries on a powder magazine at the important town of Shumsabad, but was repulsed. The flame of actual civil war thus once again threatened the State, while the British Resident stood by, uttering no word of moderation or warning to the aggressor. Sir Salar Jung made strenuous efforts to effect a pacification, but was only able to do so by again entreating, and finally persuading, the wronged parties to submit.

The young Princes at last abandoned the idea of armed resistance under pressure of the Minister's solicitations. Their spoliation was complete. The Ameer had possessed himself by open violence, attended with the outrages we have described, of estates to which he had no shadow of title, yielding a revenue of about £100,000 a year. The young noblemen who had been thus despoiled, now put their case into the hands of an English barrister of the High Court of Bombay, and that gentleman, Mr. Tyrrell Leith, proceeded to Hyderabad and sought an interview with Sir Richard Meade, to ascertain, if possible, upon what grounds he had connived at their spoliation. It would serve no useful purpose, and would only weary our readers, to narrate the mockery of judicial procedure which followed upon Mr. Leith's appearance. Sir Richard Meade refused even to see him, but advised the Nizam's Government—that is, the Ameer—to institute at once a so-called inquiry, not into the lawfulness of the proceedings by which he had plundered his nephews, but calling upon the nephews to *disprove* the genuineness of a scrap of paper which the Ameer at the last moment, and but three days before Mr. Leith's arrival, professed to have found in the palace of the late Nizam, directing that the two estates *last seized* should be transferred to himself upon the death of his half-brother. Not one word had been

heard of this scrap of paper till now. The estates had been seized without pretext, by open violence, under the eyes of the Resident, and with his palpable connivance; and but for Sir Salar Jung's counsels and influence, the outrage would have thrown the Nizam's country into anarchy, and undone the Minister's labours of the last twenty years. Not one word of the Ameer's proceedings did Sir Richard Meade report to the Government of India; and we need hardly say that neither Her Majesty's Government in Downing Street, nor the Parliament and people of this country, would ever have heard of them, but for our full determination that they should be known. All that Sir Richard Meade could do by countenancing the Ameer in his proceedings he has done, to plunge the country into a state of civil war, when the world would have been asked, how it was possible for us to give back the Berars to a rule such as the Nizam's. At the last moment, we say, and but three days before Mr. Leith arrived at Hyderabad, the Ameer professed to have discovered in a box that had been lying somewhere in the palace for twenty years, the scrap of paper on which he based an *ex post facto* justification of his last act of lawless violence. It was literally a loose scrap of paper. No one could recognize the handwriting, and the paper bore no signature whatever. It was an anonymous memorandum alleging that one Mama Peeroo, a servant of the palace (now dead), came on the 14th October, 1857, from within the women's apartments, and told one Mahomed Kajali, a man servant of the palace (also now dead), who in turn told the unknown writer of this precious memorandum that [presumably by the Nizam's orders] the two districts (which the Ameer had last seized) should be his after the death of his half-brother! We feel that the statement is incredible, when we add that the British Resident at once accepted the memorandum as complete justification *ex post facto* of the Ameer's robberies; challenged the despoiled Princes to disprove it; hurried forward in the most shamelessly indecent way, what he called a judicial inquiry into the facts, before a tribunal that he well knew did not dare to oppose either the Ameer or himself, and from which he directed the English barrister to be rigorously excluded; openly coached the judge at all stages, writing to him that his inquiry "may clear up the case in a way favourable to the plaintiffs which is not now apparent," and finally pronounced his complete satisfaction with the dictum of this tribunal, which was that, as the despoiled nephews could not disprove the authenticity of the scrap of paper which the Ameer brought forward in justification of his title *ex post facto*, the property should remain in the possession of the plunderer! We are abbreviating the story to the utmost, for the reasons

we have already given. No more scandalous perversion of justice was ever associated with the administration of a civilized government. The result is that in the State of Hyderabad, and in every part of India where the facts are known, the very idea of justice emanating from a British officer is scoffed and jeered at, and we now expressly charge Sir Richard Meade with inflicting this shame upon our nation.

Conscious of the true character of the proceedings, the Resident would seem to have succeeded in keeping all knowledge of them from the Calcutta Foreign Office. At all events that Office has shown no sign, although an appeal was addressed to it by the despoiled Princes more than a year ago. The appeal had to go through Sir Richard Meade's own hands, as Resident, in the usual routine order by which justice is made impossible in India. The memorial, if ever sent forward at all by him, would be sure to be accompanied in the customary official way by representations that would prevent any review or reversal of his proceedings. And unless, as Anglo-Indian publicists, we have the courage to lay the history of such transactions bare, they can never be heard of at all. The most melancholy part of the story to ourselves is the fact that Sir Salar Jung allowed himself to be betrayed into a seeming agreement with the Resident and the Ameer in these proceedings. The truth is, one would need to be oneself in the position of this great but unfortunate Minister to understand the dangers and embarrassments that environ him. Hemmed in on all hands, by the power of the British Resident and the creatures of the Co-Regent, he has carried his policy of retirement and conciliation to most undue lengths. At all events, we can allow no regard for Sir Salar Jung, nor even the sense we have of what we owe to him as a nation, to make us hush up the proceedings which have so deeply disgraced the British name at Hyderabad of late years. Who can wonder that the ex-Resident's name is associated with rumours of the most painful character in that city? We shall not conceal, for we ought not to conceal, the fact that rumours have been prevalent at Hyderabad for the past three years which, unless explained, are fatal to the character both of the Resident and of Major Euan Smith. Incidents, the full particulars of which are in our possession, which demand explanation, and which may be explainable as innocent on their merits, though hardly defensible in any case against the charge of unaccountable imprudence, are necessarily invested by public suspicion with the most sinister aspects, especially when there is on the face of the transactions generally, so much that is difficult to account for. Sir Salar Jung weakly consented to allow his own nephew to be appointed to conduct the mock inquiry set up to justify

the Ameer's robberies; but no one in Hyderabad suspects Sir Salar Jung, or his nephew, of anything more than bowing to the sinister influences that have ruled the State since the Ameer was appointed, at the instigation of the Resident, to the supreme power. For unworthy purposes this Ameer has been set up as practically the ruler of Hyderabad, and the result is the reintroduction of the lawlessness of past times. Unhappily, another result may prove to be the ruin of the young Nizam; for melancholy stories have reached the Government of India itself, of the effect produced on the boy Prince by the influences with which he is surrounded. For it must be added that as if to consummate the injustice inflicted upon them, the two despoiled Princes, who, as the premier nobles of the land, are his natural companions, have been from the time their spoliation began, excluded—of course, again with the concurrence of the Resident—from the Nizam's Court, and even prohibited, as though they were criminals, from appearing on public occasions. The effect has been equivalent to their social disgrace in the eyes of all the nobles and people of Hyderabad, without pretext of any sort for the dishonour. So keenly did the elder of the two Princes feel the bitterness of their position, that he died a few months ago heart-broken, and he was permitted to die without even knowing whether his appeal against the Resident's injustice had ever reached the Government of India or not. Incredible as the statement is, it is the fact that this Wikar-ool-Oomra, this Ameer, the Resident's creature, was allowed even to outrage the young nobleman's remains, and to prevent by an armed force of 80 men their being interred beside his father's grave. With Sir Richard Meade in London, we demand that these charges against him should be inquired into, for the honour of the nation, and the reform of our Indian administration.

We have reached the end of this "tale of shame" as far as it has, as yet, gone. For our own selfish purposes, we have forced a second Chundoo Loll upon the Nizam's administration. The Calcutta officials set up the former one simply to compel the Nizam to provide them with the monstrous "preserve" of patronage known as the Hyderabad Contingent Force, with its five brigadiers and brigade staffs for cushioning their sons and nephews upon. And they have now set up another to make their hold upon the Berars, with its highly-paid appointments, as secure as the Ameer's tenure of power can make it. They will never give the Provinces back but under imperative orders from Home. To retain their hold upon them they have plunged the Hyderabad State back into lawlessness, and outraged in the grossest manner the one native Indian statesman to whom the English nation owes what it can never repay.

HOME AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S explicit declaration in his Birmingham speech that the Government were determined to stand or fall by their Irish Land Bill, has had a marvellous effect in lulling the fury of the Opposition. It has compelled the Tory chiefs to consider what their position would be, if they were suddenly called upon to govern Ireland just when they had practically pledged themselves against the necessity of remedial measures. And the prospect is one that they have not the courage to face. We owe to this timidity a measure of progress for the Land Bill in its passage through Committee, which no one had hoped for. Simultaneously, too, with this, the Irish Irreconcilables appear to have discovered that their constituencies are not prepared to acquiesce in the delay or destruction of Mr. Gladstone's Bill, and are now assisting to expedite its passage through the Lower House. We may, therefore, be allowed to hope that before the end of next month it will be in process of discussion in the Upper House. The writer of a letter to the *Spectator*, referring to its possible fate there, has quoted a very timely passage from a speech of Lord Salisbury during the debates on the Disestablishment of the Irish Church, and this passage certainly evinces a degree of political good sense which, since his sudden conversion to Jingoism, has been conspicuous by its absence in Lord Salisbury. Lord Salisbury therein lays down the doctrine that when the will of the nation has been clearly pronounced in favour of any legislative change, the functions of the House of Lords cease. They may dislike the change, but the responsibility is removed from their shoulders, and transferred *in toto* to the House of Commons. It remains to be seen if Lord Salisbury will consider this rational doctrine applicable to the case of the Irish Land Bill, and much more will depend upon the conduct he adopts towards the Bill than the fate of the Bill itself. For better or for worse, Lord Salisbury has become the head of the Conservative Party. It is a position of great influence at any time, and, should the Tories return to power, it will make him Prime Minister of the empire. The nation will watch with interest his attitude towards the Land Bill, as determining what his policy is likely to be should he ever become Prime Minister. There can be no question that Lord Salisbury as he was some fifteen years ago—protesting against the surrender of Conservative principles to "the ethics of a political adventurer," or advocating a scheme of concurrent endowment in Ireland—presented a more honourable and dignified figure to the world than as the henchman and second fiddler to Lord Beaconsfield. Lord Salisbury dragged through the streets of London, like an ancient captive, to enhance the triumph of the same "political adventurer," was, assuredly, a very sorry spectacle indeed. The opportunity is now given him of redeeming his lost reputation. He has it in his power to show that the many discreditable performances of his Jingo period were, in truth, due to a temporary aberration of mind, and that he is now again restored to his worthier self.

Apart from the Irish Land Bill, there is nothing of interest in home politics; but abroad storms are gathering over Europe from more than one quarter. The

new Emperor of Russia; after vacillating for awhile to and fro, appears finally to have made his determination against all reform in the administration. This has been a great encouragement to the Nihilists, and a proportionate discouragement to the friends of Constitutional Reform. If adhered to, the resolution has soaled the fate of the Emperor Alex ander III.; and in all human probability the same terrible doom awaits him which removed his father from the world. At the same time, despite its manifest infatuation, the resolution of the Emperor ought to surprise no student of history. Between the monarchical principle and the principle of popular liberty there seems to be an antagonism which cannot cease except by the extinction of one or other. A liberating king is a contradiction in terms. We have another remarkable illustration of the hatred which royalty, by its very nature, feels for popular liberty, in the action of Prince Alexander in Bulgaria. The practice of perjury has commonly held a prominent position in the number of royal characteristics, but amid all the royal personages who have practised perjury towards their subjects it would be hard to find one so shameless as this mushroom princeling of Bulgaria. Curiously enough, this august personage has found an apologist for his treasons in the columns of a journal where one would least have expected it—the *Pall Mall Gazette*. The *Pall Mall Gazette* appears to consider it an ample justification of Prince Alexander's arbitrary proceedings, that the Bulgarian Constitution was not calculated to work well in practice. • This reasoning would equally have justified the *coup d'état* of Louis Napoleon, and, indeed, would cover any forcible subversion of popular liberties. If the Bulgarian Constitution be faulty, the people whose legitimate province it is to amend it are the Bulgarians themselves. Prince Alexander, if he objected to that Constitution so strongly, had the remedy in his own hands. He could resign his office and retire into private life. But having sworn to observe the Constitution, it was a gross breach of faith to dissolve the Representative Assembly, and attempt to transform himself into a despot by means of a *plebiscite* carried out under military terrorism. In truth, it is no better than an insult to the intelligence of its readers for the *Pall Mall Gazette* to undertake the defence of such proceedings. Any one in the smallest degree versed in the politics of modern Europe knows that Prince Alexander would not have dared to act as he has done, if despots of a more powerful kind were not secretly impelling him, and had pledged themselves to protect him. Prince Alexander being a prince, unfortunately thinks little of breaking an oath which he has solemnly sworn. To do this seems to be normal in royal personages. But it requires no power of divination to know that it is the Austrian Government—that abiding enemy of justice, freedom, mercy, and honour—which stands behind the Prince and is directing his movements. As to the pretence that the Bulgarians are unfit for political freedom, it is a plea which these Continental despots would as readily urge against the British people as against the Bulgarians. In the eyes of these crowned enemies of the human race, no people ever has, nor ever will be fit for political freedom. But the plea is one which an Englishman should regard it as disgraceful to advance; and it is as absurd as it is disgraceful. Allowing the Bulgarians are unfit to govern themselves, is Prince Alexander of Battenburg likely to govern a bit better? Are the Russian officers with whom he is surrounded, men fitted to watch over the nascent liberties of a young State? The fact is that the talk about this and that people being incapable of "self-government," is the silliest nonsense. In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, the people are infinitely more capable of "self-government" than are their rulers to govern them, for this sufficient reason, that they know their own

wants far better than any one can find them out ~~for~~ them. What is all political progress but the gradual vindication by the people of this right of "self-government" from the privileged classes who would withhold it from them? Among the nations of the world, which are the happier and the better governed:—those where the people govern themselves, or those where the people were governed by despots and bureaucracies? It is quite certain that the Bulgarians have a great deal to learn in the way of "self-government," but it is still more certain that they can learn nothing from a forsworn lieutenant of Prussian Hussars, and a gang of Muscovite officers brought up in the worst governed country in Europe, the Ottoman Empire alone excepted. Our own Government at this moment might strike a great stroke not only for Bulgarian liberty, but for constitutional freedom all over the world, and we shall rejoice if they exhibit the courage requisite for this. We do not mean that they are forcibly to intervene in the internal affairs of Bulgaria. That is impossible; and were it not so, such interference would set South-eastern Europe in a flame. But by simply calling a spade a spade, they could checkmate the course of Prince Alexander, and defeat the secret designs of Austria. There is, however, hardly any hope of an English Ministry rising to the level of the occasion.

The French Government has apparently found the Kroumirs a nut too difficult to crack, and is withdrawing its troops from Tunis without attempting their subjugation. A French column it is said, attempted to penetrate to the Kroumir hills, but found the task more than it could manage. They suffered from the attacks of the mountaineers, and still more from typhoid fever: and it has been found on the whole to be safer, if not quite so glorious, to parade the streets of Marseilles than to thread the defiles of these wild mountains. Meanwhile the French are already beginning to suffer from the Nemesis which follows in the wake of unrighteous conquest. Tunis was annexed in order to insure the security of Algiers, and now they have discovered that it will be necessary to annex Tripoli in order to insure the security of Tunis. The fact is that whether it be French or English, when a nation starts upon a career of annexation, in order to obtain a "scientific frontier," it finds that it must go on joining field to field until there is no place left for it on the earth; and this because the removing of one neighbour's landmark inevitably rouses the fears of every other neighbour lest their landmarks, too, should be removed.

An apparently trifling incident has occurred in Calcutta which, unless Sir Ashley Eden, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and the other officials concerned exhibit a degree of moderation and common sense which cannot reasonably be expected of an "able Indian administrator," will, in all probability, fasten public attention upon India in the intense but fitful fashion which is usual with us. It is impossible to say beforehand what will effect this most desirable result. Trifles will accomplish it, when events of real importance produce no impression whatever. Lord Lytton, Sir John Strachey, and Sir George Couper carelessly starved to death a million of Her Majesty's subjects in the North-West Provinces, and Great Britain went on eating and drinking, marrying and giving in marriage, and was altogether too busy to waste its time and temper over such a trifle. In all probability neither Mr. Gladstone nor Mr. Bright, nor any other member of the Cabinet is aware to this day of the occurrence to which we refer. But now the authorities in Calcutta have prohibited Protestant missionaries from preaching in the squares and streets of Calcutta, and if this does not arouse the indignation of Protestantism in this country, we shall be greatly surprised. We earnestly hope it will. No matter what may be the cause, it is to the profit of

India whenever the attention of the British nation is directed to the action of the authorities in that dependency, because only in this way is there any chance of the immenso stupidity of Anglo-Indian officialism becoming known to the public in this country. The present story is briefly this:—

In India, open-air ceremonies form a conspicuous element in both the Hindu and Mohammedan religions. At sunrise and at sundown the Faithful are to be seen drawn up in long lines to pray together in the squares and other open places. Religious processions, both Hindu and Moslem, are perpetually passing to and fro through the streets of the town. When Christian missionaries began their operations in India they, as a matter of necessity, adopted the customs of the country. They preached in the bazaars of the cities, and in the open spaces in the centres of the native villages. In Calcutta, as elsewhere, this open air preaching has gone on for years; all the religious denominations have adopted it more or less; and there have been no breaches of order worth mentioning, or any public inconvenience. Wellington Square is a large open space in the centre of Calcutta, with tanks of water, and nicely laid-out gardens, and a favourite resort of the native population in the cool of the evening. It has long been used by the missionaries as a favourable place for open-air preaching. It has also been so used by Moslem and Hindu preachers, and no objection has ever been raised. About the middle of May last, a slight disturbance was occasioned in the Square, beginning in a dispute between some bystanders and a Hindu preacher belonging to one of the missionary societies. The disturbance was of the most trivial character. The preacher had been in the habit of addressing his audience from a particular bench, and finding some people in possession of the bench he desired to oust them. He was had up before the magistrate and fined ten rupees for creating a disturbance. There the matter ought to have ended; but it is one of the peculiarities of the “able Indian administrator” that he regards the Protestant missionary with a deep and undisguised aversion. The bishops, and the chaplains on the ecclesiastical establishment, he does not dislike. They are officials like himself, and preach and pray in obedience to orders received from the Governor-General in Council, but the Protestant missionary is a lawless creature owning no allegiance to the official hierarchy. Consequently Bengal officialism could not resist the temptation to do something nasty to people whom it regards as natural enemies. There is a Calcutta Municipality, the Chairman of which is a Mr. Harrison, a Bengal Civilian, and its members are in the main either Hindu or Mohammedan gentlemen of Calcutta. The municipality has, of course, nothing to do with the maintenance of order in the streets and squares of Calcutta. Its duties are to look after the lighting and cleansing of the streets, and the conservancy of the town generally. But Mr. Harrison is also Commissioner of the City Police; and in *this* capacity he is responsible for the preservation of the public peace. He, however, fell into signal confusion with regard to the duties attaching to his two offices; and, as Chairman of the Municipality, took it upon himself to suspend the prescriptive right of the missionaries to preach in the squares of Calcutta, unless they first obtained a licence from him. This preposterous assumption of power was no sooner made than it had to be abandoned. Its immediate effect would have been to destroy the attitude of complete impartiality which the Government of India strives to maintain towards all the various religions of India. A Protestant missionary, licensed by the Civilian Chairman of the Municipality to preach the Gospel in Wellington Square, would not be distinguishable, in native eyes, from a Government functionary enforcing an official creed. On the other hand, the refusal of a licence to preach would logically

compel a similar refusal to the open-air religious ceremonies of Hindus and Moslems. Defeated, however, when attacking the missionaries as Chairman of the Calcutta Municipality, Mr. Harrison found that he could still assail them with effect as Commissioner of the City Police. Consequently, on the 17th May, 1881, he issued the following order:—

On the 20th April last, an order was issued, prohibiting meetings for religious preaching in Wellington Square and other squares belonging to the Corporation of Calcutta, except when the person preaching had been duly authorized by the officiating Chairman to use the Square for that purpose.

This order was necessitated by the disturbances that had recently occurred in Wellington Square, but, though the prohibition has been disregarded in certain cases, no prosecution has yet been instituted, as it was brought to the notice of the officiating Commissioner of Police, that the practice of preaching without authorization had for some years past been very general, and that several of the preachers claimed it as a right, with which the Corporation of the town of Calcutta had no power to interfere.

On the evening of the 14th inst., a serious disturbance again occurred in Wellington Square, in consequence of, and connected with, the claim of certain Hindn preachers to exercise the so-called right above referred to. This renders it imperatively necessary to interfere in the interests of order, and temporarily to prohibit all preaching in Wellington Square, as well as to place it under necessary restrictions.

It is therefore ordered, that no assembly or meeting for religious preaching, for lecturing, or for any religious service shall be held in Wellington Square till further orders. Also that no such assembly shall be held in Beadon Square, College Square, Wellesley Square, or Cornwallis Square, unless the preacher or person conducting the service, or lecturer, be duly authorized in writing by the officiating Commissioner of Police.

The police-officers on duty will show a copy of this order to the preacher, or person conducting the service or lecturer, and to the leading members of the assembly, and should warn them, that unless they peaceably disperse at once, it will be necessary to institute a prosecution against them for infringing this order.

This is an admirable illustration of official logic and the governing sagacity of Anglo-Indian officialism. A "serious disturbance," or rather what Mr. Harrison is pleased, for his own purposes, to call such, occurs in Wellington Square. No attempt is made to bring any rioters to justice, but a sweeping order is issued suspending a public right which has existed in India for more than half a century. Any one who enters a London park on a Sunday will find a dozen groups collected here and there listening to itinerant preachers. If these groups were attacked by city roughs, what should we say if, instead of arresting the roughs, the police dispersed the orderly groups and compelled the preachers to abstain from further speaking? Yet this is precisely what Mr. Harrison has taken upon himself to do. A missionary, Mr. Hobbs, who had been in the habit of preaching in one of the prohibited places, went thither after the issue of this order. The people thought he had come to preach, and collected round him as usual. But he observed that preaching having been prohibited he could not follow his usual practice, and, therefore, instead of it, he would read to them from an interesting Bengalee book, which he had brought with him. The people were delighted, and collected round him, but the police inspector was unable to distinguish between preaching a sermon and reading a book, and Mr. Hobbs was compelled to desist. Six missionaries, however, have felt it their duty to persist in preaching on the ground that the order of the Police Commissioner is *ultra vires*; and that he has no more right or power to prohibit their preaching than to prohibit their entrance to the public squares. These six missionaries are accordingly to be tried for defiance of the Commissioner's order. If it can be shown that that order was *ultra vires*, the incident will be at an end; but if the order is upheld, it is obvious that it is one to which the missionaries can pay no attention. If the Bengal Government is determined to put a stop to the preaching of Christianity in the streets and squares of Calcutta, there is only one way in which it can accomplish its object—it must incarcerate every missionary the instant he enters Calcutta. We earnestly hope that this matter will be taken up, not merely by the great religious bodies at home, but by all good Liberals. It is at bottom a piece of petty spite and petty persecution—an illustration of that insatiable desire for domination in small things as well as great which is engendered in the Indian Civilian by the character of the official system which he administers.



The Statesman.

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EDITORIAL NOTES.

LET the details of Mr. Gladstone's Land Bill be as defective as they may, it is a noble measure, conceived in the right spirit, and pervaded by a single-minded desire to remedy the evils against which it is directed. Those evils are notorious. Under the existing law, Irish landlords possess an almost unlimited power of oppressing their tenantry; of confiscating, in fact, the fruits of their industry, and their occupancy rights in the soil. It is idle to say that it is a minority of the landlords only, who ever assert these powers. What is it but the remorseless use of them by this minority, that has set all Ireland in a blaze, and given birth to Mr. Parnell's Land League? Well, this Bill is an honest effort to protect the tenant from such usage, in a very direct and simple way. It does not profess to be a general reform of the Land Laws of the kingdom, but an attempt to rescue the tenant from the bondage in which the existing state of the law enables a grasping landlord, or land agent, to hold him. The Tories, as a matter of course, hate the Bill, as they hate every measure that trenches upon the traditional rights of the privileged classes. They are ardent reformers, all of them, but then it is reform of a kind that leaves the wrong-doer "freedom to contract" himself out of its reach, as in the case of the Agricultural Holdings Bill. Whether the Ministry succeed or fail, they have done their duty in bringing in this Bill. Should the Tory party combine with the Home Rulers to defeat it, it will be but a fresh illustration of their determination to oppose every reform that lays the axe at the root of the tree. It is sham reform, pretended reform, and that only, that the Tottenhams and the Gibsons admire so ardently. Both these gentlemen, we observe, demand compensation from the State for the "confiscation," as they call it, of the landlord's right to appropriate to himself the fruits of his tenant's toil. The better class of Irish landlords look with contempt upon the men whose practices have necessitated this Bill, while it is these men who dare talk of compensation for being at last deprived of the legal power to rob their tenantry. It is needless for us to review the Bill at length in these pages. Its merit is that it is an attempt to put fetters upon a class of landlords who have shown themselves remorseless to the cultivator, and who have ever been the opprobrium of their own order. No really honest man will vote against the Bill but with reluctance, and under an overwhelming conviction that he ought to do so.

THE Government is steadily realizing the hopes which the country cherished from Mr. Gladstone's return to power. We do not conceal from ourselves

that a powerful minority of the nation—including, unhappily, a majority of the so-called "influential" classes—regard its course with intense repugnance and an almost furious jealousy. It is wormwood to these classes, to see difficulty after difficulty, bequeathed to the present Ministry by its predecessors, patiently dealt with, and at last surmounted, by integrity of purpose and wise discernment of the right issues to be laboured for. Never in the modern history of this country, did any Ministry work such complicated mischief as Lord Beaconsfield and his colleagues contrived to bequeath as a legacy to their successors, from their six years' reign in Downing Street. And the sting of our reproach is this, that it was not intellectual feebleness in the great leaders of the late Cabinet that produced this mischief, but the thoroughly immoral character of their policy. For the last three years of their rule, it had degenerated into something very like a conspiracy against the public liberties. Sedulously diverting attention from the inroads they were making upon the safeguards of those liberties, every effort was made to debauch the people by occupying their minds with the false glories of a great military and aggressive empire. To this hour, the nation does not yet fully know the true character of Lord Lytton's rule in India. His speeches in the Lords as to his course, have been untruthfulness itself, and the measure of the national deliverance by his recall will not be clearly understood, until a mass of matter that is now concealed in the recesses of the Secret Department of the India Office finds its way, if it ever does, to the public eye.

In the height of his career, it will be remembered that he heroically gagged the vernacular Press of India. The Bill for carrying this measure was brought into Council by Sir Ashley Eden, who openly expressed his regret on the occasion, that the English Press was not to be silenced simultaneously. The remark was levelled mainly, we believe, at this journal (*The Statesman and Friend of India*, Calcutta); indeed, we were specially referred to by name, in the papers laid before the Council. And now, let the reader recall a fact or two of Lord Lytton's course at that very time. He had inhumanly ignored then the dreadful sufferings of the people from famine, and was allowing, by his own subsequent admission, 6,000,000 of people under British rule, to die of hunger, privation, bitter cold, and intolerable heat, under circumstances of misery too harrowing to be conceived. He had his Afghan War to conduct, and, surrounded by officials of the Temple, Strachey, and Couper stamp, had made up his mind that the Natives were traditionally accustomed to hunger (true enough under our rule of late years), and that it was Utopian to attempt to save them by State aid. They were to "pull through" as they could, by the help of the mhowa flower, and roots grubbed up from the jungle. In the North-west Provinces, State aid was absolutely forbidden. And he had an overwhelming majority at his back. The entire Indian army and nearly the whole Civilian body, were furious with the one or two English journals in the country who had the courage to tell Lord Lytton in plain terms of the guilt of his course. To their lasting credit, but as we might have hoped would be the case, the missionaries of India were with us to a man; the Chaplains largely so also, and the great Education Department, which lies outside the bureaucratic official body, and is ever regarded by it with more or less jealousy. If Lord Lytton had dared take the step, Sir Ashley Eden's Bill would have suppressed *THE STATESMAN* and every English paper in the country that questioned the morality of what was being done, and the general course of our rule. Sir Salar Jung was simultaneously being goaded with insult after insult to drive him into open indiscretion, or punish him for daring, as an

honest Minister, to represent justly the young Nizam's claims upon us. The Princes of Rajpootana were being pressed with the utmost determination and injustice to raise their salt duty to a level with our own rates, while scandal after scandal was incessantly cropping up from the judicial misconduct, or executive immorality, of the official body under the Imperial Government, and Sir Richard Temple's administration of Bengal. And it was a demoralized and scandalous rule of this order, that naturally came forward to "gag" the Press. He who runs may here read, if he chooses, what a Tory Administration really means. Sir Ashley Eden's creditable measure was brought suddenly before Council, and passed through all its stages at a single sitting! And Lord Lytton dare stand up in the House of Lords, to defend his administration, relying upon the Tory ranks behind him to bear him unblushingly through. Lord Hartington, true to the principles of enlightened rule, is following up his reversal of Lord Lytton's infamous Afghan policy, by setting the Press of India free from the fetters which that most frivolous ruler and his willing tools imposed thereon. The Government is redeeming its pledges to the country, and a few years hence the Administration of 1874-80 will be remembered by the nation only as an evil dream.

THE *Standard* has an interesting notice of the mhowa tree of India;—

As the great majority of the natives of India are able to subsist on a small daily supply of simple and inexpensive food, and yet large districts are constantly threatened with or subjected to famines, the increase of permanent and reliable sources of cheap and at the same time nutritious food products is necessarily a matter of considerable importance. Among the most recent suggestions in this direction is the more extensive cultivation of the mhowa, or mahwah tree, known to botanists by the name of *Bassia latefolia*, the flowers of which, when dried, are much prized by the natives of Central India. These flowers come to maturity towards the end of February or beginning of March; and the corollas, becoming fleshy and turbid with secreted juices, gradually loosen their adhesion to the calyx, and fall to the ground in a snowy shower. The duty of collecting the crop, as it is called, is chiefly performed by women and children, who generally remain under the trees all day, alternately collecting the fallen blossoms and sleeping, the male members of the family visiting them once or twice a day to take away what has been collected. In cases where the trees are a long distance from a village, a temporary encampment is often formed, in which they live till the whole crop is secured. A first-class tree, it is said, will continue to shed its blossoms for fifteen days, at the rate of 100 lbs. a day, which weight is reduced by one-half in the process of drying. A maund (80 lbs.) of dried mhowa will furnish a fortnight's food to a family of two parents and three children. It keeps good any length of time, and is generally eaten with the seeds of the sal tree, or with the leaves of jungle plants, a small quantity of rice being sometimes added. The Natives protect such trees as exist, but, strangely enough, do not seem to take any steps to increase their number.

This general description of the mhowa tree is, we believe, true, but we have no means of verifying the yield of the blossoms. It is odd that the writer should have failed to notice that it is the mhowa flower that yields under distillation the common *spirit* consumed by the people over the greater part of the country. We notice the paragraph, however, for another purpose. The reader will observe that it is introduced by the statement that "the great majority of the natives of India are able to subsist on a small daily supply of simple and inexpensive food." The statement is true, but we are jealous of such assurances, because of the use to which they are too commonly put by the official classes of India. They are far too ready, in our experience, to make the submissiveness of the people to privation, an excuse for leaving them to pull through famine as they can. Thus the total amount spent by Sir George Couper on what was called

the relief of the starving population of the North-west Provinces in 1877-78, fell short of £80,000. As a fact, we doubt if even half that amount was properly entitled to be described as "relief." The people *could* not pull through, in spite of the mhowa flower, and the roots they grubbed up from the jungle. Their sufferings were frightful, and the mortality appalling; and while the governing officials of the country are permitted to excuse their inaction upon the plea so commonly heard in India—that the people are traditionally accustomed to hunger, we shall never see the calamity of famine dealt with in the right spirit. The Stracheys and Temples were ready enough to abet Lord Lytton in his expenditure of £20,000,000 sterling upon that most guilty Afghan War, while vehemently protesting that a people dying of hunger could live very well on a pound of grain a day. The nation must refuse to be misled by assurances that the Native of India is used to being starved. The proof that he is so is to be seen in the 5,000,000 or 6,000,000 of deaths from hunger, officially admitted by Lord Lytton and his colleagues to have occurred under his brief and disastrous rule. Let the Forest Department plant the mhowa tree by all means, but the less we hear of the people living upon its flowers the better. War inflicts terrible misery upon mankind, but what, after all, are the 50,000 or 100,000 lives sacrificed in the Afghan War to the starving agonies of 5,000,000 or 6,000,000 of our own subjects? There was not a man in Lord Lytton's whole Council and Staff who would not have deemed the writer mad who should seriously have proposed to devote £5,000,000 of money to save the lost 5,000,000 of people alive, and yet they are intensely angry at being charged with their inhumanity towards our own people, and their guilt in spending £20,000,000 upon slaughtering the Afghans. They are *Statesmen*, and we have no pretensions to the title who tell them what our convictions are upon such courses.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this new Conference at Paris on the Bi-metallic question. The Government of this empire is making a profound and lamentable mistake in standing aloof from the efforts of other nations to solve the Currency question. We fear it is leaning implicitly on Mr. Goschen; while no proof could be clearer than Mr. Goschen's speech afforded on the silver question in the Commons in June, 1879, that he has failed to master it. It is no reproach to him to say so, for we know not where to look in this country for the men who really have mastered it. We read Mr. Goschen's speech with the utmost care and attention, and rose from its perusal with a feeling akin to despair. The truth is, the subject has been so determinedly tabooed in this country for the last twenty-five years, that English statesmen are uninformed about it altogether. It is the demonetization of silver *by this country*, and the following of its evil example by Germany, that has produced the enormous, though to a large extent concealed, mischief which the fall in silver is working throughout the commercial world. The position has become this, that no one nation can remedy the evils which have been produced by the empirical legislation which demonetized silver in Germany a few years ago, except perhaps *this* nation, which mischievously set it the example. It is the legislation of this empire, and its truly monstrous currency system, ignorantly inaugurated in 1816 and completed in 1844, that are the real cause of the embarrassments which other nations are suffering from the condition of the silver market. By a just Nemesis, too, we are ourselves made to feel the evil more keenly than any other nation, from the disorder and ruin which the fall in silver has produced, not in the public finances

of India alone, but in every private and commercial relation we have with our vast empire there.

PRESIDENT GARFIELD is one of the few statesmen who see clearly the true nature of the evil, and the direction in which the remedy is to be sought. In his great speech of 17th May, 1878, in opposition to Mr. Bland's Bill, he pointed out the impossibility of the United States, "single-handed and alone," attempting to rehabilitate the metal by unlimited coinage. In the same speech, he avowed his conviction that the time was "ripe for some wise and prudent arrangement among the nations," to save silver from the complete break-down with which the demonetizing legislation of this country and Germany was bringing upon it. In his inaugural address, again, on the 4th of March last, at Washington, he declared his "confident belief that arrangements could be made between the leading commercial nations which would secure the general use of both metals." The Government of this country dare not stand aloof from the Paris Conference, for the interests of India therein are too paramount to be ignored. It should not only be represented at the Conference, but should take its full share in the proceedings, reserving only to itself freedom of action, and binding itself to nothing but a full and unprejudiced consideration of the recommendations of the Conference.

THE India Office is still unable to see what every one else sees plainly—namely, that the present mode of financing the requirements of the Home Treasury is as suicidal as it could possibly be. Thus, Mr. Platt, in his recent essay on "Money" (Simpkin, Marshall, and Co.), points out that the present unintelligent system of selling the Council drafts, is simply a sale "by auction to the highest bidder." Mr. Platt thinks that it is the Secretary of State's "bills" that are sold; but he probably discerns by this time, that the operation is really a sale by auction of the "silver" lying in the Indian Treasuries, in direct competition with the "silver" offered for sale in the London bullion market. To expect the price of silver to rally, and the metal to recover its normal value, while masses of it are being thrown upon the market every few days, for sale by auction, whether it is wanted or not, and at any price that the Exchange banks choose to tender for it, is preposterous. We are tired of calling attention to operations the character of which seems to be quite unsuspected. The financing of the Home Treasury's wants is an operation that demands the utmost skill, and attentive observation of the Exchange market. The error that is being committed is twofold. In the first place, the financing is done from the wrong end. Instead of *drawing* for the money in London, the money should be *remitted* from India. It is only under exceptional circumstances that it can be more profitable to draw than to remit. In other words, the silver lying in the Indian Treasuries should be sold upon the spot, where there is ever a more or less urgent demand for it, instead of being offered for sale in London, where the demand for silver is seldom or never urgent, and where our coined Indian silver has to compete with Mexican and American metal. In the second place, the selling of this silver at all is a very delicate operation, and should be in the hands of a thoroughly skilled Exchange banker, who would know how to keep his own counsel and conduct his business in the same way and on the same principles that the Exchange banks adopt. We are governing India by routine, by blind official machinery, and sacrificing the interests of her people at all points by our course.

THE writer of the Money Article in the *Daily News* of the 18th ult. writes:—

At the Monetary Conference, whose sittings are to begin to-morrow, the discussions will apparently turn first upon conventional bi-metallism, and, secondly, upon the alternatives to that course. As to the former head of discussion, it has been more than sufficiently threshed out already; and it is plain that the silver market is not influenced by any substantial hope of that recovery to 60d. per oz. which an unlimited demand for coinage at the equation of 15½ to 1 of gold would produce.

We look in vain in the Money Articles of the daily London papers, for any true insight into the cause of the continued depression of the silver market. Not one of these journals seems able to discern vigorously for itself what it is that prevents the price of silver rallying; and the nation has cause to complain that the men whose special vocation and business it is to throw light upon the subject, keep in the same groove from one year's end to another, without an effort to understand the true causes of the phenomena of which they speak. How can the price of silver rally, while the Secretary of State for India throws into the market £500,000 of the metal every fortnight for sale by auction at any price that the exchange banks choose to bid for it? The Council drafts, as they are called, are simply "orders for the delivery of so much silver" lying in the Indian Treasuries, and instead of attempting to make a market for the sale, to sell with discretion and to the best advantage, Lombard Street is simply invited to bid for the metal at auction, and the silver is mechanically knocked down to the highest bidder. The marvel is that under such a system, silver has maintained any value whatever. Instead of Germany, it is *this* country that is the effective cause of the present state of the market; and until more wisdom is shown in the mode of financing its wants by the India Office, we can look for no recovery in the price of the metal.

THE same writer proceeds as follows:—

As to the alternatives, these seem to divide themselves into three, viz.: 1. The allotment of a gold standard to certain countries, and silver to others. To fanatical bi-metallists no proposal could be more objectionable, and few European countries could be induced to acknowledge the secondary rank implied by a silver standard. Even Italy, hitherto content with depreciated paper, aspires to gold, at whatever cost to herself and annoyance to the money markets of the world. Nevertheless, it is pretty plain that all countries cannot have a gold standard, and if Italy and others were willing to take silver on monometallic principles, there can be no doubt that they would be readily accommodated by the countries which have too much silver, whatever treaties nominally bind them. 2. The recognition of two currencies—silver for the payment of small debts and debts unspecified, gold for the discharge of large debts, the parties to specify gold in their contracts. 3. The remaining alternative is to allow things to take their course, and let those nations who want gold "fight it out." This, it is to be feared, will be the most probable result of the Conference, assuming that France and America do not plunge into bi-metallism with unlimited coinage, but No. 1 is the most desirable alternative in our view.

The silver question is, emphatically, one of those questions that nations may not determine for themselves, without careful regard to the circumstances of other nations. It is for this reason that "conference" between them is so necessary, as to the action that should be taken by each, or by all collectively. The necessity of agreement is seen clearly enough in the case of postal, telegraphic, and railway arrangements; but the prejudices of the monometallic fanatics of this country render "conference" arrangements as to "currency" next to impossible. A narrow, insular conceit that our own system is the best of all, while to the

competent mind it is the very worst of all, prevents our statesmen taking any part in an inquiry in which the interests of every other nation are vitally concerned, and our publicists maintain the selfish delusion from one year's end to another, till men of sense are ready to despair of reform.

A WRITER on "Trade and Finance," in one of the morning journals, a fortnight ago, expressed himself as follows on the phenomena of the money market:—

The money market is like a pond; buckets take out water from the one side and pour it in again on the other, and the surface is ruffled; but this activity takes no water away. The supply of money, similarly, is not appreciably reduced, though cheques be drawn with astonishing activity, provided the money drawn be not taken away, or is paid into the market again directly. When business is active, the buckets are, if we may thus express the matter, actively at work, drawing out and again pouring into the pond; the splashing is terrific, but the supply is unchanged. The bankers' clearing-house returns will then show that enormous amounts have been drawn and transferred, but the market supply of money is hardly affected, and there is preserved in the serene depths of the Bank of England, an unaltered cash surplus.

The money market is very little affected by the activity or sluggishness of our internal trade, for this reason—that the internal trade of the country is not carried on by money (that is, by gold or bank-notes) at all, but by the discounting of bills and the passing of mere instruments of credit, or cheques, through the bankers of the country. The supply of gold in the Bank of England, is practically unaffected by the rapidity, or otherwise, of the internal exchanges of the country. What follows is of deeper importance:—

But let the pond be drawn upon for the purpose of filling other ponds; let part of the central supply of cash in London be removed to the tills and pockets of the people; or, worse, let a German coinage demand, or an American currency demand, take a few necessary tons of gold from the serene depths referred to, and the value of money flies up. It is then a matter of scarcity.

Is it not strange that the writer who discerns this so clearly, should accept it as a wise and natural order of things that the pond—in other words, our own home supply of money—should be accessible in this way to "German coinage" or "American currency," demands? He lays his finger upon the evil, and then assumes that there is no corrective. While the English people are compelled to make "money" for all the world—for that is what it virtually comes to—instead of leaving other nations to get the bullion they require as we ourselves get it, we shall suffer alternate plethora and starvation in our own money market, the supply therein not being regulated, as it ought to be by our own wants, but, as it ought *not* to be, by the wants of other nations.

THE last effort of Sydney Smith in the cause of human freedom was a "Fragment on the Irish Roman Catholic Church," which he did not live to complete, but that was published in the posthumous edition of his works by Longmans. We notice it for the sake of a single quotation. After half a century, then, of keen observation of public life, we find the old man writing upon the Bishops of the Church of England, as follows:—

Providence does give us Generals and Admirals and Chancellors of the Exchequer; but I never remember in my time a real Bishop, a grave elderly man . . . gentle and kind to his poor clergy, of powerful and commanding influence: in Parliament never to be put down when the great interests of mankind were concerned; leaning to the Government when it

was right, leaning to the people when they were right; feeling that if the Spirit of God had called him to that high office, he was called for no mean purpose, but rather that, seeing clearly, and acting boldly, and intending purely, he might confer lasting benefits upon mankind.

And who now living, remembers any more than did Sydney Smith, fifty years ago, "a real Bishop" of this order in the Anglican Church? There is not a Roman Catholic country in Europe that does not, we think, produce such men. The atmosphere of the House of Lords appears to be fatal to the existence of such amongst ourselves. We must go back to the seventeenth century for an English Bishop of the type which Sydney Smith portrays. No true lover of the Church of England can reconcile himself to this reproach, and we once more avow our conviction that the most telling step that could be taken at this moment in the interests of ecclesiastical and parliamentary reform alike, would be the exclusion of the Bishops from the House of Lords. They are the dead weight in that House that perpetuates and consolidates the conservatism of every abuse in the Constitution, and everything that is worldly and self-seeking in the Church. Is there no one in either House, to draft the long and terrible indictment of reproach that lies against the Bench, in the record of their votes for the last two centuries on every great question of civil freedom and human progress? A simple record of the votes of the bench of Bishops for the last two centuries, would compel, we believe, their retirement from the House, when it is hard to say whether the Church or the nation would make the greater gain. For very many years, it has been matter of astonishment to us that the Reform party did not long since formulate the exclusion of the Bishops from the House of Lords as the very first item of their programme. While the Bishops remain in that House, the influence which the Lords exert over the legislation of the country will never be of a healthy order, for it is the ecclesiastical element therein that crystallizes its conservatism into granite. Let the Bishops of the Anglican Church but realize their true vocation, and their whole momentum will be directed towards the cause of human freedom and progress.

THE *Standard* gives us incidentally a very fair portrait of the typical English Bishop, in its notice of the second volume of the "Life of Bishop Wilberforce," of whom it speaks thus:—

Whatever may have been Wilberforce's errors, no one ever questioned his versatility and power of adapting himself to all societies and circumstances. We have sketches in the present volume, of rides in the suburbs with Carlyle, of gallops over the windy downs about Lavington, and of Graffham, with an occasional peep, perhaps, at the hounds, of rambles in Sherwood Forest and the Welsh hills, of conversations with the Emperor and Empress of the French, with Baron Stockmar and Prince Albert; of high debates in the House of Lords, when the Bishop was pitted against such men as the late Lord Derby and Lord Lyndhurst, and was adjudged to have fully held his own; of dexterous addresses to hostile and excited mobs, and of elegant literary breakfasts with Macaulay and Milman. But wherever he was, the Bishop was equal to the situation; and were it not that the circle in which he habitually lived formed rather too much of a mutual admiration society, we should pronounce the Bishop's pictures of it to be as charming as anything we are acquainted with in this particular kind of literature. Bishop Wilberforce's lay friends belonged mostly to the Peelite section of politicians, and they exchange flatteries like snuff-boxes.

And again:—

That he meant to be perfectly straightforward we have no doubt, yet the impression left behind is rather that of the man who wishes, if possible, to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds, to enjoy the popularity of rebuking the Tractarians, and with it the respect and

confidence of men of intellect and rank who more or less shared their views. He himself says in this volume that if he had chosen to place himself at the head of the Evangelical party, they might ere then have carried him in triumph to Lambeth. But the Bishop, as may be readily allowed, was too much of a man and too fundamentally honest to care for such success as that. But that he did desire more than was good for him—that all men should speak well of him—is an opinion which, however erroneous, will not be disturbed by the second instalment of his biography.

We have here an incidental and yet striking picture of the type of ecclesiastical rulers, which the Erastianism of the Anglican Church produces. Every earnest Churchman must feel, we think, that there is something in this portrait essentially unlike what a Christian bishop ought to be. The main features of the portrait will remain the same, until "the circle" in which our bishops move is wholly changed. Samuel Wilberforce was a good man, and even a religious man, but we must have a very low ideal of the life of a Christian bishop, to persuade ourselves that Bishop Wilberforce's life was such. Our Anglican bishops are mere political functionaries constituting a sort of link between the State and the Church. A true conception of the Christian bishop involves, fundamentally, his complete independence of the temporal power, as the head and representative of another power on the earth altogether—namely, the spiritual. Things are much better with us than they were at the beginning of the century, when reverend renegadoes were advanced to the highest dignities of the Church, for their open subserviency to the political rulers of the time; but the system is the same, and must ever prove fatal to the existence of an Episcopate that discerns and fulfils its real vocation.

We are glad to see the leading native papers of Bombay protesting in strong terms against Colonel Malleon's characteristic assurance that "the people of India heard with dismay that the Government of Mr. Gladstone had determined to withdraw from Kandahar." The series of letters in which this assurance was given to the public were marked by a recklessness and positiveness of statement, that were intensely offensive to those who knew their real value at the time they appeared. The writer is now deservedly gibbeted by the leading native papers. We need not regard him as consciously false, but a bolder draft upon his imagination for his facts, was never made by Colonel Malleon himself. The letters in question are characterized in strong terms in India. The *Indu Prakash* affirms, and it is the leading native paper of Western India, that as far as the educated native communities are concerned, there is not a man who is not opposed to the retention of Kandahar, while as to the "uneducated," they know nothing about it:—

If a European gentleman in the Colonel's position were to consult them on the question, the probability is that they would not know what to say. Let Colonel Malleon put the question in its proper light before them—let him tell them that if Kandahar be annexed, India will have to pay for the government, &c., and then he will find where the Natives feel that the shoe pinches.

Native Opinion is still more emphatic in its denial. Colonel Malleon is afflicted with the disease that marks almost every Anglo-Indian official in dis-couraging about India. It is seldom or never the truth that they tell, but that view of matters which, more or less consciously, they wish to see adopted in this country. The false impressions which consequently prevail as to the character of the people, and of the effects of our rule upon them, are the result of the interested mis-statements with which the country is perpetually plied, by

Indian officials. They do not mean to be untruthful, but cannot persuade themselves that things are as they really are, and so they are "false, with the consciousness of being sincere."

THE Conservative journals are, of course, but too glad to avail themselves of such authorities as Colonel Maleson, to propagate the belief in this country that our retirement from Afghanistan is likely to create an unfavourable impression amongst our Indian subjects. It is difficult to listen with patience to the interested mis-statements that have been made upon this point. The people of England are utterly misled when they find such statements, for instance, as the following in the *Standard* :—

The withdrawal from Kandahar will be taken throughout India as meaning a confession of weakness, and a dislike to accept the responsibility of our own acts. The Indian Government will have cause to think itself fortunate if it succeeds in removing this unfavourable impression before the latent discontent among the masses in India finds vent in some more general expression of hostility than the numerous petty disturbances that have already marked the present year throughout the vast tract of country from Kolapore to the districts of the Sonthals.

The incessant stream of interested misrepresentations of this order daily poured forth upon this country, makes us almost despair of any wise rule of India from English hands. The prophets (press) prophesy falsely, the priests (official hierarchy) bear rule by their means, and the people *love to have it so*. The positive statements that have been made in this country, from the House of Lords downwards, in the last few months, as to the impression that will be produced amongst the people of India by the undoing of Lord Lytton's crime, are simply a mass of lies, let it offend whom it may to be told so.

LORD SALISBURY has denied that he ever made any declarations, as Foreign Minister, to M. Waddington acquiescing in the French occupation of Tunis. At all events, Signor Cairoli told the Italian Parliament so, two or three weeks ago, and on the authority of the British Ambassador at Rome. The Paris Correspondent of the *Times* thereupon declares himself "not merely surprised, but stupefied" at the denial, and proceeds to dispel "all ambiguity" upon the matter by quoting the text of a confidential despatch written by Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons on the 7th August, 1878, shortly after the Berlin Conference—a despatch very obviously written to allay the irritation awakened in France by the secret convention with Turkey, under which Lord Beaconsfield obtained the cession of Cyprus. Now, in this despatch, Lord Salisbury acknowledges the correctness of M. Waddington's recollections of what was said on the Tunis question at Berlin. The despatch runs thus :—

Without being able to vouch for the exact expressions I used, and of which I have preserved no written trace, I nevertheless acknowledge the correctness of M. Waddington's recollections as regards the conversations we had during the Congress concerning the Tunis question, and the interests France may possess or have in view. Without dwelling on the terms or shades of expression, which cannot alter the basis of the question, or the opinion one may have of it, it is more conformable to what is asked of me, to set forth seminally the views of the British Government relative to the action of France in Tunis. England has in those parts no special interests which can in any way lead her to view with distrust the legitimate and increasing influence of France—an influence springing from the possession by France of Algeria, from the considerable military forces she there maintains, and from the work of civilization she is accomplishing on the African continent, to the deep admiration of

Her Majesty's Government. Even the fall of the Bey's Government, were it to come about, would in no way change the attitude of England, who has no interests of her own there, and who would in that case do nothing to disturb the harmony existing between the two countries.

With this despatch before him, let the reader note carefully the statement made by Signor Cairoli to the Italian Parliament:—

Signori Massari and Rudini have questioned me as to the alleged agreement between France and the late British Cabinet respecting the eventual occupation of Tunis. . . . I can declare that I have long ascertained from official sources, that the declarations attributed to Lord Salisbury are incorrect. As early as 1878, I deemed it right to put categorical questions on this subject, and the reply was a prompt denial. More recently, the present English Ministry declared to me most explicitly, that the London Government had never given its adhesion to the occupation of Tunis. Only yesterday I saw the British Ambassador, who replied to my question by confirming that Lord Salisbury had strongly denied the engagements attributed to him.

The Roman Correspondent of the *Standard* simultaneously produces a despatch which the same Lord Salisbury sent to Mr. Consul Wood, at Tunis, two months after these express assurances to M. Waddington, that France was at perfect liberty to take Tunis, in so far as England was concerned, and that the fall of that State would be in no way opposed by us. On the 19th October, 1878, he wrote to Consul Wood as follows:—

Your despatch (No. 61) of October 8 has been received and submitted to the Queen, and I must reply that the Government of Her Majesty is glad to know that the mind of the Bey is tranquillised as regards the idea of favour shown by the Government of Her Majesty to a supposed project on the part of the French Government for the annexation of Tunis. Mischief only can result from the fears which, according to your information, have recently occupied his mind. You ought to take every favourable opportunity to induce him to dismiss from his mind all apprehension of sinister intention on the part of either France or Italy. It is his interest to live in peace with them, and to avoid giving to either of these Powers legitimate cause of complaint. If this policy be accurately observed, and his Highness occupies himself with constant care for the welfare of his subjects, there is no reason to think the neighbouring Powers will form any design incompatible with his security.

It is thus clear that both Italy and Tunis, alarmed in 1878 at certain assurances that M. Waddington declared had been made to him on the subject, by Lord Salisbury at the Berlin Conference, instituted direct and categorical inquiry of Lord Salisbury as to their nature; and as clear is it that Lord Salisbury deceived them both. "We in England," says the *Pall Mall Gazette*, "who have had Lord Salisbury as our Foreign Secretary, are neither surprised nor stupefied. Lord Salisbury probably replied to Signor Cairoli's inquiries about this secret despatch as he replied to Earl Grey about the *Globe's* transcript of the secret memorandum. Of course, if an Italian Minister heard that a statement was 'wholly unauthentic, and not deserving of any confidence,' he would naturally conclude that the statement was false." The dishonour brought upon the nation by such diplomacy is very deep.

It is a heavy reflection upon an age that has made such discoveries in all departments of knowledge as our own, that it has not yet learned how guilty a thing is war. It is hardly the fault of the people. It is the fault of our public writers, and but too often, alas! of public orators, like Earl Cairns: the one seeking the profitable sale of their writings, the other an accession of popularity to their party. This Boer War, from which we have just escaped, was either an innocent and a justifiable war, or an indefensible one. Now, which was it?

Were the Boers wrongful aggressors against us, and so wrongful that it was a righteous thing for this great nation to determine to put forth its might to stamp out what we called their "rebellion," by slaughtering them till all opposition was over, and the remnant of them lay at our mercy; or was there room to believe that Sir Owen Lanyon, Sir Bartle Frere, and other of our officials, had so misrepresented matters concerning them, that we were unwittingly involved in war with a people whose only offence against us, before God and man, was their determination not to lose the freedom that had been filched from them in a way too common in our history not to cover us with shame at its repetition in this nineteenth century? As a fact, the civilized world was pointing the finger at us, for the conduct which drove these people into war against us. We called it "rebellion;" but the conscience of a very large majority discerned it to be something very different; and when the Government had the courage to face the odium which a righteous course towards these people required of us as a Christian nation, a wild and furious war-whoop is raised by the Tory ex-Chancellor in the Lords, and every art of oratory employed by him to persuade the nation that the guilt of continued bloodshedding would not have been ours, but that of the "feeble folk" who were opposed to us, and had dared to encounter us in arms. The sting of it was, that these Boer farmers, though contemptible as soldiers, happened, by the necessities of their mode of life, to be riflemen and game-stalkers; and because a rash and incompetent leader had led a handful of our soldiery two or three times over, into positions in which they were massacred, Lord Cairns would have had us use the overwhelming forces at our command to visit the rashness and incompetency of our own General upon the men whose bravery and unlooked-for success entitled them, and secured to them, the generous admiration even of their enemy. My Lord Cairns, your religion is your own private concern, but it would be well to spare us your appearance upon Missionary platforms. A wise and great writer of the last generation told us, my Lord, that "more of misery is inflicted upon mankind by one year of war than by all the civil oppressions of a century," and that it is "the business of every wise and good man to set himself against that passion for military glory" which your Lordship is so anxious to stimulate in the nation. The blood shed in that most guilty Afghan War is not very far from your Lordship's skirts, and, instead of using the high position to which Divine Providence has exalted you, to allay the passions of a people but too sensitive to such appeals, you have deliberately attempted to lash the dead horse of Jingoism, if possible, into new life. Your Lordship has brought a stain upon your profession as a Christian man by such appeals to the passions of the country.

LORD BEAONSFIELD.

THE death of Lord Beaconsfield has acted upon the country like the bursting of a dyke. A deafening torrent of eulogy has been set free. Papers, associations, and individuals, that a few months ago were emphatically declaring the Beaconsfield Administration to be the worst this country had known since the evil days of Lord Castle-reagh, are now to be seen, clad in the sombre livery of woe, and wringing their hands, as if in sorrow for a national loss of enormous magnitude. There was a similar display of forced and hysterical sentiment when the late Imperial Prince fell in Zululand. It is, in fact, for the present, a national fashion, which must be accepted by sensible men like our east winds and our London fogs, with such stoicism and indifference as each man has at his command. So far as these eulogies emanate from Liberal sources, they may be set aside as utterances of insincerity. They do not represent the thoughts and convictions of those who, from whatever cause, feel impelled to speak them. But it is a very significant fact that even Conservative eulogists—and that their sorrow at the death of Lord Beaconsfield is real and unfeigned there can be no doubt—find it impossible to lay their fingers on any specific achievement, and say, "This was his work." The Reform Bill of 1867, which is the only large measure with which the name of Mr. Disraeli was associated, was so completely changed in its passage through the House of Commons, that it ceased to be his Bill at all. It was a measure which, in literal truth, may be said to have been brought in, amended, and passed by the Liberal Opposition. And, quite consistently with fact, Conservative eulogists have not alluded to this Bill in their panegyrics upon their departed leader. This blank in the eulogies of those who are most deeply interested in exalting the merits of Lord Beaconsfield, decisively settles the question as to whether or not his death is a loss to the nation. A man who has passed forty years of his life in the political arena—who has been the leader for many years of one of the great parties in the State—who, for six years has had at his disposal a powerful and docile majority—but who,

notwithstanding all these advantages, has failed to leave any distinct or permanent impress of himself upon the statute-book of the country may, perhaps, have been a man of great abilities, but his departure from among us cannot be regarded as a national loss. It may, however, be an event of national importance. Lord Beaconsfield's forty years of political activity were, by the tacit confession of his admirers, destitute of positive results. But consequences of a negative kind they could not avoid having; and it is by considering the character of these that we shall be able to arrive at a true estimate of Lord Beaconsfield's public character.

From humble and obscure beginnings, Benjamin Disraeli rose to be a peer of the realm, a Prime Minister, the friend and confidential adviser of the Queen, the unquestioned leader of the British aristocracy, and died full of years and honours. And yet he accomplished nothing for the nation as a whole. His political record is as writing traced in the sand. What a singular commentary is this on the working of the British Constitution, and the part played in it by those of whom Lord Beaconsfield was the chief? Had Benjamin Disraeli adhered to those Liberal principles with which he began his political career, he would certainly not have attained eminence. The indolence, the incurable looseness and inaccuracy of his mind would have debarred him from that patient study of facts, that thorough mastery of details, which are the indispensable equipment of those who aspire to be leaders in the Party of Progress; for they can vindicate their right to that position only by the precise and positive results to which they point the way, and whither they are prepared to guide those who follow them. Had Benjamin Disraeli remained a Liberal, he would have been, to his life's end, no more than a "free lance," attached to no political party, but raiding indifferently upon all. He would have been a shining "ornament of debate," relieving the tedium of discussion by effective personalities and biting sarcasms—a thorn in the flesh to a great many members of Parliament, but of no practical utility. But Benjamin Disraeli's was a spirit at once too ambitious, and too discerning, to waste its powers in such an unprofitable occupation as this. He had the quickness of mind, the unscrupulousness, the equanimity of temperament, the satiric force and bitterness—all the qualities, in fact, which make what is called an effective debater; he had the discernment to perceive how potent, in such an assembly as the House of Commons, were those qualities, if exercised with judgment and for a predetermined end; and he placed them at the disposal of a Party, who themselves desiring to do nothing whatever, wanted only to obstruct the legislative action of others, and yet

to have this log-like procedure so ornamented and disguised, that its veritable character should be hidden from the unreflecting many.

For nearly the whole of his political career Lord Beaconsfield was engaged in the performance of this extraordinary business. He dressed up obsolete Tory prejudices in all kinds of fantastic garments. He derived them from historical antecedents which he obtained from his own imagination. He gave them a philosophical basis not so plainly ridiculous but that it could pass muster in the heat of a debate. And he did all these things with a gravity that was imperturbable, at the same time, making it quite clear to all the world that the exhibition was a theatrical one merely. It was the utter unreality of his proceedings which imparted to Mr. Disraeli's political career, its peculiar attraction and amusement. People were always on the watch to see what new character this entertaining actor would put on, as new exigencies arose. It would, too, be unjust to deny to his political career, while he was in opposition, a certain measure of usefulness. Political questions for Mr. Disraeli lost all interest as soon as they passed beyond the walls of the Houses of Parliament. As soon as the fate of a measure had been decided by a vote of the House, he looked upon it as dead and buried. It had got into a world whither, conscious of the limitations of his own powers, he had no desire to pursue it. As a consequence of this peculiar mental temperament, he did, unquestionably, act as a moderating influence on the rank and file of his party. The country owes it to him, that the Tory squires are not still assiduously engaged in flogging the dead horse of Protection—that they are not still representing the disestablishment of the Irish Church as a most unnatural murder of the rights of property and the Christian religion. It was not until the very close of his career, that the reckless incapacity of this "clever conscious juggler" was disclosed. A strange revelation it was when at last the disclosure came. In contemplating the character of Lord Beaconsfield as it was revealed by the light of his "Eastern Policy," it is hard to say what is most to be marvelled at—his levity and stupendous ignorance, his cynical disregard of human suffering, or the audacious untruthfulness of his public utterances. The necessities of language compel us to speak of his "Eastern Policy," but he was far too ignorant of the whole subject to have aught which could properly be designated a policy. The measure of his ignorance is seen in one of the earliest answers he gave in the House when questioned on the subject of the Bulgarian massacres. The Circassians, he said, who had been imported into that country, had become a race of thriving and industrious agriculturists; and their prosperity

having excited the cupidity of the Bulgarians, these latter attacked the Circassians, and the result was that horrible atrocities had been committed on both sides. The ignorance here manifested would be strange even in a private individual; in the Prime Minister of Great Britain it exhibits a lack of conscientiousness, and a levity of mind which are in the highest degree criminal. The answer, it is obvious, must have been made out of his head on the spur of the moment, and it strikes, as it were, the key note of his "Eastern Policy" throughout. It was made up as he went along, and was in a state of perpetual flux in order to adapt it to every fluctuation in popular feeling. It was composed in about equal parts of empty and insulting bravado, followed by a humiliating eating of the leek in the form of a Secret Agreement, or some other disgraceful transaction. Affecting to be based upon an exclusive regard for "British Interests," it is impossible for its most enthusiastic devotees to say in what way "British Interests" are related to the objects which it strove after. How are "British Interests" benefited by the division of Bulgaria? How are "British Interests" benefited by the underhand filching of Cyprus? How are "British Interests" benefited by the obligation laid upon this Empire to defend the Armenian Frontier of the Ottoman Empire? But the silliness of this policy is of slight importance compared with the dishonourable manner in which it was carried out. Contemporary history passes so rapidly into oblivion, that people have already well nigh forgotten the disgraceful transactions of that time—the insults and menaces with which at the Guildhall Banquet, Lord Beaconsfield thought fit to respond to the late Russian Emperor's message of peace and conciliation—the affected indignation over the terms of the Treaty of San Stephano, when, at the very outset of the war, the Russian Government had made known to our Foreign Office the terms they intended to exact at its close—the cowardly betrayal of Greece—the wicked manner in which Lord Beaconsfield, Lord Salisbury, Lord Cranbrook, and others deliberately did their utmost to foment the national distrust and hatred of Russia. (In this connection, that most pitiful book—the third volume of the Life of the Prince Consort—ought not to be forgotten, or the exertions of that eminent and pure-minded British patriot Mr. Levy Lawson,) Lord Beaconsfield deserves whatever credit attaches to the fact that he discerned to what political uses the baser and more vulgar elements of the national character might be turned. This far-reaching British Empire of ours bears witness to the enterprise and governing capacity of its people; its commerce and its manufactures to their assiduous industry; but our wealth and our extended domination have also

their counter-balancing disadvantages. Wealth, luxury, and pleasure breed in a nation a spirit of vulgar ostentation, an indifference to the feelings of those in a humbler walk of life, as if they were beings of different flesh and blood; an extended domination over weaker peoples, breeds an arbitrary temper in those who exercise it, a hatred of freedom, and of strict equity between man and man. It was to these baser qualities of our national character that Lord Beaconsfield frankly made appeal for the support of what he called his "Eastern policy;" and, indirectly, he may be said to have so done the country some service, by revealing to thinking men how powerful for evil these qualities had become. But he had no forethought of what he was himself doing, no foreknowledge of whither he was hurrying the nation. And so it came about that we were pledged to go to war with Russia unless Bulgaria was divided into two provinces. Nothing but the moderation of the Russian Government saved us. It is terrible to think of what our position would have been at this moment had we plunged into war. The Turkish armies were broken to pieces, beaten, and demoralised, so that no further fighting could have been got out of them. The Russians were in immense strength at Adrianople, under leaders whose skill and competency had been tested in the fiery ordeal of war. And against their hosts, we might, perhaps, have assembled an army of 50,000 men. We should, in a word, have been involved in a war in which a crushing disaster was certain and inevitable, for the sake of that tremendous "British Interest"—the division of an independent Bulgaria into two provinces. A policy which founded itself upon the narrowest national selfishness, which denounced as contemptible visionaries those who had regard for any considerations except those of pure selfishness and material gain, culminated in threatening war for such a mere phantasm as this. It was impossible that a man could have a wise and rational "Eastern Policy" who imagined the Circassians of Bulgaria to be a race of industrious farmers "with a large stake in the country." But a statesman with a heart not entirely closed to the appeals of justice and compassion, with an intellect not entirely blind to the "interests" of an Empire such as ours, could not have gone astray precisely as Lord Beaconsfield did. To such a man it would have been a thing intolerable to preserve even the semblance of friendship with the Ottoman Government, after the facts of the Bulgarian massacres had been disclosed. To such a man it would have been apparent that no "British Interest" could be served by the existence of a Government which deliberately laid waste with fire and sword the richest and most peaceful of its pro-

vinces. The heart of Lord Beaconsfield was too cold and hard to be moved either to pity or indignation by the barbarities of the Porte, and his intellect had too dim an apprehension of practical realities, to draw the correct inference from the awful misgovernment of the Ottoman Empire. He made his choice accordingly, and he had his reward. All that large portion of the British nation which had rejoiced in the effacement of Poland by Russia, in the effacement of Italy by Austria, in the effacement of France by that gilded imposture the Empire, rallied round the great Minister who seemed devoted heart and soul to the maintenance of Turkish lust and rapine in South Eastern Europe.

Lord Beaconsfield's Indian policy has been so fully discussed in the pages of *THE STATESMAN*, that it is unnecessary to go into details at present. Suffice it to say that it displayed precisely the same qualities of mind and heart, as his policy in South Eastern Europe; the same levity, the same profound ignorance of all that a Prime Minister ought to feel it his duty to be acquainted with, and the same audacious disregard of justice, mercy, and veracity.

Lord Beaconsfield's greatest achievement, it has been said, is the reconstruction of the Conservative Party; and it cannot be denied that he has reconstructed it after a fashion. He has prevailed upon it to vote at the word of command, with a marvellous unanimity. But to accomplish so much is to reconstruct a party in a superficial sense only. If we ask what political principles he has imparted to the Conservative Party, and what political objects he has educated them to aspire after, we shall have to wait in vain for an answer. Lord Beaconsfield has prevailed upon them, in pursuit of office, to abandon all the principles they once professed, but he has substituted none in their stead. He has led them along a wild course strewn with broken pledges, heavy deficits, insane treaties, unjust and disastrous wars, and has departed, leaving them leaderless and demoralized, the confidence of the nation withdrawn from them, and their policy fallen into such contempt and failure that it has been reversed without the Conservatives themselves daring to enter a protest against the process. This was an inevitable result of such leadership as Lord Beaconsfield's. He was not a statesman at all, but merely a word-fencer, an expert debater. So long, therefore, as he remained the chief of a minority, he was in his proper element. He was required to do nothing but debate, and he debated with immense dexterity, with indefatigable perseverance and vivacity. But the time at last came when he was called upon to assume the part of a practical statesman, and quit that of a theatrical debater. It may be said of Lord

Beaconsfield, that, given the resources and mental equipment of a theatrical debater, he did, in the way of practical statesmanship, the very utmost that was possible. Inspired newspapers, patriotic music-halls, packed public meetings, spread-eagle oratory, and a large and docile majority in both Houses—he worked all this extensive machinery with extraordinary skill. But it could do little for a policy founded neither upon sound knowledge nor an enlightened morality, but reflecting only the fantastic dreams of a writer of romances. And the Conservative Party are now paying the penalty of having sacrificed their principles in the past and their hopes in the future for the sake of these fantastic dreams.

To sum up: it is impossible to consider Lord Beaconsfield, seriously, as a statesman at all. He was a man determined to achieve eminence and success, as “Society” here in Great Britain understands eminence and success. And he achieved them, but not in virtue of any statesmanlike quality. If the Tory Party had required of him that he should *do* anything, he would have failed signally and completely. Even as the leader of a Tory opposition it is not possible, during a long political career, to escape entirely from the burden of *doing* something, and when Mr. Disraeli’s genius was exerted in that unwonted direction, the thing which he produced—whether it was a Budget, a measure for the better government of India, or a Reform Bill—was so preposterous that the world fell to laughing at once. “If you see,” said Lord Palmerston, “two people in the street, laughing together, you may be certain they are talking of Mr. Disraeli’s India Bill.” Happily for the success of Mr. Disraeli’s ambition, the Tories wanted him to *do* little—only to debate. But even so, the character of the man was clearly enough disclosed—a nature secretive and impenetrable, entirely devoid of large and generous sympathies with his fellow men, and with a contempt for truth that passed into a by-word. And by “truth” we mean much more than simple veracity of speech, though, in that, too, Lord Beaconsfield was grievously lacking. We mean that habit of mind which, in all things whatsoever, makes a man eager to get into contact with facts, which will not allow his eyelids to slumber, nor the temples of his head to take any rest, until the thing as it actually is lies naked before the eye of his mind. Lord Beaconsfield knew nothing, cared nothing for things as they actually exist in the world outside of the House of Commons, but only for things as they might be made to appear in an effective speech. Words were realities to him, and a vote of the House of Commons the final touch-stone of fact, and of right and wrong. Provided that a majority of the House could

be prevailed upon to record their opinion that a "scientific frontier" had been got, then the "scientific frontier" was actually *there*; and if not—not. By the irony of events this man, so utterly lacking in every quality essential to the statesman, without knowledge of facts, without sincerity of soul, became the leading statesman of a great Empire. His sway lasted but three years, but what havoc and confusion he brought about in that brief period. Slaughter might say of him as she has been made to say of one of his predecessors:—

He came by stealth and unlocked my den,
And I have drunk the blood since then
Of twice three hundred thousand men.

The victims of Lord Beaconsfield's insensate and unscrupulous policy lie scattered over three quarters of the globe—a multitude which no man can number. There would be no lack of mourners at his funeral if the widows and orphans whom his policy has made could be gathered together in the churchyard of Hughenden. And now because he is dead, from pulpit, platform, and from Press issues a stream of panegyrics upon him. He is described as a patriot. He is held up as an example which all Englishmen would do well to imitate. We venture to record here a most emphatic protest against this teaching, whether it proceeds from a canon of Westminster Abbey or from any other less sanctified quarter. If veracity of speech be a virtue to be loved and sought after, then is Lord Beaconsfield an example not to be imitated. If diligent endeavour to apprehend facts as they actually are be an obligation incumbent upon man, then is Lord Beaconsfield an example not to be imitated. If, on the other hand, to follow the example of Ahab in the matter of Naboth's vineyard be the mark of wise and honourable statesmanship, then it may freely be conceded that Lord Beaconsfield was a wise and patriotic statesman. If a selfish pursuit of power, and if to achieve success such as "Society" deems success, be worthy objects of a man's ambition, then there can be no question that the world has rarely seen a more perfect exemplar than the late Lord Beaconsfield.

ROYALTY IN ENGLAND.

THE disturbance of public opinion in England now-a-days, regarding political and other than strictly political questions of great importance to the community, is tolerably apparent even to careless observers. It is exciting the hopes of all who hold that for the healthy growth of the nation great reforms are yet needed in continuation and expansion of the reforms already effected ; and it is alarming all who, whether they object or not to every reform which has been effected, profess to think that no further change in our institutions is desirable. No one who has watched the progress of events during the last twenty or twenty-five years, and who compares even that near past with the present, can fail to see how great a change has taken place in nearly every department of life, or can shut his eyes to the prospect of far greater changes resulting from the disintegration that is now going on. Our new methods of trade and commerce, our new discoveries in science, and the numberless alterations caused by the new application of scientific principles to the practical affairs of life, are startling in themselves, yet only in harmony with the revolution occurring in our ways of thought on nearly every sort of subject. Under the influence of new thinkers, there is now as notable an upheaval of religious opinion and as vigorous a rebellion against old dogmas as there was three centuries ago, when England, like the rest of Europe, had to decide whether or not it should join in the revolt against ecclesiasticism and superstition which was led by Luther. In the war against religious observances and theological dogmas fighting is harder and more painful than in any struggles over scientific or artistic innovations, or even over the reconstruction of our political machinery ; but in each and all the conditions of disturbance are similar, if not identical, and, however divergent the movements may be, the revolutionary temper that prompts and guides them is the same.

In the department of politics, and especially in that branch of it which has to do with the management of State affairs, with all questions as to the functions of government and the individuals entitled

to exercise those functions, in person or by proxy, this revolutionary temper has of late been very active. Between the Reform Act of 1832 and the Reform Act of 1868 there was a long interval, not ill occupied, to some extent, in fighting the battles of Free Trade, Municipal Reform, and other essentials of social prosperity. But the Act of 1868 was a necessary sequel to the Act of 1832, and itself only a step towards the full recognition of the people's right to govern themselves, which will have to come some day; and if many ardent reformers are distressed that the day should seem so long in coming, they may console themselves by remembering that even the most perfect Parliamentary Reform Act, according to every member of the community his and her due share of representation in a properly devised national assembly, would be in itself inadequate, even were it attainable, until many obstacles to self-government by the nation are removed, and that a good deal is being done just now, indirectly as well as directly, towards the removal of, at any rate, some of those obstacles. Whatever ideal reformers may have of a perfect House of Commons, it is impossible that it should be realized while our present House of Lords exists, and even those who are most eager to reform the House of Lords, or to reform it away, may well shrink from laying violent hands on it until time and effort—American competition, bad harvests, Irish Land Leagues, the political education of farmers and peasants, the bankruptcy and social degradation of aristocratic landholders, and so forth—have rendered it impossible for the forces now dormant, and comparatively idle, in our fossilized House of Lords to be revived by any sudden change in the political balance which might follow the downfall of the Upper Chamber. Moreover, and yet more, it is worth the notice of those who look upon the Crown as a useless and mischievous encumbrance of our political machinery to consider whether it has not, at any rate, negative uses with which, in the existing state of society and political arrangements, it would be dangerous to dispense, and whether the mischief incident to its maintenance would not be far outweighed by the perils consequent on its too hasty abolition.

That last sentence indicates the purpose of the present paper. About ten years ago, steady-going people were shocked by the lectures that Sir Charles Dilke delivered at Newcastle-on-Tyne, and other places, in denunciation of our monarchical institutions. If it was his intention then to lead a crusade against the Crown, he soon abandoned the project, which at the time obtained but little support. The fear of his friends, however, that his bold action in this matter had ruined his chances of advancement in political life, were soon

falsified, and to-day he is not the only avowed Republican who holds a place in the Government. Here we have striking evidence of the progress within the past decade that has been made in public opinion regarding this as well as other questions. It is true that the statesmanlike prudence shown by Sir Charles Dilke, Mr. Chamberlain, and their Republican allies, in devoting their energies to work of more immediate practical importance than the advocacy of a republican form of government has had much to do with their admission to high offices of State; but it is by no means improbable that before another decade is over we shall have an Administration in which more than half of the members will be at least as staunch Republicans at heart as are Sir Charles Dilke and Mr. Chamberlain, and thus the question whether monarchical institutions should be maintained in England is by no means one the discussion of which can be relegated to the far-off future. It is a question that may have to be settled, rightly or wrongly, within a very few years, and therefore one worth considering at once.

The question, be it noted, is not whether a monarchical or a republican form of government is preferable on abstract grounds, but whether or not it is desirable, our other political and social institutions remaining pretty much as they are at present, that the institution of Royalty should be done away with. Assuming that Royalty in itself is an objectionable institution, will its perpetuation in England, for a time at any rate, be helpful or detrimental to the removal of other and, perhaps, more objectionable institutions?

As a first step towards answering that question, it is necessary that we should understand what is the present position of Royalty in England as compared with its position in past times. When William the Norman took possession of England, six hundred years ago, he came as the feudal chief of an army of retainers, among whom he portioned out large sections of the country in return for their loyal submission to him as their sovereign. In order to hold and strengthen their ground, he and his successors found it necessary to make terms not only with their Norman barons, but also with their English subjects and with the clergy, who knew well how to benefit both themselves and the Church by siding alternately with kings, lords, and commons. The result was that the Crown became a more complicated and in some respects a more powerful institution in England than in any of the foreign countries where feudalism prevailed. The monarch was sometimes the servant of his people, often the servant of his barons, and still oftener the servant of the Church; but in spite of all that, partly even in consequence of it, his monarchy was a very real thing. Nowhere

else was "the divine right of kings" so fully acknowledged in theory, or allowed to have so much efficacy in practice; and all the maxims in vogue about the sanctity of the kingly office had peculiar weight in this country. None of the revolutions by which dynasties were changed, by which feudalism was weakened, and by which the interests of the people were promoted, seriously impaired the dignity or lessened the authority of the Crown, until Charles the First was executed; and even after that, the traditions which the Long Parliament was supposed to have crushed for ever showed a strange vitality. The "glorious revolution" of 1688 established a fundamental change in the relations between the kings and the people, but it left nearly all the theories about kingly power extant, doing no more than strengthen and multiply the safeguards against too great misuse of that power. A scheme—such as it was—of parliamentary government, with a measure of Ministerial responsibility, superseded the arbitrary rule of the Stuarts, and the "divine right" assumption received a shock from which it never recovered. Those, however, were only days of somewhat clumsy seed-sowing in ground ill-prepared for the production of good fruit.

While the exercise of the Royal authority was restrained within the proper limits of the Constitution, [as Sir Erskine May has said] the Crown was shorn of none of its ancient prerogatives, but remained as it had ever been, the source of all power, civil and ecclesiastical; the fountain of honour, the first and paramount institution of the State. Its powers, indeed, were now exercised by Ministers responsible to Parliament; yet so great were the attributes of Royalty, and so numerous its sources of influence, that, for more than a century after the Revolution, it prevailed over the more popular elements of the Constitution. A Parliament representing the people little more than in name, and free, in great measure, from the restraint of public opinion, which had not yet the means of being intelligently formed or adequately expressed, promoted the views of rival parties rather than the interests of the people. This popular institution, designed to control the Crown, was won over to its side, and shared, while it supported, its ascendancy. The Crown now governed with more difficulty, and was forced to use all its resources for the maintenance of its authority; but it governed as completely as ever.

The history of the English Court under the House of Hanover, abounding as it does in loathsome scandals, is worth studying in order to see how much strength, mischievously used, was in the royal prerogatives that were left intact by the Revolution; and however meanly we may think of the characteristic exploits of these notable monarchs, we may find some compensation for the discredit that they brought on England by remembering that their misdeeds helped materially to prepare the way for the reforms that they set themselves against. A nation so conservative as we are refuses to

move in new directions until it has had indisputable evidence that the old paths are leading to destruction ; and the questionable virtues of George the Third, prompting him always to stretch his authority in despotic lines, and the unquestioned vices of George the Fourth, inclining him to let matters take their own course, except now and then, when he thought he could stem the tide of destiny by a ribald oath or two, alike conduced to the outbreak of public opinion which secured the Reform Act of 1832, and cleared the ground for the healthier national growth of the past half-century.

Among all the anomalies that make up our boasted British Constitution, the most anomalous is the position now held by Royalty in England. Panegyrists of constitutional monarchy are apt to take credit for the form of it which prevails in this country, as realizing M. Thiers's ideal of " a king who reigns, but does not govern ;" yet in theory the sovereign has almost unlimited powers of despotic government, and nothing but good sense, which may or may not be plentiful at Court, and fear of consequences, which is in truth our chief safeguard against tyranny, can stand in the way of almost any outrageous feats of despotism that the royal fancy may devise. " Royal prerogative " is a vague term, which no one can so define as to take in all its powers and possibilities. More than a hundred such powers are specified in the old law books, and, though many of them have fallen into desuetude, no one can say which or how many even of those may be successfully revived on provocation. One such prerogative was brought to light in 1856, when the Crown proposed to exercise its ancient right of creating life-peers. As the House of Lords disputed the vitality of that right, the claim was not insisted on ; but a few years later, others besides our hereditary legislators were startled by Mr. Gladstone's having recourse to the royal prerogative in order to abolish purchase in the army, after the House of Lords had rejected the Bill to that effect. Even those of us who think that in the first of these cases the Queen's advisers would have done well to insist on an exercise of her prerogative which might have done something to improve the character and composition of the Upper House, and that, in the second, the urgency of the proposed reform almost justified the violent means taken for securing it, may reasonably tremble when we reflect on the immense power that is placed within reach of the Queen by her prerogatives.

Not to mention other things, [wrote Mr. Walter Bagehot in 1872] she could disband the Army (by law, she cannot engage more than a certain number of men, but she is not obliged to engage any men) ; she could dismiss all the officers, from the Commander-in-Chief downwards ; she could dismiss all the sailors too ; she could sell off all our ships of war, and all our naval stores ; she could make a

peace by the sacrifice of Cornwall, and begin a war for the conquest of Brittany. She could make every citizen in the United Kingdom, male or female, a peer; she could make every parish in the United Kingdom a university; she could dismiss most of the civil servants; she could pardon all offenders. In a word, the Queen could, by prerogative, upset all the action of civil government within the Government; could disgrace the nation by a bad war or peace; and could, by disbanding our forces, whether land or sea, leave us defenceless against foreign nations.

The most obvious answer to all that, and a tolerably effective one, is, of course, that the Queen would not dare, on any important question, to set herself against the wishes of the people and expose herself to their wrath. The sovereign in these days generally finds it necessary to yield to the advice of his Ministers, and those Ministers are responsible to the House of Commons; so that the ultimate power of authoritatively sanctioning or condemning is vested in the people through their representatives. But during the years when the Prince Consort was the chief adviser of the Queen, we now know, through Sir Theodore Martin's too candid book, how much of what we call the privileges of Parliament and the functions of the Cabinet could be meddled with in accordance with courtly views of Royal prerogative; and the history of the Beaconsfield Administration furnishes yet more unwelcome evidence of the strength of underhand forces working against the interests of the nation. The question whether there is a preponderance of advantage or of disadvantage in the maintenance of Royalty in England is, therefore, a very pertinent one.

Royalty, it should be borne in mind, is not now exclusively, perhaps not even principally, a political institution in England. It is quite as much a social institution; and a very large share of its power for good or for evil depends on the sway it exercises in social affairs and over the wide border-land between the regions of society and strict politics.

The Court of Queen Victoria is very different, in character as well as in influence, from the Court of Queen Elizabeth, when the royal smile was the sole warrant for admission into any sort of "society," and when the royal frown conveyed as heavy a punishment as a year's imprisonment in the Tower; when her Majesty was absolute dictator as to the style of dress her ladies should wear, and often as to the lords they should wed; when statesmen and soldiers, prelates and poets, had to surrender their own wills and mould their plans of life in accordance with the whims and foibles of their heartless or fickle-hearted mistress; when courtiers like Leicester and Hatton were in what was Paradise for them, and when others, like Sidney and Raleigh, had to waste half their lives in order that they might win

permission to do or to attempt in the other half something worthy of them. Happily, it is even less like the Court of Charles the Second, when libertinage was the social law, when shameless women, enticed from the stage and the stews, flaunted in Whitehall, and debauched in St. James's Park, and when there was a profusion of royal bastards to grace the ranks of our modern peerage. Nor has it very much resemblance to the Court of George the Fourth, when vice was no less rampant because it put on filmy cloaks, and sneaked into alleys and garrets to do more than it dared to do in the saloons or highways. Partly because the "set," which was formerly small and select in its way, has now grown to be an "upper ten thousand," far too numerous to be gathered together in Buckingham Palace or even in Windsor Park, partly because Windsor Park and Buckingham Palace are rarely open to even a few of those who would like to frequent them, there is now an oligarchy of leaders of society in which many minor luminaries divide the functions of social sovereignty which its hereditary representative has well-nigh abrogated. There is still, however, a semblance of social Royalty in occasional "drawing-rooms," and levées, and State balls, and the like; and when the time comes for Buckingham Palace to be swept and garnished for another occupant, it is quite likely that this now neglected office of the Crown will be restored to something of its old importance. About that the only thing which need be said is that no good can possibly result from it, while there is grave danger of the effects being mischievous. In late years there has begun a feeble and partial, but, as far as it goes, a very commendable revolt against the tyranny of fashion. Conventionality, in other things as well as dress and deportment, is by no means so oppressive as it used to be, and there is hope that its thralldom may be steadily weakened; but fresh power would come to it if any serious effort were made to restore to the royal office its former duties as head of society, and the public would suffer thereby even if the headship were of a sort that did not set more openly at defiance than is now done the moral proprieties of life, which are of infinitely greater moment to the nation's welfare than any fashions in dress or deportment. Whatever other advantages there may be in the perpetuation of Royalty in England, its uses as a leader of society are not among them.

Nor can any good be expected from the continuation or expansion of other functions of Royalty connected with its assumed position as the head of society. A large amount of patronage, cheap or costly, is dispensed by the Crown in ways hardly, if at all, connected with politics. The prerogative of elevating whomsoever it chooses

to the peerage, and thus of endowing him and his descendants with legislative powers, is exercised now-a-days with moderation, and exercised far more by the Prime Minister of the Crown than by the Crown itself. The public may not greatly care, moreover, whether few or many creditable or discreditable additions are made to the House of Lords, seeing that the House of Lords is steadily and rapidly losing most of its authority as a political institution, and that the political influence of territorial and other wealth can be exercised with almost as much or as little prejudice to the community, whether or not its holders are men of title. The venerable and still vigorous notion that the Crown is "the fountain of honour," however, is a most mischievous one in many ways. It may be well that whatever enhanced dignity can come from this source should be conferred on a great soldier like Sir Colin Campbell, or a useful administrator like Sir John Lawrence, or a clever politician like Mr. Lowe; and there may be no great harm in raising to the peerage wealthy men who court such a reward. But generally these honours are not conferred for honourable motives, and it is more often the successful adventurers or the political supporters for whom no other recompense can be provided who are ennobled, so that public morality is more or less grievously tarnished when men like Sir John Pakington and Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen are promoted from the commonalty to the peerage. And it is yet worse, because, though the "honours" are of humbler sort, they are far more frequently bestowed, with the baronetcies, knighthoods, and other minor titles conferred by the Crown. False and misleading views of the duties of citizenship are spread abroad when any alderman or placeman is encouraged to hope that he can, by playing the courtier, win some badge of distinction which will make him seem superior to his neighbours.

The merely complimentary titles that the Crown dispenses, however, are open to but slight objection in comparison with the substantial offices of which it often has far more than the nominal disposal. Now-a-days, and for a long time past, the appointments to such offices are and have been, to a great extent, under the control of the Crown's advisers, rather than of the Crown itself. Even in the selection of her Prime Minister the sovereign must surrender her own wishes to those of her people. If the people require that Mr. Gladstone shall be made Premier, private antipathies have to be set aside; and if Mr. Gladstone declares that Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Fawcett must hold office under him, the seals have to be given to them. But in the construction of a Cabinet and its subordinate staff, the royal wishes have to be considered in some measure, and in the most popular Administration that can be formed

there must be at least a few administrators in whom the people have little or no confidence.

Yet more is this the case with the other offices under the Crown. In appointments to the higher branches of the legal and clerical professions, the bench and the episcopacy; it may be assumed that Royalty has least power of exercising mischievous favouritism and making selections that would be generally offensive to the nation; but the public troubles itself less about ambassadorships and colonial governorships, and we find that for such posts as these, men like Lord Lytton and Sir Bartle Frere can be chosen and endowed with power to involve the country in dishonourable and ruinous wars before any question arises as to their competence for their work.

And in the army the active influence of the Crown is greatest of all. It is notorious that the Duke of Cambridge was made Commander-in-Chief, and has held that post for twenty-five years, not because of his exceptional fitness for its duties, but because he is the Queen's cousin, and because, in these days of growing democracy, it is considered at Court to be very necessary to the stability of the Throne that a member of the Royal Family should be at the head of the army. . Whatever estimate may be formed of the Duke's military or administrative capacity, he deserves credit for, having more than once yielded to the pressure of public opinion in consenting to reforms, or attempts at reform, insisted upon by the House of Commons; and as one of the most assured prerogatives of the Lower House is the power of allowing a standing army to exist only from year to year, it must be admitted that the authority of the Commander-in-Chief is materially crippled. No one who knows anything of Horse Guards arrangements, however, of their favouritism and martinetism, can doubt that, even without any diminution in the strength of our army, several millions a year could be saved to the national exchequer if courtly and aristocratic notions were excluded from its management. Control of the army is perhaps the most solid of the prerogatives yet remaining to Royalty in England, and if it does not work altogether well at present, it is capable of being made to work very ill indeed in the future.

If it were not for the power over the national purse which is now indisputably vested in the House of Commons, and which, as in the case of the Mutiny Act, enables it to forbid the maintenance of any army or navy beyond the twelve months for which it votes supplies, there would be nothing but his own good pleasure to prevent the sovereign in England from being an arbitrary despot. As it is, the fact of his being able to appoint any Commander-in-

Chief he likes, and for so long a time as he likes, and, through that functionary, to commission any officers he likes, subject to their satisfying certain prescribed conditions on entering the service, gives him very considerable power, the possible danger of which must not be lost sight of because its exercise has for a long time past been comparatively harmless. British troops, it may be safely said, are at least as loyal and patriotic as French or German troops, but, partly in consequence of the national temperament, partly because they are voluntary recruits enlisted only for a short period, their patriotism is more genuine than that of French or German soldiers, and if, unhappily, it were ever to be put to the test, their loyalty to their country might prove stronger than their loyalty to their king. For all that, in the event of a collision between king and country, we must not deceive ourselves by supposing that the *esprit de corps* prevailing in each regiment, and linking all the regiments together, would not enable the king's officers, acting under a royal Commander-in-Chief, to make terrible havoc before the army could be disbanded. When we see with what blind zeal, in obedience to their leaders' orders, our soldiers will slaughter Zulus, and advance to be slaughtered by Boers, we should be prepared to find that they would consider it no less their duty to attack the citizens of their own country if they were so bidden. Of course, it is in the utmost degree unlikely that they would ever be so bidden; and even in that case, the onslaught would soon be counteracted, and would insure the complete overthrow of the despotism that prompted it; but the contingency is a possible one, and we shall do well to bear in mind what capacity for evil-doing is retained in that tradition of royal prerogative which makes the sovereign the supreme head of our standing army.

That is a tradition which has been jealously guarded and laboriously kept alive, while many others have been ignored. It was only a few years ago that the old rule requiring every officer's commission on each re-appointment to be signed by the monarch's own hand was abandoned, and then solely because the duties of Royalty were so very onerous that officers had to wait several years after being gazetted before they received their commissions, and sometimes had grown old and died in the service before they had formally entered it.

The punctilios of royal prerogative have been less rigidly observed in most of the civil offices under the Crown; but even here the royal prerogative has more reality, or semblance of reality and possibility of renewed vitality, than many persons imagine. It is by the Crown that all magistrates are appointed, whether unpaid and untrained

justices of the peace, who can give force from the bench to any small spite which they, as gentlefolk and landlords, may feel towards their plebeian neighbours, or the highest judges in the land. And so with the other branches of the public service. The one great safeguard against grave abuse of the royal prerogative in all these respects, or, indeed, against any such actual exercise of it as would lead to grave abuse, is that, though "the king can do no wrong," the king can do very little for which his Ministers are not responsible to Parliament, and that therefore, as it is the Ministers who really now hold the reins of power, they cannot, in the king's name, nor can he, without their being blamed for it, do any serious mischief. This, it may be admitted, is a tolerably good safeguard against grave abuse of the royal prerogative. But we must not be deceived by its apparent completeness.

The principle of Ministerial responsibility, which is the basis of Cabinet government, and, in England, of constitutional monarchy, is sufficiently intelligible, and satisfactory as far as it goes. It has rendered Royalty possible in this country for more than two centuries since the time when Cromwell and his Ironsides thought they had demolished it for ever, and has helped the progress of English liberty infinitely better than any such military despotism, calling itself Republicanism, as was desired by Cromwell and his Ironsides, could have done. It has been developed, and its methods have been improved, with the advance of the nation which has been improved by those methods. But it is by no means perfect yet, or, if it is about as perfect as it can be, it is only waiting to be superseded by some more perfect instrument of national self-government.

When Madame de Stael had delivered to the Empéror Alexander an eloquent encomium of beneficent despotism, the sagacious monarch replied, "Yes, madame, but it is only a happy accident." Constitutional monarchy is more likely to work well than even a beneficent despotism, but its good working cannot be relied upon. As Mr. Bagehot has aptly said :—

It is easy to imagine upon a constitutional throne an active and meddling fool, who always acts when he should not, who never acts when he should, who warns his Ministers against their judicious measures, who encourages them in their injudicious measures. It is easy to imagine that such a king should be the tool of others; that favourites should guide him; that mistresses should corrupt him; that the atmosphere of a bad Court should be used to degrade free government.

And the same discreet apologist for a kingly form of rule in England goes on to say :—

We have had an awful instance of the dangers of constitutional Royalty. We

have had the case of a meddling maniac. During great part of his life George the Third's reason was half upset by every crisis. Throughout his life he had an obstinacy akin to that of insanity. He was an obstinate and an evil influence; he could not be turned from what was inexpedient; by the aid of his station he turned truer but weaker men from what was expedient. He gave an excellent moral example to his contemporaries, but he was an instance of those whose good dies with them, while their evil lives after them. He prolonged the American War, perhaps he caused the American War; so we inherit the vestiges of an American hatred. He forbade Mr. Pitt's wise plans; so we inherit an Irish difficulty. He would not let us do right in time; so now our attempts at right are out of time and fruitless. Constitutional Royalty under an active and half-insane king is one of the worst of governments. There is in it a secret power which is always eager, which is generally obstinate, which is often wrong, which rules Ministers more than they know themselves, which overpowers them much more than the public believe, which is irresponsible because it is inscrutable, which cannot be prevented because it cannot be seen. The benefits of a good monarch are almost invaluable, but the evils of a bad monarch are almost irreparable.

Of course, a great change has taken place in the political relations between the Crown and the English people since the time when George the Third was king. The Reform Act of 1832 was the first great victory in a revolutionary movement by which the right of the people to have at least a large share in the management of the nation's affairs is being secured. Thereby the unwarranted, but long-tolerated, claim of the aristocracy not only to exercise great legislative powers in the House of Lords, but also to more than half fill the House of Commons with its nominees, while more than half of the residue were nominees of the Crown, was once and for ever repudiated in principle; and since that time the tendency, though not always working steadily, has been to give to the people more and more political power, more and more equitably apportioned. Even were she so minded, the present sovereign would not be allowed to meddle with affairs of State as much or as injuriously as did her grandfather in a hundred instances hardly less obnoxious than the occasion of his successfully plotting against his own Ministers to defeat their India Bill, and to overthrow them at the same time, in 1783, when Fox wrote: "We are beat in the House of Lords by such treachery on the part of the King, and such meanness on the part of his friends in the House of Lords, as one could not expect either from him or them;" and while the open interference of Queen Victoria with the business of the Cabinet is so small as to be hardly perceptible, no one could justly apply to the secret influence of the Court such language as Fox used when he described the clandestine tactics of George the Third as "the undetected agency of an infernal spirit." But we still have an English Court which, as far as politics are concerned, insists, and with good excuse, on being something more than an idle hanger-on to the Cabinet.

A characteristic and, in its way, amusing illustration of the claim of Royalty to be a political entity, occurred almost at the commencement of the present reign. The young Queen had been barely two years on the throne, under the able guidance of that excellent Whig statesman, Lord Melbourne, when, in May, 1839, his loss of popularity induced him to tender his resignation, and Sir Robert Peel was accordingly requested to form a Cabinet. To her mentor's retirement from office the Queen, very properly, made no objection, but she objected strongly to having all the Whig ladies who had been attached to her household displaced by the wives, sisters, cousins, and aunts of the Conservative leaders. Personal regard for her friends, and not politics, may have caused, and almost justified, Her Majesty's stubbornness; but we need not read over again those pages of Lord Beaconsfield's novels in which the vast influence, secret and open, of political ladies is glorified, to be reminded that this "Bedchamber question" was one of very real political significance. Hence arose something more than a storm in a teapot. When Sir Robert Peel informed the Queen that, besides new Ministers of State, some of whom were personally distasteful to her, he must provide her with new Ladies of her Bedchamber, she bluntly refused to part with her old attendants, and Lord John Russell, staunch Royalist and staunch Whig as he was, encouraged her in her opposition. After further consultation with her political allies, she wrote to Sir Robert Peel, formally declining "to adopt a course which she conceived to be contrary to usage, and which was repugnant to her feelings." Peel thereupon, with no more than a proper sense of his own dignity and due regard for the constitutional principles that were at stake, declined to form a new Administration, alleging that, for any Administration he might form to be successful, it was necessary "that he should have that public proof of Her Majesty's entire support and confidence which would be afforded by the permission to make some changes in that part of Her Majesty's household which Her Majesty resolved on maintaining entirely without change,"—graceful language to the effect that he could not take office as Her Majesty's Premier and the nation's Prime Minister unless he was relieved from the risk of his political work being thwarted by domestic arrangements. In consequence of that quarrel, Lord Melbourne's Ministry was reinstated in office, and dragged on a feeble life for two years longer. The Whigs gained little for themselves, and less for the country, however, by their excessive courtliness. The General Election of 1841 gave such strength to the Conservative party that when Sir Robert Peel formed his Administration neither Whigs nor courtiers ventured to

revive the Bedchamber question. It had been partly superseded, it is true, by an amicable arrangement, in accordance with which the Queen generally chose for the Ladies of her Bedchamber ladies who were not of very pronounced politics, and who could thus hold their posts with a clear conscience, and without prejudice to party government, under Whigs and Tories alike, only such more important State functionaries as the Mistress of the Robes, and those of avowed political bias, being subject to the vicissitudes of office.

The Bedchamber question was a matter of public discussion forty years ago. At that time, however, but little was known, though something was guessed, about the very persistent efforts that were made almost from the beginning of Queen Victoria's reign to revive the declining functions of Royalty as a political power in England. Only since the publication of Sir Theodore Martin's "Life of the Prince Consort" have we been permitted to see with any approach to clearness what forces were here at work. Baron Stockmar, who found her husband for the Queen, was the zealous adviser both of the Queen and of her husband as to the place which in his opinion the Crown ought to hold in relation to the country. He was a most skilful instructor, and had not wholly inapt pupils. He knew exactly what were the limits beyond which it would not be safe for royal interference to go, and to what extent there would be no risk in making tentative endeavours to restore, at any rate, some of the personal rule of the sovereign which had existed in old times, and had been perpetuated in the German principedoms from among which our own Royal Family had arisen. What might have happened had his counsels been followed with as much skill as he showed in delivering them it would not be easy to guess. Happily, the following was not very skilful. Neither we nor posterity need altogether repudiate the Poet Laureate's panegyric of "Albert the Good" as one

Who revered his conscience as his king ;
Whose glory was, redressing human wrong ;
Not swaying to this faction or to that ;
Not making his high place the lawless perch
Of wing'd ambitions, nor a vantage-ground
For pleasure ; but thro' all this tract of years
Wearing the white flower of a blameless life,
Before a thousand peering littlenesses,
In that fierce light which beats upon a throne,
And blackens every blot ;

but, while acknowledging the honesty and perseverance with which, rendering many great and unquestionable services to the people among whom he came to live under peculiarly trying conditions, we may be grateful that he was not quite so "all-accomplished, wise,"

as he is represented to have been, and that, with good intentions, he failed in putting to all the bad use they were capable of the instructions of his friend and tutor. Had all the autocratic power that Stockmar planned for it been given to the English Crown during the twenty years or more of Prince Albert's influence in this country, the question as to the expediency of allowing Royalty to continue among us would have been a far more pressing one than it is just now. As it is, the revelations made in Sir Theodore Martin's five volumes are well worth studying.

No one who has read that work needs to be reminded that there was little to complain of and much to applaud in Prince Albert's scheme of strengthening the position of Royalty in England, as far as home affairs were concerned. His rare encouragement of decent ways of living at Court, and of respect for nearly all the Ten Commandments, can hardly be too much commended. And the country owes a great deal to him for his unwearied patronage of art literature, science, and industry; for his promotion of such an enterprise as the Great Exhibition of 1851; for his journeys to and fro to deliver lectures, simple but genuine, on thrift and cleanliness, good drainage and good ventilation; for his model cottages and model gardens, and much else of the same varied sort. Nor should we credit him with anything but an honest desire to act aright in his schemes for maintaining what he held to be the dignity and interest of England in all its foreign concerns. We must not forget, however, that his influence in those concerns was often very pernicious, and that, whether pernicious or not, the fact that he was able to exert so much influence on behalf of the Crown, which during his lifetime he chiefly wore, was altogether obnoxious.

There is no space here for a review of the direct or indirect action of the Crown in England's relations with foreign countries during either the twenty years before or the twenty years after Prince Albert's death, but a single illustration may serve to indicate the nature of the royal influence for which he and Baron Stockmar were mainly responsible.

In 1852, Lord Palmerston was summarily dismissed from the Administration in which he held office as Foreign Secretary, on the ground that he had exceeded his authority, and taken upon himself to act independently as the organ of the Queen's Government, in sanctioning the *coup d'état* of Louis Napoleon in the previous December. The dismissal was well deserved, but the reason given for it by Lord John Russell, then Premier, that he had offended the *amour propre* and the personal feelings of the Queen by what he had done, was monstrous. On that occasion Lord John Russell adopted

the unusual course of reading in Parliament a memorandum prepared in 1850 by Prince Albert, on the Queen's behalf, respecting the duties of the Foreign Secretary to the Crown, which deserves careful attention, as a glaring exhibition of the pretensions to personal and autocratic rule which Royalty can make in these days of parliamentary government. "The Queen requires," this document asserts in imperious terms, "first, that Lord Palmerston will distinctly state what he proposes in a given case, in order that the Queen may know as distinctly to what she is giving her royal sanction; secondly, having once given her sanction to a measure, that it be not arbitrarily altered or modified by the Minister. Such an act she must consider as failing in sincerity to the Crown, and justly to be visited by the exercise of her constitutional right of dismissing that Minister. She expects to be kept informed of what passes between him and the foreign Ministers, before important decisions are taken, based upon that intercourse; to receive the foreign despatches in good time; and to have the drafts for her approval sent to her in sufficient time to make herself acquainted with their contents before they must be sent off." There is not much harm in the courteous terms still in use by which a semblance of absolute monarchy is kept up, as when the Queen in official documents speaks of "my dominions, my subjects, my allies, my exchequer," and so forth; but when these terms are supposed to have any real meaning, they are offensive to all notions of popular liberty; and when the Crown is suffered not only to address such language as the above to the Foreign Minister appointed by consent of Parliament, but even to discharge him for non-compliance with it, the scandal is none the less because in the case in question the Minister was discharged for having acted in a really improper way. Yet we know that until Prince Albert's death such pretensions were persistently made and acted upon, and that if, in the absence of such a hard-working and trusty private secretary as her husband was, the Queen now exercises less constant control over the foreign business of the country, her right to do so is still asserted as zealously as ever.

The great personal loss the Queen sustained by Prince Albert's death, indeed, if it has to some extent relieved the nation of the perpetual meddling with State affairs which prevailed in his lifetime, has been, apart from other considerations, a national misfortune, in that such meddling as now goes on more or less spasmodically, lacks the measure of good sense and caution of which he was possessed. On Lord Beaconsfield and his colleagues must devolve the responsibility of the great follies and the greater crimes that were committed, in England's name and the Queen's, during the hateful six

years of Tory misrule which came to an end in 1880; but it is no secret that Lord Beaconsfield's Administration was encouraged, if it was not induced, to carry on its long series of blusterings and aggressions by the knowledge that all this dangerous and unpatriotic procedure was heartily approved at Court. In the fact that at the General Election of 1874 the apathetic and misguided constituencies sent to the House of Commons a large majority of representatives pledged to support the Tory leaders in their projected defence of "Beer and the Bible," and, as an unexpressed corollary, to support them in everything else they chose to do, there was technical warrant for all that Lord Beaconsfield's Government did with the consent of Parliament; but, had the constituencies known beforehand what sort of policy the Government would pursue, no one can imagine that they would have placed it in office. More than that, and this is more immediately to the point, let it be clearly understood that the main offences of Lord Beaconsfield's Administration were such as no well-constructed Tory Cabinet could have been expected to be guilty of, such as would not have been committed by a Tory Cabinet with a man like the late Lord Derby at its head, or one in which the present Lord Derby could be listened to, and such as even Lord Beaconsfield's Government would not have committed had it not been egged on to do so by Royal influence. From the time when Parliament was forced to give its sanction to the Queen's resolve to call herself Empress of India, all the mock-Imperial tactics of her highly favoured Ministers were as consistent as they could be, and there was complete accord between the elevation of Mr. Disraeli to the peerage and the sending of a complimentary letter from Windsor, or Osborne, or Balmoral, or wherever else Royalty was nestling for the moment, to the author of the great Jingo anthem.

We may take to ourselves some comfort by reflecting that there is no great likelihood of such another Government as Lord Beaconsfield's existing in England for a long time to come, if ever; but that it contrived to exist so recently, and to gain strength by subjecting itself so thoroughly to royal influence, should put us on our guard concerning the future.

Perhaps enough has been said in the foregoing pages to indicate the dangers to which English liberty and the welfare of the nation are exposed from the maintenance of Royalty among us. No exhaustive enumeration of what may be called the abuses of Royalty in England has here been attempted, but the most prominent of them have been briefly exhibited. The perpetuation of monarchical institutions is tolerated and approved of by a great many persons, who

would resent any autocratic or despotic system, on the ground that they are merely convenient traditions, with not enough vitality left in them to work any serious mischief. "Ours is really a republican form of government," it is repeatedly urged by good Radicals, "a more truly republican form of government than prevails in America or in France. The people rule through the House of Commons. The Crown is only a gewgaw which pleases certain members of the community whom we can afford to humour, even at the cost of a small addition to the national expenditure." Is it so indeed, and no worse than that? We have seen that the Crown may, and has very recently, cost the nation vastly more than the amount assigned to it in the annual estimates. It would be rash to assert that royal influences are mainly responsible for the aggressive enterprises of the past few years, for which we are now bearing the disgrace and the pecuniary burthens—the Afghan wars and the South African wars; but it is quite safe to say that royal influence has helped to promote them, and that, had we been saved from it, our chances of being saved from them would have been very much greater. If the power that Royalty now possesses of meddling in State affairs, and especially in foreign politics, is considerably less than it was in former times, it is still a power to be dreaded. Nor can a wise student of social politics look complacently upon the influence that Royalty can and does exert in other ways, more social than political, because at the present time the Crown distributes its social honours with much discretion and some moderation, and because, by rare good fortune, the Court, as far as it shows itself at all, shows itself to be remarkably free from courtly vices. We have to consider not only, or chiefly, how much or how little harm comes to the community from its allowing the Crown to remain as something more than a mere figure-head of the State, but what is the extent of the harm it may cause if those who wear or guide it choose.

But there is another side to the question. Granting that the Crown works or can work great evil, are there no benefits wrought by it, which cannot safely be dispensed with at present? A long string of arguments in favour of the maintenance of Royalty in England may be found in the writings of political philosophers, who have no sympathy with Tory traditions and prejudices—such, for instance, as Mr. Bagehot's essay on "The English Constitution," which has been quoted from in this article. Some of these are plausible; but they need not be repeated here. It will be sufficient to call attention to one main argument against the too speedy abolition of Royalty in such a country as ours, which has by most reformers been strangely overlooked. Whatever is to be said for or against the

monarchical institution in itself, however much its former authority has been crippled and its old splendours have been tarnished, it is still something more than the nominal head of the aristocracy that still retains something more than the spent traditions of the feudal system from which it grew. According to the popular and, from a historical point of view, erroneous, but practically accurate reading of a venerable phrase, there are three "Estates of the Realm"—King, Lords, and Commons. The legislative functions of the king have fallen into abeyance, or been assigned to the Cabinet, which, whether its head be a peer or a commoner, and although it is bound to have representatives in both Houses of Parliament, is really subject to the Lower House. A vote of censure on "Her Majesty's Ministers" may be passed in the House of Lords, as happened recently on the question of the evacuation of Kandahar, without influencing either public opinion or the action of the Government; whereas a similar vote in the House of Commons, passed only by a majority of one, would be fatal, unless a dissolution and a general election proved that the censuring Commoners did not represent the feelings of the constituencies. The Cabinet is thus manifestly the servant of the House of Commons, except in so far as there is more than a pretence of service to the Crown implied in the term "Her Majesty's Ministers." The term, as we have seen, is not all pretence; but in all important respects both Crown and Cabinet are generally merely servants of the Commons. The immense gain to the people, and the vast strengthening of popular powers consequent on this arrangement, should be too patent to need demonstration. The arrangement works so smoothly on ordinary occasions, and with so much concealment of the humiliating position now held by the House of Lords in the legislative machinery, that its full importance is hardly noticed. How important it is, however, should appear from a proceeding already referred to, when Mr. Gladstone had recourse to the royal prerogative in order to enforce the scheme of army purchase abolition, which the House of Lords had rejected after it had been approved by the House of Commons. That may have been a dangerous and in some respects an unwise expedient, but it made plain the extent to which now-a-days the royal prerogative—that is, all that remains of the authority and dignity of the Crown—can be used to help the Commons in defeating the Lords.

The House of Lords is a dangerous and obstructive institution, which cannot be too soon got rid of. In some respects the sympathies of Royalty with the aristocracy enable the aristocracy to be more obstructive and dangerous than it would otherwise be; but

as long as the House of Lords exists it is a matter of supreme importance to the progress of the nation in self-government that, whenever the Lords and the Commons are at variance, the Crown should side, as it virtually does now, with the Commons and not with the Lords.

Nor is that all. Even those who most object to the House of Lords, in its present shape or in any shape, may well shrink, as has already been hinted, from hastening its overthrow until some arrangement has been made for preventing the tide of aristocratic influence, with all its power of wealth and all the force of its "birth and breeding," from being turned out of its present lethargic channels, and from flooding the fields in which democratic principles are as yet insufficiently rooted. We need a far more perfect democracy before we can venture to bring it into a death-struggle with the aristocracy, and we cannot yet dispense with the service that is rendered to the democracy by a large part of what remains of the social as well as the political influence of Royalty. Our duty is first to get rid of the great monopolists of land and territorial wealth, and all the social and political strength their positions give them. When that is done the House of Lords will disappear; and if the Crown disappears with it, no honest citizen need deplore its loss.

H. R. FOX BOURNE.

PRINCE METTERNICH.*

THIS "autobiography" is a truly marvellous illustration of the slender wisdom with which the world is governed. From the fall of Napoleon, onwards for a period of fifteen years, there was no man in Europe so powerful as Prince Metternich. Emperors, kings, princelings, and archdukes—personages who at that day infested Europe more abundantly than now—all regarded him as their guide, philosopher, and friend. He disposed of the military resources of Austria, Russia, and Prussia almost as if they had been his own. He had powers to bind and to loose in actual fact, almost as ample as those claimed in theory by the Papal See. And here at last we have a portrait of the man drawn by himself. It is that of a shallow, conceited coxcomb.

Conceit like that of Prince Metternich has, we should imagine, rarely existed in human form. Prince Metternich was to Prince Metternich a subject of contemplation, which was a joy for ever. Age could not wither, nor custom stale its infinite variety. Whether regarded from a moral or an intellectual standpoint, his own character was to the writer of this autobiography an inexhaustible well-spring of delight and reverence. He is continually pausing, as it were, in mid career, to direct attention to its manifold excellences—to point out wherein it differs from the characters of ordinary folk. Here are a few illustrations of this habit :—

Sept. 4, 1818. . . . I have become a species of moral power in Germany, and perhaps even in Europe—a power which will leave a void when it disappears; and nevertheless, it will disappear, like all belonging to poor frail human nature.

July 27, 1819. . . . My mind conceives nothing narrow or limited; I always go, on every side, far beyond all that occupies the greater number of men of business; I cover ground infinitely larger than they can see or wish to see. I cannot help saying to myself twenty times a day, "Good God! how right I am, and how wrong they are! And how easy this reason is to see; it is so clear, so simple,

* *Memoirs of Prince Metternich, 1815—1829.* Edited by Prince Richard Metternich. Translated by Mrs. Alexander Napier. Vols. III., IV. Bentley and Son. 1881.

and so natural!" I shall repeat this till my last breath, and the world will go on in its own miserable way none the less.

Sept. 3, 1810. . . . I shall be regretted by many of the great and good—execrated by those who are neither. The standpoint from which I have thought and acted is of such a height that my name remains identified with great events, for the very reason that I had the misfortune to live in a period of revolution.

February 17, 1821. With me the future is always before my eyes, and I believe I am far less exposed to the danger of error with regard to the future than with regard to the present. . . . I do not overlook the present—I take it at its real value; but the present is not worth much. This is evident to me, and history has, perhaps, never displayed such a pitiable crowd of small personages who only busy themselves with follies. Heavens! how we shall all be abused when the day of reckoning comes! And that day will come. Then some worthy man who, among the hundred thousand pamphlets and in the grocers' shops, discovers my name, will find, perhaps, in the year 2440 that in this far distant time one being existed who was less wrong-headed than his contemporaries, who carried self-ostimation so far as to believe themselves arrived at the culminating point of civilization.

"Surely great wit to madness is allied;" but the relationship between conceit and shallowness is indefinitely closer and more inevitable. In truth, in such a world as ours, conceit is impossible except for the shallow man who imagines that nothing exists beyond the reach of his own particular plummet. Prince Metternich knew absolutely nothing of the nature of the social and political forces which were working and gathering strength around him; hence his calm assurance that he had completely gauged and discovered their value; and hence his satisfaction in a policy which consisted in nothing but a system of cruel and insensate repression. When the armies of the French Republic poured across the borders of France, they sowed in every country that they entered the seeds of a national life. They prepared Europe for that mighty revolution which is transforming her from a continent of kings to a continent of free peoples. The first enemy against whom these new ideas of national unity and independence had to assert their right to exist was the very nation which had imparted them. Under the Imperialism of Bonaparte, France became the destroyer of national life, as under the Republic she had been its nurse and protector. The Battle of Leipsic was rightly called "the battle of the nations," not because of the numbers engaged on either side, but because it was a struggle for national life against the levelling monotony of a grasping Imperialism. The despots of Austria, Russia, and Prussia were for the moment kings of the people,

And by the heart, not hand, enslaving them.

But when Napoleon had fallen, these same despots, with Prince

Metternich as their adviser, fondly imagined that they had resumed possession of an Europe precisely as it was before the French Revolution had burst its local boundaries and submerged a continent. They parcelled it out among themselves, as if it had been a vast estate tenanted by nothing of a higher kind than "dumb, driven cattle," and then proceeded to keep military watch and ward over their stolen goods against what they were pleased to style "the principles of the Revolution." Prince Metternich was the great political High Priest and Prophet combined of this order of things; and he was never weary of expatiating on the beauty and profundity of that wisdom which had called it into existence.

According to him, "the principles of the Revolution" were nothing more than counsels of anarchy, generated, not by unjust laws and defective political institutions, but having their origin in a malignant and irrational spirit of "presumption" in the middle classes of Europe. This "presumption" was the result of the rapid advance in various directions which the world had made during the past three centuries. It had attacked society like a disease, and "become an almost universal sentiment." The consequences to Europe threatened to be of the most appalling character. Inspired by this spirit of "presumption," the middle classes in every country were working for the overthrow of society, the subversion of ancient institutions, of law, order, and religion. The monstrous absurdity of a wealthy educated class, with all their material interests ranged on the side of peace and order, thus abandoned to a purposeless frenzy for destruction, never glimmered for a moment before the mind of this eminent political quack. He appears to have regarded it as a fact so self-evident, that to adduce evidence in support of it was needless. Such, however, being his conception of the danger to be encountered, his remedy followed as a logical consequence. The peril was not peculiar to one country, but common to all. It was a plague spread over the face of all Europe, and which, consequently, all Europe was equally interested in stamping out. To use his own formula, "all that was legally established" in Europe must band together against the common enemy of legality—these devil-possessed middle classes. And by "all that was legally established" Prince Metternich understood Europe as it had been cut and carved and parcelled out at the Congress of Vienna. All the emperors, kings, princes, grand dukes, and others whose legal right to exist had received the ratification of that august assembly must form a "Holy Alliance" for the preservation of religion and society against the inroads of atheism and lawlessness. The Emperors of Austria and Russia were the two

presiding spirits of this Holy Alliance, and it was their duty to coerce, not merely the Satanic middle classes, but any sovereign who shewed the slightest bias towards the infernal "principles of the Revolution." To give any liberty to thought was to be guilty of encouraging those principles. Prince Metternich doubts if "society can exist with the liberty of the press, a scourge unknown to the world before the latter half of the seventeenth century"—this liberty, therefore, no member of the Holy Alliance was to allow within his dominions. To advocate the unity of Germany was to advocate "an infamous object"—all such teaching, therefore, must be sternly and promptly silenced. But even so, Prince Metternich is not entirely happy. Political discussion he may possibly silence, but he finds that he cannot check the growth and multiplication of religious sects. This phenomenon troubles him. It shows that there is still movement and vitality in the minds of those devil-posessed middle classes, despite of the chains in which the Holy Alliance has bound them. So long as this is so, the "principles of the Revolution" are only scotched, not killed; and these volumes contain a number of despatches dwelling on the dangers lurking in religious schisms. But behind and above all other dangers was that great peril—the existence of secret societies. Prince Metternich speaks of them as "a real power, all the more dangerous as it works in the dark, undermining all parts of the social body, and depositing everywhere the seeds of a moral gangrene which is not slow to develop and increase." But his political quackery is not able to suggest any measures for dealing with this evil, except that of driving it still deeper underground by severer and severer measures of repression. In short, Prince Metternich's method of combating what he called "the Revolution" was to heap weight after weight upon the conscience and intellect of the middle classes, until the pressure had crushed them into a state of insensibility. If, under the agony of this treatment, the middle classes anywhere rose in revolt, the armies of Russia, Austria, and Prussia were immediately to proceed to the spot and slaughter them back into a state of quietude. When commotion occurs in any part of Europe, Prince Metternich accounts for it always in the one way, and advocates always the same treatment. It is easy to see that such a conception of international policy could hardly have risen in any mind except that of an Austrian bureaucrat. It is an attempt to find in the nature of things a justification for that artificially constructed, heterogeneous empire. But it was a policy entirely to the liking of the multitude of princelings, grand dukes, and people of that kind who were fattening upon the wealth of Europe. They had not the least desire to

concede constitutions to their subjects, or promote any intellectual activity among them; and it was glad tidings of great joy to learn that in doing exactly what they wanted to do, they would be supported by the legions of Austria, Russia, and Prussia. So, for the space of some ten years, "all went merry as a marriage bell." Popular movements occurred here and there, but the prescriptions of Prince Metternich were promptly acted upon, and they were speedily put down. It is curious to note the almost identical phraseology in which these prescriptions are couched.

The following is the prescription for an outbreak in Naples:—

The late events in the kingdom of Naples have shown more overtly and significantly than any former occurrence of this kind, that even in a well-regulated and well-governed State, among a quiet, peaceable nation, contented and satisfied with their government, the pernicious influence of revolutionary sects can cause the most violent agitation, and quickly lead to an entire revolution. . . . His Majesty the Emperor [of Austria] is particularly interested in these unfortunate incidents by his political and personal ties, by his relationship with several Italian princes, and by the geographical situation of his own countries. The political order of things established in 1815, and guaranteed by all the European Powers, has made Austria the natural warder and protector of public peace in Italy. The Emperor is firmly determined to fulfil this high vocation, to keep away all peace-disturbing movements from his frontiers and those of his nearest neighbours, to allow no infringement of the rights of Italian princes; and if legal and administrative precautions should not afford sufficient protection, he will resort to the most vigorous measures.

The following is the prescription for dealing with an insurrection in Piedmont:—

At the very moment when their [*i.e.*, the sovereigns of the Holy Alliance] generous determination was accomplished in the kingdom of Naples, a rebellion of a still more odious kind (if that were possible) broke out in Piedmont. . . . The allied sovereigns, together with their Majesties the King of the Two Sicilies and the King of Sardinia, have thought it indispensable to take measures of temporary precaution, such as were directed by prudence and regard for the general safety. . . . The justice and disinterestedness which have presided at the deliberations of the allied monarchs will always regulate their policy. In the future, as in the past, its aim will ever be the preservation of the independence and the rights of each State as they are recognized and defined by existing treaties. The result of so dangerous a movement will yet be, under Providence, the strengthening of the peace which the enemies of the people endeavoured to destroy, and the consolidation of an order of things which will secure peace and prosperity to the nations.

The following is the prescription for treating an insurrection in Spain:—

Spain is now undergoing the fate which awaits all States unfortunate enough to seek what is good in a way in which it can never be found. It is passing.

through the fateful circle of its revolution—a revolution which deluded or evil-disposed men represent as a benefit, or, indeed, a triumph of the enlightened century. . . . If ever a Power was raised in the very heart of civilization hostile to the principles of conservation, to the principles on which the European confederation rests, that Power is Spain in its present state of decomposition. Can the monarchs look with equanimity on the evils heaped on one country which are accompanied with so many dangers for others? Dependent only on their own judgment and their own conscience in this grave juncture of affairs, they must ask themselves whether it can be longer permitted to remain quiet spectators of calamities which daily threaten to become more dangerous and more horrible, or even by the presence of their representatives give the false appearance of a silent consent to the measures of a faction ready to do anything to maintain and support their pernicious power. The decision of the monarchs cannot be doubtful. Their ambassadors have received orders to leave the Peninsula.

More contemptible quackery than this never passed itself off for statesmanship; but so long as Castlereagh survived to misrepresent the desires and convictions of Great Britain on questions of foreign policy, there can be no question that it seemed to have a certain measure of success. The popular risings in Naples, Piedmont, and Spain were stamped out with unexpected ease and celerity, and it was during this period that Prince Metternich became exalted beyond measure. He little guessed the thorn in the flesh that was preparing for him when Canning became Prime Minister of Great Britain. Before that event the Greek Insurrection had broken out. Metternich considered this, as he considered every other popular movement, to be the work of the devil-possessed middle classes—an obolition of the same infernal machinations which had caused similar disturbances in Naples, Piedmont, and Spain. He appealed to the simultaneousness of the insurrections in Greece and Spain, as an unquestionable proof of the truth of his theory, and he was prepared to coerce the Greeks into submission to the Sultan by precisely the same methods which he had employed upon Neapolitans and Piedmontese. Canning's policy defeated this project, and destroyed the Holy Alliance; and it is not a little curious to watch the varying feelings with which Metternich regarded this unexpected antagonist on the field of European politics, where hitherto he had held an unquestioned supremacy. The tone, at first, is one of lofty contempt:—

Jan. 6, 1823.—People are really very foolish. I can find no more power of judgment among them than among children who, if they see a great cloud, want to climb up and walk upon it, as if it were firm ground. When I speak of "judgment," I take the word in its most positive signification, and separate it entirely from mind or intellect, for this is generally possessed by the very men who suffer from want of judgment. I much fear that this is the case with Canning also.

May 1, 1823.—What, then, does Canning want? Whoso part will he take? What is he about? . . . I really begin to lose the very small portion of respect I had (not without difficulty, God forgive me) attained for the man. . . . A fine century for this sort of men—for fools who pass for intellectual, but are empty; for moral weaklings, who are always ready to threaten with their fists from a distance when the opportunity is good.

A month or two later, there is a change of tone. He bewails the decadence of Great Britain under the pernicious influences of a Liberal Prime Minister :—

July 18, 1823.—What a pity it is that the Queen of the Sea, and at the same time ruler of the world, should lose her salutary influence! What has become of the great and noble British Empire? What has become of its men and its orators, its feeling for right and duty, and its ideas of justice? [This is in reference to those "ideas of justice" and those "feelings for right and duty" held, in common with Prince Metternich, by the Castlereaghs, Eldons, Sidmouths, and Ellenboroughs of a time that was passing away.] This is not the work of a single individual, of one weak and feeble man; Canning is but the personification of the symptoms of the terrible malady which runs through every vein of the fatherland—a malady which has destroyed its strength, and threatens the weakened body with dissolution.

A few months later, the "one weak and feeble man" is again commented upon, and this time as follows :—

Nov. 25.—People in London see so wrongly that they will go wrong there again, as they have so often gone wrong before. But Canning's nature is still a very remarkable one. *In spite of all his lack of discernment, the genius which he undoubtedly has, and which I have never questioned, is never clouded.* He is certainly a very awkward opponent.

As Canning's designs unfold themselves, Prince Metternich, in great alarm, dubs him "the scourge of Europe." "I am," he writes to his son, Victor, "overwhelmed with business. My situation is like that of one crucified; one arm is nailed to Constantinople, and the other to Lisbon; home affairs occupy the trunk; Mr. Canning is my crucifier." His consternation and his indignation reach their culminating point when "the scourge of Europe" succeeds in inducing the Emperor Nicholas to withdraw from the Holy Alliance altogether, to abandon its principles, and unite with France and Great Britain in the application of coercion, not to the rebellious Greeks, but to the Porte—a Government which comes under Metternich's definition of "all that legally exists." He draws a deep sigh of relief when the news of Mr. Canning's sudden death reaches him :—

I do not [he writes to the Austrian Ambassador in London] think it necessary to repeat to you the opinion we have from the first entertained of the merits

of the man whom Providence hurled upon England and Europe like a malevolent meteor. . . . He has shaken everything, and destroyed a great deal, but he has built up nothing—a sad but common thing with men of his stamp. England is delivered from a great scourge. Will the world seek for compensation for the evil which has been done to it by him to an extent which cannot be estimated? This important question can only be answered in ways and by means so far beyond our powers that all we can do is to wait and hope.

Canning would have desired no higher eulogy than this reluctant testimony to the success of his policy.

The greater part of these volumes is occupied with Turkish affairs and the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29. It is a curious evidence of that obstinate foolishness which passes for wisdom among "the sovereigns and statesmen" of this world, that instead of hastening to the utmost of their power the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, they have for the last fifty years been diligently expending hundreds of thousands of human lives and millions of treasure in keeping the noisome thing alive. When asked wherefore they persisted in this insane and inhuman policy, these sagacious gentry have invariably replied that if the Ottoman Empire disappeared, there was no knowing what would take its place; a reign of anarchy would follow; and so, to prevent anarchy, they preserved anarchy; to prevent misrule, they preserved the most gigantic system of misrule the world has ever witnessed; to save Europe from war, they went to war again and again. The fact is that "sovereigns and statesmen" in nineteen cases out of twenty are no better than empirical quacks like this very Prince Metternich. Ignorant of the records of past history, destitute of the philosophical insight to discern the true laws of social and political development, they almost invariably identify that which exists with the everlasting order of the universe; and departure or deviation from the established fact they designate as "a leap in the dark," fraught with consequences beyond the reach of human sagacity to divine. They constantly mistake cause for effect, and so feed the very evil which they suppose that they are engaged in extirpating. Notably has this been the case with the Ottoman Empire. As we all know, this Empire of Sodom has been fondly cherished by generation after generation of (so-called) Christian "sovereigns and statesmen" on the ground that it was their sole bulwark against Russian aggression. Not one among them had the wit to perceive that it was the existence of the Ottoman Empire which not merely provoked this Russian aggressiveness which they so much dreaded, but actually justified it. For what was the pretext on which Russia claimed to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey? It was the unanswerable one of the intolerable sufferings of a

Christian population, allied to herself by blood and religion, under the yoke of a Mohammedan. The only way to extract the cogency out of this pretext was to join with Russia in the liberation of the oppressed populations. One of two things *must* then have happened: if Russia had no motive for action against the Porte except to ameliorate the condition of the Christian population, with their freedom, her aggressiveness would have passed away; or if extension of territory had been her aim all along, that aim would then have revealed itself stripped of the plausible garb of a philanthropic purpose. As a mere conqueror, all Europe, without shame, and with a clear conscience, could have combined to check Russia. As a deliverer of cruelly oppressed peoples, they could not do so without becoming participators with the Turks in all their acts of lust and savagery. This, in fact, is the frightful position which this country has occupied from the days of the Crimean War until now. No Christian woman, during that period, has fallen a victim to the lust of some Turkish official but may summon the sovereign and the people of Great Britain to the bar of the divine judgment as accomplices in the act. No Christian man, during that period, has been massacred by Turkish officials but he may charge on our heads a joint responsibility in the deed. "But," pleads the astute company of sovereigns and statesmen, "what would you have us to do? The populations of the Ottoman Empire are not fit for self-government." "Sovereigns and statesmen" never believe the people to be fit for self-government, and there can be no question that if to govern well, be to govern after the manner of "sovereigns and statesmen," the people are not, and never will be, fit for self-government. Dynastic wars, territorial aggrandisement, the balance of power, these are the will-of-the-wisps, the pursuit of which "sovereigns and statesmen" have deemed commensurate with the entire art and practice of state-craft. But even were it not so, reflect for a moment on the hopeless confusion and bewilderment in which a man's mind must have fallen before it could have recourse to such a plea as this for the preservation of Turkish ascendancy. The populations of the Ottoman Empire are unfit for self-government. Why? Because for so many centuries they have been subjected to a cruel and degrading bondage. Therefore, to educate them for the work of self-government, keep them still under that degrading bondage. As regards the "Eastern Question," for the space of more than fifty years the "sovereigns and statesmen" of Europe have been revolving in these two vicious circles. The Ottoman Empire was to be a bulwark against Russian aggression, when it was the existence and the character of that empire which

was repeatedly arousing and justifying Russian aggressiveness. The populations of the Ottoman Empire being unfit for self-government, were, on that account, to be hopelessly enchained to that very government; the vileness and cruelty of which had rendered them unfit. But even this does not exhaust the full measure of that folly which governs the continent of Europe. In the lowest deep there is a lower still. From time to time, despite of all that sovereigns and statesmen could do, first one province and then another threw off the Turkish yoke; and what happened then? The people of the province, emancipated from their prison-house, at once put forth those capacities for self-government which were supposed to be lacking to them. Order and progress, peace and plenty, characterised lands which had been a scene of perpetual disorder and bloodshedding. Did "sovereigns and statesmen" learn a lesson from this spectacle? were they capable of drawing its inevitable inference? Not the least. They still clung to the residue of the Ottoman Empire as their only bulwark against Russian aggression; they still declared that Turkish savagery was the only guarantee for order amid populations unfit for self-government. As one province after another achieved its independence, the same panic-stricken shrieks rose from the lips of these august personages, that now for certain chaos had come again; and only three years ago we had the disgraceful spectacle here in London of two (so-called) statesmen strutting about as the manufacturers of "peace with honour," whose solitary achievement was that they had succeeded in thrusting back to their prison-house a vast multitude of men, women, and children, who, through much tribulation, had achieved their freedom.

It is unnecessary to say that Prince Metternich was a profound believer in all the saving virtues attributed to the Ottoman Empire by the class to which he belonged. He could see nothing in the Greek insurrection except one more ebullition of that malignant spirit of presumption which, as he believed, had got possession of the "middle classes." His inclination was to suppress it precisely as similar movements had been suppressed in Naples, Piedmont, and elsewhere—*i.e.*, by marching a Russian or Austrian army to the spot, dispersing the insurgents, and hanging, shooting, or imprisoning the leaders. But there was an impediment in the way of this swift and decisive method. The Holy Alliance was the guardian of political order, but it was not less the guardian of the Christian faith; and it was found impossible to make out, in a State paper, how the Christian religion would be advantaged by aiding a Mohammedan sovereign to slaughter and oppress his

Christian subjects. The task was especially difficult in the case of Prince Metternich, for he prided himself on the purity of his religion even more than upon his political sagacity. In the way of preaching and improving the occasion he was a regular Chadband; and, according to him, the Holy Alliance was built up upon the Prophets and Apostles, with the Christian religion as its chief corner-stone. Here is his statement of his difficulties in a Memoir addressed to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris, dated January 5, 1826:—

The insurrection of the Greeks has been condemned from its origin by the principal Christian Powers—explicitly and publicly by some, tacitly and virtually by others—as *a revolutionary attempt which the most determined oppression (even if the authors of the revolt had proved the fact) could never justify*, and is an event tending to add new embarrassments and dangers to the already critical position of Europe. *In any other circumstances, the sovereigns, to be faithful to the principles which they have solemnly proclaimed and applied to more than one of the revolutions of our time, would, in the cause of peace, good order, and justice, have given their assistance to the outraged Government, and helped it to stifle, as soon as possible, a conflagration which threatened the repose of three parts of the world.*

If Metternich had written or done nothing beyond the passages in the above extract which we have italicised, they would have sufficed to obtain for him a distinguished place among the most infamous of his species. The cruel heart and contemptible intellect of the man come forth in them, in all their naked repulsiveness. He goes on:—

One consideration only arrested the sovereigns at the very beginning; it was repugnant to them to furnish arms to a Power professing dogmas contrary to Christianity, against subjects guilty, but Christians, and unfortunate. It was this which threw them into the painful dilemma of being able neither to aid the Greeks without violating the principles of public right, nor of fighting against them without wounding religious feeling. A passive attitude (very different from a neutrality, properly so called) was the only means of conciliating these two great interests.

These two passages ought to be read with careful attention. They indicate a habit of mind which, to a greater or less extent, is common to all sovereigns, statesmen, and diplomatists—the habit of erecting a verbal obstacle against some course of action which, in every other respect, they deem to be most wise and necessary, and then treating the verbal obstacle as if it really existed in the nature of things, an insurmountable barrier. To assist the “outraged” Sultan against his revolted subjects would, the Christian Powers considered, have been to aid “the cause of peace, good order, and justice,” and to insure “the repose of three parts of the world.”

Then why did they not do it? Because the "outraged" Sultan "professed dogmas opposed to Christianity." The Christian Powers were paralysed by this untoward fact, and could do nothing, in consequence, for "the cause of peace, justice, and good order." We need not say that we rejoice heartily that Prince Metternich, and the crowned noodles who mistook him for a wise and great man, were paralysed by the "dogmas" of the "outraged" Sultan. What we wish to call attention to is the trait so characteristic of the royal and diplomatic mind which finds in the "dogmas" of an "outraged" Sultan a sufficient reason for abandoning the "cause of peace, good order, and justice." Sovereigns and statesmen may be said to be never so entirely themselves as when they are thus sacrificing the greater to the less—when they are allowing some verbal formula to blind them to a living fact. Our late Government may be said to have revolved in this sort of thing; this is not surprising, for in so far as their actions had any meaning or intelligible purpose, they were an attempt to emancipate the foreign policy of Great Britain from popular control, and work it out, continental fashion, by the unchecked agency of "sovereigns and statesmen." But even under our present rulers we have suffered many things from this same ineradicable habit. When the Government declared that they would not leave Afghanistan without bestowing "institutions" upon it, they allowed a verbal fiction to blind them to the cause of peace, good order, and justice, and Afghanistan will yet have to suffer heavily for the mistake that was then committed. When Lord Kimberley urged, as a reason for not mediating between the Basutos and the Cape Government, that the former were "rebels to the Crown," he was faithfully following in the footsteps of Prince Metternich. He allowed a verbal fiction to blind his recognition of the cause of peace, good order, and justice; and many hundred lives have been sacrificed in consequence. And so it will always be. On no pretence whatever can the cause of peace, good order, and justice be thrust aside without disastrous consequences to mankind. The Holy Alliance chose to believe that the salvation of Europe depended upon the salvation of every princeling and archduke who happened to exist in it; all Europe, more or less, following the blind guidance of blind sovereigns and statesmen, lent themselves to this delusion, and heavily has all Europe had to pay for it, and heavily still will she have to pay. It is due to Prince Metternich and his Holy Alliance that the beneficent changes which have been wrought of late years—the Republic in France, the unity of Italy, the unity of Germany, the partial liberation of South-eastern Europe—have been accomplished, not peacefully, but amid carnage

and tears. The Holy Alliance has passed away in name, but we see the embodiment of its spirit in the huge standing armies, and the repressive laws which deface the continent of Europe, and which awaken, and in part justify, that wild spirit of retaliation which finds expression in the acts and the writings of Socialists and Nihilists.

POLITICAL AGENCY IN INDIA.

THE biography of Monarchs and Ministers innumerable, the history of Parties, of Churches, and of Empires, teach us—if we will but attend to the lesson—that the most dangerous crisis in the course of power is that of its culmination. It is then that the pride which goeth before a fall attains its height. The Indian despatches of Wellesley, Wellington, Munro, Malcolm, and Mountstuart Elphinstone show that the men who created an Empire out of scattered provinces, and brought virtual supremacy out of a chaos of obligations and claims, did not despise the views of Indian Princes or of Indian Ministers, or arrogate to themselves, even after a conquest, the right of overriding or overruling at will all separate interests. A Hindu or Mussulman Sovereign, and the Native statesmen who served him, were then not only treated with due deference and personal respect, but were acknowledged as the legitimate exponents and advocates of their local concerns and objects, and were not urged or expected to give way beyond the terms of their engagements. But, with unquestioned supremacy, another spirit has gradually crept over the relations of the British Government of India with the allied, tributary and protected States. The aspect and demeanour of our diplomatic Agents towards the Princes and statesmen of India has been, by degrees, offensively transformed, so much so, that the moral and intellectual superiority which used to be, and ought to be, our chief distinction, has disappeared for many years from the principal transactions of the Calcutta Foreign Office, and has been in many cases manifestly transferred, in the face of all India, to some widowed Ranee or some helpless Chieftain. It is not now enough that the course pursued by a Nawab or a Rajah should be irreproachable according to the letter and spirit of his treaty obligations. He must not endeavour to plead the limitations of a treaty when it is the cue of the British representative to stretch its provisions, or to go beyond them. The plea of local interests threatened, or of good administration harassed by some requisition or change, will not suffice to exculpate either the

importunate Prince or the contumacious Minister. It is not enough that the best man should be Minister, unless the Minister is at the beck and call of the Residency. Some latitude, some freedom from interference, may be allowed in local affairs, in accordance with a stipulation in many of the treaties; but when any measure meditated by the inferior State, or proposed by the Viceregal Government, is considered to affect, directly or indirectly, any British arrangement or plans, it must be forbidden or enforced, as the case may be, by the fiat of the Political Agent. In such matters his word must be law, and no words in a treaty can be held to have any weight. When the case on the side of the British Government is so bad that no answer can be given to remonstrances, they must be put down. The time has then come when dispute, discussion, or appeal can be no longer tolerated. The stronger party being able to do nothing but doggedly "decline to disturb its previous decision," the weaker party must be silenced. The British Agent and the Calcutta Foreign Office, being beaten to a standstill by all the weapons of rhetoric and all the laws of logic, fall back upon brute force and sheer terrorism. The Agent's own credit and advancement depend on his following the lead and fulfilling the expectations of the Department by which he is instructed. If he cannot make his personal influence felt in any other way, he must make it unpleasantly felt.

Brought up in this unhealthy atmosphere, trained in this bad school, the pestilent weakness of our average Resident or Political Agent,—a weakness from which not one out of ten of the class is free,—is that he is not content if the administration of the protected State is working satisfactorily for the public good, unless it is working in a way that upholds his personal consequence. He is, in his own conceit, not merely the representative, but the embodiment of Imperial dignity. It matters not how offences come; if he is offended, the Empire is attacked. The year 1858, when a good instance of these misproportioned pretensions occurred, may seem a long time ago, but the records of the Indian Foreign Department—especially of recent dates—are not always attainable, and the high and historical position of the audacious Hindu Minister, Jung Bahadoor, as compared with the utter nonentity of the indignant British official, Colonel Ramsay, make this a very striking example, and worthy of being saved from oblivion.

Colonel George Ramsay, in 1858, had been for four or five years Resident at Khatmandoo, the capital of Nepal, during which period he managed to make himself heartily detested by Maharajah Jung Bahadoor, the celebrated Minister. Colonel Ramsay had previously

officiated as Resident at Nagpore, and behaved himself there in a manner so intolerably overbearing and offensive, that the Rajah, than whom there never was a more good-humoured and accommodating potentate, complained of him to the Governor-General. Lord Dalhousie himself, in a document that has been published, refers to this incident in the following cool and cursory terms : "Major Ramsay, when officiating Resident at Nagpore, was compelled to bring the late Rajah to order. The Rajah complained of him to me in 1848. The officiating Resident was in the right, and, of course, was supported."* And yet the provocation which led to the daring step of a complaint was not a slight one. In no matter great or small, affecting the British Government, had the Rajah of Nagpore ever gone wrong, or been found wanting. But the Resident had been told,—the tale being probably not without foundation,—that his Highness's private life was more princely than saintly. Captain Ramsay took upon himself, in Lord Dalhousie's phrase, "to bring the Rajah to order" in the Durbar, before the Ministers and officers of State, regarding certain alleged acts of dissipation. The Resident's remonstrance was resented as an unwarrantable intrusion. As the Maharajah was only a reigning Prince, while Captain Ramsay was not only an Acting Resident, but an actual kinsman of the Marquis of Dalhousie, of course "he was in the right," and "authority" was supported. The Rajah was effectually put down, and, according to local belief, driven by mortification into increased intemperance and greater neglect of business; but it is not clear that British influence, or moral influence in any form, was elevated or strengthened in the least. The Acting Resident, it is true, became a more formidable person than before; one or two of the Maharajah's confidential officers, who had presumed to take their master's part in the Durbar, were displaced and banished from the capital; but nothing was gained either for Imperial supremacy or for good administration by what Mr. Mansel, the last Resident at Nagpore, called "the uncompromising interference" of Major Ramsay.†

When promoted to be Resident at Khatmandoo, Major (afterwards Colonel) Ramsay was placed in very different relations to the Goorkha State of Nepaul from those in which he had stood towards the Mahratta State of Nagpore. Nepaul is neither tribu-

* Blue-book, "Annexation of Berar" (82 of 1856), p. 41.

† "Annexation of Berar" (82 of 1856), p. 7. At page 1 of this Blue-book, it will be seen that the Home Government had heard nothing of "the transactions ascribed to Major Ramsay," which are, indeed, carefully coloured and covered up in the published papers. This we may, perhaps, enter upon again.

tary, nor feudatory, nor protected. The Resident had not even the right of offering advice in the affairs of the country. Jung Bahadur was at the head of the Administration, and sole possessor of executive power. There never was any doubt of the all-powerful Minister's adherence to that friendly alliance and good understanding to which alone the Goorkha Government is bound by treaty; but that was not enough for a Resident accustomed to the submissive ways of Lucknow and Nagpore. He could not have been happy, he would not have considered that he was doing his duty or upholding the honour of Great Britain, unless he could make his presence felt, if possible, unpleasantly. In this he completely succeeded—so completely that, in 1858, when the Viceroy, Lord Canning, received Jung Bahadur at Allahabad, expressly to thank him for the great service he had rendered to the British Empire in India by bringing a force of 20,000 Goorkhas from Nepal to co-operate with our army under Lord Clyde in the Oude campaign, Jung Bahadur preferred a request for "one small boon only"—the removal of Colonel Ramsay from the Nepal Residency. Lord Canning was very much inclined, at first, notwithstanding some obvious exaggerations and misrepresentations in the details of Jung Bahadur's grievances, to grant "the small boon," while upholding the Resident's personal credit; but Colonel Ramsay vehemently protested, and by the combined weight of official precedents and his own family connections at home, held his own against every one, and the Maharajah of Nepal and his Minister had to endure him for two or three years longer. But the instructive and amusing part of the case, as recorded in a little pamphlet which Colonel Ramsay himself printed for circulation among his friends, is the language which the Resident is permitted to use, without rebuke, regarding Jung Bahadur, and the grounds on which he deprecates any concession being made to that "vain, imperious, arbitrary man," "whose personal views are adverse to his Sovereign's interests." Colonel Ramsay's repeated assertions of Jung Bahadur's "disloyal objects of ambition," and his empty boasts of having "checked Jung Bahadur, and prevented his assuming supreme power," ought to have been assessed at their true value, as at once impertinent assumptions and unguarded confessions of unauthorised meddling. For, while Colonel Ramsay had no right whatever to "check" Jung Bahadur in the internal policy of Nepal, and, while he most certainly failed utterly, by his own account, in all his endeavours to check, we know that Jung Bahadur remained for twenty years after this episode at the head of the Nepalese Administration, and in full possession of the confidence of his own Sovereign.

Although Colonel Ramsay made free use of invective, he attempted argument also. Lord Canning was at first, as already mentioned, disposed to grant the "small boon" for which the Maharajah of Nepaul asked, simply because "the continuance in Nepaul, as the representative of the British Government, of an officer who is personally unacceptable to the Durbar, is not to be desired on either side." Against this judicious doctrine Colonel Ramsay protested. Any honest Resident, he declared, must be "unacceptable" to Jung Bahadoor. His main argument and appeal, reiterated in every possible shape, is most clearly and distinctly announced in the following passage from paragraph 27 of his letter to the Government of India, dated 24th of May, 1858: "Let his lordship support and encourage me, and uphold the dignity of my position as his representative at the Court of Khatmandoo, and all will go on well there; but if Jung Bahadoor finds that he is permitted to trample upon one Resident at that Court, I venture to assert that until another officer is sent there, whom he may find as pliable and yielding as he could wish, and who would compromise the British Government by yielding to his preposterous and unreasonable demands, there will be incessant squabbling and ill-feeling between the two countries." But there had been no "squabbling or ill-feeling between the two countries" at all, but only between the Resident and the Minister. Colonel Ramsay says that if the Governor-General will "support and encourage" him, Colonel Ramsay, and "uphold his dignity" at the Court of Khatmandoo, "all will go on well there." But with reference to British interests, all had "gone on well there," and signal services had been rendered by the Nepalese Government; and, as the Maharajah of Nepaul reminded Lord Canning, "not the slightest complaint" had ever been made by the Nepalese Durbar "against any of the Residents who preceded Colonel Ramsay." It was not in any respect a difference between "the two countries," nor was there any danger of any difference, except on this one point of receiving a Resident who had made himself "personally unacceptable." Colonel Ramsay, in short, set himself up as the embodiment, rather than as the representative, of his country and of the Indian Government, and to this there was no official dissent. He talked about Jung Bahadoor "trampling" on the Resident, although neither he nor any Resident had ever been treated with personal disrespect, but he was not called to account for this grossly exaggerated expression. Irrelevant abuse of the Minister and superfluous professions of sympathy for the Sovereign of Nepaul met with no disapproval from the Government of India. They were too much in keeping with the general tone of Political Agency to raise any

unfavourable criticism. Colonel Ramsay was even allowed to characterise Jung Bahadoor as "*a most unscrupulous liar*," without any remark being made on his nice choice of epithets.

A gentleman of the Indian Civil Service or officer of the Staff Corps, "in political employ," may transmit what he pleases, in official or demi-official form, of current gossip and snrmise, backstairs tattle, or personal opinion, as to the private morals and pursuits of a Sovereign or a Minister; and if he does it effectively, he will make a reputation by it. He need not be very particular about his language. But nothing like reciprocal freedom is allowed in such matters. Some day we may show how a Resident may slander a Prince in order to hide his own blunders; how the Prince may, in due course, be heavily mulcted and stigmatized in public records; and how the Prince's unanswerable refutation of that slander may be thrown back in his face as "highly disrespectful and unbecoming." A Political Agent may write that the Prince's "personal appearance is painfully against him,"—and it may be published in a Blue-book—that the Prince "drinks," that he eats too much, that he is entirely under the influence of his wife, or of some lady who is not his wife, or of a favourite servant. But let us imagine the Prince or Minister turning the tables on an officer of the Staff Corps, and writing to the Viceroy that the Political Agent drinks too much champagne, or smokes too much, or that he is under the influence of some irresistible and irregular charm, or that he is managed by a Moonshce, whose annual salary is £250, and who is known to have amassed a large fortune; the consequences would be terrific for the dark statesman. Colonel Ramsay may write that "Jung Bahadoor is a most unscrupulous liar," but if the Maharajah of Nepaul says that Colonel Ramsay's manners and conversation are so disagreeable and captious that he is personally unacceptable as a Resident at the Court of Khatmahdoo, Colonel Ramsay complains that he is "trampled on." What in a Captain's but a choleric word, is in an Indian Prince flat blasphemy!

SIR JOHN LUBBOCK ON INDIAN FINANCE.

THREE or four years ago, Sir John Lubbock publicly congratulated the nation upon the fact that whatever shortcomings might characterize our rule of India, we were entitled to the praise of having administered its finances with the utmost conscientiousness and unselfishness. Writing in the first number of the *Nineteenth Century* (March, 1877) he said :—

So far is it from being the case that we have forgotten our responsibility, that there has for long past been scarcely a year when this country has not liberally and cheerfully borne a considerable expenditure incurred for the good of India, and which we might very reasonably have declined to undertake.—*Nineteenth Century*, March, 1877, p. 37.

Now, if English writers so well informed as Sir John Lubbock, can honestly cherish the impressions here set forth, what wonder is it that the masses of our countrymen should be in complete ignorance of the true state of matters, and of the real character of our relations in this vital matter with the people of India. The writer of the present essay has repeatedly endeavoured in the last twenty years to awaken the conscience of the country to the fact, that our administration of India from the first has been marked by a long series of exactions upon the industry of that country, of the most oppressive order. As it is now some years since we made our last effort to create juster views upon the subject, the time has perhaps come when we may with advantage attempt once more an exposition of the facts. It has ever seemed then to us, that the cost of maintaining English supremacy in India should be apportioned between the two countries upon a fair and comprehensive review of the benefits which each respectively derives therefrom; in particular that such part of the cost thereof as arises in this country, and necessitates our drawing upon the Indian taxes to defray it, should be very scrupulously inquired into. It is impossible, in the nature of things, that the taxpayers of *this* country, having had unlimited and irresponsible control of the revenues of *that*, and at the same

time, the most intimate and costly relations with the taxpayers of India, should have used their power with a due consideration for them. All that men can differ upon here, must be as to the extent to which the want of consideration has gone.

The taxpayers of this country, by their representatives in Parliament, and without effective criticism of any kind, vote every year the appropriation of every sixpence of revenue raised in India. The people in India have no voice whatever in the matter. The taxpayers of *this* country administer as they will, the taxes raised in *that* country, and have done so ever since there was an English Government in India at all. Now, the relations between the two countries being almost infinite in their ramifications, and the maintenance of those relations costly in the extreme, what might we naturally expect to find upon a close examination of the accounts of the two countries respectively? I think we might reasonably expect to find exactly what we do find, an infinite number of positive misappropriations of Indian revenue on the part of the stronger country, and a spirit of selfishness pervading its whole management. Under such conditions, it were absurd to expect anything else. We do as we please with the Indian Treasury, and have ever done so. Every charge that we could connect with the name of India, we have cast upon her; and instead of a scrupulous regard to what equity required, a careful attempt to apportion the cost of maintaining the connection between the countries, upon the principle that each should pay according to the benefits it derives therefrom, we have made India pay the whole.

The true state of matters, however, is beginning to be understood by political writers in this country. It used to be the fashion to speak of India as a burdensome possession, from sheer ignorance of the facts. That India has never cost the people of England one shilling, has never been allowed to cost them one shilling, but that (to use Mr. Laing's forcible expression) she has ever been "the milch cow" of this kingdom, and that the whole record of the connection is marked by unrighteous appropriations of her revenues to ease the taxpayers of this country, is a fact happily beginning at last to be understood by every one apparently, but Sir John Lubbock.

It is a too common belief among us, that England has very little interest in the maintenance of her Indian empire. But what are the facts? In the first place, our administration of the country enables our merchants and manufacturers to secure the great advantages which flow from unrestricted commerce therewith. Were India under foreign dominion, it is certain that the East India trade of

this country, instead of its present dimensions, would have been very restricted in extent. With what ease, for instance, might the French, had they been rulers of India, have excluded the manufactures of Lancashire from the Indian market altogether, in favour of their own. The astonishing growth which our commerce and manufactures have attained, has been so largely the result of our political ascendancy in Asia, that they stand to each other almost in the relation of effect and cause; and this consideration alone is sufficient to show how great an interest England has had in the maintenance of the Indian empire. The loss of that empire would deal a blow at the commerce of this country, from which we may reasonably doubt if it would recover. At all events, it is certain that our political supremacy in Asia has been one of the chief causes of the amazing development which the century has witnessed in our trade and manufactures.

But the benefits arising from our empire, far from being confined to the mercantile classes, are shared by all classes in England, from the peer to the peasant. The Viceroyalty and the subordinate Governorships of the presidencies are the ambition of the peers of the realm, the chief prizes the Crown has to bestow in the whole breadth of its dominions. Then there are Lieutenant-Governorships of territories equal in population and extent to all France; half-a-dozen Commissionerships of provinces hardly less important, a host of councillorships, embassies, collectorships, magistracies, and judgeships, with incomes of almost princely amount, and a thousand civil appointments subordinate to these. If we turn to the field which India offers to the professions, we find English lawyers filling the highest judgment seats of the country, with jurisdiction over territories the half of Europe in extent; English lawyers filling the positions of Administrators-General, Advocates-General, Masters in Equity, Legal Remembrancers, Judges of the Small Causes Courts, and crowding the Bar of each presidency for the administration of English law. Without intending any disrespect to those gentlemen, the fact is well known that to the majority of English barristers and solicitors who find their way to India, little hope of professional advancement existed at home; while we are familiar enough with the fact that a very few years suffice, in general, for them to make their fortunes and retire.

Now, it is our rule of India that makes this possible, and that rule only. Had the country been under French dominion, and were the Code Napoleon the law administered therein, how many of the hundreds of English lawyers who have retired from India with fortunes, would ever have risen from obscurity? So again with the

medical profession. Of the 1,000 to 1,200 physicians and surgeons in India, labouring with a prospect more or less sure of a competency, not ten would have gone there but for the empire being in our hands. Nor may we avoid mention of the Church, the missionary body, and the colleges, which absorb between them and provide a large body of educated gentlemen for the education of their families. A consideration of very great importance to the nation is this family one. The classes we have been enumerating are marrying classes, and it is a matter of national consequence that the families of these gentlemen commonly receive the highest culture and education which money can secure for them. The value of the accession which England is receiving, year by year, from its schools and colleges, in the sons and daughters of the thousands of gentlemen whose fortunes are linked with the existence of our rule in India, it would be difficult to rate too highly. No other country can reckon upon such an addition to its intellectual classes; and they know little of the elements of national greatness who overlook its value.

To a very considerable extent, again, all we have asserted of the above classes may be affirmed of the body of gentlemen who constitute the officers of the united Indian Army. The incomes of a large proportion of these permit them not only to marry, but to maintain their families in a rank equal to their own, and to give their children the highest culture they can obtain at home. The same may be said of the Education Department of the country, now in its infancy, of the Department of Public Works, and others. How vast a field is the Indian empire opening to our engineering and railway enterprise, from the humblest skilled workman it is necessary to employ, to the scientific head that organizes it. It is the possession of India that makes all this possible. Were the administration of the country to become French or Russian, the field which we monopolize would pass into the hands of our successors. Not to pursue this part of the subject further, we may notice, lastly, the growing class of English planters, shopkeepers, and tradesmen in India. The point of all these illustrations is this: that it is our dominion of the country that opens this great field of enterprise to English energy, skill, learning, and philanthropy; and the advantages I have enumerated are legitimately our own.

It must be remembered, further, that the thousands of our countrymen earning their living in India under the protection of English institutions, the benefits of English law, and large classes of them under circumstances calculated to develop the national character in its fairest and best attributes, all but the soldiery, whose term of

exile is very short, have the prospect of retiring to spend the evening of their days in comparative affluence in England. Year after year, a ceaseless stream of retirements takes place, with the transfer of the fortunes, or the attainment of the pensions, that have been earned in India. It is not easy to estimate the benefits derived by England from this source. The Pension List affords but an imperfect gauge of that stream of wealth which is constantly being poured by India upon this country, in this manner. The civilian comes home to spend for the remainder of his days £1,000 a year in the country, the Indian Treasury furnishing him with the means. But few civilians leave India who are wholly dependent upon their pensions for support. In the majority of cases, these gentlemen have acquired some fortune, and they bring it with them to enrich the land of their birth. The same transfer takes place with all other classes upon attaining the appointed rank, or sum, at which they have determined to retire. What the amount of this transfer annually may be, it is difficult to estimate, but if we add thereto the payment of dividends upon Government stock, the sum total is many millions sterling a year, raised in India, and distilled in a fertilizing shower upon our own soil.

Important as are the direct material benefits which this confers upon this country, we must not overlook the moral and political advantages attending it. They who watch the tendencies of modern times, must notice the annual recruiting of the intelligence of England with classes peculiarly and highly educated from India, with equal satisfaction and interest. India not only furnishes the means by which thousands of our families are educated to the highest point of refinement and culture, with great benefit to this country, but in the very maturity of their powers and of their age, she sends the wisest of her statesmen and administrators, the foremost of her soldiers, the most successful of her lawyers and merchants, and the most experienced of the professions, to recruit English society in its upper ranks. The room which the Indian empire thus presents for the enterprise of the classes who have their fortunes to make, and the influence which the return of these classes in mature age and with acquired fortune, exercise, are of considerable influence upon the country, and that influence will be increasingly felt. The prominence with which Indian affairs have stood forward in this country within the last few years, is largely owing to the prominence of this Indian leaven in English society. Compared with the considerations we have imperfectly attempted to sketch, the advantage of our trade with India is a subordinate consideration. The future will more

rapidly, and with ever-growing distinctness, show how vitally the Indian empire has grown, and is growing, into the very being of this country, and how immense are the advantages which we derive therefrom.

Under these circumstances, is it fair to make the people of India defray the whole cost of maintaining our empire over their land? Our rule, be it remembered, is a gigantic system of absenteeism. All the chief executive officers of Government in India, all the officers of the Army, all the planters of the country, merchants, lawyers, engineers—in fine, *every* Englishman in India, whether he derives his income from the State or from his own private enterprise, sends a very large proportion of it, year by year, and at last, upon retiring, his whole fortune, to this country. The salaries paid out of the taxes, and the fortunes saved therefrom, or made in private enterprise by our merchants or planters, are never spent upon the soil where they are earned, but are transported to this country as fast as they are realized. And as all the chief civil and military appointments throughout the country are held by men who have families or family connections to be maintained in England, and whose customs and habits necessitate the expenditure of a large proportion of their incomes upon articles imported therefrom, we have a very heavy drain upon the taxes of the country. There is thus not only the plain and palpable drain of the Home Charges of the Government to sustain, but a ceaseless, unseen stream of private remittances of savings and fortunes to aggravate its pressure.

And all this is a part only of the *material* cost at which India has bought the blessings of our rule. To obtain an adequate idea of the *whole* penalty is very difficult. For a century, there has been the exclusion of her own children from every administrative post of importance in the country, an exclusion carrying with it a sense of inferiority destructive to their self-respect and extremely demoralising; and when to this is added the remembrance that our administration of justice is a positive reproach to us, and is likely to remain so from our want of insight into native life and character, and defective sympathy therewith, the cost at which the supposed advantages of our rule are purchased, however great, must be allowed to be very heavy; while Sir John Lubbock seems to be totally insensible to the whole class of considerations on which we are writing.

Their force would be considerably lessened, were we able honestly to entertain the belief that our empire had promoted the material well-being of the people whose rule we have taken upon ourselves. The official testimony to the contrary is literally overwhelming. Never were the people of India, as a whole, in such distress and

poverty as they are at this moment enduring under British rule. It is idle, and worse than idle, if the fact be so, to disguise it from ourselves. In opposition to the delusions propagated amongst us by Indian civilians of the Sir Richard Temple order, we have shown, in recent issues of this journal, how explicit and alarming is the testimony of more honest officials as to the true effects of our rule. The American Civil War threw a temporary gleam of prosperity over the condition of the cultivating classes of India, but they have fallen back almost everywhere into the same state as before, under the enduring causes of their pauperization, incident to foreign rule.

Concerning Bengal, the *Friend of India* wrote in 1853 as follows:—

No one has ever attempted to contradict the fact, that the condition of the Bengal peasant is almost as wretched and degraded as it is possible to conceive; living in the most miserable hovel, scarcely fit for a dog-kennel, covered with tattered rags, and unable, in too many instances, to procure more than a single meal a day for himself and family. The Bengal ryot knows nothing of the most ordinary comforts of life. We speak without exaggeration when we affirm that, if the real condition of those who raise the harvest, which yields [a revenue of] between three and four millions a-year, was fully known, it would make the ears of every one who heard thereof to tingle.

There has been a marked improvement in what are called “the Eastern districts of Bengal” since this was written, but the picture is as true to-day as it ever was, of the 20,000,000 of people in Behar, and of many millions more in the western districts of the same Presidency. It is necessary to tear the veil of self-love away from our minds, to discern the enduring causes of the people’s wretchedness under our rule, a wretchedness that has culminated, under the administration of the Temples and Stracheys, in the starvation of 5,000,000 or 6,000,000 of the people to death, within the last three or four years only. Some of our readers will remember a series of letters which appeared in the Calcutta press under Lord William Bentinck’s administration that created a profound sensation at the time, and were soon after reprinted in this country in two volumes. The author of these letters proved to be a Bengal civilian, the Hon. Frederick Shore, a son of the first Lord Teignmouth, and judge, at the time, of the Civil Court of Furukabad in the North-west Provinces. A passage or two of Mr. Shore’s concluding remarks are so full of interest and instruction, that they ought to be periodically reproduced in this country, for its warning and enlightenment.

“More than seventeen years have elapsed since I first landed in this country; but on my arrival, and during a residence of about a year in Calcutta, I well recollect the quiet, comfortable, and settled

conviction, which in those days existed in the minds of the English population, of the blessings conferred on the natives of India by the establishment of the English rule. Our superiority to the native Governments which we had supplanted; the excellent system for the administration of justice which we had introduced; our moderation; our anxiety to benefit the people—in short, our virtues of every description, were descanted on as so many established truths, which it was heresy to controvert. Occasionally I remember to have heard some hints and assertions of a contrary nature, from some one who had spent many years in the interior of the country; but the storm which was immediately raised and thundered on the head of the unfortunate individual who should presume to question the established creed, was almost sufficient to appal the boldest.”

“Like most other young men who had no opportunities of judging for themselves, it was but natural that I should imbibe the same notions; to which may be added, the idea of the universal depravity of the people, which was derived from the same source. Being appointed to the Upper Provinces, shooting and other boyish recreations occupied so much time on the voyage up the river, that I had little leisure for observation or inquiry which could lead to any change of opinion; unfortunately, I imagined that nothing interesting or instructive could be gained from any communication with the people, and, like the generality of my countrymen, supposed even the most intelligent native to be inferior to an Englishman, though his education had been on the lowest possible scale.

“For a year or two longer, I entertained similar sentiments, and possibly might have retained them to the end of my sojourn in India, had I continued my mode of life at that period; residing at a large English station, associating entirely among my countrymen, and holding no more communication with the people of the country than the actual demand of business required. But, fortunately for myself, I was sent to reside alone for some months at Bullundshur, an out-station, where I had little intercourse with Europeans, and where I was necessitated to have recourse to the opinions of respectable natives, from utter inability to form a judgment on many of the cases which were brought before me. In the mean time, for my own convenience, I had made some progress in the language, so that I was able to communicate with the people without the aid of an interpreter.

“From the intercourse which thus took place, I was enabled to perceive the errors and absurdities of my former notions, and soon discovered, that though the natives were of a different race and complexion from ourselves, there were among them men of respectability

and worth; and that, with regard to their own country and concerns, many of them were very well informed. I also reflected on the expediency of not depending wholly upon such aid; that it was the duty of those in official situations to make themselves acquainted with the customs of the people; and on the very poor character a man would receive for intelligence, if, on returning to England after many years' residence, he were unable to give any account of its affairs or of the people.

"I endeavoured, therefore, to acquire a more intimate acquaintance with the people; and becoming more familiar with their habits, thoughts, and opinions (which I soon found them willing enough to communicate), I perceived a strong feeling of disaffection towards the British Government, and a dislike to the English themselves as a nation, and, generally speaking, indeed, as individuals. This impression insinuated itself by degrees into my mind, which was naturally by no means disposed to receive it, all my previous conceptions having produced ideas and opinions quite of a contrary nature; still, it was so constantly forced upon my notice, directly or indirectly, that, in spite of myself, the conviction was irresistible.

"This being the case, an attempt to discover the reasons for such sentiments on the part of the native population, was the natural result. Well-founded complaints of oppression and extortion, on the part of both Government and individuals, were innumerable. The question then was, why, with all our high professions, were not such evils redressed? This, however, I was assured was impossible, under the existing system; and I was thus gradually led to an inquiry into the principles and practice of the British-Indian Administration. Proceeding in this, I soon found myself at no loss to understand the feelings of the people both towards our Government and to ourselves. It would have been astonishing indeed had it been otherwise. *The fundamental principle of the English had been to make the whole Indian nation subservient, in every possible way, to the interests and benefit of themselves.* They have been taxed to the utmost limit; every successive province, as it has fallen into our possession, has been made a field for higher exaction; and it has always been our boast how greatly we have raised the revenue above that which the native rulers were able to extort. The Indians have been excluded from every honour, dignity, or office, which the lowest Englishman could be prevailed upon to accept, while our public offices, and, as we are pleased to call them, courts of justice, have been sinks of every species of villainy, fraud, chicane, oppression, and injustice; to such an extent, that men, who have been robbed of their property, and whose relations

have been murdered, will often pay large sums to the police to prevent investigation, from the dread of being compelled to attend one of our courts, even in the character of a prosecutor or witness.

"The summary is, that the British-Indian Government has been, practically, one of the most extortionate and oppressive that ever existed in India; one under which injustice has been, and may be committed, both by the Government and by individuals, provided the latter be rich, to an almost unlimited extent, and under which redress from injury is almost unattainable; the consequence of which is, that we are abhorred by the people, who would hail with joy, and instantly join, the standard of any power whom they thought strong enough to occasion our downfall. Some acknowledge this, and observe that it is the unavoidable result of the imposition of a foreign yoke. That this is correct regarding a Government conducted on the principles which have hitherto actuated us, is too lamentably true; but had the welfare of the people been our object a very different course would have been adopted, and very different results would have followed; for again and again I repeat it, there is nothing in the circumstance itself of our being foreigners of different colour and faith that should occasion the people to hate us. We may thank ourselves for having made their feelings towards us what they are."—*Letters on Indian Affairs*, vol. ii., pp. 517—20.

Such was the judgment upon our rule, of one concerning whose competency to form an opinion there has never been a doubt, for Mr. Shore was a member of the Bengal Civil Service of many years' standing.

In opposition, then, to Sir John Lubbock's unfaltering belief that we are entitled to the praise of having ruled India unselfishly, Mr. Shore, from a nearer inspection of matters, and after seventeen years' close observation of them, tells us that "the fundamental principle of our rule had been to make the whole Indian nation subservient, in every possible way, to our own interests and benefits." Would to God, we were able to question the general accuracy of Mr. Shore's verdict. But Sir John Lubbock denies in particular that we have been guilty of any misappropriation of the Indian revenues; and it is to this bold denial, that we address ourselves in this paper.

The atmosphere of politics is unfriendly to any true magnanimity, or morality. It seems to be almost a settled article of the statesman's creed, that nations cannot show the same regard to equity and good conscience in their dealings with each other, which we look for in individual life. It is to put a strain upon corporate humanity that we must not expect it to bear. And so the standard is lowered

to the conventional mark, and statesmen do not hesitate to commit their country to courses from which they would recoil with disgust, if their imitation were proposed to themselves in private life. A curious illustration of this fact was furnished incidentally in a Parliamentary return a few years ago, upon the subject of our relations with the Nizam.

It is within the knowledge of everyone that we are administering in trust for that Prince, certain districts in the Deccan. A great effort was made twenty years ago, to induce him to make over to us the full sovereignty of those districts, which he declined to do. He was then required, on what ground it is hard to tell, to waive his right to an annual account of our stewardship, and to permit us to appropriate any surplus which the districts might yield under our management. It is difficult to speak with moderation of such a demand. The Resident noticed the proposal as follows :—

I have heard it argued, why take upon ourselves the trouble and responsibility of managing territory that belongs to the Nizam, without receiving any advantage for our good administration, by obtaining whatever may hereafter be the surplus revenue. I do not think such an argument deserves much weight. We obtain what we state we alone require—viz., a material guarantee for the regular payment of the Contingent. If we require anything else, in my opinion we are bound plainly to say so. Then, again, it would be a most selfish policy to deny to the people of the Berar districts as good a government as we can give them, because we put ourselves to some trouble and inconvenience in managing these districts as trustees for his Highness the Nizam. The whole people of India appear to me entitled at our hands to everything we can do for them in the way of good government, without entering too minutely into the question of profit and loss; and in this instance I think it is clear we make no pecuniary sacrifice.—*East India—Deccan. Par. Return. May 31, 1867.*

We venture to think that every one must feel the nobleness of these sentiments. What was the Secretary of State's comment upon them?

I attach less importance to the claim reserved by his Highness to secure any surplus that may arise under our administration, because both the number and constitution of the Contingent on the one hand, and the free disposal of the revenues on the other for purposes of local improvement, rest entirely on your discretion. It would, however, have been more reasonable, in the event of increased revenue resulting either from improved management, or from the returns of capital expended [the Nizam's own capital, be it understood.—Ed.] that the surplus should have accrued to ourselves, to whose improved administration alone its existence was due.—*Id.*

Now this is official morality, and is conventional. In private life, such views would be held to be disgraceful. We thrust ourselves into the position of trustees of the Prince, and then set up a claim to

any surplus revenue that may accrue under our management. If we insist upon administering the affairs of other nations, the least we can do is to administer them according to the best of our ability. Should we fail, the loss is theirs; should we succeed, we have a right, it seems, to appropriate the surplus, and to bring it to this country. Now this idea that we have a right to make our rule of India a good thing in a pecuniary point of view, has tainted all our relations therewith from the very first. The idea was long fostered by Mill and Auber. Mr. Mill laboured, like Auber, under the disadvantage of being a servant of the East India Company, and contrived to persuade himself that it was a just and proper thing for this country to get as much as she could out of India, in return for what he believed to be the superior rule we had established. Such a claim must be rejected at once, in the clearer light of these days. We never had the right to exact a shilling from India for the rule we assumed therein, a rule frightfully disastrous to her people for the first eighty years of its existence, and which has benefited her of late years, when at all, through causes mainly independent of ourselves. This idea that we had a right to be paid for our rule, in return for the favour we conferred by assuming it, has regulated all our proceedings towards India: while our incessant exactions under this belief have resulted in bringing the whole empire to the verge of pauperization.

In reviewing our financial relations with our great dependency, we find that our century and more of rule, has resulted in a heavy load of debt. At the outset then, there is a presumption that there has been bad management; for debt, nine times out of ten, means bad management. There has been no interference with us in the management of the Indian revenues; we have had them wholly in our own hands, and have got the country heavily into debt, but that debt unhappily, represents a very small part of the misappropriation of Indian revenue of which this country has been guilty. For ourselves, we have never been able to understand how the debt of the East India Company ever came to be regarded as a debt for which the people of India were responsible. The Company were simply trustees of the English Crown, and their liabilities were incurred in the wars which they prosecuted in its behalf, in the acquisition or defence of territory.

These wars were either commenced under the orders of the Crown, or were formally sanctioned by it, while the vast territories which were acquired thereby, were held to be the property, not of the Company, but of the Crown. We appropriated the territory, but formally repudiated all responsibility for the outlay which the

conquest involved. The Company were simply trustees of the English Crown, and the extraordinary spectacle was presented to the world, of that Crown devolving upon the Company the right of making war in Asia as it pleased,* so long as the fruits of victory were made over to the nation, and the cost discharged by the Company itself.† But the Company had no funds to carry on war. When Lord Clive obtained the grant of the Dewanee, in 1765, and the Company first became rulers of Bengal, they were already heavily in debt,‡ a debt incurred with the full knowledge and sanction of the Crown, in prosecuting our life and death struggle with the French in the Carnatic.

Now, we should like Sir John Lubbock to tell us, what possible justification there was for imposing that debt upon the shoulders of the people of Bengal, who were removed half a continent from the scene? We had been conducting a war against our old rivals, the French, for many years in Southern India, with varying success, partly by the East India Company and partly by the direct resources of the Crown. The result was, that the French were crushed, but the Company involved heavily in debt. At this juncture, Lord Clive conquered Bengal, and without inquiring for a moment what rights that conquest, or the gift of the Dewanee which followed it, conferred upon us, a disgraceful rush was made upon the revenues of the unhappy province, by the English nation. The Company at once fastened all its own liabilities upon the Provinces, and were assured by Clive, in his secret letter of September 30, 1765, that they might still count upon a surplus revenue of £1,650,900 sterling a year therefrom.§ The Crown of England formally sanctioned whatever disposal the Company might be pleased to make of these revenues, upon the respectable condition that it paid £400,000 a year into the English Treasury, as the nation's share of the spoil.|| Conceal the fact as we please, or gloze it over as we may, the truth is that the nation simply gave the Company a commission to plunder the princes and people of India, on condition that an annual contribution of £400,000 a year, was made from the spoils into the English Treasury. *Now this was the beginning of the so-called debt of India*; for, vast as the revenue at the Company's disposal, it was unequal to the demands made upon it, and Bengal was drained dry.

* Charter, April 3, 1861; Mill, vol. i, p. 64, ed. 1858.

† Commons Report, June 26, 1805, p. 171.

‡ Mill, vol. iii., pp. 302-4.

§ App. Third Report, 1773, p. 394.

|| 7th George III., ch. 57; see also Ninth Report, 1873, p. 15.

One-third of the territory became jungle. War after war was prosecuted—the infamous Rohilla war* amongst them—and vast acquisitions of territory made; and as the revenues of Bengal could not meet the cost, the brilliant idea was conceived of pledging the resources of the people of India, to a debt. Thus the revenues of Bengal were used to subvert the rule of Mysore, and then the revenues of Mysore to subvert the empire of the Mahrattas, and so on. And when the revenues failed, the Company forestalled them by borrowing upon their credit. With the full sanction and complicity of the Crown, the Company prosecuted vast wars, on its behalf, not merely with native troops, but with native revenues and native credit, and when the Crown formally took over the empire from their hands in 1858, the boast was as true as it was disgraceful, that the Company had “won the Indian empire for the Crown, without the expenditure of one shilling on the part of this nation.” The truth is that the Company bribed the nation to continue the Government in its hands, by a promise to make conquest support itself. We built up our Indian empire wholly out of the resources of the people themselves, and then declared that the debt which the East India Company left as the result of this policy, was no concern of ours. Not an English writer has touched upon the first Napoleon’s wars in Europe, who has not spoken with indignation of his policy of making war support itself; but we ourselves taught him the art. The debt hanging round the neck of the people of India to-day, represents a part of the price at which our empire there has been founded; but not content, as other nations have been, with empire as an equivalent for the sacrifices through which it has been won, we insist that the people of India shall pay to the last farthing the cost of the wars in which native rule was overthrown. The advantages of empire are ours; the cost of the acquisition theirs. Do not let us deceive ourselves. The course we have followed contrasts so strikingly with the history of our colonial acquisitions and other dependencies (all made honestly at our own expense) that it is amazing men can be found to talk about our course in India in any terms but those of indignation. But this is not the worst part of the story, as we shall show by-and-by, when we point out how the people of India have been made to defray the cost of wars carried on beyond their frontiers for purely Imperial purposes of our own, and under Imperial orders.

At the very beginning of our rule, the whole cost of our long struggle for supremacy with the French on the Coromandel Coast,

* Mill, ed. 1858, vol. iii., p. 393-5; Marshman’s History, vol. i, pp. 415—20.

years before we had any territory in India, was boldly cast upon the shoulders of the people of Bengal, the moment the Dewanee was acquired. The Company estimated the cost of that war at upwards of £5,000,000 sterling. So that the people of India have paid, including interest, the enormous sum of £160,000,000 sterling for a struggle that was waged by this nation against its French rivals, long before those people became our subjects at all. They might as justly have been required to pay the cost of the Duke of Marlborough's campaigns in Europe. The struggle was maintained, from first to last, purely for our own national purposes, and by the forces of the Crown. When the work was accomplished and the Company's bill had to be paid, there was the God-send of the Bengal Dewanee to meet it, and a draft was sent boldly in for the whole amount. And Sir John Lubbock does not know it!

We might enlarge upon the private exactions wrung out of that unfortunate province, during the first twenty years of our rule therein. It is impossible to estimate their amount; nor does any history we know of, give an adequate idea of the course of spoliation that set in with Lord Clive's victories of 1757. The Ninth Report of 1783, Bolt's "Indian Affairs," and Dow's "Introduction," all inaccessible to the general reader, lift the veil partially upon the hateful spectacle. Our course resulted in reducing one-third of the Dewanee territory to jungle, in twenty-five years. The nation was delirious with the brilliant prospects held out to it by Clive. In the language of the House of Commons itself (its Ninth Report), Bengal "suffered what was tantamount to an annual plunder of its manufactures and its produce to the value of £1,200,000," from the open exactions of the Crown and Company alone. What the private spoil amounted to, it is impossible even to estimate. Suffice it to say that, by consent of the authorities at the time, it was not less than £20,000,000 sterling from 1757 to 1782. For twenty years after the acquisition of the Dewanee, the territories were a scene of misery such as the world has seldom seen, while a steady and continuous drain upon their supposed wealth, but actual destitution, went briskly on. It would be impossible to read in any modern assembly, Commissioner Paterson's evidence of what took place under our sway of Bengal during the first twenty years of that rule. And Sir John Lubbock knows nothing about it!

To dignify the Company's "investments" at that period with the name of trade, would be to prostitute the term.* Their divi-

* "Ninth Report, 1783," pp. 14—27; Bolt's "Indian Affairs"; Dow's "Introduction to History of Hindostan"; "Lord Clive's Letters"—Appendix to Third Report, 1773.

dends were wrung from the misery of the people, and to the shame of the nation, it guaranteed those dividends upon being permitted to share the spoil. Act after Act of Parliament was passed, confirming them in possession of the territories they were destroying, upon condition of their paying a certain proportion of the revenues into the English Exchequer. Under these Acts, many direct payments were made, and it was not until the province was beggared and destroyed, that they were discontinued. These direct and open appropriations from the Indian Treasury, under the authority of these Acts and in some other ways, amount to-day, with interest at 5 per cent., to the enormous sum of four to five hundred millions sterling.* And Sir John Lubbock knows nothing about it!

Let it be well understood that these sums of money were taken by the superior might of this country from the poverty-stricken people of Bengal—for it was upon that province that the chief weight of these exactions fell—without pretext, plea, or pretence of any kind, that we had a right to them, except the right of the stronger. Do we owe this money to the people of India, or has time condoned the wrong? By violence we seized the taxes of Bengal, and brought them to this country, and abandoned the practice only when the territory broke completely down under the exaction.

Come now to a transaction of later times. The monopoly of the trade with India which the Company enjoyed under its charters, was put an end to in 1814, and from that year the trade with India was thrown open to the private merchants of this country. The monopoly of the *China* trade was continued to the Company twenty years longer, down to the year 1834. Upon the expiration of the charter in that year, the Company was finally deprived of all trading character whatever, and required to confine itself to an administration of the political affairs of India, in trust for the English Crown. Up to this period, the Company had retained its character as a society of merchants engaged in trade. It was now required to desist therefrom altogether, and it became under the Act of 1834 a purely political body. But the joint trading and governing operations of the Company had ended in the accumulation of a debt of some £60,000,000 sterling. The paid-up capital of the old East India Company amounted to the sum of £6,000,000 sterling, and with this capital they had carried on the somewhat incongruous

* See List of them at length, at page 60, of "Papers respecting the Negotiation for the Charter of 1814," printed by Court of Directors, 1813.

occupations of East India merchants and rulers of India. Well, it was found impossible to keep the accounts of the two separate; and in 1834, when Parliament put an end to the trade of the Company altogether, the capital of the Company had disappeared, and a debt of fifty or sixty millions sterling was owing by them. Whether the revenues of India had gained or lost, upon the whole, by the trade of the Company, no man could tell. Some said one thing; some another. The only thing that was certain was, that the financial result of the joint business of trading and ruling, was an enormous debt. The Company and India were ever treated, by this country, as partners; and under that partnership, the former was empowered, by Act of Parliament—let the net result of their trading and governing be what it might—to declare a dividend every year of 10 per cent. upon their £6,000,000 of capital called East India Stock, even though they had to borrow the money to pay it. The result was that the price of that Stock ruled constantly somewhat above 200. Well, in 1834, the nation determined to put a stop to the trade of the Company altogether, and to confine them to the business of administration. It was affirmed that the interests of English merchants demanded that the trade should henceforth be thrown open in their favour. The Company itself protested that great profits had accrued to the Indian revenues from the trade, and that their debt would have been much heavier but for those profits. I believe it was impossible to determine, with any reasonable certainty, what the net result of the trade had been, except for the last few years of its continuance.

Parliament resolved, however, and wisely, that the trade of the Company, whether it was profitable or otherwise, should cease, in the interests of the private merchants of Great Britain. In other words, the partnership between the East India Company and the people of India was declared dissolved, and, as there were little assets to divide, but enormous liabilities to meet, it was generously determined that the East India Company should be let out of the partnership, and the people of India required to pay the Company *twice the amount* of their paid-up capital, or a sum of £12,000,000 sterling, on the ground that they had for very many years been empowered by the same Parliament to declare an annual dividend out of Indian revenues of 10 per cent. upon their £6,000,000 of Stock! It is truly amazing that such a transaction should have been possible. Upon the supposition that the trade was profitable, surely it was reasonable, when transferring that trade to the merchants of this country, that *they* should have indemnified the East India Company for its loss. On the other hand, if the trade was not profitable,

it was monstrous to require the people of India to recoup the Company twofold the capital it had lost therein.

If we even assume that the Company's capital had been sunk on territorial account, the replacement of that capital out of the revenues of India, was all that could be justly exacted therefrom; while to require that India should pay a forfeit of £6,000,000 sterling beyond that capital, that the merchants of Great Britain might obtain the advantages of an open trade with China, does seem the very acme of injustice. However, so it was determined, and the result is, that we find a charge of £630,000 entered year by year in the Indian balance-sheet as the first item of the Home Charges. This item alone represents an abstraction of capital from India since 1834 of a sum which, at 5 per cent. only, would represent, I suppose, two-thirds of the present debt of India.

But, looking more closely into the matter, the picture is a good deal darker. It was admitted by the Company themselves that their trade with India had been carried on at a loss, and even if we allow that the trade with China had been profitable to the full extent made out by the Company's accountants, so far from the Company having earned in trade, the large dividend which they had annually appropriated for nearly three-quarters of a century, that dividend had come out of the revenues of India. Viewing the circumstances under which that trade was carried on after the acquisition of the Dewanee by Lord Clive in 1765, we have not a doubt that an honestly prepared balance-sheet of the Company's trade from that year down to the year 1834—and it would be quite possible to prepare such a balance-sheet—would show that the trade, though a monopoly, had resulted in enormous loss. The Company's trading operations, upon the whole, were simply disastrous, and the dividends they appropriated year after year, under the pretence that they were earned in trade, were simply wrung, under the legislative sanction of this country, from the pockets of the people of India.* It would be impossible for us to go at length into the proof of this statement, but we may direct attention to one or two facts which it is desirable to state. And the first is this: that the Company's trade was carried on for seventy years before its close, entirely upon the credit and resources of the Government of India. The fiction was that the £630,000 a year divided by the gentlemen in Leadenhall Street were the profits earned upon the employment of their £6,000,000 of paid-up capital. Upon this point a remarkable

* Wilson's Note, p. 314; Mill's Third Vol., ed. 1858.

statement was made before the Select Committee of 1830 by one of the witnesses :—

I will only advert (said Mr. Rickards) to one circumstance which happened in the year 1813, when Mr. Cartwright, the late Accountant-General of the East India Company, was examined before the Select Committee, of which I was a member. Mr. Cartwright, upon that occasion, was asked a question with regard to the Company's capital, and his answer was simply this: "Capital, sir, I have been forty years in the Company's service, and I never could find out that they had any capital at all."—*First Report*, 1830, p. 461.

Mr. Rickards tells us that the statement gave such offence to one of the Directors of the Company who was present on the occasion, that Mr. Cartwright requested to be allowed to modify it. But he had told the simple truth, and there is no room for honest doubt, that the Company's capital had been swallowed up over and over again in their dividends and wars. From the date of the Dewanee, the power of the Company to trade at all was derived entirely from its command of the revenues of Bengal, and its credit as the Government of India.* If any of our readers want confirmation of these statements, we refer them to the ninth report of the Committee of 1782, as to the nature of the Company's trade; and as to its dependence upon the credit and resources of the revenues of India, to a letter addressed by the Right Honourable Henry Dundas (afterwards Viscount Melville) to the Chairman of the East India Company, dated 3rd June, 1801, in the Blue-book of 1805. It will be remembered that Mr. Dundas was President of the Board of Control, and the subject of his letter was "The Indian Debt."

Now, as it was upon the credit and resources of the people of India that the Company's trade was carried on, it would have been but just that if profits *were* made, they should have been permitted to share therein. But the revenues of India were never even credited with interest upon the advances required for the Company's investments. All the resources of India and all its credit were used in this great one-sided partnership, as freely as the Company pleased, while the notion that the people of India had any claim on the profits that might result from these operations, never entered any man's mind in those days. All the interest that the people of India had in the matter was to supply funds for the Company's investments, and £630,000 a year for their dividends, let the trade result as it might. As a fact the loss was uniform, and could not possibly be otherwise.†

* Wilson's Note, quoted above; Parliamentary Returns, East India, 1805.

† MacCulloch, 1858 ed., p. 552; Select Committee, 1830; First Report, 481; Ninth Report, 1783; Clive's Letters; App. to Third Report, 1773.

In the year 1814, Parliament threw open the trade with India to private enterprise, but continued to the Company a monopoly of the China trade for twenty years longer. This suited the Company very well, for it did not deny that the trade with India had resulted in nothing but loss. To ascertain what the results of the China trade alone would be, the Company was required to make a complete separation in that year between its accounts as a commercial corporation, and its territorial revenues and expenditure. And now mark what took place. The Company's capital of £6,000,000 had been swallowed up, in dividends and losses, over and over again. But the Company could not trade upon nothing, and to provide it with a capital for its China trade, what was done? Under sanction of the Board of Control—for Parliament never heard of the matter until twenty years afterwards—the Company were empowered to open their books with a capital of £21,000,000, by assuming that every asset the Company held, that was at all commercial in its form, should be held to belong to them in their capacity of private merchants.* No matter how that property had been paid for, the millions of produce lying in their warehouses in London, and the millions more on their way home from India and China, purchased from first to last out of Indian revenues—all was declared to be the commercial assets of the Company, while the debt round their necks was transferred to the debit of their territorial account—in other words, to the people of India. Under this convenient arrangement, the long period of bad trading and misrule which followed upon the acquisition of the Dewanee in 1765, resulted in leaving the Company with a capital of £21,000,000 sterling, although they had started in debt, and had divided £23,000,000 of dividends during the intervening half-century!† The transaction nearly takes away one's breath. Twenty years afterwards, when the trade with China also had to be given up, the Company's balance-sheet was made out in conformity with this fiction of 1814, and the Company's advocates protested that they were defrauded out of £9,000,000 when the amount of their capital in that year was struck down to the limit of £12,000,000. That sum, the people of India were required to pay; and they are paying it now, to purchase the privilege of an open trade with the East for our own merchants. The transaction was simply an infamy. British taxpayers decided that something must be paid to get rid of the Company's monopoly, and the readiest way to do it was to make the people of India, already so

* Select Committee, August 16, 1832 (p. 206); also xxvii.

† Macgregor, part xxvii., p. 223.

cruelly oppressed in the matter, pay £12,000,000 for the purpose. But even that was not the limit of the wrong. The Company's princely commercial establishments at Canton and elsewhere had to be closed, and compensation made to their *employés* for the loss of their appointments out of the revenues of India. Every one knows how grand the Company's ideas were, and the magnificence of the scale on which their fleet and commercial agencies were paid. A dozen of their head clerks in Canton alone, received salaries of £7,000 to £10,000 a year each, while living in the utmost splendour at the Company's expense. Now, the whole commercial staff of the Company was held to have "vested interests" in their appointments, and, instead of being simply pensioned off, they were allowed "compensation annuities" for the loss of their appointments. The Company admitted the claim, but, instead of defraying it themselves, were empowered by the Act of 1834 (Sec. 9) to make the people of India find the money. The section is so worded that not one reader out of a thousand, would see what it involved. It involved the payment out of Indian taxes for an indefinite period of £150,000 a year,* or a capitalized sum of £3,000,000 sterling. So that the abolition of the Company's trade in 1834—a trade which, from the acquisition of the Dewanee, had been fraught with nothing but wrong to India, and which was abolished at last in the interests of British merchants alone—had to be purchased by the people of India at the cost of £15,000,000 sterling, amounting at 5 per cent. interest to-day to £70,000,000 or £80,000,000 sterling. Is it possible to conceive wrong-doing more gross? To treat the Indian debt as a debt owing by the people of India, is to deliberately shut our eyes to the process by which that debt was incurred. And Sir John Lubbock knows nothing about it!

Other plain and direct misappropriations of the revenues of India were the casting upon those revenues of the expenses of the Company's establishments at St. Helena, Bencoolen, Malacca, and Prince of Wales' Island. St. Helena was acquired a full century before the Company held a foot of territory in India outside their Factories, and both it and Bencoolen were acquired and maintained purely for purposes connected with the commerce of the Company. The following pertinent question was put to Mr. Cosmo Melvill by one of the members of the Select Committee of 1830: "5857. As the island of St. Helena was acquired long previously to the acquisition of the Dewanee in Bengal, and for purposes avowedly and ex-

clusively commercial, on what ground have their expenses in general been charged to the political department (i.e. to the revenues of India)?" Mark the answer: "There was a correspondence," replied Mr. Melvill, "between the Court of Directors and the Board of Commissioners upon the subject, and that correspondence ended in a resolution to charge the expense of St. Helena to the territory." We suppose no man would venture to maintain that the people of India had any, even the remotest, interest in these outlying territories. St. Helena and Bencoolen were acquired and maintained before the Company had any territory in India whatever, for its commercial needs; but the moment they got possession of the revenues of Bengal, they cast the expense of both places upon the people of that province. One after another, all these settlements have been abandoned, or the sovereignty of them assumed by the English Crown; but their acquisition and maintenance had cost the people of India in round figures the *principal* sum of £10,000,000 to £12,000,000 sterling so far back as the year 1834, when, upon the cessation of the Company's trade, St. Helena was taken by the Crown. Thus the cost of these settlements alone, which should have been defrayed either out of the Company's trade, or out of the revenues of this nation, amounts to-day, at 5 per cent. interest only, to a sum equivalent to the whole Indian debt. The wrong-doing is so plain that it admits of no question. But Sir John Lubbock knows nothing of it!

Take, again, the conquest of Ceylon. In old Parliamentary Blue-books of the early part of the century, you will find a good deal of discussion upon this subject, the Company having striven very earnestly for years, in this instance, to prevent the wrong that was being done. We shall state the case in the very words of the Company. Remonstrating in 1803, against the course of the Crown, they wrote:—

In the case of the capture of Ceylon, Government directed the Company to take possession of that island at a time when this country was not at war with the Dutch. It was conquered at the expense of the Company, but, contrary to all former example, instead of being united to their other Indian territories, was, at the end of two years, made a King's Government. Afterwards the charge and maintenance of it, with an expensive establishment of Crown officers, was committed to the Company, under a declaration that no reason appeared why, if it were retained on in peace, it should not be made over to them. When they had held it for six and a half years, at an expense of 1,500,000*l.*, Government again took it from them without reimbursing any part of their expenditure, and finally, upon a peace, the island was ceded to Great Britain, the government of it was retained by the Crown, and payment of the heavy outlay to which the Company had been subjected by the conquest and charge of this possession

(excepting only one-half the expense of capture—that is 168,000*l.*, out of 1,474,000*l.*) is now refused.—*Report Committee*, 1805, *App.* 169—171.

In the same way, the Company fought very hard to get the Indian revenues reimbursed, the cost of the expeditions they were required by the English Government to fit out, to attack the Cape of Good Hope, Manilla, the Mauritius, and the Moluccas. So plainly was their demand founded in justice, that a Committee of the House of Commons in 1808 reported upon the subject as follows:—

Your Committee cannot, in justice to the Company, conclude this part of their report without calling the attention of the House to the remonstrances made against the mode adopted by the Committee in 1805, to take into consideration the account between the public and the East India Company, as far as relates to the expenses in the capture and maintenance of Malacca and the Moluccas, and the maintenance of Ceylon—a mode of decision by which claims on the part of the Company to no less an amount than 1,972,984*l.* have been set aside.—*Report Committee*, 1831-32, *vol. ii.*, *App.*, p. 186.

The reader would surely imagine after that, that tardy justice was done. No such thing. The Company prosecuted their claim persistently down to the year 1822, when it amounted, with interest, to £5,185,088; and in that year it was paid £1,300,000 to close its mouth, four millions sterling being written off as a bad debt owing by this country. That sum alone amounts to-day, with 5 per cent. interest—and India has never borrowed, upon the average, at so low a rate—to about £35,000,000 sterling. And Sir John Lubbock knows nothing about it!

The next item we shall specify is the cost of the first Afghan war. Now, at the time when that war was decided upon by the Home Cabinet, nothing could be more satisfactory than the state of the Indian finances. There was a large and steady surplus in the annual accounts, and had the country been left at peace, there is no reason to believe that any change would have taken place therein. It is not possible for us here to narrate the circumstances which led the Ministry to decide upon the invasion of Afghanistan. Suffice it to say that so unjustifiable is that war now seen to have been, that by common consent it has come to be called “the iniquitous” Afghan war. So profound were the misgivings of the English Cabinet itself as to the justice of the war, that they did not dare present the papers to Parliament in their integrity, but garbled the despatches of Sir Alexander Burnes, the Envoy at Cabul, to give a colour of justification to it. The people of India were no more responsible for the war, than the people of New Zealand; but they were required not only to furnish, as in all these Indian wars, the life lost therein, but every shilling of the cost, to the last farthing.

There has been a great deal of dispute as to what the war really cost. Some estimated it at £20,000,000 sterling. We looked closely into the matter many years ago, and arrived at the conclusion that before its last traces disappeared from the Indian balance-sheet, the sum amounted to nearer £40,000,000 than £20,000,000. Now, bear in mind that the people of India were unable to meet the cost out of their revenues, and had to borrow at interest to defray it. If we take then the lowest estimate, £20,000,000, and add 5 per cent. interest for the years that have passed away, the amount which that war has cost the people of India, principal and interest together, is £150,000,000 sterling. As honest men, whose debt, we ask, that really is? Ours or theirs? We know how unjustifiable the war was, and how, from first to last, it was the doing of this nation*; and yet we made India furnish not only the army that perished in the invasion, but every shilling of the cost, from its commencement to its close; and when she was forced to borrow money to defray the vast outlay, we refused even the national guarantee to enable her to borrow at $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. instead of 5! And Sir John Lubbock knows nothing about it!

We pass over our China wars, the last war with Burmah, and the Persian war—concerning every one of which may the severest strictures be made upon the conduct of this country, in casting the cost upon India—and have simply given half-a-dozen instances of our vast misappropriations from the India Revenues, during the short time we have administered them.

And now let us point out the effects which these enormous abstractions of capital from India have had upon that country. The condition of its masses, a condition brought about largely by these exactions, is so abject, as to excite the deepest alarm on the part of every man who understands what that condition really is. The public mind of this country is just now interested in a discussion we have started on the comparative merits of British and native administration in India; and it is time that it was so. When Sir John Lubbock recurs to the great subject, let him be more careful how he lends his name to strengthen the delusions we are under as a people. We shall probably recur to this subject in an early issue, and bring the story of these scandalous misappropriations of the Indian revenues down to our day.

* Third Report Select Committee, 1853, p. 49.

THE BI-METALLIC CONFERENCE.

THE precious metals derive almost all their value from their use as money. The demand for them in the arts for ornamental or decorative purposes, or for purposes of general use, is so small that they would sink to the level of mere brass or copper if their value depended upon their mere beauty or usefulness in the arts. It is their special fitness for use as money that gives them nearly all their value.

It is an error to believe gold to be better fitted for use as money than silver. As a medium of domestic exchange, silver is far superior to gold, even in wealthy countries; while the great majority of nations are so poor, that copper is the only possible medium of exchange for the masses of the people, as in India. Even a wealthy country like England would find a currency of £1 notes, with a subsidiary coinage of silver, far more convenient than its present gold money.

The quantity of the metals in use as money throughout the world, is estimated at £600,000,000 or £700,000,000 sterling of each. The demonetization of either metal would plainly reduce its value almost to nothing, while the strain which such a demonetization would throw upon the other metal, would run up its price to a pitch that would involve the whole commercial world in ruin.

The demonetization, therefore, of either metal by any nation, is a very grave act, and should never be attempted without carefully considering its probable effects upon other nations. It is an offence against the comity of nations, for any Government to demonetize either metal, and so disturb values throughout the world as Germany has recently done.

But Germany is not the great offender. It is *this* country that has set the evil example that is working so much harm, and threatening far more. In complete ignorance of what they were doing, the Parliament of 1816 demonetized silver in England, and reduced it for the first time to the position of a subsidiary or token coinage. No one in Parliament at the time seems to have had the faintest

suspicion of the revolution that was being made by the Act in the monetary system of the country. The ancient standard of the kingdom was silver, and silver only, down to the reign of Edward III., when gold money was introduced into circulation. A pound *weight* of silver, as every one, we suppose, knows, was the original pound sterling, and under the first gold coinage of Edward III., the pound weight of gold represented £15 weight of silver money.

When cash payments were suspended by Mr. Pitt in 1797, silver coin was as much legal tender in England as gold, and by the Bank itself to any amount, and the great initial error of our modern currency system was the demonetizing of silver in 1816. The commerce of the world was so restricted at the time, and the long war with France had thrown trade into such confusion, that no one seems to have suspected the possible mischiefs that might arise from a demonetization of the metal. It was this country that empirically set the evil example which Germany has followed, and began the course of legislation that Mr. Peel completed by the Acts of 1844-45.

The change was made at a time when the purely theoretic views of the Bullion Committee of 1810-11 had acquired a mischievous ascendancy in Parliament, in opposition to the sounder and more practical knowledge of the Bank directors and the mercantile world, which divined by a sure instinct the mischiefs that would flow from the new monetary system forced upon the kingdom from 1816 to 1819, by men destitute of all banking and mercantile experience, and of any deep acquaintance with the true theory of money.

The evils flowing from Sir Robert Peel's legislation have been in the main confined, however, to ourselves; but the case was very different when Germany conceived the idea of imitating our example. International commerce had assumed such dimensions, was flowing in such definite channels, and was effected by such open and unveiled machinery, that it is a heavy reflection upon German statesmen that they did not discern the mischiefs that would attend their course, and upon the statesmen of our own and other countries, that they did not remonstrate in a body against a step the results of which might have been, and ought to have been, foreseen by every one. No great nation in these days, may selfishly isolate itself from others on matters which affect all, and in which all have common interests. And for any nation to enter upon a course of legislation that *must* change the relative values of the precious metals in every other nation, is an unpardonable offence against them. It is the offence which England ignorantly committed in 1816, but the effects of which have been mainly confined to herself; and it is the offence which Germany has now com-

mitted with far less excuse. She has inflicted thereby, so much suffering upon other countries, and produced such wide-spread confusion in the finances and commerce of the world, that her action would deserve the strongest reprobation, but that her statesmen may plead that they had no intention of so doing. A Conference of the nations upon the subject is therefore the wisest, most natural, and most direct step towards a general discernment of the proper remedy for the present state of matters; while it is unpardonable that the two great nations which have brought such evil upon the world should, of all others, refuse to take part in the Conference. The currency arrangements of nations are as interdependent, and require as much adjustment with each other, as their railway, postal, and telegraph systems. England and Germany have hastily committed themselves to certain currency arrangements, that are producing great mischief throughout the civilized world. Students know well that these arrangements are productive of nothing but mischief to the nations themselves that have adopted them—to England in particular; while they are unwise enough to attempt to *taboo* the discussion of them at all costs. It is not thus that nations should be led by their statesmen, and it would have been a scandal to the British people, if its Government had determinedly stood aloof from the Conference at Paris.

HOME AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

In our review of "The Autobiography of Prince Metternich," we have commented at some length on the wisdom, not to be distinguished from folly of "sovereigns and statesmen" in their dealings with the Ottoman Empire. That wisdom has just received a fresh and most striking illustration in the last development of the negotiations with the Porte on the subject of the Greek frontier. The origin of this difficulty is generally known. At the close of the Russo-Turkish war, Greece was about to strike in, as an ally of Russia, for the independence of Epirus and Thessaly, when she was restrained by an assurance from the British Government that if she held her hand now, she would find that the interests of her enslaved countrymen would not suffer in the settlement which would follow upon the termination of the war. In an evil hour for herself and for all Europe, Greece listened to these treacherous counsels, and acted accordingly. At the Vienna Congress, Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury abandoned her cause, as indeed it was their nature to abandon every upright and honourable cause. They thrust back into bondage under the Turks millions of emancipated men and women, from no motive which can be divined, except a love of evil-doing. When the present Government came into office, they set to work to wipe away, as far as possible, the deep stigma with which this nation had been branded by the treachery with which Greece had been treated by their predecessors. The Berlin Conference assembled and agreed upon a frontier which the Porte was required to concede to Greece. If "sovereigns and statesmen" were a kind of people who condescended to profit by experience, they would have known that to agree upon a frontier, unless they were prepared to enforce its cession by the Porte, was the idlest of occupations. But this is the special peculiarity of these august and most mischievous persons. They never profit by experience. They think it beneath them to do so. Accordingly, having agreed upon a frontier to be ceded to Greece, it never occurred to their sagacious minds to agree also upon the measures to be taken, if the Porte refused to yield the required frontier. They left that to the chapter of accidents. Then took place that which every sane man in the world, and, not improbably, all the lunatics in all the asylums of Great Britain and Ireland could have told these high personages would have taken place. The Porte refused to yield the required frontier. Immediately sovereigns, statesmen, and diplomatists were nonplussed. This contingency had never occurred to them. "What on

earth are we to do now?" they said, looking at each other with blank countenances. The Porte graciously comes to their relief. It will not concede the territory which *they* settled; but here is another frontier which it has no objection to surrender. These are tidings of great joy to the blank minds of these great men who, at the very first difficulty, had found themselves gravelled for lack of wit. Greece being small, they all combined together to threaten and bully her into accepting the new frontier. But, again, it never occurred to them that unless they were prepared to coerce the Porte, she would as little concede this second frontier as she would the first. Why in truth should she? Here then the matter stands at present. Greco having been disgracefully bullied and threatened, has intimated that she will be content with the new frontier *when* she gets it, but desires to know what "guarantee" Europe is prepared to give that she will get it. Blank dismay once again suffuses the intellectual countenances of a number of royal highnesses and excellencies. They had not reckoned upon such sharp practice upon the part of Greece. "Guarantees," of course, they have none to offer; and the upshot of the whole business is that, having humbly eaten the Turkish leek, the Great Powers find themselves, at the conclusion of the humiliating performance, in precisely the same difficulties as before. Terrible a calamity as war is, we believe that the short and sharp anguish of a war is infinitely preferable to the long drawn out agony of those who are groaning in bondage to the Turk—the murder, the outrage, the insecurity to life and property which are inseparable from such a condition. Therefore we earnestly hope that the wretched and disgraceful compromise whereby Europe is seeking to fulfil her pledges to Greco will be defeated. The Turk must sooner or later be *driven* out of Europe; he will certainly never depart voluntarily; and the sooner that Europe is compelled to insist upon his expulsion the better. She will be compelled to exert herself in that direction, if the Porte, true to its antecedents, refuses to cede this new frontier as soon as Greco has expressed her willingness to accept it.

Mr. Gladstone's Land Bill is a great and beneficent measure, and it is plain that its thorough and comprehensive character has surprised no one so much as it has surprised Mr. Parnell and his little following of malcontents. Would it be unjust to say, also, that in these respects it has disappointed no one so much as it has disappointed them? But the very greatness and beneficence of the measure cause us to regret all the more keenly that the Government had not the courage to trust to its healing and reconciling measures to restore order and peace in Ireland, instead of having recourse to the obsolete and futile devices of Coercion Acts and Arms Bills. The evil which we anticipated would follow the passing of these Acts has not been slow in manifesting itself. The Irish landlords, with their courage and rapacity thoroughly restored, now that they have behind them their old ally—a Coercion Bill—have recommenced evicting their tenants with a vigour intensified by the knowledge that they have but a short time. These evictions have, as a necessary consequence, aggravated the turbulence and lawlessness which the Coercion Acts were designed to repress. Day after day we read

in the papers of assaults upon process-servers, and collisions between the police and an indignant peasantry. Meanwhile the Coercion Act itself is being put to quite another use from that for which Mr. Forster declared that it was intended. We hear of no fierce and dissolute blackguards being arrested under its provisions, but of a number of orderly and respectable citizens—editors of newspapers, and the like—being subjected to that fate. It is curious to note how in every instance, when the Government has entered upon a line of policy opposed to that spirit of Radical Liberalism which carried them to power, such policy has involved them in humiliation and disaster. Afghanistan and the Transvaal are conspicuous cases in point. But their Irish Coercion Policy is hardly less so. This policy, there can be no question, was profoundly distasteful to those men throughout the country whose zeal and earnestness of conviction were the most powerful factors in the overthrow of Lord Beaconsfield's Administration. They acquiesced in it, because the Ministry deemed it needful, but they remained unconvinced of its wisdom and necessity. And who can now deny that in this, as in so much else, they manifested a sounder political sagacity, and a more accurate perception of the character of the situation than the members of the Government—men though these are of unquestionable capacity and large experience. The fact is, that even in the most popular form of Government, it is impossible to eradicate a certain degree of antagonism between the Government, and those whose business it is to obey. The members of a Government discover a heinousness in disobedience even to intolerably bad laws, which is lost to the apprehensions of ordinary men. It is only possible, so it appears to us, to account for the introduction of the Coercion Bill by Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues on some such hypothesis as this. For nothing could well be more futile than their attempts to demonstrate that the state of society in Ireland was such as to render a measure like the Coercion Bill a matter of primary necessity. At the same time, we must not forget that but for the action of Mr. Parnell and his band of malecontents, even so weak-kneed a Liberal as Mr. Forster would have been without a justification for a policy of extra-legal repression. It is this little knot of Home Rulers who are primarily and chiefly responsible for the sufferings of evicted tenants, for the incarceration of so many Irish citizens, for the lawlessness and rioting which are rife in Ireland. If, however, the Bill passes unmutated through both Houses, their mischievous occupation will be lost to them. They will be able to trouble the peace of their native land no more. But will the Bill so pass? It is extremely uncertain. The chances of a Land Bill passing through the House of Lords diminish in inverse proportion to its excellence; and the present Bill being a very excellent one, its chances of passing are, in the natural order of things, extremely small. There is no question that but one consideration will hinder the Lords from summarily rejecting it—and that is fear. How would the nation at large take such a rejection? Is it likely to be deeply moved to wrath and indignation, or will it remain comparatively acquiescent? The Lords, "dwelling in a balloon," have little knowledge of the force or direction of popular currents of feeling, and will be apt to imagine that these are as they desire them to be, and, on

that hypothesis, will either reject the Bill, or so mutilate it as to render it useless. What, then, is to be done? Some of the Liberal organs think that in Lord Beaconsfield the country has lost a moderating influence which might have been potent to persuade the prejudices and disarm the fears of the Lords. There is no evidence to justify such a belief. Lord Beaconsfield led the opposition to the Compensation for Disturbance Bill on the express ground that such opposition would indicate the determined hostility of the Lords to any more drastic schemes of Land reform which might be impending. It is, however, idle to discuss this matter now. From Lord Salisbury, the country may rest assured, the Bill will receive nothing but a bitter, unenlightened, and ignorant hostility. With him as leader of the Conservatives, it may be assumed as certain that the Lords will reject the Land Bill. The difficulty, then, which weighs upon us, is not whether Mr. Gladstone should or should not appeal to the country—that seems to us a matter of subordinate importance—but how to suspend the evicting power of the landlords. That this power should be stayed in case there is any delay in the passing of the Land Bill beyond the present session, is imperative, unless the Government is content to see their measure fail entirely as a measure for allaying the discontent and bitterness of spirit in Ireland. And we earnestly hope that the Government will not evade their obligations. There ought to be no recurrence of the meekness and humility with which they acquiesced in the rejection of their Compensation for Disturbance Bill.

The letter of Mr. Gladstone addressed to Mr. Tomkinson on the subject of the Transvaal Peace is written in a strain refreshing to listen to. "I can assure you," writes the Prime Minister, "that when we come to the discussion in the House of Commons, I shall adopt no apologetic tone. It was a question of saving the country from sheer blood-guiltiness." We trust that not only Mr. Gladstone, but his colleagues too, will act up to this manly resolve when the time comes. Since they came into office they have indulged far too liberally in "an apologetic tone," with no other results than to weaken their own position and outrage the consciences of their supporters. Months have passed since then, but still we cannot recall Mr. Gladstone's eulogy on Sir Bartle Frere without shrinking and horror. He ought to leave all such panegyrics to be pronounced by the Archbishop of Canterbury and Lord Shaftesbury, who have found in that homicidal proconsul a beautiful embodiment of the gospel of peace and good-will among men. We hope, too, that when this discussion comes on, the too long silent eloquence of John Bright will again be heard in denunciation of unrighteous war: The Boers have given one more proof of the falsehood of that character which their enemies have given to them, by their honourable conduct with regard to the surrender of Potchefstroom. They have voluntarily annulled its capitulation, and replaced the British garrison in possession of the town, because its surrender was made after the date of the armistice. Meanwhile, however, the land-grabbers and rapacious adventurers who hoped to reap a golden harvest by swindling the natives of the Transvaal under protection of the British Flag, are wild with rage and disappointment at the failure of their expectations. They have burned Mr. Gladstone in effigy at

Newcastle. They have, of course, every man among them, clothed in sackcloth and ashes, attended at the death-bed and interment of British prestige. They are, of course, every man among them, convinced that the present disgraceful peace means war and bloodshed at no distant date, and their humane hearts are deeply afflicted at this distressing anticipation. But it is the faithlessness of the British Government which has most deeply wounded their finer feelings. They had entered upon their career of land-grabbing, under the assurance that it was a principle with the British nation, never to restore stolen goods to their legitimate owners. How, otherwise, could the honour of the British Flag be maintained in distant lands? This principle Mr. Gladstone's Government has basely disregarded, and the land-grabbers and adventurers are indignant at the shameful immorality of the proceeding. At the risk of wearying our readers, we must once more point out the moral to be derived from these facts. These Transvaal adventurers do not pretend to think or to say that the British taxpayer is interested in the success or failure of their speculations; nevertheless, they consider themselves deeply outraged if that much-enduring individual refuses to carry on wars in which he can obtain nothing but injury, dishonour, and loss. This, in fact, is the habitual colonial conception of the relations between themselves and the mother country. Our obligations to them are heavy and indefinite; theirs towards us are simply *nil*.

The assassins of the late Czar have all been executed, and the Executive Committee of the Revolutionary Society to which they belonged have made their death the occasion for an address to the present Czar, which may hereafter mark a turning-point in the domestic history of Russia. It is full of facts and warnings which it is to be hoped that the Emperor of Russia will lay to heart. The address points out that such revolutionary movements as that of which it is an expression, are not self-engendered. Their causes are to be sought for in the social and political condition of the countries in which they appear. Unrelenting and fierce—almost inhuman—was the persecution to which the late Czar was subjected until at length he fell a victim to it. The autocracy of Russia did its utmost to terrorise and exterminate those who were thus dogging the Czar. Scores of them were executed, hundreds exiled; but this fate availed nothing to deter more resolute and skilful successors filling up the places which had been left vacant. It is idle, says the address, to raise hands of horror over the insanity and ferocity of such actions. What is it that has driven and still drives people mad in this way? It is misgovernment. Until Russia is ruled after a different fashion than that which has hitherto prevailed, these anarchical societies will increase and multiply, and measures of repression will merely foster their growth and popularity. "In Russia," says this address, "the Government has degenerated into a pure camarilla, and deserves the name of a usurping gang rather than the Executive Committee. Be the intentions of the Emperor what they may, the acts of the Government have nothing in common with the requirements and aspirations of the people. The Imperial Government subjected the people to serfage, and handed them over to the mercy of the nobility. At the present time it openly encourages the growth of a most dangerous class of speculators and extortioners. All its reforms tend to the further enslavement and spoliation of the people. It has reduced the masses of the Russian people to complete beggary and ruin. The eye of the spy follows every one, even to his domestic hearth, nor is any man allowed to discuss local communal wants. . . . The most flagrant frauds remain unpunished. On the other hand, what a dreadful fate awaits the man who has the public weal at

heart! You know very well, your Majesty, that it is not Socialists alone who are persecuted and exiled. What then, is a Government that produces such an 'order' of things? Is it, then, not a gang—verily, is it not a manifestation of complete usurpation?"

No one will doubt the essential truth of these statements who has had any experience of the working of our bureaucratic system in India. The methods of that bureaucracy are not so sanguinary and savage as those of the Russian bureaucracy, but the spirit in which it works is described with astonishing fidelity in the foregoing extract. The longer that a bureaucratic system of government is in operation the more completely it becomes detached from the people it pretends to rule over. This is inseparable from the very nature of a bureaucracy. However stagnant and unprogressive a people may be, there must always be continuous change, if not progress, in the internal relations between class and class. A bureaucracy takes and can take no account of these changes. Its travelling ruts are all marked out for it beforehand, and it cannot get out of them, no matter what the changes which are occurring all round it. All that it can do is to silence and suppress those who draw attention to its futilities. In British India it is absolutely impossible for any one, however able a man he may be, to advance in the public service unless he is prepared to surrender his convictions and his conscience to his bureaucratic chief. It is no exaggeration to say that a high Indian Civilian hates, as his worst enemies, free speech, independent thought, and equal-handed justice. If such be the temper of mind produced by a bureaucracy upon Englishmen who have been brought up in a land of freedom, it is not difficult to imagine what it must be among the officials of a Russian despotism. The existence of Nihilism reveals the hideous character of the rule against which it is a wild protest. It remains to be seen whether the Czar intends to lay the foundation of a constitutional system in Russia, or to persevere in the old path, till he is overtaken by the same fate as his father. A letter from its St. Petersburg "correspondent" was published in the *Daily News* a few days ago, which said that it had been decided at a Council of Ministers, at which the Emperor was present, to convoke a sort of States-General for the discussion of the internal state of Russia. This was to consist of elected representatives of territorial bodies, towns, and the nobility. We devoutly hope that the Emperor will see that this most prudent resolution is speedily carried into effect.

Kandahar is at last in process of being evacuated, and simultaneously, the expedition against the Tekke Turcomans has been brought to a conclusion, and General Skobelev is now on his way back to St. Petersburg. Inexplicably enough, the *Daily News*, at this eleventh hour, was seized with a sudden horror of Russian perfidy—for no better reason than this: On the 24th March, Sir Charles Dilke announced in the House of Commons that General Skobelev was about to be recalled, and operations against the Turcomans to cease; on the 9th April these events actually occurred. On this singular foundation the *Daily News* piled up a series of alarming leaders, declaring that this country in particular, and all Europe in general, would receive the information with profound indignation as a fresh illustration of the incurable villany of Russian sovereigns and statesmen. It is not often that any of the many stories of Russian perfidy can be traced up to their origin, but here, at last, is one; and it may, we undertake to say, be taken as a sample of all. The *Daily News* builds up a charge of perfidy, out of a scrupulous adherence to pledges given; and the like has been done, and is still being done, regarding Khiva,

and, notably, regarding Afghanistan. For the rest we have now got Major Baring's Indian Budget, and we there learn that, including the cost of frontier railways, the war in Afghanistan has cost close upon nineteen millions of money.

Two months ago we inserted in the pages of this journal a paper investigating the incidents of the battle of Isandhlwana, with the object of determining on whom the responsibility for that disaster should rest. In the month following we inserted a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, the brother of the heroic soldier who fell at Isandhlwana, relating the many but fruitless efforts he had made to persuade the Army authorities to set the matter at rest by a full inquiry into the facts. The fruitlessness of these endeavours was not surprising. The ethics of an "office"—no matter what that office may be, the Horse Guards, War Office, Colonial Office, or any other—are composed, in about equal parts, of meanness, cowardice, tyranny, and an anxiety to escape trouble. If a man is weak, or dead—if he has no influential friends in "society"—if he has it not in his power to make the denial to him of justice a decidedly more irksome business than the rendering of justice,—he may knock at the gates of an "office" in vain. But among all the offices, it is in those of the Army that the spirit of injustice and favouritism is most rampant, and reigns most openly in unblushing supremacy. In the Army, the principle of "scapegoats" may be said to have been reduced to a system, and to be regarded by the highest military authorities as essential to discipline. It is notorious that the instant the news of the battle of Isandhlwana was received in this country, high people of all kinds set to work to shield Lord Chelmsford from a too narrow investigation of the part which he played in the events of that day. To do this effectually, a "scapegoat" was indispensable, and the heroic Durnford fallen with his face to the foe, being incapable of defending himself, these high people, wisely considering that "stone dead has no fellow," pitched upon him as the scapegoat. Encouraged by the impunity thus extended to him, Lord Chelmsford thought fit to deliver a speech in the House of Lords, in which he endeavoured to vindicate himself at the expense of the fallen Durnford. The statements made in this speech we examined *seriatim* in the THE STATESMAN. We showed that they were, without exception, either false altogether, or misleading. Lieut.-Colonel Durnford—the brother—on reading this speech, addressed an appeal, first to Colonel Stanley, and subsequently to Mr. Childers, that a properly constituted military Court should inquire into the questions at issue between Lord Chelmsford and Colonel Durnford. The appeal was rejected. Neither of these official personages could see any reason why an inquiry should be opened. Most people, however, who have not the misfortune to suffer from that moral obliquity which official personages appear to don as a kind of uniform together with the seals of office, will consider that it is a disgraceful and a monstrous thing that a Peer of the Realm should be allowed to rise in the House and defame a fallen soldier, without being required by the heads of the Army to justify his accusations. If Mr. Childers and the Duke of Cambridge have yet to learn that it is a part of their duty to protect British officers—but especially those who have fallen in the execution of their duty—from calumny and injustice, the sooner they do so the better. The charge brought against Colonel Durnford by Lord Chelmsford is explicit. It is that he lost the battle of Isandhlwana in consequence of neglecting his (Lord Chelmsford's) orders. To any one who knows the character of Colonel Durnford such a charge as this needs no refutation. A few years before Isandhlwana, he all but lost his life, because of the resolution with which he adhered to most difficult orders. His orders were to stop an armed rebel tribe with a small force

of about forty volunteers and twenty Natives, but *he was not to fire the first shot*. In the execution of this difficult duty, he was severely wounded, and the *Natal Colonist*, speaking of his conduct, wrote: "We say that for cool daring and manly endurance, for humanity and every quality which can adorn an English soldier and a gentleman on the field of battle, he is one of whom his countrymen may well feel proud."

Sir Henry Bulwer, the Governor of Natal, whose just and wise conduct before and during the Zulu War stood out in such bright contrast to the wild and lawless proceedings of Sir Bartle Frere, thus wrote of Colonel Durnford: "Colonel Durnford was a soldier of soldiers, with all his heart in his profession, keen, active-minded, indefatigable, unsparing of himself, brave and utterly fearless, honourable, loyal, of great kindness and goodness of heart. I speak of him as I knew him." Such was the soldier whom Sir Bartle Frere did not hesitate to declare had shown an ignorance of the "elementary maxims" of war; such was the soldier whom Lord Chelmsford charged from his place in the House of Lords with culpable disobedience of orders; and such, finally, is the soldier whom neither Mr. Childers nor the Duke of Cambridge conceive it to be their duty to defend from these imputations in the only way in which he can be defended. If Colonel Durnford were yet alive, he could clear his reputation by demanding a Court-martial. Being dead, these official personages are only anxious to have the whole business buried with him, out of sight and memory. But a well-authenticated rumour has reached us which, if true, would at once clear up the whole matter. We have been told that since the battle of Isandhlwana, the paper on which the orders left with Colonel Pulleine were written has been found and sent to Lord Chelmsford. It is difficult to believe this rumour true, because if Lord Chelmsford has those orders in his possession, there can be no question that it would be his duty to make them public, whether they told in his favour or not. After the charges brought by him against Colonel Durnford, no other course would be consistent with the honour of a soldier. But Lord Chelmsford has made no sign. The story may, therefore, be a myth. But should it be true—and this the War Office and the Horse Guards can easily ascertain—we trust that they will see fit to make tardy reparation to the memory of a gallant and devoted soldier by publishing them to the world. We have not a doubt that they will completely exonerate Colonel Durnford from the ridiculous aspersions of Sir Bartle Frere, and, not less, from the carefully prepared imputations of Lord Chelmsford.

A few words remain to be said upon the Government proposal to erect a national monument to Lord Beaconsfield. Proposals of this kind are rare in the annals of our Parliamentary history, and it is well that they should be so. They establish a precedent capable and likely to be subjected to the grossest abuses. It may, we think, be accepted as a sound principle that national monuments to statesmen ought not to be erected by the generation among whom they lived. It is impossible for such generation to form a correct estimate of the permanent value of their career. It needs the lapse of a considerable time before that can be viewed as a whole. There are, we believe, but three English statesmen to whose memory national monuments have been erected—Pitt, Peel, and Palmerston. We pass over Mr. Perceval because in his case the national monument was due to the public excitement caused by his murder; it had no relation to his public services. Pitt, Peel, and Palmerston are, then, the three precedents whereby we can judge the soundness or otherwise of the principle. Fox protested against the monument to Pitt immediately it was proposed, and looking at Pitt's policy from the point in the world's history we have now

reached, few will question that Fox was right in his protest. Pitt's Foreign Policy, which obtained for him this mark of national gratitude, we can now see was a blunder and a crime. Pitt joined in the European coalition against Republican France mainly, as we can now see, to strengthen his position in the House of Commons. He thought the French nation almost at the bottom of its resources, and that war, if incapable of justification morally, would be brief, and would enable Great Britain to capture sundry rich spice islands. On these selfish and ignorant calculations he let slip the dogs of war, which ranged over Europe for a period of twenty years before they were chained up. Then the original crime and blunder of beginning the war he aggravated by the feeble and self-seeking manner in which he carried it on—careful only of what he styled "British interests," and, so long as these were safe, indifferent to the fate of his allies, and the ostensible object of the war. In all our roll of *Primo Ministers* there is not one who has inflicted upon the British Empire, and upon Europe, a tithe part of the evil for which the younger Pitt is responsible. Peel, again—the monument granted to him was for the Repeal of the Corn Laws, but none would deny that that legislation was the work far more of Richard Cobden than of Sir Robert Peel. Any one with less of statesmanlike greatness in him than Sir Robert Peel it would be difficult to imagine. He never saw the necessity for any reform until such necessity had been perceived by the intelligence of the entire nation, and then he carried it out. His merit lay in having the courage of his new convictions, and disregarding for their sake the taunts of inconsistency which were sure to be hurled at his head. Palmerston was a down-right genial-hearted Englishman, but, as a statesman, his special characteristic was an aptitude for conjuring up imaginary national dangers. We owe to him the first Afghan War, and indirectly the second also, for he may be said to have inoculated the nation with Russophobia. Francophobia was also a disease from which he suffered very acutely; he was for going to war with France when they occupied Algeria, because such occupation would convert the Mediterranean into a French lake and cut us off from India. Not only without evidence, but against it, he was possessed by an insensate terror that, first, Louis Philippe, and afterwards the Emperor Napoleon, had determined to invade England, that any morning a French army might be expected at Portsmouth; and with this preposterous belief also he inoculated the entire nation. He caused us to spend millions of money quite uselessly, in fortifying the Thames against this mythical invasion. In short, Pitt, Peel, and Palmerston were all of them very worthy men who served their country to the best of their ability, but we can see the absurdity of erecting national monuments to them immediately after their death by imagining the reception which such a proposition would meet with now. National monuments cannot be kept too select, because they are the very highest honour that it is in the power of a nation to confer. Shakespeare ought to have a national monument, provided we had a sculptor gifted with the genius to execute one that should not disgrace his glorious memory; but a party leader in the House of Commons—how is it possible to erect a national monument to such a man without condemning one-half of the nation to pronounce upon itself a sentence of self-stultification?

So much for national monuments generally; as regards the particular one which is to be raised to Lord Beaconsfield, the proposal is so comic that as a precedent it is not likely to do much harm. That is the best that can be said in its defence. The Queen, we suppose, and other high personages desire this honour to be paid to the departed Empress-maker, and Mr. Gladstone and his

colleagues are complaisant enough to agree. It is a great pity that the proposition has been made, but having been made, it is, perhaps, not worth while to oppose it. We trust, however, that one or other of the Radical members of Parliament will point out the burlesque absurdity of it. A year ago the nation was moved to its depths with the effort to shake itself free from the incubus of Lord Beaconsfield's Administration, and now we are asked to erect national monuments in honour of the man whom then we regarded as almost the worst Prime Minister whom Great Britain had ever known.



The Statesman.

No. XI.—APRIL 1, 1881.

EDITORIAL NOTES.

WHILE Indian officials of the Sir Richard Temple order are constantly flattering this country with the stereotyped assurances of "the blessings of British rule" in India, the Services are, happily, producing men of another mould who refuse to minister to the delusions in which the nation is steeped as to the condition of the masses of its people. We have now before us an essay upon the condition of the Dekhan, by Mr. Wedderburn, of the Bombay Civil Service, in which the reader who chooses to do so may inform himself of the effects of British rule upon the Mahratta provinces that were taken by us from the Peishwa in 1818. When those provinces came into our hands, sixty years ago, the people were living in rude plenty, in peaceful villages, disturbed only at intervals by the contending hordes of freebooters which the break-up of the Mogul Empire had let loose upon the provinces. Now it is quite true that British rule has imposed a *pax Romana* upon the country. It has established an iron system of law and order throughout the empire, crushing all opposition thereto, until opposition has ceased to be offered; and there "the blessings" of British rule for the present end. Unhappily, it is not the lawlessness of the Pindaree hordes alone that our rule has crushed; it has crushed all heart and hope out of the lives of the people, and banished peace and plenty together, from their homes and villages. Mr. Wedderburn is a Bombay Civilian of twenty years' standing, and is a brother, we believe, of Sir David Wedderburn, member for Haddington. We notice his essay here not to review the remedy which Mr. Wedderburn suggests for the deplorable condition of things which he describes—we shall probably attempt that in a future issue—but to add his testimony as that of another official, to the truthfulness of our statements concerning the effects of our rule.

HERR, then, is what Mr. Wedderburn tells us is the true state of the Dekhan villages to-day, under British rule:—

There are three chief interests to be considered: the cultivator, the money-lender, and the State as trustee for the public. At present, throughout the four Dekhan districts, each of these interests is in distress, and each is placed in a position of mischievous antagonism toward the others. As regards the distress of the ryot, it seems unnecessary for me to add anything to the long official record of his woes. Ruined, despairing, and embittered.

THE STATESMAN was established in London, first of all, for the great purpose of making known to the people of this country, the true effects of our rule upon the

masses in India. We struck the first note of our resolve in the very first issue of the paper [November 29, 1879], when, replying to the optimistic lectures Dr. Hunter was beginning to deliver at Edinburgh, we wrote :—

We doubt if there ever was a period in the history of India when the masses of its people endured such general and cruel suffering as they have endured of late years under the government of our countrymen. We put aside for the moment the consideration of its causes ; we affirm, simply and positively, that if rulers are to be judged by the well-being and happiness, or otherwise, of the masses of their subjects, then a verdict of condemnation must go forth against ourselves. The people of this country have no conception of the misery through which the people of India have gone in the last few years. And the all-important fact is this, that *it is our rule* that has been the cause, either directly or indirectly. Dr. Hunter and his commentator and disciple in the *Times* are but misleading the nation when they tell it that all is well in India ; and then, to prove that it is so, recall the anarchy and misery of a wholly exceptional period of Native rule, for self-complacent contrast with our own. Were it possible for us in these columns to pourtray the sufferings which the people of India have gone through under the Viceroyalty of Lord Lytton, the heart of the nation would turn sick at the recital. And this suffering has been determinedly ignored by the Government. Besought on all hands to open its eyes thereto, it refused. Had it not an Afghan war to prosecute ?

Our arrival was timely. Dr. Hunter has wisely seen fit to change his tone altogether upon the great subject which he was beginning to discuss in the usual "official" fashion, covering our rule with the hollow eulogiums to question which, until recently, was to bring down upon us the charge of being "calumnious slanderers" of our country. If THE STATESMAN had accomplished no other good than the shock it has sensibly given to received opinions in this country as to the results of British rule in India, it would have more than justified, we think, its *raison d'être*.

"RUINED, despairing, and embittered : " such is the condition of the masses of the peasantry over by far the greater part of British India to-day. Happy would it be for us were Mr. Wedderburn's picture true only of the Dekhan districts. It is true of Oudh, Jhansi, Behar, and much of the North-west Provinces and Bengal, numbering not fewer than 59,000,000 to 60,000,000 of people. It is in equal measure true of Mysore and of vast districts of the Madras Presidency. And it is our rule—that, and that only—that has produced this misery. We insist upon the fact, because remedy is hopeless while the disease is ignored or denied, as it is by civilian officials of the Richard Temple class, who tell us that the people of India have traditionally been accustomed to semi-starvation, that they can subsist very well on a pound of grain a day, and that famine, after all, is but the beneficent means which Nature takes to get rid of a surplus population from the soil. Infamous as these doctrines are, we appeal to every man who has lived long in India whether they do not represent the common talk of the civilian officials who rule the country, with the *Pioneer* as the exponent of their views. We have heard them preached till too sick at heart to reply to them any more in India, and our appeal is now to the English people.

In the debate on the Navy Estimates, a few days ago, Mr. W. H. Smith told the House "that the late Board of Admiralty came to the conclusion that it was no longer possible to resist the breech-loader, as it was impossible, so far as they could see, to obtain from muzzle-loaders the power, the range, and the penetration

necessary to put our guns on a par with those of other countries. However good the Woolwich gun might be, there was no doubt the present naval guns of England were inferior to the new guns carried by the German, the French, and the Russian fleets." Verily, we are a strange people. The cause of it is that we do not govern ourselves, but are governed by hereditary and professional administrators. For many years past the great Continental armies, having found by actual experience in the field, the immense superiority of breech-loading artillery, have abandoned the muzzle-loader gun altogether. The result is, that if an English army were to-day to go into the field against any of the leading Continental armies, it would do so under a disparity of force, as to its artillery, simply appalling. For years past, there has been a *consensus* of opinion on the Continent that to send artillerymen with muzzle-loading guns into the field against breech-loaders and small arms of precision, is simply to lead them to the shambles. We pride ourselves upon being specially endowed as a people with the gift of common sense, and yet we permit the Horse Guards and the Admiralty to go on constructing, for ten years on end, muzzle-loading guns, at a cost of millions annually, that the first great war will compel us to abandon instantly with desperate haste, and to substitute breech-loading implements for them in the very agony of the strife, when their manufacture in time will be impossible. Under the conditions of modern warfare, to attempt to work a muzzle-loading battery under the fire of sharp-shooters, and with breech-loading guns replying to it, would simply mean the murder of our artillerymen.

With the experience and the common sense of all Europe against them, the Horse Guards are, at this late hour, "experimenting" at Woolwich upon the merits of muzzle-loading *versus* breech-loading artillery. Mr. W. H. Smith meanwhile blandly tells us in the Commons, that the late Board of Admiralty "came to the conclusion that it was no longer possible to resist the breech-loader." Observe the attitude of the thing which, from courtesy, we call "mind"—the mind of the Admiralty. This admirable Board had resisted the breech-loader "until it was no longer possible to do so." And they have been doing precisely the same at the Horse Guards, resisting the dictates of common sense and the experience of all the European armies, "until it is no longer possible," and they must really begin to inquire. Is it not too mournful? The true cause is that the administration is carried on by a body of "officials" who have no responsibility for the enormous expenditure annually incurred in our factories and arsenals. If the nation allows it, they will go on spending millions in the same way for the next ten years, upon artillery of the same order. There is always India to fall back upon as a customer for these obsolete products. Muzzle-loaders will do very well for her, at all events, as the old Enfield rifles do. And then, it is so delightfully convenient that we can charge the Indian Treasury what we please for our own obsolete ordnance, arms, and military stores. No more utterly demoralizing system could exist. Had Mr. W. H. Smith, as an able "man of the people," been allowed to manage the business of the Admiralty as he so admirably manages his own vast private business, he would have insisted on seeing a definite and adequate return for every sixpence of the public money. Under the present system of administration, the money voted by the House is practically spent in machinery, under a routine without mind or soul in it. And so they go on for ten years together, constructing guns with which we shall not dare to send our soldiers into the field. Never mind, they

will do for India, and we can charge her full price for them. They will do to fight Afghans with, or put down a starving peasantry.

THE Lords' debate on Kandahar, on the one hand, and on the other, the grand but simple utterances of a man of the people, lifted upon his shield by the arms and voices of 50,000,000 of free people, at Washington! The reader who would see the gulf that lies between the soul of Eudymion and the soul of a born leader of men should read the Earl of Beaconsfield's *La-di-da* upon Kandahar, in the Lords, and then President Garfield's inaugural address, at Washington, on the 4th March. The States have verily lifted the right man upon the shield this time. Here is A MAN speaking at last—every quarter of the earth echoing back, with a voice like many waters, the everlasting Yea and Amen. The cackle of a coronetted assemblage, gathered together by Eudymion at Westminster, to assure the spheres that a Lytton is in accordance with the very facts of things, moves not the faintest vibration in the heavens, but the inaugural address will last for evermore. The American President is unknown to Eudymion's "sovereigns and statesmen;" he belongs to another planet, and towers above them as the cedar among brambles. We recommend our readers who have the opportunity, and can spare the time, to read Eudymion's *La-di-da* oration to the Lords upon Kandahar, and then the inaugural address of the man whom the people of the United States have elected as their Chief Magistrate for the next four years.

THE awakened conscience of the nation long since discerned that we have no moral right to occupy Kandahar, and that it would be absolutely useless as a defensive measure. If we are going to attack Russia upon the Oxus, seeking her out and making war upon civilization in her Armies, then Kandahar is a necessity to us. It can never be the *base* of any operations of magnitude, but it must be the first great point for massing our resources in our march upon Herat, and for preserving communications with the Indus. If we intend to be aggressive, if we mean to attack Russia, and drive her back upon Orenburg, rehabilitating the kidnappers and the caravan plunderers whom she is putting down with the strong hand—if, in a word, we are going to wage war against humanity and against God,—then we should keep Kandahar; but not otherwise. There is not a strategist living, who will tell us that, in the event of Russia invading India, it would be sound military tactics to anticipate her advance to the Indus, by ourselves marching to Kandahar. As a necessary consequence, therefore, we should have, in the event of such an invasion, to withdraw any garrison we might now place there, or see it starved into surrender, as Metz was, and lost to us. If an invasion ever does take place—and none see more clearly than Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury its "physical unfeasibility"—it will have to be made in such force as would enable the invaders to "mask" the garrison and march on, leaving it to surrender at discretion. The position is so simple that even a child may be made to comprehend it. The military opinions that are brought forward in favour of its retention are not worth a straw, for no two of them agree, while most of them come out of Bedlam. Let the Ministry stand fast by its determination to leave Kandahar, and the sooner it gives the order to do so the better. WE HAVE NO RIGHT TO BE THERE. That is enough for upright men. No honest Russophobic will advise us* to stay there as a question of strategy. It is the men who regard it as a favourable position for advancing towards the Oxus,

who clamour against our retirement. They see that our retirement will give the *coup de grace* to the sinister policy of an advance into Afghanistan. Unscrupulous to the core, they are posing as Russophobists under the leaders who told us in 1877—the one that a Russian invasion of India was “a chimera and night-mare,” the other that it was a “physical unfeasibility.” They had not then plunged into the crime which they are now seeking to justify, careless of the ruin in which their dishonest clamour would involve the nation.

MR. EDISON and Professor Graham Bell have both shown so little jealousy of attempts to profit by their marvellous inventions, that there is something particularly disagreeable, it seems to us, in a Governmental institution like the Post Office showing so resolute a disposition to make a monopoly of their discoveries at this early stage of their application to public use and convenience. We should be less disposed to quarrel with the action of the Office, but for the terms under which alone, it seems, it is prepared to grant “licences” to the Companies. Remembering that these discoveries, and their application to public use, are in their infancy, and that it is to the genius and researches of men like Mr. Edison and Mr. Bell that we must still look for their development and perfection, there is something intensely disagreeable in the attitude which the Postmaster-General has been induced to take up towards the use of this invention. “Government” of this order was the rock on which Mr. Lowe and Mr. Ayrton shipwrecked public sympathy with Mr. Gladstone’s Ministry ten years ago.

No one, of course, can be surprised to hear that, with this example of the English Post Office before its eyes, the Government of India has refused to allow private Telephone Exchanges to be introduced into India, but under conditions that make it very doubtful whether the Telephone Companies established for the purpose, will undertake the enterprise at all. The very first occasion on which our capitalists come forward, offering to find whatever money is necessary for giving India a great work of public advantage, without guarantee of any kind, or assistance of any kind, from the Government, they are virtually told that neither they nor their capital are wanted, and that the Government, at some time or other, will probably do the work itself. We are an astonishing people, and contrive to get astonishing rulers at our head. *Fear* of the people, *fear* of private enterprise, *fear* of liberty of action, seems to be a disease common to all “power,” of whatever political type it is. We have spoken of the “refusal” of the Government to allow Telephone Exchanges to be established in India, for practically it is a refusal. What body of capitalists can reasonably be expected to invest money in any enterprise in India, with the Government asserting a right to extinguish it every third year of its existence, and demanding heavy royalties from the Companies, whether the Telephone Exchanges they set up prove profitable or not? To this hour, the Government of India has to face a heavy annual loss upon its Telegraph service, while it insists upon a large profit being paid to it for every Telephone Exchange that may be established by private enterprise, whether the enterprise proves successful or not. It should have welcomed the Companies with both hands, in the hope that their success would prove an encouragement to private enterprise, by English capitalists, of other kinds. It is not without reason that the Government of India is charged with tacit jealousy of private enterprise in that country, however little inclined to admit the charge.

ON Wednesday, the 23rd of March, after our article on the "Situation in Mysore" and the Notes which follow this were in type, Lord Hartington announced in the House of Commons, in answer to a question put to him by Mr. Torrens, M.P. for Finsbury, that the appointment of Mr. Rungacharloo to be Dewan of Mysore, as recommended by Mr. J. D. Gordon, the Chief Commissioner, had been approved by the Home Government; that the young Maharajah, who was to be installed at the head of the Mysore Government on the 25th of March, by Mr. Adam, the Governor of Madras, had himself chosen Mr. Rungacharloo as Minister, and that the papers relating to these matters were now being printed, and would be presented to Parliament. When those papers are in our hands, we shall have more to say on the subject, especially as to the alleged preference and choice of Mr. Rungacharloo as Minister by the youthful Maharajah. In the meantime, we may say so much, that if Her Majesty's Government have agreed to the selection of a Dewan on the strength of the Maharajah's alleged choice; if the Maharajah has exercised his prerogative of choice after being invested with the actual rule of the State; and if the Minister so chosen is well understood to hold his office at the Maharajah's will and pleasure, and without any British guarantee, we can find no fault with the action of the Secretary of State in Council. Even if the illusory nature of the inquiries and reports that have so far been made with reference to the Mysore scandals should have come home to the Marquis of Hartington and his advisers as strongly and clearly as it has to ourselves, they could not avoid, we admit, giving their immediate decision on the statements and documents officially placed before them. Responsibility rests with the Government of India, and with the Maharajah himself, who is, according to our supposition, or ought to be, according to our conviction, free to appoint or dismiss his own officials, and to institute at any time any inquiry that may appear to him advisable.

In a separate article we have discussed the situation in Mysore, with particular reference to the scandalous rumours as to depredations in the Maharajah's jewel-room that have prevailed for several years, and as to the nomination of Mr. C. Rungacharloo to be Dewan or Minister of the young Prince, without any real explanation having been given on the subject of those scandalous rumours. Against that nomination we have been protesting, here and at Calcutta, during the whole of the past year:

It may be asked, if in reality Mr. Rungacharloo is rendered unfit for the high office of Dewan of Mysore by flagrant disqualifications, and if serious and unanswered imputations hang over his name, how have they escaped the scrutiny of the Government of India? It may be, with some plausibility, objected that the veto of Her Majesty's Government, on the appointment, or on the immediate and definitive appointment, of Mr. C. Rungacharloo to be Dewan of Mysore, would have seemed to express a belief in the charges against that person, and in the imputations of undue influence exercised by him during Mr. Gordon's administration as Guardian and as Chief Commissioner. It may also be asked how Her Majesty's Government could be expected to take any step in such an important matter on information unofficially and irregularly tendered?

We have only to say, in answer to these questions and objections, that all that has ever been suggested in THE STATESMAN has been a special and independent inquiry. Hitherto there has merely been a pretence of inquiry. In Mr. Gordon's own words, "specific statements" have been made; and he seriously announces to the Government of India that he has met the specific

statements by combining all the persons whom they affect, more or less, into a Committee to give them a general contradiction. The Committee was entirely composed of Mr. Gordon's own subordinates, and its procedure was guided and directed by Mr. Rungacharloo and himself. The only subject of doubt and suspicion being the actual value of the jewels compared with the value as estimated by a jury of experts in 1868, this packed Committee did not have them valued at all. The work of examining the jewels, which occupied Colonel Charles Elliot and Mr. Rungacharloo in 1868 for six weeks, and occupied Mr. Gordon and Mr. Rungacharloo for about the same time in 1872, was finished in November, 1880, although "specific statements as to losses" had to be met, in eight days. Instead of the specific charges or the general suspicion being dispelled by the published report of Mr. Gordon's Committee, they are manifestly strengthened and confirmed by it.

MR. GORDON and Mr. Rungacharloo, in their joint explanations of July 29th and December 18th, 1880, have made themselves responsible for at least three statements that are contrary to fact:—

(1.) That "the local authorities" had "never heard," "save in the Memorandum published" in the *Calcutta Statesman*, of "anything mysterious," or of any loss of jewels; whereas, in fact, rumours as to depredations in the jewel department have been notoriously prevalent in Mysore since 1874, and have been made the subject of petitions and reports to "the local authorities," which are on official record.

(2.) That the master-key of the jewel repositories was always in the custody of a superior English officer; whereas, in fact, it was on several occasions, and for weeks together, in the sole custody of Mr. Rungacharloo.

(3.) That all the jewels were kept under lock and key; whereas, in fact, a very large number of jewels were left outside in charge of the Controller, Mr. Rungacharloo.

The casual disclosures of 1877, on which the Memorandum in the *Calcutta Statesman* of April 7th, 1880, was based, and recent admissions—for example, in paragraph 4 of the Report of Mr. Gordon's own Committee of November last—prove the specific statement that some of the jewels have been reduced in value. The extent of the inroads thus made on the value of the jewels, can only be ascertained by a special and independent inquiry, and a complete re-valuation.

These established facts, the above-mentioned three untrue assertions of critical and crucial importance, and the contradictory and inconsistent utterances as to the accuracy and as to the errors of the original catalogue of 1868, still call imperatively for a serious investigation, and did, in our opinion, afford sufficient grounds, if not for the suspension, pending inquiry, of the two persons in power at Bangalore, at least for a suspension of judgment as to the confidence to be placed in them, and as to their eligibility for the respective offices of British Resident and Dewan of Mysore.

THE impropriety of such appointments being made, under such circumstances, without an independent inquiry, will be still more obvious when it is considered that almost the first act of these converted officials would be to make a formal transfer of the assets of the State and of the Palace valuables, and to exchange mutual acquittances. One of those coadjutors of many years would release, absolve, and justify the other. Mr. Rungacharloo would receive from Mr. Gordon, on the part of the British Government, a virtual certificate of indemnity that

would protect him, as Minister, from any retrospective scrutiny on the part of his own master. Again, Mr. Gordon, transformed from Chief Commissioner into Resident, would receive from Mr. Rungacharloo, on the part of the Maharajah of Mysore, a full assurance of satisfaction with his trusteeship as Guardian.

Such mutual acquittances and indemnifying declarations, it may be urged, are not only right in form and according to precedent on such occasions, but are peculiarly appropriate and requisite in the present instance. Considering the interminable intrigues, enmities, and rivalries of a Native Court, and the unusual prejudices to which Mr. Rungacharloo, from his origin as a British subject and official, has been exposed, he has extraordinary claims—it may be argued—on the countenance and protection of our Government, and is entitled, when installed as Dewan, to some safeguard against future attacks, founded on the revival of discussions that have been authoritatively closed. Unquestionably, the Dewan of Mysore, installed after a long minority, would be entitled to some indemnity as to retrospective claims and charges. But such a previous indemnity, or any subsequent protection, given by Mr. Gordon to Mr. Rungacharloo, and any acquittance given by Mr. Rungacharloo to Mr. Gordon, under the actual circumstances of their long official association, and after the “specific statements” that have been made, would be a mockery, and a reproach to Her Majesty’s Government, unless preceded and verified by some independent inquiry.

We shall conclude with a conditional prophecy. Should bureaucratic routine seem for the time to triumph by the ratification, at every stage, of the scheme arranged in the Calcutta Foreign Office by Mr. Gordon and Mr. Lyall, and should Mr. Rungacharloo be installed as Dewan, he may be upheld in that position by British bayonets, so long as the political sky is clear, and in the absence of any alarm or complication, within the Mysore State or on its borders, but he will be a constant source of provocation to the people of the country, and a cause of discredit to British authority. Time will show.

ARISTOCRATIC ETHICS.

[Continued.]

I now proceed to my second proposition, viz., that the higher morality of the nation cannot advance until the material and social conditions become more equalized. This is only saying in other words that the preaching of the higher morality in the face of adverse social conditions is a waste of time and human energy, and is as fruitless of results as the everlasting attempts to square the circle or discover perpetual motion. For the general morality of a people is as sternly limited by its material and social conditions as in political economy production is limited by capital, and is as much determined by these conditions as the health of the tree is by the state of its roots. We all believe and act on this principle in our ordinary concerns; my object here is merely to extricate it from the web of sentimentalism in which it lies involved, and to place it on a distinct independent basis. Parents act on this principle when they withdraw their children from the reach of temptation and place them under conditions and influences favourable to the growth of morality, impelled by a true and native instinct which teaches them that in the long run the influence of the surroundings is likely to beat all the preaching. Government acts on this principle when it takes the morality of the people into its own hands, and seeks to elevate it by improving the dwellings of the poor and educating their children, by closing casinos, and regulating the sale of intoxicating liquors. The Press does homage to this principle when it sneers at the Peace-preservation Society, and assures them that they may preach their high and beautiful ideal till the crack of doom, but that there will be no chance of its realization until the general condition of Europe is already prepared for it. The Americans acted on this principle when they ruptured by force the bonds of the slave, knowing well that notwithstanding the ministers who preached and the slave-owners who accepted the Gospel of Christ, and His last and greatest commandment to love one another, no justice—no expansion of mind or heart—could befall the slave under conditions so unequal. Even the serfs in Europe could be set free as

a body only when the slow changes that had been going on in their material condition had made them dangerous, and their emancipation a political necessity. Until then, not even the preaching of the omnipotent Catholic Church could avail. Thus it is everywhere and always. Show me a society where one man or class of men is, from tradition, sentiment, or material power, regarded as the "superior" of another, and I show you a society where equal justice cannot prevail. The one will become, or tend to become, a tyrant, the other a slave, as sure as gravitation or fate. In England, so great is the moral obtuseness generated by centuries of aristocratic tradition, that a man cannot take a paltry shilling from another, even for work honestly and faithfully performed, without being made to feel his inferiority, and being expected to make some more or less humiliating acknowledgment. It is not so in democracies, where men serve or are served with equal dignity and erectness of mind. The attempt, I repeat, to carry out the great and eternal principles of morality in a society where conditions are so unequal is a dream. The reason lies deep in that tendency of the human mind whereby we regard those whom we are taught to consider our inferiors as not only different from ourselves in *degree*, but also in *kind*; and therefore as having no more pretensions to equal, that is to say, just treatment, than our horses or cattle. And just as the heretic must have despaired of equal justice from the inquisitor who was taught to believe that in burning his body he was saving his soul and doing God's service; or the Hindu from the Brahmin who was taught to believe that his own life was worth that of twenty Hindus; so in a society where men are taught to believe that they are distributed into a hierarchy of "classes" by an ordinance of Nature or a decree of God, no "inferior" need hope for equal justice. I care nothing for special and exceptional instances, due to special and exceptional circumstances. I speak only of broad lines of tendency, which differ from exceptional facts in this, that whereas the latter die and are buried and forgotten, the former, like trees and other vital growths, bring forth the same poisonous or beneficent fruit, year after year, and age after age.

But the proposition that the morality of a nation can only advance *pari passu* with the equalization of its material and social conditions, rests on a profounder basis than any mere catalogue of instances, on the law, viz., that in this world things make their own relations—that is to say, their own morality—in spite of politicians or priests. The chemical elements, for example, make their own laws, and the manner in which they will combine depends on their secret affinities and repulsions. Commerce makes its own

laws, moral as well as material; the number of knaves bearing as accurate a ratio to the number of dupes as the supply of a commodity does to its demand. Marriage makes its own laws, and although religion or the customs of society may compel an outward decorum, the inner spiritual relations between a man and his wife will be determined by their respective natures, in spite of the prayers of parents or the invocations of priests. Professional life makes its own laws, and doctors and lawyers who wink at each other like Roman augurs, assume a different tone and attitude towards the uninitiated. As a general rule, a man's occupation and surroundings will determine the form in which his moral nature will be cast, and the direction it will take. So firmly do we believe in England that a man's calling sums up the inventory of his mind and character, that by society it is regarded as practically final. A man surrounded by a wife and family is sure to look at life from a slightly different angle to one who is without these ties. People living in the country differ in sentiment and sympathy from people living in towns. Society, too, makes its own laws, and you will observe that its condition at any given time determines the character of the government, and the legislation it will obey. If the mass of the people are educated, independent, and self-reliant, the government can gather to itself but little power; if they are brutal, ignorant, or unaccustomed to help themselves, the good and great will call in vain for liberty. Every man who betrays his trust, shirks his responsibilities, or breaks the law, helps to tighten the rope around the neck of his neighbour, takes taxes out of his pocket for magistrates and police, and heightens the general rate of credit. The ignorance of the people not only passively bars civilization by its inertia, but actively, by its influence over the enlightened. Statesmen, orators, priests, dramatists, artists, and *litterateurs*, reflect and embody the sentiments and prejudices of the respectable mediocrity, as the prime condition of what is called success, and so defraud the world of those great thoughts and actions of which they are capable, those great truths which they see and love, but which they find uncongenial to the general mind.

We might go on multiplying indefinitely illustrations of the law here enunciated, but enough has been adduced to show that in a country where one class of men, dilated by tradition and sentiment to a portentous bulk in the general eye, have to act in relation to another class stripped of these fictitious advantages, equal justice cannot prevail, and morality cannot advance until the preponderating inequality is redressed. For the relationship, you will observe, is not between men standing on their attributes of essential man-

hood, but rather between men who, although, like diamonds and charcoal, they are of the same inherent nature, have come to fetch, through rarity, sentiment, or fancy, quite different prices in the market. Instead, therefore, of sitting invoking a lofty morality which will prove as obstinate as the fire invoked by the priests of Baal, let us rather set to work resolutely to bring about those material and social conditions without which it cannot arise. For to this complexion must we come at last, that after calling, like Mahomet, on the mountain, to come to us, and finding it deaf, we must even like him in the end go to the mountain.

This position will be still more firmly established if, with the reader's indulgence, I may venture to cast a hasty glance over the progress of civilization, with the view of exhibiting the way in which *morality* unites with *religion*, *knowledge*, and *material* and *social conditions* to advance or retard it. With this object in view, and to give greater clearness to an otherwise complicated subject, I propose to divide morality into two kinds—the Ideal and the Practical.

All thinkers, whether they be Christian or Comtist, theist, or atheist, transcendentalist or materialist, admit that there is an *ideal* of moral elevation which is the end and goal of society, and to which the efforts of all good men should be directed. This ideal has not as yet been realized by the world, but exists only as a motor principle and bright intuition of the mind. It rises before the imaginations of men like a pillar of fire in the darkness, inciting them to new and higher efforts in the cause of humanity, and cheering them, by hope, as they plough their way through the wilderness of Time. But just as the beauteous flower, though lying latent in the seed, has to await the slow growth and development of root and branch and stem; as the mariner can only reach the haven where his wife and children dwell, by skilfully tacking about and taking advantage of wind and tide; or as a profound thought in legislation must patiently abide the time when the hindrances to its acceptance shall have been cleared away; so the Ideal Morality has to be slowly wrought out of the stubborn materials of the world, and to be reached through a thorny and entangled thicket of physical, organic, and spiritual obstructions. It can only be realized, therefore, in the far-distant future. The reign of peace on earth, for example, is an ideal which all good men seek to forward as well as love to contemplate; but so obstinate hitherto have been the material and social conditions of the world, that after eighteen Christian centuries it has still to be realized. While the tardy *world* thus slowly advances to its goal, in the meantime the souls of

individual men are impatient to enter that ideal kingdom which is theirs by native birthright—to enjoy it, live in it, and conform their lives to it. To enable them thus to anticipate the dilatory movements of the *race*, and, by overleaping the barriers of Time, to realize now and here that ideal world which is the balance and compensation of the stern realities of the actual, is the aim and business of all religions. And although these religions have each in its own way been able to satisfy the aspirations of *individual* men, it is important to observe that they have hastened or retarded the march of the *race* to its final goal, in proportion as the intellectual dogmas in which they have been embodied, have displayed insight into the constitution of the World and Man, and given, in consequence, range and expansion to the movements of the human spirit. For if that Ideal Morality which is the goal of the nations has to be cut through the entanglements of physical, organic, and spiritual laws, it is evident that the religion which exhibits most insight into these laws in their entirety—in their relations, combinations, and subordinations—is best fitted to direct society to the end in view. And thus it is that while some religions have been favourable to mental and moral progress, others have led to mental and moral stagnation. Mahommedanism, for example, after its first outburst of fanaticism had subsided, and its secret structure began to reveal itself, was found to be incapable of expansion, devoid of sympathy, and fatal to material and intellectual advancement. The Koran professed to be not only a spiritual revelation, but a scientific treatise, to close not only the book of inspiration, but the book of knowledge. It accordingly discouraged all attempts of man to discover the order of the world, and thereby to improve the condition of his surroundings; while its central doctrine led him to repose indolently on the decrees of an inexorable Fate. The consequence was that under this belief the human mind stagnated; and as we see at this hour in those nations that are deeply imbued with its spirit, progress, civilization, and morality lie rotting together. The Stoic, too, who longed to realize in himself that Virtue which was the glorious ideal of his mind, found his feet entangled like the rest of us in the meshes of earthly trials and afflictions which he could neither control by insight nor subordinate by power. He attempted accordingly to elevate himself above them by ignoring them, or trampling them with pride and disdain under his feet. But Christ, with a deeper insight and nobler sympathy, perceived that all things worked together for good, and that the end of Nature was not the unlimited gratification (impossible in a limited world) of one small egoism, but a general beneficence. Instead, therefore, of trampling on the

world, He would have us reverence it, sympathise with it, and learn to know its laws; and by a grand act of self-renunciation raise ourselves to that ideal in which He loved to dwell. While Stoicism, then, from its narrowness and imperfect human sympathies, was unable to make headway in a virgin soil, Christianity, by giving free expansion to the mind and heart, was in its essence favourable to progress and civilization. But as it gradually became embedded and lost in the intellectual dogmas of the Catholic Church, although its spirit still continued to operate in softening the cruelties of barbarous warfare, in elevating the position of women, and in keeping society together, its doctrines were found to be hostile to progress, and, in the end, to morality. From the views of the World and Man which these doctrines held in solution, were precipitated by a fatal sureness, as Lecky has so ably shown, religious persecution, witch-burning, hatred of science and the like; and not until these theological dogmas had lost their vital hold on the general mind, did these religious immoralities begin to disappear.

Although different religions are thus capable of raising *individual* men to the highest moral grandeur; and although they have advanced or retarded the progress of the *race* to its ideal goal in proportion as the intellectual dogmas of their respective creeds have been a true or false reading of the laws of the world and man; still, it is impossible that any religion can jump the element of Time, and raise the race at a bound to that Ideal Morality which it foreshadows, until material and social conditions are favourable for it. It seems at first sight a reasonable assumption that if religion has the power to raise one man (in spite of the general state of society around him) to a point of moral elevation where he is superior to fate and death, it has equally the power to raise a million, a nation, a world. But nothing will be found more illusory in fact. For society, be it observed, with its division and co-operation of labour, thought, and industry, is as much an organic whole as an animal or tree; and such is the sympathetic connection of each part with all the rest, that like seed and fruit, head and extremities, no one organ can be monstrously developed without the rest being correspondingly atrophied. And just as the outburst of celibacy and asceticism in the early Christian ages could only arise out of a colossal luxury and dissipation, to which it served as foil and counterpoise; or as in an aristocratic state of society, one class of men cannot be haughty, insolent, and independent, without the other classes being correspondingly cringing, dependent, and submissive; so in the present stage of civilization one body of men cannot have their hearts fixed on the "eternal realities" without the great mass

of the people being absorbed in the temporary passions, interests, efforts, and ideals of the hour. The truth is, the vast majority of men are so steeped in the practical work of the day, that, like the polypus which is said to change its colour with the object to which it adheres, their opinions and sentiments take their tone and character from the occupations in which they are engaged. This subduing of the mind to the element it works in, is the antagonism and compensating check which defeats all attempts to force a hothouse morality on mankind. Crusades there have been, and revivals of religion there will continue to be, but until material and social conditions have been lifted to the plane where the "money-bag of Mammon" ceases to be the idol of the nations, and men in general are no longer only another name for the functions they perform, that high ideal of character and life which is the end of religion and the goal of society can never be realized among the masses of mankind. There is perhaps no more baneful illusion than the quiet and complacent assumption, so extensively prevalent, that if the ideal is not realizable here and now, it ought to be, or might be. This is the secret source from which have issued those wailings over the existence of evil, and those discussions as to its origin, which still haunt the world like evil spirits. This is the source of that disgust with life which characterises those who sit sentimentalizing over the ideal, without putting forth their hands to help the actual. For what right have I to assume that the highest beauty of character and life is to spring full-equipped from the earth like Minerva from the head of Jove? As well expect the aloe-flower to spring in full blossom from its seed by the mere movement of a wand. The secret of the world, so far as we are able to read it, is that all great and enduring results in character and life have to be patiently wrought out *in Time*; and to misapprehend this is not so much a presumption of moral delicacy and refinement, as of poverty and weakness of thought.

I turn now to the consideration of what I have called Practical Morality, by which I mean not the morality which men profess and are willing to subscribe to, but the morality which they actually exhibit in the actions of every-day life. This morality differs from the Ideal Morality of which I have just spoken in this, that whereas the Ideal Morality being native to the human mind, is (when not embodied in creeds) substantially the same in all ages, Practical Morality, on the other hand, varies in different ages and nations, and advances with advancing civilization. If we contrast the actual state of morality in civilized countries at the present time with what it was some centuries ago, a distinct advance is visible. The decline

in war and bloodshed, in cruelty and ferocity, in civil and religious persecution, in gross excitements and sensual indulgences, are all advances in morality. So likewise are the amelioration in manners and social intercourse, in the criminal law, the greater reverence for human life, for women, and for man as man. And in the coming ages we may confidently anticipate a still further advance, in sincerity, sympathy, benevolence, love of truth, and magnanimity. If, then, we arrest this Practical Morality at any stage of its progress, and ask on what it depends, we shall find that it springs from the union and interpenetration of the Ideal with the Possible, of what we should *like* to see realized with what the *material* and *social* conditions of the time will permit. But these material and social conditions, it is to be observed, have as their correlatives on the intellectual side a set of *practical beliefs* which are generated by them, and which image and reflect them. A little experience teaches us that the world in general judges of men and things by the way in which they are *seen* to be related to each other, in spite of all theories drawn from more subtle, recondite, or comprehensive relations. If one man or class of men, for example, are seen to dominate another, the idea at once arises that the one is superior to the other, and if this relation remains constant over a sufficient length of time, the idea is confirmed, and the belief in the inequality of men arises in the mind. When we say, then, that the Practical Morality of a people springs from the union of their Ideal Morality with the material and social conditions of the time, we say, in other words, that it springs from the union of their Ideal Morality with their practical beliefs. But when two causes unite to produce an effect, one of these causes being comparatively constant and the other variable, the effect, although not entirely *dependent* on the variable cause, is said to be *determined* or *limited* by it. The Practical Morality, therefore, of any given time, although not entirely dependent on material and social conditions, may be fairly said to be limited or determined by them. But civilization and morality, as we have seen, are not stagnant, but advance together. There must therefore be some dynamical influence at work to cause the advance—some impetus, initiative, or self-evolved power, which is not the mere reflex of its immediate surroundings. Were it not so, like the lower animals, we should tread the same monotonous round for ever. It becomes interesting, therefore, to inquire, what is the dynamical power that communicates the impulse, sets the ball a-rolling, and initiates a new departure in morality and civilization? The answer will be found again in that Ideal Morality, which is an intuition of the mind, which has many sides, but which will be best

recognized under its well-known forms—the love of Beauty, the love of Right, and the love of Truth. The love of Beauty, although a most important factor in civilization, must be dismissed for the present, as its discussion would lead me too far afield. The love of Right, while always softly active like sunlight, ever and anon bursts forth like a flood of rolling fire when tyranny and oppression are full, blasting and withering; and when the hopes of mankind seem most crushed and forlorn, rising in its majesty to vindicate the infinitude of the soul. But unless reinforced by the reception of some new and regenerating truth into the general mind, its effects are transitory and evanescent, and the startled world, wakened for a moment from its dreams by the bright meteoric splendour, sinks again into sleep and darkness. The love of Truth finds its instruments in these solitary men who impelled by its spirit throw a more comprehensive glance over the field of existence, see things in subtler and wider relations, open up new riches and magnificence in tracts hitherto barren or unexplored, and give a new and deeper interpretation to life. Such men have been the founders of religions and philosophies. Then the old world begins to heave and ferment with the fire new-lit in its inwards, which working outwards from the central heart to the sodden and torpid extremities, gradually transforms and revivifies the whole. These successive religions, however, do not follow one another as complete transformations, like the shifting scenes in a panorama, but glide imperceptibly into each other, each one being blended and interfused with that which has preceded it. Thus, the pure religion of Christ falling on Pagan times, becomes tinged in its ritual with Pagan idolatry, and in its creed with Pagan philosophy. Its simple and homogeneous texture, when stretched on the loom, is swiftly set upon by Greek metaphysicians, Egyptian mystics, Neo-Platonists, Jews, and Orientalists, who interweave it with their subtleties, and dye or stain it with their peculiar superstitions, sentiments, and habits of thought. Learned divines are kept busy in Ecumenical Councils and elsewhere, superintending the selection of fibres and the blending of colours; an emperor occasionally standing by and dictating the particular threads of subtlety which are to be interwoven, while his empress, perhaps, is indulging her preference by choosing the colour which most strikes her fancy. In the meantime, heresies and schisms are falling out here and there—rents in the texture, slits in the seam—which, however, are promptly darned up again; until after infinite effort the vast and variegated web at last issues from the loom, one and indivisible—the omnipotent Catholic Church which overstretches the world. After inwrapping the nations in its all-embracing folds .

during the long sleep of the Middle Ages, it begins again to show signs of disintegration. Grecian subtlety, set free by the Mohammedan conquests, is again at work under the form of Scholasticism, loosening the cohesion of its well-knit texture; heresies follow one another with ever-increasing rapidity; until with the revival of learning, the great Protestant schism splits it through the centre, leaving a yawning gap between its opposing sides. Still the disintegration goes on. Solitary men scattered here and there have already taken to investigating Nature, at first hand, in one or other small section of her vast operations, and are discovering uniformities and laws in phenomena hitherto regarded as capricious or casual. Starting from different points, and working outwards in enlarging circles, they have gradually widened their generalizations, until meeting and combining as Modern Science, they have eaten away the last fibres of the old creed, and gone far in altering the very framework of society itself. But Science herself even, it is to be observed, like the cosmogonies which preceded her, has not been able to preserve her essential purity throughout. Her earliest generalizations were more or less tinged with the metaphysical and theological conceptions of the time in which they arose, and indeed not until quite recently has she succeeded in freeing herself from these impurities. Having at last reduced all the operations of the natural world to one vast uniformity, nothing is now wanted to complete her triumph but that she should animate this dead and unmeaning mechanism with an intelligent and informing Soul.

But what I desire especially to remark is, that while these religions and philosophies are transforming themselves into each other like beautiful cloud-wreaths in the upper air, in the meantime on the solid earth, Practical Morality does, indeed, keep limping after them, but at an immense distance, being chained to the ground by those material and social conditions whose slow advance she must await. Even the triumphant Catholic Church in her palmiest days, with her stern and unchanging creed, and Europe at the mercy of her anathemas, was forced to bend her sublimely unbending front to the state of society around her, and while preaching with matchless eloquence the lofty ideals of purity, virtue, and peace, could only avail in practice to temper the brutalities of an incessant warfare which she could not abate, and to inflict penance and retribution for crimes which she could not restrain. And the more I consider the state of society in the feudal ages, the more I am convinced that the virtues which distinguished it, and which were unknown in ancient times, such as the elevation of women and the sacredness of family life, were more intimately dependent on the

material and social conditions out of which they sprang than on the preaching of the Church.

While the Ideal Morality, then (under the forms of the love of Right and the love of Truth) is the dynamical power, the active force, which keeps the Practical Morality of the world ever advancing, the material and social conditions existing at any given time are the passive agencies which determine its character and limit its rate of progress. In any country, therefore, where the material and social conditions have lagged behind the spirit of enlightened opinion, before morality can advance they must be whipped up into line with it. In most of the countries of Europe, the framework of society has been amended or reconstructed to bring it into harmony with the new intellectual movement, either violently and suddenly by revolution, as in France, or slowly, and as yet only partially, by legislative changes, as in Prussia and other States of the Continent. But in England the enlightened opinion of the nation has far outrun its material and social conditions. With the intellectual illumination of the nineteenth century we still retain the institutions of the fourteenth, and in an age of democracy, perpetuate by law the existence of a privileged and hereditary class. It is true that in so far as our merely political institutions are concerned, we have succeeded without much difficulty in pouring the new wine of democracy into the old bottles of aristocracy, and may feel under the ribs of the old skeleton the beating of a young and vigorous heart. The once preponderant power of the Lords has, as every one knows, gone over to the Commons, and of the Crown to the First Minister of State. Thus far the old political institutions have proved elastic enough to admit of adaptation to the new requirements of the nation. But those material and social conditions on which, as we have seen, the moral and intellectual expansion of the people is so intimately dependent, are still as fixed and immovable as ever. With the object, therefore, of indicating some of the practical bearings of the conclusions reached in this essay, I shall state more definitely what those material and social conditions are, which at the present time stand in the way of the moral and intellectual expansion of the people.

The important *material* condition, then, is that the land of the country is in the possession of some few thousand persons, whose interests, sympathies, sentiments, and traditions are distinct from those of the body of the people. The important *social* condition is the rank and status attached to such possession. From these two great and pregnant facts have followed those pernicious effects on the morals of the people which I have already abundantly shown.

The effects of the former on the material welfare of the people, I may observe in passing, have been equally pernicious, but as they have been so often pointed out, and are now so generally admitted, I shall content myself here with a bare enumeration of them. In the first place, the life charges, mortgages, jointures, and the like, which result from the laws of primogeniture and entail, have so embarrassed the landowners, that at the present time, according to the best authorities, the land is not cultivated to more than one-fifth of its available resources. Secondly, the complications of title, due also to these same laws, make a cheap and efficient system of registration impossible so long as they exist, and thus prevent the land from passing into the hands of those who would cultivate it for profit to its highest capacity. Thirdly, the system of yearly tenancies which prevails throughout the greater part of England enables the landlord, by the power which it puts into his hands, to corrupt and intimidate the electors, and thereby helps to keep the representation of the counties in the hands of the landed interest. And, lastly, the divorce of the people from the soil, drives them into the towns, where, on the least commercial stagnation, they surge over into dangerous and redundant masses of pauperism.

Having seen, then, that the possession of the land by a few thousand persons, and the rank attached to such possession, not only prevent the moral and intellectual expansion of the people, but also stand in the way of their material welfare; having seen, too, that morality cannot advance until these huge inequalities are redressed; the direction in which we are to look for the remedy becomes at once apparent, viz., in the greater equalization of the material and social conditions. By this I do not mean any system of Communism, whereby the goods of this world are to be cut up and apportioned equally among the general population, or the honourable distinctions of merit to be ground down to a dead level of equality. I mean only that all restraints, whether imposed by law or public opinion, which prevent the virtue and talents of men from having a free and equal arena, should be removed, in order that the best men should take the best places, without fear or favour. And the great question, therefore, becomes, how is this to be done?

To begin with, then, we must abolish those hereditary titles which impudently presume to distribute the immortal souls of men at their very birth into a hierarchy of classes, as if they were so many different species of animals, and which would keep them there by law or public sentiment. With this standing insult to the dignity of the human mind no compromise is possible. In a former part of

this essay, while insisting on the radical identity of nature which underlies all the superficial differences in talent, sentiment, and culture, I have willingly admitted the widest range of inequality among men, in facility and power of thought, in force, fineness, and elevation of character. But of all the rough-and-ready methods of finding your hero, this, which snatches up a man, on the ground that he is the possessor of land, is the worst; of all foundations on which to build a fixed and graduated superstructure of inequality, this is the most pernicious and absurd. For consider it for a moment. We first of all support a Church at an immense cost to elevate before our minds those great ideals of virtue, humility, knowledge, industry, which are to be admired and emulated; and to illustrate and enforce these ideals by the example of the good and great in all ages, more especially by the life of Christ himself; and at the same time we make an ideal of a class of men whose position, training, and surroundings must from their very nature breed those qualities both of mind and heart most in antagonism to this teaching. That is to say, we first of all pay one class of men to preach one set of ideals, and then we set on a pedestal another class to preach by their example the opposite. For has not the noble lord become a very proverb for indolence, pride, and incapacity? Does he not indeed frankly admit the imputation, and complacently regard it as a part of his native birthright and prerogative? And yet, on looking around to find who of all men is to be regarded as the best, and therefore to be most admired, imitated, and revered, he is the person selected. As a nation we have been praised for our courage, and justly so, but consider the number of human souls who must have sold that brightest jewel of the mind—its dignity and independence of thought—before such an anomaly, such a total inversion of reason and nature, could have become an accomplished fact. Notwithstanding its absurdity and immorality, however, I feel as I write how hollow will be the echo of these words in the minds of those who have been taught to regard the aristocracy and their attributes as the bright and particular excellence of the world; and I know well that even did this privileged order radiate immorality as a pestilence, all preaching of mine or another's were a vain and shallow mockery, so long as the concentrated material power on which it is based and by which it maintains and perpetuates itself, remains. For this material power is after all the secret cause of that admiration of the attributes of the aristocracy which I have already shown to be so hostile to the higher forms of morality. Just imagine for a moment the nobility shorn of their material possessions, and reduced by poverty, for, say, a generation,

to the necessity of earning a thin and precarious subsistence by honest manual labour. Where then would be their ranks, their titles, and their pedigrees? and who of all the men in these islands would be found to admit, or tolerate for a moment, that such flimsy appendages as these, which are now the criteria of excellence, should confer on their possessor any right to superiority over the rest of mankind? It becomes evident, therefore, that in beginning by abolishing hereditary titles, we are beginning at the wrong end. We must commence lower down—in the reform of those material conditions which have kept the aristocracy on their pedestals in spite of gravitation—if there is to be any hope of success for the cause of moral and intellectual advancement among the masses of the people. This leads me naturally to the question of the present tenure of land.

Now it is important at the outset to remark that whatever ideal of society we may have in view, and however clearly we may see the action and reaction of thought and circumstance that lead to it, or the obstructions that lie in its way, it is idle to seek to realize more than the few steps that lie immediately before us, and for which the existing state of society is prepared. Indeed, after devoting so much space to showing the intimate dependence of moral and intellectual expansion on material and social conditions, I should be blind to my own principles did I not perceive that in practice all agitation for the immediate realization of remote and uncertain ideals, is a dissipation of energy, a loss of power, a weakening of the cause, a utopia, a dream. For while it is right and necessary that we should illustrate and enforce our principles (as an inter-related web of moral and intellectual truths) with all the power of which we are capable, it is equally necessary when we come to act, that we should concentrate our energies on those immediately practical objects which are within our reach, and which lie along the line of our advance. And having seen that not only the material, but also the moral and intellectual expansion of the nation, awaits the greater equalization of its material and social conditions, we must leave it to public opinion to determine how far the nation is prepared to go in the direction indicated, and which of the many schemes for the reform of the land laws it deems most practicable. But if I may venture my own private opinion, I should say that if we succeeded in abolishing the laws of entail and primogeniture, in securing a cheap and efficient system of registration, and in protecting the tenant from the political domination of the landlord, by a greater fixity and security of tenure, we should have done all that is at present practicable. These objects are the least revolutionary

in character, compatible with the public good, and least interfere with existing interests, hopes, and calculations. They make "free trade in land" possible, and only carry out a step further that principle of "freedom of contract" which is so universally recognized, but which is impossible in transactions where one of the parties has his hands tied by restrictions made before his birth. And moreover, the experience of continental countries would seem to prove that measures to effect these objects would in time break up the great estates, and admit of a class of peasant proprietors, the benefits of which to the community (when in due proportion to the larger owners) is now generally recognized, and the arguments against which it would be thrice slaying the slain to refute. And yet if I am right in my firm conviction, that all this fine zeal of the landlords as to the benefits of scientific agriculture, the advantage to the community of large over small farms and the like, is only a symptom of their real anxiety and fear for the loss of that which they so dearly prize, but which I regard as so baneful, viz., their social domination, I shall not be overbold in predicting that the abolition of the laws by which their supremacy as a class is maintained, is sure to be followed by a determination—say rather a point of honour more feared than any law—not to sell an acre; and thus the ends we have in view would be frustrated. For to attempt to pass a law which would compel them to clear off their mortgages by selling their estates, would, I believe, in the present state of public opinion, be hopeless. Practical experience, however, of the effects of the above alteration in the land laws would doubtless prepare the way for further and more radical changes. But in the meantime we must be content to wait, for the world is so round, and things in it so checked and balanced, that not the gods themselves can push it a step further than the conditions of life and the state of opinion will allow, without the risk of dangerous recoil. Like indigent lovers, therefore, whose circumstances will not permit them to marry, we must leave to the future our hopes and the consummation of our ideal.

Various other schemes have been suggested more radical in character than the ones above proposed, but all labouring under the one objection that they are at present impracticable. The idea of nationalizing the land, for example, although with much to be said in its favour, is too novel, too untried, too remote from existing methods to warrant any practical statesman in entertaining it. It takes too long a stride at once, without those intermediate links of practical experience binding it to the old, to make it possible for ordinary men to calculate its effects on their own private interests. The idea, too, of restricting the possession of land by any individual

to a given number of acres, although admitting a greater number of persons to a direct interest in the soil, and helping to break the overweening influence attached to its possession, is too arbitrary, hard, and unnatural to commend itself to the general public. In the present stage of civilization the institution of private property, like the institution of marriage, would seem to afford the best practical security for moral as well as national progress. And just as in the human body the mind can only carry on its functions when it can rely on the continued action of the heart and other vital organs, and these organs again when they are supported and kept in position by a fixed and unyielding skeleton; so the principle of private property furnishes that firm and solid basis on which a man can stand and act—a basis depending on his own will and not on the shifting quicksands of another's—which gives the security necessary to moral and intellectual advancement.

Accompanying these changes in the material conditions of the people, I long to see a grand system of National Education, free to every child born in this land, with broad avenues opening out of it to the highest arenas of life, where no distinctions are known but those of ability and virtue, and where each man may feel that his destiny has no bounds but his own exertions. The present Board Schools I hail with delight as a first instalment, but they have still far to go before they can realize their just ideal. They are hampered and hamstrung on all sides, not only by sectarianism and bigotry, but also by the torpid indifference of parents. And, indeed, nothing more clearly demonstrates the fatal blight which aristocracy has cast over human thought and aspiration than this indifference shown to education by the lower classes. The parents would willingly make any sacrifice, I am persuaded, for the education of their children, did they believe that thereby they would make them what are called "gentlemen." But the secret conviction that while poverty awaits them, the scintilla of knowledge they receive will not avail to advance them in the social scale, or open up to them other than a life of ineffectual toil; the sense that they will not be able to prosecute their studies to any practical issue, and that this "broad avenue will only end in a squirrel-track and run up a tree," prevents them from co-operating with any enthusiasm in the efforts made for their amelioration. So fatal is social tyranny, long after personal liberty and political freedom have been secured! What is wanted therefore is social freedom and equality, so that all men, by virtue of a common nature, may alike lift their minds to the highest aims and aspirations. Then only will high and equal justice be possible; then only will each man feel that he has a chance to expand to his full bulk and stature. Then no longer will

what are called the lower orders have to struggle in the stream with bladders to their feet, a spectacle to gods and men, but in the dignity of conscious manhood will walk erect as equals and brothers. Then, too, will every base and jaded life, kept now on a pinnacle perchance by monopoly, prescription, or privilege, be left to the natural law of gravitation, and equally with the meanest low-born wretch submit to the kicks and scorn of all the good. Then, socially as well as materially, a pound will weigh a pound throughout the universe, and men will choose their ideals from the character and life, and not from power, position, or birth. Then, too, will cease the preaching of that stale morality which instead of opening up a bright emancipation of mind and heart to the domestic, the working-man, and the slave, would, under the cunning guise of enforcing the unquestioned virtue of "doing our duty in the station of life to which God has called us," still further perpetuate their degradation, and which after twenty centuries of preaching has done less for the reverence of the good, the beautiful, and the true, than those self-reliant workers who, pushing forward the ark of God through the darkness, have made their own morality (which in the exact compensations of the universe is sure to be balked, if not good), and have given us the arts and sciences, the literatures and philosophies, and all the graces and amenities of life.

Above all, then, let Education be our watchword; education for childhood, for youth, and for manhood, but more than all the education which equips men and women for entering on the troubled sea of life. Not the education of the hackneyed novelist with his everlasting turns of the kalcidoscope which he fondly calls his "pictures of human life;" not the education of the metaphysician with his endless sections and sub-sections of the human mind which he takes apart and puts together again like a Chinese puzzle, but which have no life in them, and which can never issue in a living human motive; not the education of the materialist with his gross idolatry of apes and frog-spawn, and his satyr-like passion for groping at the roots of human life in the hope of accounting for its immortal beauties; but the education which by patient industry discovers the true laws of the world—physical, organic, and spiritual—which laws, when drawn out singly in threads from the web and confusion in which they lie, sink into the mind and heart, and produce their natural fruits in the character and life, and when combined, constitute a practical creed and religion, the symbol and expression of that Divine Reality which the inward eye alone can see.

JOHN BEATTIE CROZIER.

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE NATIVE ARMY.

THE war in Afghanistan has revealed anew the urgency of a speedy reconstruction of the Native Army of India, and I propose in the following pages to indicate generally the shape, as I conceive it, which that reconstruction ought to take. In subsequent articles I hope to be able to deal more particularly with matters of detail. Before, however, I discuss the reconstruction of the Native Army, there is a popular delusion as to the extent of our Indian military resources on which I desire to make a few remarks. Of all the fireworks let off by the late Government, the most successful, for the time, was the bringing of 7,000 Sepoys to Malta. Mr. Forster, referring to it, said that Lord Beaconsfield had shown to Europe that the British Empire was not only the greatest naval Power in the world, but also one of the greatest military Powers. And that this opinion of Mr. Forster was largely prevalent at the time was shown in a variety of ways. Numerous articles appeared in the magazines discussing the morality of making use of Oriental mercenaries in an European war, but no one questioned the practicability of turning India into a recruiting ground, whence we could draw armies to rival in point of numbers those of the great Powers of the Continent. And there is no reason to believe that this belief has departed. But it is a delusion, as I think I can easily show. I will assume that the Natives of India will have no objection to be torn from their homes in order to perish in European wars with which they have no concern, although, as a matter of fact, I am convinced that the prospect of such a fate would bring recruiting to a complete stop. But as others may be of a different opinion, I will not insist upon this preliminary difficulty.

The entire strength of our Native Army is about 120,000 men, and it has no reserves of any kind. Of this army, not more than 30,000 men could with safety be abstracted from their proper duty of maintaining order in India, for active service in Europe. Fully one-half of these 30,000 men would be quite unequal to the task

of coping with the disciplined troops of any of the great Continental Powers, and, quite apart from the enormous cost incurred in the transporting of these Indian auxiliaries to the scene of action, there can be no question that 10,000 English soldiers would be of more value than the 30,000 Natives. Could we have conquered India, could we retain our supremacy there for a single day, unless the Englishman was a better soldier than the native of India? I say this from no desire to unduly exalt the British soldier. So far as personal courage is concerned, the native of India is not one whit inferior, but he lacks the endurance, the cohesiveness, the indomitable hopefulness of the British soldier. He submits to what he would call "fate," when the Britisher would either vanquish "fate" or die fighting against it to the last. "Not once or twice in our rough island story" has this indomitable hopefulness wrested triumph from the very jaws of despair.

The people, however, who regard India as an enormous recruiting ground, are not thinking of a paltry army corps of 30,000 men, but of hundreds of thousands of men—armies, in short, such as Germany, Russia, or France can bring into the field in the course of a few days. It shows our profound ignorance of military matters, that people should imagine that armies of this magnitude can be, as it were, improvised at a moment's notice. Suppose we desired to raise 100,000 Sepoys for active service in Europe, where should we find officers for such a multitude of new troops. It would be worse than useless to entrust them to the leading of Englishmen unacquainted with their language, their character, and their habits. It would be absolutely impossible to find Natives capable of commanding them at all. But, assuming these difficulties to have been overcome, we are confronted by others still more formidable. Are these troops to be raised after the outbreak of a war, or are they to be kept up as a standing army? If the former, the experience of the Franco-German War proves decisively that raw levies have no chance against seasoned troops. They are unused to act together, they do not know their officers, they are unskilled in the use of their weapons, and they suffer grievously from defects in equipment and organization, inevitable from the haste in which they were embodied. What hope would there be for hastily raised levies of Native soldiers confronted by disciplined French, Russian, or German soldiers? Absolutely none. We are, therefore, compelled to fall back on the alternative of maintaining them as a force permanently embodied. Who in that case is to pay the cost? Seeing that they are embodied for Imperial purposes, the expenses ought to be defrayed by the British taxpayer; and it is quite certain that by no ingenuity in applying

the screw could the money be obtained from the Indian ryot. Moreover, with a permanent Native Army of this magnitude, we should be compelled to garrison India with a proportionately larger English army in order to keep it in order, the cost of which also would have to be charged to the British Exchequer. Lastly, it is impossible to imagine a greater danger to the peace of our Indian Empire than the return of this vast Native Army of ours, flushed with success over an European enemy, and confident in its invincibility, unless it be the return of the wrecks of such an army, after a great disaster, to spread throughout the empire the tidings of the fall of the British *raj*. No; except for some trifling service, such as the Abyssinian Campaign, or a war with China, our Indian Army can never be more than a garrison to preserve order in India. Lord Beaconsfield's 7,000 Sepoys deceived a good many Englishmen who knew nothing about military matters, but they could only have excited the laughter and contempt of the Russian generals. They were the equivalent of those painted monsters with which the Chinese endeavour to strike terror into their enemies.

The experiences of the great Mutiny have left many valuable lessons behind them, but we have refused to avail ourselves of them. Our present Native Army was brought together in the most accidental manner. The need for men was imperative, and one regiment after another was embodied in hot haste, and sent off to take part in fighting. The object aimed at was not to organize an army, but to mass a number of men with arms in their hands at certain menaced points. The case of the French during the recent war furnishes a rather apt parallel. Worth, Sedan, and Metz deprived them of the whole of their standing army; and they had to improvise a new one in the face of overwhelming disasters and a pitiless enemy. There is not a brighter page in military history than that which records the gallant resistance offered by their young recruits to the trained soldiery of Germany. Military critics in England have never done justice to the campaign of *Faïdeherbes* in the north of France, and the retreat of Chanzy from Orleans to Le Mans, the most brilliant feat of generalship of the whole war. Still, notwithstanding their undoubted gallantry, we should have deemed it the height of folly if, instead of profiting by the lessons of the war, if, instead of searching out and removing every defect which discovered itself, if, instead of reorganizing the entire military administration, the Government of M. Thiers had simply taken as they were the huge masses of men which the marvellous energy of M. Gambetta had collected together, and said, "This shall be our national army for the future." Yet this is precisely what we have done in India. Our old standing army

suddenly broke up and crumbled into fragments before our eyes, and we had to improvise a new one in the face of a struggle for life or death. When the struggle at length ceased, there were a certain number of men scattered over the country, and duly numbered into regiments. They represented the patched up, amorphous, utterly unmanageable sort of thing which was the nearest approach to a properly organized force that extreme haste and dangle allowed us to produce. They have, however, contrived to get themselves called "the Native Army," and succeeded in attracting, in considerable force, the fetish-like feeling wherewith we regard any institution which exists. Reformation becomes every day more and more needful, and every day more and more difficult.

There is, however, a tendency in civil affairs to which, sooner or later, the army will have to conform itself, but which also might with great advantage be carried out at once. We mean the centrifugal tendency, to which the decentralization scheme of Lord Mayo gave so powerful a momentum. If we retain our hold upon India, this tendency will, we cannot doubt, break up this continent into a federation of States such as prevails in the Canadian Dominion and the United States. Provincial taxation will lead to provincial representative government, and gradually to the development and definition of what may be termed the peculiar idiosyncrasy of each federated State. Now there was no fact more clearly established by the experience of the Mutiny than the advantage of such decentralization in the constitution of the army. The mass of the Bombay Army was recruited in the same districts as that of Bengal, and this was shown by the sympathetic thrill of mutiny which passed through its ranks, exhibiting itself here and there in overt action. But, just because it was a Bombay Army, with a history and tradition of its own, the very antagonism of this position placed it above the infection of a mutiny generated in Bengal. In the Punjab, where the Punjab regiments had no sympathy whatever with the mutineers, their loyalty to Government was complete and enthusiastic; while in Madras, curiously enough, the spirit of sedition, though not so strong as in Bombay, was stronger than in the Punjab, precisely as it ought to have been, looking at their respective relations with the mutineers.

These facts appear to indicate incontestably that if in the future we wish to diminish the area of mutiny, we must do so by means of provincial *corps d'armée*. Setting aside Madras and Bombay, of which the present writer does not know sufficiently to speak with advantage, there might be, for Bengal alone, three or four *corps d'armée*—the Punjab, the North-west Provinces and Oudh, Central

India, and Bengal and Behar. The Punjab force would consist exclusively of Punjabees; the Central Indian mainly of Boondeelas, and in the North-west Provinces, of Jhats, Rajpoots, and the inhabitants of Oudh. If the Bengalee could be induced to enter the service, I know of no discipline so calculated to correct that effeminacy of mind and body which, in spite of his English education, keeps the Englishman further apart from the Bengalee than from the manly and vigorous-minded inhabitants of the more northern provinces. The *corps d'armée* of two or more provinces should be brought together from time to time at some frontier station, and exercised in camps of instruction.

The advantages of such a system will, I think, be at once recognized by most military readers. It was abundantly proved in 1857 that difference of religion and birthplace were of very little avail against the feeling of unity which is excited by serving in the same regiment. Hindus and Mohammedans were quite at one on the question of mutiny. In the same way, it is quite melancholy to see the change which comes over the rough-and-ready Punjabee by a lengthened sojourn in the more southern parts of the Presidency. There is a fascination about Hindu rites and customs which the Oriental finds it impossible to resist. Even a Khalsa Sikh will be found to assume, after a time, an attitude of marked respect towards Brahmins, and to entertain the most delicate scruples on the subject of caste. Yet on the preservation of these national traits depends our main chance of circumscribing the area of any political disturbance; and they oppose the most effectual hindrance to the entire country sinking back into the unprogressive and nerveless monotony of Hinduism. The first and best effect, then, of army corps would be the preservation of national characteristics, acting as non-conductors, to check the propagation of disaffection from one part of the army to another. This was the policy adopted by Akbar, Shahjehan, and Aurungzebe. Their Rajpoots and Mohammedans formed always two separate armies under their national chiefs, and the rivalry thus engendered not only hindered any joint attack upon the state, but elicited a greater valour and hardihood when fighting in a common cause. There can be no doubt that provincial armies would be extremely popular with the Native soldier; and it would also enable us gradually to replace a mercenary by a national force, rooted, so to speak, in the soil of the country.

This can be effected in one way only. We must throw open the army to the gentry of India; and we can render it attractive to them only by improving the status of the Native officer, by increasing

both the emoluments and the authority belonging to his position, and elevating him more nearly to a level with ourselves. But before I attempt to point out the best means for effecting this, it will be necessary to meet certain objections which will be urged against such a proposal, carried out in any form whatever. These objections fall under two heads. The first is, that the morality of the Hindustanee is so lax, that it is an injustice and a cruel wrong to our subjects, civil or military, to invest him with one degree of power more than is absolutely necessary for carrying on the general administration. The second is, that the fidelity of the Native soldier is so extremely doubtful, that to give any increase of authority to the Native officer is almost equivalent to signing our own death-warrant. It is plain that unless I can show these objections, which cut at the very root of the proposition, to be without force, the proposition itself must fall to the ground. A national army and a foreign Government must be given up as incapable of combination.

The idea that the moral obliquity of the Hindustanee is so great that he cannot be used as a functionary under our righteous and equitable Government, was implanted in the Anglo-Indian mind by Lord Cornwallis. He endeavoured to give it practical expression, and made so clean a sweep of Native agency, that in rural districts the settlement officer was supposed to supervise and keep an account of the amount of oil burned in such temples as were under the charge of the British Government. Each successive race of Anglo-Indians has clung to this notion, and resisted, on the most philanthropic grounds, any extension of Native authority. But granting the moral obliquity (which, however, I am very far from doing), of what avail has all this been? Mrs. Partington's broom was hardly more impotent when opposed to the spring tide of the Atlantic. At this moment a Native judge sits on the bench of the High Court in Calcutta; almost the entire original jurisdiction of the country is discharged by Native officials; the constant shifting of Civil officers from one district to another must increase, to an indefinite and enormous extent, the power of their Native subordinates; the detection and reporting of crime depends entirely upon a rural police, virtually independent of European supervision; the collection of our taxes is in the hands of Native assessors; the sanitation and improvement of many of our largest cities is under municipalities, composed altogether of Natives; in the Punjab and elsewhere Native gentlemen are invested with powers similar to those of county magistrates at home; and, in fact, the entire detail of the executive is in Native hands. The channel of communication

between us and the mass of the people is a Native one. The happiness and well-being of the country depend as much—if not more—upon the behaviour and character of the Native subordinate as upon that of his European superior. It is the same in a Native regiment. Whatever may be the European officer's private opinion of the Hindustanee, he must treat the Native officer as an honourable man. He must always be, to a very great extent, dependent on the Native officer's knowledge of the men, in his distribution of rewards and punishments. The Native officer can control the individual fortunes of the men under him far more effectually than any of his European superiors. The first objection, then, which we urge against those who, on the ground of moral obliquity, would limit the authority of the Native official, is, that we cannot do so. A handful of Englishmen cannot govern directly 200,000,000 of men, with whom, moreover, from differences of language, differences of creed, manners, and mode of thought, they hardly ever come into personal contact, and never have any genuine intercommunion of mind. We must depend upon officials selected from among the people, and the only point at issue is the manner of selection.

Hitherto we have selected them, as it were, under protest. Whenever one of the fallen race has been permitted to enter the paradise of officialism, we have carefully explained to him that he was an inferior creature, who, if things were only as they ought to be, would never have found himself in such an exalted sphere. The ladder of promotion has been grudgingly uncovered for him, step by step. His privileges as a vertebrate animal have been meted out to him inch by inch, commencing with the first grand concession of allowing him a chair when basking in the sunshine of our august presence. This mode of selection has been productive of evil in a variety of ways. It has condemned the aristocracy of India to a most unjust and impolitic exclusion from any participation in the administration of the empire. It attracted to our service only the lowest classes, deadened their sense of responsibility, as well as any feelings of gratitude, and, until within the last twenty years, spread over the country a swarm of underpaid, unscrupulous Native officials, to tyrannise and prey upon the people. It has contributed immensely to the alienation which divides the conqueror from the conquered. It has fostered the very soul of Junkerism in ourselves, and inflicted a never-ceasing wound on the self-respect of our fellow-subjects. Yet, even under all these disadvantages, it is pleasant to think of the increasing stability which our Government gathers from every fresh influx into its ranks of Native officials. If a mutiny broke out to-morrow, or an army of Russians was reported to have

appeared upon the Indus, whom should we suspect of being our ill-wishers? The Native judge of the High Court? The young men who have competed successfully for the Civil Service? The crowd of Munsiffs and other Civil officials, who have a career before them in the public service? Assuredly none of these. We should look for them in the high-born and ambitious men, our *régime* has excluded alike from occupation in the present, or the hope of any in the future. What, then, my proposal amounts to is to extend to the Native Army that same policy of *Trust* which is rapidly effecting a complete transformation in the constitution of the Civil Service. Granted (which I do not) that the fidelity of the Native officer is of extremely brittle quality, you strengthen, and not weaken, it when you improve his position and give a wider field to his legitimate ambition.* You make it worth his while to be faithful.

There are only two ways of governing a conquered country. You may adopt the policy of absolute suppression, and so long as you can keep your victim pinned to the earth at the point of the bayonet, you are safe enough. But we have not adopted this policy; we have preached the gospel of equality to our Indian subjects in season and out of season; we have acted upon it to an extent which makes retrogression impossible now; and there is no safe standing-point between absolute suppression and absolute equality. The last is the goal to which we tend, and it certainly seems to me clear enough that every measure which associates the people more intimately with the Government, which makes the interest of the individual and his loyalty to the State more completely identical, must diminish *pro tanto* the probability of rebellion.

And then, with regard to the lax morality and oppressive propensities of the Hindustanee. These are, of course, very much to be regretted, but we must remember they are not the sole and exclusive possession of the Hindustanee. I confess to have seen a great many Englishmen in almost every profession of life whom I would cheerfully back in both these particulars against any Hindustanee that could be produced. But what is more to the point is—that we cannot conduct the business of the empire, either military or civil, without the help of these same immoral and oppressive Hindustanees. We must make use of them, however much, theoretically, we might prefer to do without them. And certainly there is no way better calculated to keep a man immoral and oppressive than to persist, either practically or verbally, in assuring him that he is so. We do not expect slaves to be remarkable for independence of mind, or the subjects of a despot to exhibit the self-reliance of the citizens of a free state. In the world of morality it is that the saying is specially

true, "to him that hath shall be given;" and if we declare beforehand that a Native officer shall get no more authority because he is immoral and oppressive, we simply condemn him to remain in that state for ever. Here, then, is my answer to the first objection. Granting that the moral obliquity of the Native officer is as great as you represent it to be, he holds at this very moment the power which you would attempt to withhold from him. But he holds it in an irresponsible way—the surest way to tempt him to use it badly. My proposal simply amounts to this—to confer upon the Native officer a status socially and pecuniarily equivalent to the power he possesses. Such a change in his position is the strongest guarantee we can have that he will use his power in support of the Government, because it attaches him to that Government both by his interest and gratitude in the firmest manner possible.

I have now to consider the fidelity of the Native soldier, and whether that is likely to be imperilled by improving the condition of the Native officer. I have, to a certain extent, anticipated the answer in the foregoing remarks; but there is a great deal more to be said on the subject, and, if I am not mistaken, the consideration of probable objections will enable me to bring forward some very strong arguments in favour of my proposal. That proposal, though it would of course have to be carried out gradually and with extreme caution, involves a radical change in the constitution of the Native Army—a change, as I believe, which would reduce to a minimum the probability of insurrection.

Hitherto the events of 1857 have been adduced as an unanswerable argument against any one who ventured to express any confidence in the fidelity of the Native soldier. But twenty-five years have now elapsed since that time, and it is perhaps possible to pass a dispassionate opinion upon them, without being held up to public execration as a *white Pandey*. There are two sides to that question as to every other. For some time before the Mutiny, the steady centralizing of the military administration had destroyed the old regimental system, or rather converted the Native Army into one vast regiment, with the Commander-in-Chief as colonel, the Adjutant-General as his adjutant, and all other ranks reduced indiscriminately to the power and authority of ensigns just landed in the country. This, I maintain, is no exaggeration. The central authority in those days did not so much as support the verdicts of military courts, but continually, on the most trifling pretexts, reversed them. By this system, the ties that should have united the officers to their men were completely severed, while no substitute could be called into existence by the relations of the men with an

invisible Commander-in-Chief and his staff. Discipline had ceased to exist in the Native Army long before 1857, although the fact became generally apparent only then. At this very time, moreover, the annexation policy of Lord Dalhousie, the settlement operations of Mr. Bird, which dealt so harshly, unwisely, and unjustly with the Talookdars of the North-west, the long discussion on the rights to pension of the notorious Nana, had spread a feeling of unrest and perplexed discontent throughout the country. In those days, as most of us remember, the suspicion that the English Government meditated a forcible conversion to Christianity of the entire country, was much more readily kindled than is the case now. A policy whose consistent end and endeavour appeared to be the obliteration of all the remaining traces of Hindu or Mohammedan supremacy, that trampled ruthlessly on all the aristocratic sensibilities of its subjects, that clutched with a seemingly insatiable greed at every square rood of territory that came within its grasp, that seemed eager to reduce all classes to a dead level of nothingness, awoke into active life these slumbering suspicions. There can be little doubt that they were diligently fostered by those who had good cause to resent Lord Dalhousie's pitiless and grinding policy; and when, finally, a cart-ridge was issued which, in popular belief, was held to be so ingeniously concocted as to destroy equally the heavenly hopes of Hindu and Mussulman, the measure of our mistakes was full. There was not, as M. Thiers would say, one single error left for us to commit.

But even then it is a mistake to suppose that the whole Native Army—or nearly the whole—had made up their minds to mutiny. Far from it; but we drove them into it. Our suspicions—reasonable enough, no doubt—left them no other course. A Native soldier in those days who should have been ingenuous enough to profess his loyalty to Government, would have been deemed a detected traitor on the ground simply of such a preposterous declaration, by the most judicial minded man. The life of the Sepoy who had not mutinied was in constant danger. He was disarmed; he was, whenever possible, placed under the fire of several guns, with cavalry and infantry drawn up behind them to help in cutting him into pieces, if he exhibited any symptoms of uneasiness. Let any Englishman place himself in the position of a disarmed Sepoy at Meean Meer or Peshawur, and we have no hesitation in saying that he would prefer to have fought as a mutineer at Delhi, to enduring the long suspense and bitterness of a life in one of those standing camps. In a word, the Mutiny of 1857 does not show that there is no fidelity in the Native soldier; but only that it is possible to bring

together a number of influences the combined strength of which may overcome his natural fidelity.

There is, however, one fact to be gathered from the Mutiny which tells strongly in favour of my proposal. The greatest difficulty with which the English officers had to contend when the destiny of their regiments still, as it were, quivered in the balance, was their entire ignorance of the feelings of the men. Until they had actually broken out into open mutiny, no one could form any idea of their intentions. The Native officers, who were intended to be the channel of communication between the English officer and his men, proved to be in practice the most perfect non-conductors conceivable. The reason of this is obvious. A Native officer of our old regiments was simply a decrepit old private, who, in virtue of his long service, drew larger pay and was permitted to sit down in the presence of his English superior. His sympathies were all with the ranks from which he had only nominally been elevated. He flung in his lot with theirs because, except in the matter of pay, he had never ceased to be one of them, and because the advantages of his position were not a sufficient deterrent to hinder him from doing so. Increase the pay of the Native officer; give some scope to his ambition; make him feel that he is a trusted servant of the Supreme Government, and not a private soldier blessed with a little exceptional good fortune; engage, in short, his *interest* strongly upon the side of order, and you supply that deterrent which to our cost we found wanting in 1857.

A still stronger argument in favour of this change is to be found in the general tendency of our civil administration. Every year sees a civil career placed within the reach of a larger proportion of the Native population. Trade, commerce, works of irrigation, facilities of transit, place the acquisition of a competence, and even of wealth, before the eyes of every class of our subjects except those who serve in our armies; while at the same time the continuous rise of prices renders the military service increasingly unpopular. All these things, unless met with a counterpoise, will operate towards two different, but almost equally dangerous, consequences. On the one hand, the exclusion from a military career, and the consequent quenching of warlike ambitions and discouragement of manly pursuits, have already engendered throughout British India a certain effeminacy of disposition which deteriorates the character far more than anything we can supply does to elevate it. In the Punjab, for example, and our Trans-Indus frontier, it is sad to see how the free, manly, and courageous character of the people is rapidly sapping away under the enervating effects of our paternal rule. The soldier-

chieftains of the old time are everywhere giving way to money-lending banias, the most contemptible type of humanity to be found in the world. On the other hand, the army is more and more replenished by rude and ignorant recruits from beyond our frontier, or from inaccessible regions within it, to whose ingenuous minds seven rupees a month appears a perfect *El Dorado*. The whole army, Native officers as well as privates, will in a few years consist of such recruits—a state of things precisely similar to that which existed in the latter days of the Roman Empire. There, as here, the spread of luxury had rendered military service distasteful to the people, and devolved upon Goths, Huns, and Avars the duties of defence. Such protectors of the fold naturally fell to slaughtering the sheep, whenever they felt so disposed. This danger for us is, however, still in a distant futuro, and if in the meantime we can attract into our armies the gentlemen and aristocracy of India—men with whom the love of a military life will compensate for the smaller pecuniary gain—it will be altogether averted. The army will become, by slow but sure degrees, a national force rooted in the soil, and not a military caste existing on it, but not of it.

Lastly, all that we know of the previous history of India is eminently in favour of this policy. It is startling to contrast the manner in which the chivalry of Hindustan served their Mohammedan conquerors, and the manner in which our Sepoys served us. Mahmoud of Ghuznee comes down into Hindustan some twelve or thirteen times, carrying fire and sword in every direction, profaning and destroying every sacred edifice he can get at—carrying off enormous quantities of wealth and thousands of captives—and regards India simply as a preserve in which the Mohammedan may gratify his love of plunder and his love of fighting. Nevertheless, his son Musasood has no difficulty in obtaining from this ravaged country armies of devoted Rajpoots, who, under their ancestral chiefs, cross the Indus, march through Afghanistan, and, in the regions of Khorasan, beyond Herat, repel again and again the incursions of the Seljuks. Under the Mogul sovereigns the Rajpoot chivalry were the main bulwarks of the throne, and never deviated from this loyalty until driven to do so by the persecuting policy of Aurungzebe. It cost us, on the other hand, a mortal effort to get our Sepoys across the Indus. A regiment, a few years ago, broke into open mutiny because it was ordered to the Straits; and we should find it absolutely impossible to do what Aurungzebe held to be the easiest thing in the world—to keep for sixteen years a Rajpoot chieftain and some thousands of his followers on military duty in the passes of the Hindu Kush overlooking Balkh. Whence this

extraordinary difference? There is only one answer. The Mogul Emperors adopted heartily and completely the policy of *trust*; we have chosen that of *suspicion*. They drew no distinction between conquerors and conquered; we have acted as though the two were creatures different in *kind*. The consequence was that Akbar's greatest generals and most devoted adherents were the men his grandfather had conquered; whereas we, at the close of a hundred years and at a time of extremo peril, could hardly find a Native officer to afford us the smallest assistance. Lastly, when Aurungzeb departed from this noble and equitable policy, when he commenced to distrust and persecute the conquered race, they turned upon him, and his power fell to pieces as speedily almost as it had arisen.

The Hindustanee, in fact, is a man amenable to precisely the same motives as other men, and the sooner we recognize that fact the better. If we had an army of Englishmen at home officered entirely by Frenchmen, the rank and file of which were excluded from any rank above that of sergeant-major, we should not expect them to be enthusiastically devoted to the State. We should consider such an organization a piece of sheer madness, and a continual menace to the public safety. Yet in India we prepare a mine of precisely these materials, and, sitting down calmly upon it, declare that in no other way can we obtain any chance of security. At last it explodes with the most disastrous consequences. We are amazed; and after due deliberation, prepare another mine exactly the same in every respect, and declare once more that in this way, and in this way only, is there any hope of the stability of British rule in India.

Lastly, we come to the officering of the Native regiments, and the mode whereby we propose to acquire for the Native officer that larger career which he may justly demand at the hands of the English Government. The first difficulty which confronts us is the extreme reluctance which the European feels to any combination of circumstances which might place him in a position of subordination to the Native. It is idle to say that such a feeling ought not to exist, or that Government is concerned with the public good and not with the unreasonable sensibilities of individuals. In providing for the public good, individual sensibilities are invariably a most important element in the problem, and to ignore them when they are so keen as in the present instance, would be to insure public disaster rather than public good. Government must make use of such materials as it possesses, and legislate accordingly,—not according to some ideal standard of what those materials *ought* to be. The difficulty, however, though great, is by no means an insuperable one. We would officer the Native regiments generally with

the same number of European officers as are provided at present; but attached to each brigade, there should also be one regiment containing only two European officers, a Commandant and a second in command, who should also perform the duties of Adjutant. All the other grades should be filled up by Native officers, on pay befitting their advanced rank. There would, perhaps, be five or six such regiments in each provincial army. In the first instance, these higher appointments should be filled by the most deserving Native officers in the army as at present constituted; but it should be laid down that for the future no Native officers should be promoted to these grades without a knowledge of English, and having passed the examination incumbent upon European officers in receipt of staff pay. All Native officers should, in fact, be permitted and encouraged to pass the examinations laid down for the English officer, and be held entitled, when successful, to the same pecuniary rewards. Few who are acquainted with the Native character will doubt that they would eagerly avail themselves of such opportunities. And we entreat our readers not to run away with the idea that these standards of merit would result in inundating the army with the ubiquitous Bengalee Baboo. Setting aside the discretion which mingles so largely with his valour, it is an utter mistake to suppose that the Bengalee is intellectually more than the equal of the up-country man. The Bengalee Baboo likes to appropriate that distinction to himself because it is the only one which there is any probability that others will accede to him. But it is, we are convinced, a delusion, generated by the accidental circumstance that in Bengal the people have enjoyed facilities for the acquisition of the English language which have only recently been extended to the upper provinces. So far as my own experience goes, I am of opinion that the Punjabee is as much the superior of the Bengalee intellectually as he is physically. The people who hold the Bengalee to be so marvellously clever are Englishmen who know little of the people living more to the northward.

The merit of this plan is that it would greatly improve the status of the Native officer without in any way making him the rival of the European. At the same time, the pay of the lower commissioned grades should be increased. The greatly increased cost of living renders this an act of simple justice and almost a necessity. And while a proportion of commissions should be set aside in each regiment for men promoted from the ranks, the greater part should be thrown open to the gentry of India, who, though desirous of entering upon a military career, are naturally reluctant to enter

the ranks as private soldiers. These commissions should be given by nomination, and only to the members of good families. The sole preliminary test insisted on should be a knowledge of English, but the young cadet should be for awhile entered into the service as a probationer, and only held to become a commissioned officer when the commanding officer of his regiment had reported him as fit for such a position. In course of time, as Englishmen became familiar with the sight of Native officers in the same positions as themselves, the spectacle would lose its horrible aspect, just as we now regard with equanimity the presence of a Native judge upon the bench of the High Court. When that good time had come, the system might be extended; and the accident that there are no longer officers sent out from England for the express purpose of spending their lives in India, renders it very easy to do so. Supposing that our provincial armies were established and duly officered—supposing, too, that the Native regiments *par excellence*—those, we mean, officered throughout with Natives—had been found to answer in every respect, and it was proposed to extend the system; this might be done, in the first instance, by discontinuing the appointment in them—first, of an European second in command, then of the Commandant, and filling up the vacancies thus obtained with Natives. Then in other regiments, as vacancies occurred, from whatever causes, they might be filled up by promotions from the Native commissioned grades, instead of fresh admissions into the Indian Staff Corps from H.M.'s regiments.

Thus, step by step, and after the lapse of many years, the Native mercenary army would be gradually converted into a national force. No injury would be inflicted upon any European officer. Promotion would be in no way delayed; only the admissions into the Indian Staff Corps would be restricted in number until they altogether ceased, and that singular creation became numbered among the things that were. A Native force established upon these principles, and supported by English Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery, would be precisely similar in constitution to the auxiliary troops of the Roman armies. These latter were all raised and officered among the conquered people; they formed the bulk of the Roman armies, and generally bore the brunt of the fighting, the Roman legion, like Napoleon's Old Guards, being held in reserve, and only brought up into action at critical moments.

The military defences of India, then, should consist of provincial armies, each like a German army corps, complete in itself, maintained in a state of thorough efficiency, and the Native portion of each provincial army recruited from the common people and

officered by the Native gentry of the provinces in which it was liable to serve. Such a system would, I believe, when completely established, become a guarantee for the stability of our rule, at least as powerful as the admission of Natives into the Civil branches of the Administration.

It may be safely affirmed that there is nothing in the character of the people of India which would lead us to the conclusion that the unity of the country under one uniform system of laws and administration would be either advantageous, or even practicable, for any length of time. The strong arm of military force holds together for a time the vast mass of heterogeneous elements, and there can be no doubt that this enforced subjection of the entire country to one supreme will and one dominant civilization has been productive of immense good—has given an impetus to the whole country which no other discipline could have accomplished so speedily and effectually. English occupation in India has, in fact, achieved for this country that which the conquests of Napoleon effected for Europe. The intellect of Europe was at that time manacled and chained under a system of the most barbarous usages the mind can conceive. The barbarities of feudalism were still rampant; torture was systematically practised in many countries as a legitimate mode of examination in criminal cases; the richest countries in Europe were impoverished as if by chronic famine, through absurd protective laws, which were foolishly held to be necessary for the prosperity of the people. In Sicily, for example, once the very granary of Europe, the corn laws had reduced the country to such distress that barely sufficient food was raised to supply the wants of the people. Years of scarcity were of frequent occurrence; not more than one-third of the country was cultivated, and that with the imperfect agriculture of ancient times. The plough of the Georgics was, in fact, in use in that country so late as 1810; and whole districts lay depopulated and waste. Napoleon swept all these and similar abuses away. There never was, perhaps, a conqueror more intensely selfish and inhuman than the exile of St. Helena, but his very want of feeling was good in certain respects for the welfare of Europe. His clear discernment of the right ends of government made him the most resolute iconoclast—a perfect Attila at the destruction of everything which impeded the natural development of a country; while his callousness to the wishes or weaknesses of others enabled him to fix his eyes exclusively on what he deemed good, regardless of the sensibilities he might trample under-foot on his way thither. Of him, too, it might be said that he gathered the wheat into his barns, while he burned up the chaff

with unquenchable fire. It requires a larger knowledge of history than most people possess to estimate aright the work for all humanity accomplished by that mighty instrument of civilization.

It seems to me that our path in India has been in many salient points like that of Napoleon's in Europe. In our dealings with the people of the country, we have too often exhibited his cruel and callous disregard for the sensibilities with which we have come into contact. Half unconsciously, we have, however, accomplished a great work. India is at last arousing herself from the long sleep of ages. The nightmares of Mahratta, Pindaree, Afghan and Sikh conquerors, which rendered that long sleep so troubled and fearful, have vanished with the return of the long-expected morning. But with the growth of active life comes also the impossibility of retaining some twenty different nations in an artificial bond of unity imposed by a force from without. India, I cannot doubt, must sooner or later resolve itself into a number of federated States under a Central Government, such as exists in America.

We have sown throughout the empire the seeds of public opinion and representative government, and to check their growth now is beyond our power. As intelligence spreads, the Councils which assist the Lieutenant-Governors of Provinces will change from consultative to representative bodies by much the same process of transition which the House of Commons has passed through at home. The system of Honorary Magistrates and Municipalities will, in the same way, develop that local independence and capacity for self-government which, more than anything else, have given stability to the political institutions of England. The increasing cost of the administration will lead to a system of taxation adapted to the different needs and resources of each province. The character of the people and the advance of civilization will, in short, act and react upon each other, developing, as they should do, a widely different product in the Punjab or Bengal to that which obtains in the Deccan, or the country of the Mahrattas. And these changes do not lie far away in a far-off future. They are going on under our eyes at this very moment. A quarter of a century will see them progressed far towards completion.

Now the danger of a Native Army, constituted as ours, we have already touched upon; but it will be as well to dwell on it at greater length. In the midst of a rich and prosperous country, we should have a standing army, recruited and officered from the lowest ranks of the population, and, in a great measure, from the wild marauding tribes overhanging our North-western frontier.

These regiments, belonging to no nationality, unattached in any way to the soil, uneducated, underpaid, with no prospects of wealth or advancement, would be expected to act as guardians of an increasing wealth in which they could never hope to share. The hour may not come to-day or to-morrow, but assuredly an hour will come when a Crimean war or some other emergency will denude India of her English troops, and then would be the chance for such an army. They might combine with the wild people of Afghanistan in a raid upon the defenceless riches of India; they might become the tools of some intriguing and ambitious leader within the limits of British rule. It would be mere blindness and folly on our part to shut our eyes against such a possibility.

Again, although to seek peace and pursue it is the duty of every rational person, it is not the less true that a people in which the military spirit is wholly extinct can never become a nation at all. We see this in Bengal,—the people of which must always be in subjection to somebody or other from sheer incapacity to defend themselves. The military profession, more perhaps than any other, cannot live by bread alone. Its highest glory is the glory of self-sacrifice; its watch-word is duty; its richest prize the prize of honour. The soldiers who fought at Cressy and Agincourt did a far greater work for England than merely to support the unjust claims of an English king. They fixed, so to speak, the standard of English heroism and endurance for all after-time. Their descendants, from age to age, fought the battles of their country with those great deeds shining like beacon-fires before them to light them on their way to death. And thus, without exaggeration, it may be said that the English archers who defeated the chivalry of France led also the columns of British infantry in their victorious march up the hill of Albuera, and inspired the six hundred with that grand sense of duty

Which to all time will show
That where the Light Brigade was sent,
The Light Brigade would go!

A nation cannot do without her soldiers, in other fields than in that of fighting merely. The discipline of an army spreads around and beyond it habits of order and obedience; a perception of the advantages of combined action, a sense of national unity, which are especially needful in India. The dissolving effects of Western thought are producing in India a state of utter anarchy in thought, belief, and action—a thorough-going atheism, which is one of the greatest difficulties the Government will shortly have to contend with.

But more than this. A provincial army, drawn from the soil and officered by men whose families were directly engaged in the production of wealth, would have the strongest of all inducements to remain true to the Government. It would be their own interests that they placed in jeopardy by any attempt to mutiny. Moreover, each provincial army would be, as it were, a barrier against every other. Say the Punjab Army become disaffected, it would certainly not ravage its own fields and villages. It would attempt that work in some neighbouring province. But there the army, however disaffected to Government, would not allow the men of another province to plunder and kill their own relatives and countrymen. Looked at either as a safeguard against internal disorder or a protection to attack from without, provincial armies organized as we have proposed seem equally effective. The principles of loyalty and good faith are involved in the very nature of their constitution.

Lastly, this change is comparatively easy of accomplishment. There are at this moment regiments in the service whose prevailing element is Punjabee, North-western, Bombay, and Madras. There are regiments of Central Indian horse and infantry corps composed of Boondeelas. Without the need of any radical change in the constitution of the army, the nucleus of the provincial armies might be established at once. There would be no need even to do away with the Staff Corps. Indeed, that creation, for the first time during its miserable existence, would be of some real utility. The circumstance of all officers being borne upon one general list and constantly moved from one regiment to another, would enable the provincial armies to be officered without any serious dislocation of existing arrangements, or any severe detriment to existing interests. But into these matters of detail I do not propose to enter at present. The time for that will come most fitly when the principle of provincial armies has been accepted by the Government as a good basis on which to organize the defence of the country.

R. D. OSBORN, Lieut.-Colonel.

READINGS ON CURRENCY.—II.

MR. GOSCHEN'S THEORY OF THE FOREIGN EXCHANGES.

It is now twenty years since Mr. Goschen published the first edition of his "Theory of the Foreign Exchanges." Elementary and simple as the essay is, it is not too much to affirm that to this hour, the task which Mr. Goschen set himself is almost everywhere misunderstood. The essay is commonly, we might almost say universally, spoken of as a defence of the Bank Act, and an unanswerable reply to its opponents. Its author himself made no such mistake. He knew well what he was doing, and what he had accomplished by the treatise. He found, as he himself tells us in his Introduction, that "the subject urgently required ventilation" (p. 15); that, in spite of "its immense importance" (p. 12), comparatively few even of our "leading bankers and merchants" were conversant with it; and that, owing to the prevalent belief that it is "peculiarly abstruse and technical" (p. 11), it is "difficult to obtain a hearing [about it] in ordinary times." Mr. Goschen might, with equal justice, have classed a host of economic writers and editors with our leading bankers and merchants. They are familiar enough with the essay, and, in a way, understand all that Mr. Goschen says; it would be difficult not to understand what is so lucidly stated; and yet the scope and conclusion of the essay seem to be misapprehended by almost every one. Mr. Goschen never intended the essay to be anything more than its title announces. It is an inquiry into the "Theory of the Foreign Exchanges;" in other words, an explanation—a transparently lucid explanation—of the causes that determine their fluctuations, in so far as it is possible for an experienced and intelligent dealer therein, to detect and follow them. It was not possible for Mr. Goschen, nor is it possible for any one, to show *all* the causes which influence the exchanges. They are partly "mental," depending more or less at any given moment upon what is called the "feeling" in the market. Mr. Goschen's great merit is that he specifies with extreme clearness, the main causes that determine the

fluctuations in the foreign exchanges of a country; the chief, but by no means the sole, cause being the relative indebtedness of nations. Speaking generally, the exchanges, at any given period, will be in favour of a nation when that nation has more to receive from other nations than it has to pay them, and against it when the conditions are reversed. And nothing could be more admirable than the simplicity with which Mr. Goschen points out how many and various circumstances may determine the temporary indebtedness, or otherwise, of nations.

All this part of the essay is so admirably written, that the book should be put into the hand of every young man entering a merchant's office or a bank. Had the essay stopped here, and the final chapter (vi.) been omitted, it would still have vindicated its title, and been entitled to the praise of a masterly exposition of the foreign exchanges of commercial nations generally. But Mr. Goschen's purpose went beyond this; and in his last chapter he abandons the general treatment of the subject to fasten the reader's attention upon the foreign exchanges of this country, as affected by the Bank Act of 1844. All that goes before is of universal application to all nations engaged in extensive commerce; while the last chapter narrows the subject to a consideration of the foreign exchanges of this kingdom, and to the so-called "corrective" which is applied to them by Sir Robert Peel's legislation of 1844, in other words, by the Bank Act.

Mr. Goschen is so widely misunderstood, that it is necessary to call attention to the caution with which he expresses himself upon points that are missed altogether by the mass of his readers. He is hardly to be blamed for this; but the essay has been so abused and so widely taken for what it is not, that we regret he did not call attention more pointedly to the controversies that underlie the special inquiry of his last chapter. For the ordinary reader—and many even careful readers—will be sure to miss his almost incidental reference, at the opening of the chapter, to the preliminary inquiry, "whether what is termed correction [of the exchanges] is desirable or not." The Bank Act professes to "correct" the foreign exchanges of this country by the rate of discount, and Mr. Goschen's object is to show how it does so. Without stopping to inquire whether he has done so satisfactorily or not, it is obvious that no inquiry of this order can possibly enable us to determine (1) whether "correction" itself is desirable or not, or (2) whether the special "correction" which the Bank Act provides, and the working of which Mr. Goschen explains, is mischievous or wholesome. And yet the readers of this essay are constantly telling us that it is an unanswerable

defence of the Act. They mistake a very lucid exposition of its supposed working for the proof (1) that legislative "correction" of the exchanges is desirable, and (2) that the special correction provided by the English legislation of 1844, is a wise and wholesome correction. We declare it to be one of violence and confiscation. Mr. Goschen himself shows it to be so, and it is extraordinary that his readers should have overlooked the very caution given by him at page 86, on this head :—

Under the present state of legislation, all engagements involve payments in gold, or in paper convertible into gold; the merchants engaging to pay in gold or bank notes at their option, and the Bank of England being bound by law, without option, to pay those notes in gold. Consequently it is of the highest importance to the whole banking and mercantile community, with a view to the certain fulfilment of such engagements, that the aggregate stock of bullion in the country should suffice to meet all wants. *Whether the law is wise in itself is beside the argument, so long as the currency laws continue as they are.* Under present circumstances, a merchant or banker will consider that to be an unfavourable state of things which points to a *dangerous* diminution of the stock of gold, and he will consider that a favourable turn of exchanges which tends in the opposite direction.

II.

We have seen that the first five chapters of Mr. Goschen's essay are devoted to an interpretation of what may be called the phenomena of the foreign exchanges. We see them fluctuating incessantly, and Mr. Goschen shows in very lucid terms, the chief causes of these fluctuations, the general conclusion being that every *rise* in favour of the exchanges of any country tends directly to the attraction of bullion thereto, while every *fall* tends to prevent its importation. When the rise or fall reaches the point at which no more "bills" (exchange) can be sold or bought, but at prices that make the transmission of bullion more profitable or less costly, then the import of bullion in the one case, or its export in the other commences. The efflux of bullion, therefore, from any country is simply, says Mr. Goschen, the natural result of an "unfavourable" state of the exchanges of that country with the outside world. Having got thus far, he proceeds to assume that it is desirable for every country, or, at all events, for this country, to apply a "corrective" to this state of matters, meaning thereby some artificial or legislative "corrective." He assumes, we say, that when the foreign exchanges of a country are so unfavourable thereto, that it begins to export "bullion," it is desirable to apply an artificial or legislative check upon the outflow. He refrains, indeed, from positively affirming that it is desirable, but he

assumes that it is so. Having done this, he then proceeds to show how the raising of the Bank rate of discount supplies the desired "corrective." And here it is that for the first, and only time we think, he appears to identify himself with the Act. Not only is "a rapid advance in the rate of discount a powerful and effectual corrective" (p. 147), but it is, he says, "*the only mode* by which that which is on the point of being lost (gold) may be retained, or that which is actually gone may be replaced," and then he proceeds as follows:—

Its natural effect (the rise of the discount rate) is not to produce a scarcity of money—of which it can never be the cause, though often the consequence—but to remedy and correct the scarcity, by offering a premium to the rest of the world to send their capital, or money, to the dearest market (presumably, at such periods, our own).

Mr. Goschen does not see that in this passage he absolutely begs the vital question in dispute. Were bullion and "money" not made identical by the Bank Act, no flow of bullion from the country would have any effect whatever upon the money market. Bullion would flow out of the country, or into it, just as every other commodity does, according to the urgency or otherwise of the foreign demand for it. By mischievously declaring the pound sterling to be simply so much weight of gold bullion, and compelling the Bank Directors to test, assay, and convert into "money," without charge, all the gold bullion that ever touches the English shores, Sir Robert Peel abolished all distinction between the *money* market and the bullion market. The result is that we have no bullion market in England, and that every fluctuation in the supply of, or demand for, gold bullion is imported by the legislation of the Bank Act into our *money* market. Thus, when, under the influence of unfavourable exchanges, the foreigner asks us for bullion instead of goods, he becomes the innocent cause of deep embarrassment to us, because our bullion is all held in the shape of money; although that money, presumably, has been made for facilitating our own home exchanges, and for no other purpose whatever. Observe closely, that the foreigner *never* wants our money except as bullion, for it is useless to him until he has coined it into the currency of his own country; and thus, although it is true, as Mr. Goschen says, that a rise in the Bank rate of discount to stop the outflow of gold, does not and cannot produce a scarcity of money; it is a signal of distress hung out by the Bank, that a scarcity of *money* is setting in upon us through the foreigner draining our *bullion* away from us; the fatal mistake being that by legislative unwisdom, we make gold

bullion and money convertible terms. Let us now recall Mr. Goschen's statement, substituting only the word "bullion" for money:—

Its natural effect [a rise in the discount rate] is not to produce a scarcity of gold bullion—of which it can never be the cause, though often the consequence—but to remedy and correct the scarcity, by offering a premium to the rest of the world to send their gold bullion to this market.

This is a most precise statement of the working of the Act, and observe what it means. The corrective—that is, the rise in the rate of discount—to be effectual, must be rapid and extreme. Nothing can be clearer, nothing more explicit, than Mr. Goschen's statements upon this head. No half measures will do; no raising the rate by fractions. The Bank must act decisively and boldly. At page 145, he shows that "a slight increase in the rate of discount is not sufficient to bring over gold from the Continent, under some circumstances." He should have said under *any* circumstances, as he has himself shown in the pages immediately preceding:—

[The rate] must reach a somewhat high point before the certain advantage begins; and hence it becomes clear that it is an error to allege that if 6 per cent. will not bring over gold, neither will 7 or 8 per cent.—a mere fractional increase in an annual rate—have that effect.

No ordinary rise in the Bank rate of discount will ever attract foreign capital, in the shape of bullion, to this country, for the mere sake of sharing with Lombard Street in the profit of discounting bills. It is the ruinous fall in all descriptions of property which the violent raising of the discount rate produces, that is the real attraction. The ruinous fall in produce, shares, stocks of all kinds, at such periods is, of course, the opportunity alike of the moneyed capitalist at home and the foreign capitalist abroad, who can by any means send "bullion" into England, to buy up the wrecked property of its merchants. The very admissions of Mr. Goschen ought long since to have proved fatal to a legislation that is a reproach upon the country. He positively himself tells us, how easy it is for a few private foreign capitalists, by combining their resources, to bring about an efflux of gold from the Bank which would produce instant *panic*, and a virtual stoppage of discount altogether, with the effect of enabling the very same capitalists to buy up at half their cost, the merchant estates thrown into the market for realization at any price to which the panic may drive them down. The remedy is thus never felt, until it is absolutely destructive. For to say that every rise in the Bank rate *tends* to attract gold to the country, is to be guilty of the well-known fallacy that marks the use

of that word so generally. The raising of the Bank rate from $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 4 per cent., or from $2\frac{1}{4}$ to 3, tends to attract gold in the very same sense, and no other, that a drop of laudanum tends to soothe the sufferings that only 100 drops will sensibly allay. It is not until the Bank rate becomes confiscatory that the tendency becomes "active," and it is surprising that Mr. Goschen should have overlooked this simple reflection.

III.

We shall now attempt to show, by an illustration of a very simple order, the true character and the working of this remedy. Let us suppose that the waters of the Thames were required not merely by the Water companies for the supply of domestic uses, but for Irrigation works on a large scale on both its banks, in Kent and Surrey on the one side, and Middlesex and Essex on the other. Let us suppose, further, that instead of being a great, navigable river, with a vast flowing tide, it ran simply down stream, and furnished, under ordinary circumstances, just sufficient water for the two purposes we have named. Now what should we say if, instead of leaving the Irrigation companies to draw the water they required directly from the river, in the ordinary way by lift and canal, the Water companies that supplied the metropolis were required by Act of the Legislature to filter the whole body of the stream into reservoirs which were built simply to supply the town with water for domestic use? By Act of the Legislature, we say, the Companies were required to filter the whole stream into their reservoirs, and then to allow the Irrigation companies to avail themselves of this artificial supply, and its high pressure free of cost. Suppose, further, that the demand made by these Irrigation companies was so fluctuating and uncertain that while the supply was sometimes untouched by them for months together, at other times their canals drew the reservoirs almost dry, whenever a few weeks' drought fell over the country. At one time the filtered waters lay stagnating in the reservoirs for months together, the wants of the metropolis being a fixed normal quantity, subject to trifling variations only. The result of these legislative regulations, as might have been foreseen, is that whenever drought occurs in the counties on either side, the reservoirs are so rapidly drained of their waters, that there is none left for the service of the city; and when grievous complaint is made of the water famine that has fallen upon the people, the defenders of this legislative wisdom tell you, that all the Water companies have to do, to stop the outflow for Irrigation, is boldly and rapidly to raise their water rates to a pitch at which the Irrigation companies will find it more

profitable to send the canal waters back into the reservoirs, to share in these high rates, than to use it themselves for irrigating the counties.

Absurd as this supposititious case is, we challenge Mr. Goschen and every other believer in the Bank Act in the kingdom, to indicate a point in the illustration in which the case does not run on all fours with the Act. *Mutatis mutandis*, the one case is an exact statement of the other. And when Mr. Goschen tells us that "the only mode by which that which is on the point of being lost can be retained," is "a rapid advance in the rates" charged for it (p. 147), that the foreigners who are carrying it away may bring it back for the sake of sharing in the profits of these rates, he describes the whole *rationale* of the defence offered for such legislation in both cases. It is not, he exclaims, "the rapid advance in the rates" that occasions the scarcity, but the drain upon the reservoirs from abroad: money is terribly scarce, filtered water is terribly scarce, not because the rates of discount, the water rates, have been rapidly advanced—that is a purely "corrective" measure, the *only* powerful and effectual one—but because the reserve at the Bank, the reservoirs of the Water companies have been drained abroad, so that there is no gold, no water, left; and the proper "corrective" is to make gold so dear, water for domestic use so dear, that the foreigners, who have carried it away, may be tempted to bring it back to share the profits which the banks, the Water companies, are making out of a people stricken with a famine of money, a famine of water. Is it not just possible that the right "corrective" is to sweep such legislative insanity away, and, to leave the canal companies to draw the water they require from the river, instead of from the filtered reservoirs that have been set up for the need and convenience of the city? We challenge reply to the argument in this simple illustrated form. We say that the actual case and the supposed case are identical expressions of legislative absurdity. The Bank Act arbitrarily enacts that there shall be no difference between gold bullion and English money, but that there shall be one common reservoir for both, although they are required for two absolutely distinct purposes. English money is made and is required, but for one use and purpose—namely, to act as the medium of effecting our domestic exchanges. It is the "filtered water" of our illustration. The foreigner *never* wants English money, for it is of no use to him. He wants simply bullion, and he carries our money away instead, because the Legislature has insanely arranged that English money shall be the cheapest and most convenient form, in which gold bullion can be held, by testing and coining it without charge. The result is that there is no gold bullion market in London. There is only the *money* market;

and so, when the foreigner wants bullion, he takes our money for the reason that it is at once the most convenient form and the cheapest form, in which gold is to be found. And this foreign demand upon us for so vital a commodity as our *money*, Mr. Goschen takes great pains to show us, is often an illegitimate and speculative demand, got up and created solely because of the facilities which the Bank Act gives to foreign capitalists for the most unscrupulous practices at our expense. How much longer the folly is to last no man can say. At all events, we are entitled, we think, to hope that we shall not again hear Mr. Goschen's essay described as an unanswerable defence of the Bank Act. It is, in fact, the most damning exposition of the nature and working of the Act, we have ever read. It is a sentence of death upon it; and the long reprieve is simply attributable to the fact that English politicians and statesmen have mischievously tabooed all discussion of the subject for the last twenty years and more. And so we have professors of political economy, like Mr. Stanley Jevons, elaborately sneering at what are called the "currency doctors," who see and denounce the mischievous absurdity. Well, we suppose we must be content to be called so. The fact is, the men who say they see, are blind. As Mr. Carlyle says: "Not the least admirable quality of Bull is, after all, that of remaining insensible: holding crass for considerable periods, ten years or more, as in this of the Corn Laws, after all arguments and shadow of arguments have faded away from him, till the very urchins in the street titter at the arguments he brings. . . Logie, the 'art of speech,' does indeed speak so and so clear enough, nevertheless Bull still shakes his head."

THE SITUATION IN MYSORE.

WHEN we made a survey of the scandalous condition of the Mysore Jewels question in our January number, the state of the case was that the Government of India, by a Resolution, "No. 813 I.P., dated Simla, the 25th of September, 1880," had declared the explanations of Mr. J. D. Gordon, the Chief Commissioner, and Mr. C. Rungacharloo to be "completely satisfactory," and Mr. Gordon had announced his intention of "making a careful final examination" of the jewels "before the restoration of the province." Up to that time, as we pointed out, there had been no real investigation whatever into the points that had been suggested for inquiry. There had been a mere routine reference to the official dignitary and the influential subordinate whose mismanagement was in question, and they had very naturally denied that there had ever been any mismanagement at all.

We also pointed out that the explanations offered by the persons chiefly implicated were in direct contradiction to records that had been published, and with previous declarations made or adopted by those persons themselves. Mr. Gordon, in 1877, said that the original lists of 1868 contained "a great number of inaccuracies" of description and value, depreciating, in some instances, articles of jewellery to one-tenth of their recorded value. He did not report these discrepancies, or mention them to anyone, till some of them were accidentally discovered in 1877. Colonel Malleon, in 1874, had heard nothing of these numerous inaccuracies from his *locum tenens*, Mr. Gordon, and in 1874, in consultation with Mr. Rungacharloo, is found assuring the Chief Commissioner of "the accuracy of the original lists," and that there is not "even a single error in the whole of this complicated property."

Mr. Rungacharloo and Mr. Gordon assured the Government of India in 1880 that "all" the jewellery was "put together" in the jewellery room under lock and key; that "the keys of the jewellery room and jewel cases had always been kept in an iron safe in the Palace, under a military guard, and that the key of that safe

had always been in the hands of the Guardian or other high European official resident at Mysore." This, we showed, was a very inaccurate statement. While all the keys had, on several occasions, been left in the sole custody of Mr. Rungacharloo, this was a comparatively unimportant correction, side by side with the fact, utterly subverting the structure of defence raised by Mr. Gordon, that a very large quantity of jewels had never been under lock and key at all, but had been left "outside" the jewellery room, in charge at first of a person of notoriously infamous character, who was very closely allied with Mr. Rungacharloo, and from first to last entrusted to Mr. Rungacharloo's discretion.

We pointed out that any examination of the jewels would be delusive and inconclusive, and would fail to satisfy public opinion in Mysore or to clear away the scandalous rumours that have prevailed for the last six years, unless it were, as recommended by Captain F. A. Wilson in 1877, conducted by "a special agency" of unquestionable independence. We urged also that, as the injurious report current in Mysore was, as ineffectually hinted by Captain F. A. Wilson in 1877, that "jewels" were not always "restored to the jewel room in the same state in which they were taken out"—that they were, in short, "sweated" by some one—the great object of inquiry must be a re-valuation of the jewels, to be compared with the careful valuation made by Major Elliot and Mr. Rungacharloo, with a jury of experts, in 1868.

Having made these not very unreasonable suggestions, we said we should wait, and that we should claim the privilege of saying something more when we heard, on official authority, what was the composition of the Committee charged with the final examination of the jewels, by whom the members of that Committee were chosen, and what limits were prescribed for their inquiry. That information has now been officially made public.

In a despatch from the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Mysore, No. C 3, dated 18th December, 1880, the constitution and proceedings of the Committee who were engaged from the 25th of October to the 3rd of November, 1880, in examining the Mysore jewels, are briefly described, and the results of the so-called examination are stated. The agency employed was not special or independent. Mr. Gordon himself, in person, presided over a Committee composed of his own subordinates, and Mr. Rungacharloo in person directed and guided the inquiry. Mr. Gordon himself, with singular *naïveté*, gives as the ground of his choice of members for the Committee, that "as such specific statements had been made of losses that had occurred since the original examination of 1868, it was

thought to be very desirable that, at the present examination, all the officers in India who had at any time since the Maharajah's death had charge of the jewellery should be present." One would certainly have thought it desirable that they should be present, but that they should be present as witnesses, not as judges, during an inquiry into specific statements that seriously implicated themselves. Mr. Gordon thought otherwise, and the Government of India seems to have agreed with him, for in a Resolution on the despatch conveying the report of the Committee, the Viceroy in Council quotes Mr. Gordon's own words that "the whole of the Palace jewellery has been accurately and quite satisfactorily accounted for."

The jewels, during this final examination, were not valued.

The whole of the jewellery was not accounted for. The most remarkable among "the great number of discrepancies and inaccuracies" which were accidentally revealed in 1877, was that of a jewel, No. 32, which had been left outside, and never locked up, in the nominal possession of the widowed Ranee Chendra Vilasa, and which, although catalogued by Major Elliot in 1868 as worth Rs. 6,000 (say £600), "appeared small" in 1877, and was found only to be worth about Rs. 600 (say £60). Now Mr. Gordon's Committee of final examination, in October, 1880, report that they have found another similar discrepancy in the value of a jewel from the same collection allotted to the same widow Chendra Vilasa, and not locked up, at any rate not until her death in 1871. Here are the remarks of the Committee on this obtrusive article:—

No. 171.—This was a diamond bracelet, recorded in the register of 1868 by Colonel Elliot as being then left in the possession of the Chendravilas lady of the late Maharajah, and valued at Rs. 5,000. When the said lady died, in 1871, the bracelet, found amongst her jewels, was discovered to be of less value—viz., about Rs. 2,000 or 3,000. It is believed in the Palace that the relations of the lady substituted an inferior jewel whilst it was in her possession.

The statement as to belief "in the Palace" is one of those statements that is very easily made, but being made by the very persons who must be more or less responsible and blameworthy, at least for any irregularities or negligence that may have facilitated malpractices, the vague reference to invisible and anonymous culprits can hardly be considered conclusive; but the Viceroy in Council considers the explanation satisfactory.

To the fact that there have been malpractices of some description, however, even this reluctant admission of the Committee

testifies, although they attribute them to the "relations" of the Royal family.

In this final examination, and in the accidental disclosures of 1877, nineteen articles of jewellery out of "an enormous number," in Mr. Gordon's words, have been casually brought under special notice. In this list of articles there appears, on reference to the original catalogue, to be a deficiency in value of about Rs. 8,000, and a deficiency in the recorded tale of stones and pearls to the number of fifty or sixty. If nineteen articles show a deficiency in value of Rs. 8,000, what might not the deficiency prove if many hundreds, or, for all we know as to "the enormous number," thousands were tested by re-valuation?

They have not been tested, they have not been valued, and yet the Viceroy in Council considers that all the Mysore jewels have been satisfactorily accounted for. The well-founded doubts and suspicions which have prevailed in Mysore for several years, and still do prevail there, will assuredly not be set at rest by the Resolutions of His Excellency in Council, by the explanatory despatches of Mr. Gordon, or by the report of his packed Committee.

The truth is too well understood in India. At both ends there is a weak point, the existence of which is an open secret. The decision of the Viceroy in Council is merely the stamp of authority given to a quiet arrangement between Mr. Gordon, of the Bengal Civil Service, and Mr. Lyell, of the Bengal Civil Service, in a private room of the Calcutta Foreign Office. Circumstances of emergency and preoccupation, and of Lord Ripon's illness, left the whole matter in their hands. As to the report of the Mysore Committee, although its members were exclusively chosen from those who were personally interested, first, in clearing themselves, and secondly, in pleasing their superior, Mr. Gordon, it is well known that the two Native members of the highest position by birth and fortune, had great scruples about signing the report, and were only induced to do so by heavy official pressure. We have not heard the last of the Mysore jewels. We wonder if Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for India has yet heard anything officially on the subject.

It is understood that the administration of the Mysore State was to be handed over to the Maharajah on the 25th of March. We wonder if the Secretary of State has been consulted, or has been afforded an opportunity of expressing his views, as to the selection of a Dewan or Minister for the reconstituted State of Mysore, or whether that rather important question was also quietly arranged by two gentlemen of the Bengal Civil Service, and the

necessary Minutes and Resolutions drafted in the Calcutta Foreign Office, with no intention of their being seen by Her Majesty's Government until fortified by the formal signature of His Excellency the Viceroy. It is not so easy to upset an accomplished fact.

And yet the Secretary of State, when inditing and defending his despatch of the 18th of April, 1867, whereby the succession of the present Maharajah was made secure, seems to have claimed, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, some voice in the settlement of affairs on the young Prince attaining his majority. Sir Stafford Northcote expressly declared that he had not fettered "the free action" of his "successors." He certainly never dreamed that Her Majesty's Government might be fettered by two gentlemen of the Bengal Civil Service. "I have pointed out," said he, "that before admitting the young Prince to a share in the administration, it will be our duty to make proper stipulations, and to take sufficient securities, for the good government of the people. But," he continued, "I have not attempted to prescribe what those stipulations and securities should be." On those points, he said, he had "left his successor to decide."* There could be no more important security for good government than a well-chosen Dewan, but if the latest information from Calcutta be authentic, the successor of Sir Stafford Northcote will hardly be asked to decide on the choice that is to be made. Mr. J. D. Gordon has chosen Mr. C. Rungacharloo, and the selection is said to have been approved and ratified at Calcutta.

The ruling and provincial authorities in India do not like nominations that are made or sanctioned in London. A previous attempt of the Secretary of State to make an appointment in Mysore had not happy results, either for the person appointed, or for the interests of the young Maharajah.

In a letter from the old Maharajah, dated the 24th of April, 1867, just a year before his death, he mentioned that he had selected as Guardian of the young Prince, Colonel Gregory Haines, "late Superintendent of the Bangalore Division, an officer well known and highly respected in Mysore," and "the tried and trusted friend of my ever to be lamented Commissioner, Sir Mark Cubbon."† Both the Chief Commissioner of Mysore and the Secretaries at Calcutta betrayed at once their conviction that Colonel Haines was too well informed and too much respected at Mysore to be a manageable Guardian,‡ but the Secretary of

* "Mysore Papers" (271 of 1867), p. 5.

† "Mysore Papers" (385 of 1878), pp. 13 and 19.

‡ "Mysore Papers" (385 of 1878), pp. 12, and 16, 17.

State's authority was just efficient enough to ensure the dying wishes of "the oldest" and "the staunchest, although the humblest, ally of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and India," being carried into effect in form. It was a tribute of respect to his memory, but that was all. The arm of the Secretary of State was not long enough to reach to Mysore. Nor, in fact, was the arm of the Viceroy. Little complications of this sort, where there is no possible loss of Imperial revenue, and a very likely gain of patronage, are settled quietly between "the Office" and the local Government.

The most important of all the injunctions on which Her Majesty's Government insisted, and which was, with equal solemnity, so far as written words went, handed on to the Chief Commissioner of Mysore by the Viceroy in Council, was that "great care should be taken to remove from" the young Maharajah's household, "all persons who are likely to initiate him, at an early age, into the vicious and demoralising practices of the zenana."* The Chief Commissioner of Mysore, being determined not to tolerate a really competent Guardian, such as Colonel Gregory Haines would have been, broke through, and was allowed to break through, the rules prescribed by the Government of India, that the Guardian should appoint the Maharajah's attendants and instructors, and that the Chief Commissioner was not to interfere in details.† This violation of its own salutary rules, most inconsistently permitted by the Government of India, led to the confirmation in one of the principal places of the zenana of Murree Mullapa, a man of notorious infamy for his "vicious and demoralising practices," with whom Mr. Rungacharloo, the Controller of the Household, was intimately allied in the most confidential relations, and against whose presence in the palace, where he found him installed, Colonel Haines indignantly protested. That was quite enough; Colonel Haines's remonstrances were condemned as presumptuous, he was worried out of the place, and the hands of Murree Mullapa and Mr. C. Rungacharloo were, of course, much strengthened, and their domination in the Palace converted into a terror by the failure of Colonel Haines to dislodge them, and his own consequent removal. Fortunately for the Maharajah, and very much to the relief of the Ranees, to whom the presence of this obscene parasite was a daily insult, Murree Mullapa died in 1871, and a long series of judicial proceedings, almost down to the present year, have

* "Mysore Papers" (385 of 1878), p. 82.

† "Mysore Papers" (385 of 1878), p. 81.

testified to the deep and brotherly interest which Mr. C. Rungacharloo, though not his fellow-countryman or caste-fellow, took in his private affairs. Murree Mullapa was a Mysorean; Mr. Rungacharloo, although in the title-page of a pamphlet assailing the administration of his patron, Mr. Bowring (published by Longmans in 1874), he assumed the disguise of "A Native of Mysore," is a Madras Brahmin. The evidence in the several suits brought against him by the widow and relatives of Murree Mullapa, showing him to have drafted a will for that degraded being, to have acted as his executor, and to have administered to his estate, would not impress most people with the notion that Mr. C. Rungacharloo was exactly the person to be Dewan of Mysore. But how should such trifling details, matters that excited no misgivings in the mind of Mr. J. D. Gordon, come to the notice of His Excellency the Viceroy of India?

The long series of evil suits brought by the widow Mullama, by no means exhausts the list of Mr. Rungacharloo's appearances as defendant in the Mysore courts of justice. In 1874, he was defendant in two cases of trespass and assault brought against him by the widow of Devaraj Urs, a relative of the Maharajah, and one of her servants, to whom he had offered personal violence with his own hands. In one of these cases, Mr. Rungacharloo was fined Rs. 100, and in the other, Rs. 200. On appeal, however, he pleaded that he was acting in his "political" capacity, and that the precincts of the palace were exempt from the jurisdiction of the courts. The Chief Commissioner upheld the plea, and the judgments against him were quashed. On the other hand, it must, in justice to Mr. Rungacharloo, be stated that in cases of this description he has not always been the assailant on the premises or the defendant before the court. He was, very soon after being thus relieved by special dispensation from the legal consequences of his own stern system of discipline, himself severely slipped within the walls of the palace by some of the Ranees's retainers, and when the culprits were brought by him before the magistrate, they were not allowed to plead that they lived in a royal Alsatia, but were treated as ordinary offenders against the law. Unfortunately, no punishment can wipe out the effects of a slipping. The fact of having been slipped, even unjustly, derogates from a man's dignity and renders him incurably ridiculous. And in this case, public sympathy in Mysore, most unofficially perverse and prejudiced, was on the side of the delinquents.

In 1872, Mr. Rungacharloo took a very active part—behind the scenes, at first—in getting up and promoting an extraordinary charge of conspiracy against Mr. Krishnasamy Iyengar,* a magis-

* This Mr. Krishnasamy Iyengar must not be confounded with a person of

trato of the Mysore district, who would have been summarily dismissed, with disgrace, from the public service, but for the prompt and peremptory orders of Lord Northbrook, then Viceroy, on Mr. Krishnasamy's memorial, that there should be a public investigation of the charge against him. The case was tried; he was fully and honourably acquitted, and the four principal witnesses against him denounced by the presiding magistrate, Colonel Hill, on the 24th of June, 1873, as perjurers. The earnest prayer of the injured person, to be allowed to prosecute the perjured witnesses, was, however, rejected by the Chief Commissioner, Sir Richard Meado, "on account of the peculiar circumstances under which the accusations were brought forward." On the same grounds, the Chief Commissioner declined to authorize a civil action for damages. "The peculiar circumstances" seem to have been that, according to his own testimony, Mr. Rungacharloo, then Controller of the Palace Household, had been active in producing and directing the four perjured witnesses at the house of Mr. J. D. Gordon, then acting as Guardian of the Maharajah, where a private inquiry was held. One of the witnesses in this case—by name, Kasecputti Shastri—stated that Mr. Gordon had put his hand on his head before he made his preliminary and private statement, and claimed to have it recorded that "he was under Mr. Gordon's protection," which the magistrate accordingly noted at the foot of the witness's deposition.

These are, indeed, "peculiar circumstances;" and, in addition to those we have mentioned, and to the fact that since Mr. Gordon's accession to the highest place in Mysore, Mr. Krishnasamy has been hustled out of the service, hardly calculated to encircle the brow of Mr. Gordon's Dewan designate with a halo of popular admiration. But this is not the only case in the records of the Mysorean courts of justice where the name of Mr. C. Rungacharloo is unpleasantly associated with those of perjured witnesses.

In 1872 and 1873 there were, in the words of Sir Richard Meade, then Chief Commissioner, "at least two burglaries in the palace at Mysore." Both of these so called "burglaries" occurred in the Wardrobe, for the charge of which Mr. C. Rungacharloo was solely responsible, and property to the value of about £4,000 was lost. No notice or report was made of the earlier "burglary," and it only became accidentally known to the Chief Commissioner two

much higher standing and greater influence in Mysore, B. Krishniah Iyengar, C.S.I., who has been for sixteen years Deputy Commissioner of Kolar, the son of a still more distinguished father, who in Poorniah's time was paymaster of the British troops at Bangalore.

years after it took place. In September, 1874, several prisoners were tried and convicted for the second of these "burglaries." One of the witnesses at this trial—a Brahmin, named Kanchi Rungachari—stated that Mr. Rungacharloo, the Controller of the Household, had instructed him to induce two men to come forward and confess to the palaco "burglary," on a promise of a reward of Rs. 500 for each of them. This deposition conveyed such a foul imputation against Mr. Rungacharloo, that it was obviously necessary for him to take some step to rebut it. He brought a charge of perjury against the witness, Kanchi Rungachari, who was tried in November, 1874, before the town magistrate of Mysore—and acquitted. The magistrate considered it clear enough that Mr. Rungacharloo had, in fact, privately offered a reward of Rs. 500 in this matter; and he narrowed the issue to two alternatives: (1) the reward was either offered for the production of Queen's evidence; or (2) it was offered to suborn false witnesses. He decided for the former and more favourable supposition, and dismissed the defendant with some rather contemptuous remarks regarding the prosecutor.

We may put entirely out of consideration the uninvestigated value of the Mysore jewels as compared with their estimated value in 1868; we may assume that "the whole of the Palace jewellery has been accurately and quite satisfactorily accounted for"; we may hope that there are no deficiencies at all in the Mysore jewels, or that instead of reaching to one-fourth, or even one-fifth—for local rumour varies—of the original value, the deficiencies may be unimportant and easily explained, and the discrepancies in the records may be mere clerical errors; we may dismiss from our minds the "burglaries," with a loss of nearly £4,000, and even acquit Mr. Rungacharloo of the "supineness" and "inadequate action" which Sir Richard Meado laid to his charge. Even supposing some further inquiry should reveal some startling deficiencies, they may be accounted for somehow, and Mr. Rungacharloo may prove to be as guiltless as Mr. J. D. Gordon, the present Chief Commissioner of Mysore, of anything approaching even to negligence in the care and manipulation of the young Maharajah's property. But such have been the unfortunate associations of Mr. Rungacharloo, such the strange incidents, both of his official and his demi-official existence in Mysore, that all the evidence that might satisfy our Government of his administrative capacity, and of his unimpeachable integrity, would not make him a dignified object in the eyes of the Mysorean population. No official report or ostensible application from our young ward will persuade the people of Mysore that the Maharajah has chosen a man whom they all view

with abhorrence. Such a *tour de force* would merely create a new scandal. The title of Dewan would confer no faculty of command on such a nominee of our Government, alien by birth and language, without personal dignity or freely accorded respect, but would leave him in the position from which he started,—a mere hanger-on at the skirts of some English official. The fact of Mr. Rungacharloo being an unpopular person in Mysore was never made the subject of doubt, if it is doubted, until Mr. Gordon became Chief Commissioner. He was officially reported to be unpopular, although no imputation was thereby brought against his character, by the Chief Commissioners who preceded Mr. Gordon. But unpopularity would be a very inadequate and misleading term to express the sentiments with which the Dewan-designate is regarded in Mysore. No favourable breeze of official patronage will suffice to blow away the cloud of scandalous facts and rumours around the head of Mr. C. Rungacharloo. Official patronage may confer official functions but cannot give distinction, or ensure public respect. The most respectable Deputy Collector might be made Dewan of Mysore, or even Dewan of Hyderabad, but the unreserved and unflinching support of a Resident could give to neither of them, as would become disastrously manifest in times of trouble or tumult, the authority of a Poorniah, of a Salar Jung, or even of a Chundoo Lall. No General Orders in the *Gazette*, either of Bangalore or Calcutta, can efface history, nullify tradition, or dislocate social connections. The conversion of a Commissioner's creature into a Resident's creature under the title of Dewan, can only weaken British influence by weakening the instrument through which it must be exercised. Although by making some of the best men in Mysore discontented pensioners, Mr. Gordon may misdirect and pervert their energies, he is powerless to transfer their influence to the man of his choice.

Of course it may be said—and, probably, has been said, and formed the basis of calculations in departmental politics—that neither a Viceroy nor a Secretary of State can be expected to go into such purely local details as the private character, the private litigation, the private fortune, the private landed estate of a Native official. If such matters cannot be left to the discretion of a provincial Governor, there, it may be said, is an end of all responsibility, and there is an end of all efficient authority. But after all, the Viceroy and the Secretary of State have their own little responsibilities, although there may be some difficulty in giving them full information as to details, and although there may be some local impediments to the recognition of their authority in what it may be

convenient to call *minutiae*. Viceroys and Secretaries of State have much to learn that is not taught in "the Office."

• The confirmation by Her Majesty's Government of the appointment of Mr. C. Rungacharloo to be Dewan of Mysore, without any real investigation into the candidate's rapid acquisition of real and personal property, into the cause and measure of the admitted reduction in value of the jewels kept in the Palace during his Controllorship, would neither dispel the scandal that exists, nor silence the protest that is being made. On the contrary, both scandal and protest would assuredly, and of necessity, be intensified and extended. Discussions and scandals of many years' currency, although they may be embittered, cannot be closed or dispelled by a dictatorial decree, but only by fair and open investigation.

E. B.

THE ABOLITION OF CHILD-MARRIAGE IN INDIA.

I.

To accumulate arguments to prove the bad effect of child-marriage upon the physical, social, and moral condition of the people, would be to offer an insult to the intelligence and decency of our readers. *Cela va sans dire*. Yet, a word or two to show how the thing presents itself in the particular case of the Hindu people may be forgiven. It is a fact well known to farmers and others engaged in cattle breeding that the first offspring of young animals are apt to be weak and undersized. Similarly, wherever in the East or in any part of the world the custom of child-marriage is followed, the people are weak, and indolent, and indisposed for any enterprise which requires much sustained exertion whether of body or of brain. In India a man will even stand by and see his house with all its contents consumed by fire, and will not exert himself to save anything or to extinguish the flames; and thus is a whole neighbourhood sometimes involved in a calamity which the energy of one man at the outset might have prevented. The fatalistic notion which leads the Hindu to coincide with the misfortune and let the flames do their worst would soon be put *hors de combat* if he had but more of that strength of body of which many generations of early marriages have now so completely deprived him. It is easy enough when a man is too weak in body or too enervated in mind to arouse himself to action at the right moment, to lay the blame at the door of fate or Providence: with such a slave ever ready at hand we should none of us conquer our daily difficulties, but should sink lower and lower into one common slough of despond. The point received striking exemplification in the contrast displayed by the Indian sailors and the English passengers on board the *El Dorado* in the remarkable storm in the Bay of Biscay in December last, when not gentlemen merely, but ladies also, revealed a pluck and a power of endurance almost superhuman in the struggle for dear life, while the men whose very profession was seafaring skulked away in terror

of the winds and the waves, and would have allowed the ship to sink. Had the physique of the Lascars been what that of their English co-voyagers was, they would not so readily have given up all for lost. Those of our fellow-countrymen who reside in the East will testify to the want of nerve, the lack of all presence of mind in circumstances of real danger, and the utter suspension of the spirit of self-help which completely over-master the Oriental, just when the moment of his greatest emergency arrives. And we undertake to affirm that this infirmity will not be cured till child-marriage has long ceased to be the custom of the people. Very happy proof of this have we in the examples of hardihood which some of the natives of Asia and Africa have from time to time afforded. Where, for example, are men to be found who are possessed of greater bravery, force, and power of endurance than the Sikhs, the Afghans, and the Zulus—races among whom this debilitating custom has no existence? Undoubtedly there is much force in the argument that the conditions of life in all tropical countries are inimical to physical culture and muscular power; and yet where are the men to be found who are capable of attesting their patriotism by so much of genuine enterprise and bodily resource as those just mentioned? It is not so in the case of the Hindus; though some of these are fine men to look at, yet they are utterly deficient in moral force and physical power, and are almost sure to collapse just at the supreme moment. We have known as many as five hundred of them driven in all directions by a single man of our own colour, and he neither a soldier nor armed. Were the people of India possessed of that physical morale of which the evil practice of child-marriage has so effectually deprived them, it may well be doubted whether we should be able to maintain our present footing in their country another day. Their numerous religious and national antipathies have undoubtedly favoured our cause, but there is more than sufficient evidence in their past history to prove that these antipathies would not stand in the way of their combining to expel us if they had but the physical power necessary for coping with so formidable an invader—a fact which is sufficiently attested by the necessity, recognized by Government, of preventing them from becoming possessed of military weapons, even though they are known to be necessary for ordinary defence against wild beasts. No man with any pretensions to respectability would contend that if child-marriage be a cause of national debility, we ought to do what we can for its perpetuation, as a guarantee for the continuance of our own régime, for this would presuppose the doctrine which we all indignantly re-

mediate, viz., that we hold the country for our own aggrandizement, and not for the benefit of the people. Surely it will be agreed on all hands that the more we seek the real welfare of the people the more closely will they feel themselves identified with us, and the more clearly will they perceive that our presence in their country is an element of beneficence, and that it is for their interest to co-operate with us for the continuance of the present rule. . . .

Nor is it merely the body that is the sufferer from this debilitating custom—the mind suffers in sympathy with the body. Those who know the Hindu people can testify to the general tendency to the physical inertness which characterizes them as a whole, and can witness that the brain also shares in the general lethargy, the whole man becoming more or less insensible to the inspiration of great occasions, and irresponsive to great motives, and indifferent to the summons to intellectual enterprise. We are not forgetting the wonderful capacity displayed by some of the Hindu boys in cramming for school examinations; but every one knows that, taking the boys of India as a whole, those who attempt these examinations form an exceedingly small proportion of them, and that of this small proportion those who succeed in the examinations are as nothing compared with those who try their utmost and yet fail. Nor must we lose sight here of a circumstance with which we are all familiar, for it is an essential consideration, viz., that the faculty of cramming is one thing, and the faculty of assimilating and utilizing knowledge is quite another thing. The Hindu boy wins by “cuteness,” not by power; and when, in after years, we meet with the same boy in some of the walks of business life, we find him still trying to push his way by the tactics of the hare—by subterfuge, circumvention, and sharp practice. Notwithstanding his success at examinations, there is, in truth, no intellectual greatness about him, and the world is none the better for his faculty of eluding the strategies of his examiners. We could well afford to dispense with the small sharpness that secures success at an examination if we could only get something of that true intellectual capacity which is a sure concomitant of genuine greatness and strength. And the point which it is to our present purpose to mark is that the mind of the Hindu has become, as far as all great practical uses are concerned, emasculated and unnerved. Doubtless something has to be said for the effect of climate, yet, inasmuch as all Eastern peoples are not affected to the same degree as Hindus are with this intellectual infirmity, we feel entitled to conclude that some share is to be attributed to the obviously demoralizing effect of early marriage.

How all this stands associated with child-marriage we shall see, if we connect with these considerations the social condition of the people. Its effect upon their social condition is just what might have been conjectured. We shall all agree that if a boy were to become entangled in the expense and anxiety of the married state he would lose some of the best years of his life—as far, at least, as personal improvement is concerned—for no one doubts that the most precious years of a youth's life are those embraced in the decade that follows his fourteenth year, or thereabouts. And what is true of boys in this respect applies equally to girls. Now, we happily have no instance of this most painful phenomenon amongst us in this land; in our Eastern Dependency, however, it is the established usage of the people—a usage which they are taught by their priests has its foundation in the will of Him who is the Ordainer of the destinies of all men. Thus is every Hindu child shut out by what he is taught to regard as the irresistible will of an inexorable God from all chance of self-improvement and social advancement; and however exceptional may be his natural abilities, or whatever may be the aspirations to which they prompt him, he is compelled to follow no better calling than the trade of his father, however depressing and degrading that may be. There is no reason why he may not be a Franklin, a Faraday, a Beethoven in embryo, yet he is doomed by this stupid custom of child-marriage to leave the world no wiser or better than he found it. What motive, indeed, have they to seek their intellectual and social amelioration, cramped as they are by every untoward circumstance, and consigned as they are to the social position of their fathers by common consent of society around them, and by customs which have for them all the force of Divine authority and all the inexorability of Divine law? The depression or perversion of the mental powers of the Hindus is in great measure attributable to that absence of motive to healthy exercise which characterizes the conditions of their lives,—conditions which owe their very existence to the mischievous blunder of marriage in early childhood. Thus are those fine intellectual faculties which the Hindu people, taken as a whole, obviously at one time possessed, stunted and rendered inoperative by confirmed disuse.

How much of promotion of the general good is thus lost through the best powers of a vast nation being from one generation to another left undeveloped and robbed of their chance, who shall say? We might form some faint conception if we could understand what would have been the condition of the civilized world at this moment if any such absurd law had been in vogue till now among the

nations of Europe. Nearly all the best men of England during the last three centuries have been men who have come from "the people"—many of them even from the very lowest strata of the population—and still they come. It is evident enough that this condition of prosperity and advancement (in which, it is to be observed, the whole nation shares) is owing to that liberty allowed to our youth to carve out for themselves the best career they can; and we may safely say that if any such ridiculous custom as that of child-marriage had been prevalent in this country, some of the noblest and most instructive examples of self-help and benefit to the public of which we are now so prond to boast, we should never have had at all.

Thus is child-marriage in India responsible for the consignment to lifelong poverty, obscurity, and uselessness, boys and girls who, if left free to choose for themselves, might be of lasting benefit to the nation to which they belong; and being, as it thus is, an effectual barrier to the social well-being of the individual, it is, by natural consequence, a fatal impediment to the advancement and happiness of the entire nation. It is not *just* to the rising generation of our fellow-subjects that they should be so circumstanced, and it clearly is the duty of the ruling power by all the means at its disposal to release the youthful population of India from the grievous incubus which the superstition and inhumanity of paganism have prepared for them. To urge that child-marriage is merely a custom of the people, and that we must not interfere to prevent the perpetration of its disgusting and mercenary tyranny, is not an act of charity, but of cowardly subterfuge or unmanly indifference. It clearly is a monstrous wrong that generation after generation of children should thus be handicapped in the race and weighted with burdens to which they were no parties; and if it is in our power to remedy the evil, there can be no two opinions as to our sole responsibility for its continuance. That the Government of India seeks the improvement of Hindu boys by means of its educational schemes is but cold irony; for as long as it declines to interpose for the abolition of child-marriage, it takes away with the one hand what it gives with the other.

Closely allied to the consideration of the effect of this evil practice upon the social life of our fellow-subjects is that of its baneful effect upon their morals. Now, although the moral condition of the subjects of Her Majesty is an affair with which, in the opinion of some, her Government has nothing to do, yet, clearly, the case is altered if it can be shown that the corruption of the people's morals is owing to a practice which Government has it in its power to

abolish. Now, the extreme looseness of the people of India in all respects affecting morals is a feature that catches the attention of any decent European who resides in the country for any length of time. The people in all grades and at all periods of life are corrupted to a degree that is happily unknown among us in this land. This result is as certain as the law of gravitation, and they could not avoid it, even if it should happen that any of them should wish to do so. "Can one go upon hot coals and his feet not be burned?" In saying this we are not speaking at random, but from actual knowledge. There is almost no restraint whatever among the people in conversation on subjects of an immoral kind. Such subjects form the very point and pith of many of their proverbial sayings; they infect, as a loathsome disease, the very words of their ordinary intercourse; they form the essence of their songs, and the purport and burden of all their quarrels and abuse; they absorb the thought alike of artist, sculptor, and poet; the very air is charged with immorality, and almost everywhere there is something ready to meet the eye or the ear which vividly reminds the people of things of which it is "a shame even to speak;" their conundrums, their enigmas, their charades, every ingenious device to which the imagination can be applied, derives from them its point and interest from its broader or more subtle attempts to lead the thoughts into channels of moral corruption, and these attempts are, in many instances, unredeemed by as much as the faintest gleam of genuine wit. We have chanced upon things exposed for sale in an Indian shop which, in any town or hamlet in England, would have led to the confiscation of the goods and to the proprietor's immediate incarceration; we have witnessed, in open day, and in the presence of a crowd of on-lookers, scenes enacted by the roadside which it would be impossible for us to name; and we have heard even small children, in the streets of an Indian city, discuss with grown-up men, matters which men of any decency among ourselves would never allow themselves to speak of, excepting in circumstances of sheer necessity and in the strictest privacy; and they have done this not only with unblushing and unhesitating publicity and loudness, but with an air of coolness which showed that, not in their thoughts merely, but also in their conversation, this was quite a habit of their lives. Is it possible, even to the most sanguine optimist, to conceive of any good arising from such a condition of things, or of the people who, from childhood up, are doomed to be under the influence of such surroundings, ever becoming better than they now are? Is it reasonable to expect that the people will improve in morals as long as there awaits them, on every hand,

at the very dawn of intelligence, knowledge whose only effect can be to corrupt their minds and weaken in them the power of virtuous resistance? No one pretends that we English people are immaculate, and that we are consequently entitled to "cast the first stone;" on the contrary, our condition would be no better than that of the people of India if we had inherited, as they have, the abominable usage of child-marriage. As long as we decline to legislate for the removal of this foul blot, it belongs, not to us, but to them to "cast the first stone." Whatever may be attempted, whether under Imperial authority or by private enterprise, for the moral improvement of the people, it clearly is impossible that they should reap any permanent benefit from such efforts, as long as we treat as a matter of indifference a custom which, with constant activity, militates against such a design.

We are quite prepared to hear it said that a man who has seen all this must have been hunting for it; and some will even seek to escape the force of such an accumulation of facts by affirming that such things can be but the reflection of the observer's own mind. We can only reply, that any man whose experience of life in India does not corroborate the representation here made must have been very exceptionally privileged. No man could really understand the languages and habits of the people, and live on anything like terms of intimacy with them, without feeling that ours is but a mild description. It is impossible to dwell upon such a subject without revulsion; we can only say that such things can be seen and known in India by any man who is not deficient in the faculty of ordinary observation. Not for the purpose of exposing the people to vituperation or contempt do we mention these things; for if evil has enjoyed an uninterrupted course among them for some thirty centuries, it is not easy to see how such a ricketty affair as human nature is to come very bright out of the ordeal. The point to which we are concerned to draw attention is that all these and many other indications of a condition of morality which we must all deplore, derive much of their currency and popularity from that state of general national corruption which is fostered by the indecent customs of child-marriage.

We know that some persons who have adopted extreme views regarding morals will contend that there is no harm in inducting young children into the mysterious connection with the practice. Such persons may find sympathizers among barbarous nations abroad and among the "dangerous classes" in our own gutters, but surely not elsewhere. It is not to such persons that humanity can turn for any help in the improvement of the condition of the fallen and ignor-

ant. These, however, do not represent *all* who would oppose reform in the direction we are now advocating; for there are some persons who, while entertaining all antipathy to usages that have an immoral tendency, object to reform in itself on some special ground or on general grounds. While entertaining all due respect for the judgment of such adversaries to our movement, we would venture to ask them a single question—Who among us would wish for the re-establishment of widow-burning in India, and of other inhuman customs which less than a century ago carried off their victims in thousands every year? Surely no one, excepting a Hindu priest—not even the most conservative man among us: even Horace Hayman Wilson, if he were here, would not, we may be sure, advocate a backward movement in regard to these matters. In like manner, it needs not a prophet's eye to perceive that not many years will have passed after the abolition of child-marriage, when even the most timid conservator of Hindu prejudices, or the most sympathetic latitudinarian, or the most enthusiastic antiquarian, will consider the Hindu people well rid of a custom in favour of which not a single reason can be advanced.

We know what will be urged on the ground of non-interference with the religious customs of the Hindus; but there clearly is all the difference in the world between making the people Christians by force and adopting measures which tend to their advancement in the matter of their social, moral, intellectual, and physical well-being. The Hindu people will not even be able to take rank among civilized nations as long as the custom of child-marriage obtains among them. Though it may not be the duty, even of a Christian Government, to compel its subjects, *nolens volens*, to embrace the religion of the Bible, there surely will be no diversity of opinion on this point—that it is the duty of a Government making such a profession, to remove, as far as it is competent to do so, any influence so inimical as child-marriage is to the well-being of the people it has undertaken to govern. What, indeed, is the very meaning of government, and what is the proper function of political ascendancy, if it be not to take cognisance of wrongs so patent, and of abuses so active and so injurious as this of child-marriage? Even if it be the case that, though we are a Christian nation, we have no *positive* duty in regard to the amelioration of the temporal condition of semi-barbarous peoples under our rule, at least let us have the candour to own that we are under this negative obligation of preventing them from doing each other actual harm. Not while this plague-spot continues will the Hindus be entitled to claim exemption from the catalogue of barbarous races, or be capable of possessing and exercising any

of the political functions of free and enlightened men, or do their share in helping the races of our Eastern dependency towards that civilized self-government which the British Government professes to be aiming at in their case.*

Child-marriage is clearly contrary to any requirement of nature. This is recognized by the very people themselves who practise it, for the children have to remain at home with their parents for years after the marriage is settled and past recal. And although among tribes and nations not blest with a Divine revelation very revolting customs have at times gained currency, yet this of the marriage of small children is known to be contrary, not to nature alone, but also to ancient custom, that is, to the customs of the people referred to in the oldest of all historical records—the Scriptures of the Jews. Not only is it unnatural, and consequently unjust and cruel; it is also degrading to the mind and character of all who have any share in it, for it ignores all the sanctity of conjugal union, and destroys all the beauty and happiness which properly appertain to married life. There obviously is no hope of the elevation of the people of India from their present helpless and debased condition as long as child-marriage continues to be permitted among them. If, therefore, it is indeed the desire and the intention of the British Government to make of the people of India a great nation, to place them well upon their feet in regard to all that relates to self-government, self-defence, and self-help—to make them, in fact, to be anything but a perpetual discredit and burden to us—we must secure that all such maudlin and emasculating usages as child-marriage shall go the way of widow-burning and other absurdities whose only plea of existence was the fattening of an idle, heartless, and immoral priesthood.

THE LAST DEBATE ON KANDAHAR.

KANDAHAR being about to be evacuated, and so the policy of the late Government in Afghanistan completely reversed, why, it may be asked, should the subject be discussed any longer? The reason is that that policy has met with its *reductio ad absurdum* in the speeches recently delivered in the House of Commons by Mr. Stanhope and Lord George Hamilton, and it is not unimportant to show how this is so. But before examining these speeches, I desire to call attention to certain revelations contained in the "Papers relating to the Occupation of Kandahar" which seem somehow to have escaped public observation. They are contained in the "Minute" from Lord Lytton, setting forth the "scientific frontier" which he and his Military Secretary, Sir George Colley, deemed essential to the securing of our Indian Empire, and in the "instructions" to Sir Neville Chamberlain previously to his setting out on his mission to the Ameer Shere Ali. Three reasons were assigned by the late Government and their supporters in justification of the war in Afghanistan. These were (1) the fear of the growing power of Russia in Central Asia; (2) the building up, upon our North-west frontier, of a "strong, friendly, and independent Afghanistan;" and (3) the acquisition of a "scientific frontier." The extracts which I am about to quote, will show that of these alleged reasons the first two are fabrications pure and simple; and that as regards the third, the "scientific frontier," was needed, not for the better defence of India, but for the purpose of carrying on offensive operations against the Russians in Central Asia.

The "Kandahar Correspondence" opens with a despatch from the Government of India, dated 9th September, 1878, enclosing a Minute from Lord Lytton, which, it needs no great astuteness to divine, was the joint production of himself and the late Sir George Colley. The arguments, the conclusions, the anticipations contained in this document are so absurd that it requires an effort to accept them as having been seriously intended. For example this:—

I conceive that it would be simply suicidal to allow Russia to establish herself peaceably and securely at Kabul, and extend her authority to our present

border and over the passes leading into India. . . . Her dream of a railway from the Caspian to Herat, and of a new and shorter line of communication with her Central Asian possessions would soon become a reality; and all her present difficulties of distances and communications would disappear.

Amazing! By simply adding a country, the size of France, to her present possessions in Central Asia, Russia's "present difficulties of distances would disappear," and the "dream of a railway," by the same magical process, "would become a reality." The age of miracles is evidently still in its infancy. The timid, however, may find comfort from the fact that these alarming consequences are to result only if Russia establishes herself in Afghanistan "*peaceably*." So also in the days of our infancy have we been told that a bird could be easily caught by the putting of salt on his tail. The putting of salt on a bird's tail is an operation a thousand times more practicable than a "*peaceable*" establishment of Russia in Afghanistan. "It is," says Lord Lytton in his Minute, "strange to what little practical purpose history is studied by some of our political prophets." It is indeed—passing strange. But notwithstanding these dismal anticipations of what would follow when Russia was "*peaceably*" established in Afghanistan, at the time of penning them, Lord Lytton had no fear of Russia at all. On the contrary, he held that her presence in Central Asia depended upon the forbearance of the Government of India, and that we could, whenever we pleased, take all her Central Asian possessions from her. He writes:—

War with Russia is not a thing to be lightly undertaken. . . . *In such a war we should doubtless be successful, for we can meet Russia with far superior forces on the Oxus.* But it is the consequences of success that we have to consider. We should probably stir up a Mahomedan rising throughout the Khanates, and we can realize the horrors of such a rising, if we picture to ourselves another Indian Mutiny, in which the mutineers would be supported by a victorious European army. *As we advance and drive the Russians out of Central Asia, and perhaps back to Orenburg,* our difficulties and responsibilities would increase. We cannot undertake the whole administration of Central Asia, nor prevent Russia stepping in to restore order in the countries which, by our withdrawal, we have abandoned to the wildest anarchy.

This amazing passage exhibits the stupendous ignorance which Lord Lytton and Colonel Colley applied to the rectification of our Indian Frontier. So far from being able to meet the Russians on the Oxus with a superior force, it would be impossible for us to get so much as a single British soldier to that river. Before we could place 20,000 troops upon the Oxus, at least 60,000 would be needed to preserve our communications. And even then, we could as easily advance and capture Moscow, as advance to Orenburg. The

passage, however, is important, as showing that the fear of Russia had nothing to do with the attack upon Shere Ali. How could it, when in this very Minute Lord Lytton gives the following description of the Russian position in Central Asia?—

The Russian frontier, from the Caspian to the Pamir Steppe, is about 1,200 miles long; 200 miles longer than our North-west frontier. . . . The fatal defect in this line is its want of inter-communication, and its distance from support. While every part of our frontier is within 200 miles of railway communication, and most of it much nearer; Tashkend, the centre of Russian power in Turkistan, is more than 1,000 miles from the nearest railway. . . . *The entire force that Russia with her vast military resources can maintain in Turkistan, does not exceed that which we maintain in the Punjab alone. It would be easier for us to collect 100,000 men at any point in our frontier than for Russia to collect 25,000 on hers.*

Fear of Russia, therefore, had nothing whatever to do with this war in Afghanistan.

The second reason urged in its justification was the obtaining on our North-west frontier "a strong, friendly, and independent Afghanistan." The publication of the "Kandahar, Correspondence" enables us for the first time to see exactly how Lord Lytton proposed to achieve this desirable consummation. The method is very clearly revealed in the "instructions" to Sir Neville Chamberlain:—

If it appears that we cannot find, in a friendly alliance with the Ameer, the necessary security for our North-western frontier, we must be prepared to take immediate steps for making the security of that frontier independent of him. The military measures proposed for this purpose have already been indicated, viz., the advance of a column to the head of the Kuram Valley, and the assembling of a force sufficient to threaten, and, if necessary, occupy Kandahar. . . . *If the Ameer still remains hostile, we should take no further action against him, beyond entering into negotiations with all the tribes and parties in Afghanistan who are unfriendly to him; and there is little doubt that his kingdom would fall to pieces of itself.*

It will be necessary to recall certain collateral circumstances before we are in a position to do justice to this plan for procuring the deposition and murder of the late Ameer Shere Ali, and the introduction of anarchy into Afghanistan. Almost from the day of his accession, the Ameer Shere Ali had been a warm and faithful ally of the British power in India. By dint of great ability, energy, and perseverance, he had redeemed Afghanistan from a state of civil commotion, and laid the foundations of law and order. It was not pretended that he had broken either the letter or the spirit of any engagement which he had contracted with us, at the time when his destruction was thus deliberately plotted by the Governor-Gen-

ral of India. It is true that the Viceroy says, that an attempt is first to be made to secure what he wants, by means of a "friendly alliance with the Ameer," but this only intensifies "the deep damnation of his taking off." For as all the world knows, not only was no such attempt made, but the Ameer was plied with insults and menaces with the manifest intention to goad him to some act of hostility against the British Government in India. And when these failed, the base and cowardly fiction of the "insult" to General Chamberlain's Mission was had recourse to, in order to furnish the semblance of a *casus belli*. I do not believe that the history of modern Europe will furnish anything to surpass the wickedness of this transaction. Not content, however, with the murder of Shere Ali, and the introduction of anarchy into Afghanistan, Lord Lytton looked forward to extending the sphere of his operations to Persia. He says:—

If, in the course of the convulsions which may be expected to precede and follow the fall of the Ameer [*i.e.*, battle, murder, and famine] Herat should fall into the hands of Persia. . . . we should insist on its immediate restoration. This, however, is to be attained, not by an expedition marched across the whole breadth of Afghanistan, but by pressure [*i.e.*, by the slaughter of Persians] applied to the exposed southern provinces of Persia, as in 1857. *Russia cannot there help her*; and Persia must either submit to the loss of some of her most important provinces, or resign Herat.

Thus we see that, at a time when in this country the late Government and its organs were denouncing the greed and unscrupulousness of Russia, they were, in India, secretly maturing a policy which would, they anticipated, certainly lead to the murder of the Ameer Shere Ali, and anarchy in Afghanistan, and not improbably to a war with Persia, and the expulsion of Russia from the Khanates of Central Asia, accompanied by all the horrors which had marked the Indian Mutiny.

The solitary object for which these atrocious crimes were to be committed was the acquisition of a "scientific frontier." Lord Lytton, when in India, kept his own *Times* correspondent, and just before the outbreak of the war, this correspondent took occasion to describe Lord Lytton as a "specially gifted Viceroy," who being possessed of "broad statesmanlike views," and "great natural capacity," fortified by "the close cultivation of political science, and the highest order of state-craft," had elaborated "an extensive concerted scheme for the protection of India"—to wit, the "scientific frontier." Now, did Kandahar form any part of this frontier? Unquestionably it did not. On the contrary, on *that* side of India

we are declared to be quite safe without the possession of Kandahar, and the "scientific frontier" is independent of that place.

While we, securely established at Quetta, can at any moment descend on the plains of Kandahar, or advance to meet our adversary in the open field, no enemy can debouch on our plains without first besieging and taking Quetta—a task of no slight difficulty, and involving much loss of precious time, and then forcing a long and difficult pass held by us. *But on the northern and more directly exposed portions of our frontier, our line is as fatally defective as ever.*

And again :—

From a military point of view our position [at Quetta] leaves little to be desired . . . and though we can never allow Kandahar to fall into the hands of a rival Power . . . *I do not consider that its occupation would actually strengthen our western frontier.*

The "scientific frontier," for which Shere Ali was to be deposed and murdered, and its especial purposes are described as follows :—

When the occasion arises India must be defended by a vigorous offensive; *and in choosing our line of contact with Russia we have to consider what facilities it offers for striking quick and hard even more than what protection it affords.* Bearing this in mind, a study of the map will show the immense importance to us of the triangle formed by Kabul, Ghuznee, and Jellalabad with the possession of the passes over the Hindu Kush. Defensively, this position, entrenched behind a rampart of mountains, and with its communications unassailable, directly commands the central group of roads . . . *offensively it gives the power of debouching at will on the plains of the Oxus, and threatens every point of Russia's extended frontier.*

The foregoing extracts have, I think, established the following conclusions. The war in Afghanistan was determined on by no dread of Russia, but with the intention of assailing her in Central Asia. The "scientific frontier" was sought after, not for the protection of India, but "for the facilities it offered for striking Russia quick and hard." Kandahar formed no part of this frontier, because it offered no such facilities. But the experiences gained in Northern Afghanistan by Sir Frederick Roberts and his troops sufficed to convince even the men who devised this wild and ridiculous frontier that the facilities it gave the Afghans for striking us quick and hard were very largely in excess of those we should obtain for so striking the Russians. And so, the evacuation of Northern Afghanistan, and the relinquishment of the entire object for which the war was undertaken, had been decided before Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues returned to office. The retention of Kandahar may be right or wrong, but its retention formed no part of the policy of the late Government,

and its abandonment is not, therefore, a reversal of it. The late Government had no policy in Afghanistan unless the idle dreams of Lord Lytton and Sir George Colley about driving the Russians back to Orenburg are to be dignified by the name of a policy. These two personages plunged the Empire into an Afghan war for an object which any man possessed of common sense, and not wholly ignorant of history and geography, would have known at the outset to be unattainable. And then, all their plans having broken down, all their anticipations having been falsified by the event, the object for which they went to war having been relinquished as unattainable, they and their confederates substituted at the last moment an entirely new policy—a policy which, until now, none have condemned more strongly than themselves. Listen, for example, to Sir Henry Rawlinson on the “Annexation of Kandahar” when it did not form a part of the immediate political programme:—

I have never advocated annexation *pur et simple*, nor would I give my adhesion to such a doctrine at the present crisis, except as a last resort. . . . I look with extreme apprehension at the prospect of introducing among the wild tribes of Kandahar without previous training our tax-gatherers and police, our law courts, our vagaries of over-education, and above all our missionaries. We have no experience in India . . . of the difficulty of administering the affairs of a province inhabited exclusively by Mahomedans. . . . If we are driven by force of circumstances to annex, we must, I submit—at any rate at first—employ a full Native machinery for all details of administration, keeping our European official supervision entirely in the background. Otherwise the friction will be insupportable.

We are now in a position to estimate, at their true value, the arguments used in the Commons against the withdrawing from Kandahar.

The speeches of Mr. Stanhope, Lord George Hamilton, and others were remarkably free from any definite reasons in favour of the retention of Kandahar. The argument on which they mainly relied was the argument based on authority. The great Indian “specialists” (so they averred) and the majority of the members of the Governor-General’s Council were opposed to the policy of the Government. So much the worse, it may be retorted, for the reputation of these great Indian “specialists” and the majority of the Governor-General’s Council. It is, however, noteworthy that while one Tory speaker after another harped upon this argument of “authority,” there was not one among them who ventured to adduce any of the arguments whereby these “authoritative” gentlemen supported the policy which they advocated. And herein, without

doubt, they showed a commendable prudence. The members of the Governor-General's Council are officials who draw very high salaries, but to suppose that any special value attaches to their opinion on questions of Afghan policy is to betray an entire ignorance of the constitution of the Council to which they belong. The members of the Council who, at present, most vehemently object to the abandonment of Kandahar are Mr. Rivers Thompson, Mr. Gibbs, and Mr. Whitley Stokes. All these are very worthy and quite commonplace individuals, but they have no claim to be listened to with deference on the question of what our policy should be in Afghanistan. They were nominated members of the Governor-General's Council—Mr. Rivers Thompson because of his knowledge of Lower Bengal and Burmah, Mr. Gibbs to represent the needs of the Bombay Presidency, and Mr. Whitley Stokes as legislative member—but outside of their own special departments, no exceptional weight attaches to any opinions they may please to express. Another gentleman on whose support the Opposition largely relied in this debate is Sir Richard Temple. Poor Sir Richard! An official career of quite inexplicable prosperity was marred just as he seemed to have within his grasp the highest prize of all. Sir Richard made the unfortunate mistake of supposing that Jingoism would live for ever—or, at any rate, for his time—so he cast overboard the professions of a lifetime, separated himself from the men of the Law-rence "school" in which he had been brought up, and stood for East Worcestershire on a Tory platform. Nothing now remains for the luckless Sir Richard except to make the best of a bad job, and stand boldly by the opinions which, in an evil hour, he adopted. But Conservative speakers reveal only the weakness of their case when they lay such special stress upon Sir Richard Temple's disinterested conversion. And now let us see what Mr. Stanhope has to urge in favour of the retention of Kandahar:—

Let them, first of all, examine the manner in which the late Government proposed to deal with it. The taunt had been more than once levelled at them, and it was the chief argument in the November despatch of the noble lord the Secretary of State for India, that they did not, in the arrangements which the late Government thought it necessary for the security of their frontier to make in the Treaty of Gandamak, recommend the retention of Kandahar. That was quite true, and the explanation was simple enough. While Afghanistan remained united under one ruler in whom they had confidence, who had negotiated a friendly treaty with them and had undertaken to conduct his foreign relations in accordance with their advice, it was not only unnecessary to maintain so advanced a position in addition to the Khyber and Kuram Valleys, but it was on political grounds undesirable. But when, unfortunately, the light of subsequent events conclusively demonstrated to the Government of India that it was necessary to

revert to the former condition of affairs in Afghanistan, because no one ruler could be found at once suitable and strong, a very different state of things had to be dealt with. It could no longer be hoped that British influence could be maintained in that country by the community of interest which it was the object of the Treaty of Gandamak to establish; and it became necessary, in the opinion of the Government of India, to establish a British garrison in Southern Afghanistan where it could exercise a paramount influence. Now, that there were objections to such a proposal no candid man wished to deny. But so there were to the occupation of the Punjab. And so there were objections to the retention of a large British garrison at Peshawur. But it was felt that a strategical position of that character, connected with their frontier and with the sea by an efficient railway running through a belt of territory under British administration, would give them military security, and enable them to a great extent to disregard the scares which for forty years had at short intervals caused so much anxiety to the Government of India. Let him quote the words of one who had been constantly mentioned in their discussions, and never mentioned without being admitted to be our greatest authority upon strategical questions—he meant Sir E. Hamley. Sir E. Hamley said: “With a garrison strongly posted in its lines at Kandahar, with all the routes and stages by which our forces might be assembled on that point, all sources of supply, and all arrangements for transport laid down, as our trained staff officers are certainly capable of laying them down, we might view calmly any possible complications before us, whether arising from the augmented military power of Russia in the East, from the success of her intrigues, or from her open hostility. (Hear, hear.) The grounds of our assurance would be manifest and easily understood, our Native subjects would soon learn to appreciate them, and what would be security for us would be tranquillity for India.” (Hear, hear.) Well, that was their plan. Hon. gentlemen might say that it was too large or too small, or what they liked; but the late Government claimed for it that it was an honest and (as they believed) a statesmanlike attempt to arrive at a settlement of this very difficult question.

The answer to this is, that this policy, whether good or bad, is not and never has been the policy of Mr. Stanhope and the Government of which he was a member. And of this Mr. Stanhope must be well aware. The late Government had no policy with regard to Afghanistan which lasted more than two or three months, before it was replaced by an entirely new one, and their present policy has not any resemblance to that sketched by Mr. Stanhope. It is a policy which requires this country to annex 75,000 square miles of barren, defenceless territory, inhabited by a hostile population, and begirt about by fierce and turbulent tribes, with whom we should live in chronic hostility. This policy is so preposterously absurd as a measure of defence, the burdens it would impose upon India are so tremendous and so indefinite, that it is not strange that Mr. Stanhope and the speakers on his side should attempt to substitute something else in its place. All the more necessary is it, that this covering of specious phraseology should be stripped away, and the policy disclosed in all its natural and proper absurdity. As Mr. Stanhope thus carefully

avoided stating the alternative policy which the Government *must* follow if they do not withdraw from Kandahar, it is unnecessary to go further into his arguments and objections beyond calling attention to this one fact. All his arguments to show that the expense of holding Kandahar would not be ruinous, that it might become a great commercial centre, that a railway would be a civilizing agency of immense power, imply that our occupation of Kandahar was to be a permanent one. They, in fact, involve that policy of annexation with its indefinite responsibilities which Mr. Stanhope is so careful not to defend explicitly. Now let us observe what Lord George Hamilton has to say on this point:—

Lord G. Hamilton said they had had the advantage of hearing from the other side of the House a number of able speeches, and as to one of these, he must congratulate the hon. member for Leeds on maintaining in his first speech the ability which he displayed in a contested election in which they were both engaged. (Hear, hear.) But in the Ministerial speeches there was one remarkable defect, and that was, they were not applicable to the motion which was before the House. In all it was assumed that the motion purposed to pledge the House irrevocably to the perpetual occupation of Kandahar. If such a motion were made, he would candidly admit he should have grave doubts as to its expediency. (Ministerial cheers.) There was an obvious disadvantage in coming to an irrevocable decision, and he should not be willing to support such a motion. But the motion related merely to the time at which the Government insisted on evacuating Kandahar. (Hear, hear.)

But if this be so, what becomes of that "honest and statesmanlike settlement" whereof we have just had so glowing a description from Mr. Stanhope, whereby Kandahar was to be converted into a great frontier fortress, like Metz or Strasburg, connected by lines of railway with the sea-coast of our Indian Empire? The fact is that the Conservative Party and their leaders having embraced a policy of "drift" in Afghanistan, the position of Lord G. Hamilton is the *reductio ad absurdum* to which such a policy naturally leads. How marvellous were to be the effects which were to follow, which indeed had followed, upon this war! Results "incalculably beneficial to both countries" were to flow from the Treaty of Gundamuk. The "atheistic" and "inhuman" policy of his predecessors had been overthrown by that eminent "soldier of the Lord," our modern Cromwell, Lord Lytton; and we had, in consequence, got "the gates of India," a "strong and friendly Afghanistan;" and all India was looking on, speechless with admiration (assisted, it is true, by a Press Gagging Act), at the achievements of Lord Beaconsfield's Government. And now, having expended twenty millions of money, and lives which cannot be counted—having filled Afghanistan with anarchy and turmoil,—we are told by one of the noisiest champions of

Lord Lytton's policy that the entire difference between this new policy and the old is—whether Kandahar shall be evacuated a little sooner or a little later. So, after all, the Tory chiefs are as little convinced as the Liberals by all the arguments, military, political, and commercial, which have been urged in favour of the annexation of Kandahar. All they want is merely to wait there a little longer, and see what next will turn up—all they ask of the Ministry is not to depart too precipitately from a policy of "drift." Mr. Stanhope describes the policy of the Government as "a policy of masterly surrender." It is impossible to give to the policy of their predecessors so precise a definition, but having regard to the magnificent promises with which it began, and its most lame and impotent conclusion, it may be compared to certain roads which are said to be found in the wilder parts of the United States. These begin magnificently with trees planted on each side, but dwindle by swift degrees, first to a footpath, then to a squirrel track, and finally run up a tree.

ROBERT D. OSBORN, Lieut.-Colonel.

AUSTRALIAN NOTES.

I.

It would be well to note Australian conditions under aboriginal occupation before the pioneers of European settlement have gone over to the majority. Dr. Pye Smith, in writing of Australia, maintained that the Deluge had not extended to that country, inasmuch as nearly all the animals that existed there before its discovery are peculiar to itself. The Aborigines have, in common with most races of men, the tradition of a Deluge. This tradition may have been brought by the race who first peopled Australia. This people may also have introduced the dog, which became wild, and spread over the country. When New Zealand was discovered, the rat was the largest quadruped found there. This was a low type of rat, which, as in Britain, has since been superseded by the Norway rat. According to the Australian tradition of the Deluge, there was, a long time ago, a great flood, which covered the tops of the highest mountains, but a portion of the human race escaped, as they were, for the time, turned into ducks. The Malays have also a traditional account of the Deluge, by which it appears that their forefathers who survived, lost all but their weapons of war, and that the Chinese lost all but their books.

We find also amongst these aboriginal races a tradition of the fall of man from a state of happiness. The Australian tradition on the Wimmera tells of a tall pine tree by means of which the sons of men had communication with the regions above. Through their own misconduct, this tree was burnt down, and when fallen, it reached thirty miles across the plains. After this disaster there was neither peace, nor happiness amongst them. According to Malay traditions, there was, in former ages, a ladder which reached from earth to heaven; but this ladder was attacked by a worm, which caused it to fall, thus cutting off such communication.

Wallace, in his "Indian Archipelago," gives a very interesting account of the peculiar fauna and flora of Australia. The dividing line with that of India is a strait in the Malay Archipelago, which strait is twenty miles in width. This is the line of demarcation.

There are, however, certain varieties which have crossed the line for some distance on either side. There is in Australia a peculiar species of bird which the Aborigines call the Lowan. These birds are gregarious, and collect a heap of vegetable matter, which they cover with two feet of sand. The eggs, of which the mound may contain a barrowful, are hatched by the heat thus generated, and the young birds make their way out of this depth of sand, and are able to shift for themselves, as they feed upon ants which abound in the selected localities.

There are birds of similar habits in Malasia, but their arrangements are less complicated, as they are not gregarious. They come from a distance of thirty miles or so to the sea-coast, make a hole in the sand in which to deposit their eggs, which are duly hatched without further trouble, and the young have the power of flight, and can provide for themselves as soon as hatched.*

It is generally known that the Australian Aborigines did not attempt the cultivation of the soil. There is a species of rice, however, which is indigenous to the country, and this they used as food when available. According to their style of occupation, about 16,000 acres were required as the hunting ground for a family. The population was kept down by infanticide, famine, and intestine wars. The normal population of that island-continent was probably about 500,000. There is even less than the usual data by which to judge of the period of human occupation there, but one fact may be mentioned. A well was being sunk in the interior, in a plain which is five miles wide, and showing no signs of disturbance of the strata. When a depth of sixty-eight feet was reached the ashes of a camp fire were found, and also the decayed leaves of trees, together with a portion of a human skull. I have this information on the most reliable authority, and may add that the bone was declared by an anatomist to belong to a human skull. It has been stated in the newspapers that a human skull was found in the gold workings in California at a depth of 100 feet, but I will not affirm the truth of the report.

It has been stated in a recent geological work that in the strata in Switzerland there was found petrified wood of the Kanri pine, which now exists only in New Zealand. It appears further that in Bagshot Heath, in England, the wood of the Australian Honey-suckle (*Banksia*) was found in a petrified state. I have seen petrified specimens of this wood which had been found in Tasmania, the pores being filled with silica, and the grain of the wood clearly distinct.

* Wallace's "Indian Archipelago," vol. i. p. 417.

Australia has had its period of gigantic animals. The remains of a species of wombat, a burrowing marsupial, have been found in South Australia, the skull of which was about four feet long. The remains of a marsupial tiger have been found also. These discoveries remind one of the *savant* who was collecting gigantic fossil remains in Buenos Ayres, but the Aborigines protested against their removal, saying, "Take our silver and gold if you will, but do leave us the bones of our ancestors." It may be remarked in passing that the geological formation in parts of New Zealand is much like that of Switzerland, and that the soil of Bagshot Heath is suitable for the honeysuckle tree.

It is providentially arranged that, notwithstanding the heat of the Australian climate, water does not become stagnant as in Britain. Few of the Australian rivers run more than half the year, and some cease to run for years in succession; but the channels being scooped into holes by the current, and having been more recently improved by excavations and embankments, a supply is generally retained, which keeps fit for use as long as it lasts. Along the south-western coast, as far north as King George's Sound, it is generally a limestone formation, with cavernous underground channels which pass the drainage to the coast. This is the case especially about Mount Gambier, a hill of volcanic origin, having a lake in its crater. From one of these underground channels fish have issued which were destitute of eyes. In wells sunk there to a depth of 100 feet or so, the water when reached was found to be flowing towards the sea-coast. It is found that a well by this coast, in which the water is quite fresh, rises and falls with the tide. Careful observation has shown that this fresh water discharges below high-water level when the tide is out, and is backed up by the rising tide without contamination. The Rev. Dr. Steele, in his "New Hebrides," says that when a well was sunk on the coast of one of those islands, fresh water was found which rose and fell with the tide. A spring of fresh water rises so strongly in the sea, off the coast of South America, that animals swim out into the sea to drink. The Rev. J. E. Woods says, in his "Geology of South Australia:" "There is a curious circumstance connected with the underground drainage, which, in any older country, would surely have been invested with some ghostly legend. Every evening during the early part of summer distant groanings are heard, like the lowing of a large herd of cattle, and very resonant, near a few swamps—such, for instance, as that near Limestone Ridge. Generally three such echoing sounds are heard, and then about half an hour's repose. I believe the sounds are entirely due to a column of air resisting a column of

water which is draining through the limestone, and finally being driven back or forward according to the periodical increase of the weight of water. To one ignorant of the cause the sounds are mournful and startling in the extreme; and they are not heard in the day, probably because there are so many other sounds of cattle, &c., to mingle and be confused with them." The most singular source of water-supply is in the Persian Gulf, where divers take down leathern bottles and fill them from springs at the bottom of the sea. On the site of ancient Tyre there is a very copious spring which has been walled round in ancient times to a height of twenty feet, and thus affords a water power which works eight mills. The Arabs say that Solomon brought this water by an underground channel from Damascus, which is eighty miles distant; but travellers may see a lake on the Lebanon range which has a copious supply of water poured into it, but has no visible outlet accounting for this spring.

The "mound springs" of Central Australia are a very interesting feature of the country. In the Journals of the Geographical Society for 1855, '56, '57, may be found several papers on the subject. The papers by Parry and Babbage are specially valuable. These mounds, which are often met with on extensive plains, vary in height from 20 to 120 feet. They are conical, and the water rises through a tubical aperture in the centre to the top. They are composed of calcareous tufa, inclosing fragments of plants, chiefly the roots of reeds, sedge grass, and polygonum, mixed with drifted sand or earth; resulting from drifted dust from the surrounding soil. Some of these springs are hot, and all appear to have a higher temperature than the mean of the district. As the country is not volcanic, the increased warmth is probably owing to the depth to which the water has been led by the dip of the strata in its course from distant mountains. The mounds have probably been formed around the original surface orifices of the springs by the gradual deposition of the earthy matters held in solution and suspension by the water, aided by the drifted sand and dust, and the vegetation that grew on the moistened ground. There is generally a good deal of green vegetation on and about the mounds, and they soon get trodden down and (to a certain extent) destroyed when cattle, &c., are allowed access to them. It seems probable that their existence in Australia may be owing to the absence of any aboriginal animal sufficiently heavy to tread them down or disturb their gradual formation. It is understood that some of these mounds are formed of siliceous instead of calareous tuff.

The town of Christchurch, in New Zealand, is unique in its

water-supply. There is a stratum of clay extending to the town, from mountains that are forty miles distant. The thickness of this deposit in the town is from forty to seventy feet. Tube wells are driven to the requisite depth, and the water flows freely and constantly from the nozzle of the tube. These tubes are put down in three days or so, and the town is thus supplied with water in abundance. When a screw pile was being put down for a jetty on the South Australian coast, fresh water was struck, which flowed from the top of the pile, ten feet above the surface of the sea. The French Chargé d'Affaires at Guatemala tells of an intermittent and most abundant spring in that country, which, being probably supplied by a natural siphon, runs for seven years and then ceases to flow for the same period. It is surmised by one of the writers connected with "Palestine Exploration," that the pool of Bethesda was supplied by a siphon. It may be mentioned in passing that a portion of stone piping, being in lengths of two feet, the orifice fifteen inches, and jointed as iron pipes now are, has been laid in ancient times to connect Solomon's pools with Jerusalem. The work shows that the engineers who were employed understood the principle of conveying water over hills in pipes, but they had not the requisite material.

Not only the aqueducts of the ancients, but the tunnels they made for the conveyance of water, evince great engineering skill. In Cameron's "Our Future Highway" we find a description of a tunnel some miles in length for supplying water to a town near the River Euphrates. The late General Chesney, in his "Euphrates Expedition," describes one such tunnel forty miles in length. Instead of being arched internally, they were lined with rings of baked clay, the opening thus provided being large enough for a man to walk through. There were shafts at intervals for the removal of the soil or other material. At page 229 of his work, General Chesney describes a tunnel under the Euphrates which has not, perhaps, been completed when attempted.

Reverting to Australia, the supply of water is all-important in that climate. The minimum rainfall is so low in some places in seasons of drought as three inches in a year. On the other hand, as may be seen in the published account of the "American Exploring Expedition," during its stay in Sydney, twenty-two inches of rain fell in twenty-four hours. In Queensland, forty-four inches has fallen in forty-eight hours. A similar rainfall has occurred in India, and may be found recorded in the "Encyclopædia Britannica." It is not surprising that this great rainfall has caused rivers in New South Wales to rise seventy feet above the running level. The River Darling, when first discovered by Sturt, had failed to run,

perhaps, for years, and the water was quite salt, owing to springs in the channel, which was followed down forty miles, but no water was found that was fit for use. Owing to the stocking of the country, and the consequent solidification of the soil, the Darling is now generally navigable for some months each year. The fall in its course for some hundreds of miles is but four inches per mile. As the banks of this river are higher than the country adjoining, when a flood occurs, the water sometimes spreads to a breadth of forty miles. Such rivers may cease to run for months or even for years, and then come down in large volume, though there has been no local rainfall. An unfortunate sheep-farmer was removing his stock from the Darling to the back country for the winter, and they came to a dry water-hole, into which they rushed, until 800 of them were smothered. A fortnight later, a flood came down the creek and drowned 2,000 more. The rain which caused the flood found the wool from this station exposed on the river bank, and the whole clip was destroyed by spontaneous combustion.

Sir Thomas Mitchell, in his exploration in what is now known as Queensland, found a species of fish that survives though the water fails. It buries itself in the mud, waits the return of better times, and thus shows a survival of the fittest. Fish are often met with in Australian lakes that are dry occasionally. The Murray Cod resembles the Pike in its habits, and sometimes attains a weight of 120 lbs. The Aborigines, when they find these fish shy in taking the bait, dive into the Murray and spear them under water. Wells had been sunk in the channel of one of its tributaries, and when it ceased to run the fish took refuge in the wells, but the blacks dived down and secured them. A baited hook being left upon a line in the Murray over night, a codfish weighing 70 lbs. was caught by the morning; the bait was first taken by a fish of 8 lbs., which was afterwards swallowed by the larger one. It is said that some of the South Sea Islanders use the Remora, a fish having a sucking disc on its head, for the purpose of catching other fish. With a ring put upon its tail, to which a line is attached, it appears that this fish enables them to secure their prey.

Reverting to the Deluge, in his work on the Euphrates Expedition, General Chesney describes the style of building vessels, as practised there, for traffic on the river. These vessels are of basket-work on a framework of stakes, the vessel being coated internally and externally with pitch or bitumen. General Chesney was of opinion that Noah's Ark may have been constructed in that way. As to the migrations of the human race, it is known that people have been drifted in canoes in the South Seas for a distance of 1,500 miles. The Maori race have distinct traditions of their migration from the

Fiji Islands some 500 years since. This voyage of 1,000 miles was deliberately undertaken by certain leaders who had a number of canoes. The Maories supplanted an inferior race that had been in occupation of New Zealand; a remnant of this lower race probably exists on the Chatham Islands.

A singular escape from the perils of the sea occurred near the South Australian coast, and is given on the best authority. A boat with two white men and several natives was swamped eleven miles from the coast; one of these Aborigines and one of the white men swam to the shore. This survivor afterwards took the native woman to be his wife, by whom he had two daughters, and one of them was married to a man who afterwards became heir to a baronetcy. A collision which occurred between two steamers in the night off that coast shows the wonderful nature of animal instinct. One of these steamers sank after the crew and passengers were rescued. There was a horse on board that got adrift and swam to the shore, nine miles, in the night, and then went forty miles inland to his usual pasture. Instinct gave him the direction both by water and by land, and his strength brought him through. Another case of shipwreck may be mentioned, where a lady passenger, though unable to swim, floated on her back for half an hour, and was saved. A very wicked remark was made by one who was told the story—viz., "the most singular circumstance was that a woman could keep her mouth shut so long."

There was a severe drought in Australia from 1836 to 1839; for three years the Wimmera River failed to run, and Lake Hindmarsh, in which that river usually terminates, was dry. Exploring sheep farmers followed this river down, at that time, for a distance of forty miles without finding water, and considered it a desert country. When rains came after this period of drought, the country was occupied with stock, and the Wimmera has not failed to run in any subsequent year. When heavy rains fell, before the stocking of the country, the soil being loose, was so boggy as to be in many parts almost impassable for vehicles or horses. When Sir Thomas Mitchell explored this region in 1836, he had the greatest difficulty in getting through, owing to the boggy nature of the soil. His dray-tracks could be seen thirty years afterwards. The soil is now firm and passable. The Wimmera is of a peculiar character, as it receives tributaries on the south side, and, when running strong, gives off streams to the north. These, as well as the Wimmera, terminate in lakes, and the water is disposed of by evaporation. Notwithstanding the evaporation of the whole rainfall in a basin of 7,000 square miles, the local rainfall does not average so much as eighteen inches.

Local evaporation does not appear to affect the rainfall. A large area of this region is now under cultivation, but the farmers suffer not only from occasional drought, but also from the rabbit pest.

The south-west coast of Australia appears to be gradually rising. Islands and shoals show it plainly during the last forty years. It is alleged that Hobson's Bay, near Melbourne, is silting up; but this gradual elevation of the land, which is observed near Adelaide, may account for the decrease in depth. In making an artesian bore on the Wimmera plains, the trunk of a tree, which was six feet in diameter, was passed through at a depth of several hundred feet.

It has been said repeatedly that the Australian Aborigines have been murdered and exterminated by the original colonists. Howitt, in his "Colonization and Christianity," brings this charge against colonists generally; but, after a lengthened residence in Victoria he withdraws the charge as far as his observation extended. It should be understood that Victoria, and other Australian colonies, have maintained a protectorate for the Aborigines, and have provided reserves of land and food and clothing for all, and also schools for the young. It is the natural course of events, however, that an inferior shall give place to a superior race.

The language of these people, like that of the Maories, is constantly changing. The name of some animal or natural object is conferred upon a person, and after death the name of the deceased must not be mentioned. The Australian Aborigines have a learned language in use amongst them, which is understood by the initiated in far distant tribes. This may be a survival of the mother tongue.

It is interesting to observe the connecting links between very distant races. The Syrian mills, which have been referred to above, may be given as an example; the water wheels in these mills approximate to the turbine wheel. After having examined them with much interest in Syria and Palestine, I found in a museum in Ballymoney, in Ireland, a wheel which had been discovered in a bog, imbedded in peat, and in the course of a mill stream. This was quite the counterpart of the wheels that are used in Syria. There is no tradition of such mill wheels having been used in Ireland. Williamson, in his "Travels in North China," vol. i., page 283, describes mills of quite the same character as those still in use in Syria. There is a flour mill in Cephalonia of a unique description. The sea water has a fall of eight feet into a crevice in the rocks, and is used as a water-power; it does not appear how the water is disposed of, but the supply is abundant.

CHARLES WILSON.

Choltenham.

HOME AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE peace with the Boers is a great achievement. Many peaceful triumphs are, we confidently hope, still in store for Mr. Gladstone's Government, but none, we are assured, more beneficent than this. It will mark an epoch in the history of our international relations even more memorable than the reference of the Alabama Claims to the decision of the Geneva Tribunal. It exhibits, almost for the first time in the history of mankind, the spectacle of a great nation, at the moment of encountering defeat, forbearing to put forth its strength and crush its adversary, because its cause was not just. It is the rectitude of the claims of the Boers which has conquered the might of England. For the courage which has thus yielded obedience to the law of an enlightened conscience, Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues deserve and will receive the gratitude of their country and of humanity at large. The attitude, too, of the Liberal Party during this most momentous crisis, is full of happy augury for the future. It shows, that the "enthusiasm of humanity" which carried the late elections was no temporary or transient exaltation of public sentiment, but the voice of the nation speaking from a moral height on which it was securely established. The nation has now clearly recognized that there is a law of righteousness controlling human affairs to which all national acts must conform themselves if we desire to be truly prosperous. And there can be no doubt that it was their clear, unwavering apprehension of this signal truth which gave Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues the strength and the support which enabled them to act as they have done.

While fully acknowledging that the Government has done the best which, under the circumstances, could have been expected from it, we must point out that the truest political wisdom would have been found in withdrawing altogether from the Transvaal, and leaving the Boers to the independence they had before the fraudulent acts of Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Theophilus Shepstone. Few reasonable people who have studied the matter, any longer doubt that the stories of Boer cruelty to the Natives were simply falsehoods fabricated in the same mint from which so much of that species of currency was palmed off upon the British public. But even had they been true, there is an overwhelming reason against our taking upon ourselves additional responsibilities in regard to the Native races, and that is that we do not and cannot fulfil those which we have already undertaken. Look at these poor Basutos. Nobody denies that they are the most civilised, the best educated, the most progressive tribe of Kaffirs with whom we have come into contact. Nobody denies (except officially) that in their quarrel with the irresponsible Sprigg they are wholly and entirely in the right. And yet what do we see? This tribe is being exterminated; the civilization we profess to desire to see established in South Africa, subjects of the Queen are engaged in violently uprooting; the war is being carried on in a spirit of ferocity which recalls the expeditions of Jenghiz Khan and Tamerlane, and the Ministry look on like men enchanted—impotent for evil or for good. Of what use, then, is it for us to promise to protect more and more Kaffirs when we see the extermination of these Basutos

going on under our eyes, and declare that we are powerless to arrest it? As to protecting the Natives from the Boers, we have already had abundant experience of what that means. The pretext given for the annexation was that the Boers were unable to protect themselves from the Natives, and to give them this protection, we slaughtered 10,000 Zulus, and ravaged the country of Sekokoeni with a ferocity which could not be surpassed. The fact is that of the relations between the Colonists and the Natives the authorities in England never learn, until it is too late, more than the colonial side. The Colonists, by a series of acts of aggression, first exasperate a Kaffir tribe and then declare its massacre to be absolutely necessary for the safety of the colony. The Colonial Office never hears or knows anything of the matter until, as in the case of the Basutos, the Zulus, Langlibatele and his tribe, it is too late to do anything beyond expressing a plaintive official regret that another Kaffir tribe is in process of extermination. The plunder and massacre of a Kaffir tribe may be said to be inevitable as soon as it has been announced that it has been taken under the protection of the British Crown, and that, for a very obvious reason. Such a state of protection brings a tribe into closer and more constant relations with British officials than would otherwise be the case, and when this is so, sooner or later, some ground of offence or suspicion will be given to our officials, and then a British official knows no mercy. The tribe will be wiped out of existence. For though brave enough in a certain way, no people upon earth are so subject to irrational panic as the British, and when in one of these fits of panic, there is no civilised people so merciless and so unjust. Regarding himself, as the Britisher invariably does when brought into contact with people having dark skins, as a heaven-sent agency for their civilization, an insurrection against himself he regards as a revolt against the counsels of Divine Providence, which he is bound to punish according to the good old practice of the Old Testament. It is, therefore, idle for us to suppose that we can protect the Natives against the Boers. When the moment for action arrives, we shall, beyond a doubt, find ourselves ranged on the side of the Boers against the Natives. A protectorate of the Transvaal, if it is to be more than a name, carries within it the germs of many Kaffir wars, of responsibilities and embarrassments of indefinite extent.

We have, in those columns, repeatedly pointed out that there is an easy escape from these responsibilities and embarrassments—that is, to cut the tie which binds us to our Colonial Possessions. We have pointed out that the value which many people attach to a Colonial Empire is a survival of the days of Protection. When the markets of Europe were closed by prohibitive duties against the commodities of Great Britain, there was, at least, a plausibility in obtaining other markets by means of colonies. But even this doubtful good has long ago disappeared. To suppose that our colonies are any longer a source of strength or wealth to us, is to suppose that an athlete with a man standing on his shoulders is stronger and more active than the same athlete without the man. Hitherto our voice has been that of one crying in the wilderness; but we rejoice to find that we are no longer the solitary prophet in Israel. We have found a distinguished ally—no less a one than the *Times* itself. There is always a certain insecurity about our august contemporary. It has an unpleasant habit of unsaying on the morrow what it pledged itself to on the day preceding; but on March 23rd, it used the following unmistakable language regarding our Colonial Empire:—

The time is at hand when the country must seriously consider how far and how long it will make itself responsible for the military defence of colonies and dependencies which

listen very reluctantly to its advice. We have waged war upon war in South Africa in quarrels not our own, not merely at great cost and sacrifice, but sometimes to the serious prejudice of more important interests nearer home. . . . It is necessary to seek a remedy for a state of things which has become almost intolerable, and to define and abridge responsibilities which are continually dissipating our resources and sapping the strength of the empire. It is not very likely that the colonies will seriously combine for their own defence, so long as they can look to England to defend them. . . . *The policy of this country, therefore, should be to encourage confederation in South Africa, if not with a view to complete independence in the future, at least for the purpose of mutual help and domestic defence, and the only way to strengthen the motives for such union is to fix a definite period for the withdrawal of direct Imperial assistance.* . . . It is intolerable that a wayward colony, or a self-willed governor, should be able, at any moment, to engage the forces of the empire in a miserable and ill-timed quarrel with some Native chief, and to paralyze its vast influence in matters which far more nearly concern it.

There is much more in the article couched in the same strain. Can THE STATESMAN claim the *Times* as the first of its converts? We should like to think we might, but the views we have propounded regarding our Colonial Empire are so obvious, and so indisputable, that it is more reasonable to suppose that the writer of the article we have quoted, arrived at them independently. There, however, they are; and a policy advocated by the *Times* is, at least, divested of that element of horror which clings to it, so long as it is a policy advocated only in the pages of a Radical journal.

Sir Stafford Northcote's letter to his constituents explaining the grounds on which he and his party intended to oppose Mr. Gladstone's motion on "urgency" on going into Supply, was a composition the sleek "foxiness" of which raised it to the level of a work of fine art. It was so beautifully plausible on the surface, so ridiculously hollow and insincere below. One could almost imagine that one saw the twinkle in Sir Stafford's eye as he penned this remarkable composition. Sir Stafford and his party have heartily supported the Coercion Act and the Arms Act; it was their nature so to do. They have for the last six months been rending the air with their cries for a Coercion Act and an Arms Act, and having got their heart's desire, they did not quarrel with it. This conduct the "foxy" Sir Stafford represents as "patriotic." The Tories and their chief have come to this that they strut about, and call upon the nation to admire their "patriotism," because they have not opposed the passage of a legal enactment of which they heartily approve. There are, however, limits even to the "patriotism" of the astute Sir Stafford. It was grievous to his just and liberty-loving soul, that, notwithstanding the sacrifices he had made in voting for repression in Ireland, the Government should call upon him to vote "urgency" for Supply. This was too much, especially when there was an Irish Land Bill looming ahead. The "privileges" of the House of Commons became all at once of inestimable value to the "patriotic" heart of Sir Stafford. In particular there were certain "Supplementary Estimates" which, on no account, could he allow to be passed without thorough discussion. So he flung himself into the breach, and a Liberal Government, intent upon the destruction of the Constitution and the political liberties of Englishmen, must pass over his prostrate body before they accomplished their fell purpose. All this was exceedingly comical, but it cannot be denied that in his eagerness to snatch a party advantage from Mr. Gladstone's motion, Sir Stafford has indirectly rendered the country a great service. The demand for "urgency" has borne better and more abundant fruit than if it had actually been carried by a two-thirds majority. Nobody likes "urgency" for itself, nobody wants it if the business of the House can be carried

on independently of it. And the Opposition has refused to vote "urgency," only it would seem, the better to show "how soft and gentle it can be." Those "Supplementary Estimates" on which Sir Stafford laid so much stress, have elicited hardly one speech from him or from the party he leads. As Mr. Gladstone said, the remembrance of obstruction is like the remembrance of an evil dream.

It is in truth impossible not to marvel at the tactics of Mr. Parnell and his followers both inside and outside of Parliament. They want Home Rule, but Mr. Parnell has already announced in Parliament, that Home Rule may be expected as a natural sequence to any thorough reform of the conditions under which land is owned and cultivated in Ireland; and if this is so, why, in the name of common sense, has he since the present Government came into office, heaped up obstacles in the way of a good Land Bill? These men have wasted the finest opportunity which Ireland has ever had. The invariable argument which has been urged by the party of reaction against the concession of justice to Ireland has been, that no such concession tended to the pacification of Ireland, but to the very reverse. It was in the power of the Parnellites to have shown the falseness of this assertion. They have done their best to establish its accuracy. They knew that the present Government was deeply pledged to carry a measure of Irish Land Reform; they knew that the Liberal Party was resolved that this measure should cut down to the root of the evil to be remedied; and it was in their power to have given invaluable aid to both the Government and the Liberal Party. Recent events have disclosed the all-important fact that, as regards the tenure of land, all Irishmen—Protestant and Catholic—are virtually one; not merely as regards the evils existing, but also as to the means whereby they are to be removed. It would have been easy for the Parnellites to have kept their movement strictly within legal limits, and by so doing they would have elicited throughout Ireland such an accord of opinions as no Government could have ventured to resist, and least of all a Government like that which now holds office. But instead of this, they deliberately conducted their agitation so as to throw the Land Question into a subordinate position. It became merely the lever whereby Ireland was to achieve her legislative independence. These ulterior views it was which brought lawlessness and violence into the agitation, and so paved the way for the Coercion Bill and the Arms Act. There was, however, still another chance for the Parnellites when Parliament assembled. Their obvious policy was to protest most emphatically against the Repressive Acts, but having done so, to withdraw from all needless obstruction, in order to expedite as much as possible the introduction of remedial measures. Had they done this, they would have established cordial relations with the Government and earned the right to modify and amend the Land Bill, when introduced. Instead of this, they plunged into that insensate career of obstruction which, useless to Ireland, had the effect of exciting against them, not only the indignation of the House, but of all England, Scotland, and Wales. And now, to crown all, they form an alliance with the Tory Party, and support their candidates at bye elections. All these follies have been aggravated by Mr. Parnell's desertion of his Parliamentary duties, his mysterious journeys to Paris, and his colloquies there with men who are an abomination in the eyes of his Catholic countrymen. As a leader, Mr. Parnell has failed signally; and the Irish members who chose to follow him in preference to Mr. Shaw have been conducted to defeat, ridicule, and humiliation. Their present state of collapse is, not improbably, occasioned by an unacknowledged consciousness of failure. For the

sole result of all their agitation, obstruction, and all their strivings, is a negative one. They have retarded for about two months the introduction of the Land Bill. If the Irish people are grateful for such a service as this, it can only be because they are Irish.

The Lawson v. Labouchere libel case has been terminated by the inability of the jury to come to an agreement, which is, virtually, a victory for the defendant. Recalling to mind the revelations which have been made during this seven days' trial, it is impossible not to marvel at the judgment of the plaintiff in placing himself in a position where his enemy had full legal licence to flay him alive for the gratification of an admiring public. And it cannot be denied that Mr. Labouchere availed himself of this privilege with an artistic skill and ruthlessness very edifying to witness. We confess to have enjoyed the process heartily. The editor and proprietor of the *Daily Telegraph* is a gentleman for whose benefit we willingly withdraw the conscientious scruples which animate us towards the practice of vivisection. It is to have rendered the public a service to strip the concealing drapery of the editorial "we" from the shoulders of this individual, and disclose him to the nation in his habit as he lives. And what a revelation it is! The editorial "we" which spoke with such immense authority on all the intricacies of the "Eastern Question" turns out to be a gentleman unacquainted with the geographical position of Epirus. He does not know whether Merv is a part of Turkey, or whether it is not. He has, like an intellectual Nazarene, kept himself so unspotted from the world of knowledge that he has never heard of Dr. Franklin. The editorial "we" which compared Mr. Bright to "a woman that had lost her shamo," is found to have obtained a large annual income by the publication of unclean advertisements. The editorial "we" which could allow no sacred day in the Christian calendar to pass by without being visited by a passionate excess of Christian sentiment, is found to be a person belonging to the Hebrew persuasion. The jury could not agree as to whether transactions of this kind rendered Mr. Lawson "a disgrace to journalism," and therefore (to quote his own expression) Mr. Lawson has a "technical right" not to be so considered. But there can be no question that they disclose a very appalling danger to the future well-being of society and the nation. After the disclosures of this trial it would be ridiculous to attribute to Mr. Lawson any knowledge of that "Eastern Question" in all its numerous branches, on which, for the past three or four years, the *Daily Telegraph* has been pretending to expound the truth with such a lofty air of omniscience. To give his motives the highest level possible, the course of the *Daily Telegraph* has been guided by no better light than a keen discernment of what would "pay" best. So it comes to this. A huge quantity of garbled statements and special pleading has been poured, morning after morning, into the minds of tens of thousands of unsuspecting readers—all tending to drag this country into ruinous and desolating wars, all holding up to public opprobrium some of the best and foremost statesmen of the day, all affecting to be the expression of a pure and lofty patriotism; and they turn out to be no more than a manufactured display of feeling prompted by Mr. Levy Lawson's estimate of what would serve his private and personal interests. Money set the whole machinery in motion. For money, Mr. Edwin Arnold, the Rev. Maurice Davies, and perhaps other writers, gave way to violent paroxysms of Christian emotion at certain stated periods of the year. For money, these and other gentlemen were equally ready, when Mr. Lawson called upon them to do so, to preach the "gospel of hate" against Russians, Bulgarians, or Afghans, as the case may be. With money, in a word, as his sceptre, Mr. Levy Lawson sat as a king, supreme over the intellects and

consciences of the editorial staff of the *Daily Telegraph*. In calling attention to these marvellous facts, we have no desire to pass censure upon individuals about whom we know nothing whatever. We have little doubt that there was not a writer on the staff of the *Telegraph* without reasons for every line he wrote in it which abundantly satisfied his own conscience. It is the national danger we desire to emphasize. Mr. Lawson had no convictions of his own in regard to Lord Beaconsfield's policy; he was far too ignorant and too illiterate to know whether that policy was right or wrong. But he conceived that it would be to his interest to support it; and the constitution of the English Press is such, that he had it in his power to give effect to this view of his interest by setting in motion a tremendously powerful agency to pervert and misinform the national conscience and intellect. A national press, conducted with earnestness and singleness of purpose, would be the strongest aid to national progress that could be imagined. But the contrary is also equally true. And a paper conducted as the *Daily Telegraph* has been under the management of Mr. Lawson is an evil, the magnitude of which can hardly be exaggerated. If Mr. Labouchere's exposure of the realities which lay behind its offensive display of Christian sentiment, and its abusive patriotism, should diminish the "largest circulation in the world," he will have earned the gratitude of every man who (to quote the strong language of Achilles) "hates, as the gates of hell, the man who says one thing with his lips and hides another in his heart."



The Statesman.

No. X.—MARCH 1, 1881.

Correspondence.

THE BATTLE OF ISANDHLWANA.

[We ask the particular attention of our readers to the following letter. It is written by a brother of the heroic Durnford, who fell at Isandhlwana, and recounts his unavailing efforts to obtain justice for his memory. In our issue of last month we printed an article on the Battle of Isandhlwana, which no one could read and doubt any longer who was responsible for that disaster. The plain facts are these. Sir Bartle Frere forced on the Zulu War, against the instructions of the Ministry, with inadequate preparations and an incompetent general. The result was the slaughter of Isandhlwana. Immediately Sir Bartle Frere and Lord Chelmsford began shouting that not on them, and their rashness and blindness, rested the responsibility of this disaster, but on a heroic soldier who, being dead, could not defend himself; and as they are people of social eminence, and move in the very best circles, it would be very disagreeable to a number of (so-called) distinguished personages should they be branded with some recognizable stigma of national reprobation. So the authorities all round came to the conclusion that the best thing to be done was to make Colonel Durnford into a scapegoat for the sins of these, his incompetent superiors; and the remarkable thing is that deliberate injustice of this kind is so essential a part of our British executive system, whether at home or abroad, that it would be as reasonable to expect a suspension of the laws of gravitation as to expect that the Horse Guards and the War Office would act otherwise than they have done. "The Service" would, indeed, be "going to the devil" if simple equity were to be the rule in such matters, and not the sensibilities of persons of social distinction.]

St. Albans, March 1, 1881.

SIR,—I have been much struck with the manner in which (in your February number) you have taken up the cause of a wronged dead soldier, and I thank you most warmly for your able, outspoken, and just remarks.

I venture to give you a sketch of what I have done in my endeavours to clear my brother's military reputation, so unjustly and wantonly assailed by Lord Chelmsford, and partially also by some of his friends and followers. When Lord Chelmsford's and Sir Bartle Frere's despatches were made public, includ-

ing the proceedings of the (so-called) Court of Inquiry, I, of course, gathered at an attempt was being made to divert the responsibility for the disaster from Lord Chelmsford to one or more of those who fell. I, therefore, made it my business to collect all possible information, which I put together in a connected narrative, and published in April, 1879 (P. S. King, Parliamentary Publisher).

I still took every opportunity of adding to my store of information, and was thereby enabled to join in writing a "History of the Zulu War" (Chapman and Hall, January, 1880), in which is a truthful and detailed account of the action at Isandhlwana, and the surrounding circumstances; every word corroborated by independent evidence.

With this I should have rested satisfied, as proving clearly that not a shadow of blame could rest on Colonel Durnford, or any of those who fell at Isandhlwana.

In the meantime I had some correspondence with the Secretary of State for War, Sir Bartle Frere, and Lord Chelmsford.

1. Colonel Stanley, the Secretary of State for War, having said in the House of Commons, on March 28th, 1879, that he attributed the disaster to neglect of Lord Chelmsford's orders, I felt it my duty to call his attention to the absence of any proof to support such a charge, and to lay before him a plain statement of facts connected with the 22nd January. This I wrote on the 29th April, 1879. The reply to this is dated 9th May, and I am informed by Colonel Stanley's Private Secretary that the matters to which I refer are of such importance as to ensure their receiving the Secretary of State's very careful attention, and that he would write to me himself on the subject at the first leisure moment he had. On the 7th June I reminded the Private Secretary of Colonel Stanley's promise, and was informed that he would take the earliest opportunity of bringing it to Colonel Stanley's notice. On the 30th July, and again on the 15th October, I wrote to Colonel Stanley, but my letters were neither acknowledged, nor have I ever received one word from Colonel Stanley.

2. Sir Bartle Frere's repeated assertions to the effect that Lord Chelmsford's orders were clearly not obeyed at Isandhlwana, caused me to write to him on the subject on the 25th November, 1879.

The answer to this, dated February 24, 1880, was very characteristic of Sir Bartle Frere, and, I felt, called for a reply, which I accordingly wrote on the 24th March, 1880.

3. Being desirous of leaving nothing undone, I resolved to appeal to Lord Chelmsford himself, and wrote on the 2nd December, 1879, on the subject of the disaster being attributed to neglect of orders. His Lordship said, "History must decide as to the amount of praise or blame which is to be attributed to the several principal actors in the late Zulu War," and that he "would deprecate any attempt to anticipate its verdict."

I again wrote to Lord Chelmsford, and received a reply, stating that the question of neglect of orders "covers the whole ground of controversy," and that "the order given was 'to defend the camp.'"

Thus matters remained until Lord Chelmsford, in the House of Lords, on the 19th of August and 2nd of September, 1880, deliberately charged Colonel Durnford with having neglected his orders at Isandhlwana, and thus caused the disaster.

These speeches, and a letter in the *Times* of August 25th, were remarkable for reckless misrepresentation, and careful avoidance of the main circumstances that surrounded the camp force. Again is dust thrown in the eyes of the public

by dwelling on *the loss of the camp*, instead of the real subject—the disaster at Isandhlwana. The Court of Inquiry which Lord Chelmsford assembled immediately after the disaster was thus restricted. One of the members (Colonel Harness) says plainly that “instructions were given to the Court to inquire into the ‘*loss of the camp on January 22nd*,’ and not ‘into the circumstances of the disastrous affair of Isandhlwana;’” and he explains “that the disastrous affair of Isandhlwana offers a much wider field of investigation than the ‘loss of the camp.’”

Lord Chelmsford's speeches were answered by me in the *Times* of August 23rd and 27th, and the *Standard* of August 25th; and, having compared his statements with available evidence, I published the result in the form of a pamphlet (P. S. King, Parliamentary Publisher, November, 1880).

My next step was to write to the Private Secretary of his Royal Highness the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, requesting an interview with his Royal Highness, for the purpose of asking for an inquiry; or that his Royal Highness might be pleased to take such steps that justice might be done to the memory of my brother. The reply was that his Royal Highness would accord me an interview at his next Levée, but could not consent to the “re-opening, by military inquiry, of any question connected with responsibility for the destruction of the force and camp at Isandhlwana.”

I duly attended the Levée on the 18th January, 1881, but with no satisfactory result.

On the 22nd January, I wrote to the Secretary of State for War, giving the grounds on which I appealed to him. He replied that he saw no reason for reversing the decision of his Royal Highness.

I wrote a further letter (addressed to the Under-Secretary of State for War), respectfully urging certain important points, and was referred to the former reply.

When I wrote to the Secretary of State I also wrote to his Royal Highness's Private Secretary, stating that I had so written.

I submit that I have a clear case, supported by plain and complete evidence, and yet I grieve to be obliged to say that I have, up to the present time, failed in obtaining (what I believe to be) simple justice for the memory of a soldier who deserved well of his country.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

EDWARD DURNFORD, Lieut.-Colonel.

EDITORIAL NOTES.

THE month that has passed will be memorable in English History for the death of Thomas Carlyle. Like all writers who have greatly influenced their generation, the fulness of his success has caused his genius to pass, for a while, into partial eclipse, so far as public recognition was concerned. His talk about the "veracities," the imperative necessity for bringing our minds into contact with the truth of things, had begun to sound vain and hollow to our ears, because that talk had done its work so excellently well. We could not recall the circumstances under which his warnings had been originally uttered. The terror bred by the French Revolution was, then, still living and intense in the minds of the nations. France was regarded as a gigantic volcano planted in the centre of Europe, which might at any moment send forth its torrents of fire and lava to overwhelm the nations around. In its last eruption there had been but one nation which had ridden out the storm uninjured; that nation was Great Britain; and, therefore, by Europe as well as ourselves, the British Constitution in Church and State, with all its unjust and unsightly anomalies—its Corn Laws, its Roman Catholic Disabilities, its Game Laws, its monstrous system of Representation, its deliberate persecution of Nonconformity—was regarded as a sacred and mystic structure—an entire and perfect chrysolite—not to be rudely touched by the profane hands of the reformer. The very anomalies were regarded as essential to the stability and perfection of the whole structure. To plaut our institutions just as they stood in every country under the sun, was popularly deemed a sure means of making the wilderness blossom like a rose. There were not a few people who would have had serious doubts whether the greatness of Great Britain could survive the termination of game-preserving on the part of the aristocracy. It was to a people given up to the worship of these shams and hallucinations that Carlyle thundered forth his prophetic warnings; and "the hero," in his eyes, was the man gifted with the discernment to pierce through them to the veritable springs of life and power. This is the point of resemblance in all his "heroes," and it is obvious how such a conception might seem identical with a reverence for force apart from the ends for which it was wielded; but it is a mistake to attribute any such confusion of thought to Carlyle. He made of Frederick of Prussia a hero because in an age when the rule of national life was that "they should take who had the power, and they should keep who can," Frederick, above all his contemporaries, perceived where and in what manner the force was to be obtained whereby this rule of conduct could be successfully translated into action. Other kings and politicians had precisely the same scheme of life as he, but they lacked the penetrating eye; they were blinded with the shams and conventions of the day, and so their schemes came to naught. But it is to do Carlyle a great injustice to suppose that he ranks the "heroism" of a Frederick as moving along the same lofty heights as the "heroism" of a Luther or a Shakespeare. An eye to penetrate to the truth of things was, indeed, common to all, but there were heights and depths open to a Luther or a Shakespeare from which a Frederick was for ever excluded. "The tools to him who can use them,"—this is a maxim which Carlyle was very fond of quoting, and "a hero" with

him was one who, amid "a world of stuffed clothes-suits which chatter and grin meaningless," could find the tools requisite for the work he had in hand, and had at command the genius to wield them aright. But Carlyle never taught that all work was alike in degree of excellence, or that there were no gradations in genius and moral worth.

As unfounded, it seems to us, as another charge that is often brought against Carlyle—that, namely, that he had an ignorant impatience of science. How could this be in a man who was never weary of exhorting his readers to search for truth passionately as for hid treasures? There is, however, a certain dogmatism sometimes called science of which Carlyle was profoundly impatient. This visible universe was, to him, a Mystic Temple and a Hall of Doom—the garment whereby God was made visible to man. And holding this belief, he rebelled against that dogmatism of science which denies reality to that which cannot be brought into a laboratory and subjected to material tests. This, he held, was to empty the world of its divine significance, and convert it into merely a convenient arrangement for the making of roads and the sowing of corn. For, according to Carlyle, it is the imagination which, piercing through the things of sense, reveals the spiritual realities of which they are merely the symbol. All science, therefore, which called upon men to rest content with these things of sense, and not attempt to penetrate the hidden regions beyond, was science falsely so called, because it sought to exclude the imagination from its supreme place in the mind of man. To such men of science he causes the great Teufelsdröckh to speak as follows:—

Thou wilt have no mystery, no mysticism; wilt walk through the world by the sunshine of what thou callest Truth . . . and "explain" all, "account" for all, or believe nothing of it! Nay, thou wilt attempt laughter; whoso recognizes the unfathomable, all-pervading domain of mystery, which is everywhere under our feet and among our hands . . . to him, thou, with sniffing charity, wilt protrusively proffer thy hand-lamp, and shrink as one injured when he kicks his foot through it . . . Doth not thy cow calve, doth not thy bull gender? Thou thyself, wert thou not born? wilt thou not die? "Explain" me all this, or do one of two things: Retire into private places with thy foolish cackle; or, what were better, give it up and weep, not that the reign of wonder is done, and God's world all disembellished and prosaic, but that thou hitherto art a dilettante and sand-blind pedant.

So far, it seems to us, as the positive teaching of Carlyle went, it was teaching which did his generation incalculable service. He, perhaps more than any British writer of his day, made men feel that men are born into an order of things which they did not create; but which they must discover at their peril; that no institutions or systems, howsoever cunningly framed, can have the least usefulness or vitality except in so far as they are in harmony with this universal eternal order. His (so-called) worship of Force was, in point of fact, no more than an overwhelming sense of this irresistible order against which men are continually fighting, to their own frightful detriment; and that which he revered in his "heroes" was not the force which they displayed, but the orderly ends for which it was put forth. "Every great man," he cries, "every genuine man, is, by the nature of him, a son of order, not of disorder. He is here to make what was disorderly, chaotic, into a thing ruled regular. . . . In rebellious ages, when kingship itself seems dead abolished, Cromwell, Napoleon step forth again as kings." All this is excellent enough, but then, unhappily, it does not avail to carry us very far; and the lamentable deficiency in the exhortations of Carlyle is too obvious not to have been frequently pointed out. It is that, while dwelling with ceaseless iteration on the necessity of faith as the foundation of all fruitful conduct, he gives no help on the all-important question as to what men are to believe. We

are to believe in heroes when we can find them, but the heroic character has its roots in belief, and if there be nothing definite to believe, then there can be no heroes. Carlyle frankly accepts this dismal alternative, and without a hero he tells us there can be no salvation. "We have known," he says, "times call loudly enough for their great man, but not find him when they called." And such heroless times are, he adds, doomed "to go down into wreck and confusion." This, it must be acknowledged, is a gospel of no sort of value to either nation or individual at any crisis of their existence; but we must remember that the influence of such a writer as Carlyle is most inadequately measured by an enumeration of the positive doctrines to be found in his works. The power of such a writer consists in stimulating and enlarging the imagination of his readers, in informing the common facts of every-day life with sacredness and beauty, in imparting energy to the will, and direction and stability to the moral parts of man's nature. Against insincerities and hypocrisies of all kinds he was never weary of doing battle, and thus he, as it were, compelled his readers to question their hearts and consciences how much of this sincerity belonged to them. But, apart from and independently of all this, the writings of Carlyle are full of passages of rare poetic beauty, of a force and picturesqueness such as are to be found in no other writer; as, for example, that beautiful comparison of Martin Luther, with his mingled strength and sweetness of character, to "a rock of unsubduable granite, piercing far and wide into the heavens, yet in the clefts of it fountains, beautiful green valleys with flowers;" or that description of Hope, "whereby, on man's straight prison walls beautiful, far-stretching landscapes, and into the night of very death is shed holiest dawn;" or that exquisite little prose lyric—if so we may call it—which brings the essay on Burns to a conclusion:—

While the Shakespeares and Miltons roll on like mighty rivers through the country of thought, bearing fleets of traffickers and assiduous pearl-fishers on their waves, this little Valelusa fountain will also arrest the eye, for this also is Nature's own and most cunning workmanship, bursts from the depths of the earth with a full gushing current into the light of day; and often will the traveller turn aside to drink of its clear waters, and muse among its rock and pines.

Such passages—and Carlyle's writings are full of them—are a joy for ever, enriching both the memory and the imagination. His humour, also, was but another aspect of this imaginative power—and as original as picturesque. Was there ever such an admirable definition of a Social Science Congress as that of "a regiment gone wholly to drum." Has the absurdity of duelling ever been so convincingly put as by the great Professor Teufelsdröckh?—

With respect to duels, indeed, I have my own ideas. Few things in this so surprising world strike me with more surprise. Two little visual spectra of men, hovering with insecure cohesion enough in the midst of the Unfathomable, and to dissolve therein at any rate very soon—make pause at the distance of twelve paces asunder; whirl round and simultaneously by the cunningest mechanism explode one another into Dissolution, and off-hand become Air and Non-existent.

A THIRD defeat of British troops at the hands of the Boers; and this time Sir George Colley has paid with the forfeit of his life for the rashness of his generalship. In the present issue of THE STATESMAN the reader will find certain comments on General Colley's past career, which, had they been penned knowing that he no longer lived, would have been expressed with less severity. *Mentem mortalia tangunt.* At the same time it is necessary to point out that this third disaster is an additional evidence of their truth. It is evident that in this last

engagement, as in his two preceding defeats, no precautions were taken against the possibility of failure. The troops were thrown into action without reserves on which to retire, and so when defeat came it amounted virtually to annihilation. Sir Evelyn Wood, although very probably not nearly so "clever" a man as Sir George Colley, is what the other was not—a soldier trained in the school of experience; but the heavy losses sustained by the British troops will make it impossible for him to attempt any aggressive movements for three or four weeks, and the interval will be a period of profound anxiety to the Government and the nation. It is evident that any determination on our part to vindicate what is popularly known as "the honour of the British Flag"—in other words, not to cease from fighting until the Boers have been beaten to their knees—will cause the Orange Free State to ally itself with the Transvaal, and then it is only too probable that the conflagration will rapidly extend over the whole of the South African Colonies. We shall find ourselves involved in a war strikingly similar in many respects to the war for American Independence. The only way out of it, so far as we can see, is for the Government, even at this eleventh hour, to acknowledge that these Boers have been wronged, and to concede to them their independence. There is not the smallest hope of the Government adopting such a policy, and all that can be hoped for is that they may devise some compromise whereby further bloodshed can be stayed. We have little hope that this is now possible.

WE have insisted in this as well as preceding issues of THE STATESMAN on the degrading character of the tie which links us to the Cape Colony, how impossible is any improvement in the character of that tie, and how, therefore, both the honour and the interest of this country require that the tie should be severed, and the Cape Colony cut adrift from Great Britain. The truth of our contention was forcibly demonstrated by certain recent remarks in Parliament. The war against the Basutos, unjust and cowardly in its inception, has been carried on with a cruelty which would disgrace a savage. There can be no doubt about this, because the stories are exultingly related by the actors in them. Thus we know that prisoners are forbidden to be made; that corn-fields are devastated, ploughs broken up, villages burnt, and thousands of cattle driven away; that, in a word, war has been carried on against the Basutos by subjects of the Queen according to the methods of Ghengiz Khan or Tamerlane. And every one knows also why this is so. To the Cape Volunteer a war against a Kaffir tribe is a commercial operation. It is the promise and prospect of plunder which persuade him to participate in it. Well, a few nights ago, Sir George Campbell brought these facts to the notice of Mr. Grant Duff, and asked if Her Majesty's Government was prepared to prohibit them in future. Mr. Grant Duff rebuked his "honourable friend" for ignorance of the relations existing between the Colonial Office and the omnipotent Sprigg. Sprigg can snub the Colonial Office, the Colonial Office can do nothing to Sprigg. If the latter chose to take the Basuto leaders and roast them to death over slow fires, the utmost the Colonial Office could do would be to record its "regret" in an official despatch. This was what Mr. Grant Duff's reply amounted to; and the conditions of peace offered by Sprigg to the Basutos, followed by Lord Kimberley's meek remonstrance, show that it was the simple, unexaggerated truth: Sprigg, so far as Great Britain is concerned, is an irresponsible despot, and yet the two are so linked together, that whenever it pleases Sprigg to roll in the mire, Great Britain is bespattered from head to foot. Now this, we maintain, is a position which no

nation can endure without grievous loss of honour. At the same time, it is plainly impossible to govern South Africa by means of a Parliament sitting in London. That Parliament cannot govern Ireland, and much less a country at the other end of the world. There is, therefore, no alternative except that of cutting ourselves adrift from the irresponsible Sprigg, and leaving him to stand or fall alone.

SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS has been appointed to the supreme military command in the Transvaal. It is a curious instance of the reckless, unthinking manner in which the newspapers merely echo each other's opinions, that this nomination has evoked a general chorus of approval. We have no hesitation in saying that unless peace is arranged before Sir Frederick Roberts appears upon the scene, his nomination may be considered as filling up the measure of our misfortunes. To talk of General Roberts as having exhibited a single scintilla of military genius in Afghanistan is to talk nonsense; but the qualities which he did exhibit in a very startling manner were precisely those qualities which led Sir George Colley from one signal disaster to another—a blind rashness of movement, an unreasoning confidence in his good fortune. People appear to have forgotten how General Roberts' rear-guard was cut to pieces in the retreat from Khost, or the series of blunders which preceded the shutting up of his troops behind their entrenchments at Sherepore. If, on Sir Frederick Roberts' arrival at the Cape, he finds that he has on his hands the suppression of a general Dutch insurrection, we shall expect to hear of disaster upon disaster. The Boers are a very different enemy from the Afghans. *Wary and skilful in their plan of attack, they are, as we know to our cost, eminently brave, dashing, and determined in carrying them out. What is needed to cope with them successfully is not a dashing partisan leader, which is the best that General Roberts can claim to be, but a soldier wary, circumspect, and foreseeing—one who will leave nothing to chance, and will never take a second step before he has made certain of the first; in all such qualities our Kabul "hero" is entirely lacking. Our Afghan generals, it is plain to us, are likely to damage their luckless country to a greater extent than even we supposed it to be in their power—potent for mischief as that power undoubtedly is.

Few people, we suppose, either inside or outside of the Government, any longer doubt that Ministers committed a very heavy blunder when they allowed Mr. Forster to persuade them into bringing in this miserable Coercion Bill. It is a sorry spectacle to witness the most liberal and powerful Ministry of modern times revolutionizing the procedure of the House of Commons, doing nightly desperate battle for more than six weeks, for a measure to deprive the people of Ireland of their constitutional status before the law. We have elsewhere stated our conviction that the revolution of procedure is, in itself, beneficial, but this does not make the immediate cause of its occurrence an agreeable thing to contemplate. The fact is that there is a Jonah on board the Government ship, and it would be an exceedingly good thing for all hands if he could be thrown overboard. It would be ridiculous to question the absolute honesty of Mr. Forster as a politician, but none the less Liberals ought to beware of him. He is a broken reed, and has an unfortunate habit of piercing the hands of those who lean upon him. It is Mr. Forster's special weakness to be Liberal until some crisis arrives such as tries men and principles, and then to desert to the Conservative ranks. Thus, many of our readers will remember, when Liberals throughout the United

Kingdom were chafing at Lord Derby's policy on the "Eastern Question"—that, namely, of plastering the sores of European Turkey with the waste paper of Turkish promises—Mr. Forster took occasion to deliver an elaborate discourse to his constituents at Bradford, declaring his entire satisfaction with this treatment of the "Eastern Question." Later on, Mr. Forster, having undertaken to move a resolution voting against the grant of £6,000,000, backed out of his undertaking with ignominious precipitation, and to the extreme discomfiture of his party, because a manifestly absurd message had been received from Mr. Layard to the effect that the Russians were advancing upon Constantinople. Last year, again, when an unanimous cry had gone up from the Liberal Party protesting against that base fraud the subversion of the Transvaal Republic, Mr. Forster was ready, as usual, to scatter the seeds of doubt and division. He wrote to the *Times* to say that the Boers did not treat the Natives with justice, and therefore that we—steeped though we were and dripping with the blood of 30,000 of these very Natives—were bound to retain our grip upon the Transvaal. Nobody is likely to forget how, last year, the Bill for benefiting Irish landlords was divorced from the Bill for protecting the property of the tenants, or, when the Landlords' House passed the one and rejected the other, with what meekness and resignation Mr. Forster accepted this dispensation. And now, again, in respect of this Coercion Bill, it is plain that Mr. Forster has made himself the mouthpiece of the old bad traditional manner of governing Ireland. He has succumbed to the landlords and the "Castle" officials. As soon as this Coercion Bill is shunted out of the way, the Ministry, we feel assured, will recover its individuality, and move rapidly forward in that path of progress which is its natural direction. But it behoves the Liberal Party to remember these things. Mr. Forster is but a fair-weather Liberal, and the Liberal Party, if alive to its own interests, will, with polite regret, dispense with his services for the future. "Cassio, I love thee, but never more be officer of mine."

We cannot congratulate Sir Frederick Roberts upon either the timeliness or the courtesy of the speech he delivered at the Mansion House the other day. When men who differ from ourselves meet together in order to pay us honour, it is not customary among gentlemen to make a furious assault upon their convictions, knowing that they have not the power to reply. At the same time, his main proposition is one which has our entire concurrence. If the British nation is prepared, for an indefinite period, to be engaged in useless, costly, and cowardly wars with weaker races at the distant extremities of the earth, then this kind of work cannot be efficiently carried on with boys freshly transplanted from this country. The old soldier, as we saw pointed out in the *Weekly Dispatch* a few days ago, "represents in the Army the Darwinian principle of 'the survival of the fittest;' and if our old soldiers are to be drafted into the Reserve as soon as they become old," it stands to reason that our Army, *in partibus infidelium*, must be composed of inferior materials. In such a climate as India there is not needed the strain of a campaign to decimate one of these juvenile regiments. Any one who has been in India, and has had his attention directed to the matter, knows that regimental duties in a cantonment are more than they can stand.

As respects India, there is another aspect of this short-service system which demands attention, and that is the enormous additional burden it throws upon the Indian finances. Sir James Outram predicted that the amalgamation

of the Indian and Queen's Armies into a single service would prove a heavy misfortune to the Native taxpayer, but we fancy he never realized how heavy the misfortune would be. From 1850 to 1859, the Company contrived to land in India recruits from their depôt at Warley at an average rate of £26 7s. 5d. per man of all arms. In 1860 the Queen's rule began, and from that time until 1868, every soldier landed in India cost the Indian Treasury the enormous sum of £205 per head. In 1868, this atrocious swindling was abated, and it was arranged that a Cavalry soldier was to be landed in India at a cost of £136 13s. 11d., and an Infantry soldier at a cost of £69 8s. 5d. In other words, a Cavalry soldier, under the Government of the Queen, cost India just five times what he had done under the Company, and an Infantry soldier nearly three times as much. Then came short service, in consequence of which, at average intervals of three years, those costly soldiers had to be sent back to England, and their places supplied by newly-imported articles obtained at the same extravagant rates. Assuming that, under the old long-service system, a recruit served in India nine years after arrival in the country, under the short-service system the Indian finances have to pay for three men at the enhanced rates, where formerly they paid for only one. True it is that while our Indian garrison, native and European, is, numerically, greatly below the strength of the days prior to the Mutiny of 1857, the cost of maintaining this smaller garrison is £7,000,000 in excess of what it was in the days of the Company. We recommend the above facts to the consideration of those who wonder why the Indian Government cannot pay its way.

It is the misfortune of the nation, as well as of the Conservative Party, that in the present grave state of affairs at home and abroad, the leaders of that party, however distinguished for their abilities, command neither the respect nor confidence either of Parliament or of the nation. It is most noticeable, that the Conservative organs themselves never venture to speak of the great leaders of their party in the homely language of honest respect. They are never tired of challenging us to admire the abilities of Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury, but to speak of the sincerity of either, of their patriotism, or elevation of character, in the natural and simple way in which we associate such language with the mention of Lord Granville's or Mr. Gladstone's name, is felt to be impossible by every one. And it is a misfortune for the nation, we say, that the leaders of the Opposition at this juncture, command neither the respect nor the confidence of any part of the nation. So completely have Lords Beaconsfield, Salisbury, Lytton, and Cranbrook forfeited the right to be regarded as sincere and truthful officials, that even were they right in their contention that, as a matter of policy, Kandahar ought not to be returned to its rightful owners, they lie open to the overwhelming suspicion of simply seeking to rescue their administration from the total and unqualified condemnation, which history has already passed upon it. Lord Lytton quitted India with a reputation such as no Governor-General, no Viceroy, ever before left behind him. His rule was a reproach to the nation that sent him out; and if we speak thus, when charity would drop the veil over his retirement, it is the audacity of his statements to the Lords, as to his course in India, that prevents our doing so. Lord Lytton "does not tell the truth," must be the uncourtly answer to every "statement" he has yet made in the Lords, in the way of apology for the crime of the Afghan War. Under leaders of a higher character, and more jealous of the purity of parliamentary life, he would never have been

encouraged to make the statements he has recently proffered to the House. He is, unfortunately, but too proficient a pupil in the school of prevarication and falsehood, of which the nation has reaped the bitter fruit in no less than four wanton wars in the space of three years.

As to Afghanistan and the retention of Kandahar, the state of parties in Parliament is so peculiar, that it is desirable to direct attention to it pointedly; for the position is a curious and instructive one. To understand it, it must be borne in mind that it is in the ranks of the Liberal Party, that honest Russophobia finds its home. It is this fact that accounts for Mr. Cowen's otherwise strange attitude towards his party, throughout the Russo-Turkish War. The reader will never understand the history of the Afghan War, until he distinctly realizes the fact that Russophobia is a disease of the Liberal Party, not of the Conservatives. It has been so from the birth of the Liberal Party under the first Reform Bill. It was Lord Melbourne and the Whigs who plunged us into the first Afghan War, not the Conservative Party; and it was left to Sir Robert Peel and the Duke of Wellington to drag the nation out of that guilty business, condemning the policy that produced the war, and refusing to allow a British soldier to remain west of the Indus. It has been the misfortune of the Conservative Party, since the death of these great men, to have fallen under the guidance of a leader who assumed Conservative colours, not from conviction, but that the leadership of the party was vacant, and the position open to any man of talent not burdened with scrupulosity. The Conservative Party has thus been led for nearly thirty years, by a leader who has about as much sympathy with Conservative traditions as with those of the Zulus. Friendly alliance with Russia was one of the traditions of Conservatism. The Russian Emperor was the head of the Holy Alliance, the Czar being the great head of the Tory or reactionary Party throughout Europe. Russia has been the traditional friend and ally of Toryism, and the open and declared enemy of Liberalism everywhere. English Liberals have a profound distrust of Russia, and a party hatred of her, and it is Liberal statesmen, not Conservative, who are bitten with what we call Russophobia. The honest Russophobe of to-day, is to be seen in Mr. Gladstone, the Duke of Argyll, Earl Northbrook, and Joseph Cowen. For ourselves, we regard their fears as morbid. In our eyes, it is an infirmity in Mr. Gladstone, and in our leading Liberal statesmen, developed into acute mania in Mr. Cowen.

THE Conservative leaders have no fear of Russia, have never had any, and in this respect they are wiser than their opponents. But Mr. Disraeli, though he has no fear of Russia, has a very lively hatred—a Hebrew hatred—of her; and in this, as in so many other directions, by his ascendancy over the party which has committed its guidance to his hands, he has violated every tradition of Conservatism, and made his party betray its own principles. It is only just to him to say, that neither he nor the truthful Marquis, his ally, have ever concealed their contempt for Russophobia. Neither of them shares in it, in the very least; while the spectacle is now presented in Parliament, of these two men, as leaders of their party, affecting Russophobia for no other purpose under heaven, than to compel the Ministry to retain Kandahar. It was not any fear of Russia invading India that led them into the Afghan War, for they had no such fear; the entire movement was an aggressive one; and the nation must be made to lay hold of a fact that is the only key to the story. Lord Lytton wanted to bring Shere Ali

into alliance with us against Russia, not because the Ministry feared Russia, but because they intended to attack her on the Oxus, at the right moment. They made their forward movement into Afghanistan, and seized Kandahar, with but one object. Their policy was conceived in aggression, while they have falsely assured the country that it was defensive. The records of the India Office for 1877 teem with proofs of a fact that was discerned clearly by ourselves in India at the time, although studiously concealed by the Ministry from the Parliament and people of England. The policy having exploded, and the nation being in no humour to condone its folly, they are now playing upon the national weakness, by alleging that it is necessary to occupy Kandahar as a measure of defence against Russia. It is impossible for us, as close observers of their tortuous policy, to speak the full sense we have of their crime. All through 1877 they had but one idea, a campaign against Russia upon her whole Asian frontier, from Kashgar to the Dardanelles. Hints were sedulously thrown out by the Premier, that England was the greatest Mohammedan power in the world; Russia the natural enemy of Mohammedanism. Every effort was made to drag Shere Ali into an offensive and defensive alliance. The Turks were made to send an Embassy to him. Lord Lytton invited him to Delhi, to take part in proclaiming the Queen Empress of all Asia to the Oxus, and when he refused to come, sent Sir Lewis Pelly to insult his Envoy at Peshawur, and to fasten a quarrel upon him. Major Butler was simultaneously sent on what the scrupulous Lytton calls a "geographical" mission to the Tekke Turkomans. His real work was to incite these kidnappers to make war against Russia, and to show them the way of conducting it. Major Butler tells us this himself, but because he has no written instructions to show from the prudent Viceroy, he is boldly disavowed and discredited. The strategist, Macgregor, was simultaneously sent from the India Office, on a mission to survey the Tigris, and advise the Government how to launch an expedition of 65,000 men from India upon Bagdad, to attack Russia on the Armenian frontier. THE STATESMAN exposed the wild insanity, when this mission also was denied, and we had to fasten upon Colonel Macgregor, or upon Mr. Stanhope, the shame of falsehood. Russia was to have been attacked along her whole Asiatic frontier, from Kashgar to Constantinople. The Empress of India, as the greatest Mohammedan Sovereign in the world, was the natural protector of Islam from the Muscovite! The conception was as deliberate a treason against civilization and humanity, as the war of the Slave States in 1861 for propagating slavery throughout the world. The conception was never realized, but in baffled pride and disappointment, the Indian Viceroy forced the hand of the Ministry, as Count Schouvaloff rightly affirms. He plunged into the war with haste, lest it should be countermanded from home, while the Commander-in-Chief of the Army washed his hands of all complicity in the campaign, which the prudent Colley affirmed would be simply a military parade. And now that the nation is indignant at the crime into which it has been betrayed, its authors, who have never had a moment's fear of Russian invasion, affect that they went into Afghanistan to protect India therefrom. In their mouths, the pretence is as false as human speech could be. The Whig leaders, from the Duke of Argyll downwards, are sincere enough in their fears for the North-west Frontier, but cherishing no aggressive ideas against Russia, they see clearly how fatal must be that "forward policy" which, of necessity, makes every Afghan our enemy. *That policy will overthrow our Indian Empire if it is not abandoned.*

THE English nation literally knows nothing of the tyranny with which the Native Princes of India are treated by our officials in that country, nor of the unscrupulousness with which the slightest independence of spirit on the part of a Native Prince or private Native gentleman is resented. Thus Holkar is outraged for twenty years, because he refuses to admit that he was a "traitor" to us on the 1st of July, 1857, when the mutiny at the Residency led the late Colonel Durand to make his most mischievous retreat from Holkar's neighbourhood. He left the young Prince to his own resources entirely, when he should have stood by him to the last; and when others took the position that he had ignobly abandoned, and saved all that part of India by their alliance with the young Prince and the trust they confided in him, Colonel Durand was furious with both them and him; and being for long years the "Foreign Office" in his own person, every slight and indignity has been put upon the Prince to maintain the "fiction" that he was "*for four hours*" a traitor on the 1st of July, 1857. Again, a Native gentleman at Chittagong dares to oppose in Council some municipal regulation of the Collector (Kirkwood), and is forthwith ordered to "mount guard" over the public latrines of the city! And when an indignant public cry out against the outrage, a Temple, as Lieutenant-Governor, professes to punish this Kirkwood by removing him from the penal settlement of Chittagong to the neighbourhood of Calcutta, where every Civilian wishes to get; and finally fudges the scandal out of the Government records, by falsifying the whole heart of the matter in his confidential report to the Supreme Government.

THE system is deadly, and is producing a class of officials who appear to regard principle and conscience as simple impediments to the expeditious conduct of official business. What the end of it will be God alone knows. The men themselves are hardly conscious of the demoralization in which they are steeped, nor of the system of prevarication and oppression to which they are committed. They never tell this country the truth about anything that occurs in India, which affects their reputation. They tell *half* the truth and conceal the other half which would expose the "lie" they suggest by this semi-suppression; and they go to prayer-meetings and court our Missionary societies and Bible societies, that they may be invited to "take the chair,"—nothing rehabilitating a man in this country so quickly as an affectation of interest in such enterprises as Christian missions, or such questions as the morality of the opium revenue. Justice, mercy, and the love of God, meanwhile, are altogether forgotten; and we have a Bartle Frere counselling a treacherous entry into Afghanistan by the back door, committing us to the crime of war upon an unoffending people, and following this up within a year or two, by a course of unscrupulousness in another continent, that plunges us into war with the Zulus, the Basutos, and the Boers.

THE same evil influence demoralizes our Indian Generals. Our military men in India are so unaccustomed to see hard fighting (in the Continental sense of the term), that every paltry triumph over armed rebellion, or half-armed Afghans is magnified into a "great victory," or "crushing defeat of the enemy;" the actors therein rushing "home" to be received with ovations in every town, and to be presented with a sword of honour by the Corporation of London. The Queen calls them to her table—(how is it that Her Majesty never invited the noble Outram there? Every one in high places knows why, and how keenly he felt the neglect)—and a Frere, steeped to the eyes in bloodshed, is petted by Her Majesty. Lord Chelmsford, by his Indian contempt for the enemy, brings the

massacre of Isandhlwana upon the nation, and the Queen instantly conveys to him her condolence. A Colley steeped in Afghan blood, and in the disgraceful mismanagement of the raid upon Kabul, is at once made Sir Pomeroy, and Governor of Natal. Here, again, with true *Indian* contempt for his enemy, we see him marching his troops to slaughter twice over in a fortnight; while a Lytton—the centre of all this mischief for years—comes home to be also petted by the Court! Instead of being sent into obscurity, the Prince of Wales goes to meet him upon his landing; and the man has the effrontery—strong in the sympathies of the aristocracy and Court—to rise in the Lords and tell us what we ought to do in Afghanistan!

THE Indian Empire is destroying all morality in "official life." The possession of irresponsible power makes *all* men unscrupulous in the end, while the quiet docility of the people whom we rule, fills our military men with contempt of all opposition in the field. The nation will have a rude awakening from it ere long. A handful of Boers are sufficient to thrash the conceit of a Colley out of him, and dispol the vain dreams he has been indulging in for years. His expedition to Kabul was to be a military parade, and the wisdom of putting the fortunes of the empire into his keeping and that of the scrupulous Lytton, ended in a bloody war, in which 40,000 or 50,000 lives have been sacrificed, and £40,000,000 sterling will have been spent ere its close. If the nation is wise, it will look askance at every appointment of an Indian officer to high position. We warn the nation that it may expect unscrupulousness and rashness as a matter of course and of necessity, from these men. We are breeding a race of Civilian officials debauched by irresponsible power, and a race of military commanders whose triumph over Hindus and more border tribes fills them with the wildest conceit of their prowess and generalship. And the unhappy soldiery are periodically sacrificed to their incompetence. These Indian officials have plunged us into no less than *four* wars of injustice and disaster, without a redeeming feature in any one of them, in the last four years only. The place to strike at—if the nation would see reform—is the Indian system of government. When the new Ministry came into office, many months ago, we wrote in THE STATESMAN (July 1):—

The Crown has been made to throw its *ægis* over men who ought to be made to answer at the bar of the country, for the crime of the Afghan War. The chief subordinate actor in the business was the man who has now gone to govern Natal, and who from plain Colonel Colley was elevated into Sir Pomeroy, for no other service whatever than that of assisting the Viceroy in a crime, the cost of which no one can estimate, and the guilt of which we feel so keenly. While the nation permits its Ministerial Executive, after proceedings such as these, to take shelter under the shadow of the Throne, and to cover themselves and their instruments with honours and decorations, it is idle to talk of "responsible" government. The nation has retained the shadow and name of the thing, but has lost its substance.

Had Mr. Gladstone but recalled Sir Bartle Frere, there would have been no Basuto War; and had he recalled Sir George Colley, no Boer War. India is producing to-day a race of civilian and soldier administrators, who do not know what scrupulousness means. They are full of the notion that the Anglo-Saxon is an Imperial race that has a right to carry itself as it pleases towards all other races. Lord Beaconsfield's reign of six years has given a most dangerous development to this order of thought throughout the empire, but nowhere so fatally as under Lord Lytton's administration of India.

THE most important fact contained in the Kabul correspondence is Count Shouvaloff's account of a conversation with Lord Beaconsfield, in which the latter informed the Count that he had been desirous to "temporise" with Shere Ali, but that the action of the Indian Government had been so precipitate as to force the hands of the Government. Since this statement was made public, the papers have been instructed to deny its accuracy. The statement (so we are now told) is untrue in fact, and had it been true, the Russian Ambassador would have been the last person to whom Lord Beaconsfield would make such a confession. With the Kandahar debate in prospect, this official denial was to be looked for. It is worth nothing at all. It is, of course, quite possible that Lord Lytton and Colonel Colley did not force the hand of Lord Beaconsfield, but that they did their utmost to force the hand of the British Cabinet, and did, in fact, succeed in doing so, no one acquainted with the facts can doubt for a moment. The story has often been told, but as the actors in it, trusting apparently to the short memory of the public, are once more circulating fabrications which have been a thousand times exposed, it is necessary to repeat it. On September 19, 1878, the following message was received by Sir N. Chamberlain (then at Peshawur with his Mission) from our Envoy at Kabul:—

If Mission starts without waiting for the Ameer's permission, there would be no hope left for the renewal of friendship or conciliation. . . . If Mission will await Ameer's permission, everything will be arranged, God willing, in the best manner, and no room will be left for complaint in the future.

Had there been any desire for peace in the mind of Lord Lytton, here was an opportunity to secure it. But what did he do? He immediately ordered the Mission to advance into Afghanistan, *without waiting for the Ameer's permission*; and when it was stopped in the Khybor, as he knew it must be stopped, the shameful lie was telegraphed to this country that we had been insulted, preparations for war were at once commenced, and, but for the opposition of the Commander-in-Chief, the Fort of Ali Musjid would have been attacked without so much as a preliminary declaration of war. War from that moment was inevitable. Badly as we think of the late Government, we do not believe that it was prepared to be "rushed" into a war after this summary fashion; but it was a Government as weak and contemptible in asserting its will as it was lacking in principle, and its subordinates ruled it with a rod of iron. Lord Lytton "forced" it into a war with Afghanistan almost as much as Sir Bartle Frere compelled it to participate in his cowardly butchery of the gallant Zulus.

A MILITARY critic in the *Calcutta Statesman* has the following estimate of General Roberts' qualities as a strategist and tactician:—

If no man can be pronounced happy till after his death, it may be said with equal truth that it is premature to congratulate a General who has survived his victories, for no one can tell into what depths of the ridiculous he may yet be plunged. We shall, therefore, withhold our congratulations to General Roberts till we see how he gets through his English campaign. Thrice happy will he be if he gets back to India with some shreds of his glory still hanging round him, instead of like a Congo fetish, which, after being paraded round the village in triumph, with beating of drums, is finally pitched into the fetish-house to moulder in obscurity with other wooden-headed idols that have had their day.

For the British public, extravagant as it is in its follies, generally wakes up ere long to be ashamed of them, and then, as often as not, heaps contumely on the innocent cause of them. Being at the bottom fairly discriminating, they soon find out when they have made

a mistaken estimate, and then, with the ordinary injustice of mobs, are angry with their idol. Now it is impossible that a long time should elapse before the English people find out that they are making fools of themselves over General Roberts. When they come to consider the history of the late Afghan campaigns, under guidance of sober critics, they will understand that there was no strategy throughout the war, and that if there had been, General Roberts in his subordinate position would have had no opportunity of displaying it. But no soldier can be called a *General* who has not shown skill in strategy, though it is not necessary for this purpose that he should dispose of large bodies of troops—witness General Jackson's fine strategy in the Shenandoah Valley in 1864. Nevertheless, General Roberts might have a claim to public app'ance in skilful tactics. Many leaders, even, who have failed in the higher branch, have attained deserved estimation by their handling of troops in action, of which Marshal MacMahon is a noble instance. But General Roberts' tactics, though certainly dashing, have been deservedly condemned as ill-considered and hazardous. At the Peiwar he manoeuvred, in the face of a fortunately supine enemy, in a manner that absolutely courted a counter-stroke which could not have been resisted. Repeating the same faults on a more extended scale at Kabul against Mahomed Jan, the counter-stroke was actually delivered (though doubtless more by luck than good guidance on Mahomed Jan's part), and our force was only saved from ruin by the stubborn resistance for which General Massey was subsequently blamed by those who were in haste to believe General Roberts faultless. Of this business, and of the subsequent fighting with still disseminated forces (for General Roberts appears slow in learning by experience), which ended in our hard-pressed troops retiring into their entrenchments, the admirers of General Roberts prudently say little. But they would be wiser to say as little of the action near Kandahar, for there, when for the first time the General might have moved on a large front with advantage, having an actual superiority of numbers, he failed to seize his advantage, and three-fifths of his force was never developed at all.

At Kabul, General Roberts, having 6,000 troops and finding 20,000 men marching from one direction and 10,000 men from another, to join at a given point an advance against him, sent 3,000 men to the point of junction, twelve miles off, and 2,000 men to the rear of the enemy's main body, twenty miles off. The 3,000 troops were to prevent the junction and to drive the enemy's main body back on to the 2,000 troops, and so to *envelop* them! But of course, while the 3,000 troops were engaged with the enemy's lesser body, and the 2,000 troops were marching pleasantly on to a point in the distance, the enemy's main body passed in between and advanced on Sherpore till General Massey checked them, thereby giving time for measure of defence at Sherpore, and, by the thunder of his guns, recalling the 3,000 troops from twelve miles off.

These, like the manoeuvre at Peiwar, were apparently based on an ill-digested study of German tactics. The result apparently was to give the General an unreasoning mistrust of the Moltke system. For at Kandahar—when with 14,000 troops he was opposed to some 6,000 Afghan regulars and perhaps as many irregulars (a practical superiority of at least two to one), and had thus a perfect opportunity for putting in practice the double flank attack—he only attacked on one flank, and that the outer or indecisive one. He thus left idle two brigades out of four, and this was the more unfortunate because, as it turned out, the Afghans were already in retreat and could not, of course, be grasped by the brigades who were turning the flank from which they were retiring. One of the idle brigades pushed in on their left flank would have come down on the Afghan line of retreat, and there would have been no fear of a culm; for, apart from the fact proved at Khushk-i-Nakhiud, that Ayoub Khan's force was not an over-match for a *properly handled* British brigade, there was the reserve brigade, and, indeed, the other brigades within sufficiently easy reach.

All this will be sufficiently undernoted at home, possibly before even General Roberts comes out to take up his *Maras* command. Admiration will still be extended by soldiers to the troops and the leader who could make a march like that from Kabul to Kandahar; but the public, disgusted at having been betrayed into foolish ecstasies, will have gone into the opposite extreme, and General Roberts, like other idols of the hour, will have to experience the fickleness of popular favour. However, with £20,000 in his pocket and a Command-in-Chief, perhaps he will not very much care.

KOSSUTH'S MEMORIES OF MY EXILE.*

No description of book is so interesting as the autobiographic. To say that it is equal to a novel in interest is to do it an injustice. That truth is stranger than fiction is a truism on the lips of everybody, but it is not from the strangeness or startling character of the incidents that an autobiography derives its interest, any more than a romance if intelligently read. The value of a novel lies in the degree of success with which human character is delineated; and the reason why an autobiography, if written by one who has some capacity for verbal expression, surpasses a novel in interest is that no novelist, however great, can lay bare the labyrinths of the mind in an imaginary character, as he can, who is revealing his own. Autobiography is, of course, a very subtle form of self-flattery, but then this half-unconscious, involuntary self-flattery is itself a manifestation of character, and in consequence enhances the interest of the book as a whole. During the past year, three very important autobiographic memoirs have been published. The first in date, as it is the most important, both for the variety and character of its details, was Madame de Remusat's Memoirs of the Court of Napoleon. No such picture of the great conqueror and his court and his other surroundings had before been given to the world. Though a long way behind it, it is true, it will always be classed with the Duc de Simon's Memoirs of the Court of Louis XIV. Simon's Memoirs, it may be confidently said, is the most interesting book in existence; and if any reader of this review is still unacquainted with its contents, let him hasten to taste the sweets of a new and unrivalled pleasure by removing that ignorance. Madame de Remusat's Memoirs are not equal to those of Simon, in consequence of an unlucky incident. She had written during her life at the Court of Napoleon a minute

* *Memories of My Exile.* By Louis Kossuth. Translated by Ferencz Jausz. Cassell, Petter, Galpin & Co. London: 1880.

account of all that went on under her own eye, and had this original account been preserved, we should be now in possession of a book not inferior to that which describes the Court of the great king. But when the Bourbons were restored, Madame de Remusat feared that these memorials might compromise her husband with the new Government, and in a moment of alarm she destroyed them. The Memoirs we have are, in consequence, reminiscences of those former Memoirs; and thus it is that they lack the vivid realism of the Duc de Simon's pictures. None the less they make up a book of surpassing interest and value. A more dismal picture of human wretchedness in the midst of splendour than her description of the Court of Napoleon was never drawn for the edification of mankind. The second important book of this nature which has recently been published is the Memoirs of Prince Metternich, the Austrian adversary of the Great Napoleon. Metternich had an acute eye for the discernment of character, and it is most interesting to compare his account of Napoleon with that of Madame de Remusat. They mutually confirm each other, especially, and in a very remarkable manner, in their account of Napoleon's conversation, and the extraordinary intellectual power it manifested. And now, finally, we have a third work of the same kind in Louis Kossuth's "Memories of my Exile." This volume is merely an instalment, and covers only that period of history during which the campaign of Magenta and Solferino was begun and ended. The peace of Villafranca marked an abrupt and abortive termination of that war. It was begun with the avowed determination to free Italy from the Austrian yoke "from the Alps to the Adriatic." This grand programme had to be abandoned, partly by reason of the heavy losses sustained by the French at Magenta and Solferino, but principally because the army of the German Confederation, assembled on the Rhine, menaced France with invasion should the war have been prolonged. But before the peace of Villafranca had been thought of, the French Emperor formed the project of weakening the Austrian resistance, by instigating the Hungarians to rise and renew the struggle of 1849, which, but for the intervention of the Emperor Nicholas, would have destroyed the sovereignty of the House of Hapsburgh over that part of its present dominions. For this purpose he had recourse to Kossuth—then living an exile in London—and this volume is an account of what took place in consequence.

Now that the Austrian has been expelled and Italy has become a single country under a national sovereign, it is hard to realize that the prospect of so rational and beneficent a change should have filled "sove-

reigns, statesmen, and diplomatists" with perplexity and consternation. Yet so it was. Some day, perhaps, the world will awaken to a correct estimate of the inability of these three orders of men, and the frightful miseries which have, in consequence, fallen upon mankind. In 1859 they proclaimed with one accord that if the brutal and unnatural Austrian rule was not maintained in Italy, all law and order would be destroyed throughout Europe. These same gentry, untaught by the past, have, as we all know, been recently maintaining that the same direful consequences would ensue if Turkish domination was not upheld in South-eastern Europe. In neither case had they the wit to see that Austrian rule in Italy and Turkish rule in Europe were, in themselves, breaches of law and order which produced the confusion and violence which they were so earnest in deprecating. Mrs. Browning has well described the feelings experienced by these dim-sighted officials when the French Emperor declared that the Austrian should cease to rule in a country that was not his. The verses are just as applicable to the period of the Russo-Turkish War :—

Then sovereigns, statesmen, north and south,
Rose up in wrath and fear,
And cried, protesting by one mouth,
"What monster have we here !
A great deed at this hour of day,
A great just deed, and not for pay ?
Absurd, or insincere !
"And if sincere, the heavier blow
In that case we shall bear,
For where's our blessed '*status quo*,'
Our holy treaties, where,—
Our rights to sell a race, or buy,
Protect and pillage, occupy,
And civilize despair ?
"A great deed in this world of ours ?
Unheard of the pretence is :
It threatens plainly the great Powers :
Is fatal in all senses.
A just deed in this world ! Call out
The rifles, be not slack about
The national defences."

What possible "British interest" was involved in the preservation of Austrian rule in Italy it would puzzle any one to conjecture. But at that time the Tories were busy promulgating a notion that if Venice passed out of Austrian hands, the route to India would be in peril. The train of reasoning by which this precious conclusion was arrived at, was as follows : Italy, freed by the aid of France, would,

of course, be no more than a country in a state of vassalage to the French Emperor. He would take advantage of this state of vassalage to build a fleet on the Adriatic, by means of which he would convert the Mediterranean into a French lake, and so close the Overland Route. A stronger motive for intervention was, however, the natural affection which the British Tory feels towards all bad and cruel Governments. His affection is proportioned to their badness; consequently he has never had such a tremendous access of enthusiasm for a bad Government as that which he experienced for the rule of the Sultan and his Pashas. Still, the Austrians in Italy and Hungary had not done badly. They had flogged high-born ladies, like the worst malefactors, in the presence of their soldiery. They had fastened Italian patriots to the walls of their fortresses, and fed them on tallow candles. Clearly, therefore, the Austrian Empire was necessary in order to preserve the "balance of power," and the British Tory was bound to do his utmost to preserve it. The Earl of Derby was then the English Prime Minister, and his Government made the most frantic endeavours to avert the war. Portions of their despatches are quoted by Kossuth in this book, and they cannot be read without laughter. These despatches assure the Italians that the Austrians are most anxious to carry out "reforms" in Lombardy, but are restrained by a wise prudence which has taught them that the Italians are a people who cannot endure "sweeping changes." Is not this delicious? Lanza, the Sardinian Minister of Finance, having introduced a Bill in the House of Representatives for sanctioning a loan of fifty million francs—which loan he justified by a reference to the alarming preparations of Austria—the English Foreign Office addressed the following remonstrance to Turin: "Sardinia was to blame for the attitude of Austria. If Sardinia had not taken advantage of the feelings with which the population of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom *was assumed* to be animated as regards the Austrian Government to raise the cry of Italian Liberation, Austria would have had no occasion to take up a *defensive position* on her frontier." This "*was assumed*" is really an admirable joke. Lord Malmesbury then goes on earnestly to entreat the Court of Turin "*to pause in its headlong career*; to avert the danger which it had so *rashly courted*; to retract the application which it had made for foreign support." The efforts of the British Cabinet were directed to obtain that infallible panacea for all political ills—at least, in the judgment of sovereigns and statesmen—an European Congress to deliberate upon the condition of Italy. Then, as afterwards, when they were called to deal with the Eastern question, these

high official personages either could not or would not perceive that nothing short of independence and unity would satisfy the Italians, because nothing short of these would be equivalent to their legitimate claims and aspirations. Against the demand of a nation for independence, they set up the Treaties of 1815, precisely as diplomats of later date thought to still the convulsions of South-eastern Europe by an appeal to the Treaty of 1856—in other words, by an appeal to “*their* rights to sell a race or buy.” These endeavours of the British Cabinet were fruitless. War broke out, and Lord Derby’s Government made a proclamation of neutrality. But it was understood that this proclamation was conditional on certain unexpressed contingencies. The war, as the diplomatic slang phrases it, was to be “localised.” If it extended beyond the boundaries of Italy, the British Government held itself free to act as circumstances might require. Nothing of all this was stated in the proclamation, but it was understood none the less; and both in Great Britain and in Europe it was believed that the contingency which would liberate the British Government from an attitude of neutrality, was a rising in Hungary, fostered and assisted by the Emperor of the French. This it was which gave occasion to Kossuth’s mission to England, the narrative of which in this volume is its most interesting element for English readers.

The independence of Hungary has been, as all men know, the great object to which Louis Kossuth has devoted his life. Though a Republican himself, he had no overwhelming desire to see that particular form of government accepted by the people of Hungary, so long as they were set free from the domination of the House of Austria. Louis Kossuth has often been contrasted, not by any means favourably, with Francis Deak, the Hungarian lawyer and politician, to whom is due the credit of having worked out the existing *modus vivendi* between Hungary and the House of Hapsburgh. In Great Britain our domestic politics is so completely a system of compromises, that we have brought ourselves to believe that nothing in the political world can be good for anything which is not infected with the spirit of compromise. In Francis Deak, accordingly, we recognized an apostle and practiser of the great saving doctrine of compromise; in Kossuth, the unpractical man indissolubly wedded to an abstract principle incapable of being embodied in action. But the progress of events is more and more tending to show that the (so-called) unpractical man was the man who rightly apprehended the nature of the situation. Kossuth perceived that so long as Hungary remained an appendage of Austria, it was not possible that the various races

which inhabit her soil should amalgamate into a single nationality. The House of Austria maintains a precarious domination over its heterogeneous dominions by the device of playing off one race against another. The instinct of self-preservation compels it to a policy of division, and Hungary, he contended, as well as the rest of its territories, would have to be sacrificed to this necessity. Precisely this is what has occurred since the grant of a constitution to Hungary. There is no nation in Hungary. There is simply a Hungarian faction, in alliance with the Court of Vienna, and which, in return for this alliance, is allowed to oppress the vastly more numerous Slavs among whom they live. No one supposes that the present state of things can last. Sooner or later the Slavs must attain the rights and privileges which their increasing numbers will give them the power to exact; and then the very name of Hungarian will disappear from among the nationalities of Europe. By making Hungary independent of Austria, Kossuth trusted to absorb the Slavic population into the Hungarian; instead of, as will now in all probability be the case, the Hungarian being either exterminated by the races which he has so long oppressed, or simply submerged and lost in their multitudinousness. After the Hungarian war of 1849 had been brought to a close by the intervention of the Czar Nicholas, Kossuth became an exile. But he never laid aside the great purpose of his life. At the same time, the independence of Hungary, he held, was not an object attainable by secret conspiracies, local outbreaks, and the ordinary revolutionary contrivances. On this point he expresses himself as follows :—

My view of the matter was always this, that what is permissible and may even be judicious in the case of a nation rising merely to change the form of its Government or to transform its internal organization, is neither judicious nor permissible when the end in view is national independence and delivery from foreign dominion. In the former case revolution does not really mean war. It is but an internal contest, in which the people are confronted only by governmental power; and such a revolution has, in more than one instance, been decided by a few days' fighting in the streets. But in the latter case, revolution is a real war against a foreign enemy, whose centre of power cannot be reached in the country because he has at his disposal armies and resources outside the country. Such a war cannot be decided by fighting from behind barricades. In this case the activity of patriotism must confine itself to keeping alive the aspirations for independence, and to taking care that the nation may be in readiness to seize such an opportunity for the realisation of its aspirations, as will make the probability of success, according to human calculations, depend solely upon the will of the people. . . . To organise local outbreaks is a political error by which no reasonable purpose can be gained; and from a moral point of view it is to be condemned, for it unnecessarily compromises those who are ready for sacrifice, and the lives of such should not be risked in vain. These views served to guide

me under all circumstances since I became a refugee, and from them I have never swerved.

These convictions saved Hungary from incalculable calamity during the Italian war. Whether or not the Emperor Louis Napoleon cared anything for the independence of Hungary, is a question to which no certain answer can be given. At any rate he affected to do so, but it was also obviously for his advantage, while attacking the Austrians in Italy, to create a diversion in the rear of the enemy so formidable as an insurrection in Hungary. Kossuth declined to enter into any proposals of this kind which were not accompanied with material guarantees to show that Hungary was not to be used as a mere tool for the advantage of others. In May, 1859, he left London for Paris in order to confer personally with the Emperor on the subject. As a preliminary to this conference, he had an interview at Paris with Prince Napoleon, of which there is a curious and interesting account in these "Memoirs." The Prince stipulated that if Hungary became free with the assistance of the French Emperor, she should adopt not "a Republican form of Government, but a Constitutional Monarchy." To this Kossuth agreed; and the following remarks then ensued:—

Kossuth.—The exigencies of the European situation, and especially the fact of our alliance with monarchs, decidedly point to a Constitutional Monarchy. I therefore accept this stipulation of the Emperor without reserve, and can assure your Highness that my nation will do the same with general consent. Still, to be able to prepare public opinion in our country, I should like to know upon whom the Emperor would most wish our choice of a king to fall.

The Prince.—The Emperor leaves this entirely to your own discretion. He has no special wish in the matter.

Kossuth.—Of course the wish to dispose of the Crown of Hungary cannot enter our minds for an instant. We have no right to do so. But I know my nation. I know that gratitude is one of their national characteristics. If, as a consequence of our present negotiations, Hungary should become independent, this would be ascribed to the protection of the Emperor, and this again to the mediation of your Highness. I cannot refrain from expressing my conviction that my nation would offer the crown of St. Stephen to your Highness!

Upon this the Prince, who sat with me at a small table, rose, and making a deep bow, said: "I am sensible of the honour you do me, and thank you very much. But I must request you not to mention this again to me, or to the Emperor when you speak with him. We Bonapartes have learnt much from the history of our uncle. We have learnt not only what we must, but also what we must not do. We know that members of our family must not accept foreign thrones, for that might lead to a European coalition against us . . . Therefore do not let us mention the subject again; let us leave it and pass on to practical subjects. Tell me what you wish, what you require to put the Hungarian nation under arms again, in order that they may make use of the Italian war to resume their struggle for national independence."

The conditions, in response to this inquiry, which Kossuth declared to be indispensable were these: "First of all, and above everything else, we want a material guarantee that the instigating of Hungary to insurrection is not solely intended to make a diversion in order to weaken Austria's force in Italy;" secondly, a guarantee was required "that the Emperor and King Victor Emmanuel look upon the independence of Hungary as an object of this war co-ordinate with the object of Italy;" and thirdly, Kossuth required "an assurance that if Hungary takes up arms against Austria on this understanding, she will not be left in the lurch, and that in case of victory no peace shall be concluded with regard to Italy without Hungary being liberated from the rule of Austria and made an independent State." In other words, Kossuth refused to stir in the matter unless the liberation of Hungary was as much an integral and essential part of the impending campaign as the liberation of Italy. As in the one country, so in the other, the French flag must be unfurled, and a French army must be sent strong enough to protect that flag from insult. The Prince undertook to communicate these conditions to the Emperor, and at about midnight on the 5th May, another interview took place, those present being the Emperor, Prince Napoleon, and Kossuth. The Emperor admitted the reasonableness of Kossuth's stipulations. There were difficulties, however, in the way of sending an army to Hungary which the Emperor did not see how to remove. He said, according to Kossuth's report of the conversation—

The chief obstacle is England. The Tory Government now in power manifests a decidedly hostile attitude towards my enterprise even as regards Italy. They cling to the Treaties of 1815, which others beside myself have torn to tatters long ago. For, you see, these treaties proscribed the Napoleons, and I am here at this moment. . . . You may imagine what the Tories would do were I to extend the war to the Danube, if they behave in the way they do while there is a question of Italy only. To extend the war so far would mean to strike out forever the Austrian dynasty from the list of the Great Powers, and the English Government clings obstinately to that dynasty. The antiquated notion that the existence of the House of Hapsburgh as a great power is essential to the maintenance of the European equilibrium is one of the traditional maxims of English policy. I have reason to believe that England would even be capable of actually intervening against me—and that I cannot risk. Please take this into consideration. . . .

Kossuth.—Your Majesty's distrust is well founded. The problem, therefore, would be to overthrow the Ministry of Lord Derby, and to do so just on the question of its foreign policy. The place of the Tories should be taken by the Whigs, on such an understanding as would entirely secure the neutrality of England. As your Majesty wishes only this much from England, permit me to declare that I will take upon myself the task to carry this into effect.

The Emperor.—What do you mean? Do you really think you can do this?

Kossuth.—Yes, Sire, I believe I can. Pray do not regard my words as mere extravagant boasting. I am only a poor exile, whose sphere of action is very limited, and certainly do not dream of being able to direct England's policy, but I know the position of the parties; I am on a friendly footing with the personages who can bring this about; and I hope I shall be able to persuade them to do it.

Much more on this subject was exchanged between the French Emperor and the Hungarian exile; and the result was that Kossuth returned to England a few days after to try his hand at overthrowing a Tory Government.

At the beginning of the year 1859, a Tory Cabinet under the conduct of Lord Derby guided the destinies of Great Britain. Mr. Disraeli was the Conservative leader in the House of Commons. The Government brought in a Reform Bill, which towards the close of March was rejected by a majority of twenty-nine, and Lord Derby dissolved Parliament and appealed to the country. At this time, it was known that war between France and Austria was inevitable; and the prospect of this impending struggle was appealed to by Lord Derby and his colleagues as a strong argument against making a change of Government. It is amusing to contrast Mr. Disraeli's manifesto of 1859 with that which, a short time ago, shipwrecked his party, and to note how much the two resemble each other. "The blow," says Mr. Disraeli, "which has lately been inflicted on the Government deprives it of authority; and yet in the ranks of the Opposition there is no more unity of sentiment than when their distracted politics rendered it necessary that Lord Derby should assume the helm. The Opposition in the present House of Commons, which was elected under ambiguous circumstances, is broken into sections, which can always combine and overthrow the Queen's Government, however formed. This is a condition alike prejudicial to Parliament and to the Empire. It is for the country to comprehend and to remedy these evils. The moment is critical. England has engaged to mediate between two great monarchs, and, if possible, preserve the blessings of peace. It is necessary that the Queen's Government should be supported by a patriotic Parliament."

Here, as our readers will perceive, are precisely the same phrases with which we have become so painfully familiar during the last four or five years. Then, as now, it was out of a concern for the "blessings of peace" that a Tory Cabinet was constrained to assume a menacing attitude towards France. Then, as now, they wanted "a patriotic Parliament," *i.e.*, a strong Tory majority, in order the more effectually to menace the French Emperor, of course with no other purpose than to preserve the "blessings of peace." Then, as now, the Liberal party was represented as split into factions which

could never unite except for the purpose of expelling a patriotic Government from office. Parliament was dissolved on the 20th April, and was re-opened by the Queen in person on the 7th June. The elections had not been altogether unfavourable to the Conservative party. They had gained twenty-six seats, and as against the Palmerstonian Whigs they had an effective majority. The Conservatives numbered 302; the Whigs proper only 263. But there was a third party—numbering no less than ninety members—which was composed of men who adhered to the political doctrines of Messrs. Cobden and Bright; and the fate of Government depended upon the action of this third party. Their foreign policy, as every one knows, was a policy of rigid non-intervention in the troubled waters of European politics; but few who use the word “non-intervention” are at all aware of how it was interpreted by Mr. Cobden and his disciples. The vulgar Jingoistic notion of Mr. Cobden is that he regarded a nation as merely a trading association, which, so long as it obtained a market for its commodities, had no duties to fulfil in the world. Consequently, so long as the continental nations were willing to purchase what we desired to sell, we ought, he considered, to remain uninterested spectators of their internal troubles. Had Cobden held such sentiments as these, he would have been, not a bad man, but an idiot who knew nothing of the things which belonged to the prosperity of even the narrow commercial objects which he set before him as the whole purpose of national existence. The purchasing capacity of a nation is affected for good or ill by every modification in its internal condition. No men are so directly interested in the internal peace and prosperity of the nations of Europe as the British traders. For trade is essentially a matter of reciprocity; the wealth of Great Britain sinks or rises in proportion to the wealth of the world. It was his clear perception of this fact that made Cobden what he has frequently been termed, “an international man.” So far from counselling an indifference to the concerns of foreign nations, no English politician, both by precept and example, has taught with such earnestness a precisely opposite doctrine. He was indefatigable in acquiring information respecting foreign lands. And he was never satisfied until he had verified the results of reading by examination of the facts upon the spot. The consequence was that no Englishman of his day—or probably of any day—had so minute and abundant a knowledge of the condition of Europe as Mr. Cobden. The knowledge thus laboriously acquired, led him to assert “non-intervention” as the principle which should regulate our foreign policy; but, like all other principles, this one must be interpreted with special

regard to the circumstances under which it was enunciated. What, in other words, was the state of Europe? The state of Europe was based upon the treaties of 1815. It is a peculiarity of "sovereigns and statesmen" that when they have completed any arrangement—no matter how perverse and unstable it may be—they immediately identify it with the everlasting order of the universe. Notably was this the case with the settlement of Europe devised in 1815. A bevy of sovereigns and statesmen had parcelled out among themselves the nations of Europe as if they had been disposing of so many head of cattle. And the policy of "intervention" in the mouth of a British statesman meant intervention for the purpose of maintaining the settlement of 1815. No British statesman—Whig or Tory—thought of intervening when the liberties or the rights of a people were crushed by the action of a foreign despot. No British statesman invoked the principle of intervention to rescue the people of Lombardy from the brutal and bloody tyranny of Austria. No British statesman intervened when a French army crushed the nascent liberties of Spain, when the Czar Nicholas crushed the independence of Hungary, when the Republic of Cracow was extinguished by Austria. But when Greece was liberated by the war of 1828, British statesmen did intervene to force back the larger part of her provinces into bondage to the Turk. When Mehemet Ali had conquered Syria, British statesmen intervened to bring the wretched populations back again to their former state of servitude under the Sublime Porte. When Roumania was set free, British statesmen intervened to break it up into two provinces, precisely as they intervened, a brief while ago, in the case of emancipated Bulgaria. Such was the "intervention" against which Mr. Cobden and his disciples vigorously protested—an intervention that was invariably directed against popular freedom, and in the interests of effete and cruel despotisms. They perceived—while yet the immense majority of the British nation was plodding along in darkness—that a great popular movement had begun among the nations, which would speedily transform the face of Europe. They were averse to active intervention where it could be avoided, even in the cause of popular freedom, because they held that there were forces fighting on the side of the people which would bring them victory independently of our assistance. At the period of which we are writing, the Tory Government and the Tory party were eagerly looking out for some pretext to intervene in favour of Austria. Just as in the case of the Christians of South-eastern Europe, Tory speakers and the Tory press were pouring forth calumny and invective against the Italian nation. They were slaves, assassins,

revolutionists, utterly unfit for freedom, and Heaven knows what else. The Austrian bureaucracy was extolled precisely as in these latter days we have heard the Constantinople Pashas extolled. Mr. Cobden and his friends stood amid this turmoil firmly and consistently by the principle of non-intervention. They did more than this. They declared that the unity and emancipation of Italy were results which all Englishmen ought to desire—that if the heterogeneous Austrian Empire went to pieces in the struggle, that was a consequence which should disturb the equanimity of no lover of order and good government.

The relations between Kossuth and this (so-called) "Peace" party had long been of an intimate kind. The party may be said to have included almost every Englishman who really valued popular freedom, and was animated by a keen and hearty indignation against arbitrary rule and military oppression. The great Hungarian leader was just the man whom such men would receive with the heartiest friendship. Kossuth arrived in London from Paris on May 8th. Cobden was at that time travelling in America, and in his absence Kossuth had recourse to Mr. Charles Gilpin, M.P. for Northampton. After pronouncing a warm eulogy on Mr. Gilpin, Kossuth proceeds as follows :—

I communicated to him, in confidence, what had passed between myself and the Emperor; he gave me his word that he would help me to attain my end, and he redeemed his word. We talked over the *modus operandi*. He approved of my suggestion that we should commence with public meetings; but was of opinion that we must wait a few days until the elections were over, lest I should lay myself open to the charge of trying to interfere with them, though a foreigner; that, besides, it was necessary to know the result of the elections, according to which we should have to arrange our future proceedings. It was expected that the elections would be over by about May 14th; five or six days would be sufficient to let the excitement calm down and to give time for the people to take an interest in something else. Accordingly, we had only about ten days left in which to hold public meetings; for Parliament would very likely be opened on the last day of the month. We decided that meetings should be held in London, Manchester, Bradford, and Glasgow.

Kossuth then proceeds to give a report of the speeches delivered by him at these places. We wish that space would allow us to quote largely from them. Not only are they remarkable as examples of the finest English oratory—indeed, quite marvellous when we remember that they were spoken by a foreigner—but we do not know where else one could look for so masterly an exposition of the position of Austria in the European national comity. There is, however, one passage which we must enjoy the satisfaction of quoting, because it sets forth a fact as important to remember now as it was then :—

Can any one give me a single instance of Austria's having resisted Russia

from extending any further? Nobody can cite me a single instance. . . . But, unfortunately, history records that Austria joined Russia in her conquests, and divided the spoils with her, that she played the part of receiver of stolen goods; also that she assisted, absolutely assisted, Russia in upsetting the European equilibrium. Of all this you will find records in history; but you will find no record of Austria's having resisted the encroachments of Russia. And why not? The reason is simple. Russia is a Slav Power, and there are 17,000,000 people belonging to the Slavonian race in the Austrian Empire, all of them discontented and oppressed; and some of them form not only nationalities, but nations, who have a separate past history as a nation, and who see and hate in the Austrian rule the extermination of their independence. Such is Austria's position, and, as far as Russia is concerned, it has its logic, to which the Czar Alexander gave expression when he instructed Admiral Tsitsakoff to say, if he found Austria playing fast and loose, "Ye 17,000,000, rise against the oppressor of your nationality! Here I am to help you!" Consider this, and you will understand the reason why France and England, in spite of excessive flattery, persuasion, and courting, were not able to induce Austria to draw her sword against Russia in the Crimean War.

These meetings had a powerful effect on public feeling; and resolutions were passed all over the country in favour of absolute neutrality during the coming contest. This, however, was not sufficient for Kossuth. He felt that so long as a Tory Government remained in power there was an obstacle the more in the way of Hungarian independence. What he wished to see accomplished was a coalition between the party of Cobden and the Palmerstonian Whigs to expel Lord Derby from office, expressly on the ground of want of confidence in the latter's foreign policy. Parliament re-assembled on the 7th June, and how he achieved his purpose is thus related:—

Now the moment had arrived to bring to a practical issue what I had implored my friends to do in the interests of the liberty of Hungary and Italy. My late lamented friend, Mr. Charles Gilpin, took the matter in hand. He was in constant communication with me, and once more conferred upon the conditions with the more notable members of his party, notably with Mr. John Bright, who, in the absence of Mr. Cobden, was the leader of the party; and in accordance with their mutual agreement, he assured Lord Palmerston of the support of his party on these conditions:—

1. That the Tory Ministry should be overthrown expressly on a question affecting foreign politics.

2. That Lord Palmerston, as well as Lord John Russell, and any other member of the future Cabinet, whose selection might have been already determined upon, should each address a separate letter to Mr. Gilpin, binding themselves that the basis of their foreign policy would be the absolute neutrality of England, not only while war is confined to Italy, but also in case it should extend from the Po to the banks of the Danube and Theiss.

3. That, in order to insure this neutrality, two members of the future Ministry should be chosen from the party on whose behalf Mr. Gilpin was negotiating.

Lord Palmerston accepted these conditions, and next day he, as well as Lord John Russell and the other three members of the Cabinet, whose selection had already been decided upon, handed the letters referred to in the second point of the agreement to Mr. Giffin (*who immediately handed the originals of the letters to me, authorizing me to make discreet use of them, and more particularly to show them to the Emperor Napoleon*); and Lord Palmerston also declared in his letter that, in conformity with the third condition, Messrs. Richard Cobden and Milner Gibson would be nominated members of the future Ministry.

In this way the coalition which Kossuth desired to see had been brought about. On the 10th June, a vote of want of confidence in regard to their foreign policy was moved by the Marquis of Hartington against the Government, which, after a long and animated debate, was carried by a majority of thirteen. Lord Derby resigned, and Lord Palmerston reigned in his stead. By the middle of June, Kossuth was on his way to Italy to join the Emperor, carrying with him the letters which contained the Ministerial pledges of England's neutrality. He had done what he undertook to do.

While Kossuth was in England, the allied armies of France and Italy had been beating the Austrians at Montebello, Palestina, Casteggio, and Magenta; and the Hungarian exile reached Genoa just two days before the crowning victory of Solferino was won. He received a summons from the Emperor to repair to head-quarters without delay. The account of his journey through Italy is given in these "Memories" in a series of letters to his wife, and is bright with graphic touches. The Italians were rejoicing in the fact of their deliverance from the hated Austrian bondage, and recognized in Kossuth a valiant fighter against their common enemy. The news of his arrival in any town was the signal for the population to throng the doors of his hotel, in order to offer their tribute of admiration and sympathy to the Hungarian exile. At Piacenza, he and his travelling companion—Colonel Kiss—arrived late at night:—

I slept peacefully, and at eight o'clock sat down to breakfast, still unrecognized. At this moment the waiter brought in the visitors' list. Nicholas Kiss enters my name; the waiter says, "Grazie," and goes. At the door he cast a look over the names, and looked back to us with eyes that can only be compared to the first eruption of fire from a volcano. He ran like mad down the steps, and before five minutes—no, scarcely three minutes—had passed by, the 30,000 inhabitants knew it. They rushed into the streets as if the alarm bell called them; they were coming from all directions, and stood underneath my window and shouted "Evviva!" as if they wished to bring down the firmament of heaven by their voices. The Mayor and all the municipal officers came into my room to pay their respects to me, to offer their services, to beg my commands; the venerable Montanelli, a late Minister of Tuscany, who lost his left arm at Curtatone, where he fought as a volunteer in 1848, came, accompanied by many officers of the civil

guard, but he himself dressed like a private soldier; in a word, everybody came. Half an hour afterwards, when I was stepping into a carriage, everybody who could came near me, kissed my hands and clothes. We moved along with great difficulty, and had scarcely reached the street when the people unharnessed the horses, and themselves drew us through the town, while crowds streamed towards us from every street, thousands followed us, flowers were thrown from the windows, and the people honoured the poor homeless traveller with the perfect frenzy of young liberty's first intoxication. And why? Because they identify his name with that of liberty, the perception of which runs like a current of electricity through the nerves of humanity.

On the 3rd July, Kossuth, having, in the course of his journey, traversed the field of Solferino, still covered with traces of the great battle, arrived at Milan, and was admitted to an interview with the Emperor Napoleon:—

First of all, I gave an account of the result of my mission to England. I did so only verbally, lest I should appear to be boasting; but Pietri interrupted: "Yet the strangest part, Sire, is that M. Kossuth has in his pocket the letters of the English Cabinet Ministers, by which they engage that England will remain neutral even if we go to Hungary." "Indeed!" said the Emperor; "may I see them?" I handed him the letters. They seemed to interest him very much. He read them one after the other, smiling every now and again, and shook his head as if astonished. Then I spoke. "Your Majesty can see," I said, "that I have not only faithfully carried out the task I had taken upon myself, but I have accomplished it with even greater success than I had promised, and I now feel compelled to ask, what are your designs with regard to Hungary?"

The Emperor assured him that nothing short of an European coalition would prevent him aiding a movement in Hungary by the co-operation of a French army, and the interview ended with the Emperor requesting Kossuth to return to Turin and devote his energies to organizing, with the utmost promptitude possible, an Hungarian legion to be incorporated in the allied army. This was on the 3rd July. Five days later (July 8th) Kossuth learned at Genoa that an armistice had been concluded between the French and the Austrians. The news struck him like a thunderbolt. A few days after, Pietri paid him a visit:—

He handed me an autograph letter addressed to him by the Emperor. I wept like a child, and could scarcely read it. The contents of the letter were to the following effect: "We have well considered the matter on all sides with the Prince and the King, and, however reluctantly, have come to the conclusion that we must make peace. This time we cannot go further. There is now an end to the war. Tell M. Kossuth that I am extremely sorry that the liberation of his country must now be left alone. I cannot do otherwise. It is an impossibility. But I beg him not to lose heart, but to trust to me and the future. Meanwhile, he may be assured of my friendly feelings towards him, and I beg him to dispose of me with regard to his own person and his children." When I came to this

point of the letter I could not control myself sufficiently to prevent my revolted feelings from venting themselves in a bitter exclamation. "Yes, yes!" I said; "such are these crowned heads! Such is their idea of the creature that is called man! To the wind with the fatherland! A bag full of money to the man, and he will console himself! Senator, pray tell your master that his Majesty the Emperor of the French is not rich enough to offer alms to Louis Kossuth, and Louis Kossuth is not mean enough to accept them. He has turned me out of my position. Well, my sons will gain our living by their work. *Je vous salue!*"

There was another man then living on whom that armistice fell with a more crushing shock than even on Kossuth. That man was Cavour. Kossuth relates what he said when Pietri and himself waited upon the Italian Minister, a short time after that fatal 8th July. "I tell you," said Cavour, "and I say it before this gentleman [*i.e.*, Pietri], and to say it before him is tantamount to telling it to his Emperor, this peace shall not come to pass! this treaty shall not be executed! I will take Solaro della Margarita (the leader of the Conservative clerical party) by the one hand, and Mazzini by the other. If necessary, I will become a conspirator! a revolutionist! but this treaty shall not be executed! No! a thousand times, no! Never! never!" And, as a matter of fact, the Treaty of Villafranca never was executed.

This profoundly interesting book is translated into English by Mr. Ferencz Jausz, and the translation exhibits a mastery of easy idiomatic English which is simply marvellous. No one would imagine it to be a translation, and far less that it was executed by one who was not using his native language.

ARISTOCRATIC ETHICS.

THERE can be, perhaps, no better time than the present for considering the effects of the aristocratic *régime* which prevails in these islands, on the morals, sentiments, and habits of thought of the English people. The discussions in the press on the proposed alteration in the Land Laws have familiarized the public with the effects of the present tenure of land on the material and economic prosperity of the country. But no one has as yet attempted to show systematically the influence of the aristocratic principle in retarding or accelerating the moral and intellectual development of the nation. It is but rarely that the higher social and moral considerations are made the ground of legislative reforms. This has been done but recently, it is true, in the matter of primary education, but as a general rule, such considerations are regarded as lying quite outside the sphere of practical politics. They are usually dismissed as sentimental or utopian, and are relegated to the moralist, the satirist, or the *doctrinaire*. Nevertheless, it may be confidently anticipated that sooner or later they will become the objects of political agitation. The energies of man are first of all directed to the winning and securing of his personal freedom; after that, of his political liberty. When these have been attained, he cannot rest, but by his very nature, which is illimitable, must push forwards until he breaks through those social barriers—soft as air, though strong as iron—which impede the free play and expansion of the soul. To attain his end he will press legislation into his service; and as the object of all government is generally admitted to be the moral and political elevation of the people, through the operation of political changes, he will be fully justified in so doing. In his magnificent work on America, De Toqueville has traced the influence of Democracy on the politics, morals, manners, and aspirations of the Americans, and his book is justly regarded as a repository of political wisdom. In this essay I shall attempt to point out, however feebly, the influence of Aristocracy on the morals, sentiments,

and habits of thought of the English people, and shall endeavour to show—

Firstly—That by holding up a false ideal of humanity it corrupts the moral sense, degrades the mind, and blunts the finer sensibilities of the heart.

Secondly—That the morality of the nation cannot advance, until the material and social conditions become more equalized.

And lastly—I shall indicate in a general way the bearing of these conclusions on the present state of society.

But before proceeding to the consideration of these points, I desire to make a few preliminary observations, to avoid misapprehension, and to give more definiteness to the issues put before the reader. In the first place, in speaking of the aristocracy I must be understood to regard them, not as so many independent units of every shade of disposition and culture, but as a body, an institution, an order in the State, the members of which are bound together by common traditions, sympathies, and habits of thought. In the next place, I shall assume that, like every other institution, organization, or association, their attitude as a corporate body to other classes in the State is one of conscious or unconscious self-interest. Perhaps one of our most amiable illusions is the idea that classes are governed by the same moral principles as individuals. We fondly imagine that they will act with the same high and generous impulses which characterize their members in their private capacities. No illusion is at once more seductive and more fatal. Individuals, though raised to the purple, may go back to the plough; but classes, once possessed of power, never without compulsion relax their grip. In private life, the rough edge of self-interest is tempered by principle or affection, and selfishness is subordinated to the influence of old associations, to love, honour, friendship, admiration, or pity. In our personal relations with our fellows, our whole being interacts and alternates; and the higher and nobler as well as the more selfish attributes of our nature are called into free play and activity; but once we are grouped into circles, like circles we can touch on only one point, that of self-interest. All organizations, from the smallest and meanest up to Church and Government, have this as their vital and primary law. The professions, the merchants, the tradesmen, the mechanics, have each their *esprit de corps*, as against the rest of the world. Even the Church of God becomes aggressive and selfish the moment it becomes organized and established. Do Churchmen and Dissenters love one another when

fighting for what are called their respective causes? As well expect the soldiers of opposing hosts to embrace each other. Government itself, the hugest of all organizations, is as inexorable as the grave. All are stretched alike on its Procrustean bed, without regard to the endless extenuation of circumstances. It is a gigantic, unrelenting machine, enforcing its decrees, collecting its taxes, and upholding the letter of the law, without pity or remorse. In the international relations, too, of war, diplomacy, or trade, where is the magnanimity, the honour, the high morality, that are to be found between man and man? The truth is, there is a scale in moralities. International morality stands at the lowest point—that of pure and undisguised self-interest. Class morality stands next above it, for, although equally selfish in its instincts, it is restrained by the law, which is a kind of public conscience. Social morality, or the relations that exist between man and man, stands highest, although there is a higher flight to be reached which is as yet almost out of sight. The "Ten Commandments" are a very crude code of morals for modern civilization; and the high virtues of magnanimity, sincerity, and openness of mind, are not yet compulsory, but have still to be embodied in the traditions of the race. As the world at present goes, then, it is absurd to expect that men banded together for a particular object will exhibit, in that capacity, the finer amenities of the mind—its graces, chivalries, and moral refinements. These can only arise between individuals, and as I shall endeavour to show further on, between equals. And so it is with the aristocracy. Between them and their tenants, dependents, and parasites, multitudinous influences combine to soften the asperity of power; but between them, as a body, and the other classes in the community, the above considerations will fully justify us in assuming that there is and can be no tie but that of self-interest. The defection of any exceptionally high-minded member from the common interest, proves as little as the occasional marriage of one of them with a domestic, and must not be permitted to veil our sight for a moment. However great his prestige and authority, his action is not representative, but is merely that of a unit. Some of the leading families have, in politics, allied themselves in the past with the party of progress, and at present even with the Radicals. Does anyone therefore believe that there is any real and vital sympathy between the aristocracy as a body and the party of progress? When the question of the tenure of land comes on for discussion we shall see.

I desire, furthermore, to explain that in my remarks on the effects of aristocracy on society, I shall speak of its influence on the

great masses of the population, rather than on the few exceptional minds who in every class look at life with a free and disengaged eye, On the great masses of the poor and ignorant, because their elevation and amelioration is the end of all government and legislation, and the reward of all those who devote themselves to the service of humanity, On the great masses of the respectable, because only by reflecting their interests, sympathies, and prejudices, can men hope to attain wide and paramount influence and authority, the great seminal minds having little influence beyond the narrow circle of the cultivated, and being regarded by the public as *doctrinaires*, a term synonymous with contempt, On the great masses as a body, because their simple faith in symbols as if they were serious realities makes them the easy prey of every species of superstition, and by giving a factitious greatness and authority to those who mirror their delusions, indirectly perpetuates the evils which we seek to eradicate. Here, for example, are a herd of idolaters prostrate before an image. We perceive that they as sincerely believe in its real and vital efficacy, as, when boys, we believed in our toys, games, and fairy tales. The priest is quite ready to admit to you, who are a man of insight, that the fetiches he has set up, have a symbolical value only, not an intrinsic one. But by making himself the mouth-piece and exponent of this superstition, he attains an influence in Church and State which else were denied him. The scholastic subtleties which are to him alone of importance, and are the very kernel and marrow of his thought, would otherwise fall unresponsive on the empty air. Here, again, are a vast herd of peasants, farmers, and country tradesmen, who believe that the nobility are their natural and eternal superiors, of different flesh and blood, and that the fixed strata in society is as much a piece of fate and nature, as the strata in the rocks. By virtue of this widespread superstition, the nobility retain their power and influence over society, and without it, they, too, with their ranks and pedigrees, their belief in the natural inequality of souls, and in their own "right to do what they like with their own" would collapse and vanish.

These illustrations show how important it is to distinguish between the opinions of the learned few—the literati, philosophers, men of science, and economists—and the beliefs held by the great masses of the people. While the former are busy exchanging those lofty thoughts, which foreshadow the history of the world, and which, when concentrated and combined, will fall like vivifying showers on the future generations, the latter, on some of the most momentous questions of life, are still sunk in that torpor in which they have lain

since the dark ages. And, in passing, it is interesting to remark that while the ruling powers ignore the very existence of the thinkers, and the leading organ of public opinion (abetting a too aggressive Philistinism), asks with a sneer whether these *doctrinaires* imagine that, like the three tailors of Tooley-street, they are settling the affairs of the world, not an uneasy dissenter can groan in his dreams, but it is heard and noted, with awe and respect, by both press and government, as a movement of public opinion; the nice appreciation and estimate of its strength and volume being regarded as the measure and index of "practical statesmanship." While the political beliefs of the body of the people are thus faithfully reflected, those beliefs which it is the object of this essay to bring into prominence, are to be gathered neither from the politicians nor the press, but by direct contact with the world itself. There we can see the real and abiding sentiments of men, in so far as they determine their actions or conduct, and can judge as to how far political measures have gone in elevating their lives. The press is essentially a political medium, and deals almost exclusively with material and economic concerns; and as the will of the people is now the supreme law, its spirit is accordingly democratic, whatever may be the political leanings of different journals. The politician, too, deals with the same material interests, and in his public utterances is forced to keep out of sight all that is not strictly economic, or to veil it under voluminous clouds of cant and sophistry. For example, if the question of the tenure of land arises, I observe that learned members discuss it as if it turned entirely on the relative value to the community of large or small farms, or the like,—the landed interest struggling fiercely to prove the superiority of the former. And indeed we hear it everywhere said that the difficulty is not in finding landlords to sell, but in finding purchasers to buy, as men are too sensible to invest in so unremunerative a commodity. Whereas, if I go about among men, I find that owing to the dignity and influence attached to the ownership of land, those who hold estates wish to buy more, and would sooner starve than sell an acre of what they already possess. Or again, if I read a leading article on the House of Lords, I find the noble members of that body spoken of as if they were of little more consequence than so many old clothesmen; whereas, if I go down into the counties, I find them sitting majestically apart like Olympian deities, each on his separate peak. Or, on the other hand, if I read a glowing eulogy on the public appearance of some eminent representative of literature, science, or the arts, I imagine his influence in society will be commensurate with the prominence given to his utterances or per-

formance; whereas, I shall probably find that he is patronised by the nobility, considered of little account by the vulgar, and his calling, whether literary, artistic, or scientific, considered beneath the dignity of persons of quality. So true is this, that in the great works of fiction—and these after all are the best mirrors of the opinions, beliefs, and sentiments of the age—it is everywhere taken for granted as a matter of course.

It has been remarked by a distinguished thinker, that there is at the bottom of every society, an idea or principle, which animates the members of which it is composed, as the mind animates and directs the movements of the body. This idea differs, of course, in different times and places. In Sparta it was patriotism; in Judea, religion; in France, at the time of the Revolution, equality. And just as the spirit of a poem controls the selection of sentiment and incident; and the spirit of a legislative measure its separate clauses; so the idea which is at the root of any society dictates its code of morality, its aspirations, sentiments, and habits of thought. In England, at the present time, as in most of the ancient European States, there are two ideas at work—the mediæval feudal, and the modern democratic idea. The play and interaction of these two principles determine the movements of English life. Before, therefore, we can estimate aright the part played by each, we must separate as far as possible their respective spheres of activity. I rejoice to have lived while the old tree of Feudalism, whose roots are so swiftly decaying, but whose leaves are still fresh and green, yet survives; for it will be ere long as extinct as the fossil remains of the primæval world. It is interesting to the moralist, as a living illustration of how the spirit of man, which in our dreams we fondly imagine to be infinite and free, can be moulded into any shape, stamped with any impress, and made to dance to any tune. It is instructive, too, to the statesman, as furnishing, by comparison with that democratic state of society which in one nation at least has been completely realised, that second point of observation, which is as essential to the political thinker as it is to the astronomer. A century or two ago, aristocracy was the paramount and all-pervading influence in English life. Founded on material power as its basis, with rank and birth as its flower and outcome, it set its image and superscription on every department of thought and activity—on legislation, manners, morals, and culture. But for ages there had been growing up alongside of it another influence, which, though still overshadowed by it, was waxing in strength year by year. This, too, was founded on material power, viz., industry and commerce, and differing in interest and tradition from

the aristocracy, constituted the democratic element in modern society. It became in time greater in combination, if not in concentration, than the aristocracy itself; and after lying latent and invisible for a while, made its appearance, after the first Reform Bill, as an active power in the State. In its conflict with the aristocracy, the rising democracy first succeeded in winning for itself personal liberty. Many ages had to come and go after the time that Gurth the swine-herd wore the brass collar as bond-slave of Cedric the Saxon, before the Habeas Corpus Act finally asserted that no Englishman could be arbitrarily detained in prison without being brought to a fair and speedy trial. Personal liberty secure, the tide of democracy next set in the direction of political enfranchisement. And although the local government of the counties is still in the hands of the aristocracy, or those allied to them in interest and sentiment; and the extension of the franchise to the counties has still, with other reforms, to be fought and won; on the whole, political liberty is tolerably complete; and with it, the influence of democracy on English life practically ends. It has secured us personal liberty, so that the haughtiest patrician must now submit to be jostled in the public streets like the meanest plebeian. It has secured us a large measure of political freedom, so that the meanest mechanic, in all things else a cipher, without the least influence on thought or culture, has to be flattered, cajoled, or even bribed, once at least at every turn of the election-wheel. But in all that constitutes the higher life of man—his morals, sentiments, culture, and aspirations,—the country is still dominated by aristocratic habits of thought. This domination is of course not so glaring as it was formerly, for every advance in democracy must modify to a greater or less degree the prevailing spirit, as a stone thrown into a lake, pulses, however imperceptibly, against its remotest shores. But this avails little, so long as the ideal which the nation sets before its youth remains practically the same as before. For it cannot be too often repeated, that just as the society which a man deliberately prefers is a finer and more sensitive touchstone of his moral quality, than any particular action, so the ideal which a nation follows is the most significant symptom of its health or disease. It determines its aims, its aspirations, its desires, its exertions. The press speaks as if social prestige were a mere bauble and sentiment compared with political power. Nothing can be more delusive. The mental and moral characteristics of the class that is at the top of society, determine the mental and moral characteristics of all the other classes; and its code of morality becomes the national conscience. Though imposed at first by force, it ends usually by being accepted

from conviction. Where the heart of a nation resides, there will its people, like pilgrims and lovers, be found wending their way. So powerful is sentiment! It rules our whole being, making all the sordid moneys and vulgar interests of the world its willing ministers. The aristocracy, or land-owning class, having succeeded in keeping themselves by power at the top, have accordingly become the nation's ideal, and their moral and mental lineaments the mirror in which it fashions itself. This ideal is the nation's real religion, and like all religion, as you will observe, is held with a mystic sanctity, a sacred reservo. Though its influence is as pervasivo as electricity, and as sensitive as light, it is never mentioned in conversation; dissentients, like infidels, being afraid of the secret charge of vulgarity and lowness of mind which attaches to them; the faithful, of the more odious imputation of toadyism. I speak, as I have said, of the mass of respectable people; and are not the respectable peoplo the nation? Some persons may make an ideal of literature, science, or the arts, as others see a new cra in Shakerism, spirit-rapping, or the water cure, but the bulk of society is practically untouched by any such heresy.

With these somewhat extended preliminary observations, we are now in a position to maintain our first leading proposition, viz., that the views of life and code of morality which aristocracy has imposed on the nation are opposed to a high ideal of humanity, and in consequence degrade the mind, corrupt the moral sense, and render the highest kind of justice impossible. The first and most baleful effect of the aristocratic régime was to imbue the people with a belief in the essential inequality of men. This was not directly inculcated as a doctrine, but arose out of the primordial relation between lord and serf, which consisted in the minute and incessant exercise of power on the one hand, and the habit of submission on the other. As the nation grew, this relation worked itself into the minutest fibres of social life, and the tendency in the human mind, which De Toqueville remarked, of regarding our oppressors as our superiors, became embodied among the traditional beliefs of the peoplo. I do not intend here to enter into any discussion of the question of the inequality of men considered as an abstract proposition. I shall merely remark in passing, that the differences in men's capacities no more destroy their moral and mental identity, than differences in their bodily development destroy their physical identity; and I should as soon expect to find new organs in their bodies as new powers and faculties in their minds. I have observed that it is generally the mediocrities, the men of one idea, and those who are superior to their neighbours in some petty

ingenuity or intellectual knack, that are the greatest sticklers for inequality; for there is no talent so contemptible, but that the vanity or pride of its possessor would, if he had the power, make it the ground of superiority to the rest of mankind. So, likewise, are those who think that fineness of elevation of mind is an affair of pedigree, who know that blood must tell, and who believe that new and higher capacities are to be induced in men, as in dogs and horses, by the careful selection of breeds. But the great men have most clearly perceived and most strongly emphasized the essential likeness of all men; the small superficial differences in power and degree fading away before this grand moral and spiritual identity. It would be absurd, indeed, to deny that immense inequalities exist between man and man, in range, facility, and power. We see men apparently all run to one organ—men with overgrown memories, improvisators, musical prodigies, lightning calculators, and the like; but these mental tuberosities are as much lost in a common humanity as the inequalities of the earth's surface are lost in its sphere. The true sons of genius even are characterized and distinguished by a greater fineness and power of receptivity, rather than by any new or exceptional faculty. But what I desire especially to call attention to is the fact, that while it is certain that men are as alike in their essential natures as they differ in degrees of power, there is a tendency to consider those who are superior in degree, to be different in their essential natures, and to be beings of another order. The Roman Emperors were in many instances addressed and worshipped as deities. The men whom we considered great in our youth, we imagined to be of different natures from ourselves, until by contact we found them to be the same, or by culture, rose to their point of view. And the preponderating weight and authority of the great names of the past, are no doubt partially due to our belief, that somehow or other they were different to the men of our own time. These are natural tendencies, and can be corrected by experience, culture, or reflection. But when inequality is made the basis of a social structure as it is in England, with birth and title as its crowning distinctions, this tendency hardens itself and becomes a concrete consolidated fact. Then begin the degradation of the human mind, the corruption of the moral sense, and the reign of injustice. For without equality, respect degenerates into base servility, dignity into cold-blooded pride or impudent self-assertion. Without it, as I shall show, virtue is regarded as a commodity; morality, a question of social status; talent, a more dextrous or efficient tool; genius, a more refined buffoonery, flattered and despised. The man of title becomes the beau-ideal, the great, the

admirable, the flower of the race, the elect of Heaven. Elevated as an exemplar for our imitation, emulation, and even worship, his patronage is regarded as the sweet and sufficient solace for all the toilsome efforts of all the great workers who have made England the envy of the nations—poets, inventors, philanthropists, men of science, and philosophers. This apotheosis of idleness and torpid repose sinks into the souls of the people, and degrades in their estimation those who are the real glory of the nation; for no man can serve two masters, or follow with equal ardour two opposite ideals at once. With this anomalous position of the really great men, it is not surprising that the masses themselves should be regarded as tools, chattels, and property, rather than human beings with immortal spirits. A copper firmament closes down on them, smothering all expansion of mind and heart, and shutting out their energies from all the higher planes of aspiration. No broad and open thoroughfare opens out to them in which they can walk, relying on their ability and character as men, but every step is clogged, and artificial passports are demanded at every turn. The few and uncertain vents hypothetically provided for their emergence from their lowly estate, are practically closed to them by reason of impassable currents of prejudice, and insurmountable barriers of caste. A base materialism prevails, and men, instead of being regarded as temples of a Divine Presence, are regarded as so many cattle with labels affixed to their foreheads, and values written thereon, so much for a lord (a peculiarly choice breed), so much for a gentleman, so much for a working man. Between individuals so unequally freighted and handicapped from birth, there is as little chance of justice being done in this world, as between men and the lower animals, for there is no common social measure to which their actions are referred. They may be equal before the law, but this deadly inequality, this false and artificial halo of sentiment which surrounds the one and is shorn from the other, stupefies the higher conscience and renders the preaching of morality and duty, let alone Christianity, a hypocrisy and a sham. For whoever withholds from me, by reason of my birth or occupation, the encouragement, sympathy, respect, and approbation, to which my character as a man entitles me, denies me justice; and although the law may recover the gold that is filched from me, I am robbed of that which is dearer than gold, and which it is the ultimate object of all gold to buy.

Another direct result of the aristocratic *régime* is the ignorance and degradation of the masses. A deep-rooted aversion (compounded of pride and fear) to the education of the people, has always characterised aristocracies, and inheres in their very nature.

They have done all they could in every age to prevent the intellectual elevation of the people, and have succeeded in proportion to their power, from the despotism of the slave-owners in America, who made it penal to teach a slave to read or write, to the more subtle and intangible despotism of the aristocracy in England, who trained their dependents, as they did their dogs and horses, to as much knowledge only as would enable them to "do their duty in the sphere of life to which God had called them." In this conspiracy to stifle the aspirations of the human mind, they were abetted by a Church, linked and allied to the ruling powers, whose clergy, pledged to proclaim abroad the doctrine of their Master—the equality of souls—have betrayed their sacred trust and gone over to the enemy. By holding out to the lower orders an ideal Heaven where their miseries will be redressed, and their higher natures find that range and expansion denied them in this world, they have confirmed the evil which it was their mission to eradicate. They have smothered at birth in these weary-laden souls the bright and inborn aspirations of the mind—its dignity, independence, and self-reliance—and have left them to grovel in torpid despair.

These results follow the ascendancy of a privileged and hereditary class, as surely as the waters follow the moon, and can neither be blinked nor denied. They commence with it, advance as it advances, and decline as it declines. I will listen to no ingenious subtleties, no historical pedantries, to show that they are the effects of this or the other miserable secondary cause. If the account is in any way overdrawn, the improvement is to be placed to the credit of the swiftly advancing democracy, but the balance I charge to the principle of aristocracy. This will be at once evident if, leaving generalities and descending to the details of social life, we contrast the state of social morality that is engendered in democracies, and notably in America, by the equality of men, with that which prevails in England under the aristocracy. We shall find that the social and moral code which is natural to the aristocracy, and which has arisen out of their position and the circumstances surrounding them, has been accepted by the mass of the people, and that this code degrades the mind, impairs the sense of justice, and blunts the finer sensibilities of the heart.

In democracies, no man need feel ashamed of his calling, for all work is alike honorable—industry, trade, bodily labour; but in England the aristocracy as a body are neither engaged in trade, industry, nor bodily labour, and consequently society has agreed that persons following these pursuits are of an inferior caste. So deeply has this feeling saturated the souls of men, that for a respect-

able family to have one of its members engaged in trade, is a fatal "bar on its escutcheon," and any reference to it is as studiously avoided in conversation, as if it were a moral leprosy. The tradesman himself, unable to resist this overwhelming pressure of public opinion, meekly bows to it, and basely accepts the livery of servility. The iron has entered his soul, and like a fall from virtue in woman, farewell for ever to all hope of dignity, erectness of mind, or magnanimity. We need not feel surprised that trade is derogatory, when we remember that even the Church of Christ itself was barely respectable until the aristocracy embraced it, having discovered how rich a pasture it offered to the members of their own body. It is little more than two centuries, since, as Macaulay has shown, the great body of the clergy were regarded as a superior order of menials, sufficiently happy if at the houses of the great they were allowed to sit with the upper servants at the lower end of the table. The only profession not considered derogatory to a gentleman of birth was the profession of arms, and this, you will observe, was the only one absolutely necessary to the existence of his class.

If all work is alike honourable in democracies, all idleness is equally ignoble, and is visited with marks both of public and private disapprobation. But in England, where idleness is the Elysium of the aristocracy, the commercial activity of the nation, otherwise so essential to its well-being, shows like a break-neck struggle, in which merchants, shop-keepers, and publicans jostle each other in their efforts to reach that goal of gentlemanly ease which is the heritage of the well-born. In every age and country pride and the love of domination have been sweet to the human heart. They abound in democracies, as elsewhere, but any manifestation of them is a disparagement, and has to be repressed, or veiled under soft and inoffensive forms. But in England these passions have been the traditionary prerogatives of the aristocracy from time immemorial, and accordingly, in spite of the professional exhortations of the clergy to humility, they are regarded by the people with admiration; and their outward manifestation, either in word or expression, at once marks the "gentleman."

In democracies, a man who refuses to pay his just debts is held dishonoured by society; but in England the aristocracy, from an early period, drew a convenient distinction between debts of honour, contracted originally, it must be remembered, between members of their own body, and debts of other kinds, contracted with the herd of dependents who surrounded them. Their religious scrupulousness in regard to the former (so essential to their cohesion as a body) was in striking contrast to their contemptuous disregard of

the latter. This distinction was, as usual, accepted by society as the correct version of the moral law, and until very recently the suspicion that a man was deeply indebted to his tailor, raised a strong presumption in favour of his gentility, while its careless avowal gave him that *distingué* air which characterizes those who have mixed in the best society.

In democracies, where men are born free and equal, education is universal; but in England, so deeply are the middle classes imbued with the idea that the lower orders, as a body, exist for their convenience and comfort, that from them proceeded, as Professor Huxley remarked at the time, the strongest opposition that the advocates of the Board Schools had to encounter. They asked with consternation, where are we to get our servants, if the people are to be educated? and, while boasting of the institutions of a country which permitted a handful of their own number to creep into the ranks of the aristocracy, did their utmost to stay the hands of those philanthropic men who were endeavouring to raise the heads of the people above the slough of ignorance in which they were drowning. And thus it is. Carrying into action the principles which we have imbibed from the aristocracy, we first of all, be it observed, keep the people in ignorance, and then make their ignorance a ground of exclusion; we set the stamp of flunkeyism on their foreheads, and then treat them as slaves; like libertines who having first subdued and then debauched their victims, turn on them, on the first provocation, and defame them as prostitutes.

In democracies, society is based on the idea that men take rank in public estimation according to their talents and virtue. If the mediocrity finds himself in the highest position, it is owing to the exigencies of party politics. If the charlatan creeps into the people's favour, it is because, in the present state of civilization, the counterfeit is still mistaken for the genuine; if wealth is most sought after, it is because, in an industrial age, it is, perhaps, the fairest general index of energy, perseverance, judgment, and force of character. But in England, where the aristocracy, according to Lord Beaconsfield, "do not read," men of culture are regarded by the vulgar million with indifference, or even with contempt. The literary men themselves, having drunk of the polluted stream, have become infected; and the *Times*, while speaking with respect of the return of some well-fed alderman, has been known to thank God when political thinkers of the highest eminence have been rejected at the polls. In the most influential city in America, the men of genius of the nation are also the leaders in society; and men of wealth, to gain and maintain their footing, are obliged to keep them-

selves abreast with the highest and latest literature, science, and philosophy. But in England, where the fox-hunting squires take precedence, men of culture feel and accept their inferiority, and drop quietly into an unobtrusive and secondary position.

In democracies, literary men are appointed to the highest posts in the diplomatic service, and usually fill them with honour and distinction; but in England, where these positions are reserved by the aristocracy for men of their own order, the press which, in this matter, fairly represents the average public sentiment, dismisses the idea of any such appointments as absurd, and quite beneath the dignity of the nation. So true is it that whatever class of persons a people places at the top of society will become the ideal of that people; and in the long run, in my opinion, will determine its rank in the scale of nations.

Even in its amusements, the nation follows the moral dictum of the aristocracy as humbly as if it were the voice of a Pope speaking *ex cathedra*. When the aristocracy patronized the cock-pit and prize-ring, these sports were considered innocent diversions; when they ceased to do so, they became positively immoral, and a mark of vulgarity and lowness of mind. But they still hunt their foxes to the death, I observe, with the sympathy and admiration of society, while, like attorneys conscious of a weak cause, or sovereigns declining in their people's favour, they divert the vulgar moralist by heading the crusade against scientific vivisection.

In democracies, the virtue of woman is most jealously guarded, and any insult offered to it is most sternly avenged, both by law and public opinion; but, until very recently, in England, (Oh infamy!) the seduction of a seamstress or tradesman's daughter by a man of fashion, was regarded by society as a peccadillo, and even now is basely extenuated. One still hears of persons who regard the relation as an honour to the victim, as one still meets with old-fashioned valets who consider it an honour to be kicked by a gentleman of birth. Some years ago, during a celebrated trial, one of the witnesses, in reply to a question by the judge, said that he considered the criminality of seduction depended on the social status of the person seduced. Consider the stench and pestilential miasma that must have arisen like an exhalation from society before so concentrated an abomination could be precipitated in one small brain, and be held there as an article of faith.

And lastly, in democracies, all men are considered as spiritually and morally equal, in virtue of the deep identity of nature that underlies and levels all the superficial differences of sentiment, opinion, or culture; but in England, rank and birth are, like Fate,

supreme over all the gods—over intellect, over beauty, over virtue, over the soul of man, over the laws of God himself. "Depend upon it," said a French lady of the old *régime*, "God Almighty thinks twice before he damns a person of quality."

These broad contrasts, owing to the pictures of society which they suggest, exhibit more clearly than any exposition the spirit and tendency of aristocracy, and its effects on the national morality. And here it may be as well to pause for a moment to consider the two codes of morality which these contrasts illustrate and bring into prominence. The first code is founded on the deep intuition in the heart of man that all men have equal rights, in virtue of a common humanity. Its sphere of operation, accordingly, embraces every tribe and nation, and is co-extensive with the human race. Its precepts are embodied in what are called the universal laws of justice—the Ten Commandments, the duty of doing to others as you would be done by, and the Christian precept of loving and reverencing your neighbour. The second code is founded on the more narrow and superficial relations of classes of men—lords and serfs, masters and slaves, and the intermediate gradations of rank that unite these extreme points. The one takes for granted, as you will observe, the essential equality of man, and therefore springs naturally and spontaneously in democracies; the other assumes his inequality, and is therefore characteristic of aristocracies. The one it is the end of religion to sanction, to enforce, and to propagate; the other is in antagonism to religion, and as long as it exists, as I shall presently show, is a standing obstacle to the reception of its teachings. In England we have accepted the aristocratic code of morals, having stretched what was natural to a small and privileged class until it has become the conscience of the nation, with the results which we have just seen. I have not forgotten, of course, the countless influences everywhere at work which mitigate, in greater or less degree, the pernicious moral effects of the aristocratic *régime*. I only remark that, in so far as they do so, they are democratic in spirit. The present state of society is, as I have said, an amalgam of two principles—the democratic and the aristocratic. Any improvement in the social morality of England to-day, over what it was fifty years ago, is due solely to the extent to which society has been interpenetrated with the democratic spirit, and not to any tendency in aristocracy to ameliorate by time. There are those, I am aware, who urge in justification and defence of aristocracy the benefits which it conferred on society and civilization during the Middle Ages, and who ask you to admire the beautiful relation which existed between lord

and serf—the lord giving protection and guidance; the serf, in return, loyalty and obedience. Now, I am quite prepared to admit that, as a stage in the evolution of European civilization, feudalism was inevitable, and that the reciprocal interchange of services between lord and serf was not only beneficial, but was absolutely necessary to the existence of society in those rude and lawless ages; but that the moral relation between lord and serf was beautiful, is simply incredible. It is a dream of the historians, a fond imagination of those who love to idealise the past. Instead of regarding the serf with the reverence which was due to him as a human being, as a matter of fact the lord regarded him as little better than a beast of the field. *Individuals* may require the loyalty and obedience of their inferiors with love and affection, but in every age and country, *classes* of men have regarded their inferiors with secret or avowed disdain. The reverence and obedience of the child may call forth the love and affection of the parent; the interest and enthusiasm of the scholar, the esteem and gratitude of the teacher; the devotion of the soldier, the sympathy, and even tears, of the general; but while human nature remains as it is, the obedience of the slave—as the slightest provocation or ruffle of the blood will at once make manifest—can inspire the master with nothing but contempt. The relation of superior and inferior, founded on power on the one hand and submission on the other, is fatal to all moral grandeur and magnanimity. It is when men are free and independent that they disclose the finest qualities of the mind and heart. Then it is that love and reverence spring spontaneously like flowers, and the infinite range and subtlety of affinity and personal attraction have free and unimpeded play. I have noticed that lovers never afterwards exhibit to the same degree the beautiful iridescence of thought and fancy, the generous and lofty enthusiasm, as when, unshackled and free, they approached each other like stars moving regally in their respective spheres. But the knot once tied, and the one—as, alas! too often happens—become the mere appendage of the other, then domination begins, and vulgarity, recrimination, and brutal caprice enter with all their train.

JOHN BEATTIE CROZIER.

(To be continued.)

THE QUESTION OF KANDAHAR.

I PROPOSE, in anticipation of the parliamentary debates on the subject, to examine in the following pages the arguments which have been urged against the withdrawing of our troops from Kandahar. The majority of those who are opposed to such withdrawal are military men; but there is one very significant feature common to all the remonstrances against Lord Hartington's policy, whether proceeding from soldiers or civilians, which can hardly have failed to strike the most careless readers, and that is the very subordinate place occupied by strictly military considerations in these remonstrances. Whether it be Lord Lytton or Lord Napier, or the traveller Vambéry, who is delivering his soul, the bulk of his arguments will be found to be, not arguments based upon experience and observation, but merely guesses at the unknown and the unknowable. Lord Lytton is convinced that such a withdrawal will be "bewildering and inexplicable" to the "bazaars of Asia." Lord Napier, writing from Gibraltar—an admirable situation, as any one will perceive, for divining what is passing in the minds of the Afghans—is satisfied that it "will be misunderstood by the Afghans, and attributed to their own prowess." The Hungarian traveller protests against it because it "must inevitably ruin our *prestige* with Asiatics." Arguments such as these are "trifles light as air." Even if they represented duly verified facts, they could not be considered as valid reasons for retaining Kandahar; but seeing they are merely guesses at the unknown and the incalculable, they only exhibit the weakness of a case which is forced to support itself by such shadowy considerations. The explanation is to be found in the fact that the present enormous value attached to the possession of Kandahar is nothing but an after-thought. It is the last of a series of positions from which the gentlemen of the "Forward school" have been ignominiously expelled by the irresistible logic of events. The invaluable character of the position at Kandahar was never perceived by these gentlemen until experience and argument

combined had driven them out of every other part of Afghanistan. These numerous changes of front form a very important part of the case of those who advocate a complete withdrawal from Afghanistan, and I shall, therefore, give a brief history of them before taking Kandahar itself in hand.

The original inventor and patentee of the "scientific frontier" was Sir George Colley, the late Governor of Natal. Colonel Colley (as he then was) was simply Lord Lytton's Military Secretary, and had no official or responsible position connected with the Government of India. Nevertheless, we find from the Blue-books that he was the bearer of confidential communications to the Khan of Khelat, and that he "carried out his mission with care and judgment." And the object of this selection is obvious: Colonel Colley having no official status in connection with the Government of India, there is no official report from him concerning the purport of the negotiations with which he was entrusted, and they remain unknown to this day. But one result of this irregular employment of Colonel Colley was that (I am now quoting from a minute by Sir Erskine Perry) he "*laid a paper before the Viceroy denouncing the existing mountain frontier as an extremely bad one, and maintaining that, according to modern notions of military science, India could only be defended against an enemy advancing from the west by the British occupation of the whole mountain mass of Afghanistan; that is, by securing the western passes leading into the valley of the Oxus, as well as those debouching on India.*"

The object of the invasion of Afghanistan was to obtain possession of this frontier. Of this there is not a shadow of doubt. Not only was this object frankly avowed by Lord Beaconsfield in that notorious speech of his at the Mansion House in November of 1878, but the frontier itself was described in detail in the Calcutta letters of the *Times*. The Calcutta Correspondent of the *Times* in those days was, in point of fact, the Government of India. The letters which purported to come from Calcutta derived all their inspiration from Simlah, and in one of these, dated 10th September, 1878, the new "scientific frontier" was thus described:—

The Indian Government are most anxious to avoid adopting any policy which would bear even the semblance of hostility towards Russia, but *the extreme probability of a collision sooner or later cannot be overlooked*. It is necessary, therefore, to provide for a strong defensive position to guard against eventualities. From this point of view; it is indispensable that we should possess a commanding influence over the triangle of territory formed on the map by Kabul, Ghuznee, and Jelalabad, together with power over the Hindoo Khosh. . . . *The strongest frontier line which could be adopted would be along the Hindoo Khosh from Pamir*

to Bamian; thence to the south, by the Helmund, Girishk, and Kandahar, to the Arabian Sea. It is possible, therefore, that by friendly negotiations some such defensive boundary may be adopted.

Sir George Colley's military operations in Africa have shown that he is sorely lacking in those powers of accurate forecast which enable a man to proportion his means to his ends. He regarded the Afghans and their country with the same contempt with which he appears to have regarded the Boers and their mountain passes. He must have been confident himself, and appears to have persuaded the Government at home, that this vast extension of frontier could be secured at the cost of a single brief campaign and the expenditure of little more than a million of money. The British columns were thrust into Afghanistan after most inadequate preparations, and in the course of two or three months were crippled so far as aggressive operations were concerned. The death of Shere Ali enabled Lord Lytton to extricate himself from his difficulties by patching up a peace with Yakoob Khan before the total and ignominious failure of his ambitious plans was apparent at home. The Treaty of Gundamak gave to our Indian Empire that glaring imposture which is commonly known as the "scientific frontier," and the privilege of having a British Envoy massacred at Kabul—a privilege of which the Home Government and Lord Lytton, as we know to our sorrow, availed themselves with a truly remarkable alacrity. The "scientific frontier" consisted in planting British troops in the Khyber Pass, where they have perished of fever by hundreds; in shutting up about 8,000 men in that *cul de sac*, the Kurram Valley, where, also, regiment after regiment has been more than decimated by fever and pneumonia; and in the occupation of the Pisheen Valley. It will be remembered that the occupation of these detached positions was declared by Lord Salisbury to have made India "absolutely impregnable," and was described by Lord Beaconsfield as placing in our possession "the three great highways leading to India." The utter worthlessness of this much belauded "scientific frontier" is no longer denied, even by those who were once loudest in proclaiming its merits. The Pisheen Valley was occupied as a spot from which we could easily advance upon Kandahar; but when General Primrose was besieged in that city, it took General Phayre no less than five weeks to move 4,000 men from the Pisheen to Kandahar—a distance of not more than eighty miles. As for the Khyber and the Kurram, they have by general consent been dethroned from the proud position in which Lord Beaconsfield had placed them as "the gates of India," and are now

declared to be worthless encumbrances. Sir Frederick Roberts thus passes judgment on them :—

Viewing Kabul in the altered and powerless condition in which we shall leave it, with a ruler quite unable to cause us trouble or even anxiety in India, and knowing (as we now do) with what ease and quickness we can again at any time make ourselves masters of Kabul by either of these two roads under consideration, I can see no reason why regular troops should be kept either in the Kurram or the Khyber. We are now also fully aware of the extraordinary difficulties which Russia would have to encounter were she at any time to advance upon India *via* Kabul, and to how great an extent we could injure and harass her by raising the tribes along the line of communications which it would be necessary for her to maintain. . . . *The longer and more difficult the line of communication is, the more numerous and greater the obstacles which Russia would have to overcome; and, so far from shortening one mile of the road, I would let the web of difficulties extend to the very mouth of the Khyber Pass.*

It is seldom that an officer of distinction makes so candid a confession of historical ignorance and lack of military prevision as General Sir Frederick Roberts has accomplished in the foregoing passage. His surprise at "the ease and quickness" with which Kabul was occupied would seem to denote that he had never heard of General Pollock's march thither; and if General Roberts is only "now fully aware" of the "extraordinary difficulties Russia would have to encounter were she at any time to advance upon India *via* Kabul," all that can be said is that he was discreditably ignorant of what it was his obvious duty to know, as Quarter-master-General of Her Majesty's Forces in India. The truth is, that in the foregoing passage General Roberts has simply put upon record a state of mind which he shared with all the advocates of this war in India. They were profoundly ignorant of all that it behoved them to know before giving the weight of their authority to the invasion of Afghanistan. I shall return to this despatch of General Roberts when I have to speak of Kandahar. Meanwhile, I ask the particular attention of my readers to the passage I have italicised: "*The longer and more difficult the line of communication is, the more numerous and greater the obstacles which Russia would have to overcome.*" True, beyond a doubt. But if true on the Kabul side of Afghanistan, why, in the name of consistency and common sense, should we, by the occupation of Kandahar, shorten the line on *that* side of Afghanistan by 400 miles?

The imposture of the "scientific frontier" flourished for about four months. Then, Sir Louis Cavagnari having been murdered, an entirely new policy, as we find from the last Blue-book on Afghanistan, was adopted by Lord Lytton and his colleagues. On the 5th of January, 1880, a despatch was addressed to Lord Cran-

brook by the Government of India, in which this new policy is detailed. At that date Lord Lytton and his colleagues were still alive to the extreme undesirability of annexing Kandahar. "It is," they write, "our desire to avoid territorial annexation and the further extension of our administrative responsibilities;" and though they consider it will be "necessary to retain a British garrison at or near Kandahar," they "contemplate no interference in the internal administration of the province." In fact, so late as the beginning of this year, it is not from the Kandahar side that the Indian Government anticipate any danger to India from the Russian advance, but from the Kabul side. Regarding that part of Afghanistan, they write as follows:—

Of the future of Kabul it is difficult to speak at this moment, when military operations are still in progress around its capital. . . . Our aim, however, is to minimise that occupation and control, and ultimately to make over the internal administration to a Native ruler, in subordinate alliance with ourselves, *supported and controlled by a strong British cantonment, established at some suitable point.* . . . But on this side our policy must largely depend upon the action of Russia and upon the truth or otherwise of the rumours which ascribe to that Power the intention of moving forces to the Oxus next spring, with ulterior designs upon Afghanistan. *We consider our withdrawal from Kabul to be impossible if the Oxus provinces are entered or seriously threatened by a foreign Power.*

Here we find it stated, in so many words, that the immediate danger which menaces India is not from Herat, but from the Oxus, and that to obviate this it is necessary to set up in Kabul a puppet ruler, "supported and controlled by a strong British cantonment at some suitable place," and, indeed, at Kabul itself, if Russian movements indicate a disposition on the part of that Power to cross the Oxus. This, then, was the new "scientific frontier." A few weeks pass, and there is another complete change of front. On the 27th April, 1880, the Government of India, in a despatch to Mr. Lepel Griffin, gives an entirely new version of the war and its objects:—

When Her Majesty's troops re-entered Afghanistan in September last it was with two well-defined and plainly-avowed objects. The first was to avenge the treacherous massacre of the British Mission at Kabul; the second was to maintain the safeguards sought through the Treaty of Gundamak, by providing for their maintenance guarantees of a more substantial and less precarious character. These two objects have been attained, the first by the capture of Kabul and the punishment of the crime committed there; *the second by the severance of Kandahar from the Kabul power.* Our only reasons, therefore, for not immediately withdrawing our forces from Northern Afghanistan, have hitherto been, first, the excited and unsettled condition of the country round Kabul . . . and, secondly, the inability of the Kabul sirdars to agree among themselves on the selection of a ruler strong enough to maintain order after our evacuation of the country.

Originally the policy of the sagacious Lord Lytton and his sagacious advisers was to have a "strong, friendly, and independent Afghanistan." Then there was substituted for this the policy of a weak, fragmentary Afghanistan, nominally ruled by British puppets, residing at Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat. Originally their "scientific frontier" was the one sketched out by Colonel Colley. Then they substituted for this the "scientific frontier" of the Treaty of Gundamak, by which India was made "absolutely impregnable." Then, as the above extracts disclose, they devised a third frontier, the principal features of which were a strong British cantonment at or near Kabul, and a like cantonment at or near Kandahar. And now, finally, the proposition of a Kabul cantonment is abandoned, and India, we are told by these sapient and consistent gentlemen, is as good as lost unless we tack on to our Indian Empire about 70,000 square miles of barren land, and call the new province Kandahar. For this is really what is involved in the "retention" of Kandahar. It is not a question of a single garrison in a single city, but of the government of a large expanse of barren and inaccessible country. The proposition that the defensive strength of India will be increased by having 70,000 square miles of territory to defend, in addition to its present area, is so ludicrous, so plainly and laughably absurd, that no wonder the military men who have undertaken to maintain it should abandon military considerations, and have recourse to guesses at the unknown and the unknowable.

In the *Contemporary Review* for October, 1879, I gave the following account of the march of General Stewart's force from the Indus to Kandahar:—

The plan of the campaign required that Afghanistan should be invaded from three points; but the most important operation was understood to be the advance of General Stewart upon Kandahar. As soon as hostilities appeared inevitable, a small force under General Biddulph had been sent forward to secure Quetta against a sudden attack. General Stewart followed later on, and the two columns numbered upon paper about 20,000 men, with sixty guns. Meanwhile, a third column was ordered to assemble at Sukkur in support, and placed under the command of General Primrose. These extensive preparations were supposed to indicate the determination of the Indian Government to push on as far as Herat. The distance which had to be traversed between Sukkur and Kandahar is, roughly speaking, about 400 miles, but the country presents extraordinary difficulties. From Sukkur to Jacobabad extends a level tract which, during the rains, is flooded to a depth of seven feet. Between Jacobabad and Dadur—a town situated at the entrance of the Bolan Pass—extends the Sindh desert. Any large force marching across this desert would have to take with them, not only food and forage, but water, for only at intervals of fifteen or twenty miles is the parched and barren soil pierced by a few brackish springs, which just suffice for

the needs of the hamlets which have sprung up around them. For six months of the year this desert is literally impassable. A hot wind sweeps across it, which is fatal to man and beast. Only once did the Indian Government venture to send troops across it after this "blast of death" (as the Natives call it) had begun to blow. This was in the last Afghan War. Some hundreds of Native troops were sent as an escort in charge of supplies, and in four days 100 Sepoys perished, 300 camp followers, and (I think) nine officers out of fourteen. Beyond Dadur is the Bolan Pass. This Pass is about eighty miles in length; regular road there is none; what purports to be a road is merely the bed of a stream, which, during the rainy weather, is filled from bank to bank with a volume of rushing water. Neither food nor forage is obtainable in the Pass, and even the camels, when starting from Dadur, had to carry a seven days' supply of food for themselves. Between Quetta and Kandahar the country is open, but neither is food procurable for a large force, nor forage for the horses and camels. From first to last General Stewart's troops were almost wholly fed from India. The winter, luckily, was one of unprecedented mildness. But for this, in place of a march upon Kandahar, a terrible catastrophe could hardly have been averted. In ordinary seasons the snows fall heavily in and around Quetta early in November, and the cold is intense. The Bolan Pass is swept from end to end by hurricanes of wind and rain and snow. At the very time when these storms usually occur we had a dozen regiments and batteries straggling along the whole length of the Bolan Pass. Last year, however, there was neither snow nor hurricane, and our troops got through the Pass in safety. There was no opposition offered to our advance on Kandahar, but, from the want of food and the hardships which had to be endured, no less than 20,000 camels perished upon the march. This mortality decided the campaign. When General Stewart reached Kandahar the situation was as follows: The magazines at Quetta were nearly empty. Four months' food was collected at Sukkur, but awaited carriage for its transport to Quetta. The third column under General Primrose was assembling on the Indus, and needed 10,000 camels to enable it to advance. To supply all these wants there were at Sukkur about 1,600 camels. In order to lessen the pressure on the Commissariat, General Stewart divided his forces, dispatching one column to hunt for supplies in the direction of Girishk, and sending another with the same object to Khelat-i-Ghilzie. These movements caused the death from cold and hunger of a large additional number of camels, and demonstrated that there was not food in that part of Afghanistan sufficient for a force so large as that collected at Kandahar. Since, meanwhile, had been swept so bare of camels that it was impossible to collect a sufficient number for the carriage of food to Quetta before the hot weather had set in, and the march across the desert was barred by "the blast of death." Immediate action was necessary. General Stewart's troops were not to starve; and 8,000 men returned to India, reducing the garrison left at Kandahar to 4,000. This number, it was trusted, the Commissariat would be able to feed during the hot weather. But even this small force was so scantily supplied with carriage that it could not have moved, in a body, for fifty miles in any direction. It was, so to speak, nailed to the spot on which it was encamped. This want of food, far more than the physical difficulties of the country, is and always will be the insuperable obstacle to carrying on extensive military operations in Afghanistan. The people obtain no more from the soil than just suffices for their own wants; and for days together an invading army has to pass over huge wastes with hardly a trace of human habitation, and consequently destitute of food.

Not a little amusing was the revulsion of feeling caused throughout India by the lame and impotent conclusion of the advance on Kandahar. It was a demonstration of the impossibility of an invasion which convinced those who were most reluctant to be convinced. If when we had all India from which to draw our supplies, and with no enemy to oppose us, our utmost efforts had merely sufficed to place 4,000 men in Kandahar, and leave them there, isolated and defenceless, it was chimerical to suppose that the Russians could march for double that distance an army capable of attempting the conquest of India. "Kandahar," writes a military correspondent to the *Pioneer*—the official journal of India—"is acknowledged to be a mistake, and it is hoped that a British army will never again be dispatched in that direction; it is a mere waste of men, money, and means, and an unsuitable line for either attack or defence."

And the *Pioneer*, the very purpose of whose existence is to preach the infallibility of the Indian Government, thus endorses the remarks of its correspondent: "The theories about Kandahar are by this time exploded; indeed, there are many critics who have refused to adopt them from the very beginning; believing against General Hamley, that the main road into Afghanistan, whether we march as defenders of the Kabul Ameer or as avengers, must lie past Peshawur and Jelallabad."

The accuracy of this judgment was demonstrated anew by the campaign of Maiwand. We had then been at Kandahar for nearly two years. The ruler of the country was a creature of our own, and we had bridged the desert between Jacobabad and Sibi by means of a railway. Yet what happened? Neither our political officers nor our commanders could obtain information of the strength or the intentions of Ayoub Khan's troops, even when distant only a few miles from General Burrows' brigade. And on the other side, the lack of provisions, forage, and transport was such that General Phayre could not, in five weeks, move 4,000 men a distance of eighty miles. Is it possible to imagine a demonstration more complete of the wisdom of Sir Charles Napier's judgment that if the Russians invade India we ought to await them on the Indus? Now, what is it that Lord Napier, Sir Frederick Roberts, and the other military gentlemen to whom we are asked to surrender our common sense and our reasoning capacity, would effect by the retention of Kandahar? They would act in direct opposition to General Roberts' own military canon that "the longer and more difficult the line of communication is, the more numerous are the obstacles an enemy has to overcome." They would thereby obliterate 400 miles of obstacles (as we have found) almost insuperable, and so bring our Indian Empire within striking distance of the Russians in Central Asia, while, at the same time, they would incalculably aggravate its vulnerability by the addition of 45,000 square miles of open and defenceless country. There would be some semblance of a reason for this step, if the advance to Kandahar placed the British

outposts in the centre of a staunch and friendly people. But these gentlemen do not pretend to believe this. Sir Frederick Roberts frankly acknowledges that the occupation of Kandahar can be purchased only at the cost of the bitter enmity of its present possessors. He says :—

It may not be very flattering to our *amour propre*, but I feel sure I am right when I say that the less the Afghans see of us the less they will dislike us. *Should Russia in future years attempt to conquer Afghanistan, or invade India through it, we should have a better chance of attaching the Afghans to our interests if we avoid all interference with them in the meantime.* The military occupation of Kandahar is of vital importance; *even there we should make our presence little felt, merely controlling the foreign policy of the ruler of that province.*

The truth is that General Sir Frederick Roberts and the rest of these gentlemen, in advocating the retention of Kandahar, are not thinking of the defence of India. The prospect which they see before them is a series of aggressive campaigns against the Russians in Central Asia, and the Afghans in the remaining parts of Afghanistan. They desire a strong British force to be garrisoned at Kandahar, not to enhance the defensive capacity of the North-west Frontier, but as an admirable situation from which to manufacture and carry on new wars. This is very frankly, because quite unconsciously, revealed in the Minute by Sir Frederick Roberts, from which I have already quoted. For example :—

The Kandahar-Herat line certainly presents to us fewer difficulties than any other line, and, *with the completion of the railway to Kandahar, that place would be our starting point.* Thence Herat is distant only 350 or 400 miles, according as the northern or southern route is adopted. The road is quite practicable for wheeled guns, and for some part of the way a fair amount of grain and forage is procurable. . . . Under any circumstances, *I am of opinion that it is by this line that all offensive operations on our part could most advantageously be carried on.* . . . To what extent these offensive measures might be pressed in Southern or Western Afghanistan, scarcely comes within the scope of this paper, depending, as they assuredly would, on numerous and complicated eventualities, such as the attitude of Persia, the object and strength of Russia, and the state of Afghanistan generally. *It might be found necessary to make a rapid advance on Herat and mass a considerable army there; or it might, on the other hand, be deemed desirable to confine operations to Kandahar itself, or to Sistan, and the valley of the Helmund. It will be sufficient for our present purpose if we can come to the conclusion that the Kandahar line will be the one by which all offensive movements against Russia would be carried on.*

Here we have the naked truth revealed by one whose authority is unquestionable. Kandahar is to be "the starting point" from which "offensive movements against Russia can most advantageously be carried on." The object of its occupation is to precipitate a collision with that Power. In order to obtain this enormous piece

of good fortune, we are asked to sacrifice the defensive capacities of the existing frontier, which (in the judgment of such men as Sir Charles Napier and Sir James Outram) render it virtually impregnable; we are asked to incur the bitter hostility of the Afghan nation; and, finally, we are required to pay, or, rather, the Indian taxpayer will have to pay, a certain annual charge of £2,000,000, and an indefinite charge, in addition, for military expeditions to quell disturbances in the wild country round our own borders.

A Russian invasion of India is as pure a nightmare as ever terrified the slumbers of a child, so long as "a friendly and independent Afghanistan" extends its wild hills and barren wildernesses between the Russians and ourselves. But even if this were not so, these gentlemen of the "Forward school" offer us no escape from it. The utmost which their policy, according to their own showing, can accomplish for us is, to place us within easy striking distance of Russia, to remove the theatre of war to a distance of 900 miles from our base of supply and reinforcement, and to convert the Afghans from possible friends into implacable enemies. All these evils they acknowledge. What advantages we are to obtain in exchange for them, I have never been able to ascertain, and I can honestly say that I have read every fragment of Russophobic literature which promised to give me this much-desired information.

I had written thus far before the "Kandahar Correspondence" had been laid before Parliament. The publication of these important papers may be said to close the discussion. As the *Pall Mall Gazette* very truly observed, that, looked at by this new light, the wonder is that we should still be in Kandahar. Before those who desire the annexation of Kandahar can expect the nation to listen to their suggestions, it behoves them to come to some agreement among themselves as to the probable results of such an annexation. At present hardly two among them are of the same way of thinking. Some think it would be a cheap proceeding, others a costly; some think the Afghans would like it, others that they would not; and the only point on which they are all agreed is that which has become manifest in the foregoing pages—that the annexation of Kandahar is not a defensive measure, but only the first act in a series of aggressive campaigns. If Lord Lytton and his friends are prudent, and desire to escape self-stultification, they will not press for a discussion upon the subject in either the Upper or the Lower House. The basis of their case against the Government was, that the resolution to abandon Kandahar had been taken in defiance of an unanimous judgment in favour of an opposite policy by the

highest military authorities in India and at home. It is now seen that there is no such unanimity, and that, as regards annexation, there is an overwhelming weight of opinion recorded against it. But whatever they may elect to do, the withdrawal from Kandahar is now certain; the doubts and fears which, until the publication of these papers, troubled most Liberals, whether, at the last moment, the Government would not find some excuse for evading its pledges, show how profoundly the Party has been impressed by the weakness, timidity, and blundering which have characterized the policy of the Cabinet, both in Africa and Asia. The course of events in both these continents since Mr. Gladstone came into power, exhibit in startling clearness, with what accuracy of insight the awakened conscience of a nation apprehends the character of a political crisis; with what a dim and faulty understanding it is read by the professional politician. Had the nation, after replacing Mr. Gladstone at the head of affairs, remained master of its destinies, there is no doubt what it would have done. We should have made a national confession of the grievous wrongs we had been entrapped into doing, and set to work at once to repair them as far as was possible. Sir Bartle Frere would have been recalled to this country—a disgraced man; the captive, Ketshwayo, would have been restored to his people, the Transvaal to its legitimate owners, and peace would now be reigning in South Africa instead of havoc and bloodshed, and the threatenings of even more appalling calamities behind. In Afghanistan we should have immediately retired, thus escaping the sorrow and humiliation of the Maiwand campaign, and sparing the Afghans the war between Eyoub Khan and our puppet, Abd-al-Rahman Khan, which must ensue upon our evacuating the country. But the Government would insist upon trying to supply us with better bread than could be made of wheat. The plain elementary rules of universal morality would not suffice until they had been leavened by the principles of statecraft in its more “occult branches,” and the consequences have been what we all sorrowfully feel and see. There was a light to walk by, and an open way out of our difficulties; but we preferred, like the Israelites of old, to kindle a fire of our own, and to compass ourselves about with sparks; and so, like them, we have to walk by the light of this fire and in the midst of the sparks that we have kindled.

But even when Kandahar is abandoned, and Afghanistan evacuated by British troops, the nation must not imagine that this question of how India is to be defended, is one which they can dismiss from their minds. They must remember that there is a

strong party in the State which is now pledged to the proposition that the possession of Kandahar is indispensable as a safeguard to our Indian Empire. The whirligig of a General Election may, at any time, restore this party to Office, and, unless there be some third way of escape, what the nation has to look forward to, is a see-saw between two conflicting policies on our Indian Frontier, as one or other party happens to have a majority in Parliament. Now this nervous anxiety regarding the approach of Russia to our Indian Frontier is an unquestionable testimony to the accuracy of that view of our government of India which THE STATESMAN has endeavoured to impress upon its readers. Why are our Indian officials thrown into a condition of such ignoble panic because a Russian army is reported to be approaching Merv? Why should we be seized with fear and trembling at the report, merely, of Russian intrigues in Afghanistan or India? If the populations of our Indian Empire were heartily loyal to the Powers that be, there would be no room for such fears, for it would be too absurd an enterprise for any nation to undertake—that of subverting a domination supported by the wealth and power of Great Britain, and the suffrages of two hundred millions of people in India itself. And if British rule in India be aught even distantly resembling that which is depicted by the Indian official apologist—by Sir Richard Temple, for example, in his recently-published book—the Indian populations could not fail to be in a state of hearty and enthusiastic loyalty. But their ignoble terror of Russia shows that our Indian officials do not believe in the pictures they habitually draw of the character and effects of British rule. They know that they have utterly and justly failed to secure either the confidence or the affection of the people they have been appointed to rule over; and therefore the sound of a falling leaf is sufficient to shake them. They know that our administrative system has failed so completely to take root, that a very slight shock from without would suffice to overthrow it. The utter failure of British rule in India is the suppressed premise in all their attempts to demonstrate that there is somewhere a “Scientific Frontier,” behind which the troubled consciences of able Indian Administrators may find rest and peace.

These dreams are idle. The true “scientific frontier” of India is a people convinced that the preservation of British ascendancy is also the preservation of their own political freedom. At present it is impossible that they should feel this. British rule in India, as at present constituted, is simply a despotic and alien machinery for the collection of taxes. It may be said to lack almost every condition of good government. It is mercilessly destructive of rights of pro-

perty; its costliness is such that the great mass of the Indian populations is continually sinking to lower and lower depths of misery and destitution; it both hates and fears ambition, ability, and an independent spirit among its subjects, and obstinately sets its face against giving any field or scope for the exercise of such qualities. By holding all India bound together in an unnatural unity, it inflicts (as I have pointed out in former essays) grievous wrong upon the separate parts of it—the wealth of the richer provinces being drained away in order to make the poorer better capable of paying the taxes demanded of them, and thus, while no relief is granted to the latter, the former are taxed twice over. British rule in India, as at present carried on, is a system so preposterously absurd that it is impossible to describe it without appearing to use the language of caricature. And until it is re-established upon a rational basis, a lasting relief from Russophobia is not to be looked for. We must abandon the delusion that about two dozen third-rate or fourth-rate Englishmen, entrusted with irresponsible authority, constitute a sufficient machinery to provide for the wants of two hundred millions of human beings, from whom they differ in every particular in which it is possible for one man to differ from another. We must fearlessly apply to India the same principles which revolutionised our Colonial Administration. With our Colonies we recognized and acted upon the obvious truism that the Colonists must understand their own wants and wishes better than others could, and ought, therefore, to be allowed to govern themselves. This is the principle which needs applying in India. The “able Indian Administrator” is a gentleman enormously wise in his own conceit; but even he is subject to human imperfection. He cannot achieve the impossible; and to believe that either loyalty, prosperity, stability, or growth is capable of production by our administrative machinery in India is to believe in the impossible. This war in Afghanistan, with its gigantic blunders, its astonishing miscalculations, its recklessness, blindness, and want of moral principle, shows, on a miniature scale, the kind of work which “able administrators” are carrying on in India on a large scale.

ROBERT D. OSBORN, Lieut.-Colonel.

CULTURE AND CULTIVATION.

WHEN our Government was in possession, during the war with Napoleon, of Java and the Dutch Spice Islands—the conquest having been effected by expeditions from India—the vast profits derived from the monopoly of the most costly of condiments attracted the attention of the Directors of the East India Company. The Government of Madras, early in the present century, received an elaborate despatch from their “loving friends” of the Honourable Court, fortified by statistics and tabular statements, recommending that great efforts should be made to introduce the cultivation of the nutmeg-tree into the Madras Presidency. This was followed by a subsequent and supplementary despatch, in which the Directors explained that, from the latest information that had been placed at their disposal, they were inclined to think that the cultivation of the mace-tree would be found even more profitable than that of the nutmeg. In due course, we may hope, it was ascertained, either in Leadenhall Street or at Fort St. George, that the two sorts of spice in question were produced by the same tree, mace being the pericarp, or outer husk of the nutmeg. This is really a very fair and quite authentic specimen of official agriculture.

It would hardly be a fair specimen, but rather a caricature, of the same spirit of superfine supervision for the East, founded on Western experience or erudition, if we were to bring forward seriously the well-known but probably apocryphal story of the late Lord Tweeddale, soon after his arrival at Madras, having recommended, on the strength of the observations he had made during several evening drives, that the paddy-fields should be carefully drained by means of the celebrated Tweeddale tile, which had proved so efficacious in Scotland.

Although the theories and suggestions emanating from a succession of Agricultural Commissions and Model Farms that have dipped into the Indian Budget in the last half-century, may not very often have rivalled in absurdity the alleged proposal of the Scotch Marquis, yet the general results of a somewhat lavish ex-

penditure in the scientific farming department have gone very far to show that the unlettered ryots understand their craft much more thoroughly than had been supposed, and have little to learn from us; and that while European enterprise and capital may do much, when allowed free scope, for the development of new staples and new industries—as proved by the annals of Indian tea, coffee, and jute—the direct interposition of Government has been of little benefit in such matters, while it has often been clearly injurious.

There is another lesson to be learned from the industrial progress of India, that when the growth or consumption of any novel article of aliment or luxury, when any newly-contrived process of construction or manufacture, is really congenial or suitable to the climatic and economic conditions of the country, no vested interests, no rooted prejudices, can long stand in the way of its appropriation and naturalisation. From tobacco—which is proved, both by the silence of ancient books and by its etymology in the vernacular languages, to have come from America, probably with the Portuguese—down to the railway and the steam cotton factory, there is ample evidence in the daily life of India that the common taunt of stagnation is utterly unfounded. And this evidence, if the demand for imports, including machinery, can denote the advance of enlightenment, is, to say the least, quite as conspicuous in the allied and protected States, in due proportion to the components of their population, as in the British provinces. The Maharajah Holkar of Indore has, for example, invested a million sterling on a railway through his territories, and a large sum also in a very profitable steam cotton-mill, and in iron works. The great bulk of the importations of wine, beer, and spirits, military stores, books, and millinery, are of course taken out for consumption by the British troops, the military and civil officers, the railway officials and mechanics, the European mercantile community and their families, chiefly in Her Majesty's immediate dominions. On the other hand, we may mention among the distinctions and qualifications with which any general statements or statistics as to Indian trade must be approached, that there are some articles and commodities which are imported almost exclusively for the use of persons of rank, and for an opulent and well-to-do class in the Native States, that no longer exists as a class in the monotonous and exhaustive dead level of British administration. There is, for instance, a superior class of cotton goods landed at Bombay that has acquired the name of "Hyderabadées," because they meet with hardly any sale except in the Nizam's dominions. Similar observations, we believe, are applicable to some sorts of woollen goods.

Hints and facts of this description are not likely to be encountered in the Administration Reports of our distinguished Residents and Political Agents, or in the despatches for the information of Her Majesty's Government drafted for the Viceroy in Council by Secretaries of every department. "*Non sic itur ad astra.*" That would not be the way to the stars. Such hints are not the less worthy of serious attention when we do come across them; and the best hope of the timely disillusion of statesmen and leaders of opinion as to the condition of our Indian Empire, is to be found in the more frequent occurrence of such hints in the writings of independent and competent persons who are not looking for the way to stars or to seats in Council. Quite recently Mr. Caird, a very able and acute observer, was much struck with "the self-containedness and self-dependence" of the Native States, and with "the greater liveliness and spirit, and general evidence of active industry, in the capitals of Native States, compared with towns of equal population under our rule. The people in their cities are undoubtedly more prosperous and happy than ours," while, he continues, "the example we have afforded of impartial justice, and the equality of all men before the law, is taking root in the Native States where our influence extends."*

Yes, even from our complicated and inflexible judicial system the rulers of several reformed Native States have contrived to select all that is congenial and suitable to the habits and pursuits of the communities under their administration, while rejecting those harsh and subversive elements that have made our codes and courts of law a byword throughout India, as being unduly favourable to the usurer and the rich litigant, injurious and even ruinous to the needy landholder and to the poor.

The reformed Native States are able to profit by our good principles, and to avoid our bad practice. They manage to get all that they want in the way of civil engineering, forest conservancy, and even education, without imitating the overgrown monstrosity of our establishments, which national nepotism has turned into vast salary beds and pension plots for young English gentlemen.

Without going back to the annexation period, when such great authorities as Sir John Peter Grant and Sir Frederick Halliday, at Calcutta, and Mr. Ross Donnelly Mangles, in London, were descanting on "the ineffable blessings of British rule" and the "incorrigible" tyranny of Indian Princes, there can be no doubt that the notions that have long been prevalent among well-informed and

* "Report of James Caird, Esq." (c. 2,732 of 1880), p. 14.

influential people of the literary and political world—principally derived from official statements and from social intercourse with officials in retirement or on leave—differ very widely from those views which are now beginning to force themselves on public attention, and which we consider to come much nearer the truth. It used to be assumed as quite self-evident that without British administration there could be neither justice nor good order in any part of India; that no man under Native rule could be sure of enjoying the fruit of his industry; and that, as a matter of fact and observation, the inhabitants of the allied and protected States were less prosperous and less contented than those of British provinces. It was, moreover, very generally taken for granted that a wonderful stimulus both to production and to commerce had been given by European "settlers"—a class that, in truth, has never existed in India; that the English indigo and tea planters, the speculators in cotton and sugar, were angels in disguise, with healing on their wings, who spread light and blessings around them, and that the Native States in particular were languishing for want of their ministry. Here is a specimen of what even now represents opinions that are very commonly entertained. "Can it be argued," said the *Times*, on the 8th of October, 1878, "that it would be better for India if English merchants and planters never made fortunes in India, but left trade and agriculture to stagnate as they do in most of the Native States?" Now trade and agriculture do not stagnate by any means in the Native States. Lord Dalhousie and his advisers and admirers, during the mania for annexation, doubtless thought so, and expressed their thoughts both in counsel and in action. Lord Dalhousie urged the annexation of Nagpore and the sequestration of the Berar Provinces, expressly because by means of those two iniquitous transactions we could "secure a sure and steady supply of cotton wool." "And thus," as Mr. J. B. Norton wittily said, "cotton stuffed the ears of Justice and made her deaf as well as blind." Of course not one pound more of cotton was produced or sold in those provinces under British administration than would have come into the market under Native rule. In the *Annual Report on Cotton for the Bombay Presidency*, for the official year 1879-80, which has just been published, the table which commands the greatest interest is that of the area put under cotton cultivation. In all the districts there was an increase over the preceding year, except in Sind; but the great increase was in the Native States, being there 477,154 acres against an increase of 318,399 acres in British territory.

The most hopeful and helpful features in the political condition

of India may be seen, by those who have eyes to see, in the administrative advancement of the leading Native States. Here, although some of our own officials may seek to cry it down, and others claim too much of the credit for themselves, is something for us to be proud of. This is the direction in which our main efforts ought to be made, because we can assist the movement, because we cannot stop it if we would, and because we can profit by it, if we will, honestly and honourably. This is true progress; this is something permanently gained, accepted, and assimilated by India: while our complicated legislation and our departmental perfectibility must always be precarious because they are so often vexatious. The terms used in designating the several divisions of Imperial administration are very misleading. The department which is in direct contact with the allied and protected States ought not to be called "Foreign." The "foreign" element is to be found in the Home, Revenue, and Finance Departments. The Indian principalities, the self-governed provinces, are not in any sense "foreign;" they are not outside but within the Empire; they are, and always have been, not accidental but essential constituents of British power in India. Our Indian Empire would never have come into being, and cannot continue to flourish or to exist, without them. Without Native allies, Great Britain could not have won her way to virtual supremacy between 1756 and 1819, through the stages of vassaldom, rivalry with France, and the final struggles of some considerable potentates for independence or domination in certain regions of the Indian continent. Without the aid and influence of the Indian Princes, the mutinies of 1857 would have swelled into a general rebellion so tremendous that the restoration of British rule could only have taken place at an incalculable cost of blood and treasure, and with horrible and ruinous results of devastation and disorganization. As Lord Canning said in his Adoption Despatch of April 30th, 1860, at that crisis "the patches of Native Government served as breakwaters to the storm which would otherwise have swept over us in one great wave." If any one of the leading Princes, the Nizam, Holkar, or Scindia, or one of the Sikh Rajahs, had set the example of turning against us, the example would soon have spread. A reigning leader, with an organized government, would have given form and body, and, as it would have seemed, legality to the insurrection; leadership might have developed into a confederation; and in the eyes of India, still worse in the eyes of Europe, the rebellion might have been rapidly converted into a legitimate war. We should have become foreign invaders, and the problem would have been how to reconquer India without Native allies, perhaps without Native troops.

If one or more of the Princes just mentioned had acted with passive hostility instead of the friendly activity they actually showed on our side, the contest must have been prolonged and embittered, and must have ended much less conclusively. We might have regained the upper hand, but we should hardly have recovered the moral advantage of the unquestioned and acknowledged initiative and lead. British domination would have been challenged, and whether it was done openly or covertly, the fact would have been noted, and not forgotten. The utter and final destruction of British power in India would have become, to say the least, quite conceivable and familiar to the popular mind.

In the twenty-one years that have elapsed since the restoration of internal peace in India, British administration has become more complicated, costly, and uncongenial. The debt has doubled; the annual hæmorrhage of capital to meet the Home Charges has risen to £16,000,000 sterling, or about two-fifths of the net revenue.

On the other hand, in that same period, the administration of the chief Native States has remarkably improved; their capacity to relieve and support the people in times of scarcity and famine, their conservation of local industries and interests, their thrift, their neighbourly expenditure, have become recently more closely noted, in contrast with our inflexible and over-centralized rule, our dissipation and dispersion of resources.

But such are not the lessons that float on the surface of Indian Anglo-Indian Administration Reports. Have we any statesmen who can look below the surface?

READINGS ON CURRENCY.

IN commencing a series of "readings" on this important and sadly neglected subject, we do so with a feeling akin to despair. Merchants, bankers, economists, statesmen, and publicists, all with one voice, tuned to the conventional note, tell us how fully persuaded they are of its extreme importance on the one hand, and of its immense difficulty on the other. And there they leave it, after the usual sincere-insincere fashion that characterizes human speech in these days; for there is no real sense of its importance anywhere, that we can see, either amongst our statesmen and publicists, or in the mercantile community. On the contrary, there is an idle and all but complete acquiescence in the Currency arrangements of the Acts of 1819, 1844, and 1845 as an expression of final wisdom on the subject. The Currency question has been so tabooed in this country for nearly a generation of years past, by the public press, that it can hardly be said to be studied in England at all, while there are literally no masters of the subject anywhere that we know of, in the kingdom. The two ablest treatises that exist upon the subject, are a volume, published by Longmans in 1855, entitled "Currency Self-regulating," and a work—a second edition of which was published by Walton and Moberly in 1863—entitled "The Mystery of Money Explained." Both are anonymous, but the author of the latter was, we believe, an old banker in the north of England, who died just after the publication of the second edition of his essay, at seventy-six years of age. It is in these two volumes only, that we have found the intricate subject really mastered, and its bearings upon the national well-being, clearly set forth. After long years of study of the subject, we say advisedly, that we know no other works in English, that show such mastery of the subject as the two essays we have named. We exhaust the merits of Mr. Göschen's "Theory of the Foreign Exchanges" when we say that it is lucid as the day; but then, it is as thin as it is transparent; and it is a striking proof of the idleness, the want of earnestness, with which this great subject is handled, that Mr. Göschen's essay is commonly spoken of as an unanswerable defence of Sir

Robert Peel's legislation. But all that Mr. Göschen has done is to show with great simplicity and clearness how the Act of 1844 is believed to affect the foreign exchanges of the country. The question still remains—Is the Act a wise and beneficial arrangement of matters, or an unwise and mischievous one? Mr. Göschen expresses no opinion upon the point; while from sheer want of acquaintance with the problem which the Act solves by violence, his admirers and the public press declare the "Theory" to be an unanswerable defence of the Act. Mr. Göschen meanwhile is careful not to commit himself to an approval of the Act, but reminds his readers (page 86) that "whether the law is wise in itself is beside the argument, so long as the Currency Laws continue as they are." We have a profound respect for Sir Robert Peel's memory, but he was not gifted with great original powers, and he was apt to form strong opinions upon very imperfect information and study. What he saw he saw clearly, or thought he did; while he possessed the art of using his knowledge very persuasively, and in a peculiarly authoritative and weighty manner. Now he certainly had no knowledge of the Currency question. He had never really studied it at any period of his life, while to look upon him as having mastered it would be ridiculous. The revolution that he was permitted to make in the Currency arrangements of the nation, by the Acts of 1819 and 1844, seems to be quite unknown. We shall devote, therefore, our first "reading" on the subject to a narrative of Sir Robert Peel's connection therewith; for until our publicists and statesmen cease to bow down before the shadow of his great name, there is no hope of any reform in our legislation upon the subject.

Sir Robert Peel's Legislation.

The monetary system, that was introduced by the late Sir Robert Peel, in 1819, being founded upon Lord Liverpool's theory, it is important, to the present inquiry, to examine the foundation on which that theory is based. Mr. Charles Jenkinson—who was first made Lord Hawkesbury, and afterwards Earl of Liverpool, for his supposed services in throwing light on the Monetary Question—addressed a "Treatise on the Coins of the Realm, to King George III.," which was first published in 1806; but the following quotations are from the second edition, published in 1846. In this treatise, his lordship says: "The money or coin of a country is the standard measure, by which the value of all things bought or sold is regulated and ascertained;" and he adds: "It is itself, at the same time, the value or equivalent for which goods are ex-

changed, and in which contracts are generally made payable." He then says, that it is the combination of these two qualities, "which constitute the essence of money." But he immediately afterwards tells His Majesty, that "these two qualities can never be brought perfectly to unite and agree." His lordship not only says this, but he gives very satisfactory reasons why they cannot unite and agree. He says: "If money were a measure alone, and made, like all other measures, of a material of little or no value, it would not answer the purpose of an equivalent. And if it is made, in order to answer the purpose of an equivalent, of a material value, subject to frequent variations, according to the price at which such material sells at the market, it fails, on that account, in the quality of a standard or measure, and will not continue to be perfectly uniform, and at all times the same."—(p. 9.) Gold is clearly a commodity which comes under the latter description, and therefore, according to his lordship's own showing, cannot be such "a standard or measure," as his lordship says money ought to be. Yet his lordship's "Theory of Money" is based upon the assumption, that gold is a uniform measure and rule for the value of all commodities, and that the money of the realm ought to possess an intrinsic value, exactly equal to its conventional or legal value. Thus, while his lordship, with marvellous inconsistency, tells the King that "the essence of money" is constituted of "two qualities," which, he admits, "can never be brought perfectly to unite and agree," he attempts to establish his "Theory of Money" on a foundation which his own argument destroys.

His lordship appears to have fallen into these extraordinary errors, for want of properly discerning the distinction there is between the bullion used in mercantile transactions, between different nations, and that which is *legally* used within any given nation. They are distinguished in Scripture, as "money current with the merchant," and "tribute-money." The essential characteristic of the former is, the intrinsic value of the material of which it is made; but the essential characteristic of "tribute-money" is, the authority of the impression affixed to the material as legal tender. In the former case, uncoined gold or silver may be money; in the latter case, they are not money until they are coined, although, of course, they may be, and are, money's worth. Tribute-money may be made of gold, silver, or copper; or, as we know from experience, it may be made of wood or paper, or of any other commodity, which is comparatively worthless in itself—the sign affixed to it, by the ruling power, constituting its value as a legal tender, for the payment of a definite amount of national taxes, or any other credit engagement within the

realm. But this tribute-money is no further valuable to the merchant, who wants to take his money for expenditure in a foreign nation, than for the amount of gold or silver it may contain, or for the amount of these, or any other valuable commodities which he can obtain for it, in the nation to which this tribute-money belongs. The gold or silver, or other valuable commodities thus obtained, in exchange for this tribute-money, is that money which is meant by "money current with the merchants," in their transactions between different nations.

These two distinct kinds of money are well defined by Lord Liverpool himself. He tells the King, at p. 18 of his Letter, that "coins of every kingdom or state are the measure of property and commerce, within every such kingdom or state, according to the nominal value declared and authorized by the sovereign, so far as they are made a legal tender." Herein, he correctly describes the essential characteristics of home, or *tribute-money*. Then his lordship tells the King, that "in exchange with foreign countries, and in payments made to them, the *intrinsic value* of the metal of which the coin is made, is the only measure of property and commerce; because (as he justly remarks), the authority of sovereigns cannot extend to regulate payments made in foreign countries, where they have no power or jurisdiction." In this explanation, his lordship is equally successful in describing the essential characteristic of that money which is "current with the merchant."

It is, therefore, very marvellous that after his lordship had, at the commencement of his treatise, so correctly shown that there are these two kinds of money; and so distinctly admitted, that the two conflicting principles on which they are respectively based could never be brought to unite and agree, he should have persisted throughout the remainder of his work, in the endeavour to do that which he had admitted to be impossible. But so it is. His lordship sometimes argues upon one of these definitions of money, and sometimes upon the other, until he deludes himself into the belief that he has succeeded in amalgamating the two conflicting elements into one essence; and, as a natural consequence, his lordship's arguments are frequently contradicted by the facts which he has to adduce. It is no wonder, therefore, that his lordship should have to state, in a subsequent part of his work, that almost all the eminent men who have written on the subject, have been baffled with the difficulties of the question; nor surprising, as his lordship says, "that persons, wholly occupied in official business, should not have had leisure to study or understand a subject which is, in its nature, so abstruse and complicated."

Notwithstanding these obvious discrepancies in the very foundation of Lord Liverpool's "Theory of Money," the conclusion at which he arrived obtained the assent of the well-known Bullion Committee of 1810 and 1811. And, to prevent his lordship's theory from obtaining the sanction of Parliament, it required no ordinary exertions on the part of the then Chancellor of the Exchequer and his colleagues. Had the scheme been forced into operation at that time, the French War would, in all probability, have been brought to a hasty, and for this nation, a dishonourable conclusion. After the war terminated, the advocates of Lord Liverpool's theory renewed their efforts to get it adopted; and, as a preliminary measure thereto, the silver coinage, when it was renewed in 1816, was, for the first time, coined after the rate of 5s. 6d. per ounce, and restricted, as a legal tender, to the sum of forty shillings. But when cash payments had been suspended, in 1797, our silver coin was a legal tender to any amount, although the coin then in circulation was far inferior in value to the new coin, issued in 1816. Every loan which the Government had borrowed between the years 1797 and 1816, had been borrowed with the understanding that it should be ultimately repaid in the same kind of money as that which existed in 1797; but this stipulation was entirely set aside by the new law in regard to the silver coinage; and, after bank-notes ceased to be a legal tender, great injustice was inflicted upon the productive classes of the nation, by this alteration in the legal-tender power of our silver coin; while the wealth of those who had accumulated capital in the National Funds was proportionately increased.

In 1817, the Directors of the Bank of England voluntarily attempted to resume specie payments in the coin of the realm; and would, probably, have succeeded in their object had it not been for this new law in regard to silver money, by the operation of which the bullion dealers were enabled to realize considerable private profit, by drawing gold from the Bank of England, for the French Government, in our gold coin, at 77s. 10½d. per ounce, when the market price of it, in exchange for silver, was at the rate of 80s. 6d. per ounce. And this traffic in gold, so injurious to England, could only be counteracted by the renewed suspension of specie payments; so the Bank Directors were prevented, at that time, from accomplishing their laudable object, in consequence of silver coin having ceased to be a legal tender for sums above forty shillings.

Regardless of this suggestive experience, Lord Liverpool's theory found a speedy advocate in the late Sir Robert Peel, in 1819. Sir Robert, then Mr. Peel, when he became Chairman of the House of Commons' Committee on Cash Payments, appears,

from his own confession, to have been almost unacquainted with the monetary question. He admits his ignorance of it until he had read Lord Liverpool's book, which it seems was after he had commenced his duties as Chairman of the Cash Payments' Committee.

It appears that he had no sooner read Lord Liverpool's "learned and able book," as he calls it, than he felt that he had acquired a complete knowledge of the whole subject, and it soon became evident that he had more confidence in Lord Liverpool's theory than his lordship himself. Statements which his lordship had made with cautious qualifications, Mr. Peel made without them, and in his speech of May 24th, 1819, taking his lordship's book as his brief, Mr. Peel, like a skilful barrister, made a more plausible case in support of his lordship's theory than the brief itself contained. For while Lord Liverpool admitted, as we have seen, that Mr. Locke and Mr. Harris, and other well-known writers on the money question had maintained the opinion, that silver coin had always constituted the standard money of this nation, Mr. Peel asserted that "a certain weight of gold bullion, with an impression upon it, denoting it to be of that certain weight, and of certain fineness, constituted the only true, intelligible, and adequate standard of value," and that, "every sound writer on the subject" came to the same conclusion. In support of this strange assertion, he remarked that "Sir Isaac Newton, retiring from the sublime studies in which he chiefly passed his life, from the contemplation of the heavenly bodies, from an investigation of the laws by which their motions were guided, entered on the examination of this subject, but that great man came back at last to *the old, the vulgar doctrine*, as it was called by some, that the true standard of value consisted in a definite quantity of gold bullion."—*Hansard*, vol. xl., 680. Where and when Sir Isaac Newton made this declaration is not stated, but it appears to have escaped Lord Liverpool's observation, or he would have been glad to avail himself of Sir Isaac's authority to have shown that the notion of a gold standard of value, upon which his lordship was anxious to establish his new theory of money, had existed as an old and vulgar doctrine in the time of Sir Isaac Newton.

Mr. Peel, who was then a young man, appears to have been quite unconscious of there being two kinds of money. He had probably read Lord Liverpool's work too hastily to discover that his lordship had commenced his definition of money by showing that its essence was to be found in the combination of two conflicting elements, which he said could never be made to unite and agree, and unconscious of the difference between *mercantile money* and *tribute money*

and of the essential characteristics of each, Mr. Peel appears to have been quite unconscious of the absurdity involved in Lord Liverpool's definition of the essence of money. It is of course impossible to make two conflicting elements, which it is admitted can never be made to unite, constitute *one essence*; but it is not impossible to make the two kinds of money, which Lord Liverpool so correctly defines, work together in harmony, while each retains its distinctive character. If Mr. Peel had really understood the question, and if he had been willing to avail himself of the advice of his father and his father's friends, he might easily have discovered the way in which this harmonious action between our *mercantile* money and our *tribute* money was accomplishable; but after he had read Lord Liverpool's book he appears to have become so self-confident in his own knowledge and that of his new associates, that, like the son of Solomon, he was too wise to receive instruction from his father's friends, or from his father himself. And in his zeal to carry out his new project, he scrupled not to avail himself of accusations and arguments most unfounded and unfair, to excite popular prejudice against his father's friends, and especially against the Court of Bank Directors, whose influence, as experienced men practically acquainted with the subject, he appears to have deemed it needful to destroy. He and his partisans succeeded so well in doing this, that Mr. Tierney, who had joined the Cash Payments Committee of 1819 with feelings of prejudice against the Bank Directors, became thoroughly ashamed of the treatment which those gentlemen had received from the younger Peel and his supporters. And Mr. Tierney thus expressed himself. Though no man in Parliament had shown less leaning towards the Bank of Directors than himself, yet, said he, justice ought to be done to all parties, and—"He could not figure to himself anything more mischievous than for the Government to hold up*the Bank to the world as unworthy of public confidence. . . . Three months ago, the Bank was respected by all classes, even courted and conciliated by Ministers; now it was abused by its oldest friends and abandoned by the whole world." The faults alleged against it were, he said, truly belonging to the Ministers of the Crown, and he added: "In short, the shepherd was to be put into the stocks, while the wolf was to be allowed to prey upon the flock."

It is most true that the Directors of the Bank of England had been very faithful shepherds over the pecuniary interests of the British people through all the perils to which those interests had been exposed during the French war from the frequent and pressing demands of the Ministers of the Crown. And these unfair proceed-

ings against the Bank Directors were not improbably promoted by a desire on the part of the Ministers of the Crown to increase their own power over the managers of the Bank of England, as Mr. Tierney's remark seems to imply.

In restoring cash payments, the just and equitable course would obviously have been to have restored precisely the same system of money as that which had been suspended in 1797. Both the gold and silver coin of this kingdom would then have been our legal money for all sums, however great; but to this equitable restoration of the former system of cash payments an obstacle had been ignorantly or artfully interposed, as before observed, by the new laws in 1816 relative to our silver money, by which its legal tender power was restricted to sums not exceeding 40s.

The difficulty thus needlessly created might, however, have been overcome by sanctioning the proper use of bank-notes in connection with the use of gold coin for all the larger payments in this nation, if the petition of the merchants and traders of London, presented to the House of Commons by Mr. Peel's father, had been duly attended to by the son, and especially if the advice of the Court of Bank Directors had been fairly received and honestly interpreted by him and the Ministers of the Crown. The difference between the suggestions offered by the Court of Bank Directors and those contained in the plan proposed by Mr. Peel, may be explained in very few words. Both parties admitted the necessity of some means being adopted for the equitable adjustment of the *legal* value of the bank-note with the *mercantile* value of gold. But the plan proposed by Mr. Peel imposed upon the Directors of the Bank of England the obligation of *regulating* the market price of gold by increasing or diminishing the issue of bank-notes; while the Court of Bank Directors suggested, as an alternative, that they should be allowed to regulate their issues in *subordination* to the market price of gold, leaving gold and silver to find their relative value in the market of the world. Unimportant as this distinction *appears* to be, there is really involved in it as great a difference as there is between the *setting-up* of a coach and the *upsetting* of it. Mr. Peel himself was either unconscious of this distinction, or he knowingly gave to the House of Commons a false description of his proposed system of cash payments. He alleged that the plan embodied "in the resolution that he had the honour to lay upon the table proceeded on the principle that the Bank should regulate its issues by the price of gold; the same principle, be it recollected (he said) on which the Bank of England had uniformly acted previously to the restrictions imposed upon it in 1797."—*Hansard*, vol. xl., 686.

If this description which Mr. Peel gave of his plan had been true, the Court of Bank Directors would have had no need to object to it; but it was essentially untrue. Mr. Peel's plan was *not* founded on the principle which had been acted upon previously to 1797; nor was it "founded on the principle that the Bank should regulate its issues by the price of gold," but, as we have said, on the principle that the Bank should regulate the price of gold by its issues.

From the hasty manner in which Mr. Peel had taken up his new currency opinions, it is very probable that he might not discern this important distinction between his plan of cash payments and his description of it: just as a Frenchman, imperfectly acquainted with the idiom of the English language is oftentimes unable to perceive the difference of meaning there is between a "coach *set up*" and a "coach *upset*." But the Directors of the Bank of England perceived the serious error involved in the proposed plan, and the strong probability there was that the prosperity of Great Britain would be "upset" if this error were not rectified. They immediately memorialised the Government, expressing their fears that, if the proposed plan were not altered, it would inflict great distress upon the people, and would probably "compromise the universal interests of the kingdom in all its relations of agriculture, manufactures, commerce, and revenue." And they suggested, as we have said, a mode by which Mr. Peel's plan would have been made consistent with his own description of it, *i.e.*, they proposed that the Bank should be allowed to regulate its issues in *subordination* to the mercantile price of gold, instead of its being required to *govern* the mercantile price of gold by its issues. Mr. Peel was also equally incorrect in his other assertion, *viz.*, that the principle involved in his plan was the same as that "on which the Bank of England had uniformly acted previously to the restrictions imposed upon it in 1797." Prior to that restriction, the Bank Directors were under no obligation to regulate the market price of gold or silver more than anybody else. All they were then required to do was to redeem their notes in the coin of the realm, either gold or silver. If the bullion market were scantily supplied with silver, and it was wanted for exportation, the Bank Directors were not obliged to provide it. They could pay any demand upon them in gold coin; or, if gold was more wanted for export than silver, they could legally make their payments in silver coin, and thus regulate their issues in subordination to the gold and silver coin of the realm. It is true that the Bank Directors had at that time sufficient control over the bullion market, to enable them to protect the public from the speculative demands of private bullion dealers, so that merchants

could generally get supplied with gold or silver on fair terms ; but it is altogether untrue that they uniformly acted upon the same principle as that which Mr. Peel's new scheme proposed to impose upon them.

In consequence of the French Revolution and the war with France, in which this nation became engaged soon afterwards, the bullion market of the whole world became greatly deranged. In 1794 and 1795, more than £8,000,000 of specie was sent out by the British Government as subsidies to our continental allies. This large amount of the precious metals could not be obtained without giving for them a high market price, and it appears by the evidence which Mr. Abraham Newland, the cashier of the Bank, gave before the Lords' Committee in 1797, that to obtain gold in 1795 to meet the Government wants the agents of the Bank had been obliged to give for it, in Portugal, for a short time, as much as £4 8s. per ounce. Of course this would not have been the case, if the Bank of England could then have fulfilled the provisions of Mr. Peel's plan, by providing gold coin for the whole world at £3 17s. 10½d. per ounce.

Although the above evidence of Mr. Abraham Newland was given before a Committee of the Lords, of which Lord Liverpool himself appears to have been a member, and given only a few years before his lordship's book was published, yet it seems to have quite escaped his recollection at the time when his work was written, for he tells the King : " For twenty years previous to the year 1797, the Directors of the Bank of England have, as I am informed, paid for it, on an average, not more than £3 17s. 7¾d. per ounce."—(p. 157).

It is worthy of notice that his lordship qualifies this statement by saying that it was what *he had been informed* ; but with the important evidence to the contrary of the cashier of the Bank of England, so recently recorded in a Report of the Lords' Committee, he should not have given the sanction of his authority to this *hearsay* statement. Mr. Peel appears to have been deceived by it ; for relying absolutely, as he appears to have done, upon every statement made by Lord Liverpool, without troubling himself to reconcile his lordship's statements one with another, he, in support of his plan, boldly offered the following challenge to the House of Commons : " Let the House remember what the Bank were enabled to do when they were compelled to pay in specie. From 1774 to 1797, they did that to which now the objection was made. During that period they conformed their issues to the price of gold, and he challenged any man to produce an instance during that period when the price of gold exceeded 77s. 6d. per ounce. Thus (said he) so long as the

Bank conformed to the practice of thus regulating their issues they have found no difficulty, and the price of gold never increased."—*Hansard*, xl., 690:

This, it will be seen, is a repetition of Lord Liverpool's statement, only exaggerated and expressed in much stronger language, and its correctness is, as we have already seen, clearly refuted by the evidence of Abraham Newland, formerly so popularly known as the cashier of the Bank of England.

It will be necessary hereafter to notice many other important errors in Lord Liverpool's book, which were repeated, with some exaggerations, by Mr. Peel in the speech with which he introduced his new Monetary Scheme of 1819 into the House of Commons; but the *essential* error of that scheme will be found to originate in the mistaken transposition of ideas, which has been noticed. If the old system of cash payments suspended in 1797 had been fairly restored; or if the new system introduced by Mr. Peel had been accompanied with such provisions as would have allowed the Bank Directors to regulate their issues by the price of gold, in accordance with Mr. Peel's *professed* object, the result would, probably, have been most favourable to the steady and progressive prosperity of the British Empire. But so little was the Money Question understood at that time, either by Mr. Peel or by the majority of the House of Commons, that he and they were evidently unable to discern the distinction between the Bank Directors *regulating their issues* by the price of gold, and *regulating the price of gold* by their issues; and it is equally evident, from the whole tenor of Mr. Peel's speech, and from the final comments upon the debate, which were offered by Mr. Canning, that Mr. Peel's new measure obtained the sanction of the House on two false assumptions, viz., that, under it, the Bank Directors would have to regulate their issues by the price of gold; and that the new scheme was a real restoration of the *ancient* system of cash payments—that system which Mr. Canning remarked had been suspended for twenty-two years.

These were extraordinary errors; but it is, perhaps, more remarkable that while the Bank Directors by their advice were anxious to suggest means by which the new scheme might be made truly to fulfil Mr. Peel's professed object, their suggestions were not merely rejected, but rejected by him in the most offensive manner. He alleged that their suggestions involved a fraudulent departure from the ancient system of cash payments, although it was his own departure from that ancient system which had rendered their suggestions needful. He accused them of great ignorance of the science of money. He stated that the imports of grain and pro-

visions into Liverpool from Ireland in the preceding year (1818) had amounted to £1,950,000; and that 457,000 bales of cotton had been imported from America in the same year; and these enormous imports, as he considered them, he attributed to the imprudent accommodation which the Bank Directors had afforded to the mercantile and commercial world. He dwelt eloquently on the melancholy results of this *overtrading* prosperity, as he called it; and he attributed to this *overtrading* the monetary pressure that had been occasioned by the drain of gold, caused by the financial measures of France in 1817, as previously explained. He led many to believe that the Bank Directors were actuated by a narrow-minded selfishness in their advice; and he asserted: "If the circulating medium were to be left to the discretion of the Bank Directors, uncontrolled by any considerations but that of their own profits, it would be impossible to estimate the extent of the mischief that might ensue."

Regardless of the voluntary attempt which the Bank had made in 1817 to resume cash payments, but in which they had been frustrated by the pernicious operation of the new law in regard to our silver coin, he alleged that the Bank Directors were desirous of a perpetual suspension of cash payments. With sarcastic contumely, he said: "For the Directors, individually, it was impossible for him to entertain anything but great respect; but they, as a public body, must not be surprised to have their official conduct questioned, and that the House of Commons should, at least, doubt whether that was the institution, to the discretion of whose Directors were, or ought to be, confided the pecuniary and commercial interests of the British community. Whatever were their opinions, it was now the proper moment to relieve them from the duty of attending to such concerns."

But while Mr. Peel was thus anxious to relieve the Bank from the duty of attending to the public welfare, he could by no means see that there was any necessity for the Government to pay to the Bank even one half of the £20,000,000 which was at that time owing to it by the exchequer, and he intimated that it would be deemed very offensive on the part of the Directors if they could not accommodate the Government with such loans as they might require, and, at the same time, provide gold for everybody that might want it.

While Mr. Peel was thus accusing the Bank Directors of being actuated by a narrow-minded selfishness, Mr. Ricardo accused them of paying too much attention to the interests of the public, and thus neglecting the interests of the Bank proprietors. Others accused them of great presumption, in supposing that it was any part of

their duty to attend to the monetary interest of the nation at all ; contemptuously telling them to mind their own affairs, and leave the care of the public to the King's Ministers.

But while these conflicting accusations were preferred against the Court of Bank Directors by different detachments of these superficial thinkers, all of them appeared to agree in the opinion that those experienced men, who had so ably managed the Bank of England through all the pecuniary difficulties of the French war, and so wonderfully assisted the King's Ministers in obtaining the large supplies of money required for bringing that war to a satisfactory termination, were quite ignorant of the science of money, and unfit to have the management of these monetary matters when the war had ceased, and when the Ministers of the Crown thought they could do without the further services of the Bank and its Directors. It is not improbable that some of the Ministers of the Crown might at that time think, as others have since thought, that it would be very pleasant to them to have the monetary power of the Bank of England so under their own control as to get rid of that watchful regard to the people's interest which the Bank Directors so successfully exercised during the French war, and by means of which the amount of bank-notes in circulation was always kept within the limit of the national revenue. This was, no doubt, Mr. Tierney's suspicion, when he accused the Ministers of the Crown of a desire *to put the shepherd into the stocks, that the wolf might be allowed to prey upon the flock.*

It is worthy of notice that Mr. Tierney became so aroused at last to the perils to which Mr. Peel's plan would subject the nation, that, breaking off from his own political party, he said : " He objected to the plan, because, in his conscience, he believed it to be so full of danger that nothing could justify it but necessity."

Notwithstanding the practical and common sense arguments with which the errors of the new scheme were exposed by many merchants and bankers of great experience, Mr. Peel succeeded in carrying his object, and there can be no doubt that, in accomplishing it, he was greatly indebted to the ability with which he excited popular prejudice against the Bank Directors and against those parties with whom his own father had been, and continued to be, very much identified.

AXIOMS CONCERNING THE LAND.

In the nature of things, if we will consider it—the land, air, and waters which the living generation of men inhabit, must in all countries belong to them, and cannot possibly belong to generations, however remote or however near, that lived before them. It follows from this self-evident truth, that any disposition whatever of the land, air, or waters, or any regulations concerning their occupancy and enjoyment, made by generations that have passed away, can have no binding force in morals or common sense upon the present generation, if those dispositions or regulations are inimical to, or interfere with, its well-being.

Each generation, as it succeeds another, must, in the nature of things, be the absolute proprietors of the land, air, and waters it inhabits, and no disposition of either by generations dead and gone can possibly be binding upon the present, in reason or in equity, where that disposition is harmful to the existing race of possessors. In particular, can no such disposition of the land, air, or waters that interferes with their productiveness, for the supply of the wants of the present generation, or with its general well-being, have any binding sanction whatever in morals, or common sense.

If, therefore, the existing generation of men, in any country whatever, consent to respect and give the force of present law to the dispositions of past generations concerning the occupancy and enjoyment of the land, air, or waters, that belong to them and to them only, whether we call their society a state, kingdom, or commonwealth, that sanction is given only upon the presumption that it is for the welfare of the existing generation and its successors, that it should be accorded.

Such phrases, therefore, as "the wisdom of our ancestors," "the rights of property," as applied either to land, air, or water, or the "sacred principles of the Constitution," are the outcome only of the ignorance or the self-interest of classes, or the flattery of their apologists.

In particular, must each living generation, and its successors

after it, possess an absolute right of determining for itself what dispositions shall be made for promoting the productiveness of the land, air, and waters for the wants and general well-being of its members. It follows that the existing generation—*i.e.*, the state or commonwealth of to-day—has an absolute moral right to sweep away all such dispositions or regulations, by whomsoever made, concerning the occupancy and cultivation of the land, air, and waters as are declared by the general intellect and conscience to be hurtful to the people as a whole. This right is paramount, absolute, and indefeasible, and no opposing class interests whatever, can claim toleration and continuance, on any fancied ground of moral or legal “right.” If the interests of such classes are respected, it can be only with a sentence of death, and final extinction, hanging over them. The sentence *must* be one of “death” in all such cases, execution being deferred only from motives of regard for the general welfare of all classes.

Let it be observed, however, that in formulating these axioms we are not necessarily affirming that private proprietorship either of the land or the waters should be swept away. We say only that each existing generation has the full absolute right to determine for itself whether such private rights are conducive to its general well-being or not, and to act accordingly. In particular, has it the absolute right to determine under what regulations and conditions the cultivator of the soil—its *husband*, as the insight of ages designates him—shall toil for the supply of the general wants. To permit any man, or any class of men, to assert the right of determining in virtue of the legislation of past generations, the terms on which the husband of the soil shall live and cultivate thereon, is monstrous, in any light whatever in which it may be viewed.

Now, in communities which have been fairly well governed in the past, it may happen that the existing generation has inherited a disposition of these great matters which makes it inadvisable to assert to their legitimate extent, the first principles to which we have now called attention. The inequality, injustice, and hurtfulness of inherited arrangements may not be felt to be intolerable, while reverence for the past, and a general unwillingness to make sweeping alterations of the law, combined with the influence and power of the privileged classes, may make what is called “radical” reform distasteful and unwelcome to the masses of the country. But in circumstances like those of Ireland at this moment, where the masses are bound together in a common revolt against their inherited institutions, it is the bounden duty of the Government, let it be constituted as it may, to review matters from their

foundations. Landlordism in Ireland—the landlordism of past ages—the landlordism that exists in the island to-day, is plainly intolerable to the people, as being incompatible with their well-being. There is an all but absolute agreement as to this fact; and if the Government is to legislate successfully on this great subject, which has come to involve the very existence of society in Ireland and the maintenance of peace and order therein, it must rise to the occasion, and deal with the subject in its full length and breadth. Injustice *cannot* be done to the landed classes by any legislation that is possible under 'so aristocratic a constitution as that of the British Parliament. The landlords may count with confidence upon a larger share of general sympathy and support than they can fairly lay claim to; and the only fear is that the new Land Act will be inadequate to the actual need of the country. The landlords have held on by their traditions and inheritance as long as it was possible to do so. They have steadily resisted and resented all equitable and reasonable consideration of the claims made upon them, and unwisely insisted upon "concessions" being dependent upon their personal discretion, instead of consenting to see those concessions enforced by law. The time has now come when the people refuse to be dependent upon such concessions any longer. They claim their natural and inalienable rights as the existing race of possessors of the soil; they claim that the cultivator of the land—the *husband*—shall have *his* claims recognized as preferential, in the nature of things, to the landlord's claims; and the everlasting laws saying Yea to this, the claim will have to be allowed. No one wants to see the landlord destroyed or impoverished, if that can be avoided. We are a Conservative race by instinct, but we are a practical race too; and the conviction is all but universal that landlordism in Ireland must undergo such a modification of its claims, as will permit the husbandman to till his fields in hope instead of with despair. We speak with moderation, of set purpose, but none the less firmly. The Liberal Ministry must rise to the occasion, and do all that it is possible for it to do to reform matters.

We now pass to another class of considerations. Generations succeed each other insensibly. They are not separated from one another by a cataclysm, but the past becomes insensibly the present, the interests of both alike asserting themselves at every moment. The generation that is passing away bequeathes to us itself, with all that is harmful and all that is healthful in the legacy, as it comes insensibly into our hands. Whatever knowledge, wealth, or culture we possess, we owe to the presence of the past in the midst of us, with its experience and wisdom embodied in wise laws, well-considered institu-

tions, and wholesome regulations. On the other hand, it lives amongst us in the shape of unwise laws, unjust institutions, false and unwholesome traditions; parents of the existing ignorance, poverty, wretchedness, and crime. The work of every statesman, consequently, who is worthy of the name, must be to determine between the evil and the good, of which "the past" is the expression in our midst. Now, the just Conservative attitude consists in a jealous watchfulness over the knowledge, wealth, culture, and wise regulations of the past, that no atom thereof may be lost. The Liberal attitude, on the other hand, must be one of resolute determination that the ignorance, poverty, misery, which the selfish traditions and unwise dispositions of the past have produced, shall disappear from amongst us. Conservative legislation is unavoidably addressed to the protection and preservation of the classes who are well to do, and who, by virtue of their position and power as "in possession," are but too well able to take care of themselves, and really want no protection. Liberal legislation, on the other hand, whether wise or not, successful or not, aims at the elevation of the ignorant, the poor, and the wretched, by a more equal distribution of the culture, wealth, and happiness of the nation. With the past living amongst us, in two great expressions of enormous wealth and inconceivable wretchedness, every statesman worthy of the name will have his heart set upon the more equal distribution of matters.

With the instinct of human selfishness, the well-to-do are ever seeking to stereotype and make perpetual their advantages, by legislative measures of precaution and protection; and so the history of English legislation, until of late years, has been one continuous round of provisions and regulations for the protection of the well-to-do classes; the very classes whose wealth, influence, and power leave them in no need of such protection, as being but too well able to take care of themselves. On the other hand, it is a continuous record of measures of "repression" for the classes whose need of an outstretched arm of power for their elevation and advancement, is paramount. A nation may easily arrive at a state when broad and generous measures of self-sacrifice on the part of the powerful and wealthy classes therein, can alone ameliorate the condition of, and restore hope to, the lower classes. England and Ireland alike have long presented this precise problem to practical statesmanship, and Ireland particularly so. The "past" is living amongst us in both countries, in forms of injustice established by law; and enforced by a selfishness that knows no principle but that of taking care of itself. And the State can be saved only by self-sacrifice. It is unwise, we believe, to attempt to hide the fact from

ourselves. Wise legislation, in the circumstances of this kingdom, means legislation of a self-sacrificing order on the part of the classes who engross the advantages which the past has bequeathed to the existing generation. It is not worth while to go back into the history of the past, to trace the origin of the great and wealthy families who to-day "inherit the land." It is sufficient that every reflecting man sees that if the laws, regulations, and institutions under which these vast disparities have grown up, are to endure and be respected, it must be because to abrogate them would do more harm, upon the whole, than good. The moment they are shown to be working more harm to the commonwealth than good, they are sentenced to death; and the man or men who stand up for their continuance on such pleas as the sacred rights of property, principles of the British Constitution, the wisdom of our ancestors, &c., is either silly, selfish, or traitorous to his generation. Plain and simple as these considerations are, they are an abhorrence to the ordinary politician. Multitudes, on the other hand, generously give in their adherence to them at once, recognizing their truth, and are nobly ready to assist in legislation that even sacrifices themselves.

It is the professional politician, the self-seeker of the Disraeli stamp, that damps the generous instincts of the well-to-do classes, and throws an air of dubiety over the counsels of the wise and good, whenever such cases as the present arise amongst us. We have faith in the present Ministry. It is a Ministry such as the country has never seen before, for the single-mindedness of its aims, and the whole nation must rally round the great leaders, who are about to risk everything in a struggle with traditional Toryism, led by the Mephistophelian strategy of a man whose name will be an abhorrence in English history.

HOME AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

INDIRECTLY, and without at all intending to do so, we think it will be found that the Irish Obstructives have rendered to the British Empire a very memorable service. How to limit the talking capacity of the House of Commons so as to bring it into some reasonable proportion with the enormous and increasing quantity of work which the House has to get through,—this was the problem which, for some time past, had been forcing itself upon the attention of thinking men. The main obstacle in the way of its solution was a superstitious veneration, characteristic of the British nation, for machinery. Unlimited freedom of debate—this, no one questions or denies, is the indispensable preliminary, and enabling condition of wise legislation, but it is an absurd perversion of facts to identify “freedom of debate” with unlimited licence to talk. This, however, was what we had come to. The House of Commons was fast transforming itself from a legislative assembly into a mere debating assembly; the end for which it existed was being more and more ignored, and the machinery erected into an end in its place. Thus, by way of illustration, we were informed that Mr. Gladstone had imperilled the most valuable privilege of the House of Commons when he interposed to protect the French Ambassador from the slanders of an Irish member of Parliament. To act thus, the public was informed, was to restrict “freedom of debate.” And so, doubtless, it was in a certain sense. But parliamentary “freedom of debate” is useful or noxious only in so far as it promotes or retards the progress of legislation. And the immense service which the Irish Obstructives have rendered to the country is that they have compelled it to admit the force of this simple truism, and regulate our parliamentary procedure accordingly. “Precedent” being the Englishman’s god, it takes a great deal to persuade us to waver in our devotion towards it, but seventeen hours expended in successive motions for the adjournment of the House sufficed for even this. It is doubtful if anything less would have done so.

Fear has been expressed lest the stringent powers which have been accorded to the Speaker may be hereafter exercised in a manner injurious to the rights of parliamentary minorities. Such a fear is born of a misapprehension of the existing relations between Parliament and the country. A quarter of a century ago, Parliament might still have been regarded as the political educator of the nation, and so long as it was so, the utmost care was necessary that a minority should not be arbitrarily silenced. A very important factor in the political education of the nation would thereby have been expunged. But now-a-days the nation is no longer dependent upon Parliament for instruction in political knowledge; it decides for itself what shall be done, and simply entrusts to Parliament the work of carrying out its mandates. The consequence is that a

minority silenced in Parliament can always appeal against that decision to the nation at large, with the certainty of obtaining a hearing. During the ascendancy of Jingoism, Mr. Gladstone was as good as silenced in the House of Commons, but his power outside of it was never so great or so far-reaching.

The conduct, again, of the Irish Obstructives, although almost universally condemned, has, it appears to us, rarely been condemned on the right grounds; while not a few Liberals appear to think that, as Irish members, it was their duty to oppose by all the arts of obstruction such a measure as the Coercion Bill. This, we think, involves a very mistaken notion of what the duty of a member of Parliament is. He is not merely the member for this or that constituency; he is also a trustee for the good government of the whole British Empire. In offering himself for the office of a member of the British Parliament, he does, in fact, tacitly pledge himself to do his utmost to promote the well-being of the British Empire; and if, after this, he makes use of his position to stolidly obstruct all legislation because he chances to disapprove of a single measure, he is obviously guilty of a breach of trust. And this it is of which the Irish Obstructives were guilty. They were abusing the forms of the House so as to block the whole business of the empire, and apply the test of physical endurance to matters which they had tacitly pledged themselves to try by no other tests than those of argument and persuasion. They were, in fact, as much in rebellion against the Constitution of this country as if they had asserted their opposition to the Coercion Bill through the medium of the Irish shillelagh; and if the majority of the House had lacked the courage to cancel rules and regulations which could thus be abused, representative government would have become impossible. If a small minority could obstruct as much as these Irish Obstructives had done, a large minority, it is obvious, could bring the business of the empire to a complete stand-still.

At the same time, our readers must not suppose that we have any liking for this Coercion Bill of the Government, or for the tactics of the Government generally. As far as argument goes, the anti-Coercionists, we consider, have had much the better of it; and it is our firm belief that if the Government had had the courage to bring forward, at the opening of the session, such a Land Bill as they are now prepared to give Ireland, there would have been no need for this Bill at all. But it is, we fear, not doubtful that when the session was opened, the Government were still groping about for a Land Bill, and the Coercion Bill was brought in as a stop-gap, until by feeling the pulse of Parliament they could determine how strong or how weak that Land Bill was to be. We need not express our conviction that so far as the Lord-Lieutenant and Mr. Forster are concerned, the powers granted by this Bill will not be abused; but we have also a very strong conviction that their power to prevent its abuse by others is simply non-existent. A class of people more signally unfit to be entrusted with arbitrary powers of arrest and imprisonment than the Irish magistracy is not to be found in the world. Their demeanour during the present agitation furnishes an abundant proof of this. We suppose, for instance, that under the provisions of this Bill a man like Mr. Bence Jones will have power to arrest any one whom he "reasonably suspects" of being a disturber of the public peace. Why, the man has not a scintilla of reason in his mental composition. He is simply a harsh, unjust, and unreasonable tyrant, who even in piping times of peace is unfit to be entrusted with magisterial duties. In times like these such a man, entrusted with the powers of the Coercion Bill, will establish a reign of terror around him. It is probably an injustice, even to Irish landlords, to say

that many of them are like Mr. Bence Jones; but, at any rate, they are landlords, and by the Coercion Bill the magistrates among them are made at once plaintiffs and judges. Assuredly, neither Mr. Forster nor any of his colleagues has made out a case to justify so monstrous a perversion of law and equity as this. Mr. Forster, we do not doubt for a moment, has brought this Bill in with a sad but perfect assurance of its necessity, but not the less it will place in the hands of the Irish magistracy a terrible instrument of oppression, nor do we doubt that it will be oppressively used. The Irish people, at the same time, ought to—and in after times probably will—lay the odium of its introduction on the leaders of the Land League rather than on Mr. Gladstone's Government. Even if the Irish people knew it not, Mr. Parnell and his followers were well aware that the present Government came into office both pledged and resolutely determined to reform the conditions of land tenure in Ireland. Instead of facilitating the passage of such remedial legislation, Mr. Parnell and his followers have done their utmost to obstruct it by mixing up the question of an independent Ireland with that of the relations between landlord and tenant. The spirit in which their agitation has been conducted has not been a constitutional one, but delighting, as it were, in expressions of defiance and hatred of the established authorities, and it is this spirit which has given rise, in its turn, to those outrages which are now sought to be suppressed by means of a Coercion Bill.

We have discussed elsewhere the arguments which have recently been put forward in favour of the permanent retention of Kandahar. Something remains to be said regarding that ridiculous mare's nest—the Russian correspondence found at Kabul. The tactics of the late Government with regard to this correspondence display a good deal of astuteness of the vulpine order. As it stands, the correspondence is as emphatic a condemnation of their policy, both before and after the beginning of the war with Afghanistan, as it is possible to imagine. The correspondence extends over a space of four months only, and shows that there had been no Russian intrigues in Afghanistan, and no thought of an alliance between the Russians and the Ameer Shere Ali, until Lord Beaconsfield's Government, by simultaneously menacing them both with war, drove them, in self-defence, to become allies against a common enemy. The correspondence also shows that as soon as the Russian Government was relieved of the fear of war with Great Britain, its overtures to the Ameer came to an end as abruptly as they had commenced. Thus, as we have said, this correspondence is good for nothing except to furnish one more demonstration of the unscrupulousness and almost incredible folly of the late Government. They drove Shere Ali by menaces and threats to seek an alliance with Russia, in order to protect India from the danger of intrigues which are now seen to have been imaginary; and ultimately they plunged England and India into a bloody and costly war to put an end to an alliance which, as we see from this correspondence, had perished almost in the act of being born. Except as demonstrating these facts anew, the correspondence is entirely without significance; and had it been published when the train of events leading up to the war in Afghanistan were still fresh in the memories of the public, the correct relation of these papers to Lord Beaconsfield's foreign policy could hardly have been missed by any one. Consequently, at that time, with a great deal of astuteness, the late Government refrained from publication. They contented themselves with mysterious allusions. They took credit to themselves for their abstinence in withholding these documents, as a course demanded by the highest interests of the empire. They suspended them, as a kind of Damocles' sword, over the heads of the Liberal Party, urging them

not to press a "patriotic" Government too hard, lest something terrible should happen to them—to wit, the publication of the correspondence found at Kabul. There is not an enemy of the late Government but will cordially admit that these tactics were extremely "foxy." And not less so is their recent change of front. Contemporary history passes rapidly into oblivion, and already the events leading up to the war in Afghanistan have, for most people, become dim and confused. The relation of these documents to those events will be apparent to comparatively few, but, as evidences of Russian influence in Afghanistan, they may be serviceable in another way. The immediate need of the discredited Jingo faction is, something to support their demand for the annexation of Kandahar. And human nature is so constituted that if Englishmen are convinced that Russia is doing something in Afghanistan, the most of them will feel a desire for some counter-move—a Rowland for an Oliver. The publication of this correspondence will be to many people an evidence of Russian intrigues in Afghanistan going on actively at this very moment, and they will in consequence cry out for the annexation of Kandahar as a counter-move fit and proper under the circumstances. In some such way we surmise that Lord Lytton and his backers reasoned upon this matter. Happily, the calculation has not been verified by the result. Neither the publication of these papers, nor the meeting held at St. James's Hall, nor the debates in Parliament, have availed to awaken any response from the nation. Throughout the Liberal Party there is, we are convinced, but one feeling, and that is of regret at the unaccountable and (not improbably) mischievous delay in carrying out the evacuation of Kandahar.

Elsewhere the nation has paid heavily for the incapacity of Lord Lytton's favourite lieutenant. The rashness and signal incompetence exhibited by Sir George Colley in his operations against the Boers will surprise no one who is acquainted with what he is responsible for in India. At the time of his appointment we took occasion to protest earnestly against it, and, with his Indian antecedents fresh in our memory, we predicted that should he be placed in circumstances requiring accurate judgment, prudence, and circumspection, he would fail disastrously. No one will deny that the prediction has proved an accurate one, and our readers will perhaps be curious to learn the grounds on which it was made. Well, Sir George Colley may be said to be the inventor and patentee of the "Scientific Frontier,"—not the abortive thing that was so designated after the Treaty of Gundamak, but a frontier that was to run along the outer boundary of Afghanistan proper. As we have seen, after employing an army of 60,000 men for two years, and after expending twenty millions of money, we have not even got near to this frontier. Sir George Colley thought that it was to be won in a few weeks, and at a cost of a little more than £1,000,000 sterling. Again, so eager was Sir George Colley to plunge into the war in Afghanistan, that on the occasion of the "insult" to Chamberlain's mission, he persuaded Lord Lytton to order an attack on the Fort of Ali Musjid by a few hundred men. Happily for India, the Commander-in-Chief positively refused to carry out the orders. In Africa, to our sorrow, Sir George Colley had no advisers other than his own rashness and uncalculating self-confidence, and the slaughter at Laing's Neck and on the Imbogo River are the result of following these blind leaders of the blind. The fact is that after the war in Afghanistan, Sir George Colley ought never to have been entrusted with aught but subordinate appointments. It is true that in India he had occupied a subordinate position only; but it was an "open secret" that, though nominally only Lord Lytton's private secretary, he was, in fact, his chief military adviser; and the Indian Commander-in-Chief

and his staff were simply "shunted" in order to remove every obstacle which might have impeded the counsels of this secret and irresponsible adviser. Under his auspices, the British columns were thrust into Afghanistan without adequate preparation in the way of transport and supplies, and, before two months had elapsed, were completely crippled. The campaign was a disgraceful and ignominious failure, and nothing but the sudden death of Shere Ali saved the Indian Government from having to encounter dangers and embarrassments of the most serious character. In a word, Sir George Colley had exhibited an incapacity for the conduct of either civil or military affairs which no prudent or patriotic Government would have ignored. Unhappily for the country, the late Government was neither prudent nor patriotic. They had claimed the ignominious campaign in Afghanistan as a brilliant success, and so found themselves in a manner compelled to decorate and reward its principal inventor and patentee. General Colley was accordingly transformed into Sir George Colley, and appointed to the Governorship of Natal, where he has exhibited the same signal lack of either civil or military ability which he had already shown in India.

In addition to this war in the Transvaal, it seems as if we were about to have a second war in Ashanti. There is one great benefit which may be reaped from the accumulation of these "little wars," if they have the effect of causing the British nation fairly to confront this matter of a Colonial Empire, and ask, what is the precise advantage it derives therefrom? The disadvantages are only too apparent. Assuming that these recent wars—wars against the Boers, the Zulus, the Afghans, and other wild races—were not the wanton, cowardly outrages upon weaker peoples which undoubtedly they were; assuming, for the sake of argument, that right in every case was on our side—it is ridiculous to say that the British nation dwelling here in these islands has derived any profit from these distant wars equivalent to the lavish expenditure of its blood and treasure. There are people who allow their imagination to be dazzled by mere extension of territory, and who have persuaded themselves that a nation's strength increases in proportion to the increase in its area of domination. This is a gross delusion. All that is increased by an increase of territory are the national vulnerability and the national financial burdens. But there are also other and more sorrowful consequences. Great Britain is herself full of wounds and sores which cry aloud for a healing hand to be applied to them. But we have neither eyes nor ears for our own pressing wants at home, while we devote the national wealth and the national time to wars and troubles at the uttermost ends of the earth. If we could manage our own affairs as well as the affairs of our vast and scattered empire, it would perhaps be pusillanimous to shrink from the labour and the burden that have been laid upon us. But we cannot; and in the effort to accomplish a task beyond the reach of human capacity, we involve ourselves and others in endless confusions and disasters. At home, we have to put up with all manner of evils, from sheer lack of time to remedy them; and abroad, we are at the mercy of ambitious and unscrupulous agents who are seeking only their own profit, not the good of the nation. Therefore it is that men like Sir Bartle Frere, Lord Lytton, Sir George Colley, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, have the power to involve us in entanglements from which we cannot extricate ourselves except at heavy cost and with an irretrievable loss of honour. The way of escape out of all this imbroglia is short and simple, if only we have the courage to adopt it. It is, to cut our Colonial Empire adrift—to call upon our colonies to set up in life for themselves. Harsh, as such an act may superficially appear, it would, we are convinced, be

a greater boon to Canadians, Australians, Cape Colonists, and others, than even to ourselves. These colonies of ours never will, and indeed never can, develop the capacities and virtues of independent nations until they have taken upon themselves all the responsibilities of independence. Who is there that does not perceive that the United States Republic could never have grown to her present majestic stature if she had remained a dependency of Great Britain? For us, the colonies which once were ours would still remain as before—outlets for the surplus of our population, markets wherein to exchange our manufactures; and all that we should have lost would be the privilege of waging wars for the benefit of the colonists, and the obligation of providing for their defence when we ourselves were at war.

The last Blue-book "respecting the affairs of South Africa" gives us in detail the narrative of events up to the outbreak of the war in the Transvaal, and a melancholy narrative it is of official blindness and incapacity. On the 29th November, a certain Mr. White moved a resolution in the Transvaal Legislative Assembly to the effect that it was expedient to grant representative institutions to the people of the Transvaal. In speaking on this resolution, a Mr. P. F. Marais spoke as follows:—

It must be fresh in the memory of numbers of the inhabitants of Pretoria what efforts were made at the very outset, and, since the annexation, first by Sir Theophilus Shepstone and subsequently by Sir Bartle Frere, and subsequently to that, again, Lord Kimberley remarked the very same thing, *that representative government was constantly offered to the people of this country, but they have most stubbornly refused to accept of it.* It must be perfectly fresh in the memory of members and people of the Transvaal, as I have said, how that Sir Bartle Frere went out to the Boer camp or meeting, when those composing it were assembled in great numbers, spoke to them, and represented matters to them in such a light as to make them accept of the boon of representative government. *He told them there distinctly, "Once submit to the inevitable—that is, to the British flag; do that, and then demand anything in reason, and it shall be granted to you." The reply of that assembly was, "We shall do nothing of the sort; we do not wish for one moment to converse upon representative institutions, or upon any improvement in the position of things, but we simply want 'our freedom.'"* . . . At the present moment, and indeed, ever since the day of the annexation, the opposition has been such that it is a moral impossibility to grant what the hon. member's motion now includes—that is, representative government.

Now here we have the statement of a member of the Transvaal Legislative Assembly, that never since the day of annexation have the Boers wavered for a moment in their hostility to the British annexation. They would receive nothing at our hands except the independence of which we had treacherously robbed them. Mr. Marais speaks of these things as so notorious that no inhabitant of the Transvaal would dream of either questioning or denying them. And yet a month later we find Sir W. O. Lanyon writing of the agitation among the Boers to the Colonial Secretary in this fashion:—

The term "people" in reality only represents an excited, clamouring crowd, which is not even a constituted part of an organized whole, and the Government would be strangely wrong were it to mistake their clamour for public opinion. It cannot agree that the dictum of a few agitators can be regarded as the organically evolved opinion of the people. There is no *vox populi*, for the phrase here means nothing but the despotic power of insinuating leaders.

It would be difficult to compress into a few lines a greater amount of blind arrogance than is compressed in the foregoing paragraph. The truth is that a military man entrusted with the conduct of civil affairs is as completely out of his proper element as a swan on a turnpike road. All his previous training renders him incapable of estimating the power of the currents of feeling which

surround him, but exceedingly quick to resent them. He governs in the narrow spirit of a military martinet, and regards all opposition as the work of rogues and scoundrels who ought to be shot as mutineers.

Sir G. Colley was as blind to the significance of what was going on around him as his brother *militaire* of the Transvaal. On the 13th December he writes to Lord Kimberley in the following airy and careless style respecting the progress of events in the Transvaal:—

There is little news from the Transvaal. The present agitation seems principally connected with the annual tax notices. . . . Although large armed gatherings have taken place, and a good deal of violent language has been used by the Boers, I still trust that we shall be able to avoid any collision, and that a patient but firm enforcement of the law will ultimately tire out these spasmodic efforts of disaffection.

There was, however, one man who saw clearly enough that which was hidden from the British officials all round. That man was Mr. Brand, President of the Orange Free State; and his warnings were treated with that contemptuous indifference which ordinarily befalls the warnings of those who have the misfortune to be wiser than their neighbours. On the 6th December he telegraphed to Sir George Strahan at Cape Town as follows:—

I read with very deep concern the account of the very serious aspect of affairs in the Transvaal. The gravity of the situation will, I hope, be accepted by your Excellency as an excuse for the liberty of asking your Excellency whether your Excellency will not devise some means by which a collision which seems imminent may be averted.

Sir George received this urgent appeal with imperturbable composure. He put it in an envelope and transmitted it *by post* to the Colonial Office in London. Lord Kimberley cannot be described as an energetic or powerful Colonial Secretary, but this leisurely procedure was too much even for his long-suffering disposition, and in a letter of January 1st, 1881, he records a plaintive remonstrance against it.

President Brand, meanwhile, not entirely disheartened by the dignified composure of Sir George Strahan, was knocking frantically at the doors of the London Colonial Office, in the hopes of awakening the illustrious inmates to a recognition of the fact that a fire had broken out on the premises. On January 11th, he telegraphs: "I think not a moment should be lost, and some one, say Chief Justice de Villiers of Cape Town, be sent to the Transvaal Burghers by the Government, with the view of stopping further collision, and with a clear and definite proposal for the settlement. Moments are precious." This appeal did not succeed in arousing Lord Kimberley, and a reply was sent couched in the unmeaning jargon of officialism. On the 16th President Brand renewed his attack. "The only way," he writes, "in which further bloodshed can be prevented is, in my opinion, that the British Government make a clear and distinct proposal to the Transvaal people without delay." This second appeal fell as powerless as the first. Lord Kimberley frankly avowed that he could think of nothing better to do than to repeat the unmeaning official jargon which he had elaborated a few days previously for the benefit of the President of the Orange Free State. President Brand, nothing daunted, made yet a third assault upon the fortresses of official torpor, and this time succeeded in awakening Lord Kimberley to a sense of the threatening reality. On the 26th January, that nobleman telegraphed to Sir Hercules Robinson that "if armed opposition should at once cease, Her Majesty's Government would thereupon endeavour to frame such a scheme as, in their belief, would satisfy all enlightened friends of the Transvaal community." Alas! it was too late. Two months almost had been wasted in the

exchange of telegrams before the Colonial Office could be roused to attempt anything more practical than the utterance of official jargon; and when this last telegram reached Capo Town, Sir George Colley was in the act of receiving his first beating at the hands of the despised Boer.

If the nation were wisely awake to its own interests, both present and in the future, it would insist upon a full inquiry into all the circumstances connected with the war in Afghanistan. At present, the facts are imbedded in such a jungle of false and misleading statements, that it is all but impossible to get hold of them. And these misleading statements never cease. A very remarkable addition to them was made by Lord Lytton in the House of Lords on the night of Tuesday, February 15th. The Duke of Argyll, a few nights previously, had alluded to certain well-known facts connected with Sir Lewis Pelly and the memorable Peshawur Conference—namely, the throwing a bridge of boats across the Indus, and the concentration of 30,000 men at Rawul Pindee, as if for an invasion of Afghanistan—and he asked what was the meaning of these menacing demonstrations. On Tuesday night, Lord Lytton described the whole story as “a myth.” There had been no bridge of boats, at least for the purpose surmised by the Duke, nor had there been any undue collection of troops. There had, it is true, been some talk of an expedition against some recalcitrant tribesmen in the Kohat Pass, but Lord Lytton had declined to agree to it, so as not to give any room for suspecting the peaceful disposition of Lord Beaconsfield’s Government. Now let the reader mark the actual facts. At the time referred to by Lord Lytton, Sir Lewis Pelly was engaged in negotiations at Peshawur with the Ameer’s Envoy, Synd Noor Mahommed, and simultaneously there was a great exhibition of military strength at Rawul Pindee. The *Pioneer*—the inspired newspaper organ of Lord Lytton’s Government—commented on the latter circumstance as follows:—

The great gathering of troops, transport, commissariat and medical stores, northwards, accomplished with most praiseworthy celerity and quietness, cannot but lead to much speculation. Whether Sir Lewis Pelly . . . is going into Kabul with a right royal escort, or whether, as Lord Warden of the Marches, he goes out to set a guard over the passes, or whether an independent expedition with some startling new and bold aim is to set forth, nobody knows, but everybody guesses.

Almost simultaneously with this inspired article, an inspired telegram was also sent to the newspapers to the following effect:—

The rumours telegraphed from Rawul Pindee are unfounded. No expedition has been determined on. . . . The military movements referred to simply denote preparedness in the present aspect of political affairs in Europe.

Now these extracts show how flagrantly opposed to the facts was Lord Lytton’s reply to the Duke of Argyll. Not only was there a large concentration of troops at Rawul Pindee, but it was ordered with special reference to Lord Beaconsfield’s anti-Russian policy at home. The fact is that the real purpose of Sir Lewis Pelly’s negotiations with the Ameer’s Envoy have never been officially revealed. But they are an “open secret” nevertheless. Their purport was to persuade the Ameer to ally his army with the 30,000 men gathered at Rawul Pindee. The combined armies were then to march through Afghanistan, and attack the Russians in Central Asia. Happily for the existence of our Indian Empire, the Ameer refused to become a party to this wild and nefarious project, and so the Peshawur Conference was abruptly broken off and Shere Ali “Boycotted;” but of the fact of the project there is no reasonable doubt. The

Simla Correspondent of the *Pioneer* thus referred to it at a subsequent period (28th August, 1878):—

I believe it is no longer a secret that, had war broken out, we should not have remained on the defensive in India. A force of 30,000 men, having purchased its way through Afghanistan, thrown rapidly into Samarkand and Bokhara, would have had little difficulty in beating the scattered Russians back to the Caspian.

On Friday, the 18th, the Duke of Argyll made his promised reply to Lord Lytton's statement, the gross inaccuracy of which we have exposed above. The *Times*, we perceive, represents this matter as merely a trifling personal dispute between the Duke and Lord Lytton; but this is as erroneous as are most of the statements regarding matters of fact which appear in these latter days in the columns of the *Times*. There is, absolutely, no matter of such tremendous national importance as the veracity of our leading politicians. Representative government, and indeed all government and all human relations whatsoever, are based upon a belief in the honour and truthfulness of those who undertake to conduct them. Now, our contention is, that Lord Lytton, by his conduct in India, has forfeited all claim to public confidence, because, either from constitutional habit or from deliberate intention—it is immaterial which—his public statements of fact never tally with the facts themselves; and the present controversy between him and the Duke of Argyll furnishes a very striking illustration of that painful characteristic of the late Indian Vice-Empress, or whatever may be his proper official designation. The question at issue we have already stated. It is whether or not a large force of British troops was drawn together at Rawul Pindee in December, 1876, and whether or not a bridge of boats was thrown across the Indus. Now, as regards the gathering of troops there never has been any question; for on June 15, 1877, when inquiries were made concerning it by the Duke of Argyll, the Marquis of Salisbury replied: "The troops were assembled without the slightest reference to any such demand" (*i.e.*, to force an Envoy upon the Ameer at Kabul). Clearly, then, the troops were assembled. Now, bearing the above fact in mind, let the reader attend to Lord Lytton's version of the occurrence. We have already given the substance of it; we now give it in his own words:—

'It appeared to me that at that time there was a very unfortunate but a very marked predisposition on the part of certain influential persons and parties in England to attribute upon any conceivable pretext to the Government of India certain bellicose propensities which they were certainly very far from entertaining towards neighbours very much more important than these tribes. Although in ordinary circumstances I should have regarded this proposed expedition as a very natural and very proper, and probably very efficacious measure, still, having regard to the whole situation, it appeared to me that it was not expedient for the Government of India at that time to sanction any military movements not absolutely indispensable, which might possibly have the effect of giving even the faintest pretext for those most deplorable and mischievous impressions with regard to our policy. At that time we were most anxious to avoid giving even the shadow of any thought of provocation to the ill-will of the Ameer of Kabul, who had previously assumed towards the Government of India an attitude very ambiguous, very sinister, and, short of actual hostilities, very hostile. At the same time the whole Eastern Question was under the consideration of a European Conference at Constantinople, the results of which we could not foresee or forereckon. That was my view of the measure upon which I had to give my decision; but before finally acting upon that view, at least in reference to this proposed expedition, I thought it desirable to defer my view to my military colleague, Sir Henry Norman, who had reached Calcutta with his other colleagues in Council. On the 3rd December, 1876, Sir Henry Norman wrote to me to say that he thought the three measures "will all be beneficial. Your lordship's resolution not to send a detachment to Thull, in the face of the advice to do so from

influential quarters, was, if I may venture to say so, admirable. But what is actually ordered is desirable, and can have no bad effect." So far from collecting a large army on our Afghan frontier, or any army at all, either at that time or any subsequent time until we were in open hostilities—forced upon us by the conduct of the Ameer—I, in the year referred to by the noble Duke, rescinded an order issued by the Punjab Government for the employment of troops in the enforcement of its blockade.

There is not a statement in this extract which is not in direct opposition to the truth. So far back as December, 1876, there was no "predisposition," either "marked" or otherwise, on the part of influential persons to "attribute to the Government of India bellicose propensities." We wish there had been; for then, not improbably, the war in Afghanistan would have been averted. The *Calcutta Statesman*, it is true, detected those "bellicose propensities," and warned its readers of what was preparing for India; but, with sorrow, we are bound to acknowledge that no influential persons paid any heed to our warnings; and Lord Lytton was allowed to pursue his nefarious projects undisturbed. Again, Lord Lytton says: "At that time we were most anxious to avoid giving even the shadow of any thought of provocation to the ill-will of the Ameer of Kabul." And yet at that very time a British Vakeel had been sent, and was then present at the Court of the Ameer, at Kabul, charged with this message to that sovereign—that he (the Ameer) was a pipkin between two iron pots, and that if he did not immediately agree to the propositions of the Indian Government, the two iron pots were prepared to come to an agreement to wipe him out of existence. Lastly, on the 6th December, 1876, Colonel Johnson sent the following official telegram to Calcutta, to the President in Council:—

Viceroy considers it highly desirable to have a flying column ready, in the event of war, to advance to Kurram, to give weight to any communications it may be necessary to make to the Ameer, and to be the advance column of such larger force as it may be necessary to send if war be declared. . . . Order equipment and carriage being prepared for earliest possible movement after declaration of war.

Now what is apparent on the face of this message? First, that "communications" were about to be made to the Ameer which it was considered advisable to support by a display of force; secondly, that even thus, these "communications" would be, it was surmised, so disagreeable to him that "a larger force" was to be got ready for immediate action when war was declared. There is not a word about troubles in the Kohat Pass, or expeditions against the Afreedees.

It is instructive to watch the pitiful wriggings of the late Viceroy when thus placed under the microscope of exact historical investigation. He now says: "I maintain and assert most positively that no movement of troops took place, no military preparations were made, and no military operations were undertaken which were not absolutely necessary for the defence of our frontiers." Of course not. But to say so much is, in fact, to admit all. The invasion of Afghanistan, and all that has come of it, has always been described by Lord Lytton and his brother conspirators as "military operations absolutely necessary for the defence of our frontiers." "If," Lord Lytton goes on to say, "the Government of India had undertaken such military preparations or operations, it would have been our imperative duty to lay our course of proceedings before Her Majesty's Government; but if the noble duke cannot find in the archives any report of such official proceedings, he might, I should think, have given to the late Government the credit of possessing sufficient common sense not to have provoked a quarrel with the late Ameer of Cabul at a time when there was very great reason to fear that the Ameer would be backed up by the whole power of

Russia." And yet, at this very time, our truthful and immaculate Vice-Empress was sending messages to the Ameer that Russia was prepared to unite with England in order to "wipe him out of the map altogether." The fact is that Lord Beaconsfield choss to appoint as Governor-General of India an intriguer who blunders miserably in the use of his own wretched instruments; and therefore it is that about once a month the nation is treated to the spectacle of Lord Lytton laboriously passing from one form of self-impalement to another. As to what was required by the obligations of duty and the dictates of common sense there can be no question; but the Indian administration of Lord Lytton was what it was because no liud was paid to either.

The remarks with which Lord Beaconsfield closed the dsbate desrrve a passing notice. Referring to the Duke of Argyll's statement that an invasion either of Afghanistan or Russia in Central Asia was intended, he says:—

It is curious that the foundation for the statement of the noble Duke that there was to be, or was, a great military force assembled here, was a telegram giving instructions from the Viceroy for the assembling of the troops and the necessary preparations.

Lord Beaconsfield is, of course, the best judge of Lord Lytton's character, and it is, we suppose, on the ground of this knowledge that he considers it so "curious" that the written "instructions" of his chosen Viceroy should be accepted as evidence of his actual intentions; but the author of "Endymion" has not yet done.

It is possible that the estimate of the noble Duke may be correct, and that this force may have amounted to 5,000 men—a terrific force to conquer Afghanistan, and to check and control Russia! . . . These immense preparations alone convict my friend the late Viceroy of all the dark designs so systematically attributed by the noble Duke.

The Tory peers wore vastly amused by this poor wit, but they might have rsmembered that the speaker did actually endeavour to "control Russia" by bringing 7,000 Sepoys to Malta—a proceeding so ridiculous, so destitute of common sense, that we will defy Lord Lytton or any other blunderer upon earth to surpass it. The immediate point at issue, we need hardly remind our readers, was not to convict Lord Lytton of any "dark designs," but of having made in Parliament, a few nights previously, a grossly inaccurate statoment; and this, there can be no question, was proved abundantly. Lord Beaconsfield concluded his remarks by expressing his assurance that "on every occasion when the Government of India under my noble friend is subjected to the inquiry and criticism of this House, there will be only one verdict—that of entire approbation of its policy." That is not to be disputed. We shall, indeed, have entered upon a new epoch in the history of humanity when a majority in the British House of Lords is arrayed on the side of the weak against the oppressor—against the robber, and not against him who is robbed.



The Statesman.

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EDITORIAL NOTES.

THE present issue of THE STATESMAN will close the first year's subscriptions to the journal. The nine monthly numbers, now completed, added to the fourteen weekly issues with which the publication was commenced, exhaust the first year's subscriptions to the paper, and subscribers will kindly, perhaps, take note of the fact. A good deal of regret was expressed at the time, at our discontinuance of the paper in a weekly form, but the belief has steadily grown upon its conductors that the purpose for which it was established, is more likely to be accomplished by THE STATESMAN in its present form, than in that in which it made its first appearance. We have never regretted, however, that the journal was at first published as a weekly paper, for, though precluded thereby from treating the great questions of our administration of India in the exhaustive form we desired, we were, on the other hand, enabled to speak with the necessary frequency, as well as earnestness, on the deep degradation into which British rule had been forced in India, under the Viceroyalty which, happily for both countries, was dragged down by the late Ministry in its own fall and ruin. We came home from India with the set purpose to pull that Government down, in so far as it was possible for us to affect the issue by determined and uncompromising exposuro of its wanton crime against the Afghan people, and its persistent and cynical indifference to the starvation, by millions, of the miserable subjects of our iron rule in that country. We have the satisfaction of knowing that the publication of THE STATESMAN gave a quick and very sensible shock to the opinions generally received in this country, as to the character and the effects of our rule in India. There has been but too often an absence of all morality in the conduct of the Calcutta Foreign Office, for years past, towards the Native Princes of India, while under Lord Lytton its course culminated in persistently fastening a quarrel upon the Afghan ruler, upon the lying pretence that he was intriguing against us as an enemy, and then invading the Afghan people upon the fresh pretext altogether, that the war was waged for the attainment of a "scientific frontier." Not one word was ever heard or whispered, in either country, of this need, until it was produced at the Lord Mayor's banquet by the Earl of Beaconsfield in November, 1878, weeks after our proclamation of war had been issued by his excellent Lieutenant, Lord Lytton. How little attention Indian affairs command in this country, was shown by the fact that it escaped observation that the need of "rectifying the frontier" was a pure after-thought, conceived in the brain of the false and hollow-hearted Minister who ruled the country, simply to give a semblance of justifying cause to the crime, weeks after the proclamation of war had been published to the world. That infamous Administration, with its unspeakable Parliament, are, happily, gone; but it will be remembered by the

nation long years to come, for the wide legacy of evil and embarrassment it has bequeathed to both countries: to England, the shame and guilt of wanton and ruinous war; to India, the bitter memory of the starvation of its people, upon a scale so vast as to defy imagination, and of a deficit in the accounts so huge that the shortest plumb-line measures it at £17,500,000 sterling, while the real chasm will not fall short of £40,000,000 deep. The guilty nightmare is at an end, and we rejoice that THE STATESMAN had something, however little, to do with awakening the nation from its uneasy sleep. We enter upon the second year of our life, with a Tory prosecution hanging over us for libelling one of Lord Lytton's instruments in India—the well-known Ameer-i-Kabeer, of Hyderabad, whom that nobleman has fastened round the neck of Sir Salar Jung, to assist him in the administration of the Nizam's territories. We have no fear of the results of this suit whatever; but, unfortunately, the defence will be very costly.

THE ex-Ministry appear at last to have awakened to the fact that the verdict of the constituencies at the last Election, was one of stern condemnation of their course. "We suffered," said Lord Cranbrook at Lincoln, the other day, "a great defeat. It is no use to conceal that fact; it is no use to minimise it. From some cause or other, the constituencies of this country gave a verdict against the late Administration. But I am glad to observe that there are living men to uphold the Conservative cause yet." The doings of the late Ministry were an outrage upon Conservatives and Liberals, alike. If ever men deserved impeachment in modern days, it was the leaders of that Ministry, for the scandalous immorality of their course, and the prevarications and open falsehoods with which they concealed what they were doing, from the nation. England has never seen a Ministry in modern days, upon which so deep a brand rests as the Cabinet of which Lord Cranbrook was a feeble member. Were he a man of much ability, fitted to cope in the Cabinet with colleagues such as the late Premier and the "truthful" Marquis, his guilt would be as deep as theirs; but he is a poor creature, and when the crime of the Afghan War was presented to him for his "endorsement," as Secretary of State for India, he gave it as a matter of course, because he had neither the ability nor sense of moral rectitude to refuse to participate in its guilt.

AND it is this feeble creature that is whining before the country, every few weeks, about that "mischievous man," Mr. Gladstone! And so we find him saying at Lincoln:—

With respect to the Land Laws, I should be prepared to treat any such laws which may be brought forward upon principles such as Lord Granville has laid down, when he said they should be founded upon some sound principles, and as Lord Hartington in his last speech stated, that they would be founded upon principles of justice. But how can it be expected that the Conservatives should give their confidence to the present Prime Minister—the present Prime Minister who has changed his opinions, not the opinions simply of youth, but the opinions of mature age, and who has become the leader of the Radical party, and combined himself with men who, if not in practice, admit themselves to be theoretically Republicans? If we are to have reforms of the institutions of this country, is it better that they should come from the friends of those institutions or from their enemies?

The University of Oxford may well be congratulated upon the elevation of Mr. Gathorne Hardy to the House of Peers. We were greatly struck a year or two ago, as we think every one must have been, by the appearance made by these two gentlemen respectively, at Convocation. The University rose as one man, to welcome with deafening plaudits its greatest man, while of Mr. Gathorne Hardy's presence no one seemed conscious. The bitter enmity with which the "small"

fry of the Conservative party—the Gorsts, the Chaplins, the Churchills, the Cranbrooks—follow the great statesman's footsteps, barking at his heels, while fawning upon Earl Granville and Lord Hartington, would make a very effective, if somewhat unpleasant, cartoon under Mr. Teniel's treatment of the subject. Mr. Gladstone is a Republican and a traitor, we all know; for we have Mr. Gathorne Hardy's assurance of the fact. He himself indeed, would be a follower of Earl Granville and Lord Hartington, but for their companionship with Mr. Gladstone! Is it that Lord Cranbrook has become conscious of the guilt into which Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury led him as Minister for India? History has put its brand upon him, for weakly permitting these men to betray the nation into the guilt and shame of the second Afghan War; and no diversion of the infamy will be possible, while our generation retains the memory of the crime. Mr. Gladstone would have cut off his right hand, ere he had incurred the guilt into which this poor, newly-made peer plunged—out of gratitude, we presume, to those who had elevated him into a position which nothing but party necessities could even account for.

THE *Times* and *Daily News* comment with deserved severity on the conduct of Lord Lytton's government, in concealing from the nation the real cost of the Afghan War:—

Lord Hartington in a trenchant despatch reminds the Indian Government of Sir John Strachey's assurance that "the estimates had been prepared with much care," and that there was "no reason to suppose that they err on the side of being too low;" and that Lord Lytton had said that "so far as it has hitherto been possible to verify them," the estimates had proved to be remarkably accurate. Lord Hartington examines these statements, discusses what the possibilities of verifying them were, and shows that the most ordinary precautions were not taken. He comes to the conclusion that the Government at home were seriously misled, not only as to the amount of the expenditure, "but as to the care and attention the estimates had received before sanction, by language that could not fail to have the effect of allaying any suspicion of error." The complete exposure of the incapacity and recklessness of the late Viceroyalty which Lord Hartington makes is, however, a more severe rebuke than that which is conveyed in his actual words. It has, fortunately, never before been needful that such an exposure should be written since the transfer of the Government of India to the Crown. Lord Hartington's despatch expresses the judgment of contemporaries and the verdict of history on Lord Lytton's Viceroyalty.

And the nation, unfortunately, can do no more; but if ever men, we say, deserved impeachment, it is the men who betrayed the nation into this guilty war. The point we would make, however, is this—that the deception practised upon the nation as to the cost of the war, is but of a piece with all that comes from India, whenever the reputation of its government is concerned. A conventional, untrue, optimistic colouring is given to every report that comes home, concerning the country. The Native Princes are full of loyalty, the people are full of contentment, the blessings of British rule are more and more appreciated year by year:—and so on from one year's end to another. A true description of things as they really are, is unknown.

THE refusal to allow Telephone Exchanges to be established in India, is deserving of strong reprobation. The Government itself, will never establish such Exchanges, nor is it desirable that it should. So successful, we suppose, has it been with the Telegraph Service, and with the State Railways, that it is now considered desirable that it should take this new and special enterprise upon itself. It has spent £7,000,000 or £8,000,000 sterling upon the telegraph lines of India, which are as far off from paying now, we fear, as they ever were. Not a railway has

the Government constructed in any part of India that has not been so costly, and is not so ill-managed, as to make all hope of its paying impossible. So conscious is the Government itself, of its inability to conduct such enterprises with the skill and economy which alone can ensure success, that, in buying up the East Indian Railway, it has not ventured to undertake to work it, but has created a private Company to do what itself cannot. Instead of undertaking telephone works in the country, it should make over the telegraphs of India to the conduct of a private Company, who would make the service pay, within a year. We cannot speak too strongly our sense of the unwisdom of the course that is being followed. You can introduce no enterprise into India, under governmental conduct, that will pay: and for this reason, that every such enterprise degenerates into the creation of a mere preserve for a number of highly-paid European appointments. The two private Companies which have sent agents and experts to India to establish Telephone Exchanges there, are paying the staff they have engaged, salaries less than one-third of what the India Office would have regarded as necessary. And the same extravagance runs through and pervades the entire system of Indian administration. The Bureaucracy are ready to undertake anything and everything, because a new department means a number of highly-paid appointments, while the stimulus of self-interest in the work having no existence, there is no motive for economy, and no sense of responsibility for financial results. A *cheap* railway in India is impossible, under State construction and State management. We could tell a story under this head, that would make men's ears tingle to hear it. And now we are to have a great Telephone department, in addition to the costly, because mismanaged, Postal, Telegraphic, and Railway monopolies. If Lord Hartington is well advised, he will stop all discussion of the subject, and send out explicit orders to the Administration to interfere with the Telephone Companies in no way, stipulating only for a reasonable control of the setting up and direction of the wires, leaving the question of Royalties or licences to solve itself by-and-by. The Indian Government fails uniformly in what it attempts to do, because it can do nothing with real economy, and in the present case it is simply "the dog in the manger." It cannot establish Telephone Exchanges itself, and refuses to allow private enterprise to do so, lest it should lose some possible profit in the future, from an invention to which it has contributed nothing, while greedily determined, if it can, to monopolize the profits which the inventors themselves are willing to share with the entire world.

THE heart of the long debate on the Coercion Bill, is contained in an extract or two from the speeches delivered on the night of its introduction. Describing the lawlessness and reign of terror that necessitate the Bill, Mr. Forster said:—

The men who have planned and perpetrated the outrages to which I have referred are the men without whose help the speeches of the hon. members for the city of Cork, for Tipperary, and for Cavan would be mere harmless exhortations and vapouring. (Cheers.) It is these men who have struck terror into the hearts of the districts in which their operations have been carried on, and we must strike terror into them—(loud cheers)—in order that outrage may be stopped, persons and property may be protected, and liberty may be secured. (Renewed cheering.) We must arrest these criminals. (Hear, hear.) We cannot do it now, because these criminals have made themselves safe by the enormity of their crimes, and the power which those crimes have enabled them to acquire. They knew that they would be perfectly foolish to fear the law when no man dared to appear and give evidence against them. Did not the police know the names of these village tyrants? (Hear, hear.) Of course the police knew them, and they themselves were perfectly aware of the fact. (Hear, hear.) These men may, I think, be divided into three categories. There are, first, those who remain of the old Ribard and other secret societies of former days; in the second place, there are a

large number of Fenians who have taken advantage of the present state of affairs, not so much as caring about the land as in order to promote their own particular views in regard to the political situation in Ireland; and in the third, there are a large number of men who are the *mauvais sujets* of their neighbourhood. (Hear, hear.) So it not infrequently happens that the most powerful man in a particular district is a contemptible, dissolute ruffian and blackguard, who, his character being known by all his neighbours, is shunned by them all, but who nevertheless acts as the powerful and active policeman for the execution of the unwritten law. (Loud cheers.) To what, then, are we driven? Simply to this, to take power to arrest these men and keep them in prison in order that they may be prevented from tyrannizing over their neighbours. (Hear, hear.)

Now it is noteworthy, that Mr. Justin McCarthy, while opposing the Bill, distinctly allows this account of the state of matters to be true. He says:—

Never before were agrarian contest and controversy carried on with less serious outrage, less tendency to crime, and such disposition to resort to open combination, as distinct from honourable combination. Those on that side of the House were as much opposed to outrages as the right hon. gentleman himself. They had never failed to reprobate those outrages, but they knew that the intelligent and respectable farmers they [the Land League] addressed had nothing to do with them, and had no control, direct or indirect, over them. Those outrages were the work of the scum and residuum that belonged to every movement, who, like cowardly assassins, sought to avenge their private wrongs under the guise of belonging to the Land League.

Suppose we admit that it is so, and, for the sake of argument, grant Mr. McCarthy that it is not the Land League that has incited these ruffians to a course of outrage so congenial to them, the fact remains that the crime exists, and that the Government is bound to put it down with a strong hand.

THE speech of the evening, however, seems to have been that of Mr. Dillon, if we may judge from the reports; and so important does it appear to ourselves, that we make no apology for an extract from it:—

The right hon. gentleman had told them that outrages had enormously increased in the last three months, and that the area in which the Land League reigned had enormously increased. But the right hon. gentleman had not told the House why this was so. There was no child in Ireland that could not tell the reason. Before the reaping of the harvest quiet prevailed, because there was nothing to fight for; but, as soon as the harvest was reaped, the struggle for life and death began, the question being whether it should go to pay arrears of rent, or whether it should be used as food by the people. The people believed that the Government had handed them over to another famine. There were thousands upon thousands of families who, if the law had taken its course, would have been left, as they were last year, to depend upon the charity of foreign nations after the payment of their rents. He was proud to think he was one of the "miscreants," who had had something to do with the failure of the law to run its course.

It is impossible not to feel the force of this statement. The contemptuous rejection by the Lords, of the Government Bill, for staying "evictions" during the continuance of the distress, was the immediate and foretold occasion of the Home Rulers throwing the whole force of their agitation into the Land League movement, with the result of placing the sympathies of almost the whole country on the side of Mr. Parnell and his following. Never did the House of Lords use its power more mischievously than under the Earl of Beaconsfield's guidance in the closing days of the last session. At the advice of their Mephistophelian guide, the House was persuaded to throw its influence, at a very critical moment, into the scale of the Home Rulers, who dreaded beyond all else the passing of a Bill that would have spoiled their autumn campaign of agitation. The Earl of Beaconsfield's advice was followed by the Peers, and the consequence is that they have banded all Ireland together with the Home Rulers, by the force of their

common sympathy upon the Land Question. We quote Mr. Dillon once more :—

Was the House aware that Unitarian ministers, Presbyterian ministers, Dissenting Methodists, and thousands of Catholic priests were enrolled in the Land League? Surely it could not be seriously maintained that the priesthood of Ireland had deliberately lent their names to establish what was called a reign of dissolute ruffianism? Fully one-half of the Catholic priesthood of Ireland were enrolled among the members of the League. Moreover, three-fourths of the Irish bishops had given assurances of their warm approval of the movement, while most of the other prelates had stated that they encouraged it. . . . It was not only the people but the priesthood of Ireland, that the Government would have to encounter. If the priests deserted the people of that country now, the Church of Rome would receive the heaviest blow that had ever been struck at it. (Loud cheers from the Home Rule benches.) He was satisfied that in Tipperary the priesthood would become much more extreme in their views if this coercive measure were passed. The Archbishop of Cashel was one of the most ardent Home Rulers in Ireland. (Cheers.) And if this Bill were passed he would place himself at the head of the Land League of Ireland. (Cheers.) The Government would hesitate before they placed themselves in such a position that they must arrest half the priesthood of Ireland, or must subject themselves to the derision of Europe. If he was not very much mistaken, the Government would have a very great number of Presbyterian ministers also to deal with.

The statement, we fear, is but too true. The House of Lords, by its conduct last session, has made all Ireland followers of Mr. Parnell, and, more or less, Home Rulers, while there is a very natural and instinctive distrust amongst all classes in England, of what Home Rule, in the mouth of Mr. Parnell, really means. Mr. Davey expressed the general feeling in this country, we believe, very exactly when he said :—

He thought the right hon. gentleman had made out this, that there was an organization in Ireland which set itself up against and above the ordinary law, and which the ordinary laws were unable to reach—firstly, because you could not get witnesses to give evidence; and secondly, because you could not get juries to convict. That being so, we had this further circumstance, that this state of things was the result of a league, a formidable and remarkable organization—an organization of the most widespread character, and directed by men of determination and ability. The impression left upon his mind by what he had read and what he had heard in and out of that House was that the ultimate object of the leaders of that organization was not to reform the land laws, but to repeal in some form the Union. (Hear.) That being so, should they play into the hands of the leaders of the Land League? He answered, No. He preferred to place his confidence in the Minister; and he asked members on the Liberal side of the House to place their confidence in him whom they had helped to place in power.

Now, in this utterance of an Irish Protestant gentleman and member of the House we may recognize, if we please, the position into which the Earl of Beaconsfield has plunged us, by the ascendancy he has obtained over the landed classes, from his purely Mephistophelian advocacy of privileges and abuses, that would long since have been swept away, but for the astonishing cleverness—for it does not deserve the name of “ability”—by which he has contrived to stay reform. He has made all Ireland, priest and people alike, Home Rulers and followers of Mr. Parnell, rather than the landlords should be deprived of the power of evicting tenants from their homesteads, penniless and without compensation. It has been given to few men to work such evil in their generation as to this unhappy man, whose talents have served but to raise him from one position to another, in which his influence for evil has grown with every step. The state of Ireland has now “cowed” him for a while, but he will still do everything in his power to prevent the coming Land Bill being more than a mockery of the situation.

LORD LYTTON'S VINDICATION.

ON Monday, 10th January, Lord Lytton rose in the House of Lords to "call the attention of the House to affairs in Afghanistan, and to make a personal statement with reference to his own action as Viceroy of India in regard to the late Afghan War." The pre-announcement of Lord Lytton's intention had excited considerable curiosity. That Lord Lytton could, at this eleventh hour, clear his character of the charges that have been brought against it was, of course, out of the question. Those charges rest, not upon the evidence of enemies, but upon the official reports put forward either by himself or other persons in office under him. If their authenticity could have been overthrown or even shaken, the counter-evidence would certainly have been produced before the Government ventured to appeal to the country at the late General Election; for there can be no question that none of all the many crimes they committed contributed so much to their overthrow as the war in Afghanistan. The ignorance, the blindness and folly which characterised the conduct of this war—great as these were—were felt to be as nothing compared with the trickery, the bad faith, the bullying and prevarication which were employed in order to manufacture even the semblance of a *casus belli*. Remembering all these things, the curiosity was, naturally, keen when it was known that Lord Lytton intended to attempt a personal vindication. It was the certain impossibility of the achievement which gave it interest in the endeavour. Public curiosity, however, was doomed to be disappointed. In his speech to the House Lord Lytton made no attempt to vindicate his character from the charges which have been brought against it. He recognized the impossibility of the task, and allowed judgment to pass by default. His speech was exclusively devoted to a protest against the abandonment of Kandahar. But, as we shall show, it was impossible for Lord Lytton to deliver even this protest without self-stultification. So contradictory have been the statements made at different times by Lord Lytton and the late Ministers concerning the objects and

origin of the Afghan War, that the utmost they can now do is to shift the scene of their self-impalement from one horn of the dilemma to the other. For example, in insisting upon the retention of Kandahar as essential to the safety of India, they destroy their reiterated assertion that "the Scientific Frontier" of the Treaty of Gundamuck rendered India absolutely "impregnable." The "Scientific Frontier" has indeed gone the way of the Anglo-Turkish Convention, and other great achievements of the late Government. There is "none so poor to do it reverence," and neither Lord Lytton nor any other of the Tory speakers thought it worth while to produce this detected imposture as one of the results of the Afghan War which had been given up by their successors. Not a speaker ventured so much as to allude to it. The debate had reference to nothing but the retention of Kandahar, as if the war had never had any other object, or as if the speakers had not themselves caused Kandahar to be evacuated after British troops had been in possession of it. Lord Lytton's speech, however, has this much of interest and importance, that we may assume that all which can be urged in favour of retaining Kandahar is to be found in it; and it is on this account that we propose to pass in review the statements and arguments which it contains.

"The effect," said Lord Lytton, (of the abandonment of Kandahar) "in India will be this—in every Native bazaar, along every frontier, from one end to the other of Asia, it will have the effect of displaying to Her Majesty's Indian subjects, and feudatories and neighbours, the unaccustomed and bewildering spectacle of the most violent and altogether inexplicable oscillation in the policy of their rulers. If I know anything of Indian character, I say the effect of the spectacle will certainly not be conducive to their respect for the sobriety and steadiness of our will, or confidence in the certainty of our wisdom, or belief in the value of our word."

Mark the solid foundation on which this argument is made to rest. No attempt is made to show the utility of Kandahar for either military or any other purposes, but its retention is urged on the ground that withdrawal will present an "unaccustomed and bewildering spectacle" to the Native bazaars from one end of Asia to the other. This is a fair example of the childish and irrelevant considerations which gentlemen of the "Forward" school introduce in discussing matters of strictly practical import. Even if there were any means—which there are not—of ascertaining what is "bewildering and inexplicable" to the bazaars of Asia, could any

British statesman allow the policy of the Empire to be shaped by such a fantastic consideration? But Lord Lytton has another argument with which to fortify the preceding one. If he "knows anything of Indian character," our withdrawal from Kandahar will lower our character for sobriety, wisdom, and fidelity to our word. The obvious reply to this remark is that there is not the least reason to suppose that Lord Lytton knows anything of the Indian character, while many reasons might be adduced to show that he is altogether ignorant of it. The argument, however, has been used for the same purpose by others as well as Lord Lytton, and there is a very effective reply to it. The argument is good for nothing except upon the assumption that all the variations in our attitude towards Afghanistan have been followed by the Natives of India with equal interest and attention; otherwise, one particular variation would not affect them more than any other. And if so, their "confidence in the certainty of our wisdom, or belief in the value of our word," must long ago have been completely destroyed by the actions and policy of Lord Lytton and Sir John Strachey. Why, this very war could not be commenced until we had violated pledges to the Ameer Shere Ali which the Government of India had repeatedly vowed to observe. To make out a *casus belli*, calumnies, which were known throughout India to be calumnies, had to be fabricated against Shere Ali, and propagated by the Government of India itself. When, finally, we took the field, the Government of India issued a proclamation, declaring that it had no thought of territorial aggrandizement—that it made war, not against the chiefs and people of Afghanistan, but against Shere Ali alone. Whatever other arguments there may be in favour of retaining Kandahar, there can be no question that we ought to abandon it as soon as possible, if we desire to preserve in "the bazaars of Asia" any "confidence in the certainty of Lord Lytton's wisdom," or any "belief in the value of his word."

• Leaving the "bazaars of Asia," Lord Lytton then proceeded to estimate the effect upon English feeling of the surrender of Kandahar to its natural possessors. "Obviously, it will be—I will not say to cast upon the late Government, for I do not believe it possible—but to advertise to the whole country the deliberate intention and eager desire of the present Government to cast upon their predecessors in office the unmerited odium of having involved India in a great and costly war, leading to no appreciable result or adequate benefit to the permanent security and welfare of the empire." We are, then, to retain Kandahar, not because it is useful or necessary to do so, but because an opposite policy will involve the late Govern-

ment in "the odium of having involved India in a great and costly war, leading to no appreciable result." Lord Lytton, without intending it, has here disclosed the veritable motive which impels the "Forward" school to desire so eagerly to retain a grip of Kandahar. They cannot but see that every prediction which they made concerning Afghanistan has been falsified by the result. They said the war would be brief and inexpensive; it has been long and costly beyond all precedent. They said the Afghans would receive our soldiers as friends and deliverers; the Afghans received them with an indomitable resolution never to lay down their arms until the invader was expelled. They staked their wisdom that a British Resident would be as safe in Kabul as he would be in Calcutta; and the result was that a British Resident was killed three months after his arrival in that city. They said that their profound knowledge of the Afghan character left no room to doubt that in Kandahar, at least, there was a sincere desire among the people to participate in the blessings of British rule; and the defeats of Maiwand and Doli-i-Kwajeh, and the blockade of Kandahar, have demonstrated the worthlessness of this "profound knowledge." So now they stand, Lord Lytton and all other gentlemen of the "Forward" school, not merely disgraced and discredited prophets, but with a weight of blood-guiltiness upon them which in their hours of solitude cannot be a pleasant subject of contemplation. Escape from this they cannot; but if, by hook or by crook, they can persuade the nation to retain Kandahar, they make it a participant in their own guilt and folly. If the nation consent to share in the wages of dishonour, it is plain that it can no longer point the finger of scorn at those who originally earned them. For ourselves, we need not say that we consider this consequence alone is more than sufficient to justify a decision against the retention of Kandahar.

At this point in his "personal explanation," Lord Lytton branched off into a digression, the relevancy of which it is impossible to discover. It purported to be a narrative of Russian intrigues in Afghanistan culminating in the appearance of a Russian Mission in Kabul. There never having been any Russian intrigues in Afghanistan, Lord Lytton's narrative was a romance of his own inventing, except in the single circumstance that a Russian Mission did make its way to Kabul. Lord Lytton speaks of the advent of this Mission as the "immediate occasion of the war." In saying this he states what is notoriously contrary to the fact. The (alleged) occasion of the war was the refusal of the Ameer to receive a similar Mission from the Government of India; but, as most people

are aware, this allegation was a shameful deception, the Ameer being willing and even anxious to receive a British Mission, and the statement that he would not being a fiction.

Having completed this digression, Lord Lytton went on to say that to exclude Russian influence from Afghanistan must be the primary object of every Indian Viceroy. The most obvious plan for effecting this was, he said, the establishment of a British Envoy at Kabul; but (as Lord Lytton was reluctantly bound to admit) it had been tried and failed. It was merely "an experiment," and now it seemed to the noble lord that there was nothing left but to try a second "experiment"—that of annexing Kandahar to the Indian Empire. "The question of Kandahar" (said Lord Lytton) "does not stand alone; beyond Kandahar is Herat, and beyond Herat is Merv. . . . If I may express my own opinion about Herat, I may say that I have always thought its importance rather relative, because if you are firmly established at Kandahar you can contemplate what goes on at Herat with comparative indifference." These remarks (though Lord Lytton does not seem aware of the fact) amount to a very emphatic condemnation of Lord Lytton's own policy. He here affirms Kandahar to be the key of the entire Afghan problem. Occupy that place, and we may regard with indifference the events occurring in the neighbourhood of Herat. And yet, when Lord Lytton had the opportunity of doing what he now urges upon the present Government, he left it undone, preferring in its stead to check the Russian advance by the ingenious "experiment" of planting an undefended British Envoy in the most turbulent and fanatical city of Asia. But look at this proposition in another light. We had a force planted in Kandahar; and this force, after suffering a signal defeat, was blockaded in the citadel of that town by an Afghan force from Herat. And yet, immediately upon the heels of these events, we have a late Indian Viceroy assuring us that if only we garrison Kandahar, we may regard with "comparative indifference" what is going on at Herat. To do the "Forward" school justice, Lord Lytton, so far as we know, stands alone in this preposterous contention. With Sir Henry Rawlinson and others, the retention of Kandahar is advocated simply as an advanced post, whence we are to march into Central Asia as soon (according to the calculations of Sir Henry Rawlinson) as the Russians make their appearance at a place called Abiverd. People who have not paid much attention to the subject are frequently under the impression that the proposals of the "Forward" school are made with the purpose of averting a collision with Russia. Actually, they are made in order to precipitate such a collision. That some day or

other we shall have to contend with Russia for the rulership of India these gentlemen hold as a political axiom requiring no proof beyond its statement; but they have also, by some occult process unintelligible to the ordinary mind, convinced themselves that we shall fight at a great advantage if we place the deserts and hills and wild people of Afghanistan behind us, instead of retaining them before us, as an almost insurmountable obstacle which an invader must penetrate in order to reach India at all. In truth, the policy of the "Forward" school with regard to Afghanistan might, with far greater reason and consistency, be advocated by their opponents than by themselves; for it stands to reason that a Russian attack upon India is facilitated as the distance between the two empires is diminished. But, according to these gentlemen, the opposite process is the true one, so that, when actual contiguity is obtained, the possibility of invasion altogether disappears.

These are, literally, all the arguments which Lord Lytton, in a long speech, could find to urge against the abandonment of Kandahar. They amount to three in number. First, the abandonment of Kandahar will be "bewildering and inexplicable" to "the bazaars of Asia." Secondly, it may bring upon the late Government the odium of having involved India in a costly and useless war. Thirdly, the occupation of Kandahar will enable us to regard with "comparative indifference" the events going on in the neighbourhood of Herat. Of these, only the last can be considered as an argument having even the semblance of practical value. It is directly in the teeth of our recent experiences; but even were it otherwise, could there be a more complete *reductio ad absurdum* than it amounts to? We are to garrison Kandahar in order to bring about a mental state of "comparative indifference." What is "comparative indifference"?

THOMAS GRAHAM, LORD LYNEDOCH.

THIS volume* contains upwards of 800 pages, and bears, externally, the semblance of a book. But the luckless reader who attempts to peruse it, very soon discovers that a backgammon board, lettered and painted so as to represent a "History of England," bears about the same relation to a veritable history as this volume to a veritable biography. The author has had a large quantity of materials placed at his disposal, but he has simply "shot" these into a common receptacle, and dubbed the result of this achievement a "Life of Lord Lynedoch." General Graham was the most able and distinguished of Lord Wellington's subordinate generals; and he had a wide and varied experience of war in other fields than the Spanish peninsula. Added to all this he was, as a man, of a singularly fascinating and attractive character, kindling the friendship and admiration of all with whom he came in contact. A better subject for an interesting biography it would be difficult to find, and had the work been undertaken in an understanding spirit, such a biography might have been made an important contribution to modern history. For the life of some worthy who has just quitted this mortal scene, it is enough to publish his letters, diaries, and such like autobiographic reminiscences; but for the life of one removed to some distance in the past, this method does not suffice. A great part of such reminiscences has been lost; and the mere publication of those which remain is not enough to bring the man and his surroundings before us. What is required from one who undertakes to write the life of one of these ancient worthies, is that he should endeavour to find out from the literature of the period how his hero was regarded by his contemporaries. For example, the Peninsular war has left behind it a vast quantity of autobiographic literature of all kinds—memoirs, letters, lives, personal adventures and so forth, and out of these a very full and interesting portrait of General Graham might have been constructed. Captain Delavoye has made no attempt at constructing such a por-

* *Life of Thomas Graham, Lord Lynedoch.* By Alex. M. Delavoye, Captain, 53th Foot (late 90th L.I.). London: Richardson and Co. 1880.

trait. He has simply bound up in a single volume all the materials entrusted to his care, with no attempt at compression, with hardly a word of elucidation; and the result is that after wading through his 800 and odd pages we know hardly anything more of his hero than we knew already from Napier's "Peninsular War." The book, however, traverses a series of events which, under the dullest method of treatment, cannot fail to be interesting, and it is not a little instructive to compare these military worthies of a past day with our modern heroes of Coomassie, Magdala, and Baba Wali Kotal. Such a comparison shows how completely, in matters military, the present generation of Englishmen have lost all sense of proportion, and what trifling affairs are now magnified into achievements of the first magnitude.

General Graham's military career is peculiar in this, that he did not enter the army till he was past the age of forty. A Scotch gentleman of good means, he had until he reached this mature age, been content to represent his native county, Perth, in the House of Commons, and to devote the rest of his time to field sports and the management of his estates. It was the death of a beautiful and dearly loved wife that first turned his mind to that more stirring life in which he afterwards won so much distinction. Home and country became alike distasteful to him from the melancholy recollections they awakened. The great revolutionary wars were then convulsing Europe, and he hoped to find distraction from his melancholy by becoming a spectator of, and participator in, some of these exciting events. Even then, he had no thought of becoming a soldier. It was merely as a sightseer that he proposed to accompany a British force operating in the field. He went to Toulon, which was at that time held by a British garrison, supported by a British fleet, and which was being besieged by the French Republican army. This was in the year 1793. "On the 6th September," writes Graham, "Lord Mulgrave, who had been with the Piedmontese army in Savoy, arrived here to take command of the troops employed in the defence of Toulon. . . . Lord Mulgrave very kindly offered me an apartment in his quarters in Toulon, requesting at the same time that I should assist him as a volunteer A.-D.-C." In this singular capacity, the General that was to be, rendered very signal services in the defence of the place. The special characteristic of his military genius appears to have been the flashing clearness with which he could discern the right moment to strike an enemy, and the lightning-like swiftness with which he then struck. These attributes enabled him to give such advice at a critical moment to a superior officer, that a very formidable attack on the defences of

Toulon was completely defeated, when an opposite result seemed all but inevitable. This event determined Mr. Graham to embrace a military career. In an account of the incidents of that day, he writes :—

I shall not, I am sure, be accused of fanfaronade, when I solemnly assert that at no subsequent period of my military career did I ever see with more accurate and cool discrimination the moment when a forward movement on our part was imperiously called for in order to prevent the certain disaster that must have followed the repulse of Admiral Gravina's column, which I have no doubt would have happened but for our well-timed attack on the right of the enemy's line. . . I am satisfied myself that by the experience of this day I might not unreasonably hope, even at an unusually advanced period of life for entering on a new profession, to be able to serve with credit and distinction, having ascertained that the natural turn for accurate observation of ground fostered by a constant enjoyment of field sports, would give the advantage which many who had entered the service at a very early age never could possess.

The British Government at that time was sorely in lack of troops to carry on the war against the French Republic. And it was customary to allow gentlemen of rank and position to raise regiments for the British army, such gentlemen being allowed the privilege of commanding them during the continuance of the war for which they had been raised. Graham applied and received permission to raise a regiment; and as he worked with immense zeal and assiduity, not many months had elapsed before his regiment became a component part of the British army, and was numbered the 90th Light Infantry. It was early in the spring of 1794 that he obtained the necessary authority from Lord Amherst, then Commander-in-Chief, to raise the regiment, and he commenced operations in March of the same year. "By means of great personal exertion in going about through the great manufacturing towns in England, and thus stimulating the parties to carry on the levy with the utmost activity, and without regard to expense," he was able to ask the Commander-in-Chief in Scotland to name the 13th May for the first inspection of the regiment at Perth. Eight hundred men had by that time been embodied. For the next year or two the regiment was either employed upon services of trifling importance or garrisoned at Gibraltar. . . But during this time Colonel Graham found himself confronted with a difficulty which threatened to cut short his military career. The colonels of these newly-raised regiments had, as I have said above, temporary rank only. So urgent, however, was the need of the Government for officers to make good the waste of war, that special facilities were provided to enable these temporary colonels to convert themselves into permanent officers. At a very small

expense, they could, if they so pleased, purchase their way through all the inferior grades, and thus be brought upon the establishment as lieutenant-colonels, in virtue of regular promotion. Having no thought that these privileges were in danger of withdrawal, Lieutenant-Colonel Graham neglected to avail himself of them. In 1795 the Duke of York became Commander-in-Chief, and almost his first act was to abolish them altogether. His refusal to make an exception in favour of Colonel Graham appears to have been prompted almost as much by the Whiggism of that officer as from any inflexible regard for the rules he had himself laid down. In consequence of this resolution on the part of the Duke of York, Colonel Graham's military career would have terminated at the Peace of Amiens, but for a fortunate ambiguity in the phraseology of the letter of service which empowered him to raise the regiment. And after the rupture of that peace his services were of so distinguished a character that it became impossible to withhold a permanent rank from him.

In 1796 the young Napoleon was electrifying Europe with the brilliant exploits of his first Italian campaigns. Colonel Graham was selected by Lord Grenville, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to proceed on a military mission to the headquarters of the Austrian army opposed to Napoleon. He arrived there shortly before General Beaulieu was superseded in his command by Wurmser, and was present with the Austrian army in all the subsequent operations for the relief of Mantua. He gives a very interesting account of these operations, which terminated—as all the world knows—not in the relief of Mantua, but in the relieving army, after having sustained a series of defeats which destroyed more than half its strength, being itself blockaded in the town it had attempted to relieve. Colonel Graham gives a vivid account of the sufferings of the blockaded garrison :—

The additional numbers soon exhausted the small stock of cattle, and it was found necessary very soon to reserve for the use of the hospitals all that remained of fresh beef or of wine, the army only then receiving bread as their rations. It was soon evident that the quantity of forage was very inadequate to the support of such a great number of horses. An inspection, therefore, took place twice a week, and all those horses that seemed sinking under the scanty allowance of hay, were condemned to be slaughtered, and a distribution of a quarter of a pound of horseflesh was daily made to all those soldiers who chose to accept of it. Many at first declined, and particularly the corps of artillery, but by degrees all became willing competitors for the allowance. Meanwhile the want of hospital stores, and particularly of bark, increased the mortality to an alarming degree; some days the deaths accumulated to 150, and were scarcely ever under half that number. So few men sent into hospital ever rejoined their corps, that at last the

soldiers actually died at their posts, having preferred concealment of their complaints, in order to avoid being condemned to go into hospital, which they considered as a warrant of death. In this melancholy state of affairs the spirits of all were much depressed, and the greatest impatience prevailed to hear of some attempt being made for the relief of this most important fortress.

Winter, however, set in, without any intelligence being received respecting the movements of a relieving army; and Colonel Graham determined to effect his escape alone from the beleaguered city, which he accomplished successfully on Christmas night, 1796. He immediately repaired to Bassano, where General Alvintzy was at work maturing his arrangements for the relief of Mantua. The accounts of that place brought by Colonel Graham showed that no time was to be lost if the city was not to pass into the possession of the French. Colonel Graham accompanied this last endeavour to effect the relief of Mantua; and was present at the crushing defeat of the Austrians at Rivoli, which cut off all hope of deliverance from the garrison in Mantua. But of his experiences during this eventful campaign, his biographer gives us nothing beyond what is contained in a single brief letter to his brother:—

I am [writes Colonel Graham, two days after this battle had been fought] *crêvé* with disappointment, mortification, and fatigue, and after the volume I have written to Lord Grenville, I can only tell you that with half our army we had beaten B. Parte, and must have destroyed him with the other half, but for the damnable stupidity of our generals, and the disgraceful and unaccountable terror that seized our men, and though this singular opportunity was lost, we should not have been so shamefully licked at last, had any decision been taken in time.

The battle of Rivoli was followed, after a brief period, by the peace of Campo Formio, and in the summer of 1797 Colonel Graham returned to England, his mission having ended with the end of the war. Such were his earliest experiences of war, and it is not strange, having been educated in such a school, that he became a proficient in the art. It was a period fruitful of great generals, and therefore a period fraught with incalculable misery to the human race. Military glory is a flower which has to be watered with blood and tears in order to make it flourish.

Though obstinately refusing to grant him permanent rank in the army, the British Government recognized too clearly the value of Colonel Graham's services not to make use of them to the uttermost, and he was employed, in quick succession, in a variety of difficult and delicate operations, in all of which he acquitted himself with singular distinction. But to enumerate these would require more space than is at our disposal. We pass, therefore, to the next

operation of first-rate importance in which he was engaged. He was Aide-de-Camp to Sir John Moore in the Spanish campaign which terminated at Corunna, and cost the British nation the life of one of her greatest soldiers. Sir John Moore, regarded either as man or as soldier, was one of those peerless characters whose memory is an everlasting pride and delight. We doubt if Wellington himself was his superior in military ability, while there can be no comparison between the two men in all those elements of character which kindle love and enthusiasm. In all who served with or under him, Sir John Moore awakened the same ardent affection, the same crusading zeal for the brightness of his name. Lord Lynedoch felt these sentiments as fully as any of his contemporaries. "Never," he says, "was there a more perfect soldier and gentleman." He thus describes his bearing at Corunna after the terrible fatigues and anxieties of the retreat:—

I could scarcely have believed it possible for a man so worn down with fatigue and anxiety to have been so transformed as he was on the 16th January, 1809. It was a transition from fixed gloom, bordering almost on despair, to a state of exultation at the prospect of being attacked before the embarkation could take place. After having been out in the morning to see that his orders for the occupation of the position had been properly obeyed, he returned into the town to take some refreshment. On a summons from Sir J. Hope, he called for his horse, and I shall never forget, not only the animation, but the almost boyish gaiety of his manner and countenance, as we rode out to the lines. He repeatedly expressed to me his delight that Soult was at last going to give him an opportunity of trying the stuff which their respective troops were made of. He did not entertain a doubt of the successful issue of the battle, though the position was by no means a strong one, particularly on our right.

All through that day he moved from point to point, cheering the men with his presence wherever the fire was hottest. The enemy, Colonel Graham says, having a distinct view from the commanding height occupied by a powerful battery, watched his motions, and volleys of cannon shot and howitzer shells were poured in wherever he and his staff remained stationary for any time for the purpose of giving orders. It was thus that he fell mortally wounded as night was falling, and the French attack had been everywhere repulsed. Colonel Graham thus describes the incident:—

I was sent several messages, and on my return always found him where the fire was hottest. General Paget was directed to support the rifle corps, obliged to yield ground to the westward of the valley; the Guards were ordered up to take up the ground where the 42nd and 50th had stood; the 4th, thrown back from the first, was protected by a deep hollow way and a garden wall, and kept up a heavy fire on the column which remained crowded in the village where the enemy must have lost a great number of men. About this time the sun was setting, and

the smoke hung entirely to our right. A report prevailed that the enemy had pushed a column round that way, and as nothing was heard from General Paquet, the General wished to make a diversion by an attack on their centre at the bottom of the hill, where at the White House and Oakwood, they were in considerable force. The left battalion of the Guards was advanced for this purpose, but owing to an improper formation, got into some confusion, which obliged them to fall back, and form behind a wall; at the same time the left company of the 42nd conceiving they were to be relieved by the Guards retired up a narrow lane. The General, owing to these circumstances, remained for some time stationary at the cross of these roads. The enemy, whose artillery all day had been directed with much precision and rapidity against groups of mounted officers, continued firing at this spot, when at last a fatal ball took the General under the left arm, shattering the ribs, and almost severing the arm from the body; he fell at my horse's feet; but such was the invincible firmness of his mind, such the consciousness of his rectitude, that he bore the pain without an altered feature. I scarcely thought him wounded till I saw the state of his arm.

The wounded General was borne off the field, and two hours later he had breathed his last. Colonel Graham did not again see him until the end was immediately at hand :—

Soon after (when the battle was over) we returned to headquarters, that noble spirit fled. How wonderfully sublime his self-devotion, how genuine his patriotism, his anxiety for the honour of his gallant army! How touching his kindness about the fate of us all! Never was a general more deserving of the confidence, the affection, and the admiration of his army; nor was ever a general more universally beloved, or more sincerely lamented.

Men like Sir John Moore are truly the salt of the earth. Simply to hear of the lives they led and the affection they inspired, awakens the desire and imparts, in some degree, the power to fashion our lives in imitation of theirs. Sir John Moore devoted his last hours to providing for the future well-being of the officers to whose assistance he had been most deeply indebted during the campaign. Colonel Graham was prominent among them; and not the least of the many services rendered to his country by the dying soldier, was the earnest recommendation from his bed of death that Colonel Graham should receive permanent rank in the British army. Such a request, made at such a time, it was impossible to refuse; and Colonel Graham was, in consequence, gazetted to the rank of General, and shortly after appointed Lord Wellington's second in command in the Spanish peninsula. To Colonel Graham it was a cause of special pleasure that he owed his rank to the esteem and friendship of Sir John Moore. In reference to this he writes :—

It is quite impossible that I should ever find language to express the feelings which were excited in my breast on this occasion. To have merited in so high a degree the approbation of so distinguished an officer, whose loss was deplored by

the whole army and felt by me as having deprived me of the best of friends, and at last to have gained this distinction by such a recommendation, was indeed ample compensation for the bitter disappointment I had so many years laboured under.

It was by a despatch dated 19th February, 1810, that the Earl of Liverpool informed Lieutenant-General Thomas Graham that "His Majesty had been graciously pleased to select him to command the British forces assembling at Cadiz for the defence of that most important place." The General left London six days after the receipt of this despatch, and landed at Cadiz on the morning of the 25th March. The state of affairs at that time in the peninsula was as dismal as it well could be for the cause of Spanish independence. The campaign of Talavera had been brought to an unprosperous termination on the 11th November of the preceding year. A few days after, on the 16th November, a Spanish army, 50,000 strong, had been completely defeated on the plain of Ocana, with the loss of half its men and nearly the whole of its baggage and artillery. Not deterred by this crushing disaster, a second Spanish army of 20,000 men courted destruction by attacking the French under Kellerman, and was, also, completely defeated. To add to the effect of these disasters, the French armies had, during the winter months, been largely reinforced. Portugal was threatened with invasion by an army of 60,000 men. Catalonia was the single Spanish province which kept up a regular active system of war; and Cadiz, which was defended by a British force of 7,000 men, in addition to the Spanish garrison, was blockaded by the French under Marshal Victor.

On arriving at Cadiz, and inspecting the defences of the island of Leon, General Graham found them to be weak and badly arranged, requiring for their defence a much stronger force than that which occupied Cadiz. But his efforts to remedy this precarious state of things were baffled by the supineness of the Spanish authorities.

It would be endless [he writes to Lord Liverpool on the 30th April] to enumerate the instances of want of foresight, of inattention, and of indifference that occur. A resolution taken and an order given, after much delay, without any care about the execution, are urged as proofs of their activity, and the necessity of such frequent complaints as neglect would require produces irritation. It is impossible not to suspect many of those intrusted with the execution of more than indolence and ill-will. Nothing seems to be done to awaken the inhabitants to a sense of their danger, and to animate them to patriotic enthusiasm and the sacrifices that may become necessary.

The Cadiz Junta contented itself with professing its absolute inability to do anything. It could not provide supplies for its British

and Portuguese allies. It could not obtain either boats or carts for the distribution of such supplies as were lying stored up in the magazine. Nay, the demolition of certain houses being necessary before certain fortifications could be completed, the Junta declared that these houses could not be pulled down, because they could not obtain hands for the work. The French, however, had reasons of their own which prevented them from taking advantage of the weak defences of Cadiz and the apathy of the Junta. They were preparing for the great attempt under Massena to drive Lord Wellington altogether out of the peninsula—an attempt which, as all the world knows, was defeated by the defences of Torres Vedras. To ensure to this attempt every probability of success, troops were drawn in from all parts of Spain towards the frontier of Portugal, and the force blockading Cadiz had to contribute its quota as well as others. Those detachments reduced Marshal Victor to a passive attitude before Cadiz; but he was careful to strengthen his position by line upon line of strong works; and Lord Wellington was himself desirous that no great effort should be made to raise the blockade believing that in such an event the whole of Victor's force would be set at liberty to swell the hosts under the command of Marshal Massena. Thus it happened that no military operations of any importance took place in the neighbourhood of Cadiz until the month of January, 1811. At that time it became known within the city that Marshal Soult, who had been covering the rear of Marshal Victor, had been ordered to co-operate with Massena in Portugal. This movement greatly weakened the position of Marshal Victor's army; and it was thought that an attempt to work round to its rear and attack it would be repaid by some striking success. Contrary winds baffled the project; and in February Victor was reinforced; nevertheless it was determined to persevere in the attempt. The entire force collected for this purpose numbered ten thousand infantry and six hundred cavalry. Of these four thousand were British troops under the personal command of General Graham. The chief command was held by the Spanish General La Pena. Without the aid of maps and plans it is impossible to give an intelligible account of the series of movements which brought about the battle of Barossa. But the conduct of the Spanish commanders was characteristic throughout. General Graham, discerning the extreme importance of the troops arriving at the point of attack in good order and unexhausted by long marches, had succeeded in extracting a promise from General La Pena that the force should move by easy stages, and, above all, that no long night marches should be undertaken. The operation

had no sooner commenced than the Spanish General acted as if no such stipulation had been agreed upon. The troops, by the time they came in contact with the French, were so worn out with harassing night marches, that the Spaniards were incapable on the day of battle of giving any assistance to their British allies. But this is to anticipate events. The first effect of this furious and ill-considered haste was the failure of concerted operations. Before General La Pena's army marched from Cadiz it had been arranged that his attack upon the French position at Chiclana should be supported by an attack in front from within the defences of Cadiz. The time for this concerted attack had been fixed on the supposition that General La Pena proposed to march leisurely, and the consequence of his subsequent haste was, that when he reached the Barossa height, the forces in Cadiz, not expecting him so soon, were unprepared to co-operate.

It was on the morning of the 5th March, that the 4,000 British troops, under command of General Graham, and constituting the reserve of the Spanish army, reached the height of Barossa. As the Spanish army was now situated, this height was the key of their position. If the French succeeded in seizing upon it, they would be able from a superior height to pour down upon the Spanish army, confused and crowded together in a narrow and difficult country where manœuvring was impossible. The issue of a battle fought under such conditions was not doubtful. General La Pena's force would be entirely destroyed. On this account General Graham was desirous to hold the Barossa height in force. He, however, received peremptory orders from the Spanish General to evacuate the position. This order the British General obeyed, but, perceiving the importance of the position, he did so under the impression that La Pena purposed to hold it himself, and, in consequence, he left only the flank companies of the 9th and 92nd, under command of Major Brown, to cover the removal of his baggage. But no sooner had the British troops left the heights, than the Spanish General abandoned them also with the whole of his force, the two flank companies of the 9th and 92nd alone excepted.

Up to this time the French had not appeared in sight. But Marshal Victor with 9,000 men and fourteen pieces of artillery was close at hand, and eagerly watching every movement of the allied force. He saw at once the fatal error which had been committed when the Barossa height was left so scantily protected, and was prompt to seize the opportunity. His 9,000 men, in two divisions, under Laval and Ruffin, rapidly ascended the hill, driving Graham's rearguard before them. Major Brown sent word of the attack to

General Graham and asked for orders. "Fight," was the laconic order he received in reply, and simultaneously with the giving of the order, General Graham countermarched his men and moved rapidly to the support of his rearguard. He did so under the impression that he would find the hill still held in force by the Spanish General; but the scene which met his eye upon reaching the field of action was one to try the nerve of the coolest general. Not a man of the Spanish army was in sight, while his slender rearguard was retiring under the fire of fourteen French pieces of artillery, and the advance of 9,000 French troops. Already had the French columns reached the crest of the height. The alternatives before the British General were these. Either to withdraw and so expose the whole allied army to the certain destruction which would have followed as soon as the French had established themselves on the Barossa hill, or to try the desperate hazard of an assault by 4,000 wearied men on a fresh unbroken force of 9,000. General Graham was the very man to choose rightly between these tremendous alternatives. He had even then passed his sixty-second year, but the brightness of his eye was not quenched, nor the natural force of his mind abated. "Trusting," he says, "to the known heroism of British troops, regardless of the numbers and position of the enemy, an immediate attack was determined upon." His infantry was hastily thrown into two columns, commanded respectively by General Dilkes and Colonel Wheatley. The former column was directed against the French under Laval, the latter upon the French under Ruffin, the advance of the whole being covered by the fire of ten guns under the command of Major Duncan. The two British lines struck the masses of the French army with irresistible force, driving them headlong over the crest and down the slopes of the Barossa hill. The General himself twice led the Grenadiers to the charge through the hottest fire. And how hot the fire must have been, how close and fierce the contest when it came to push of bayonet, may be seen by a single fact. The battle lasted but an hour and a half, yet in that time out of the 4,000 British troops who took part in it, fifty officers, sixty sergeants, and 1,100 privates were either killed or wounded. Two thousand of the French fell on the field, and they lost, in addition, six guns, an eagle, two generals, and 500 men of lower rank taken prisoners. How puny, when contrasted with such a fight as this, are our achievements in Afghanistan, Abyssinia, Ashantee, Zululand, and elsewhere. This was not a victory over badly armed, half-hearted, and undisciplined barbarians, but a battle in the open field—an attack upon the finest troops in Europe by less than half their number of British infantry. But in

this world all things go by comparison; and those to whom the battle of Baba Wali Kotal is a great victory, are in all probability unacquainted with either the name or the achievements of General Sir Thomas Graham.

The French troops withdrew from the field completely defeated. Had means been at hand to pursue them in their retreat, it is not doubtful that Marshal Victor would have been compelled to raise the blockade of Cadiz. But what remained of the English column was completely worn out by nineteen hours of marching and fighting wholly without food. And General La Pena and his Spaniards were nowhere to be found. They had withdrawn to the Bermeja height—a trifling distance only from the field of battle. From this point their General looked idly on. Not a regiment was moved forward to aid Graham in his unequal struggle. Not an attempt was made to follow up the victory when victory had been achieved. Only from an impulse of zeal, and without orders, two small Spanish regiments did their utmost to come up in time to share in the battle, but arrived too late for the reward due to their honourable exertions.

Had [General Graham writes] the whole body of the Spanish cavalry, with the horse artillery, been rapidly sent by the sea beach to form in the plain and to envelope the enemy's left, had the greatest part of the infantry been marched through the pinewood in our rear to turn his right, what success might not have been expected from such decisive movements. The enemy must either have retired instantly, and without occasioning serious loss to the British division, or he would have exposed himself to absolute destruction; his cavalry greatly outnumbered, his artillery lost, his columns mixed and in confusion, a general dispersion would have been the inevitable consequence of a close pursuit. . . . This moment was lost. Within a quarter of an hour's ride of the scene of action, *the General remained ignorant of what was passing, and nothing was done.*

General Graham remained for several hours on the Barossa height after the engagement was over, hoping against hope that the Spanish General would make a tardy endeavour to improve the signal victory which had been won. But the General gave no sign, and Graham withdrew his troops within the fortifications of Cadiz, declining any longer to serve under his command. This gave the Spaniards the opportunity they desired, and with one voice they threw the entire blame of the fruitlessness of the victory of Barossa on the General who had fought and achieved it. It was, they said, *his* failure to co-operate which paralysed the activity of General La Pena. Lord Wellington expressed himself on the whole transaction with a characteristic vigour, and not without a flavour of humour. He writes to General Graham:—

I beg to congratulate you, and the brave troops under your command, on the

signal victory which you gained on the 5th instant. I have no doubt whatever that their success would have had the effect of raising the siege of Cadiz if the Spanish corps had made any effort to assist them; and I am equally certain, from your account of the ground, that if you had not decided with the utmost promptitude to attack the enemy, and if the attack had not been a most vigorous one, the whole allied army would have been lost. . . . The conduct of the Spaniards throughout this transaction is precisely the same as I have ever observed it to be. They march the troops night and day without provision or rest, and, abusing everybody who proposes a moment's delay to afford either to the famished and fatigued soldiers. They reach the enemy in such a state as to be unable to make any exertion or to execute any plans, even if any plan had been formed; and then, when the moment of action arrives, they are totally incapable of movement and they stand by to see their allies destroyed, and afterwards abuse them because they do not continue unsupported exertions to which human nature is not equal.

Soon after the victory of Barossa, the services of General Graham were transferred to the army directly commanded by Lord Wellington. He acted as his second in command, and in that capacity was present at the capture of Ciudad Rodriguez, and the operations preceding the battle of Salamanca. He did not, however, participate in that battle, an acute disease in his eye compelling him to give up his command and return to England. A few months' rest so far restored his sight that he was able to return to Spain in the following year, and bore a leading part in the series of brilliant operations which ended in the great victory of Vittoria.

The long war in Spain is popularly regarded among Englishmen as an unbroken series of successes on the side of the allies. This notion has as little resemblance to the actual facts, as vague popular notions ordinarily have. These campaigns were of a very chequered character. Victory was succeeded by reverse, and that again by success in constant alternation. And not until the campaign of Vittoria was the position of the British in Spain otherwise than most precarious. Had the French Emperor taken the field against them in person, their expulsion from the peninsula was inevitable. Lord Wellington was never blind to his veritable position. Even after the victory of Salamanca, and when he was in possession of Madrid—in the eyes of the world, a conqueror secure in his grasp of provinces he had wrested from the French—he writes in the following desponding strain to his brother. After a general description of the hopelessness of the outlook, he says:—

What will be Lord Castlereagh's reply to the next proposition for peace? Not that we will not treat if the Government of Joseph is to be the guaranteed Government; but he will be too happy to avail himself of any opportunity of withdrawing with honour from a contest in which it will be manifest that, owing to the inability of those employed to carry it on on the part of the Spaniards,

there is no prospect of military success. Thus, this great cause will be lost, and this nation will be enslaved for the want of men at their head capable of conducting them.

The accuracy of this forecast had not long to wait for verification. Lord Wellington very shortly after had to raise the siege of Brucos, to withdraw our troops from Madrid, and retire to the Portuguese frontier, so hotly pursued by the French under Marshal Soult, that in the siege and subsequent retreat the allies lost no less than 9,000 men. Their sick and wounded had to be abandoned on the line of march, and perished miserably. The pursuit was stayed on the banks of the Huebra, from the difficulty which Soult experienced in feeding his army in an exhausted country, otherwise it is hard to see how Wellington's troops could have escaped a severe defeat, so demoralized had they become. That Wellington himself did not undervalue the perils he had escaped, is evident from the way in which he spoke of them:—

I assure you [he wrote to the Secretary at War], that considering the numbers of the enemy, and considering the state of the Spanish troops, the great proportion of foreign troops in the divisions which I have with me, and their general weakness, and the weakness of our cavalry, *I think I have escaped from the worst military situation I was ever in.*

This candid confession was made a year before the campaign of Vittoria, and it is one that the student of history should make special note of. There is an English legend about the Peninsular War which is as fabulous as the French legend about the battle of Waterloo. The British people fondly imagine that it was the war in Spain which cast Napoleon from power; and their opposition to this war is even to this day cast in the teeth of British Liberals as an evidence of their unpatriotic spirit and the superior intelligence and foresight of the British Tory. The fact is, that the military glory acquired by our armies in Spain has so dazzled the national imagination that few have cared to discern the veritable character of the conflict. A more useless expenditure of blood and treasure was never perpetrated on earth than that occasioned by these Spanish campaigns. Until Napoleon ruined himself by his mad expedition into Russia, neither the military genius of Wellington nor the surpassing excellence of his soldiers availed to loosen Napoleon's grasp upon Spain; whereas it is indubitable that had all this genius and courage been combined in the field with the armies of Austria, Napoleon's career of conquest would have been finally checked upon the field of Wagram in the year 1809, and Europe would have been spared all the terrible slaughter and

suffering which she had to endure till 1815. To Spain these campaigns were worse than useless, for at their close we gave our sanction to a Government which bound her people in a more degrading bondage than even France had desired to impose upon her, and to which her present sunk and hopeless condition is mainly due. To Great Britain the consequences of this war were disastrous in the extreme. It had been a Tory war, although the utter incompetence of Tory Ministries had repeatedly brought our armies to the verge of destruction. But dazzled, as we have said, by the military glory which had been won, the nation had no eyes to see anything beyond it. They were content to receive the Tories as heaven-born rulers simply on the score of their approval of the Spanish war; and the Tories took advantage of this state of feeling to maintain in Great Britain, until the year of the Reform Bill, a system of rule the most corrupt, reactionary, and oppressive which had been known since the time of Charles II. A history of Great Britain from the Revolutionary period down to the first Reform Bill remains to be written. It has as yet been done only by the great "Mr. Wordy," who, according to the author of "Coningsby," wrote it, in "twenty volumes in order to prove that Providence was on the side of the Tories."

The campaign of 1812 had ended disastrously. Lord Wellington, as we have seen, had "escaped from the worst military situation he was ever in." But that of 1813 opened under hopeful auspices. Napoleon's Grand Army had been destroyed in Russia, and he was waging an unequal conflict against the allied powers beyond the Rhine and the Elbe. To give greater consistency and confidence to his young conscripts, he had withdrawn from Spain the best of his officers and a large number of veteran soldiers. Wellington saw that the opportunity had come for striking a decisive blow. He writes to Sir Thomas Graham, then on his way to rejoin, that he has under his command forty thousand British troops in excellent spirits and discipline, and twenty-seven thousand Portuguese, and that he is in good hopes of having a successful campaign. Napoleon, too, perceived how the situation in Spain had been changed by his disasters in Russia. In studying these Spanish campaigns, the reader is repeatedly startled by the extraordinarily accurate appreciation of changing situations shown by Napoleon. From remote parts of Europe, beset, one would think, by overwhelming cares and labours of his own, he was always ready to send to his Marshals in Spain advice at critical moments, which, had it been followed, would rarely have failed to command success. He saw now that if the British army could be met and defeated, the

French position in Spain was secure; and he sent word to his brother Joseph to concentrate all his troops, regardless of what provinces might by such a concentration be recovered temporarily by the Spanish Juntas, and so fall upon Wellington at the head of superior forces. Napoleon was a man for such a work, Joseph was not; and the French armies were still widely divided, when such men as the latter had collected were attacked and overthrown at Vittoria. •

Wellington had passed the winter as usual in Portugal, but as he crossed its frontier on this the last of his Spanish campaigns, so confident was he of the success awaiting him, that he rose in his stirrups, exclaiming "Adieu, Portugal." His army was divided into two great divisions. One, 40,000 strong, was placed under the command of Sir Thomas Graham with orders to penetrate through the Portuguese province of *Tras os Montes* to the *Esla* river in Spain; with the other, 30,000 strong, he designed to force the *Tormes* pass, cross the *Duero*, and uniting with Graham, march all abreast upon the scattered French and drive them back upon the *Pyrenees*. A grand design, says the historian of the *Peninsular War*, and grandly executed. The movements, however, which brought the French and Allied armies face to face in the basin of Vittoria are too numerous and complicated to be intelligibly stated in a brief notice like this. Suffice it to say that those entrusted to Sir Thomas Graham were executed with signal success in face of numerous obstacles. On the day of battle it was his duty to crush the right wing of the French army, and then by working round their flank to blockade their retreat by the direct road to France. After the battle he was despatched in pursuit of the flying enemy, and in the execution of this duty inflicted a severe defeat on Foy. While Wellington continued to push the retreating enemy towards the *Pyrenees*, to Sir Thomas Graham was intrusted the conduct of the siege of *St. Sebastian*, into which place the French had thrown a garrison. The defence was heroic. The first assault upon the works was repulsed with terrible slaughter. The second assault succeeded only by an accident. The French had repelled all attempts to mount the breach, and the losses of the assailants had been dreadful, when a vast explosion within the French defences, which slew hundreds of the brave defenders, gave the British infantry the opportunity of forcing their way in. Napier has drawn a vivid picture of Sir Thomas Graham in the critical moment of this assault:—

Graham, standing on the nearest of the *Chofie* batteries, beheld this fright-

ful destruction with a stern resolution to win at any cost, and he was a man to have put himself at the head of the last company and die sword in hand rather than sustain a second defeat; but neither his confidence nor his resources were yet exhausted. He directed a new attack on the hornwork, and concentrating the fire of fifty heavy pieces upon the high curtain sent his shot over the heads of the troops gathered at the foot of the breach—a fearful stream of missiles which pouring along the upper surface of the high curtain broke down the traverses, shattering all things, and strewing the rampart with the mangled limbs of the defenders.

The General himself in his official despatch, gives the following account of this manœuvre:—

Everything that the most determined bravery could attempt was repeatedly tried in vain by the troops who were brought forward from the trenches in succession. No man outlived the attempt to gain the ridge; and though the slope of the breach afforded shelter from the enemy's musketry, yet still the nature of the stone rubbish prevented the great exertions of the engineers and working parties from being able to form a lodgment for the troops exposed to the shells and grape from the batteries of the castle.

In this almost desperate state of the attack, after consulting with Colonel Dickson, commanding the Royal Artillery, I ventured to order the guns to be turned against the curtain. A heavy fire of artillery was directed against it, passing a few feet only over the heads of our troops on the breach, and was kept up with a precision of practice beyond all example.

Shortly after the capture of St. Sebastian, ill-health compelled Sir Thomas Graham to relinquish his command, and in consequence he took no part in the great battles fought in the Pyrenees. Neither was he present in the campaign of the Hundred Days. But for a short time before the first abdication of Napoleon, he commanded a British force in the Low Countries, when he distinguished himself by an attempt to carry the fortress of Bergen-op-Zoom by a *coup-de-main*. The attempt was unsuccessful, but the originality and daring of the plan excited the admiration of Napoleon. Sir Thomas Graham, at the close of the war, was raised to the peerage under the title of Lord Lynedoch, and lived to the ripe age of 93. His biographer quotes the following account of him, so late as 1837, from the journal of Henry Cockburn:—

The 24th October, 1837—I dined at Craig Crook, the residence of Lord Jeffrey, near Edinburgh, on the 21st. And at the "New" Club yesterday, for the first time since he was couched for cataract, met with one of the finest specimens of an old gentleman, Lord Lynedoch. . . . At the age of about eighty-eight his mind and body are both perfectly entire. He is still a great horseman, drives to London, night and day, in an open carriage, eats and drinks like an ordinary person, hears as well as others, sees well enough . . . for all practical purposes, reading included, has the gallantry and politeness of an old soldier. Enjoys and

enlivens every company, especially where there are ladies, by a plain, manly, sensible, well-bred manner, and a conversation rich in his strong judgment, and with a memory full of the most interesting scenes and people of the last seventy years. Large in bone and feature, his head is finer than Jupiter's. It is like a grey, solid, war-worn castle. . . . Nor has it been only in the affairs of war that his manly, chivalrous spirit has made him admired and loved. He has always taken a decided part in politics, on the popular side, and is one of the old Whigs who find nothing good prevailing now but what he fought for and anticipated long ago. He is one of the men who make old age lovely.

THE PEASANTRY OF INDIA.

No. III.

IN my two former articles having this title I treated of the condition of the agricultural classes in the North-west Provinces, and in Bengal, Behar, and Orissa. I showed, mainly from official evidence, that in two most essential points our Indian administration had signally failed—namely, in giving security to rights of property in land, and in insuring to the great body of the people an existence other than one of grinding toil and chronic hunger. In the following pages I propose to inquire how matters stand in the province of Oudh.

As regards the condition of the Oudh peasantry, in my article last month on “Mr. Caird and the Government of India,” I quoted a passage from Mr. Irwin’s recently published work, entitled “The Garden of India,” which may be requoted hero. Mr. Irwin says:—

Taking the province as a whole, it is scarcely too much to say that a large proportion of cultivators have neither food sufficient to keep them in health, nor clothes sufficient to protect them from the weather; that their cattle are miserably thin and weak from under-feeding; that they are hardly ever out of debt for twelve months together . . . and that, *except in specially favourable seasons, they are dependent on the money-lender for their food for from two to six months in the year.* . . . The Oudh tenantry and their families—men, women, and children together—do not, on an average, consume even so much as 20 oz. of food-grain per diem. Well-fed-looking men are certainly the exception among them rather than the rule, and *it is notorious that the able-bodied adult convict nearly always increases in weight after a few months on a gaol diet of 24 oz.* The condition of the Oudh cultivators might seem to be life reduced to its lowest terms. But there are hundreds of thousands all over the province compared with whom he, as Lear has it, is “sophisticated;” the landless village labourer is “the thing itself.” Everywhere, in every hamlet, there is a residuum of half-clad starvelings, who have no cattle and no means of livelihood save, perhaps, a tiny patch of spade-tilled land; and their labour remunerated at the rate of 4 lbs. of coarse grain, or of three halfpence, or, at most, twopence farthing per diem. And even this wretched employment is not procurable all the year round. How, under-fed and almost unclothed as they are, they contrive to live through the cold nights of winter, which they often spend in field-watching to keep off thieves, is a standing marvel.

This quotation suffices to show that our administration has failed in Oudh, as it has failed in all other parts of India—as, indeed, so long as its existing constitution remains unchanged, it must continue to fail more and more disastrously. No reasonable person now-a-days expects to gather grapes from thorns, or figs from thistles; but it is every whit as unreasonable, as contradicted by all the experience of mankind, to suppose that an alien despotism can produce happiness and prosperity in the land where it exists. We writers in *THE STATESMAN* are, in fact, engaged in laboriously proving that which really needs no proof at all—in (as Job complained of his friends) “plentifully declaring the matter as it is.” We occupy ourselves in the demonstration of facts which no Englishman would dream of doubting or questioning if they were stated of any other people except his own. But propositions which may be safely predicated of the human race elsewhere, the Englishman regards as having no validity in his own case. He may appropriate a neighbour’s field, when a Russian or a German dare not so much as look over the gate. He may carry fire and sword through neighbouring territories exclusively for his own interest, when other Powers may not do so even for the purpose of liberating their kinsmen from a degrading and cruel bondage. Englishmen, in like manner, are never subject to legitimate defeat at the hands of those they are endeavouring to murder and rob; they are “treacherously massacred.” And it is in virtue of this miraculous immunity from all the frailties and imperfections of mankind, that even a despotic system, when worked by Englishmen, is purged of all the evils which, in other hands, are inherent in despotism, and produces, throughout a vast continent, a state of Arcadian felicity. There (we may say, in the words of the Psalmist) the men are strong to labour; there there is no decay, and no complaining in the streets. “Happy are the people who are in such a case; yea, happy are the people who have a British bureaucracy for their lord and their god.”

All that is needed for the progressive well-being of the Natives of India is that we Englishmen should discard this preposterously exalted notion of our administrative infallibility. The Indian official apologist would at once cease to find a market for his commodities if, instead of being blindly credulous, Englishmen would exercise a little common sense. The “able Indian administrator” is not a mysterious being whose capacities for regenerating a continent cannot be estimated as those of any other man may be. We have him here in our midst. He may be seen almost any day playing billiards in a Pall Mall club, or lecturing, or presiding at a lecture. Does he ever dazzle the beholder with excess of light? Is there

anything in his appearance or his conversation to distinguish him as a veritable "king of men"—one to "scatter plenty o'er a smiling land" spontaneously, as heat proceeds from the sun? Does Sir Richard Temple impress those who have the honour of his acquaintance in this way? or Sir Lewis Pelly, or Lord Lytton, or any of the members of the Indian Council? We all know that there is nothing remarkable about these men. Outside of India, their opinions carry no greater weight than those of any other "man in the street;" and yet the official apologist asks us to believe, and does persuade a large number of people to believe, that commonplace Englishmen have only to be transported to India to become like men inspired—infallible both in counsel and in action, pure spirits of benevolence incarnate—"reading their history in a nation's eyes." Of course, nobody really believes this when the fact is thus nakedly stated. The delusion about the nature and effects of our rule in India is caused by a trick of the imagination. When Englishmen speak or think of "British rule in India," they do not think of what it really is—a large number of quite ordinary persons, English, Scotch, and Irish, engaged in the collection of taxes, and the blundering administration of very imperfect laws. Their minds are filled with an idea resembling Comte's "Great Being"—that of the collective wisdom and philanthropy of Great Britain manifesting itself in the building up of a new and better civilization in India. A grand idea, possibly, but without any counterpart in reality.

The province of Oudh is a specially favourable spot on which to test the merits of British rule. The beginning of that rule dates from 1853, and the province was annexed because Native rule was held to have broken down altogether. That Oudh at that period was in a condition of deplorable disorder no one would deny—that intervention of some kind was imperatively required is not less unquestionable; but it is also most true that there were a number of circumstances, which largely mitigated the sufferings of the people. Sir William Sleeman, in his "Tour through Oudh," thus describes the country:—

Never was country more favoured by nature, or more susceptible of improvement under judicious management. There is really hardly an acre of land that is not capable of good culture, or that need be left waste, except for the sites of towns and villages, and ponds for irrigation, or that would be left waste under good government. The people understand tillage well, and are industrious and robust, capable of any exertion under protection and due encouragement. *The Government has all the revenues to itself, having no public debt, and paying no tribute to any one, while the country receives from the British Government alone fifty lacs, or £500,000 a year.* (This was derived from several sources, but prin-

especially the interest on loans made by former sovereigns of Oudh to the British Government, and the remittances of Oudh Sepoys serving in the Company's army). . . . It requires little from other countries but a few luxuries for the rich in shawls from Kashmere and the Punjab, silks, satins, broadcloth, muslin, guns, watches, &c., from England. A great portion of the salt and saltpetre required is raised in Oudh, and so is all the agricultural produce, except in seasons of drought; and the arms required for the troops are manufactured in Oudh, with the exception of some few cannon and shells, and the muskets and bayonets for the few disciplined regiments. . . . Mohammedan gentlemen from Oudh, no matter in what country they may serve, like to leave their families in Oudh, and to return and spend what they acquire among them. They find better society there than in our own territories, or society more to their tastes; better means for educating their sons; more splendid processions, festivals, and other inviting sights, in which they and their families can participate without cost, and more attractive places of worship and religious observances.

The very disorders in Oudh had a beneficial effect on the productiveness of the soil:—

If a landholder takes to rebellion and plunder, he is followed by all his retainers and clansmen; and their families and the cultivators of other classes, feeling no longer secure, go and till lands on other estates till they are invited back. The cowherds and shepherds, who live by the produce of their cattle and sheep, remain and thrive by the abundance of pasture lands from which the rich spring and autumn crops have disappeared. These cattle and sheep graze over them, and enrich the soil by restoring to it a portion of those elements of fertility of which a long succession of harvests had robbed it. Over and above what they leave upon the ground over which they graze, large stores of manure are collected for future use by the herdsmen, who now exclusively occupy the villages. *The landholder and his followers . . . are at last invited back by a weak and wearied Government to reoccupy the lands, improved by this salutary fallow, at a lower rate of rent, or no rent at all for some years, and a remission of all balances for past years on account of treading down of crops during the disorder that has prevailed.* The cultivators return to occupy their lands so enriched, at reduced rates of rent; and in two or three years these lands become again carpeted with a beautiful variety of spring and autumn crops.

The superior productiveness of the soil in Oudh over the over-cropped fields in British India was even then apparent. Sir W. Sleeman gives the following conversation between himself and some Brahmin cultivators living in Oudh:—

They told me that "nothing could be better than the administration of the Shahjehanpore district by the present collector and magistrate, Mr. Buller, whom all classes loved and respected." "But the returns, are they equal to those from your lands in Oudh?" "Nothing like it, sir; they are not half so good; nor can the cultivator pay half the rent that we pay when left to till our lands in peace." "And why is this?" "Because, sir, ours is sometimes left waste to recover its powers, as you see all the land round you, while theirs has no rest." "And where would you rather live—there, protected, as the people are, from all violence; or here, exposed as you are to all manner of outrage and extortion?" "We would rather live here, sir, if we could; and we are glad to

come back. Your courts of justice are the things that we most dread, sir, and we are glad to escape from them as soon as we can, in spite of all the evils we are exposed to on our return to the place of our birth."

The reader must not be led away by the foregoing extracts into believing that Sir William Sleeman was a man who saw but one side of any matter he undertook to examine ; that he was either ignorant of, or indifferent to, the horrible disorders which were ravaging Oudh. No man has depicted them more vividly than he in the very book from which these quotations are made. What he perceived was that these disorders were the consequence, not of the system of Native rule, but of the weakness and frivolity of the Executive ; and he protested with the greatest earnestness against the impolicy of subverting Native rule instead of attempting to reform it.

The system of annexation [he writes] pursued by Lord Dalhousie and his Council has, in my opinion, and in that of a large number of the ablest men in India, a downward tendency—a tendency to crush all the higher and middle classes connected with the land. These classes it should be our object to create and foster, that we might in the end inspire them with a feeling of interest in the stability of our rule. *We shall find, a few years hence, the tables turned against us.* We have no right to annex or confiscate Oudh ; but we have a right, under the Treaty of 1837, to take the management of it, but not to appropriate its revenues to ourselves. We can do this with honour to our Government and benefit to the people. To confiscate would be dishonest and dishonourable. *To annex would be to give the people a government almost as bad as their own, if we put the screw upon them.*

This prophetic letter was written in 1854. Of the passages I have italicised, the first was fulfilled in 1857 ; the second has been in process of fulfilment ever since.

Before annexation there existed in Oudh that diversity of trades and occupations, and those gradations of wealth, which are the indispensable conditions of progressive prosperity in a State. We annexed the country, and the immediate result of that proceeding was that the entire population was flung upon the land to draw its subsistence thence ; and the land, as was to be expected, proved incapable of meeting the demand. The Court, of course, disappeared from Lucknow ; and the effects of that disappearance are thus described by Mr. Martin Gubbins—as thorough-going an admirer of British rule in India as ever lived :—

There were many innocent sufferers by the change of government. Thousands of citizens found employ in providing for the ordinary wants of the Court and nobility. There were several hundreds of manufacturers of hooqah snakes. The embroiderers in gold and silver thread were also reckoned by hundreds. The makers of rich dresses, fine turbans, highly ornamented shoes, and many other subordinate trades, suffered severely from the cessation of the demand for the

articles which they manufactured. But, perhaps, the class most entitled to sympathy was the nobility itself, and the numberless relatives and friends who hung upon it. The nobles had received large pensions from the Native Government, the payment of which, never regular, ceased with the introduction of our rule. Government had made liberal provision for their support; but before this could be obtained it was necessary to prepare careful lists of the grantees, and to investigate their claims. It must be admitted that in effecting this there was undue delay; and that, for want of common means of support, the gentry and nobility of the city were brought to great straits and suffering. *We were informed that families which had never before been outside the Zenana, used to go out at night and beg their bread.*

Another class which the conversion of Oudh into British territory brought down from prosperity to abject poverty, were the inhabitants of the small Mohammedan townlets known as "kasbas." These little communities had sprung up in the following way. When the Moslem armies marched into Oudh, at various dates, for the purpose of establishing their supremacy there, they were accustomed to leave detachments in defensible positions for the purpose of maintaining their communications with Delhi. The camp, thus originally formed, grew into a townlet. The soldiers received small grants of land in the immediate neighbourhood of the cantonment, which they planted with fruit groves, and held free of rent. They married, built houses and mosques, and marked out a burial-ground; and so, in course of time, a little town arose upon the site of an encampment. In the Lucknow district, and also in other parts of Oudh, there were a considerable number of such townlets. Their population amounted in all to many thousands. Their prosperity was intimately connected with the existence of the Native Government, by service under which, and by the possession of their small holdings of rent-free lands, they obtained a comfortable existence. The disappearance of the Court from Lucknow cut them off from one means of livelihood, and the operations of our Settlement officers destroyed the other. Mr. Connell, in his admirable book on "Our Land Revenue Policy," from which I have quoted in a previous article, describes the miserable condition to which they were reduced:—

These orchards, small garden-plots, and cultivated scraps of land have been, since annexation, assessed to the Revenue demand; their owners have lost now all the means of employment and opportunities of service which were open to them under Native rule, and they have to eke out a miserable subsistence from the scanty profits of their minute holdings. Even had their land been left unassessed, in consideration of their reduced circumstances, they would be hard pressed to find clothes and food. As it is, it is pitiable to stroll through one of these townlets, and to witness the squalid poverty of these Mohammedan gentry. The whole town seems afflicted with a curse; the houses are crumbling to pieces;

the decorated gateways stand open and defaced; the wood of the doors has been cut away for sale in the market; the poverty-stricken owners slink out of their houses in the dusk of evening to catch a breath of fresh air, for they are too proud to show their rags in the sunlight. . . . Even in the worst days of previous anarchy they retained their small holdings on a rent-free tenure; the English Government, with its usual hard adherence to red-tape and regularity of procedure, has saddled these Native gentlemen with the burden of an oppressive taxation, and although they are now rendered more dependent than ever on their small estates by the very change of rule, they have been further reduced in their circumstances by this taxation to the land revenue.

The great chiefs and landholders were, of course, compelled to dismiss the armed followers and retainers on whom they had relied to resist the demands of the Government at Lucknow; the manufacture of arms necessarily came to an end; the weaving of fine cotton cloths, which, until the annexation, had been the most flourishing industry of the province, perished with that event; and thus, as I have already said, the entire population of Oudh were flung abruptly upon the resources of the soil alone, which was incapable of meeting this sudden, and largely-increased demand upon it. Added to all this was the vile character of the subordinate Native officials, who, under the protection of British bayonets, spread like a swarm of locusts over the province, bringing misery and oppression wherever they appeared. In his "Personal Adventures during the Rebellion," Mr. Edwardes—a Bengal Civilian—describes their operations, as related to him by a Native gentleman who had granted him shelter and protection:—

In the conversations I have had with Hurdeo Buksh, who is a very superior, intelligent man, he has given me to understand that the revenue collectors, who were introduced in such shoals into Oudh immediately after the annexation—were the curse of the country, and, in his plain-spoken phrase, "made our rule to stink in the nostrils of the people." . . . The Native officials they described as regular harpies, and a Native deputy-collector who had been stationed at Saudee they frequently mention to me with expressions of the deepest hatred. This fellow, they assert, had a pair of slippers of extra size made on purpose for "shoe-beating" (the most disgraceful punishment that can be inflicted on a Native), in open court, any one who refused to pay him what he demanded in the shape of bribes, or to sign any agreements respecting the disposal of their villages or land that he chose to fix upon, however unjust and ruinous to their interests these might be. Old Knssuree told me that he had paid 1,000 rupees in petitions alone, not one of which ever reached the Commissioner, and more than 6,000 rupees in bribes; notwithstanding which, he had lost the village farmed by him and his ancestors for many years, and had been assessed so highly for those he had left that he had only been able to pay his rent the preceding year by the sale of some of his family jewels and a mare he highly valued; and this year, he said, he would, no doubt, have been a defaulter, and been sold up, had not the rebellion fortunately occurred.

To all these adverse circumstances we have to add yet one more, which, as being continuous in its operation, has certainly told most heavily. In its independent state Oudh was a province, the entire resources of which were not only expended upon itself, but which drew in large supplies from other quarters. Its conversion into a British province converted this prosperity-producing condition into one exactly the opposite. Its surplus wealth was now drained away at the rate of £900,000 annually; so that, since the annexation, a sum of not less than £20,000,000—the combined product of the fertility of the soil and the industry of the people—instead of enriching the province, has been expended in defraying the costs of British rule in other parts of India. By annexation, the people of Oudh are taxed for the interest on debt accumulated in all the past wars of the East India Company; by annexation, they are taxed for famine in remote parts of India; by annexation, they are taxed because silver has fallen in value in relation to gold. Had we, as honesty and sound policy alike demanded of us, been content to restore order in Oudh; instead of confiscating for our own uses the wealth of the province, we should, not improbably, have escaped the great revolt of 1857, and Oudh, at this moment, would have been the home of a well-fed, contented, and thriving people.

I have, however, still to state the all-pervading evil which in Oudh, as in every other part of India, is eating away the happiness of the people and the prosperity of the province. I mean our Land Revenue Administration. "The members of the landed aristocracy of Oudh," Sir William Sleeman tells us, "always speak with respect of the administration in our territories, but generally end with remarking on the cost and uncertainty of the law in civil cases, and the gradual decay, under its operation, of all the ancient families. . . . They say that four times more of these families have gone to decay in the half of the territory made over to us in 1801, than in the half reserved by the Oudh sovereign; and this is, I fear, true." Since the annexation the same destructive process had been going on in that part of Oudh which had till then escaped the visitation. Sir George Couper—the late Chief Commissioner—while frankly admitting the fact, attributes it, with the habitual self-complacency of the British Civilian, to the superlative excellence of our administration. These are his words (Oudh Revenue Report, 1873) :—

It is of no use lifting up our hands in horror and dismay, and calling for reports, and uttering platitudes about the land passing out of the hands of the ancient race. We must either accept the situation, or alter our system of government altogether for it is that system which has called this state of things into

existence, and is perpetuating it. It is owing to our system that the thousands who formerly aided the soil with their earnings sent from afar, are now living on it a dead burden, where they were formerly an active support. It is owing to our system that girls are reared in hundreds. . . . It is owing to our system that men are no longer allowed to kill each other by scores in agrarian quarrels, that the march of fever and epidemic disease is checked. . . . Owing to the operation of all these causes, the population, which have only the land to look to for their support, are annually becoming more and more numerous. The consequences are not difficult to foresee; when the land cannot yield more than is sufficient for the mouths dependent on its produce, it follows that there is nothing left wherewith to meet the demands of the State. . . . Consequently . . . the land which is the security for the claim must be transferred in satisfaction of what is due upon it. . . . It is the business of higher authority to determine whether the blessings of our rule counterbalance its disadvantages. *But it is certain we cannot give a country all the benefit of civilization and allow the dwellers therein, at the same time, those advantages which they derived from being in a state of barbarism.*

I request the particular attention of my readers to the foregoing quotation. It is as fine an example as I have ever seen of the sagacity and logic of the "able Indian administrator." If we are to accept Sir George Couper's statement precisely as it is written, he holds that the inevitable result of the introduction of British rule into an Indian province is to impoverish, ruin, and starve the inhabitants. He admits that, in what he calls "their state of barbarism," they were exposed to nothing quite so terrible as this; but it is, he adds, impossible that they should receive at one and the same time "the advantages of barbarism" and "all the benefit of civilization." What these "benefits" are it would be difficult to discover from his explanation of the matter. Ridiculous, however, as the reasoning is, the passage is important as an official acknowledgment of the truth of my contention—that British rule, so far from giving security to rights of property, is a ruthless destroyer of them. It is, says Sir George Couper, "useless to lift up our hands in horror and dismay at the land passing out of the hands of the ancient race," for it is "our system which has called this state of things into existence, and is perpetuating it." Sir George goes on to say that the causes which lead up to this are the checking of female infanticide, the cessation of agrarian riots, the checking of epidemics, &c. This is stuff. The veritable causes are the same in Oudh which have produced similar results in the North-west Provinces—namely, excessive land assessments, which drive the cultivating classes into the hands of the usurer, and the enormous power wielded by the usurer through the action of our (so-called) courts of justice.

Whether levied on a single proprietor or a village brotherhood,

the Government demand on an estate is reckoned at half the actual rental; but in the case of a newly-annexed province, such as Oudh, there could be no trustworthy record as to the past rental of estates. The proprietor, or proprietors, stated one thing, which, of course, the Settlement officer disbelieved, and then proceeded to evolve a rental according to his own internal conception of what a fit and proper rent ought to be. As the greater part of our Settlement officers are about as fit to judge of the comparative productiveness of various soils as a blind man is to judge of colours, these "shots" at the rentals of estates were, as may be imagined, very wide of the mark. Only in one particular they rarely, if ever, erred; they rarely erred on the side of being too low. The Government demand was, almost invariably, considerably in excess of half of the rental actually received by the landholder or cultivating brotherhood.

A landholder thus over-assessed has two courses open to him—the one, to go on quietly paying the enhanced demand until he has ruined himself; the other, to institute suits in court for the purpose of enhancing the rents of his own tenants to an extent sufficient to enable him to meet the Government assessment. This latter course has the advantage that it will cause his ruin more speedily than the other. Mr. Connell has an account of what will follow, supposing the landlord to adopt it:—

The assessor told him to raise his rental from Rs.500 to Rs.1,000, and without delay proceeded to fix the tax at Rs.500. The landowner, after filing stamps and employing lawyers, after adjournments, delays, and appeals, obtains a decree raising the rental to the sum assumed by the Settlement officer to represent the proper rental. He has probably had to borrow in the first instance at excessive interest, in order to pay legal expenses. The decree transfers nominally the payment of all legal expenses, but not the usurer's interest, to the tenantry; these, crippled by this decree, are either unable to pay the costs of the suit, or, if they do so, are incapacitated from paying the enhanced rents; both they and their masters have been involved in one common ruin. As to the heart-burning and the bitter enmity created by these proceedings, no remarks are needed; the track of the Settlement officer must leave, not, indeed, burning villages, but scowling faces and griping poverty where before reigned peace, comfort, and contentment.

Sometimes, however, as Mr. Connell points out, the confusion is aggravated by the Judge taking a different estimate of the correct rental of an estate from that which has been assumed by the Settlement officer. The Judge then quietly tells the landholder that the rent cannot be equitably raised; and meanwhile the collector sends a process-server to arrest the bewildered landowner, because he has failed to pay the increased Revenue demand. And

then Mr. Connell gives the explanation of all this cruel blundering in the following instructive passage:—

Our system is simply to collect the tax to the last penny through the agency of the Tahsildars (native tax collectors). As the instalments fall due the Tahsildar scatters his notices to pay all over his subdivision; there are no jungles to fly to for refuge, and there are auction sales which are upheld by the arm of a resistless Government; the (English) collector knows little and does less; *the landowners feel that mercy is not to be expected; they pay what they can from the rents, and they mortgage or sell their property privately in order to liquidate any balances, for they fear that a smaller sum will be secured if the sale is an auction one managed by dishonest Government subordinates.* There is, in fact, no real revenue administration; the collector, especially in Oudh is a tax gatherer, and nothing more; he is a compulsory Jack-of-all-trades, whose days are spent in inditing countless reports on all miscellaneous matters of great or small importance, upon which the local Government of the day sets, or is forced to set, great store; he has to draw up portentous memos. on conservancy, municipalities, drains, and self-government, all the morning; his afternoons are occupied with his appellate work, and an odd half-hour or so, as leisure permits, is with difficulty snatched for the real work of a collector—namely, the disposal of the Revenue reports; those papers which have to do with the future prosperity or ruin of villages, must be perfunctorily rushed through, while a proposal for a new latrine has taken up hours of valuable time. The English correspondence and the judicial work *must* be got through for obvious reasons, but *few know or care about the internal state of a district so long as the Revenue balance-sheet is clear*; the registers of transfers of landed property may be long enough to stretch from Lahore to Peshawur, but few pay any attention to a trifle of this kind; the revenue has all been realized without much resort to coercive measures, for the mere threat of a Tahsildar suffices in most cases to drive the landowner to the money-lender, and the Local Government congratulates itself that the largest revenue ever known has been realized in a year of great agricultural distress without any noticeable resort to the sterner coercive processes; *animan picturâ pascit inani*, for those who go among the people, and who really make good use of their cold weather tour, know how grinding is the poverty of the landowners, and how many have been forced to borrow at ruinous interest, to mortgage and to sell, in order to meet the relentless Government demand. So the years roll on, and then perhaps, when half the land in the district has changed hands, the Government wakes up, and the reason is asked in surprise; a culprit is sought, but who can possibly be charged with the crime, for the head of the district has been changed every year, and each officer has governed on the old principle, "After me the deluge"?

Twenty years of insane administration of the kind sketched in the foregoing pages have sufficed to bring the people of the richest province in India to the miserable condition described by Mr. Irwin. And that this misery is not occasioned by the absurd and fantastic causes assigned by Sir George Couper, but from the stupid rapacity of the British Government, may be ascertained by any one who will take the trouble to look at the Oudh Revenue Reports. I quote a single passage from the Report of 1872 in order

to show the character of the information the reader will find there. The Collector of Hardui reports that—

As regards the collection of land revenue, we shall soon have a new set of landlords, who will probably be more punctual in their payments. . . . I found that during the year . . . the total, both of sales and mortgages, amounted to a third of the revenue of the district. *It would be difficult to meet with a single village, excluding the larger estates, in which the owners are free from debt and the land free from encumbrances. I can affirm with confidence that the money, save a fraction or so, borrowed during the year was taken to pay the revenue, and for no other purpose. The zemindars have been, and are, unable to meet the enhanced assessment.*

Thus are we once more brought to the fact to which, in nearly every paper I have contributed to THE STATESMAN, I have specially desired to call attention, and that is that the primary cause of the exceeding poverty and misery of the people of India is the pitiless and stupid severity with which our Government exacts its share of the produce from the soil. We rule the diverse races and provinces of India as a single community by means of an excessively centralized despotism, and the result of such a system is a perpetual antagonism of interests between rulers and ruled. It cannot be otherwise, because the system is in direct and violent opposition to the natural order of things—the richer provinces finding their wealth steadily drained away from them to supply canals and railways for the benefit of peoples who have no more legitimate claim upon their charity than Russians, Germans, or Frenchmen. The accident of a single paramount authority inflicts this wasting wrong upon them. The remedy, as Mr. Caird has shown in his valuable report, is to be found in a wide and courageous measure of decentralization. At present the theory of our Indian Administration is that the wants of the Central Government are first to be satisfied in full, and then, if anything remains, that residue may be applied to the benefit of separate provinces. This theory needs to be subverted, and one exactly the reverse to be substituted in its stead. The revenues of each Indian province should primarily be expended upon the needs of that province, and whatever surplus remains applied to the expenses of the general administration.

We do not mean that this theory could be carried into practice absolutely, but that it should be accepted as a guiding and regulating principle. Justice and expediency alike require that so it should be. When the nations of Europe were chained to the chariot-wheels of the first Napoleon, it required no lengthy argument to demonstrate the cruelty of that Imperialism whereby the youth of Prussia and Italy were drawn away from their native

lands to perish amid the snows of Russia or in the forests and hills of Spain. But the Imperialism we have set up in India acts in a manner not to be distinguished from the Napoleonic system. The rich provinces are starved of their wealth in order to feed the poor, and the consequence is that all are reduced to the same pitiful level of destitution. For when wealth is abstracted from one province in order to be poured into another, the object is not, primarily, to enrich the people of the latter province, but to enable the Government to give an additional turn to the screw of taxation. And thus no one is benefited—not even the Government, which would speedily find it to be far more profitable to allow this surplus wealth to fructify in the hands of its original producers. It is, however, idle to expatiate on this matter. The Ethiopian *may* change his skin, and the leopard his spots, but Indian Civilianism will never reform its ways, or acknowledge that it is otherwise than infallible, until some huge catastrophe, by destroying it and the empire together, has put it out of its power to make confession of error. Towards such a catastrophe we are drifting with alarming speed in India.

ROBERT D. OSBORN.

THE INVASION OF THE CRIMEA.*

FIRST NOTICE.

IN reviewing the "Life of Lord Lynedoch," we spoke of Wellington's Spanish campaigns as an unprofitable waste of human blood and treasure. But as we recall, one after the other, England's campaigns on the continent of Europe, it is difficult to recall any of which the same description would not be correct. For hundreds of years have we been pouring out our blood like water in pursuit of objects which neither benefited us nor any other people upon earth. Murderous wars, for example, for the preservation of the independence of Hanover; for preventing a French Prince becoming a Spanish King; for restoring the Bourbons to France—and Heaven knows what else. The British National Debt is a colossal monument in which we have reared an everlasting record of these national insanities. The happy chance of our insular position having excluded us from any legitimate participation in the distracted politics of Europe, we have supplied this deficiency by going in quite madly for "crazes." The Crimean War was occasioned by a "craze" which future generations will contemplate with a feeling of incredulous amazement. We rushed into this war, shouting loudly that we were determined to uphold "the sacred principles of international law." And then, as worthy associates in a mission so sublime, we joined ourselves to the two great anarchs of the day—the Sultan of Turkey and the blood-stained hero of the Paris massacres; the fact being, that our concern for "the sacred principles of international law" was itself the merest pretence. If international law had been the only thing likely to be injured by the Russian Czar swallowing the Turkish Sultan, not a British soldier would have left his barracks in consequence; but, as every one knows, we had a "craze" on the subject of Constantinople from which even to this day we have not wholly

* *The Invasion of the Crimea.* By A. W. Kinglake. Vol. VI.—The Winter Troubles. Blackwood and Sons. London: 1880.

liberated ourselves. We shall do so before many years are over if a Liberal Government remains in power. The moment that, instead of shrieking panic-stricken, we ask what it is we are frightening ourselves about, this particular "craze" will perish of its own absurdity. For what is Constantinople to us more than any other city in the world? We reach none of our outlying possessions *via* Constantinople. In all the vast mass of Jingo literature it has been our misfortune to read, we never saw any attempt made to answer this simple question. Five and twenty years ago this Constantinople "craze" was more rabid than even during the late Jingo frenzy; and the Crimean expedition was the horrible and disastrous consequence. Not less than 1,000,000 of men, it has been calculated, perished in this useless war, for which the British nation are mainly responsible. Mr. Kinglake, it is unnecessary to say, in his history of this stupendous national "craze" holds a brief for Lord Raglan. The object of his vast work is, primarily, to free the memory of Lord Raglan from all the aspersions that have been cast upon it in respect to the conduct of the Crimean campaign. And so far as the present volume is concerned, it cannot, we think, be denied that he does so successfully. The first hundred pages are taken up with what Mr. Kinglake calls a "Retrospective Inquiry" into the war administration of Great Britain. Much exception has been taken to this inquiry by the Reviews, as being irrelevant to a history of the Crimean campaign. But to us it seems strictly in place, and there can be no question, despite of Mr. Kinglake's occasional prolixity, that the investigation is very instructive.

The Government and people of Great Britain rushed into the Crimean campaign, ignorant almost as children of what was needed for the support of an army in the field, and without adequate machinery for the supplying of those needs when they came to be ascertained. We were without commissariat or hospital arrangements, without a transport corps, and without a War Department. All that we had towards the fighting of a successful campaign was a single army without reserves, and the recollections of Wellington's campaigns. It was these latter recollections which misled the nation. We supposed that the same war machinery was in existence in England which had supplied Wellington with the means of winning his battles, and we concluded that what it had done once it could be depended upon to do again. As Mr. Kinglake shows in his "Retrospective Inquiry," the people were mistaken every way. Wellington had organised his own War Department. Up to the close of the disastrous campaign of Talavera, there had been in England nothing at

all resembling a War Department. The method of carrying on war against France which was pursued by Pitt and his successors, had consisted in throwing a British force upon the coast of the country to be assailed, and then leaving the issue to Providence. No system was at work for supplying the waste of war, for keeping the force duly supplied with food, transport, and other indispensable requirements. The consequence was that until 1809 our military operations presented an almost uniform series of failures. They nearly all of them presented identical characteristics. A British force advanced bravely enough into the heart of a hostile country; occasionally it won a brilliant victory; but, destitute of reserves, and without proper transport and commissariat, the British general, sooner or later, was compelled to retreat hurriedly, and with all the external signs of defeat, to the sea-coast from which he had advanced. The Talavera campaign was, perhaps, the most signal instance of this. Opening as it did with a brilliant victory, it ended in the British army being chased out of Spain, leaving to the French the guns captured at Talavera, all their ammunition and supplies, and all their sick and wounded. So completely had both transport and commissariat broken down, that for ten days the troops had to subsist on four days' rations. Lord Wellington perceived that under conditions such as these it would be hard even to retain a footing in Spain, and quite impossible to drive the French out of it. He therefore applied his thoughts, and exerted all his influence, to the building up of a regular War Department, in place of the feeble and disconnected machinery which passed for such in London. This he effected, and his victorious career was the result. But, as Mr. Kinglake points out, peace was no sooner firmly established, than the Ministry of the day deliberately broke up and destroyed the War Department which Wellington had so laboriously constructed, so that when the Crimean war commenced we had fallen back upon the feeble and disjointed machinery which had all but destroyed the British army that fought and conquered at Talavera. Instead of a single organised department, all the forces in which could be set in motion by the impulse of a single will, the following was what we were possessed of, as set forth by Mr. Kinglake:—

In the ancient Tower of London, amongst the Clubs in Pall Mall, in the Strand, in Whitehall, and besides in the neighbouring purliens, there were nests of public servants transacting their respective bits of England's military business; some, for instance, in strength, at the Horse Guards, some holding the Ordnance Department, some ensconced at the Admiralty, yet engaged in land service duties, some busied under the roof of the Treasury, others burrowing in several small streets, yet somehow providing for our army, pay,

pensions, adjustment of claims ; the means of transport by sea ; stores, clothing, equipment, recruits ; surgeons, surgical instruments, medicines ; courts-martial, chaplains, church services : but there was not, until war approached, any high over-ruling authority that bound up the aggregate number of all these scattered offices into anything like a real unit of administrative power. Far from always appealing for guidance to some paramount chief, they rather co-operated with one another, and this, too, in a highly English spirit of independence, each maintaining with firmness the integrity of its little dominion, and expressing in able despatches to co-equals over the way, or perhaps at the end of the street, all those delicately shaded varieties of request, pressure, warning, remonstrance, which diplomatists well know how to choose when they speak in the name of Great States.

The cause of this ludicrous anarchy Mr. Kinglake finds in a constitutional "fiction." By a constitutional fiction, the British army was spoken of officially as if it were so much private property belonging to the Sovereign. And this fiction, during times of peace, was supported by so much of reality, that a considerable part of the military administration was independent of the control and supervision of Parliament. When, however, war broke out, the Sovereign was understood to make a formal abdication of his rights over the army in favour of Parliament and a Ministry responsible to the country. In this clumsy fashion the Sovereign escaped' the responsibility of seeming personally to conduct the war ; and thus, in case of failure, the constitutional fiction that the King can do no wrong, was preserved from injury. But another consequence was, that Ministers unacquainted with the work found themselves suddenly charged with the guidance of military affairs at a time when the quickness and decision born of intimate knowledge were, of all things, most essential. Having regard to all these things, it is not strange that a British army well nigh perished of cold and hunger on the bleak and windy heights of the Chersonese. The only thing to be surprised at is that it did not perish altogether.

The invasion of the Crimea was itself no better than a "happy thought," which occurred one morning to our prudent and sagacious nation, and which forthwith they compelled the Government to carry into effect. The origin of the war was the occupation by the Russian army of the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, as, what is termed in diplomatic jargon, a "material guarantee ;" and the allied armies were, in the first instance, assembled in Bulgaria as a preliminary step to the recovery of these provinces. But the menace of the Austrian Government, that if the Russians did not at once evacuate them, the Austrian army would act in conjunction with the allies had the desired effect, and the Czar Nicholas did as he was bid. Thus, not only had the original *casus belli* disappeared, but it was plainly demonstrated that Austria so completely commanded

the European approach to Constantinople that a Russian advance upon it was impossible without her permission. If the vast majority of the nation had not, at that time, been no better than political lunatics, Russia's prompt obedience to the Austrian demands would have cured us of Russophobia at once, and there would have been no Crimean war. - But we had set our hearts upon a war, like a child upon some new toy. And so, led by the *Times*, we began to vociferate that we could no longer allow the peace of Europe to be disturbed by the aggressive designs of Russia, and we ordered our rulers to go to war in order to preserve peace.

He who in quest of quiet "silence" hoots,
Is apt to make the hubbub he imputes.

This was precisely our condition. In an excess of zeal for international law we had allied ourselves with the two greatest anarchs at that time in existence. In our indignation against Russian aggressiveness, we were now guilty of a most unwarrantable aggression ourselves. We ordered Lord Raglan to invade the Crimea. Lord Raglan, a soldier of great experience, perceived at once the hazard of such an enterprise with a War Department such as we had in London, and ventured upon a remonstrance, which was immediately overruled. For a time all went well. The battle of the Alma gave us the command of all the resources of the Crimea, which by the celebrated "flank march" we deliberately surrendered to the Russians. The effects of that manœuvre are thus set forth by Mr. Kinglake:—

Resulting from the policy of the "flank march," and the more siege-like measures which followed, there had come upon the allies before Inkerman a change of conditions so harsh that they who, on the day of Alma, became potentially masters, if not of Sebastopol itself, yet certainly of all the rest of the Crimea, were now without a spot of ground left them except what lay under their feet, and had lost, too, all freedom of movement. Having voluntarily abandoned to the enemy, not only his precious line of communications, but almost the whole of the Crimea; having judged that—at least for the present—Sebastopol must stop them in front; and finally, having suffered Liprandi to close around their flank, nay, even to encroach upon their camp and warn off our people from the Worenzoff road—they had become completely hemmed in on the land side. In surrendering themselves thus to the yoke of their own chosen strategy, the allies, amongst other things, ventured to put themselves at war with the elements; and, their armies, lying camped for the most part on the bleak, open hold of the Chersonese, it was thus that they now undertook to confront the approaching winter. But, moreover, for their place of duress they had chosen a pittance of ground so small and so barren, that not only did it yield their soldiery no food, but even denied them what they needed of forage and fuel. . . . While they thus yielded up to their adversary the resources of the

invaded country, the Allied Armies threw themselves wholly upon aid brought over from the sea; and more absolutely than ever before, their welfare became committed to distant Ministers of State, and numberless officers and public servants of lesser degree, to merchants, contractors, ship-owners, ship-captains and sailors, to artificers of various callings, and workmen of various races.

As Mr. Kinglake's narrative clearly shows, this miscellaneous horde of personages on which our troops in the Crimea depended for their lives, worked with tremendous energy, and, considering all the circumstances, with no small measure of success. But sheer ignorance of the needs of an army in the field so operated that hardly anything was foreseen a moment before it was actually wanted; and a series of untoward events largely aggravated the difficulties which had to be overcome. To begin with, there had been no thought of a winter campaign until the failure of the bombardment of the 17th October, and then the warm clothes and other supplies which had been promptly despatched for the use of the troops, were lost in the tremendous hurricane which occurred on the 14th of November:—

In the evening of the 13th November, after wild storms of wind and rain there set in a calm, which lasted until an hour before sunrise on the following day; but then over the open downs on the Chersonese, [and the neighbouring coasts, harbours, and roadsteads, there swept on the 14th November a violent hurricane, accompanied by thunder and lightning, by heavy rain, hail and sleet, and followed, before the day ended, by driving snow. . . . Of the French shipping, one man-of-war, one despatch boat, and several supply vessels and transports were lost: but it was upon the English supply-ships and the English camp that the disasters most heavily fell. Of the vessels freighted with munitions and stores for our army, no fewer than twenty-one were dashed to pieces and totally wrecked, with grievous loss of life, while eight besides were dismasted. . . . Even in the little land-locked pool of Balaclava, the shipping there huddled was grasped as it were and confounded and rudely battered together by the whirling tornado; whilst, moreover, the captains of vessels which had been lying outside seized the one hope of saving their crafts which seemed to be left them, and lawlessly drove their way in, carrying yet more confusion and horror into a crashing thicket of bulwarks, and masts, and spars.

On the morrow of this tremendous calamity, Lord Raglan set to work with patience and promptitude to repair the mischief which had been done. He sent selected officers to Constantinople and elsewhere to buy up warm clothing and hay to replace that which had gone down in the ships sunk by the hurricane, and these missions were carried out with marvellous celerity and success, but fresh difficulties had arisen before they could be executed. The storm and the wet weather which followed had converted the hard clay road between the British camp and Balaclava into a sea of liquid and adhesive mud. Mr. Kinglake shows, conclusively enough, that no

blame attaches to Lord Raglan for the terrible condition into which this road was permitted to fall. He was fully alive to the urgency of the need, but the siege labours imposed upon the British army—thinned as it was by death, wounds, and sickness—were so continuous and exhausting, that men were not to be got for the construction of the road. The consequence was, that with abundance of supplies in Balaklava Bay, our army—only nine miles distant—was perishing of cold and hunger. In the month of January, the British troops, nominally effective, in front of Sebastopol, numbered only a little more than 11,000 men; a force which, after manning the trenches, and providing the necessary camp guards, left the General about 4,000 men on which he could rely for repelling a Russian attack in force. In a passage of fine eloquence, Mr. Kinglake describes the demeanour of the British soldiers at this crisis of the campaign:—

Even of the 11,000 men on the Chersonese, still able to handle a firelock and keep their names out of the sick-list, it must not be imagined that all, or even perhaps a great part, were free from great bodily ailment; for there reigned in the suffering army so noble a spirit, that many, though ill, refused to increase the labours of their comrades, by going into hospital. . . . All their hardships—hardships too often fatal—our officers and men endured with a heroism, as the Sebastopol Committee declared, “unsurpassed in the annals of war; and in truth the contented devotion of the men under these cruel trials was such as to appear almost preternatural in the eyes of one who measures self-sacrifice by a merely civilian standard. . . . The true soldier, or “paid-man,” as distinguished from the one raised by conscription, is indeed a man governed by feelings and convictions which at first sight appear strangely different from those of other human beings. Upon the humble rights that he has acquired by entering the army he insists with a curious tenacity; but as regards the other side of the wild romantic bargain, he performs it with unstinting readiness, paying down his vast stake, his freedom, his ease, his strength, his health, his life, as though it were nothing worth. Lord Raglan, when visiting the field hospitals, used to ask upon entering each tent whether any of the men there collected had any complaints to make; and then it commonly happened that one of the sufferers answered by firmly alleging a grievance, but a grievance, strange to say, unconnected with the privations then threatening his very life,—a grievance based in general upon some question of “stoppages,” and always concerning money. . . . He would hold the State fast to its bargain in respect to those pence that you promised him through the lips of the recruiting sergeant; but on the other hand he seemed to acknowledge that he had committed his bodily welfare no less than his life to the chances of war, and would let the Queen have what he sold her without a grudging word.

But the spectacle of a British army perishing by slow degrees upon the bleak Chersonese hills was not at all that which the nation had promised itself when it rushed into war. It knew nothing of war but the superficial glitter which a victory lends to the history of

a people. And when confronted by the stern reality, it passed from a state of unreasonable confidence, into one of contemptible panic.

The most interesting chapter in Mr. Kinglake's present volume is that on "the demeanour of England" during the "winter troubles" of 1853-54. The reader of Mr. Kinglake's previous volumes will not need to be reminded that he has a very peculiar method of writing what he calls history. Specially does this appear in his treatment of public characters. He deals with them very much as Mr. Robert Browning deals with Bishop Blougram or Sludge the Medium. He subjects them to psychological analysis as though he had some gift of divination whereby he could penetrate the inner chambers of thought, and reveal the processes which are there proceeding. He differs from Mr. Browning in that he does not present the subjects of his analysis as speaking in the first person, and so being self-revealing. There is a certain piquancy in this method which tickles the imagination for the moment, but it is, in truth, very little removed from mere speculation. Mr. Kinglake really knows no more of the thoughts of the Duke of Newcastle, Lord Panmure, and others whom he thus analyses, than is known by the world in general. As history recedes into the background, these secret matters are, as it were, cast up on the surface by the publication of letters, memoirs, autobiographies, conversations, diaries, and other varieties of private history, and then this psychological treatment is more practicable. But we are still a great deal too near the period of the Crimean War to have acquired the materials for such minute knowledge of the hidden springs of events.

Our troops in the Crimea during the winter did not, in all probability, suffer more than, or even as much as our armies had to endure in Spain, in the island of Walcheren, and elsewhere. But the nation was altogether unprepared for any suffering. They remembered the glories of Wellington's campaigns; they had forgotten the terrible cost which had been needed to purchase them. Also, for the first time in history, they had the dismal, unexciting realities of a winter campaign painted for them, week after week, by one who had a remarkable capacity for that kind of work. But for Mr. Russell's letters to the *Times*, there seems no reason to suppose that the condition of our army upon the Chersonese heights would have evoked any urgent public attention. The service to the State rendered by those letters extended far beyond the Crimean campaign. They had the effect of familiarising thoughtful men all over the country with the

details of what an army in the field requires in order to make and keep it efficient; and in this way they created a public opinion outside of the army of sufficient strength to compel the carrying out of reforms within it. Our army administration is very far from what it ought to be even yet; but the progress is immense since the days of the Crimea, and this advance we owe, primarily, to the rousing effect of Mr. Russell's letters.

The *Times* has now fallen into a state of such decrepitude that it requires an effort of the imagination to realise the enormous power which it wielded then. It, more than any other agency, had been the means of hurrying the nation into this most foolish and iniquitous war. Cobden and Bright, as we all remember, had tried in vain to stand up against this daily manufacturer and guide of public opinion. They were swept away into a temporary unpopularity; a fact that will remain in history, as a proof of the passionate, unreasoning credulity of the English people. We are not, as a nation, very much more stupid than other nations; but the singular thing about us is the credit we take to ourselves for the possession of qualities in which we are signally deficient. We pride ourselves, for example, on our sound practical good sense, and immediately exhibit our utter lack of it by choosing the *Times* as our guide; and rejecting the monitions of such a calm, farseeing, reasonable intellect as that of Cobden. When the winter set in and the "winter troubles" of the army began, the *Times*, which had been the most eager for war, led the way in exciting the national terrors. Mr. Kinglake gives us some extracts from its "leaders" of those days, which sound strangely in the ears of those acquainted with the colourless articles which now fill its columns. After speaking of our dying soldiery, the "leader" goes on as follows:—

But their aristocratic general, and their equally aristocratic staff, view this scene of wreck and destruction with a gentlemanlike tranquillity. Indeed, until strung into something like activity by the reflections of the press, the person on whom the highest responsibility for this situation devolves, had hardly condescended even to make himself superficially acquainted with its horrors. The aristocracy are trifling with the safety of the army in the Crimea, just as here they are dawdling over that periodical luxury, the formation of a Government.

The *Times* looked forward to a time when Lord Raglan and his staff would "return with their horses, their plate, and their china, their German cook, and several tons' weight of official returns, all in excellent order, and the announcement that, the last British soldier being dead, they had left our position in the care of our gallant

allies." The *Times* would not even hear of reinforcements being sent to our weakened army. It wrote:—

For our own part, whatever others may be pleased to do, we will take no further part in such an affair. We wipe our hands of the war under the existing management. If Government, if the House of Commons, or the British public choose to sell themselves to the aristocracy, and through the aristocracy, to their enemies, it is their own affair; we wipe our hands of the national suicide. All that we can do is to protest and to warn, and that we will not cease to do, though hitherto we have done so in vain. Under the existing management, we repeat, we have no choice left but to protest against the further prosecution of an enterprise which leads to nothing but ruin and disgrace.

The *Times*, in a word, which had been most urgent for the war, now apparently desired to withdraw from it abruptly, without even attempting to arrange conditions of peace, or so much as consulting with our allies. Articles such as these pouring forth in a continual stream had the effect of creating a panic throughout the country. Among the many admirable capacities of our gifted nation, that of being panic-stricken without adequate reason is one of the most conspicuous. In general these panic-terrors seize upon us, not merely without adequate reason, but without any reason at all. We imagine all at once that the French are about to attack Portsmouth or the Russians to appear in Calcutta and pull the noses of the Governor-General and his Council. At such seasons, it is in vain for the few who preserve their sanity to demonstrate the utter impossibility of either occurrence. The sane people are denounced as traitors; and we spend millions of money in fortifying Portsmouth or invading Afghanistan, or perpetrating some other wild and costly absurdity. In the case of the Crimean War there was some cause for alarm. The nation had forced the Government into a war, and neither the nation nor the Government had any idea of how a war ought to be conducted. The consequence was that our troops were perishing. They were without warm clothing, without adequate food, without base hospitals that could properly be called such. But the Government and all the various departments were working as hard as men could work to make good the shortcomings of their times of ignorance. It was clearly no time to call off their attention from these pressing duties, by compelling them to appear as defendants in a kind of national court-martial. That our war administration had failed grievously in fulfilling the purpose of its existence was not to be denied. That a searching examination into its nature and methods of conducting business had become imperative as soon as the war had ended, was also obvious. But a panic-stricken nation had got beyond the reach of reason. Nothing would

content us but an immediate inquisition into the conduct of the war, while still the war was going on. Officials who could not be relieved from the duties they were discharging, were at the same time to be put upon their trial as being unfit to carry on those very duties. Lord Raglan was not himself to be relieved from the command of the army, but his staff was to be taken from him, and brought home to England under a cloud of disgrace. In other words, the General was to go on fighting, but as a warning that his fighting had not given satisfaction, his hands were to be lopped off. All through the autumn recess of 1854 these irrational purposes continued to grow in strength and definite shape, and when Parliament assembled on 23rd January, 1855, they found expression in Mr. Roebuck's motion for a Committee—"To inquire into the condition of our army before Sebastopol, and into the conduct of those departments of the Government whose duty it has been to minister to the wants of that army." This motion was carried by a majority of 157, and thereupon Lord Aberdeen's Government resigned. The new Ministry differed from the old only in this, that Lords Palmerston and Panmure filled the offices hitherto held by the Earl of Aberdeen and the Duke of Newcastle.

The charge which the *Times*, as we have seen, was repeatedly urging against Lord Raglan and his staff, was that they had taken no pains to ascertain the actual condition of the army entrusted to their keeping. It was perishing, as it were, immediately under their eyes, but, they knowing nothing about it, Ministers at home were of necessity equally ignorant. As soon as Lord Panmure became Minister of War, he embodied these charges in an official despatch, thereby giving them royal and ministerial sanction. In this despatch there is one sentence which has roused Mr. Kinglake's wrath exceedingly. It is as follows:—

It would appear that your visits to the camp were few and far between, and your staff seem to have known as little as yourself of the condition of your gallant men.

This is put with a bluntness which may be set down as rude, and the charge is, of course, absurd. Lord Raglan and his staff must have known the condition of the army from the reports of officers commanding regiments, if not from their own observation. The really important question at issue is, whether or not they kept the authorities at home properly acquainted with what was going on. Both the Duke of Newcastle and Lord Panmure complained bitterly of the darkness in which Lord Raglan left them. Mr. Kinglake, on the contrary, declares that their ignorance can be accounted for only

on the assumption that they did not read Lord Raglan's despatches. He says that having before him "two folio volumes comprising Lord Raglan's despatches and private letters to the Duke of Newcastle, I perceive them to be abounding—richly, largely abounding—in that very information which Lord Panmure says he 'cannot find.'" It follows, therefore, that Lord Panmure did not carefully read, did not master the papers in question. Unluckily for the settling of this disputed question, this conclusion is not so clear to the reader of Mr. Kinglake's book as it is to Mr. Kinglake. There is not an extract from these folio volumes illustrative of this "abounding information." We are asked to accept Mr. Kinglake's assertion for proof, and from so devoted an admirer of Lord Raglan this is by no means sufficient.

MR. GLADSTONE'S LAND BILL.

THE proposed Irish land legislation, as indicated in the Queen's Speech, and further by Mr. Gladstone, is likely to follow a safe middle course. It would be equally futile to attempt to satisfy the extreme Tory party or the adherents of the Land League. Both parties occupy extreme positions, and must submit to a middle course. The Home Rule question is beyond the sphere of practical politics. If that claim were granted, we might expect the same intolerance of Protestantism which has been experienced by Roman Catholics in the past. It is the intention of the Government to reduce exorbitant rents where they prevail. Where the rent is too high, or is objected to by the tenant, or where an increased rent is imposed, the matter could be settled by arbitrators mutually appointed, these selecting their umpire. This is the plan proposed alike by the Ulster tenants and probably by the Commissioners on the Land Act of 1870. It must be admitted that equal protection could thus be afforded to both interests; and it is admitted even by landlords that the value of the tenant's interest is in many cases greater than that of the landlord. This is made clear in its origin in two cases given by the *Times* correspondent in its impressions of the 6th and 7th January. In both cases land worth only 2s. per acre was reclaimed at the tenant's cost, and thus raised to a rental value of 20s. per acre. If such tenants get fair play, their tenant-right is worth nine times the value of the fee. Suppose such reclamation to have been effected a short time before Griffith's valuation was made, the rate would be ninefold greater than the proper value of the landlord's interest. In one of the cases mentioned in the *Times*, as above, the tenant had capital at command, and reclaimed the land—which is in County Kerry—in five years. The law should provide protection for capital which has been thus invested. It should be taken for granted in Ireland that improvements have been made, according to custom, by the tenants, but the landlord should have the opportunity of proving the contrary. On some Irish estates the sale of tenant-right is not permitted, though

the tenant may have made all improvements. Other landlords restrict the price to £5 or £10 per acre, though it may be of five or six times that value in the market.

Though some landlords impose these unjust and capricious rules, they urge the necessity of protecting the interest of the purchasers of land through the Encumbered Estates Court and otherwise. Such buyers must take the risk of falling as well as rising markets. If such land is to be utilized, the tenants should be able to live by the produce of the land, and not on charity. We shall see by-and-by that no consideration was shown for the tenant's interest when the land was sold by the said Court.

Rent can be equitably arranged by arbitrators mutually appointed. It has been found that the decisions of county court judges under the Land Act were supposed to be affected by political feeling. A Ministry who held that the Land Act of 1870 was "spoliation and robbery" could not be expected to appoint judges who would have the least sympathy with the tenant's claims. On the other hand, if the Land League party were in power, the landlords would not get justice. Land tribunals should be above the suspicion of partiality. Even Irish Tory landlords are now reconciled to arbitration upon rents. The principle has been in operation for many years in our Australian colonies, with very satisfactory results. Even-handed arbitration is the method proposed by the Ulster tenants for arriving at a fair rent. We find certain Irish landlords who object to their tenants giving fortunes of a few hundred pounds to their daughters when they get married; others charge Irish tenants with having, in the aggregate, large sums deposited in the banks. The agent of the Fishmongers' Company says that rents are not too high while tenant-right sells well. All such remarks imply that tenants should pay rack-rents, and have no right to any return for the large capital they have invested in improvements. We are told by Sir Richard Wallace that tenant-right on his estate is worth £19 10s. per acre. That property has been as honestly and honourably acquired as the fee, and should be equally entitled to share the profit or loss by the land.

It is alleged that meat, pork, and butter are higher in price than they were fifty years since; but it should be borne in mind that disease is much more prevalent, and that wages, rates, and taxes are much higher. In some cases during the last year the whole of the sheep on certain farms have died from flukes, and there was much loss amongst horses and cattle from that disease also. The production of pork in Ireland is vastly reduced in consequence of the potato disease. Bacon and hams were among their chief exports a few

years since ; but, taking one Irish town as a sample, it appears that nine-tenths of the local consumption of bacon and hams is now supplied from America. The purpose of the rack-renting policy of certain Irish landlords is to absorb the tenant's interest by maintaining or imposing exorbitant rents, and by the establishment of such office rules as have been mentioned above.

The present state of lawlessness in Ireland has arisen from the causes which have been partly indicated above. Irish tenants feel that the laws which specially affect them have been framed so as to be injurious to their interests, while affording an undue advantage to the landlords. Those who enacted and maintained such unequal laws are responsible for the present state of affairs. There has been one good result from the present agitation ; it has made Irish and other landlords amenable to reason. As to fair rents, arbitration would reduce rack-rents, and would also prevent an undue increase of rent.

Mr. Gladstone seems to be prepared to provide for the free sale of the tenant's interest. This may be carried out to the fullest extent, to the advantage of all parties. Farms may thus be transferred without cost or trouble to those who have the skill and means to work them. This arrangement does not suit those landlords who wish to appropriate their tenant's property, but the landlord's outlay in improvements should be as fully protected as that of the tenant.

Under the guidance of the present Ministry, we may expect a proper development of the Bright clauses of the Land Act of 1870. It seems reasonable that where tenants have, say, a third interest in the fee, the said interest should go far towards the needful security for the payment of the instalments of the purchase-money. These payments might be spread over fifty years. It could be arranged that when two or three yearly payments were in arrear the land must be sold, and that the balance of the price would be paid to defaulting owners. The cash to buy out such estates as would come into the market could probably be obtained at 4 per cent. in the money market.

It should not be supposed that Mr. Gladstone's land scheme is fully developed, especially as the results of the Commission of Inquiry on the Land Act are not yet available. He is, surely, to be trusted for the doing of all that is practicable and requisite in connection with the Irish Land Question. A large amount of information is now available on the subject, and the welfare of the Irish people, and even of the British nation, is at stake. Landlords should consider whether their prospects as regards an equitable

settlement of the Land Question would be improved by waiting the effect of a much more widely-extended franchise.

Lord Grey has filled some columns of the *Times* with his objections to the Land Act of 1870, and to any further concessions to tenant farmers. If he were inclined to do equal justice to both parties, he could state his views more briefly. While condemning the Land Act, which only gives an instalment of justice to the tenant, he has nothing to say against the Encumbered Estates Act, which has been applied to property of the value of £52,000,000; thus absorbing the interest of the tenants, which was worth at least £10,000,000, into the fee. This is quite as it should be from the standpoint of certain landlords. The Prussian Land Law of 1811 was on a more equitable basis. The combined interest was sold to the highest bidder, and the proceeds equitably divided between landlord and tenant. This could be done in Ireland also, but the system of absorption is more in favour with the majority of landlords. It does not seem to occur to them that by putting off the day of reckoning they only insure the worse terms in the end. The 10,000 Irish landowners cannot continue to override the rights and liberties of 5,500,000 of people. If landlords are wise, they can still have their just rights. Mr. Disraeli said in 1834 that in Ireland "they had a starving population, an absentee aristocracy, and an alien Church." The landlords, as a class—at least, the majority of them—have been disposed to perpetuate these evils. It appears that English landlords have also been exacting rents that have rendered vacant in Essex farms to the extent of 50,000 acres. The loss and misery that result from this state of affairs is more easily imagined than described.

Lord Dufferin, in his statement on the Irish Land Question, which appeared in the *Times* of 4th January, maintains that the free sale of tenant-right is an infringement upon the interest of the landlord. I would ask how this agrees with his further statement, that a large property in Ulster has been sold lately at twenty-seven years' purchase? We are told also that the Land Act of 1870 has confiscated the landlords' property; but we find that the average price in 1868 was 18·9 years' purchase; for the five years ending 1876, 19·4, and in the above case twenty-seven years' purchase! The fact is, that by defining and protecting the respective interests, the value of each is increased. It should be observed that the absorption of the tenant-right, as the above property was sold through the Encumbered Estates Court, has probably raised the price from £18 to £27 per acre. It is worthy of note that the landlords' interest in Ulster (notwithstanding the high price of tenant-right) is of more

value than in the South and West of Ireland. It is merely trifling with the subject—taking for granted that the tenant should pay rent on his own improvements—to say that the high price paid for tenant-right doubles the rent. The one-third interest of the tenant should be free of rent. The tenants are quite willing to bear their proportion of the fall in prices and rental value, but object to the loss being thrown wholly upon them.

Lord Dufferin sees the necessity for emigration, but in recommending the Canadian Dominion as the proper destination, he overlooks the fact that while £6 6s. takes the emigrant to Canada and £14 to Australia, the former takes only 40s. per annum of our manufactures, as compared with £17 per head in the latter case. The exports respectively are 50s. and £19 per head. There is the further circumstance in connection with Canada that it may at some future day be annexed to the United States.

As to extensive reclamations of land in Ireland, I find that the cost would be about £15 per acre—say £375 for twenty-five acres. The passage money for a family to Australia would be £70; the balance of the £375 would purchase 180 acres of much better land, besides affording the means of bringing it into cultivation, and providing stock to work it. In the colonies, both the results of their labour and the consumption of our manufactures would be doubled, and the risk of being thrown on the charity of the British and American people would thus be avoided. I am fully sensible of Lord Dufferin's many admirable qualities, but submit that we are all subject to prejudice where self-interest is concerned. As to relieving the pressure of our population by emigration, the Australian colonies are taking out large numbers at their own cost, and could probably take double the number if the Home Government would bear half the cost—still leaving the selection to the colonial agents. Even in England there is much surplus labour. Notwithstanding the mild winter, there are many able-bodied men now out of work. It is much better policy to aid in the conveyance of such labour to the best market than to allow the unemployed to drift into pauperism. If labour is withdrawn from any part of the three kingdoms, room is made for the surplus that exists elsewhere. We decline to pay £7 as a moiety of the passage money to secure good customers, and thus incur the risk of supporting them as paupers at a cost of £10 per head per annum.

We learn from the *Times* of December 16th that Leicestershire landlords have, in some parishes, half the farms thrown upon their hands; to secure tenants, they have reduced the rent 20. or 30 per cent, and also spend large sums in improvements, rather than

throw the land out of cultivation. In other English counties, farms of 1,000 acres can be had by merely paying the rates and taxes. Compare this state of affairs with the position of the tenants of Sir Richard Wallace, in Ulster. The tenants of this most benevolent baronet met in a suitable building near Moira to discuss the question of a reduction of 25 per cent. in the rent, on account of foreign competition in produce. The discussion was interrupted by an Orange mob with a band of music. Stones were thrown on the slated roof, and against the window shutters; the door was burst open, and the farmers were assailed with stones and brick-bats; some of them were severely injured, and the meeting was thus broken up. This is the mode of reasoning adopted by Tory landlords and agents, who employ the residuum of their supporters in this manner, both during elections and other exciting times. Sir R. Wallace is quite a favourable specimen of his class, and is only maintaining the rents imposed by his predecessor. One of his tenants stated to the meeting that the farm which he now held at 25s. per acre was held by his grandfather at 2s. 6d. per acre, and that all the improvements that had so largely increased the rental value were made at the cost of the tenants.

Lord Oranmore has alleged in the *Times* that the rent on his Hertford estate cannot be too high when the tenant-right has been lately sold, in some cases, at £19 10s. per acre. This just implies the absorption of the tenant's improvements by a rise of rent. The rent on the said estate 150 years since was from 3s. to 5s. per acre; the present average appears, from "The Great Land owners of Great Britain," to be 24s. 4d. per acre. This increased value has arisen chiefly from the tenants' outlay—at all events, not from that of the landlord. Lord Oranmore does not refer to the brutal assaults committed on these tenants. He probably views the occurrence as an illustration of the boasted "freedom of contract." Landlords who are so ready to raise the rent, so as to absorb the tenants' outlay, should be willing to reduce it to meet lessened returns from the land; by refusing such concessions, they teach their tenants to act unjustly in return. Tenants have been driven by such conduct, in certain cases, to combine against the payment of rents that are reasonable. Where the tenants have doubled or trebled the rental value, they have as large an equitable interest in the land as the so-called owner. I have known the tenant-right of Ulster farms, on which the tenants had made very costly improvements, to sell so high as £52 per acre; and even in Kerry it sometimes sells at £24 per acre. The present state of the Irish Land Question seems to have arisen chiefly from the imposition of rack-rents by certain

landlords. Had the owners made the needful improvements, a change of tenants could have been easily effected, and real freedom of contract secured. According to the Irish custom in days of old, land was let at a moderate rent to local residents, but of aliens a rack-rent might be exacted; it is but too commonly the case on some estates to rack-rent all alike. While the land was tribal property, members of the tribe or clan were allowed to hold on easy terms, while interlopers paid a rack-rent. In many cases interlopers now strive to exact more than a rack-rent from the descendants of former owners of the land.

As the character of the Irish people is too commonly traduced through the press and otherwise, I quote the words of Bianconi from his "Biography," page 83. He was an intelligent, independent, and unbiassed witness. "The peaceable (character) and high moral bearing of the Irish people can only be known and felt by those who have lived amongst them, and who have had long and constant intercourse with them. I have, therefore, been equally surprised and pained to observe in portions of the respectable press, both in England and Ireland, repeated attacks on the morality of our population, charging them with a proneness to violate the laws, and with a disregard of private property. But as one plain truth is worth a thousand bare assertions, I offer, in contradiction of these statements, this indisputable fact: *My conveyances, many of them carrying very important mails, have been travelling during all hours of the day and night for forty-two years, and the slightest injury has never been done by the people to my property, or to that entrusted to my care.*" His conveyances ran 3,800 miles per day.

Mr. Bianconi bought estates to the extent of 5,000 acres; one purchase was in a locality known as the "Devil's Bit," County Tipperary. The tenants were not in the habit of paying rent, but he called them together and told them that all his tenants were required to take leases at Griffith's valuation. The leases were accepted, and the result was "that he had no tenants on any property who were more punctual in paying their rent, and they afterwards became orderly, industrious, and thriving."

The tenants of Sir R. Wallace had a more recent and undisturbed meeting, requesting a reduction of rent on account of bad harvests and low prices. They say that "it is utterly misleading for Sir Richard Wallace to refer to Griffith's valuation, as many of the tenants have paid large sums for fined-down leases, thus capitalizing and buying out a portion of their rent. A former owner, the Marquis of Hertford, to serve his luxurious wants, absorbed nearly all the tenants' capital, giving in return fined-down leases;

the payment was in many cases compulsory upon the tenants. This explains the statement that the rent is below Griffith's valuation." The tenants allege "that their improvements have been made the basis of continual rises of rent;" "that the right of free sale is interfered with;" "that vexatious office rules have been recently introduced; and that 5 per cent. on the rent is charged as receivers' fees." They say that, "unless there is a system of live and let live between landlord and tenant, many of them have no resource but to leave the country." Such being the circumstances under a most benevolent proprietor on a large estate, what must be the position of tenants on small properties? I have it on the best authority that many Ulster farmers, even those holding fifty acres or more, are unable to provide as nourishing food for themselves and their families as they have to provide for the paupers in the workhouses. A farmer who took his butter to market, and was told by the official who tested its quality that it was first-class, replied that he could not say as to that, having never tasted it. The landlords have upheld their sway for many generations by a sort of trades' unionism; but the mass of the Irish population is following suit, which may result in equitable terms. See the position of the tenants on a small estate in Ulster which was bought some twenty years since, and the rents were doubled on the tenants. One had to pay £64 instead of £23, another £57 instead of £29; another lost his lease by an accident, and though the landlord had the counterpart, instead of producing it, he raised the rent 50 per cent. Another, who holds in perpetuity, was charged £15 per annum for some years as a drainage rate; but, suspecting wrong, he applied to the Board of Works, and found that the landlord was paying only £5 19s., and pocketing the difference. The tenant got this put right, and recovered the surcharge. The drainage scheme was carried out by the Government, and cost £150,000 for the River Bann; but it was coupled with an abortive navigation scheme, costing £104,000. This navigation was carried on for some years by occasional trips of forty miles by a small steamer, worked by two men and a boy. This traffic ceased years ago, and the weirs and locks only tend to the silting-up of the channel and the flooding of 20,000 acres of valuable land. After many years of agitation, the present Government have granted a Commission of Inquiry on the subject. The better drainage of the country has doubled the maximum discharge of the Banu in forty years.

CHARLES WILSON.

Cheltenham.

POSTSCRIPT.—The tenant who has been mentioned as holding in perpetuity was also a tenant at will of 8 acres, but as the rent thereon was raised from 80s. to 60s. per acre he threw it up. This landlord has just reduced his rent 20 per cent. The nonpayment of Irish rents is the more inconvenient, as it is customary to have a notice to quit printed on the back of the rent receipt. I may add that the flow of water in the Lower Bann has increased from 400,000 to more than 800,000 cubic feet per minute during the last forty years. This fact may account for the floods in British rivers also.

INDIA BEFORE OUR TIME AND SINCE.

II.

WE have now before us the Report of the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone on the territories conquered from the Peishwa, in 1818, that was submitted by that gentleman, as Commissioner of those territories, to the Snpreme Government of India, and printed in Bombay in the year 1821. The reader will understand that Mr. Elphinstone was reporting upon those very Deccan districts, the misery of which has been so extreme for some years past; the districts in which the Deccan riots occurred three or four years ago, the causes of which a Commission was assembled at Poonah to investigate in 1875. At page 42, then, of his Report, we find Mr. Elphinstone writing as follows:—

The Mahratta country presents in many respects a complete contrast to the picture of Bengal. . . . The people are few compared to the quantity of arable land; they are hardy, warlike, and always armed. Till of late years, *the situation of the lower orders was very comfortable, and that of the upper prosperous.* There was abundance of employment in the domestic establishments and foreign conquests of the nation.

We have here the very distinct assurance that under the Peishwa, the situation of the lower orders of the people was very comfortable, and that of the upper prosperous. It is of these very districts that Mr. Malet wrote, as quoted by us in our last issue, that "great stores of grain existed even in the small villages, and that it was not uncommon for the ryots to possess a four years' store of grain in hand." Now the question is,—how is it that this state of matters has so completely disappeared, and that under a rule, administered with such pure intentions as our own, the people have become so abjectly poor and miserable? The statement that our rule has reduced the people over wide provinces of India to pauperism, is so wounding to our *amour propre*, that many Englishmen are ready to resent it as a calumny, believing it impossible that it should be true. It is, therefore, of importance that the fact should be established clearly; since it is obviously that poverty which everywhere

in modern days, converts mere drought and scarcity into actual famine. When we succeeded to the Peishwa's territories in the Deccan, the condition of the lower classes was "very comfortable;" that of the upper classes even "prosperous." We have the assurance of Mr. Elphinstone that this was so, after long years of residence at the Peishwa's Court, and after three years' actual administration of the territories after they had come under our own rule. How could a people be anything but "very comfortable" with abundance of employment, and with years of food stored up in their villages, as Mr. Malet tells us from his own knowledge of the facts. But we have other authority, as striking and as explicit, as to the facts. In a private letter, dated 1849, "written by a gentleman high in the Company's service," the decay of the people under our rule, in the adjoining province of Guzerat, taken by us twelve years before from the Peishwa, is described as follows:—

Many of the best families in the province, who were rich and well-to-do when we came into Guzerat in 1807, *have now scarcely clothes to their backs.*

Mr. Giberne, another Indian civilian, after an absence of fourteen years from the same province, on returning thereto in 1840 as Judge, says:—

I did not see so many of the more wealthy classes of the Natives. *When we first had the country, the aristocracy used to have their gay carts, horses, and attendants, and a great finery about them, and there seemed now to be an absence of all that.*

He gave this statement in evidence before the Select Committee of the Commons in 1848. As to the ryots, he said:—

The ryots all complain that they had money once, but that they had none now.

It is another writer, however, of this bygone generation to whom we are mainly indebted for our knowledge of the ruin which our rule brought upon the Mahratta provinces. Mr. Saville Marriott was nearly half a century in the Civil Service of Western India, terminating his career in 1842 as a member of the Bombay Council. Returning at last to England as an old man, we find him publishing an admirable essay upon the effects of our rule on the condition of the people. In this pamphlet he reproduces a letter which he had addressed in 1836 to Sir Robert Grant, who was then Governor of Bombay, Mr. Marriott being, if we remember rightly, Commissioner of the Deccan at the time. Observe what he says:—

For many years past I have, in common with many others, painfully witnessed the decline of the people, and more especially that part of the community

which has emphatically been styled "the sinews of the State"—the peasantry of India. It is not a single, but a combination of causes, which has produced this result. Some of these are, and have been from the beginning, obvious to those who have watched with attention the development of the principles of our rule in relation to such as have been superseded, become blended with our system; or are opposed to it in practical effect. Others are less apparent, and some complex; whilst another cause of the decline may possibly be involved in obscurity.

It is a startling but too notorious fact that, though loaded with a vastly greater absolute amount of taxation, and harassed by various severe acts of tyranny and oppression, yet the country was in a state of prosperity under the Native rule when compared with that into which it has fallen under the avowedly mild sway of British administration. Though, in stating the subject, I have used the expression, "a vastly greater absolute amount of taxation," yet I would beg to be understood as being fully aware those terms must be treated in a qualified sense, since it is manifest that, relatively viewed, a smaller numerical amount of taxation may, with reference to the means of payment, be, in point of fact, more burdensome than a much larger where the resources are more adequate to the object. But, in the particular case in point, it is, I believe, ability which has diminished; and that, too, to many grades below the proportionate fall in the pecuniary amount of fiscal demand. To the pecuniary injurious results are also to be added the many unfavourable circumstances inseparable for a time from a foreign rule. In elucidation of the position that this country is verging to the lowest ebb of pauperism, I would adduce a fact pregnant with considerations of the most serious importance, namely, that of late years a large portion of the public revenue has been paid by encroachment upon the capital of the country, small though that capital is in itself. I allude to the property of the peasantry, which consists of personal ornaments of the precious metals and jewels, convertible, as occasions require, to profitable purposes, and accommodations in agricultural pursuits, most frequently in the shape of pawn, till the object has been obtained. I feel certain that an examination would establish that a considerable share of this and other property, even to cattle and household utensils, has been for ever alienated from its proprietors to make good the public revenue. In addition to this lamentable evidence of poverty, is another of equal force, to be seen in all parts of the country, in the numerous individuals of the above class of the community wandering about for the employment of hirelings, which they are glad to obtain even for the most scanty pittance. In short, almost everything forces the conviction that we have before us a narrowing progress to utter pauperism.

Unfortunately, neither Mr. Marriott nor any man of his day saw with sufficient clearness the causes of this decline. The great fact that the currency of the country was inadequate to our administrative system, and produced all this misery, while the tribute absorbed the exports that should have led to its augmentation, was dimly discerned by these gentlemen. For want of clearer insight, the decline was laid upon the Ryotwaree settlement of the Presidency, and a permanent settlement at lower rates of assessment, recommended in its room. At best, such a measure could only have deferred the pauperization of the people, which, under the existing condi-

tion of things, was inevitable. These are not the passionate, ill-conditioned utterances of a disaffected press, be it remembered, but the mournful conclusions of an aged and able man, who knew precisely what he was saying, and who had with his own eyes seen the people sink, under our rule, from the comfortable "position" in which we found them, into this blank and utter misery. And we are to-day still inquiring how it is, that our rule thus panperizes the people, to whom we so earnestly desire to do good.

The first step that shook the prosperity of the Mahratta districts of the Deccan, was the demand made upon the people for payment of the land revenue in money. We forgot that there was little or no money in the country;—a consequence itself largely, of the exactions and rapacity which had everywhere marked our course in the last century, from 1757 to 1780. The phenomenon of a great and sudden fall in the price of agricultural produce, uniformly followed wherever British rule was set up over the people, in substitution of Native rule. The fall simply meant, of course, the impoverishment of the agricultural classes, and the depriving them of those stores of grain which they had ever amassed against scarcity. More than one early writer seems to have suspected the cause, but it was not clearly discerned or pressed upon public attention, until twenty-five years ago, when Major, now Sir George Wingate, almost the sole surviving author of the thirty years' lease system and of our modern land settlements, made an effort to awaken the Government to the facts. From that date, the point has never been absent from our own mind. Drought and scarcity were common enough before our time, and sometimes passed into actual famine; but the people were never so powerless before, to prevent the development of scarcity into starvation. Every village in the country had its own reserve of grain stored up therein against famine. To this hour, nothing will induce the ryots in Lower Bengal or Orissa to part with their private food reserves of rice, but necessity. It is of no use to offer a high price for the grain. The horrors of famine are burnt into the ryot's soul, and he is never at ease unless he has an ample reserve of rice stored in his own homestead to meet the calamity. In Orissa, the ryot never deems himself quite safe, we are told, with less than a full two years' store of rice in his homestead. Now the uniform result of introducing our rule into a province, seems to have been the gradual exhaustion of these stores, and at last their total disappearance. The sufferings of the rural population during the first few years of the transition from Native to British rule, seem to have been uniform and severe; and the cause one and the same throughout, namely, the hasty substitution of "cash assessments" for "payment

in kind," under the fatal delusion that "the principles of political economy" demanded the change. Within three or four years of the establishment of our rule, we find Mr. Chaplin, the Commissioner of the Deccan, writing (August, 1822):—

In closing my observations on matters connected with the revenue, it will not be irrelevant to notice *the extraordinary depression which has taken place during the last year in the prices of all descriptions of land produce.* Grain is throughout the Deccan cheaper now than it has been during the last forty years. This state of the market is not to be ascribed to any redundancy in the harvests of the last season, which were certainly not more than ordinarily productive. . . . The depression of the market unquestionably gives rise to difficulty in realizing the land revenue, and furnishes a *plausible subject of complaint* to the ryot.

The italics are ours. Not an inkling does Mr. Chaplin, who was an able man, seem to have had of the real cause of the depression. The ryot was being stripped of his "four years' stores" of grain, and obliged to sell them for nothing, to find cash for our land revenue demands upon him. "I am puzzled to discover," said Mr. Chaplin, "any satisfactory mode of accounting for it." The fact was, the system of enforcing cash payments from the ryot threw him at once, and hopelessly, into the hands of the only class that had, or could get, money. All that had been demanded of him before our time, was so much grain or other produce, while strict injunctions were issued to the mamlutdar (collector) that as "the grain and other articles payable in kind to Government, were valued in annual accounts at the market rate of each year, care should be taken to dispose of the same at the conjunctures that might be most favourable to the interest of Government" (p. 28). The only cash that the Government received was the cash paid to it by the native banker in payment for their purchase of the Government grain, or as an advance thereon, while the mamlutdar was waiting for a "favourable conjuncture" to effect the sale. As remissions, moreover, were regularly made to the ryot, on the occurrence of any great calamity or insurrection, and as arrears were never allowed to be carried forward and pressed against him beyond the next *kist* [collection], it is easy to see how much more lightly such assessments sat upon him, than the rigid exaction of cash payments at constantly recurring intervals, under our system. Payment in kind suited his condition and circumstances exactly, while it permitted the villages to amass reserves of grain, for their maintenance in drought and scarcity. But these reserves had to be sold, under a system that required the assessments to be forthcoming in money, and inexorably. Under this system, the ryot came almost immediately, we say, under bondage to the sowcar. The advances he required from the latter under the old

system, were mere advances for his own living, or for cultivating his holding, and were made in grain; while, under our system, the sowcar was indispensable to him, to enable him to pay his cash liabilities to us. Seed-grain or food-grain were all the advances he wanted before; now he must have *cash* from the sowcar to pay the Government. The sowcar found it almost as difficult to get the money as the ryot, the currency of the country being very restricted in amount. We make no pretensions to any discovery in this matter. That merit belongs to others, and mainly to the late Sir George Wingate. It was he who first led us to the study of the land revenue question in all its bearings, and who first opened our own eyes to the effect of the Home charges, and awakened a conscience within us on the subject. We have striven for twenty years past to popularize and enforce his views, and may here introduce an extract from his essay of 1857, every word and fact of which should be pondered by the nation:—

The Anglo-Indian financial system differs from that of the Native Governments in the following most important particulars:—

1stly. The payment of the Army, Police, and other public establishments in cash.

2ndly. The collection of the land-tax in money, instead of wholly or partially in kind.

3rdly. The transfer of a portion of the Indian revenues to England, for the payment of the Home Charges, usually and correctly styled "the Indian Tribute."

4thly. The creation of a funded public debt, of which the interest has to be paid in cash.

The charges to be defrayed out of the Indian revenue, being of an inflexible character, could only be met in years of deficient collections by borrowing, and hence they involved the creation of a funded public debt. But they brought about more important consequences still; for the payment of troops and establishments, and the interest of the public debt, in cash, of necessity involved the collection of the revenue in cash too; and the latter measure, however little thought of at the time of its introduction by our Indian land revenue collectors and financiers, has produced a momentous revolution in the value of property and bearing of taxation in India, far exceeding in degree, but similar in kind, to that effected in England by the return to cash payments in 1810.

Under Native rule, the land-tax was the chief source of revenue, and was in great part either levied in kind, or assigned for the support of troops and establishments. There was only a small portion of the whole collected in money, and transferred from the local to the central treasuries. The standing military force, kept and regularly paid by the Government, was small. The bulk of the troops consisted of a kind of militia furnished by jagheerdars and other landlords, to whom the collection of the tax was assigned for the support of these levies, and for conducting the civil administration of the districts placed under their jurisdiction. The troops or retainers of these feudatories were in great measure maintained on the grains forage, and other supplies furnished by the districts in which they were located. The land-tax was in consequence either wholly or

partially taken in kind, and what was collected in money was generally paid away to parties on the spot, and thus quickly returned into circulation. The hereditary Revenue and Police officials were generally paid by grants of land on tenure of service. Wages of farm servants and agricultural labourers were paid in grain. Grain, also, was the common medium of exchange for effecting petty purchases in country towns. The farmer's or labourer's wife took a basketful of grain on her head to market, instead of a purse of money, and therewith purchased her week's supplies. The people lived in a rude and simple fashion, having few wants, and knowing little of luxuries. In inland districts the chief imports were salt, metals, and a few luxuries for the better classes; but the value of the whole was inconsiderable, and the exports with which these were purchased were, of course, correspondingly limited. In this state of things, money was hardly wanted at all, and a small supply of coin sufficed for the realization of the public revenue and the settlement of commercial transactions. But while the quantity of coin in circulation was small, the prices of agricultural produce were well sustained, owing to the limited extent of land in cultivation, and the large demand for food by the numerous body of the people employed unproductively as soldiers, retainers, and public officers of all kinds, and the difficulty of supplementing deficient harvests by importations from more favoured districts, through the want of good roads or other facilities for the transport of bulky produce.

The foreign commerce of the country at large was necessarily confined within very narrow limits. It was only the products of the coast districts and the more valuable commodities of the interior, such as indigo and manufactured goods, that could bear the expense of carriage to the ports of shipment, so as to admit of being exported. India, at that time, coveted few of the productions of foreign countries, and her most important imports were the precious and common metals, broadcloths, jewels, and other luxuries for the wealthy.

The innovations made in the revenue and financial system by the British have, however, effected the most sweeping changes in all these particulars, and we shall now endeavour to trace their operation. On the territory of a Native prince passing under the sway of the Company, the first steps taken were to substitute regularly paid and disciplined troops, located in military stations, for the rural militia of the Native feudatories, and a staff of European and Native officials receiving fixed salaries, in place of the former *mamludars* and revenue farmers with their followers, who paid themselves by perquisites and other indirect gains, but received very trifling emoluments from the treasury of the State. The next, and an all-important step in Anglo-Indian administration, was to collect the land-tax in money, instead of realizing it in kind, according to the practice which had virtually, if not nominally, obtained to a great extent under Native rule. The immediate and inevitable consequence of this general enforcement of money assessments was, that the amount of coin previously circulating, and sufficient for the adjustment of the limited transactions connected with revenue and commerce under the Native system, proved quite inadequate for the settlement, without a derangement of prices, of the greatly enlarged transactions resulting from the British system. Under the Native system, the sale for cash of a small part of the agricultural produce of a district sufficed to provide for all its liabilities connected with taxation and commerce. Under the British system, on the contrary, twice or perhaps three times the quantity of produce had to be sold, in order to provide for the same objects, owing to the whole amount of the land-tax being demanded in coin. But the supply of coin remaining as before, the effect of this increased demand for it was, of course, to enhance its price. The coin in circulation had

to perform double or treble the work it had accomplished before. The ryot requiring more cash to pay his money assessment, had, of course, to bring more produce to market, which occasioned a glut and brought down prices. And this state of things was aggravated by the demand for grain and forage in the country markets being less than before, owing to the disbanding of the irregular force which had been kept up by the Native jagheerdars and other functionaries of the former Government, and to the increased production due to an extension of cultivation by means of these disbanded levies. Prices fell more and more, until in many cases our collectors found it to be wholly impossible to collect the full land assessment, and large remissions had to be annually made. The village grain merchants, who are also the village bankers, deprived of a sufficient market at their own doors, were compelled, in order to find money to supply their constituents with, to seek more distant markets for the disposal of the produce left upon their hands, in liquidation of advances previously made by them to the ryots.

The sufferings of the rural population during this transition period were, without doubt, very severe. The Revenue reports of our collectors in newly-acquired territories abound with harassing descriptions of the depressed condition of the agricultural classes, and with representations of the difficulties they experienced in collecting the land assessment, owing to the great fall in the prices of all descriptions of agricultural produce. The assessments of Sir Thomas Munro in the Madras districts failed from this cause. So did the early Revenue Settlement of the Bombay territories, and also the Permanent Settlement of Bengal, which occasioned the ruin of the first proprietors. And quite recently we have had a striking example of the same phenomenon, in the case of the Punjab. It is stated in the Report of the Board of Administration for the years 1849-50 and 1850-51, printed for the Court of Directors, that fixed money assessments were substituted in 1847 for the system we found in existence, and that in the whole of the Punjab a reduction of the land-tax, equal to 25 per cent., has been effected. The demand for food has not decreased—it has probably increased; for although the army of the late Government has been disbanded, there are not, between the Sutlej and the Khyber, less than 60,000 fighting men, with perhaps five times that number of camp followers. Hence there is a larger demand than before for food over the country generally, though the market round about Lahore is more limited. The labour employed on canals, roads, cantonments, and other public works, must cause the circulation of large sums of money, and increase the demand for food. The pay of our army within the limit (of the Punjab) has been estimated to be equal to £1,650,000. The expenditure by the various Civil establishments, the Commissariat and Executive departments, and the different works in progress under the Board, are probably equal to another £1,000,000; so that nearly double the Punjab revenues are at present spent in the country. In despite, however, of large reductions of assessment, the complaints during the past year on the part of the agriculturists have been loud and general. Prices in many villages have fallen a half. The cry of over-assessment is loud and general. There has been a very general demand among the agriculturists for a return to grain payments, and to a division or appraisement of the crops every season.

It is clear, from these statements of the Board of Administration, that the specie in the Punjab must have been largely increased under our rule, even if we make the most ample allowance for the re-export of a portion of it, remitted by

our Sepoys and camp followers to their homes in the older provinces. And yet, in the face of this large increase of coin in circulation, prices have fallen nearly 50 per cent. The Board, following the example of our early collectors, attribute this decline of prices to abundant harvests and extension of cultivation; but it may well be doubted whether the increase of production in the Punjab up to the time referred to in the Board's report, had more than kept pace with the increased consumption due to the presence of our army, numbering with its camp followers nearly 400,000 souls. The phenomenon of a great and sudden fall of prices is not singular, or confined to the Punjab, but was equally observable in other parts of India, when they first passed under the rule of the British Government. The fall in the former, as in the latter case, will be of a lasting character, and an explanation of it must be sought in some cause of wider and more enduring action than the casual state of the harvests, or the extension of land under tillage. These circumstances may have contributed to the effect, as already pointed out, but only to a very limited extent.

This remarkable fall of prices, which has almost invariably followed the transfer of territory from Native to British rule, while neither capable of being accounted for by the state of the crops and extent of cultivation, nor by the annual tribute remitted to England, may yet be clearly traced to the extraordinary demand for money occasioned by our collecting the land assessment in cash, and conveying it away from the agricultural districts to our large military stations for the payment of the troops located there. A much larger currency than before would clearly have been required under this change of system, in order to sustain prices at the old standard. It was, however, impossible to enlarge the currency so as fully to meet the change, and no attempt to do so was made, or apparently ever thought of. The consequence was, that in order to obtain money for the payment of his assessment, the ryot brought more produce to market than before; but as there was no corresponding enhancement of the demand for it, prices necessarily fell.

It is now twenty-six years ago since the late Mr. Green, at that time Professor of Literature in the Poonah College, wrote a very striking series of papers on the "Deccan Ryots, and their Land Tenure." The papers originally appeared in the *Bombay Gazette*, but were seen to be so valuable, even by the Government itself, that they were collected and re-published in official form. We have treasured our own copy of them for the last twenty years, and never recur to them without being newly impressed with their value. "Our rule," said Mr. Green, "will be light or heavy in India, almost in exact proportion to the facility or the difficulty which the country has in creating a demand abroad for its products." Mr. Green's essay appeared at the moment when the people of the Deccan had reached their deepest misery. It was just before the Crimean War; and never was more clearly seen than in these writings, the value and importance of a thorough mastery of the principles and conditions upon which the "wealth of nations" depends. Mr. Green's political economy was far as the poles from the science which handed over a

million of people to death in Orissa fourteen years ago, under cover of its so-called principles; and which has again and again, within our own experience, been allowed to stereotype evils that should have been swept away without ten minutes' consideration. Mr. Green was one of the few men who *see* clearly the conditions of things around them. Their *foresight* would be prophetic, but that it springs from their exact insight into the present, and their knowledge of the laws which determine human progress. He pointed out that under our rule, an unheard-of portion of the revenues of the country was spent upon foreign commodities. A Governor, a Member of Council, Judge, or Collector, does not, as a Native Rajah or Jaghirdar, or Amildar, would do, spend his income on crowds of retainers and hangers-on of all kinds, creating a large and constant demand for the common food-grains of the country, and for ghee, goor, pân, betel, and so on. The English Judge, or other official, requires Long Acre carriages, Arabian or Australian horses, French wines, Parisian and London millinery, and the long list of foreign luxuries in which every one in India indulges, from the Viceroy down to the engine-driver. The rich Native, unfortunately for his own country, long since acquired a taste for these imported luxuries, and even the very poorest expends what he has—beyond the mere necessities of life—upon English piece-goods and copper, or upon China silk and silver. This intense demand for foreign goods was unknown before our time. It has sprung up under foreign rule, and has wholly changed the economic conditions under which the country is now administered. Let us suppose that a Native Prince and his nobility, such as the Peishwa, Bajee Rao and his Mahratta Sirdars, had suddenly changed their tastes and habits, say at the time of the Treaty of Bassein (1803). Let us suppose the Peishwa to have suddenly dismissed the swarms of Brahmins that hung about his court at Poonah; that the great Mahratta Sirdars of the Deccan followed his example; and that the sowars, peons, ghora-wallahs, and troops of idle servants and retainers, to whose maintenance the Mahratta revenues had up to that time been devoted, were suddenly cast adrift upon the Deccan; and that the revenues—which had hitherto supported all these dependents in rude comfort—were now devoted by the Prince and his Sirdars to the purchase of every variety of foreign luxury.

The first effect would be great misery to the classes thus deprived of their accustomed means of living; the misery we have seen so terribly exemplified at Lucknow, in the last twenty-five years. The second effect would be that the revenue spent by the Court and its Executive, no longer finding its way to the classes

thus suddenly made destitute, and through them to the Native bazaar, and through them to the cultivators that supplied the bazaar, the last or cultivators would no longer have it to return to the Government as revenue. The money, by the supposition, would have gone out of the country, to pay for the foreign luxuries consumed by the Prince and his noblemen under their new style of living. The final result would be a general inability of the cultivator to pay the former land revenue, and wide-spread poverty and distress, reaching to all classes. Now this is precisely the change which has everywhere followed upon the substitution of British for Native rule; while our *amour propre* is so profound that it is almost impossible to get the fact fairly looked at, when the policy of "annexation" is under discussion. Under Lord Dalhousie, it meant political extinction for any one, to suggest that a revolution of this order might possibly *not* prove beneficial to the people. That the subversion of Native rule in Oudh has been the direct cause of the cruel sufferings of Native society in Lucknow, is notorious. In the famine of 1878 we had Native ladies starving upon three pice a day, as our correspondent, an English official, wrote to us at the time:—

A system of relief by task-work has since September been in operation in the city zenanas. The Native ladies, many of them highly born and delicately nurtured, have been glad to earn three pice a day by embroidering caps and doing chignon work. The money for this was all supplied locally, *i.e.*, by charities, subscriptions, and municipal grant.

The ruin which this one annexation wrought was, unfortunately, not confined to Lucknow. From some cause or other, or a combination of causes, our rule has reduced the masses of the cultivators to utter, abject pauperism; and their sufferings in the late famine, 1877-78, were incredible. We refuse sternly to shut our eyes to these facts, or to be silent about them. We have brought this misery upon the people by our ambition and greed, and we must redeem them at all costs from the position into which we have brought them, or stand branded in history with the deepest dye. What can we do? *That* is the earnest inquiry we should be all making of each other. Do something we must, and do it quickly too.

In inquiring into the causes of the growing poverty of the people under our rule, too much importance has, we believe, ever been attached to the nature of the land tenures. It has its place in the inquiry, and an important one, but no mere change of land tenure will ever rescue the people from the condition in which they now are. As a fact, we hold that the land systems of the Bombay Presidency and of the North-west, are among the achieve-

ments of our administration. Sir Richard Temple's settlement of the Central Provinces, on the other hand, is a cruel scandal, and ought to be done away with at all costs. It is the work of an utter charlatan, and, if permitted to endure, will eventually bring upon the Central Provinces all the confusion and misery, alienation of classes, and conflict of interests that the Cornwallis settlement has brought upon Bengal. In Behar, again, a radical change of land tenure would seem to be necessary. How can any peasantry be redeemed from abject poverty, when the classes above them are allowed to take nearly two-thirds of the produce of their sweat and blood? In Oudh, again, we believe there must be a change. In the rest of India the land tenures may probably be left alone; the imperfections therein, and such quarrels as the Bengal rent question, must be dealt with by the Legislature. The process through which the country must pass, to render any change of settlement productive of lasting improvement in the condition of the people was declared by Mr. Green to be as follows:—

The first step [said Mr. Green] is that the low assessment and favourable tenure shall increase the means and the industry of the agricultural population, and lead, as a consequence, to a large extension of cultivation. The second is that the tendency of a large increase of agricultural produce to glut the markets and produce falling values, shall act as an inducement to a portion of the cultivating class either to distribute themselves among other home employments, or to turn their attention to the production of exports, either agricultural or manufactured.

Of these two latter alternatives, the first—the increase of mere home industry—while it would, of course, add to the general abundance, would nevertheless be attended with a general fall of prices, rendering all fixed payments more and more onerous, and throwing a greater and greater proportion of the results of the industry of the producing classes into the hands of the Government, and of those who, from whatever cause, are unable to command fixed money incomes. To maintain undiminished prices in the face of rapidly increasing production, there can be, in the main, but one thing to look to—viz., an increase of the exports. . . . The subject of roads, navigable canals, improved vehicles, and improved means of transit generally, is thus intimately mixed up with the land settlements. Whatever, by cheapening the carriage, enables any product to be exported, while yet at a better price than it would otherwise have to fall to before it could command a foreign market, makes it more and more easy for the province to pay its fixed money rates in spite of an extending production.

We may dismiss this vital point of “the cheapening of carriage” for the produce of the ryot's fields, with the following extract from a private letter addressed to us, by one of the members of the Supreme Government—Sir Andrew Clarke—three years ago:—

I see you are in favour of the line in the Central Provinces from Nagpore to the rich wheat-producing territory to the eastward of it. I should be very

glad to see you write strongly on it. Wheat in Chutteesgurh is 168 lbs. per rupee; in Nagpore, only 180 miles away from it, it is 33 lbs. per rupee. Rice is 128 lbs. in Nagpore, 26 lbs. in Chutteesgurh. *Millions of tons are allowed to rot for want of a market, and the same may be said of many places in India.*

“Millions of tons of grain are being allowed to rot for want of a market [in the Chutteespore district], and the same may be said of many places in India.” We have been writing in the same strain for the last twenty years, and the one answer has ever been, “India must not borrow; we are in a state of chronic deficit; we are overwhelmed with debt; the people are groaning under the weight of taxation.” India must not borrow, is the “stupendous stupidity” that has allowed millions of tons of corn to rot in the country, while England is importing £50,000,000 sterling of bread stuffs a year, and the Indian ryot periodically dies of hunger by hundreds of thousands in a season—nay, by millions. A fourth of the whole population of Mysore has disappeared in the last four years, a fifth in the famine districts of Madras, and God alone knows what proportion in some of the districts in the Deccan, in Oudh, and the North-west; and we dare simultaneously put out official resolutions lauding the foresight, the energy, and the “success” with which we are encountering these calamities. And a Richard Temple comes forward with a volume of optimistic flummery to assure the nation that “all is well” in India.

EDITOR.

COLONEL A. W. DURNFORD.

THE welcome that awaited "the return of the Guards" from the Crimea to London elicited the following verses from a living poet:—

The steps that scal'd the heights of Alma
Wake but faint echoes here;
The flags we sent come back, tho' rent,
For other hands to rear.

Thro' shouts which hail the shatter'd banner
Home from proud onsets led,—
Thro' the glad roar which greets once more
Each bronzed and bearded head—

Hush'd voices from the earth beneath us
Thrill on the summer air,
And claim a part in England's heart
For those who are not there.

And if unstain'd, that ancient banner
Keeps yet its place of pride,
Let none forget how vast the debt
We owe to those who died!

These touching lines have often risen to our lips in these latter days, when people have been busy, presenting swords and raising triumphal arches in honour of Lord Chelmsford, Sir Frederick Roberts, and other of our Asiatic and African heroes. Amongst the many brave men whom the cruel and silly policy of the late Government hurried to untimely graves, there were none nobler or braver than Colonel A. W. Durnford, nor any the manner of whose death did more to keep "unstain'd that ancient banner." And yet he has gone to his grave not merely unknown and unhonoured by the nation whom he served so well, but, in the minds of a great number of people, laden with the responsibility of the terrible disaster of Isandhlwana. Such injustice as this is a necessary consequence of an unjust distribution of honours. If Lord Chelmsford was responsible for the slaughter at Isandhlwana, it is clear that he ought to have been deprived of his command at once, and dismissed to obscurity. But, for reasons intelligible to

most people, though incapable of being precisely stated, the late Government found that it was not convenient to deprive Lord Chelmsford of his command; consequently it was necessary to reward and promote him, and throw upon another the responsibility of his blunders. Colonel Durnford, being dead, could make no remonstrances, and those of any other might be disregarded. Accordingly he was selected as a fitting scapegoat to bear the sins of Lord Chelmsford; and the latter was summoned to Balmoral, was presented with swords, and greeted with triumphal arches, as if he were, in deed and in truth, a conquering hero. The authorities, we have been informed, have peremptorily refused to permit an official inquiry into all the circumstances connected with the battle of Isandhlwana; and, indeed, after their treatment of Lord Chelmsford, no other course was open to them. They could not have sanctioned such an inquiry without virtually admitting that they had promoted and rewarded Lord Chelmsford without taking the trouble to ascertain his deserts. We are under no such restrictions. In Colonel Durnford (as we believe) the country has lost a soldier whose abilities were hardly inferior to his moral worth and his chivalrous heroism, and we desire to do what we can to clear his memory of the unjust reproach that Sir Bartle Frere and Lord Chelmsford have endeavoured to cast upon it.

Sir Bartle Frere, writing on the battle, says:—

It is difficult to over-estimate the effect of such a disaster as that of Isandhlwana on both armies; but it was clearly due to breach of the General's orders, and to disregard of well-known maxims of military science.

Sir Bartle Frere might be described as a professional calumniator*. It is apparently impossible for him to take up his pen to write upon any subject connected with his career in South Africa without bringing charges demonstrably false against some people or person. The above extract is an example. It contains a double calumny: the first, that Colonel Durnford acted in "breach of the General's orders;" and the second, that he disregarded "well-known maxims of military science." For the first there is not a tittle of evidence; and as for the second, it would, we suspect, puzzle even the ingenuity of Sir Bartle Frere to enumerate the "well-known maxims" which were disregarded by Colonel Durnford at Isandhlwana. Colonel Durnford, as all the world knows, arrived at the camp only an hour or so before the battle commenced, to find it surrounded by swarms of Zulus, and in itself totally defenceless. But for neither the one circumstance nor the other was Durnford in any way responsible. It is certain that even

Lord Chelmsford, had he known that the position at Isandhlwana was so thickly beset by the enemy, would not have divided his force in the way he did, or rejected the advice pressed upon him to "laager his waggons," or turned, as he subsequently did, a careless ear to the repeated intimations of danger and disaster which reached him while the desperate struggle at Isandhlwana was being fought out to its fearful close. For all that happened anterior to his arrival at Isandhlwana, it is obvious that the responsibility must rest, not upon Colonel Durnford, but upon Lord Chelmsford. The neglect to thoroughly reconnoitre the country before dividing his forces, the selection of an untenable position for the camp, the leaving it without fortifications of any kind,—all these were the acts of Lord Chelmsford, and were, in point of fact, the efficient cause of the slaughter at Isandhlwana. There was not an error which, under the circumstances, it was possible for a General to commit which Lord Chelmsford contrived not to commit; and it is no exaggeration to say that, had he succeeded in paying due attention to even a single "well-known maxim of military science," there would have been no defeat. Lord Chelmsford has had the wit to perceive this; and when, last session, he rose in the House of Lords, and delivered that vindication of his proceedings which was pronounced so satisfactory by the noble lords who listened to him, he made no allusion to anything anterior to the arrival of Colonel Durnford in the camp at Isandhlwana. He endeavoured to represent the battle of Isandhlwana as an event for which he was no more responsible than if it had been fought in a different planet. Colonel Durnford had fought it according to his own lights; no demands for help had ever reached him (Lord Chelmsford); and on the former officer, therefore, rested the whole burden of responsibility. These assertions of Lord Chelmsford have since been traversed by a brother of Colonel Durnford, and we propose, briefly, to compare the two narratives of the battle.

Mr. A. Forbes' description of the camp at Isandhlwana is well known. He speaks of it as a place which invited surprise and attack, and as defenceless as an English village. Lord Chelmsford's judgment of the position is, naturally, a different one. He speaks of the hill of Isandhlwana as "a wall" covering the rear of the camp, and adds that "there was no ground that commanded it to the left within a distance of 1,200 yards, and there was no ground that commanded it on the right at a less distance than 600 yards. Taking, therefore, into consideration the nature of the weapons with which the Zulus were armed, it might practically be said that the camp was not commanded from any position whatever near it."

Here it will be observed that the only thing which Lord Chelmsford has to urge in defence of the position is, that there was no ground very near which "commanded" it. But the hill of Isandhlwana, though it might be a "wall" to the rear of his camp, was also an impenetrable screen, behind which any number of Zulus might muster without the defenders of the camp becoming cognizant of the circumstance, and as the "wall" was open at both ends, and the camp without fortifications of any kind, it is clear that the position was one, as Mr. Forbes described it, which "invited surprise and attack." A sudden attack from behind both ends of the hill could not have been resisted for a moment. As a matter of fact, however, the hill of Isandhlwana did not protect the rear of the camp. The camp was really a series of straggling camps, and strings of waggons and baggage of all kinds, which overlapped the hill at both ends. The garrison of the camp Lord Chelmsford reckons at 1,100 men, armed with Martini rifles, and as the front of the Isandhlwana Hill was about 250 yards in extent, he calculates that this gave him about four rifles for every yard of ground. But this statement is absurd and misleading. These 1,100 men, if required to fight, were not expected to fight literally with their backs against the hill of Isandhlwana. They were to defend the camp, not the hill; and the camp not merely overlapped either end of the hill, but extended, of necessity, far in front of it. The fact is, the position at Isandhlwana was not chosen with a view to attack and defence at all. Lord Chelmsford never dreamed that it was in any danger of being attacked; and, indeed, on any other hypothesis, his proceedings both before and after the battle would expose him to a far severer condemnation than that which is already his due. It is, we repeat, impossible to account for Lord Chelmsford's neglect of reconnoitring, and his division of his forces, except upon the supposition that he had convinced himself that no enemy being at hand, no such precautions were necessary. And from the same mistaken assurance, the camp at Isandhlwana was selected as a convenient site for leaving his baggage, and not for military reasons at all. It is most necessary for the justification of Colonel Durnford that this fact should be borne in mind. He had to fight a battle upon ground not of his own choosing, and that ground had been selected by Lord Chelmsford without any regard for military considerations. Lord Chelmsford's speech continues:—

When he left the camp, early on the morning of the 22nd of January, 1879, orders were given to Colonel Puleine by Major Clery, staff officer to Colonel Glyn, who was commanding the column, "You will be in command of the camp

during the absence of Colonel Glyn. Draw in," I speak from memory, "your camp, or your line of defence," I am not certain which, "while the force is out; also draw in the line of your infantry outposts accordingly, but keep your cavalry vedettes still far advanced." . . . In addition to the written orders which he had just read, Major Clery had a personal interview with Colonel Pulleine, and explained the orders which had been given. It was impressed vividly on Colonel Pulleine's mind that his orders were to defend the camp. With regard to the orders he might himself have given, it was curious that one of his aides-de-camp, whom he met yesterday, told him for the first time that in his note-book relating the facts concerning the unfortunate day at Isandhlwana he found that he (Lord Chelmsford) had an interview with Colonel Pulleine, and in reply to his question as to any orders he might have to give him, that he had said, "Defend the camp, and do not leave it." That was written after the affair, and could not be quoted as evidence; but it expressed plainly what his views were.

Now the charge which both Sir Bartle Frere and Lord Chelmsford bring against Colonel Durnford is, that he acted at Isandhlwana in breach of Lord Chelmsford's instructions, and that the defeat was "clearly" a consequence of that disobedience. What, then, were Lord Chelmsford's instructions? Lord Chelmsford has himself forgotten what they were, but "one of his aides-de-camp" reminds him, fifteen months after the battle, that they consisted in telling Colonel Pulleine to "defend the camp, and not to leave it." All this only confirms what we have already said, that when Lord Chelmsford marched away from Isandhlwana, he had not a thought that a battle there was impending, and, in consequence, left no instructions with Colonel Pulleine. For, simply to say "Defend the camp, and do not leave it," does not constitute an "instruction" as to the manner in which a battle is to be fought or a camp to be defended. No "instructions" having been left with Colonel Pulleine, it is obvious that Colonel Durnford could not have acted in defiance of them. The fact was, that when Colonel Durnford arrived at Isandhlwana, the circumstances were such as had never been contemplated by Lord Chelmsford when he left, and the Colonel had to act entirely on his own judgment. That Colonel Pulleine himself attached no very precise signification to the direction not to "leave the camp" (supposing, which is extremely doubtful, that any such instruction was given) is apparent from his subsequent conduct. Major Chard, of Rorke's Drift, in a letter describing the incidents of that day, writes as follows: "*When I arrived at the camp, the troops were in column, about a mile or so out of camp. Before Durnford came up there was scarcely anybody in camp. . . . On my way back (to Rorke's Drift) I met Colonel Durnford, about a quarter of a mile from the camp, at the head of his mounted men.*" Thus we find that, even before Colonel Durnford's arrival, the solitary

instruction which Lord Chelmsford dimly remembers to have left behind him had been disregarded—a decisive proof, in our judgment, that no definite instructions were given.

It is now for the first time (at about half-past 10 A.M.) that Colonel Durnford appears upon the scene. He has to take command of a huge and straggling camp, occupying a position without defensive capacities of any kind, and exceptionally capable of being surprised. He has but a slender garrison wherewith to defend it. Instructions from the General there are none. So unconscious, indeed, is that worthy gentleman of the approach of danger that simultaneously with the arrival of Colonel Durnford in the camp at Isandhlwana, Lord Chelmsford is despatching an officer to Colonel Pulleine with an order to forward to headquarters tents and provisions. All the information which Colonel Durnford can obtain is that Zulus have been seen in various directions around the camp, but, the General having neglected to reconnoitre, nothing is known either of their numbers, the direction in which they are advancing, or the character of the country they would have to traverse. What, under these unfavourable circumstances, was the line of action adopted by Colonel Durnford? He acted as every military man of sense and experience would have acted. He perceived at once that Lord Chelmsford's "wall" was, as we have already described it, a screen behind which a Zulu army might concentrate at leisure, without the knowledge of the British troops, and whence they could "rush" the camp on both flanks. His first act, accordingly, was to guard against this danger by posting a company of the 24th on a height whence they could observe what was passing in the rear of the Isandhlwana hill. This detached hill was about 1,500 yards from camp. Then, dividing his native cavalry into two bodies—the one under Captain Shepstone, the other under his own guidance—he advanced in the direction where the Zulus had appeared, to feel their numbers and ascertain their intentions. This, be it remembered, was at half-past ten in the morning, and the Zulus were actually storming the camp at noon. Lord Chelmsford, however, is of opinion that Colonel Durnford might have spent this precious interval in a more profitable manner than in attempting to make good his (Lord Chelmsford's) omission to reconnoitre the approaches to the camp:—

Had Colonel Durnford, [says Lord Chelmsford] before riding away from the camp with two troops of mounted natives, taken steps to see that its garrison were properly placed in the best position for its defence, and had he left instructions as to the measures which should be taken to improve a naturally strong position, I should still consider that he had departed from the orders which he

had received. The evidence, however, is absolutely silent on this point, and it must be assumed that Colonel Durnford felt no anxiety regarding the security of the camp he was ordered to defend, and that he did not consider any special precautions, such as entrenchments or laagers, were necessary.

We will defy even Sir Bartle Frere, in his most exalted moments, to surpass the cool effrontery of this passage. We have already shown that Colonel Durnford received no "orders" from Lord Chelmsford, and could not, therefore, have disobeyed any. But if Colonel Durnford was so heavily to blame because immediately on his arrival in camp he took no "special precautions, such as entrenchments and laagers," how much more heavily to blame is Lord Chelmsford, who, with abundance of time, also took no such precautions! Only the day before the battle, Lord Chelmsford had refused to "laager" his waggons, on the ground that it would require a week to do so; while, subsequently, he excused himself for not entrenching his camp because "it was found impossible to dig even a shelter-trench near the hill of Isandhlwana, owing to the rock cropping up so close to the surface." Lord Chelmsford is, in fact, upon the horns of a dilemma. If it was the duty of any one to "laager" and "entrench," clearly it was the duty of Lord Chelmsford. If, on the other hand, it was impossible (as he says) to do either the one or the other, what are we to think of his candour and his justice when he attempts to fasten upon a fallen soldier a reproach that is false by his own confession? The truth is, that Lord Chelmsford's defence of himself in the House of Lords is, from beginning to end, an after-thought. He must be aware that in the interval between Colonel Durnford's arrival at Isandhlwana and the Zulu assault, it was impossible to fortify the camp; and he must also be aware that but for his own groundless conviction of the absence of danger, he would himself have fortified the camp before dividing his forces. It is to this inexplicable conviction that the defenceless camp at Isandhlwana is to be attributed, and, also, as we shall see presently, a fatal remissness in sending relief to the heroic Durnford and his companions.

The main incidents of the battle that followed are familiar to most readers. The parties of mounted natives under Shepstone and Durnford speedily came in contact with the Zulu army advancing in immense numbers to the assault of the camp. They fell back, fighting, before this advance; and Colonel Durnford effected this retreating movement without loss to his own men, while causing the enemy to lose very heavily. At twelve o'clock the camp was surrounded. Colonel Durnford saw that the position was far too extended to be held by the small force at his disposal, and made an

endeavour to concentrate his men on the single position of advantage which the ground round Isandhlwana afforded. But it was too late to make head against the overwhelming numbers of the Zulus, and nothing remained for the leader to do but to cover the retreat of his men, at the sacrifice (if need be) of his own life. Mounted himself, and commanding mounted men, it would have been easy for Durnford to have escaped from the field of battle. But his was not a spirit to purchase life at so humiliating a cost as this. He dismounted from his horse, a few heroic spirits rallied to his call, and covered the retreat of the remnant of the British troops until the last man had fallen where he stood. "In a patch of long grass," wrote Mr. Forbes to the *Daily News*, "near the right flank of the camp, lay Colonel Durnford's body—a central figure of a knot of brave men who had fought it out around their chief to the bitter end. A stalwart Zulu, covered by his shield, lay at the Colonel's feet. Around him lay fourteen Natal Carabineers and their officer, Lieutenant Scott, with a few mounted police (twenty). Clearly, they had rallied round Colonel Durnford in a last despairing attempt to cover the flank of the camp, and had stood fast from choice when they might have essayed to fly for their horses, which were close by their side at the picquet-line. With this group were about thirty gallant fellows of the 24th." Curiously explanatory of this description is the account of that last struggle given by a Zulu who bore a part in it. When the Zulus, he said, broke the infantry and closed in, they came "on to a mixed party of mounted men and infantry men, about one hundred, who made a desperate resistance, some firing with pistols, others using swords, and I repeatedly heard the word 'Fire' given by some one. But we proved too many for them, and killed them all where they stood. When all was over I had a look at these men, and saw a dead officer, with his arm in a sling and a big moustache [Colonel Durnford] surrounded by dead Carabineers, soldiers, and other men whom I did not know." The stroke which gave Durnford his death-wound stopped his watch; it marked 3.40 P.M. From its commencement to its close, the battle of Isandhlwana continued for not less than five hours.

We have already shown that Lord Chelmsford had marched away from the camp at Isandhlwana without taking a single defensive precaution in case it was attacked. This most culpable remissness it is impossible for him either to explain away or extenuate, and he makes no attempt to do either. But the long duration of the battle suggests a further inquiry. How was it that Lord Chelmsford sent no reinforcements to the camp when it was attacked? Can it be that all through that disastrous day he had no intimation of what

was occurring in his rear? To these questions Lord Chelmsford's reply seems, at first sight, clear and explicit enough. He says that—

In point of fact, he only received one message from his camp in the course of that day, which was that mentioned in his despatch, which had been sent to him at eight o'clock in the morning, and which was received by him at 9.30, which merely gave the information that a body of the enemy had been noticed in a north-westerly direction. *From half-past eight o'clock until he reached the camp on his return, not a single message, if any were despatched, had reached him.*

Here Lord Chelmsford admits that he did receive one message, and that it informed him of the appearance of the enemy in the neighbourhood of Isandhlwana. This intelligence ought to have convinced Lord Chelmsford of the prudence of preserving "touch" with his troops at Isandhlwana. As a matter of fact, it had no effect on him. But is it the fact that he received no further intimation of what was occurring there? We think it can be demonstrated that it is very far from being so. At half-past ten on the morning of the 22nd, Captain Gardiner was sent by Lord Chelmsford to the camp with directions to Colonel Pulleine to send to headquarters tents and provisions for the men. Captain Gardiner says: "A few minutes after my arrival in camp, I sent a message to the staff officer, 3rd column (*i.e.*, to the troops with Lord Chelmsford), that our left was attacked by about 30,000 of the enemy; a message was also sent by Colonel Pulleine." Now, were either or both of these messages received by Lord Chelmsford or any member of his staff? If they were, and no action was taken upon them, then upon Lord Chelmsford rests the entire responsibility for the defeat of Isandhlwana.

Lord Chelmsford, as we have just seen, denies that he received any message later than half-past nine; but, at any rate, he must have been aware that Captain Gardiner had been sent to Isandhlwana to bring up tents and provisions. Is it credible that he should have acquiesced in the prolonged absence of this officer without making any endeavour to discover the reason? Now, it so happens that there is a variety of testimony establishing the fact that the receipt of these messages was known to the troops of Lord Chelmsford; and it is incredible that the troops should have become aware of that which remained unknown to the General. Lieutenant Milne, R.N., A.D.C., states: "*A slip of paper was received by the General from Colonel Pulleine, saying that the enemy were collecting in large numbers on the high ground to the left of the camp.*" Nothing could be more precise and definite than this; and there is other independent testimony to the same effect. Nor is it credible that if the

message had *not* been received, subsequent inquiry should not have discovered how or whither it went astray. This, then, was the second clear intimation of danger at Isandhlwana which Lord Chelmsford completely ignored.

Lastly, there is the memorable incident of the recall of Colonel Harness when that officer was actually on his way to aid the beleaguered camp. Regarding this incident, Lord Chelmsford, in his speech in the House of Lords, made a statement demonstrably untrue. He said: "Colonel Harness had himself referred to this incident in an article in *Fraser's Magazine*, and had given quite a different account." Now, in the article here alluded to Colonel Harness does not mention the incident at all. It is important to bear in mind these inaccurate assertions of Lord Chelmsford, because they are the ordinary expedients of those who feel that the object which they have in view is not to be achieved by an appeal to facts. "As a matter of fact," Lord Chelmsford goes on to say, "the statement that he (Colonel Harness) was in a position to afford relief to the camp was quite incorrect. He (Lord Chelmsford) was on his way to the camp, it must have been between three and half-past, the whole affair being over at one o'clock, when he saw Colonel Harness, about 500 yards from him, moving off in the direction of the camp, being then ten miles distant from Isandhlwana. Major Gosset, his aide-de-camp, asked him if he should go and stop the battery, and he said, 'Yes; he could not understand why they were moving;' and yet in the public prints there had been an accusation that Major (now Lieutenant-Colonel) Gosset prevented valuable reinforcements going on to the camp, and was almost accountable for the disaster. There was not a particle of truth in the story."

To this, the reply is that there is not a particle of truth in Lord Chelmsford's version of the incident. The actual facts are these. About 10 A.M. on the morning of the 22nd, the infantry, guns, and field ambulances were about one mile in rear of Lord Chelmsford and his staff, the Royal Artillery experiencing great difficulty in getting their guns over the watercourses. Orders were accordingly sent for half a battalion of the 24th to join headquarters; the remainder to escort the guns and ambulances back to the entrance of the Mongeni Valley, and there halt until further orders. In obedience to these instructions, Colonel Harness moved back about two miles, halting on some rising ground about twelve o'clock. There he saw all the signs of a desperate struggle going on in the direction of the camp. Presently a body of about 1,000 natives appeared in the plain below, and an European officer, galloping out to meet Captain.

Church, who had been sent by Colonel Harness to ascertain what was going on, said, "The troops behind me are Commandant Browne's contingent, and I am sent to give you this message: 'Come in, every man, for God's sake; the camp is surrounded, and will be taken unless helped at once.'"

Colonel Harness's duty was clear after such an announcement as this, and no orders, either from Lord Chelmsford or any one else, ought to have turned him aside from it. He ought at once to have marched with all speed to the camp. He might by so doing have laid himself open to trial by court-martial for disobedience of orders, but we hope and believe that there are many men in the Army who would cheerfully have faced such a risk when they had so grand an object in view. Colonel Harness, unhappily, was not one of these fearless spirits. There can be little question that, had he used ordinary despatch, he would have arrived on the field in time to save a portion, at least, of the heroic band which, under Colonel Durnford, were covering the retreat of their comrades. A soldier who clings to the beaten track of military routine when such a grand achievement is soliciting him to abandon it, is a man to be pitied, for such solicitations rarely occur twice to any one; but he cannot be blamed. The true culprit in this matter is either Lord Chelmsford or Lieutenant-Colonel Gosset; and every family in the British Empire which lost a relative in the slaughter of Isandhlwana has a right to require from the Government and the Commander-in-Chief that this matter should not be huddled out of sight.

The facts are these. When Colonel Harness received the intelligence that the camp at Isandhlwana was in danger, there was with him Major Gosset, the bearer of orders from the General directing him to rejoin headquarters. Colonel Harness rightly concluded that under the circumstances it was his duty to disregard the General's order and push on to Isandhlwana. Thereupon Major Gosset galloped back to Lord Chelmsford, and returned, when Colonel Harness had got some two miles nearer to the scene of battle, with a peremptory order to return, which, this time, Colonel Harness felt he could not disregard. So he counter-marched, and Durnford and his comrades were abandoned to their fate. Now the point which imperatively needs clearing up is this. Did Major Gosset conceal from Lord Chelmsford the urgent reason which had caused Colonel Harness to set aside the General's order to return? Because, if he did, we have no hesitation in saying that he ought to be dismissed from Her Majesty's service. Or did Lord Chelmsford, knowing the appalling news which had reached Colonel Harness, nevertheless send to him peremptory orders to rejoin headquarters?

Because if so, we have no hesitation in saying that *he* ought to be dismissed the service.

To sum up: Lord Chelmsford appears to stand convicted of the following faults of omission and commission in relation to the battle of Isandhlwana:—

1. He chose an untenable position for his camp.
2. He neglected either to entrench the camp, or laager his waggons.
3. He left it insufficiently garrisoned, without, by means of reconnaissances, having ascertained whether an enemy was in the neighbourhood.
4. On the day of the battle he received no less than three clear intimations that the camp and the garrison were in danger, all of which he totally ignored.
5. He has ungenerously attempted to transfer the responsibility of these errors and their terrible consequences to one who, being dead, is unable to defend himself.

A Government can plead, and not without reason, that it is impossible at this late date to go into Lord Chelmsford's acts anterior and during the battle of Isandhlwana; but this, at any rate, they can do: they can do justice to the memory of a soldier who died the death of a hero, by the publication of a General Order exonerating Colonel Durnford from the charges of disobedience to orders, and disregard of "well-known maxims of military science."

HOME AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE epistolary deluge that was let loose in the *Guardian* and elsewhere by the incarceration of Messrs. Dale and Enraght shows no signs of abatement. It was not likely that it should be checked by the escape of these gentlemen from durance, by means of a technical flaw in procedure. The decision which released them from prison was careful, at the same time, to affirm the entire validity of Lord Penzance's position as a Judge in ecclesiastical cases. And this, as we all know, is the veritable stone of stumbling and rock of offence to the High Church Party. Unceasing, though, as has been the outpouring of clerical letters upon this burning question, it cannot be said that they have been either interesting or instructive. The writers, one and all, have deliberately evaded the veritable point at issue. They have treated the controversy as though it were limited to the legality or otherwise of certain vestments, and the spiritual authority or otherwise of a particular Court; whereas it has reference to a far wider and deeper matter, which is—whether or not the Church of England is a body endowed with supernatural attributes. No one who has missed the perception of this can appreciate the magnitude of the controversy. When Englishmen threw off the religious supremacy of Rome, the act was regarded as an exercise of private judgment rebelling against the principle of sacerdotal authority; and so it was. But neither English bishops nor English clergy (as is manifest in almost every page of the Prayer Book) supposed that the English Church thereby divested herself of any of the supernatural attributes which belonged to her while in communion with Rome. In her corporate character, she was still in possession of certain divine gifts and graces which were not natural to her bishops and clergy, individually, as men. The episcopal laying on of hands, in the ceremony of ordination, had effects which transcended the physical sequence of cause and effect. The sacrament of the Lord's Supper was not merely a memorial feast, but a channel (so to speak) whereby spiritual power, unattainable otherwise, was poured into the hearts of those who participated in it. The infant at baptism was actually "regenerated" by means of that mystic ceremony. There were, in short, certain spiritual privileges belonging to the Church of England which Nonconformists were held to forfeit when they separated themselves from her. For a considerable time after the separation from Rome, the Church sought to convince the Nonconformists of the existence of these special privileges by cutting off their ears, slitting their noses, and setting them up in pillories to be

pelted with dead cats and rotten eggs. These measures having failed to produce the desired effect, a sort of tacit agreement was come to to allow the spiritual pretensions of the Church to fall into the background. The Prayer Book, as before, continued to assert them, and anybody who pleased was at liberty to believe in them, but they were no longer insisted upon, as in olden days, as constituting the very life and definition of a Church. The High Church Party, of which the Ritualists are no more than the logical development, brought these supernatural pretensions out of the obscurity into which they had been thrust, and insisted upon ascertaining if they were true or false pretensions. Having decided in their favour, they set to work, as opportunity offered, to purge the Church of opinions which denied the reality of these supernatural attributes. At this time they had no reluctance to set in motion the legal machinery of the Ecclesiastical Courts. The prosecution of Mr. Gorham for his rejection of the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, the prosecution of certain of the writers of "Essays and Reviews," the prosecution of Bishop Colenso, were all High Church prosecutions. It was their failure to purge the Church by legal methods of its Evangelical and Liberal elements which caused the High Church Party to doubt the spiritual authority of the Ecclesiastical Courts; and this doubt was converted into a certainty when the legal machinery, so ineffectual against their adversaries, was found to be so much more effective against themselves. In all this there has been (so it appears to us) no blame attaching to the High Church Party. On the contrary, their action has been consistent throughout. If the Church be, as they declare, a body having its roots in the apostolic ages, and informed, from age to age, with supernatural powers, it is, of course, impossible that the trustees and wielders of these divine graces should acknowledge themselves to be the creatures of a Parliament of Gallios, and bound to teach only such things as are pleasing to these Gallios. What all shades of the High Church Party—from Dean Church down or up to Dr. Littledale—are contending for, is not merely to escape from the jurisdiction of Lord Penzance, but to transform the English Church into a living embodiment and expression of the principle of Sacerdotalism. And here it is (as we believe) that the High Church Party will find, if they persevere in their present course, that they have provoked a collision with a feeling perhaps the deepest and strongest in the national character—its fear and hatred of Priestcraft. It is true that many of the most extreme among the Ritualists—notably Dr. Littledale—are vehement in their denunciations of Rome; but the abuses in the Roman Church which our Ritualists denounce are due to that very principle which they desire to revive in the English Church. A Church claiming supernatural illumination is not at liberty (without self-stultification) to reverse in one age errors which have been sanctioned in a preceding one, and is, therefore, under a necessity to uphold and defend them. Its action is paralysed by the tremendous character of its own pretensions. Now there can be no question that by Englishmen in general our Church is regarded as a protest primarily against Priestcraft and against Rome only, because Rome has hitherto been identified with this principle of Priestcraft. Nonconformists—even sceptics—have regarded the

Establishment not wholly without affection, as the memorial of a national victory over the great national enemy, and a certain ally in case the battle should have to be fought over again. A very similar view of the English Church has been accepted by the Evangelical and Liberal Parties within it. It is to this wide-spread and deep-rooted feeling that the High Church Party is bidding such noisy defiance. They openly declare their determination to set up the Kingdom of the Priest in the very institution which was intended to protest against him and all his works. That they will succeed is manifestly impossible; that they will disintegrate the Church, if they do not destroy its character as an Establishment, is hardly doubtful. The principle of Protestantism and that of Sacerdotalism cannot co-exist in one and the same institution when both are being pushed to their extreme consequence. The weaker must suffer expulsion.

Certain Deans—with the Dean of St. Paul's at their head—have addressed the Archbishop of Canterbury on this burning topic. They say: "Having regard to the uncertainties which have been widely thought to surround some recent interpretations of ecclesiastical law, as well as the equitable claims of congregations placed in the most dissimilar religious circumstances, we cannot but think that the recognized toleration of even wide diversities of ceremonial is alone consistent with the interests of true religion and with the well-being of the English Church at the present time." We have quoted this passage as illustrating the evasive manner in which Churchmen are dealing with this matter. One and all of the reverend gentlemen who signed this address must be well aware that the intensity and force of the present agitation is due to the circumstance that it is not a question of "ceremonial" at all, but of the essence of Christianity, and the spiritual nature of a Church. Either the sacerdotal claims of the Ritualists are very awful facts, or they are mere mummeries and absurdity. It is ridiculous to suppose that a Church professing to set forth a system of divine truth can quietly leave such a question to settle itself. Not poppy nor mandragora, nor all the drowsy syrups of the world, will medicine the Establishment to that sweet sleep which it enjoyed before the Ritualists began their clamours.

The "Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of South Africa," published about a fortnight ago, discloses the complete ignorance of both Sir G. Pomeroy Colley and Sir W. O. Lanyon, regarding the state of feeling in the Transvaal down to the very eve of the outbreak on the 21st October. Sir G. Pomeroy Colley, when opening the Natal Legislative Council, described the situation in the Transvaal thus:—

In the Transvaal the agitation which has long been fanned by a party inimical to the British Government appears to be subsiding. The country is tranquil, law and order are everywhere maintained, taxes yielding a large revenue have been regularly paid by whites and natives alike; and we may reasonably hope that the prosperity which the Transvaal now enjoys under a firm and settled Government will be permanent and increasing, and will beneficially affect this Colony also.

A month later Sir W. O. Lanyon, the Administrator of the Transvaal, appears to have acquired some dim recognition of the veritable state of feeling among the Boers. On the 19th November he addressed a despatch to Lord Kimberley, which ought to ensure his immediate removal from any post of importance in Her Majesty's Service, so plainly does it demonstrate the incapacity of the writer. Sir W. O. Lanyon surpasses the immortal Mrs. Malaprop in his partiality for "a nice derangement of epitaphs." He entreats the Colonial Secretary not to mistake "the dictum of a few agitators" for "the organically evolved opinion of the people." The term "people" in the Transvaal, according

to this military philosopher, is not "even a constituted part of an organised whole," but only "the despotic power of insinuating leaders." "I firmly believe," he goes on to say, "that had the people been left alone, or had they been accessible to those means and sources which governed public opinion elsewhere, their own good sense and feelings of right and wrong would have prompted them to accept the change as one which has brought increased security and prosperity to their houses and country." Here we have the habitual, self-complacent incapacity of a dull-witted Englishman to understand that what seems to him an admirable arrangement can appear otherwise than admirable to anyone else. Sir W. O. Lanyon, like most Englishmen when placed in a similar position, fails to see that if the new system is so superlatively excellent, and if the opposition is confined to a few self-interested agitators, "the means and sources which govern public opinion elsewhere" have been in the Transvaal all on his own side. But it is idle to argue seriously with a man in the position of Sir W. O. Lanyon. His position compels him to maintain a certain opinion, and to find arguments in support of it; and there being no good arguments, he is obliged to have recourse to bad. In the Transvaal we are merely reaping what we have sowed. The annexation was an act of aggression, rendered possible by menaces of violence, and sustained by promises of political privileges which have never been redeemed. There is only one wise and honourable course for the nation to follow, and that is to make speedy restitution of stolen goods. It is satisfactory to feel that by a large majority of the nation this necessity has been clearly perceived and insisted upon, and the information contained in the latest Blue Book on the subject shows that there is little or no difficulty in retracing our course. The one objection which has been urged against it, is the necessity of protecting the natives of the Transvaal from the cruelty of the Boers, and this objection has been put forth as if Boers and natives were so intermingled in the same area, that the subjugation of the former was inseparable from the grant of efficient protection to the latter. This, however, is not so. The portion of the Transvaal which has been occupied and tilled by the Boers was uninhabited at the time they entered upon possession, and to this day there are very few natives resident there. The Rev. G. Blencowe writes to the Colonial Office as follows:—

When the Boers entered the Transvaal, the Wakkerstroom, the Heidelberg, the Pretoria, and the Potchefstroom districts were without any of the original inhabitants; while the southern half of the Rustenberg, the southern two-thirds of the Middleberg, and the like proportion of the Lydenberg districts were also unoccupied. The Wakkerstroom and a portion of the Heidelberg districts do not seem to have been occupied by natives, except in some of the sheltered valleys. . . . But before the advent of the Boers all had been swept away. . . . Thus the greater part of the present Transvaal territory was free for occupation, and the Boers did not remove any natives in actual possession of the parts in which they originally settled.

Mr. Blencowe considers that this lack of native population was limited to the southern portions of the Transvaal, but a German missionary—the Rev. A. Merensky—to whom his letter was submitted for criticism, declares that the northern parts of the Transvaal, no less than the southern, were unpeopled when the Boers settled upon them; and both gentlemen agree in declaring that to this day the Boers and the Natives occupy, in the main, wholly different tracts of country. These facts, while they deepen the iniquity of the original act of fraud and robbery whereby we robbed the Boers of their independence, make the reversal of that act unexpectedly easy. And if a current rumour has any basis of fact, it would seem that the Government have perceived this and are prepared

to act upon it. That portion of the Transvaal (so it is said) which is in the possession of the Boers will be restored to independence; and only those parts inhabited by natives will be annexed to the dominions of the Crown. The profound unwisdom of extending British territory is, of course, patent to every reasonable person. The combined effrontery and hypocrisy, after all that we have done and are doing in South Africa, of pretending that we are one whit more just and humane to the native races than these same Boers cannot but be shocking to any one acquainted with the facts. But it would be too much to expect from any Government that they should wholly do the right thing. And we shall have reason to rejoice if we escape the infamy of having subverted an independent Dutch Republic by mingled fraud and violence. How very little the natives have to be thankful for by reason of a beneficent British Government being set over them may be seen from the following extract from Mr. Blencowe's letter to the Colonial Office;—

The Boer Government nominally levied a tax of one pound per hut, but this was only paid by the few natives on mission stations, and by the tenants on the farms of the few Boers who tolerated them. . . . Now, however, we have a Bill passed imposing a tax of ten shillings per hut, which the Colonial Secretary, in presenting his statement to the Council, estimates this year at £35,000, but states, on the authority of the Secretary for Native Affairs, that he expects it to bring in £50,000, while all other ordinary income is only £70,318. This last sum does not include customs dues, which are not yet imposed, but when imposed will be borne by all purchasers, black and white. Ten shillings per hut is not too much for those who are in the neighbourhood of Europeans, and who can, therefore, find purchasers for their labour and produce; but those on the northern border, far away from work and market, will find it a most oppressive burden. And it must be remembered that it is entirely new, and that now for the first time those are required to pay taxes who have hitherto received them, and that they have to pay for the hut and the land which the law declares is not their own. If your lordship will look at the map of the Transvaal, you will see that the parts occupied by the natives are as much outside of the southern division in the possession of Europeans as Zululand and Swaziland are outside of Natal. It is, therefore, no more consistent with justice that they should be taxed for the support of the Transvaal Government than that the Zulus and Swazies should be taxed for the support of the Natal Government. . . . It will certainly be greatly to their advantage to be under British rule, but it is not just to tax them beyond the true proportion of their advantages, and the expenses of their own Government.

It is tolerably clear from the foregoing passage, that these luckless natives are feeling "the beneficent effect of British rule" very much as the luckless Natives of India have been made to feel them. In other words, we, in the Transvaal, have been imposing a heavy immediate burden of taxation in anticipation of the enormous benefits which are hereafter to come to these natives from our mild and enlightened Government. To any one who knows practically the behaviour of Englishmen to what they call "the inferior races;" their tyranny, their consistent injustice, their wild and unreasonable panic-terrors, and the savage cruelty which is born of these terrors; the knowledge that a large additional number of natives have been brought under our domination can produce only the profoundest sorrow. No cattle led to the slaughter-house have a more assured destiny impending over them than these unhappy creatures. They will be ground down with taxes, and tortured with oppressive laws until they are goaded into rebellion; during this preliminary process the Secretary of State for the Colonies will look apathetically on, perhaps venturing upon a mild remonstrance, for which audacity some Colonial Sprigg will administer the necessary snub; and at last when the revolt actually occurs, the said Secretary will dub the maddened and oppressed Kaffirs "rebels against the Crown," and shoot them with a light heart.

We have commented elsewhere on Lord Lytton's speech urging the retention of Kandahar. The news that has since been received from Afghanistan shows the trouble and perplexity which arise from our lingering there so long. The tribes, we are told, in the direction of the Helmund are interfering with the carriage of supplies to Kandahar, and General Hume, the officer in command, has despatched a column of all arms to Knskh-i-Nakhud to overawe the marauders. We have not a word to say against this movement. Our garrison must, of course, be fed. But the movement shows, what we have never ceased to insist upon, that so long as we remain in Afghanistan we shall be engaged in hostilities with the tribes, and therefore must continue to be the great obstacle to a state of peace and order. The Government, we suppose, is waiting in the hope that Abd-al-Rahman Khan will become strong enough to assume the management of Kandahar. The rustic who waited for the river to flow by was not possessed by a more hopeless expectation. Eyoub Khan has planted himself too firmly in the hearts of the Afghans at Kandahar by the siege of that city, and his two victories of Maiwand and Deh-i-Khojeh, to be expelled by the puppet of an infidel invader such as Abd-al-Rahman Khan. And if we are determined to withdraw from Kandahar, it is to assure a civil war to put Abd-al-Rahman in charge of the province. He or his representative will be assailed and expelled before our troops have been absent a month, and his defeat at Kandahar would probably be followed by his expulsion from Kabul also. Actually, it is of no more importance to us what Ameer rules in Afghanistan than to know the name of the man in the moon; and we do not suppose that there is any member of the present Cabinet who, could he speak his mind freely, would not acknowledge this as freely as ourselves. But official etiquette requires that they should "make believe very much," and retire out of Afghanistan in a slow and gradual manner, looking warily to this side and to that, as if begirt about by hidden dangers and ambushes of every description. It is to be observed that neither Lord Hartington nor anyone else has assigned any reason for the inexplicable lingering at Kandahar, for the very sufficient reason (we may rest assured) that no reason can be given which would endure a moment's investigation. But for other reasons than the costliness of this stage "dissembling" policy, it behoves the Government to put a little more alacrity into their contemplated evacuation of Afghanistan. It would be a very evil thing, if insurrection assailed us in India before we were out of Afghanistan. And that such a circumstance is by no means impossible is shown by the news which has recently reached this country of the conspiracy at Kolapore. The manner in which the existence of this conspiracy (of which there can be no longer any question), was promptly denied by the Bombay Government is the latest illustration of the utter untrustworthiness of the official utterances of our Indian Bureaucracy. This abortive Kolapore conspiracy is merely one proof out of several which have recently occurred that the ground under our feet in India is, so to speak, undermined. Those whose business it is to follow events in that country with any degree of attention will have observed the frequency of what are called "scares" in our Indian cantonments. In stations widely remote from one another, we hear from time to time that the Natives have been seized with an unaccountable "fear," that there was to be a Mohammedan outbreak, or that the "Sirkar" (*anglicised* Government) was about to enter on some fierce and erratic course of action. These are straws which indicate the direction of the wind. They show that the Natives are aware that mischief is brewing around them, but are in ignorance and suspense as to when and where the storm is to burst. It is,

of course, quite possible, more probable perhaps than otherwise, that these mutterings of discontent may die away without swelling into anything more decisive. But it would be a mistake to assume that they will do so merely because an insurrection would have so little chance of success. If there be a revolt in India, it will be due to the extreme suffering and poverty of the people. When the burden of our Government has passed the limit of passive endurance (as, assuredly, it must do before long, unless wide and searching changes are effected), we shall, as in 1857, learn once more how much the wretched dare.

The Basuto War continues to drag on its weary length, and it is becoming tolerably plain that in fighting-fire the undisciplined and badly-organized colonial levies are not equal to the Basutos. Want of provisions may compel the latter to sue for peace, but they will not be vanquished in fair fight. As regards this contest, we would recommend to those of our readers who are desirous to understand its character and causes to obtain an admirable little pamphlet which has recently been published by Mr. F. W. Chesson, on behalf of the Aborigines' Protection Society. It is thrown into the form of a reply to Sir Bartle Frere's article on the Basutos, which appeared recently in the *Nineteenth Century*, and is an admirable specimen of controversial literature—abounding in facts, and unanswerable in argument. The utterly indefensible character of this war has never been so clearly brought out. While speaking of the Basuto War, it will not be out of place to comment briefly on Mr. Grant Duff's recently delivered speech on the subject. That speech was justly characterized as "ungenerous" in its references to Basuto loyalty; but it was more than this—it was misleading. Mr. Grant Duff did his best to represent the demand on the Basutos to give up their arms as a very trifling request on the part of the Cape Government, and which, had the Basutos been really loyal, they would not have hesitated to obey. But to say this is to take no account of the deep and cruel antipathy which Englishmen brought into contact with what they call "inferior races" invariably feel for them. The feeling with which our fellow-countrymen at the Cape regard the Basutos was seen in a letter from an Englishman fighting against them, on which the *Pall Mall Gazette* commented about a week ago. The writer of this noble epistle expressed the delight which he and all the force were experiencing in consequence of the issue of an order forbidding to grant quarter to the Basutos. He went on to relate how a comrade of his had butchered a friendly Basuto in cold blood, how Colonel Clarke was intending to punish the perpetrator of this dastardly crime, but the entire force having declared their resolution to mutiny if so exemplary a personage was taken to task, how Colonel Clarke set him at liberty, with something like an eulogium on his brave and humane action. Now, in estimating the conduct of the Basutos in clinging to their arms, we must remember the manner of men who are asking them to disarm. They are men like the writer of this atrocious epistle—like the perpetrator of the cowardly murder which he applauds and defends. The Basuto's gun is all that stands between him and a state of serfdom beneath the colonial farmer. British justice and British humanity are phrases which run glibly enough from the tongues of Cabinet Ministers and members of Parliament, but in relation to "inferior races," these qualities of ours are not distinguishable from the most grievous oppression and cruelty.



The Statesman.

No. VIII.—JANUARY 1, 1881.

EDITORIAL NOTES.

ON the 30th of December, the Editor of THE STATESMAN was summoned to the Bow-street Police-court on a charge of libel; and the case has been committed for trial before the Central Criminal Court on the 10th of the present month. The article complained of appeared in the October number of this journal, under the title of "The Restitution of Berar," and it is alleged by the prosecution that it contains two libels—the first, that of publishing a libel upon a foreign Sovereign for the purpose of stirring up ill-will between Great Britain and the kingdom of Hyderabad; the second, that of publishing an ordinary libel on the co-Regent of Hyderabad. The first accusation is, manifestly, absurd on the face of it. The article in question is a narrative, drawn from official documents, and relates how the present strained relations between Hyderabad and the Calcutta Foreign Department have been brought about, and suggests how that state of tension can be removed. Its obvious purport is to point out how a state of good-will can be substituted for the state of ill-will which at present exists—not between Great Britain and Hyderabad—but a certain Calcutta Bureau and the latter State. The second charge has, *primâ facie*, more of substance in it. The article in question points out what is notorious throughout India, that in their desire to sap the influence of Sir Salar Jung in the Hyderabad State, the Calcutta Foreign Office have appointed as co-Regent, the Ameer-i-Kabeer—a man in every respect unfitted for that high office. In making this statement we commented, as it was our duty to do, with severity upon the antecedents of this co-Regent as revealed in the official records of the Indian Government, and it is this part of the article which is complained of as libellous. We need not inform our readers that the Ameer-i-Kabeer is himself a mere stalking-horse in this matter. The procedure adopted shows this. What we said in the London STATESMAN has also appeared in the Calcutta Statesman, and in other Indian journals. Had the Ameer-i-Kabeer been really anxious to clear his character of the aspersions resting upon it, he would have instituted proceedings in Calcutta, where the matter could have been sifted to the bottom. But the object of this prosecution is not to elicit truth, but only to prevent its revelation to the British nation. The Ameer-i-Kabeer has already been used as a tool to destroy the power of Sir Salar Jung; and it is now hoped that he will prove not less effective in the destruction of THE

STATESMAN. What will be the issue of the trial before the Central Criminal Court we have no desire to attempt to anticipate. But the prosecution is a testimony to the utility of the work done by THE STATESMAN, and a strong encouragement to ourselves to proceed fearlessly in the task we have undertaken. THE STATESMAN is the first systematic attempt which has been made to reveal to the nation the dark and unknown places of our Indian Administration; and the Indian Bureaucracy is well aware that these places will not bear to have light let in on them. If THE STATESMAN were merely an ignorant slanderer, the secret promoters of this prosecution are sufficiently astute to understand that by a statement of the truth its slanders would be made impotent for evil. But they know that it has spoken but the truth; and therefore it is that, instead of fair discussion, the law has been invoked in order, if possible, to close its lips for ever. This hope, at any rate, we can assure them, is destined to be disappointed.

On the 16th December, the Boers of the Transvaal proclaimed the establishment of an independent Republic in the town of Heidelberg. Their determination to do this, unless the British Colonial Office was prepared to accord a measure of justice to their unquestionably just demands, has been apparent to all reasonable men for more than a year past. Official personages, unhappily, are very rarely reasonable, and are possessed by an abnormal capacity to see only those things which they desire to see. The consequence is that this (so-called) "revolt" of the Boers found the British authorities both in Natal and the Transvaal in a state of complete unpreparedness, and the Boers have passed rapidly from one success to another. On the 20th December they attacked a detachment of the 94th Regiment escorting stores from Leydenberg to Pretoria, killed some thirty or forty, and captured the rest, as well as all the stores. The prisoners were subsequently released and permitted to proceed to Pretoria. A day or two later the Boers occupied Potchefstroom, compelling Major Clarke and a small British detachment occupying the Court House to lay down their arms. There is a larger British detachment holding an entrenched camp outside of Potchefstroom. This camp is reported as beleaguered by the Boers, and as there are no means of relief available, its defenders will, in all probability, be compelled to capitulate before long. Utrecht, Pretoria, and other places have since then been reported as passing into the possession of the Boers, without the firing of a shot in their defence; and before these pages are in the hands of our readers, the probability is that the whole of the Transvaal will have again passed into the possession of its legitimate owners.

In the contemptible fashion which, in those latter days, has become common among Englishmen, the news of these occurrences had no sooner reached this country, than cries of "treachery" and "massacre" were raised—chiefly in the Conservative journals. The Boers, we were assured, had fired upon the English under cover of a flag of truce; they were shooting everybody who refused to join the movement; a reign of terror had been established in the Transvaal; and so forth, and so forth. There is not a particle of trustworthy evidence to be had in support of these statements, and they may be safely dismissed as certainly untrue. It is satisfactory to know that the country is, at this moment, governed by a Cabinet inspired by a profound abhorrence of human bloodshedding; no

matter by what high-sounding epithets it may chance to be dignified. The entrance of Mr. Courtney to the Government, is also an encouragement to hope that ample justice will be rendered to the legitimate demands of the Boers. And in the meanwhile, it will not be amiss to state clearly, what it is that we shall be guilty of if we persist in robbing the Boers of their independence. In our review of "Home and Foreign Affairs" we have given a sketch of the treacherous manner in which the Transvaal was converted into British territory. The conversion was merely nominal, as is shown by the ease and swiftness with which the Boers are resuming their own. Two reasons, however, were given in justification of this fraudulent transaction. The one was, that annexation was necessary for the successful carrying out of the scheme for a South African Confederation; the second, that a large majority of the Boers desired to be annexed. The latter statement we now know to have been a falsehood, concocted for the purpose of deceiving the Government, Parliament, and the nation; and with the final failure of the Confederation scheme, the former reason has no longer any existence. If, therefore, we insist upon retaining our grip upon this small Dutch republic, we shall be guilty of a purely objectless act of wanton robbery and oppression. We undertake to say that no parallel to such an act as this could be furnished from the annals of mankind. Unscrupulous conquerors there have been in all ages, but never one who conquered, as we shall do, in mere wantonness, and not under a mistaken belief that he would profit thereby. Our peculiarity will be that we shall have destroyed the independence of this little State absolutely without any reason. The one objection that is likely to be urged is that very stale one of a "loss of prestige." Happily, in South Africa it can be rebutted by an appeal to precedent. In 1848 we destroyed the independence of the Orange Free State; in 1854 we restored it. And no loss of "prestige" that could be discerned by the most sensitive has resulted in consequence. It is to be hoped that the Ministry will have the courage to fashion their policy in the Transvaal in accordance with this most salutary precedent.

THE Basuto War shows no sign of abatement, and it is difficult to form any judgment upon either the conduct or the nature of the military operations which are going on in that part of the world. They seem to be confined to "patrolling" in a weak and objectless fashion. In this "patrolling" the Colonial forces according to the telegraphic accounts, perform prodigies of valour; they storm positions at the point of the bayonet; they slaughter the Basutos in prodigious numbers; but the issue is always the same. The Colonial forces have to retire on Mafeteng with losses so ludicrously trifling that it is impossible not to suspect that the severe fighting has been fought nowhere except in the official telegrams. One is curious to know when this mysterious "patrolling" is to be changed into a systematic campaign.

FOR a good part of the past month, the daily papers have been amusing their readers by mysterious references to an "Arbitration Scheme" which had been set on foot by the Great Powers for the purpose of "settling" the Greek Question. Ultimately we were informed by the *Daily Telegraph* that "the scheme had collapsed." It is amusing to watch the persistence and extraordinary gravity with which newspaper foreign correspondents blow these air bubbles—with how great dexterity they gently toss them from one European capital to

another—with what solemnity and shakings of the head worthy of Lord Burleigh able editors at home estimate the exact influence of each successive air-bubble on the destinies of the human race; and finally, when the *quid-nuncs* of the clubs are getting somewhat satiate with that exhibition, the “Greek Arbitration Scheme”—or by whatever other name the last bubble is designated to distinguish it from its predecessors—“collapses,” and a new entertainment has to be provided. Foreign correspondents of newspapers have to supply a daily pabulum of news, *per fas aut nefas*, and we never see these bricks of theirs—compounded, as they generally are, without either straw or clay—without admiring the ingenuity displayed in their construction. But, except as recurring illustrations of the proverb that “Necessity is the mother of invention,” they are without interest or importance. They are nothing more than the random utterances of “the man in the street,” put into order and shape by the practised pen of a newspaper writer. We have no admiration for “the sovereigns and statesmen” whom Lord Carnarvon considers that Mr. Bright depreciates so unjustly; but they are not the unreasoning purposeless intriguers which newspaper correspondents would have their readers believe them to be. If any man of ordinary intelligence, not wholly unacquainted with the situation in South-eastern Europe, would determine for himself how he would act in the “Greek Question,” he may rest assured that the “sovereigns and statesmen” of Europe will not act very much otherwise.

In his “Memories of My Exile,” Louis Kossuth has a remark which the student of contemporary politics will find of the greatest assistance in determining the probable solution of any urgent question. Kossuth points out that as in a chain of reasoning, so in all political situations, there is “a logic” which renders all but one conclusion impossible. And whether any political question be what is called “settled” or not, depends altogether upon whether this “logic of the situation” has been rightly apprehended by those endeavouring to settle it. Sometimes this “logic of the situation” is so obscure and perplexed that none but the acutest thinkers can trace its tendencies; at other times it is so clear and palpable that even “sovereigns and statesmen”—a class of people endowed with an abnormal capacity for losing themselves on a straight road—cannot fail to apprehend it. Remarkably is this so in South-eastern Europe. For thirty years all Europe, except Russia—and notably the “statesmen” of this country—have misread “the logic of the situation” there. They imagined that it pointed to providing the Porte with annual loans, without regard to the uses to which the money was applied or the manner in which it was repaid. It requires a good deal to convince “sovereigns and statesmen” that their august sagacity has been in fault. In the present instance it required three or four cruel wars and about half a hundred horrible massacres—not to speak of the sacrifice of that credulous class—the Turkish bondholders—to convince the Governments of Europe that the Eastern Question could not be solved by the simple expedient of lending money to the Sultan and his Pashas. Deprived, however, of this assistance it is obvious that the Sultan and his Pashas cannot continue to exist; consequently “sovereigns and statesmen” will be compelled, by the irresistible logic of the situation, to assist the only durable settlement which there can be of the Eastern Question—that of self-government by the populations hitherto governed, or rather plundered, by the Porte. If our readers will consider, they will not fail to perceive that, however great the reluctance of this or that Great Power may be to be entangled in the

internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, they will all be *compelled* to co-operate in working out a policy of emancipation there. Turkish rule is crumbling away from sheer rottenness and decrepitude. No European Government either desires, or would be permitted, if it did desire, to occupy the position left vacant by the decadence of Turkish ascendancy. Consequently there is no policy possible, except that of emancipation of, and self-government by, the hitherto subjected races. Greeks, Albanians, and Bulgarians are, in fact, the masters of the situation, and have only to come to an agreement among themselves, as to what they require, to compel Europe to see that their demands are conceded. And it is tolerably plain, when we look beyond the air bubbles blown by newspaper correspondents, that this fact is being realized by the populations immediately interested. The Greeks, it is said, have made overtures to the leaders of the Albanian League for joint action against the Porte. If the Bulgarians, with the unity of the Provinces as their programme, can be induced to join the alliance, the complete emancipation of European Turkey is a consummation which may be, not unreasonably, hoped for before the close of 1861.

THERE is nothing satisfactory to report from Ireland, except it be the "boycotting" of Mr. Bence Jones. It must not be supposed from this that we approve of that practice in general, but in the "boycotting" of Mr. Bence Jones, there is a retributive justice which must commend itself to all candid and well-regulated minds. Mr. Bence Jones, as he himself tells us, is "a landlord who has tried to do his duty;" and apparently the primary duty, as he conceives it, of such a landlord is to make himself disagreeable all round. So Mr. Bence Jones shot foxes, poisoned hounds, evicted tenants, evaded the provisions of the Land Act of 1870, and, as a magistrate, acted upon system in a harsh and arbitrary manner. All this time, he never ceased to thank God he was not as other men were—fox-hunters, tenants liable to eviction, or farm labourers—but that marvel of creation, "a landlord who tried to do his duty." He looked round upon his estate of Lisselane, in the spirit of an Irish Nebuchadnezzar, "Behold this great Babylon which I have built!" It was time that some humiliation should fall upon a gentleman so marvellously exalted in his own conceit, and the unmitigated astonishment which has fallen upon Mr. Bence Jones since his fall, would elicit a smile from the most serious. Mr. Bence Jones interprets his "boycotting" as a manifest proof that the glory and greatness of the Empire has departed. For "party politics," he tells us, "he can honestly say that he does not care a rush." It is the lost "honour of the country" which afflicts him so grievously. "Since the days of civilization began" (this is Mr. Bence Jones' opinion) "never were law and order so openly defied." Courage, Mr. Bence Jones, courage! The British Empire has weathered worse storms than that involved in the "boycotting" of a "landlord who tried to do his duty" in the singular fashion which you have adopted.

THE extraordinary revolution wrought by the last General Election in the character of the predominating public opinion, is seen in the lack of any response from the nation to the frantic demands for "coercion" on the part of the Jingo journals. These journals and Tory speakers would fain convince themselves that Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet has forfeited the confidence of the country because it did not gag and manacle the Irish people the instant they exhibited any undue restlessness. But their actions show that they know the cry for

"coercion" has failed. The Tory party does not dare to summon a single meeting to pronounce a condemnation on the policy of the Government. Compare this with the state of public feeling when the Beaconsfield Cabinet had fallen under the suspicion of an intention to condone the Bulgarian massacres. The Tories will say that *that* was a got-up agitation; then, how is it that they cannot get up a similar agitation now? The will, assuredly, is not lacking. The explanation is that the great body of electors which placed Mr. Gladstone in office have no sense of the sacredness of the institution of landlordism. They think that Ireland can be made to prosper, even though Mr. Bence Jones should be forced by circumstances to desist from poisoning his neighbours' fox-hounds, and turning his land into grazing ground, should be lost to the green island altogether. The session, in short, will open with Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues more securely established in the trust of the nation than even at the close of the last General Election. And all that they have to recognize, in order to retain and still further to strengthen, that trust, is that an entirely new spirit has been breathed into politics. The nation, as we believe, will no longer tolerate the condonation of evil on mysterious grounds of political expediency. All talk about "the honour of the British flag" requiring any sort of conduct except that which is purely and strictly just and honourable, will, we are assured, be received by it with the disgust and contempt which such talk deserves.

An indication of the nature of this new life, is to be found in such articles as the following, which we extract from the *Weekly Dispatch* for the 1st Jan., 1881:—

What is it that the Boers are "rebelling" against? A usurpation that they always resented, and a gross violation of the promises that were made to them as a base excuse for that usurpation. Of course, the Jingoës never read Boer newspapers. If they would, they might have found some excellent political wisdom, and sound Christian or more than Christian morality to boot, any week during these last three years, in *De Volksstem*, a journal published in Pretoria, and written in better and more loyal Queen's English than some Jingo papers issued in London can boast of. For their benefit I make a cutting from the number for November 27th, received by the last mail: "It is not only now, but it has been the case ever since the annexation, that the Boers 'will not be won over.' They have since that time felt the grievance that their country had been 'stolen' from them, and this grievance has only increased in intensity by the maladministration and arbitrary acts of a Government which they 'will not have.' The people have said so, and proved it all along; but the eyes of their adversaries were either blind or wilfully closed. The people have sent out one deputation after the other and paid their expenses. They have held mass meeting upon mass meeting, each succeeding one more largely attended than its predecessor, some lasting for several weeks. They have tried all constitutional means to get this 'grievance' removed; but to no purpose. These very constitutional efforts were considered as proofs of their pusillanimity, or, at best, of their want of earnestness in their professions. While they were vehemently protesting against the injustice done them and felt that injustice more keenly day by day, gubernatorial dispatches were being forwarded to Downing-street and gubernatorial speeches being delivered in the neighbouring colonies, stating that a change for the better had taken place in the feeling of the people, that they had given up the 'agitation,' and that they had become quiet, tax-paying subjects of England's Queen! It was this last misrepresentation of their true feelings and intentions which led to the present unfortunate state of affairs at Potchefstroom, and which may yet lead to the most disastrous results not only for the Transvaal, but for the whole of South Africa."

That warning, be it noted, was uttered three weeks before the "rebellion" broke out, and the Potchefstroom disturbance referred to in it preceded by nearly six weeks the fighting reported on Wednesday. Not only has the English nation been now dragged into an utterly dishonourable and iniquitous war with the Boers, who whatever their fault may be, are in

this case altogether in the right, while we are altogether in the wrong; but had Sir George Colley or Sir William Lanyon, or any of the other Jingoos whom we have knighted and decorated and placed in authority for their misdeeds, had their eyes open and their wits about them they could have prevented all the catastrophe that now afflicts us. We have to pay dearly for exalting Lord Lytton's and Sir Bartle Frere's minions!

The Dutch are not likely to go to war against the English Jingoos who are now persecuting their kinsmen in South Africa as their ancestors went to war against the Spanish Jingoos by whom they were themselves persecuted three centuries ago. But if Lord Salisbury, who boasts that the Jingo foreign policy of to-day is the foreign policy of Queen Elizabeth and her sea-lions who fought with the Netherlands against Philip of Spain, can blush, he ought to blush on reading the eloquent protest which the Dutch citizens have issued. "Britons," they say, "you, yourselves a free people, cannot do otherwise than sympathise with another if comparatively unimportant race, which your powerful Government, it is true, can exterminate and scatter, but which will never allow itself to be subjugated. And it is this feeling which encourages us to direct this appeal to the sense of justice of the British nation. The people of England cannot brook the dishonour which must inevitably result from a struggle that is as unequal as it is unjust, from a struggle with a powerless race, with a people who wish for nothing further than to live in peace and quiet under their own laws, cultivating the ground that has become their own through stress and peril.

The *Weekly Dispatch* has a circulation of 200,000, chiefly among the working classes, and this is the kind of teaching which they relish. It would be a good thing if the classes who style themselves "educated" could endure the same vigorous morality and healthy directness of statement.

But the manner in which they require to be spoken to, is seen in the following extract from the *Spectator* :—

There is, we suppose, nothing to be done but to go on. . . . *The Boers, even though patriotic, are throwing off the authority of the Queen after formally accepting it. To abandon the Transvaal is to recede from our enterprise, the civilization of South Africa, which is of high moment to the world, and might end in the subjugation of the Boers by some new Zulu King. The original argument for annexing the Transvaal is as strong as it ever was, or stronger, being aggravated by one fact—that we have done it. . . . Any Boer grievances can be redressed; but the grand grievance that we are just to Natives, cannot be modified, and if they will not yield or emigrate to the Free State, there is nothing for it but force.*

The italics in the foregoing passage are ours. The Boers, the *Spectator* says, are "rebels" because they have "formally accepted" the authority of the Queen—in other words, it is possible for a Colonial Secretary to describe them officially as "rebels." In any deeper sense, the *Spectator* perceives that the Boers are not "rebels" at all. So it abandons this *casus belli*, and adopts a new one. If we do not subjugate the Boers, they will be, at some future period, subjugated by a new Zulu King, and it will save a vast deal of trouble, as well as advance "the civilization of Africa," if any robbery and murder which have to be done in that part of the world are done by ourselves, and not by some "new Zulu King." Of course all Boer grievances will be redressed if, after the war, any Boers are left alive, but "the great grievance that we are just to the Natives"—that cannot be redressed. Heavens and earth! we are to despoil and slaughter these Boers because we are "just" to the Natives, and they are not. Within the last three years, we have slaughtered, in a series of cruel, cowardly, and utterly unjust wars, more than 30,000 of these Natives. We have spared neither woman nor children in the day of our wrath. At this very moment, our gallant antagonists, the Zulus, are dying in misery and hunger on account of the havoc and desolation we wrought in their country. In Basutoland we are carrying on a war which will utterly destroy

that "civilization" which, according to the *Spectator*, we are "spreading" in South Africa. And yet the *Spectator* can, without flinching, place our "justice to the Natives" in contrast with that of the Boers; and encourage the nation to persist in fraud, and robbery, and bloodshed, because of our sensitive humanity, and our keen appreciation of equity.

THE death of "George Eliot" can hardly be described as a loss to English literature. Her work in literature has been finished some time before she died, and it would, perhaps, have been better for her fame, if "Daniel Deronda" and "Theophrastus Such" had not been written. It is only natural that on the death of so great a writer the estimates of her genius which have appeared in all directions should be remarkable rather for their extravagance than for their discrimination. For ourselves, we incline to believe that "George Eliot" will never be ranked so high as a writer as she is at the present moment. The qualities which give her works a special charm to the present generation will, we suspect, rather tell against her in the judgment of posterity. The fascination that "rayed out" from "George Eliot's" novels had a double origin. She was a thinker, as well as a novelist; indeed, the predominant tendency of her mind was in the direction of thought, rather than to the exercise of the creative imagination. For us of the present generation the effect of these twin tendencies are almost equally interesting the one as the other. The meditative and discursive portions of her writings are all, so to speak, coloured and shaped by the "*milieu*" (to use Comte's phrase), which is around us as it was around her. But as the years pass the world will be whirled away into a new atmosphere of thought and speculation, and a great deal in "George Eliot" which strikes us with peculiar pleasure—which has for us allusions full of originality, subtlety, and humour to the great questions political and ethical of the day—will lose its full intelligibility, and consequently a large measure of its charm. She will be tried and judged by her creative faculty alone. And, when so tried, we do not think she can be considered to rank very high in the hierarchy of the great creative artists. To be a great novelist, as to be a great dramatist, would seem to require an order of mind that can find delight and inspiration in the infinite diversity of human character without having any ulterior purpose in view. Such a mind was Shakespeare's; such, though moving of course on a far lower level, was Scott's. But we doubt if this special standing-point can be attained, except by minds who hold that "there is a Divinity which shapes our ends, rough-hew them how we will." The spectacle of human life becomes too sad and perplexing to be contemplated in this impartial spirit, if we have convinced ourselves that there is no power greater than that of human wills evolving order out of the seeming chaos. And it may be because this belief is weak at present that the spirit of pure fun has so completely died out of our imaginative literature. At any rate, "the burden and the mystery of all this unintelligible world" weighed too heavily upon "George Eliot" to allow her to look out upon it with the untroubled, all-receptive apprehension of a Shakespeare, or the genial sympathy of Sir Walter Scott. The world she beheld with the eyes of her imagination was a world full of sorrow, in which those who now go on their way weeping never return with joy, or bring any sheaves with them. In all her books there is one melancholy conclusion insisted upon, and that is that the game is not worth the candle. The weak and the strong, the wise and the foolish, are alike befooled. A weak, shallow nature like Hetty Sorrell sets her heart upon silk stockings and fine dresses, and the end is child murder and penal servi-

tude. But a great and good nature, such as Romola, fares no better. She lavishes all her wealth of love on a worthless Tito, and finds life reduced to blankness and despair. Even Tito, pursuing *his* aims in his own way, attains nothing but shipwreck and death. According to the philosophy of "George Eliot's" novels, there is a law of disappointment running through human life which makes all that men and women desire, change into Dead Sea fruit as soon as it is attained. And this, not so much because happiness is unattainable, but from the blundering fashion in which human beings *will* seek after it precisely where it is not. Beautiful, loving Dorotheas marry repulsive, dried-up Casaubons, under the compulsion, as it were, of some inexorable force akin to gravitation. Hence the prevailing melancholy of her books, and their depressing effect upon the reader; and hence, also, the constantly-recurring types of character. Rosamond-Vincey, Hetty Sorrel, and Tito are, in point of fact, one and the same character; as also are Romola, Maggie Sullivan, and Dorothea Casaubon. The earlier writings of "George Eliot" are fullest of imaginative power. In "Middlemarch," the meditative and didactic tendencies have clearly got the upper hand; and the consequence is that, as a novel, this work has to be placed very much below her preceding writings; while in "Daniel Deronda" these tendencies have it all but their own way. But though we do not think that future generations will read "George Eliot's" books with the avidity with which this generation has done, we are far, very far, from either denying or doubting her great and unquestionable genius. Had that genius been nourished upon a brighter and more hopeful philosophy, it would have been a happy event for the world—a happier still for herself. As it is, her books will always fascinate by reason of their power, but they will also sadden and repel by reason of their hopelessness.

SIR RICHARD TEMPLE's letter to the *Times* of the 17th inst., on the Food-supply of India, affords a fair illustration of the untrustworthiness of official assurances generally concerning that country. In his lecture before the Colonial Institute on the 14th inst., Sir Richard Temple had declared it to be a "known fact" that "the people were storing food to the extent of millions of tons annually, for their sustenance in times of drought." The *Times* noticed the statement as a fact that was "new" to it, and quoted the words we have produced. In reply to its remarks, Sir Richard writes as follows:—

My expressions may have led you to infer that the Natives of India are storing millions of tons of food grain, under special arrangements, by way of precautions against famine. I did not, however, mean exactly to imply this. The Natives generally do, indeed, store food grain to the above amount as a reserve which may be used as occasion requires, and which is so used when the periodical droughts or famines supervene. It has been ascertained officially that the annual surplus of food produced in British India amounts to at least five millions of tons. The actual amount is probably greater, inasmuch as during the famine of 1877-8 two millions of tons were imported into the distressed districts by sea, and four millions and a half of tons were carried by rail in all parts of India.

Thus the people of England were first assured by the lecturer, that this vast annual storage of grain by the Natives of India was a "known fact," and when questioned as to the statement, it was re-affirmed by him that they "do indeed" store food grain annually to this extent as "a reserve" against famine; and the people of this country were assured that "it has been *officially ascertained* that the annual surplus of food produced in British India amounts to *at least* five

millions of tons." The italics are ours, and we use them to show the truth of our charge that the people of England may not trust a statement concerning the condition of India that emanates from its officials. Instead of its being a "known fact," the statement is pure fiction. It is an absurdity upon the face of it. With characteristic courage, Sir Richard Temple has converted the worthless figures prepared for the Famine Commissioners—which they themselves declare to be "but approximate and rough estimates, made from data which they hope to see more accurately established"—into "known facts," which have been "officially ascertained." Now this taint of untruthfulness runs through every administrative report that emanates from the Indian Departments. Sir Richard Temple knows perfectly well, that the exact statistical inquiries on which alone such a statement could be safely made, have yet to be commenced in India, while he does not hesitate to tell this country that the statements are known facts that have been officially ascertained. They are pure fiction, resting on nothing better than the unverified impressions of our district officials, derived from the loose statements of their native subordinates. The statement, again, that in the year 1877-78, "two millions of tons of food were imported by sea into the distressed districts," is another gross fiction of the same order; as is also the statement that "four millions and a half of tons were carried *by rail* in all parts of India" in the same year. Sir Richard overlooks the fact, that in the transport of grain from Northern India to the distressed districts in Madras, four or five distinct lines of railway had successively to be employed, namely, the Sindh, Punjab and Delhi line, the East Indian, the Jubulpore Extension, the G.I.P. Railway, and finally, the Madras line. The very same grain was thus entered five times over in the railway returns. Instead of four and a half millions of tons in 1877-78 being borne by railway into the distressed districts, which is the suggestion made by Sir Richard Temple, you may certainly divide the figures by five, or six, or seven. It is this subtle *virus* of falsehood running through Indian official utterances against which this country cannot be too earnestly nor too frequently warned. There is hardly a statement that is, in an unqualified sense, true in Sir Richard's whole lecture. It is optimistic imposture throughout.

If any justification were needed of the strictures we have made for many years past upon the mode of negotiating Indian loans, the success of the new three and a-half per cent. loan would furnish it amply. But two years ago, the Government of India was made to negotiate a *four* per cent. loan in Calcutta, for the sum of £5,000,000, and with such marvellous stupidity was the operation effected, that the stock was finally issued at seven to eight per cent. discount. Now this was *four* per cent. stock, while the India Office has just negotiated three and a-half per cent. paper, at a premium of three per cent. At the time when this four per cent. stock was created in Calcutta, we pointed out, as we had done for twenty years without ceasing, how ruinously wasteful was the Government course. Had this one loan of £5,000,000 but been issued on the same terms and in the same simple way as the three and a-half loan of a few days back, the Treasury would have escaped the perfectly frightful loss entailed upon it, by attempting to borrow in a market where there is no loanable capital whatever but what is sent thereto from Europe, and in a metal that is depressed twenty per cent. below its normal enduring value, solely by the unwise action of the Indian Government itself. Were it possible for the Editor of this paper to find six months' leisure for an adequate exposition of what "Indian finance" has been

for the last twenty-five years, under the conduct of men like Sir Bartle Frere, Sir Richard Temple, and Sir John Strachey, the story would excite, we believe, more interest than the best novel of the season.

It is characteristically affirmed by the *Pioneer* of Allahabad, that the Mysore Jewels scandal is a mare's nest. The inquiry instituted by the Government of India has shown, it assures its readers, that the jewels have not been tampered with, but are intact. The *Pioneer* will say whatever it is asked to say, and is once more simply attempting to mislead the nation. The case stands thus: The old Maharajah died in 1868, leaving £350,000 worth of jewellery in the custody of the English Resident. A careful and elaborate inventory of the property was at once made; the enumeration, description, and valuation of the jewels being conducted with the utmost care, the task occupying our officers several months. Upon its conclusion, Major Elliott reported as follows:—

Every article has been carefully described in the catalogue, and the number of precious stones and pearls counted as far as practicable; and in the case of gold and silver articles, their ascertained weight has been duly recorded, and a valuation, though a rough one, has been generally fixed in all but a few cases of miscellaneous articles of petty value.

Now, when very serious discrepancies are found between this descriptive catalogue of 1868 and the present appearance of the jewels, Mr. Rungacharloo gives another and very different account of this catalogue:—

The jewels being registered as each came to hand, there was, of course, no attempt at classification, and, owing to the strong objections raised by the Maharanees, they were all put together in the old, rickety, and inconvenient shelves found in the jewellery room, except the small number required for the young Maharajah's use, which were kept in a separate box in the same room.

The shelves may have been as "old, rickety, and inconvenient" as the writer says they were, but he does not venture to suggest that their custody was insecure. The charge is that the jewellery no longer answers the description of it in the catalogue. Are we to understand that it has lost its value by companionship with the "old, rickety, and inconvenient shelves" to which it was confided? Jewel No. 32—consisting of 525 pearls, 42 rubies, and 21 emeralds, a present by the late Maharajah to one of his wives—was catalogued in 1868 as of the value of Rs.6,000, while it is to-day found to be a trumpery trinket, worth not more than a tenth of that amount. Meanwhile, we have a series of extraordinary and conflicting statements as to the history of the official custody of the jewels. Thus this immensely valuable property was re-catalogued, we are told, in 1872 by Mr. Gordon, assisted again by Rungacharloo. Their task appears to have been entirely gratuitous and self-imposed. Mr. Gordon had received no orders to test or review his predecessor's work, but he tells us that he "duly" informed the Resident of what he was doing, and of the fact that he found innumerable discrepancies between the catalogue of 1868 and the jewellery as he then found it (1872). Not one word, however, of "official" or contemporaneous record, is there either of his undertaking this important task, or of the discoveries made by him. The first reference that we get to this gratuitous inquiry, is contained in a letter from Colonel Malleon, dated 22nd December, 1874, in which the following astonishingly precise assurance is made that not one single error was found in the catalogue of 1868:—

After the first preparation of the lists by Major Elliott, in 1868, an examination of the jewellery was made by Mr. Gordon, when he was officiating Guardian, in conjunction with

the Controller, for the purpose of rearranging them. It occupied nearly two months, and the accuracy of the original lists, and the care with which these rooms have always been opened on subsequent occasions, have been remarkably proved by the absence of even a single error in the whole of this complicated property.

Mr. Gordon says that he duly informed the Resident in 1872 of the numerous inaccuracies he had found in the catalogue; Colonel Malleson, writing in 1874, tells us that such care had been bestowed upon the catalogue, that Mr. Gordon did not find "even a single error" therein! Not a line is there upon the official record of Mr. Gordon's having examined the jewellery at all, or made any report upon its condition; while the statement of Colonel Malleson is directly in the teeth of what Mr. Gordon now tells us. Meanwhile, it is admitted that burglary after burglary had been committed upon the Palace property since it has been in our charge, to the admitted loss of £3,500, without any notice being taken of the facts, beyond a languid expression of the Commissioner's opinion that Mr. Rungacharloo was perhaps open to "an imputation of supineness" with regard to these thefts. The conclusion of common sense is that there has been scoundrelism at work with the property; and instead of asking Mr. Gordon and Mr. Rungacharloo whether the rumour is true, the Government should send Charles Forjett to Mysore, with two or three detectives chosen by himself, to investigate the matter. It is an insult to public intelligence to permit the inquiry which the Government of India has made, by *Mr. Gordon himself*, to find a place upon the records at all. His assistant, Rungacharloo, went to Mysore, a dozen years ago, worth nothing; and he is now declared to be a very wealthy man. As a public servant, he should be required to account for the possession of so much wealth, so rapidly acquired. To entrust the inquiry to any one connected with the Mysore Commissioner is to show that the Government does not want any inquiry at all. We are assured that the perfunctory inquiry ordered, produced a report which the native members of the Court signed only under heavy pressure from their superiors.

MR. CAVENDISH BENTINCK has shown very bad taste and worse ignorance in abusing the Welsh people. The inhabitants of the principality are described as "a set of ignorant and barbarous Welshmen." Taken as a nation, the Welsh are neither ignorant nor barbarous. They are poetical, musical, and literary; some of our most eloquent preachers were reared amid the grandeur of the Welsh mountains; and for education and morality they will compare favourably with the people of England, Scotland, or Ireland. The *Echo*, commenting on this speech, says:—

Welshmen, not only in Wales, but in London, Liverpool, and other large towns, will keep these elegant epithets in remembrance. Such sneers against a nation of Nonconformists ill become a member of that party which excluded Nonconformists from the universities as long as it could, and which, while it was flinging away money by millions in Asiatic and African wars, refused a small grant of a few thousands for higher education in Wales. The man who speaks thus only exhibits his own ignorance and vulgarity. He is so ill-bred that he cannot bear a party defeat in a Welsh county without reviling his opponents. . . . Who is this flippant descendant of a greedy Dutchman, whose family was unknown in England two hundred years ago, that he should vilify the most ancient race in Great Britain? He has occupied a seat for Whitehaven for fifteen years, simply because his mother was a Lowther. He obtained a minor post in the late Ministry only because he had made himself useful to his party by acting as the Biggar and the O'Donnell of the Tories when they were in opposition. He was appointed Judge-Advocate-General, where he had little to do save to defend the

barbarous practice of flogging soldiers, because his superiors knew well enough how small a person he was. Mr. Cavendish Bentinck has sat in Parliament for twenty years, and he is so deplorably ignorant that he does not know that the Education Act was put in force more rapidly in Wales than in any other part of the kingdom, nor that the question in which Welshmen take the keenest interest is that of Higher Education, nor that Welshmen have fully compensated the neglect of the Established Church by covering the land with places of worship built out of their poverty, nor that his own colleagues got rid of several Welsh prisons because they were empty, nor that the Judges frequently travel the Welsh circuits and find hardly anything to do. If Mr. Cavendish Bentinck is not ignorant of these facts, then a still more severe epithet must be applied to him. It was only the other day that a Welsh agricultural labourer told the Commissioners of Higher Education in Wales how he had sent his son from school to school out of the hard savings of his own labour to the University of Oxford, and it is such people as these that a member of the late Tory Government describes as "ignorant and barbarous."

THE simple and straightforward way in which the Positivists appeal to moral principles for our guidance in dealing with international difficulties and quarrels, is very well illustrated in Dr. Congreve's treatment of the Irish question in his serial for December:—

I write as an Englishman, from the standpoint of our national duty, appealing to the higher conscience of this nation, to its sense of shame for past misdeeds, past neglect, past inkewarmness, to its consciousness that the effects of such a past can only be slowly cancelled, to all the latent nobleness which I believe in, and which, duly evoked, might issue in a resolution that, cost what it might to its pride or its interest, the true advantage of Ireland, and Ireland only, should be the rule of its action. I urge no special measures. I confine myself to the more general, comprehensive issue. It is for the Irish people, when made *su juris*, mistress of its own destinies, to decide on the best mode of its agricultural settlement. It is to the making it *sui juris* that I direct myself—to the gratification of the supremely just demand that Ireland be an independent nation, with full self-control.

"The true advantage of Ireland, of Ireland *only*, should be the rule of England's action." We cannot be too thankful to men who have the courage to address us in this way, referring us in our embarrassments to those first principles which conventional "statesmanship," unhappily, banishes from its counsels. The true advantage of Ireland, of Ireland *only*, should be the rule of our action towards her. Of Ireland only! It is a hard saying; who can hear it? The vital consideration for us is—Is it a true one? Does the law of self-sacrifice hold good to this extent? We have here counsels, unknown to Mr. Disraeli's sovereigns and statesmen; but what if they are true? What if they express those everlasting laws to which all things, all empires, must conform or perish? We believe that we describe the state of most minds in this country about Ireland—certainly the minds of earnest, thoughtful men of all parties—when we say that they are pervaded by a settled desire to act justly and unselfishly towards its people. This certainly is the national temper, as a whole. An almost universal belief exists, at the same time, that to permit Ireland to become an independent State would not conduce to its wise and peaceful government, while it would be a great political danger to England. These are not self-evident truths, it must be remembered; and we owe much to men like Dr. Congreve, who are not afraid of the odium of questioning them.

More immediately is it desirable that . . . we renounce all determination to hold Ireland against her will—a most difficult act of self-renunciation, but one that, if accomplished, is full of promise. One serious objection will be urged. It is a matter of self-defence to us to hold Ireland. Independent, she is a danger. I should not accept this

contingent danger as a sufficient dissuasive. But neither do I think that there is any real danger. Independent of England, and independent on the hypothesis of her being so by the aid of England, why should Ireland be hostile to England? Why should she, in the second place, invite a foreign Power to make her the basis of its operations, and if seized, against her will, what value would there be in her as such basis? Are we not, in our feelings and reasonings, on this head too much under the influence of older political associations and ideas, which are undergoing, if with extreme slowness, a transformation, and adapting themselves to the new order which is felt to be appearing in the horizon? Prudence may require us not to ignore too soon the old, but political wisdom has ever consisted in a due apprehension of the new which is being brought to the birth.

Dr. Congreve may not be right, but such writing is more healthful, a good deal, to our thinking, than the passionate contempt with which all reference to "Home Rule" is commonly treated in the press. We confess frankly, that a severance of the Union seems to us a step fraught with such grave and far-reaching issues, as hardly to come within the range of discussion; but we have at the same time the strongest conviction that not only Ireland, but our great dependency, India, has a claim upon us of the weightiest order, for a very wide-reaching measure of self-government—meaning thereby not independence of the English Crown, but the extension of powers to each people to decide for themselves the laws and institutions most likely to secure their welfare and happiness. The excellent spirit, meanwhile, in which both the Government and the people of England are approaching this Irish question, is a happy augury that the coming Session will produce a great healing and ameliorating Act to supplement the deficiencies of past measures towards the land in Ireland, which neither the factious hostility of the Marquis of Salisbury and his followers, nor the exaggerated fears of the landlords, will be able to frustrate.

WE told Mr. Parnell three months ago that if animated by a wise and loyal spirit, he would direct his efforts to the enlightenment of Englishmen upon the subject of Irish grievances, instead of pursuing his mischievous agitation in Ireland. We have since seen Lord Monteaigle, in a letter to the *Freeman's Journal*, urging his countrymen to this very course:—

I am sure that Mr. Ferguson and his friends cannot be aware of the utter ignorance that prevails in England among all classes on the subject of Irish land. If the Devon Commission had not been to a great extent lost sight of in the troublous times that followed while every one was bewildered by the vast changes which sprang up almost without the control or direction of any authority, I believe their labours would have been more fruitful. But the situation is now very different, both politically, socially, and economically; and if the [Land] Commission have but time to get at the important facts—and my chief doubt in the matter is as to the sufficiency of the time to be allowed—I entertain great hope of the effect that may be produced on the mind and hearts of the great English people. Sir, much has come to light in the course of the last few months which was quite new to Irishmen like myself who took a deep interest in the subject, for instance, of the condition and numbers of the migratory harvest labourers. I am sure I shall have much to learn from the evidence given to the Commission, and I venture to think that even Mr. Ferguson may profit if, as I hope they will, the tenants of the country follow your excellent advice.

It is the ignorance of the English people, as a body, of the true condition of the Irish peasant, and of the circumstances which have reduced him to that condition, that makes our countrymen so ready to view the agitation of the Irish people with angry impatience. The ruling classes of this country have made us, as a nation, guilty of the most cruel conduct towards the Irish people in our past history, and until the nature and history of the wrong have become familiar to our countrymen,

the attitude of the Irish people will never be rightly understood by them. The special crimes at which we express just indignation, have their real origin in the long course of legislative oppression pursued by the influential classes of this kingdom towards the Irish people, and a strong English opinion in this country should now strengthen the hands of the Ministry to apply an adequate remedy to the misery which our past selfishness has produced.

THE course taken by the Peers in the last Session, has, we believe, done much to precipitate the end of Landlord legislation in England. Their legislation has ever been controlled by two ideas: that it was the first duty of Parliament to take care of the classes who are but too well able to take care of themselves and in the second place, to take every precaution against the people becoming powerful. Under this system, the rich have been credited with the exclusive possession of wisdom and virtue; the people with nothing but imprudence and vice. And yet, which is it of the two classes that has made England what she is in the world? Is it the nobility and landed gentry of the country, who have made her great; or the men whose sole inheritance was their Saxon brain and sinew, and whose travail, intellect, and character have created an Empire upon which the sun never sets? The nobility and gentry of England, as an ornamental head to the country, have been "gracefully going idle" from one generation to another, growing richer and richer under the operation of laws that have empowered them to enter into other men's labours, reaping where they have not sown, and gathering where they have not sowed; while England's sons of toil have covered the face, not of England only, but of continents, with vast and populous cities, founding new empires accessory to her glory. The Titanic sons of toil are, nevertheless, not fit, it seems, to exercise any material influence over the Legislature of the mother country. It is the idlers of Pall Mall alone, who know how to legislate for the nation. There will be no adequate Parliamentary Reform, we are persuaded, until we are enfranchised from the rule of the "professional" politicians bred in the House of Lords. If England is to maintain her place amongst the nations, she must be guided, as America, France, and the Colonies now are, by the intellect and conscience of those who work, not by the classes who amuse themselves between Parliament and partridge-shooting, from generation to generation.

WE request the particular attention of all our readers, but especially of Members of Parliament, and all who can exercise any influence upon the Government of India, to the contents of this note. We have devoted more than one article to showing how false, how contrary to fact, is the boast of our Indian bureaucracy, that British rule has given a security to "rights of property" in land which never existed in Native States. No machinery so destructive of ancient "rights" of this kind has ever been introduced in any country as our inflexible system of Revenue Assessments enforced by the operation of our blundering Courts of Justice. Still the British bureaucracy, in asserting that they had given security to these "rights," were, as we believed, guilty of nothing more than of stating the thing that is not—and this being habitual to them, did not surprise us. We never supposed that even our Indian officials would deliberately adopt a policy of wholesale eviction such as the worst of the "exterminating" Irish landlords would hesitate to adopt; yet, unless the following extract from a circular addressed by

the Collector of Thana to the Native revenue collectors under him be a forgery, the Bombay Government, at any rate, have determined upon a land policy of ruthless confiscation in that Presidency. The entire circular is given in a Native paper called *Native Opinion*, and published in Bombay, 6th December, 1890. The Collector of Thana, after citing several Government Resolutions, proceeds to explain their practical consequences to his Native subordinates—

1. In reference to (rent-free) lands which are subject to Government dues . . . if the holder fail to pay the Government dues at the specified time . . . the holder will forfeit all his rights to the land, which will be entered as Government land. Such land will further be considered to belong to Government, and being entered in the class of waste land, will be dealt with under rules applicable to waste land.

2. If a survey occupant who is not a (rent-free) holder fail to pay the Government assessment due from any land, the whole land included in his survey will be forfeited to Government.

4. The 1st January and the 16th February have generally been accepted in this district as the dates of receiving the first and the second instalments of revenue respectively. Ten days latitude after the said dates has been allowed, considering that on the appointed days it may be hard for the ryots to pay the assessment at once, as well as the receiving officers to receive the same. If in accordance herewith Government dues are not realized, you must report on the 11th January, and 26th February, 1891 . . . the lands of defaulters declared forfeited to Government. If with reference to any land, a special arrangement for the days of payment happen to be made, you must report for such lands being made forfeit to Government immediately on default of payment at the time agreed.

Nobody can accuse THE STATESMAN of any undue admiration of the Government of India, except for its stupidity, which, we acknowledge, that we never can admire sufficiently; but the policy of this circular, assuming it to be genuine, surpasses aught that we could have predicated from the stupidity, and consequent inhumanity, of even our beneficent Indian Government. This circular destroys at one stroke all rights of property of every description. The entire agricultural community of Bombay are thereby converted into tenants-at-will of the Government of India. Any landholder, large or small, who chances to offend a Native revenue collector may find himself reported as a defaulter, and deprived of all his property. It is easy to imagine the intolerable injury that such a policy as this opens the way for—the enormous bribery, corruption, and perjury which it facilitates, the insurmountable obstacle it opposes to the sinking of capital in land held on a tenure so insecure. The Parliament about to assemble will have its time fully occupied, still we earnestly trust that this note will attract the attention of some member, so that Lord Hartington may be questioned on the subject. It is monstrous that the Government, while legislating against eviction in Ireland, should in India allow its subordinates to practice “extermination” unchecked. We are convinced that it is only necessary to make the evil known to have it stopped.

THE IRISH LAND QUESTION.

I TAKE the liberty of contrasting the land policy under a mild Prussian despotism with that which is exhibited in Ireland under a British landocracy. The Prussian tenants of 1811 had an interest in the land, which was reckoned at one-half or two-thirds, according to the tenure of the owner. The combined interest was sold to the highest bidder, and the proceeds divided accordingly. Under the landlord-made Irish Encumbered Estates Act, the tenants' interest was confiscated for the landlords' benefit, and the buyer was thus enabled, by a few turns of the screw, in addition to this appropriation, to double the rent. The pressure of the rent on many Irish tenants is so great that vast numbers are unable to use any of the butter or meat they produce. Some one who told a farmer's wife of the quantity of meat that is consumed in our colonies was informed that in Ireland they would never think of *killing a whole sheep at once*.

Lord Belmore, for whom I have the greatest respect, when writing recently in the *Times*, says that free sale of the tenant's interest would deprive the landlord of his veto in the matter. As an ex-Governor of New South Wales, he should be aware that no such difficulty arises from complete freedom of sale, by auction or otherwise, of the tenant's interest in Crown lands there, where that interest is also of about half the value of the fee. Nor is there any limit put to the price that may be given, which some purblind Irish proprietors attempt to enforce, the State being well aware that the payment, openly, of the market value of tenant-right is the best security for the payment of the rent. The comparative condition of Ulster and the south and west of Ireland should settle this point; but the case is much stronger when we compare the condition of Irish tenants with that of Crown tenants in Australia. It may be alleged that the cases are not parallel, but the objection is not well founded. The apparent disparity arises from the more rapid progress in the new country, which is owing mainly to the more equitable terms accorded to the tenants. These Crown tenants, as has been mentioned in a previous article, can have the rent

settled by arbitration for a term of years. Taking a number of cases at random, I find the rents reduced by this means 40 per cent. from the State valuations; but this was to the ultimate advantage of the State, as it stimulated improvement, and tended to doubling the rental value, through the increased grazing capacity of the country. Many, who were thus secured for a term of years, fenced in and sub-divided into paddocks, besides supplying water more fully, which, by doubling the future rental value, was even more profitable to the State than to the tenant. Certain Irish landlords, including Lord Belmore, object to Griffith's valuation as a criterion of rental value. If that valuation is repudiated, let the rent be fixed by arbitration. Some one has mooted the foolish idea that Irish rents should be fixed by three farmers; but this is not more absurd than that rents should be fixed by the landlord's nominee, according to the usual practice.

I may give an instance of the working of the system of tenancy in New South Wales; the case is not unknown to Lord Belmore, and is given on the best authority. The run in question was bought for £30,000, about twenty years since, in a comparatively unstocked and unimproved condition. A further outlay of about £20,000 was incurred in fencing, building, water-supply, &c. The rent had been paid, meantime, as fixed by arbitration. The State has sold from the run land to the value of about £250,000, and the residue is probably paying as much rent as at first, and also keeping as much stock. If some of the impecunious Irish landlords were able and willing to deal with the land in like manner, we would not find Irish misery and discontent so very prominent. The Crown tenants, in this case, as is the general custom, got the benefit of their improvements for a reasonable term, and were thus enabled to buy about 200,000 acres in fee. I feel satisfied that, with Irish rents fairly settled by arbitration, the majority of tenants could buy the fee in thirty-five years, and settle the land question once and for all.

The *Times* does a public service {by inserting the letters of certain noble landowners. Lord Dunraven has been saying in that journal what no one denies, that the smaller owners are the worst landlords; but that has no bearing on the question of a peasant proprietary. Under present circumstances the land will not afford "three profits." We should therefore try, as soon as practicable, whether it will afford a profit when tilled by the owner. If this cannot be arranged, tenants should go to the colonies or to America, where they can get the full results of their toil. W. H. Barry, Esq., J.P., who cultivates 286 acres of land, held in perpetuity, in County Cork, and has abundant capital for that purpose, tells the Land

Commission, in his evidence, that his gross returns for nine years (omitting fractions) were:—

1871 ...	£1,537	1874 ...	£1,343	1877 ...	£1,263
1872 ...	1,714	1875 ...	1,415	1878 ...	1,076
1873 ...	1,602	1876 ...	1,361	1879 ...	1,139

It is evident that the maintenance of what was a fair rent nine years since would soon bring the majority of tenants to ruin; that policy could, however, be made the means of absorbing the tenant's interest, and of turning him out of his holding.

H. R. Marmion, Esq., J.P., landlord and land agent, "had given 300 leases of farms for sixty-one years, the rent being 15 per cent. above Griffith's valuation," and he "believes that more improvement had been effected by the tenants in five years after granting the leases than during the previous fifty years. He knew other estates where the rent was double the said valuation. He is of opinion that fair rent and free sale to a solvent successor would make Irish tenants loyal, industrious, peaceful, and happy." I have had many years' experience of the Irish land question, and have a general knowledge of that kingdom and people; I may therefore be permitted to say that the wide-spread disaffection and discontent is owing, in my humble opinion, to misgovernment in the past, and to the legalized oppression that is still exhibited by many landlords in our own day.

Lord Robert Montagu, with the happy audacity which so well becomes a Tory landlord who is also a Home Ruler, has told the readers of the *Times* that the landlords are the only improving class in Ireland. Having quoted, in a previous article, from the report of the Devon Commission (all landlords) clear proof that any improvements made by Irish landlords were altogether exceptional, instead of further argument, I shall give an illustration. A certain noble lord being from home, a very important event occurred—an emu laid an egg. The steward, when announcing the fact, wrote: "In your lordship's absence, we have selected the largest goose we could find to sit upon the egg."

Cheap and easy transfer of land would be a vast boon to Great Britain as well as to Ireland. Taking twenty-one Irish farms, I find that the cost of transfer is nearly 11 per cent. on the value. In Australia one can transfer 5,000 acres at a cost of 30s. (the value being about £15,000), and the Government guarantees the title. The titles under the Encumbered Estates Court, which were as clear and simple as those in the colonies, are allowed to drift into the old form. One case has come under my notice in which the

cost of the land was £8, and the cost of transfer £12. The transfer of land was taken in hand in the South Australian Legislature by a layman, Sir Robert Torrens, with the result just mentioned. If we had fewer lawyers and landlords in Parliament, a rational and safe system of transfer could be introduced here also. We cannot afford to keep so many drones in the community. As for our land laws, we keep botching them here and patching them there, and have only loss and trouble for our pains. In order to administer this absurd system, we have had to deprive the Irish people, from time to time, of their civil liberties. We have treated Irish Romanists with the greatest contumely, and now complain that they are not accessible to Protestant teaching. In Canada, where they have been fairly treated, though there was not a French Protestant forty-five years since, there are now thousands of them. In France also many thousands of Romanists are accessible to Protestant teaching.

Charles Russell, Q.C. and M.P., writing in the *Daily Telegraph*, gives the rent of sixteen farms on the Lansdowne estate, which is £255; Griffith's valuation being £156, the advance on said valuation is about 65 per cent. The rent was reduced to the said valuation in 1850. Twenty-five years ago it was raised 3s. 6d. in the £, and it has been again increased twice—each time by 3s. in the £. One tenant had drained twenty acres of poor barren land, and brought it into cultivation, and had his rent raised from £36 to £55. The landlord was liable to pay half the poor-rates; to cover this liability and *pay his agent for collecting the rent*, an advance of 15 per cent. was made on the rent. Landlords get loans from the State at £3 8s. 6d. per cent., which pays both principal and interest in thirty-five years, for which Lord Lansdowne's tenants are charged 5 per cent.; and they are told by the agent that this must be paid, in addition to the rent, "as long as water runs." Landlords who exercise their rights with a rod of iron, and neglect their duties with a face of brass, still talk of "freedom of contract." The mandate of the agent goes forth, and the poor tenant must pay a rent upon his own outlay in "drainage, fencing, and clearing the land from rocks and stones." One of these tenants says they live upon potatoes, Indian meal, and sour milk. They complain loudly and justly of the rents imposed upon them, and many tenants would gladly escape from this worse than Egyptian bondage. It is stated in the papers that Mr. Vere Foster, with admirable philanthropy, has spent £10,000 in paying £2 each towards the passage to America of women from eighteen to thirty years of age. This is a good remedy for the tendency to over-population. It is infinitely better than the policy of the late Government—spending countless

millions in wicked wars of aggression. If the money thus recklessly squandered had been employed in part, and in conjunction with the colonies, in sending our surplus population to people our own territory, and there produce what we require to import, and consume our manufactures, it would have been a much more rational policy. The invasion and slaughter in Zululand and Afghanistan was equally wicked and unprofitable. The money thus spent would have made an incomparably better return had it been employed in developing Irish resources.

Dr. Traill, F.T.C., Dublin, in his recent speech in an Orange stronghold, gave his audience his idea of the proper course to pursue towards any Irish town or village, telling them of five African villages near to which a British sailor was killed. They were fired upon and destroyed by a man-of-war, the innocent suffering with the guilty. He would give the Irish peasantry a slower but not less certain punishment—exclude them from the benefit of all legislation, and thus permit the landlord, to use his own words, “to evict straight ahead (without any compensation for disturbance), as Mr. Adair did at Derryveagh; and the whole power of the nation should be at the landlord’s back to enable him to root out, stem and branch, a class that is not fit to live in a civilized community, and who would be on a par with African savages.” Truly, “the tender mercies of the wicked are cruel.” Mr. Adair, whose conduct excites his admiration, got a large military and police force to level the dwellings to the ground of some hundreds of his tenants, who were certainly more sinned against than sinning. The people of Melbourne took this view of the case, and raised money which paid their way to Victoria. It is the practice of the landlord class, as it was with slaveowners, not only to tyrannise over their victims, but to allege that they are utter savages. Mr. Charles Russell tells us how the tenants are treated on the Trinity College property; in one locality one-third of the land had been reclaimed by the tenants; within forty years the rents had been raised repeatedly; taking forty-one farms as a sample, the rent is more than double Griffith’s valuation. One tenant built a house seven years since, and got £40 7s. from the College towards it—£35 cash and a piece of timber charged at £5 7s. Mr. R. took a copy of the agreement, which bound the tenant to pay forty half-yearly instalments of £1 12s. This loan of £40 is thus repaid by £80, and the tenant’s outlay in reclamation leads to the doubling of the rent. It would not be very strange if any person were to feel “savage” under these circumstances. These rack-renting Irish landlords are “beginning to be found out.” Another of these tenants wanted

cash for the drainage of his farm, the money being obtained through a State loan at 5 per cent., but he was required to pay the College 1s. 7d. in the £, or nearly 8 per cent. interest, and liable to have his rent increased, besides, up to the higher rental value thus produced. From what has been stated it is scarcely necessary to say that the tenants of this wealthy corporation, so worthily represented by Dr. Traill, appear to be a squalid, miserable people. Another English barrister says: "As to the College estate, it is simply a disgrace to the country; it would be impossible to describe the filth or misery of the dwellings. I could not find that the agent had taken any trouble about them." Many of the tenants on this property received relief in meal, seed, potatoes, &c., from foreign and British charity this year. Mr. Russell says that "their rents are very high, far higher than they can pay after making a decent allowance for their own maintenance."

Reverting to the Lansdowne estates, it has been said in the *Daily Telegraph* that "for generations the Lansdowne estates have had a high fame as models of management; the liberality of the noble owners having succeeded in producing what may be called English comfort on Irish soil." If English comfort is thus fairly represented, what is Irish misery on the smaller estates? Mr. Russell tells us that the increased rent is fixed by the agent of the Lansdowne estates without any independent skilled re-valuation. "The tenant has little to say; he may either pay or go." This is what is understood by "freedom of contract"! We are told, further, that for a vacant farm there are forty candidates. The Corn Laws enabled landowners to levy upon the whole community, but the pressure now bears chiefly on the tenant-farmers, to the ruin of many. Lord Lansdowne's brother has written in defence of the management of the estate, but has not produced any rebutting evidence.

It is not unusual for the purchasers of the smaller properties in Ireland to raise the rent, and after a time to sell on the faith of this increased rental; the buyer in many cases imposes a further increase, until the rent in some instances is four and a half times Griffith's valuation. It has been said, in the landlords' interest, that Irish tenants are of drunken habits; this charge comes with a very bad grace from the party that opposed the Sunday Closing Bill, which was strenuously supported by the Irish people; but the Tory Government managed to limit the Bill to a few years, and to exclude from its operation five of the largest towns.

Those who hold up their hands in horror when agrarian crimes are reported, may not be aware that the indictable offences committed

in London (though the population is much smaller) are double the number committed in all Ireland. We find also that assaults endangering life in Ireland during the first ten months of the present year, contrast favourably with any year since 1874.

The landlord and the Land League policy seem to be equally at fault. Even British landlords, as may be seen from the *Spectator* of November 20th, are striving to exact rents which are 30 per cent. above the market value of the land, to the ruin of thousands of farmers; causing at the same time a great loss in produce and deterioration of the land. The policy of the Land League affords similar results, through the assumption of power to fix rents, which they are not more competent to do than the landlords or their agents. Some say that Irish rents should be fixed by Government valuers; but such officials might, and probably would, be influenced by the political party conferring the appointment, or in power for the time. If a fair rent is desired, it can be attained by arbitrators mutually appointed, themselves selecting their umpire. Nor would it be necessary, in my humble opinion, to go into the prices of produce for a series of years; this would be liable to mislead in these unstable times. The rent should be moderate, and the tenure secure—affording a reserve for bad seasons; thus avoiding the disgrace of asking charity in both hemispheres, to enable Irish landlords to maintain rack rents. When we attempt to redress Irish grievances, we generally *leave a splinter in the wound*. Irish landlords have been told years ago that those who strive to exact more than is due are apt to get less than justice in the end; it is these unjust claims that prevent many reasonable landlords from obtaining payment of their rents. There is something radically wrong where an army of some 30,000 men and 11,000 of a semi-military police force, are required for enforcing the payment of rent. If the laws were just and equal, there would be no scope for agitation. We have generally been dealing with the symptoms instead of reaching the seat of the disease in Ireland. Landlords will find, though the people of Ulster are pretty quiet, that they are no less determined than those of the other provinces in demanding a thorough reform of the land laws. Even the Orangemen are protesting strongly against irresponsible and tyrannical landlordism. Mr. Ancketill, an Ulster landlord, admits that insecurity of tenure and high rents prevail in Ireland. Lord Dufferin stated before the Agricultural Commission now sitting “that rack-renting was carried on to a great extent by landlords in the West, and attributed the discontent solely to that fact.” At an “immense assemblage” in Monaghan, a landlord and Deputy-Lieutenant being chairman, it was resolved,

"That the Ulster tenant-right custom does not afford sufficient protection to the tenants against capricious evictions and unjust rents." We find from a speech of Sir S. Waterlow, who is Treasurer to the Bartholomew Hospital, owning 12,000 acres of English land, that "It was almost impossible to let land on any terms." Irish landlords, instead of reducing their rents to suit the times, or submitting the question to an impartial tribunal, employ the military and police to turn out tenants who have neither the means of subsistence nor of moving to seek employment.

"Henry Fitzgerald," writing in the *Daily Telegraph*, speaks of "the immense increase in the value of everything which is produced from the land" since Griffith's valuation was made; but he says, further on, that the tithe rent charge, which depends on the average price of corn, has not increased 3 per cent. in forty years. The fact that glebe land in Gloucestershire, which has been let hitherto at 21s. per acre, is now let at 9s., does not indicate this "immense increase in the value of produce." The Irish Land Laws are utterly opposed to progress. The great majority of landlords have neither the capital nor the enterprise that are requisite for improvements. If their tenants increase the letting value by their outlay, they only increase their rents, as by law the landlord can appropriate the results of such outlay; in fact, Irish landlords, as a rule, do not improve their estates, and tenants who would improve they hinder.

Mr. W. Chambers, in his *Journal* for December, advocates the Scotch land system for Ireland, but Scotch landlords and tenants have their own difficulties. It was stated some time ago that Lord Blantyre had to reduce his rents by 40 per cent. The tenants of another, who is one of the largest of Scotch landlords, when they asked a reduction of 10 per cent. in the rent, were told that this would absorb the whole of his interest in the land. Mr. Chambers holds that in Ireland, as in Scotland, each farm should comprise some hundreds of acres. Having had ample opportunities in America and Australia of observing the capabilities of Scotch settlers, as compared with those from the smaller holdings in Ulster, I did not find a lower average intelligence in the latter case. It is freely admitted that a farm should afford, by its extent, full occupation for a family. If the land were cultivated by peasant proprietors, the average intelligence should be higher. The bothy system is the great blot on Scotch husbandry. It would be equally absurd to attempt the division of a large British farm into twenty small holdings, or to turn out twenty Irish tenants to make room for a Scotch farmer.

Mr. Charles Russell gives a typical instance of the injustice of

the Irish land system, and there are countless thousands of such cases. This tenant had reclaimed fifteen acres on the shore of Carlingford Loch from a mountain-side, and built a homestead, doing the requisite fencing and draining. The rent was £7. The tenant died after some years, leaving a widow and one daughter. Not feeling equal to the management of the farm, the widow asked leave to sell her interest, which was granted, with the proviso that the rent was to be £15 in future. This is a sample of the "silent system," by which improvements are absorbed when there is a change of tenancy. I have shown in a previous paper that Irish rents have been thus increased—and especially in Ulster—more than tenfold in 250 years.

Irish tenants of all persuasions should unite in the support of a Ministry which has the welfare of the tenant-farmers at heart. We cannot expect perfect patience on the tenant's part under the circumstances, but it should be understood that agrarian crime only tends to the perpetuation of existing and intolerable evils. The reported crimes, which in many cases have little foundation in fact, remind one of an Irish game notice, which was posted up after a very cold summer: "*Owing to the lateness of the season, Major Blank will neither shoot himself nor any of his tenantry before the 15th of October.*" Under the present exceptional circumstances there should be no shooting on either side before the 12th of August.

CHARLES WILSON.

Cheltenham.

THE MYSORE JEWELS.

SINCE our November number, when we made some remarks on a telegram in the *Times* of the 11th of October, the forerunner of a declaration by the Government of India on the subject of the rumoured misappropriation of some of the Mysore jewels, the declaration itself has arrived in the form of a Resolution by the Viceroy in Council, "No. 813 I. P., dated Simla, the 25th of September." It is to the effect that an explanatory Memorandum by Mr. J. D. Gordon, Chief Commissioner of Mysore, "is completely satisfactory" in respect to "the allegations as to deficiencies and discrepancies in the tale and value of the Mysore jewels" published in the *Calcutta Statesman*, and as to the points which that paper suggested for inquiry. It is very difficult for us to understand on what grounds his Excellency the Viceroy in Council considers the explanation to be satisfactory. There has been no investigation whatever into the points we suggested for inquiry. There has been, as our previous remarks anticipated, a mere routine reference to the official dignitary and the influential subordinate whose mismanagement is in question, and they very naturally reply that there has been no mismanagement at all.

Mr. Gordon says, towards the close of his explanation, which is dated July 29th, that he has "always contemplated a careful final re-examination" of the jewels "before the restoration of the province," that he has "already directed preliminary preparatory steps to be taken," and that when he goes "to Mysore in October next" he proposes "to arrange for such examination to be set on foot." And we learn from the Indian newspapers that a committee, consisting of two English and three Native officials, actually assembled, under Mr. Gordon's orders, at Mysore in the last week of October.

Considering that the persons within the Mysore territories most deeply interested and most fully informed in these matters are easily intimidated, from having been long under tutelage or official subjection, the report of a committee so constituted, including several persons who must be more or less implicated, if anything is

really wrong, is a mockery that cannot even be called solemn. It is a ludicrous mockery.

It would be useless for us now, when the operation must be over, or nearly so, to repeat our demand for a special and independent agency to investigate the whole subject, from 1868 down to the present day; but we may have something more to say when we hear, on official authority, who have been chosen to report on these matters, by whom they were chosen, and what limits were prescribed for their inquiry. In the meantime, we may indicate a few points that we fear will not have been open to the investigation of the gentlemen selected for the Jewel Committee at Mysore, on which no light is thrown in Mr. Gordon's Memorandum of July the 29th last, in reply to "E. B." of the *Statesman*, which the Government of India somewhat hastily, in our humble opinion, pronounces to be "completely satisfactory." The Memorandum, which consisted almost entirely of extracts from official documents, is declared by Mr. Gordon to contain "strange mis-statements." He points out, however, nothing of the sort. On the other hand, he professes to find some statements in the Memorandum that are certainly not there. For example, he says that the writer of the Memorandum represented the six weeks' re-arrangement of the jewels in 1872 to have been done "in secret." Not at all. What the Memorandum said, and what has been urged since in many articles in the *Calcutta Statesman*, is not that the rearrangement was a secret affair, but that it was a highly irregular affair, begun, apparently, without any official sanction, and finished without any official report. Mr. Gordon, indeed, says in his explanation, that "it was duly made known at the time to Sir Richard Meade, the Chief Commissioner." But what was "the time?" Sir John Falstaff said he was "born about three o'clock in the afternoon," but that did not give the Lord Chief Justice very precise information as to the fat knight's age. What was "the time"—before, after, or during the six weeks' handling of the jewels? What was the time, what was the place, what was the occasion? We should be sorry to think that Mr. J. D. Gordon, C.S.I., employed, like Sir John Falstaff, an equivocal expression almost devoid of meaning, in an equivocal manner, with the result—whatever the object may have been—of misleading and baffling inquiry. And yet we are puzzled, if not baffled. What was "the time?" and what meaning are we to attach to the word "duly?" It seems to us that the only "due" mode of making known the rearrangement of £350,000 worth of jewels would have been by an official report in writing, not by a casual remark at early breakfast, about seven

o'clock in the morning, or at "about three o'clock in the afternoon," while smoking a cigarette after tiffin.

On one occasion, when some "burglaries," as they were called, had occurred in the Palace Wardrobe, whereby property to the amount of £3,500 had been lost, a certain "time" was very precisely ordered—and ordered a second time, when Colonel Malleon, the Guardian, made some demur about it—by that same Sir Richard Meade, for an annual examination and report as to the security and condition of the jewels. This Order was dated the 30th of November, 1874, and the "time" ordered was the 31st of the following March. But the custodians never came up to time. Perhaps Mr. Gordon can explain why the first report due under that Order was not "duly made" on the 31st of March, 1875. He was acting as Chief Commissioner from the 13th of February in that year until the 31st of March, when he gave over charge to Mr. R. A. Dalzell, now a Member of the Indian Council. Mr. Gordon can, of course, explain whether he gave any instructions or permission to Colonel Malleon, dispensing with the repeated orders of Sir Richard Meade—orders which, it is understood, have been annually neglected ever since.

We have not, then, asserted that the rearrangement of 1872 was done "in secret;" but, nevertheless, considering the interesting nature of the work, and the long period over which it extended, it seems to have been "made known at the time," "duly" or unduly, to very few people. It was not known to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, who, it may be remarked, must have been aware if there had been any official or demi-official communication. It was not known to the Commissioner of the Division, residing at Mysore, with whom Mr. Gordon was in daily social intercourse, and who had himself been for a short time in charge of the jewel-room keys. It was not known to several other officers of the Mysore Commission, who, in the ordinary course, must have heard of such proceedings, and who, on the other hand, were well aware of those frequent rumours as to misappropriation of the Palace jewels, of which Mr. Gordon says he never heard anything, "save in the Memorandum published in the *Statesman*."

The case, founded entirely on official documents, stands thus: In 1868 (see Parliamentary Papers, Mysore, 385 of 1878, pp. 93, 94) Major (now Lieutenant-Colonel) Elliot, C.B., in conjunction with Mr. C. Rungacharloo, arranged and catalogued the Mysore jewellery and gold and silver plate, and valued the property, with the assistance of a jury of experts, at £350,000. Major Elliot, in a despatch dated the 13th of November, 1868 (paragraph 7) "confidentially" reported "the good precautions adopted by Mr. Run-

gacharloo for the careful examination and minute cataloguing of the property." In paragraph 8 of the same report he says: "Every article has been carefully described in the catalogue, and the number of precious stones and pearls counted as far as practicable," "and a valuation, though a rough one, has been generally fixed, in all but a few cases of miscellaneous articles of petty value."

Colonel Malleson was appointed Guardian to the Maharajah, and Mr. C. Rungacharloo Controller of the Household, in 1869.

In March, 1871, Colonel Malleson went to England on leave, and Mr. J. D. Gordon acted for him as Guardian.

In July, 1872, Mr. J. D. Gordon, the officiating Guardian, in conjunction with Mr. C. Rungacharloo, commenced rearranging the jewels, which occupied them for about six weeks or two months, but was not officially reported or sanctioned.

There are some circumstances and dates connected with the rearrangement in 1872 which deserve some consideration. Major (now Lieutenant-Colonel) Charles Elliot, C.B., who, assisted by Mr. Rungacharloo, arranged the jewels in 1868, had resigned his office as Commissioner of the Mysore Division, and had left that station, on his way home, at the end of March, about three months before the rearrangement of the jewels was commenced in July, 1872. Mr. J. D. Gordon had then been for more than a year officiating as Guardian, Colonel Malleson having gone away on leave in March, 1871. If the work had been taken in hand while Major Elliot was at Mysore, he must, from his long association with Palace affairs, have heard of it. It must have been "made known" to him "at the time," "duly" or otherwise. Mr. Gordon could not, indeed, have entered on a rearrangement of the jewels on a new system without consulting the officer who had arranged them in 1868, and who had received the thanks of the Government for "the excellent arrangements" he had made "to prevent any spoliation or loss."

Major Elliot having in his report of 1868 specially eulogised "the good precautions adopted by Mr. Rungacharloo for the careful examination and minute cataloguing of the property," Mr. Gordon must surely, if Major Elliot had been on the spot, have promptly informed him of "the great number of inaccuracies" that had been found in the descriptive catalogue. It is very true he said nothing about these errors to any one until some of them were accidentally detected in 1877. But surely Major Elliot would have been made an exception to this uncommunicativeness. Who but he could have been so likely to have thrown some light on the remarkable discrepancies and deficiencies in the tale and value of the jewels that Mr. Gordon had discovered?

In January, 1873, the Guardian, Colonel Malleon, returned from leave and resumed his office. He was told of the rearrangement, and saw the new bureaux, "with Chubb's locks and keys," but was not told that fresh catalogues of the jewels had been made, or that any "inaccuracies" had been found in the original catalogues.

Sir Richard Meade, Chief Commissioner of Mysore, in paragraph 7 of Order, No. 135, of 30th of November, 1874, when the "burglaries" from the palace wardrobe had suggested some doubt as to "the security of the very valuable property kept in the palace," calls for "copies of the lists of the property, prepared in 1868, for record in this office, any changes that have taken place being duly noted in them." According to Mr. Gordon's explanatory Memorandum of July, 1880, the most sweeping "changes" had "taken place," and "fresh lists" had been made in July, 1872. But not a hint as to the changes, as to the discrepancies and deficiencies, or as to the fresh lists, was given to Sir Richard Meade in reply to his requisition. On the contrary, in a letter dated the 22nd of December, 1874, Colonel Malleon, in consultation with Mr. Rungacharloo, assures the Chief Commissioner of "the accuracy of the original lists," and that there is not "even a single error in the whole of this complicated property."

In 1877, Colonel Malleon having gone, and certain discrepancies and deficiencies in the tale and value of the jewels having become manifest, Mr. Gordon reports that during the rearrangement of 1872 he found "a great number of such inaccuracies" in the original descriptive catalogue.

In his explanatory Memorandum of July 29, 1880, Mr. Gordon writes as follows:—

"Considering the enormous number of jewels, and remembering that Colonel Elliot's catalogue did not profess to contain the precise numbers of such precious stones (for these were counted, as he reported to Government, only "as far as practicable"), I attached no great importance to such discrepancies either in 1872, when I arranged the jewels, or in 1877, when I wrote some remarks from memory upon Captain Wilson's letter."

The counting of precious stones, as Mr. Rungacharloo rightly observes in some remarks included in Mr. Gordon's explanation, was done for purposes of valuation, and if carried on "as far as practicable," could hardly be carried on farther.

If Mr. Gordon really attached "no great importance" to "a great number of inaccuracies" of description and valuation, depreciating, in some instances, articles of jewellery to one-tenth of their recorded value, his notions as to the relative importance of things will seem somewhat remarkable to some people. . .

Mr. Rungacharloo, likewise, in the remarks incorporated in Mr. Gordon's explanation, speaks more lightly of the work done by the jury of experts in 1868 than it seems to deserve. "The counting of pearls and precious stones by so many hands," he says, "and without any further checks, was not expected to lay claim to perfect accuracy; but as far as it went, it was useful for purposes of valuation." Exactly—valuation was the object, not precise enumeration. There could be no further check, and no better check, than "counting by many hands"—by the shroffs and goldsmiths engaged for the purpose by Major Elliot. They could value with sufficient precision necklaces containing hundreds of pearls without pretending to infallible certainty as to the number of pearls in each string.

With regard to the specimen instance of jewel No. 32, from the department of "Chundra Vilasa" (one of the widow Ranees), which having been valued in Major Elliot's descriptive catalogue of 1868 at Rs. 6,000 (£600), "looked small," and was found to be worth only about Rs. 600 (£60) in 1877, Mr. Gordon thinks this may have been a clerical error, "a single cypher accounting for the difference."

The probability of a clerical error by which a cypher was added to the estimated value, seems to be reduced almost to an impossibility by the account which Mr. Rungacharloo thus gives of the process employed in making the catalogue: "The jewels were handed over to a number of shroffs and goldsmiths for counting the pearls and precious stones in them, with reference to which they were valued, and the particulars of each jewel thus examined, namely, its name, the number of pearls, stones, &c., in it, and its estimated value, were all entered from dictation on loose sheets of paper by two Palace Sheristadars simultaneously."

If the jury of experts called out the particulars of description and value of each jewel to two Palace Sheristadars writing "simultaneously," the probabilities of the value being wrongly dictated, and not checked by any of the "number of shroffs and goldsmiths," or wrongly written down by both of the Palace Sheristadars "simultaneously," would appear to be so small as to be hardly conceivable. "The addition of a single cypher," by "a clerical error," would, indeed, as Mr. Gordon suggests, "account for the difference," but, under the circumstances narrated by Mr. Rungacharloo, there must either have been a collective inadvertence by the jury of experts, or a double clerical error executed simultaneously by the two Sheristadars.

Mr. J. D. Gordon, in paragraph 5 of his explanatory Memorandum of July 29th last, says that "the keys of the jewel-room and jewel-cases have always been kept in an iron safe in the Palace

under a military guard, and the key of that safe has always been in the hand of the Guardian or other high European official resident at Mysore."

It may be so; but if the word "always" is to extend, as it ought, from 1868 to 1878, Mr. Gordon is deposing to a matter not entirely within his own cognizance; and, if we are correctly informed, he is quite wrong. We understand that on several occasions when the Guardian left Mysore on leave or on duty, the key of the safe was placed in the Controller's hands, and that when Colonel Malleson finally left Mysore in 1876, he was ordered to make over the key to Mr. Rungacharloo.

But it matters little where the keys were, unless we have previously been assured that between 1868 and 1876 all the jewels were under lock and key. Far from this being made clear, the most recent statements on that head by Mr. Gordon and Mr. Rungacharloo seem to be absolutely negatived by official documents that have long been published. Thus we learn from Major Elliot's report of 1868, that instead of "*all*" the jewels having been "*put together*" in the jewelry-room, as represented by Mr. Rungacharloo in Mr. Gordon's Memorandum of 1880, large portions of the property were left outside for the use of the Ranees and ladies, and that the portion so left outside in the name of the lady "Chundra Vilasa" was "especially large."

Mr. Rungacharloo, in the remarks incorporated in paragraph 3 of Mr. Gordon's explanatory Memorandum, says that in 1868, when the jewels had been "registered," they were "*all* put together" "in the jewelry-room, except the small number required for the young Maharajah's use, which were kept in a separate box in the same room."

Major Charles Elliot's report dated the 13th of November, 1868, contradicts Mr. Rungacharloo's statement that "*all*" the jewels were "put in the jewelry-room." Major Elliot says, in paragraph 8 of that report, that "while the jewellery of the deceased ladies has been thrown into one heap, those of the living Ranees and ladies have been kept distinct; but it is well understood that they have but a limited control over the property, its reversion vesting in the Palace."

Thus "the living Ranees and ladies," one of whom was the lady "Chundra Vilasa," had "a limited control" over some of the jewellery and plate.

"By far the great bulk of the articles," continues Major Elliot—not "*all*," as Mr. Rungacharloo says in 1880—"have been put away in the Bokkus room; and, to simplify matters further, such of

the articles as are likely to be required for the use of the young Maharaja on festival occasions, have been put in a separate box."

Major Elliot then proceeds to give some details as to "*the property left outside,*" which "*is still very large.*" But he adds, with regard to articles so left, and "other articles in frequent use," "under the joint responsibility of Goorikars and Sheristadars, I have no apprehension in regard to their proper preservation. *The jewellery left with the Chundra Vilasa Sunnidanam especially is large,* and it may be expedient to recall and place in the Bokkus such portions as may not be required."*

Perhaps "the jewellery left with the Chundra Vilasa Sunnidanam," or some "portions" of it, may have been recalled, and placed in the Bokkus room, and the fact "duly made known at the time" to the Chief Commissioner. But if that be the case, we must ask again, as we have already asked with reference to the alleged report of the six weeks' manipulation in 1872, what was "the time," what was the occasion, what was the form of its being "made known?" For how many months or years was the "especially large" amount of jewellery in the Chundra Vilasa department "left outside," "under the joint responsibility of Goorikars and Sheristadars?"

We learn from some correspondence of February and March, 1869, relating to the retirement of Colonel Gregory Haines from the office of Guardian to the Maharaja—quoted in the *Calcutta Statesman*—that the principal Goorikar of the Mysore Palace was named Murree Mullapa, a man of notorious infamy, with whom Mr. Rungacharloo, the Controller of the Palace, was intimately allied in the most confidential relations, terminating in Mr. Rungacharloo drafting that person's will on his death-bed in December, 1871, and becoming his executor. How far that person's "responsibility" extended, and how much it was worth as a protection to the valuable and portable property "left outside" in the Palace, we are not in a position to pronounce authoritatively, although we may have formed a very strong opinion. In that direction we believe inquiry might usefully be made, if the Government of India desires to get at the truth.

It was in that direction, we believe, that Captain F. A. Wilson, the Officiating Guardian, was pointing, when, in 1877, he suggested a "special agency" to examine the condition of the jewels. Mr. Gordon, in his explanatory Memorandum, assures the Government that Captain Wilson had "no suspicion of dishonest practices," and

* Parliamentary Papers, "Mysore Government" (385 of 1878), p. 94.

"did not profess to have obtained a clue to the mystery." That is extremely probable. And yet he may have been, from natural acuteness, or from the timid suggestion of a sharp native subordinate, pointing in the right direction without knowing it. He may have had "no suspicion of dishonest practices" in progress, and yet the following sentence from paragraph 6 of Captain Wilson's letter of 21st August, 1877, looks very much as if he—or his assistant—suspected that there had been some previous malpractices or negligence in the department. "Care is, however, at present taken," says Captain Wilson, "to see that jewels taken out are restored to the jewel-room in the same state in which they were taken out." That hint covers nearly the whole ground of the scandals prevalent in Mysore.

The Resolution of the Government of India declaring Mr. Gordon's explanation to be "completely satisfactory," may for a time stop the mouths of murmurers, and may have shortened the proceedings of the packed Committee at Mysore, but it will certainly not dispel the doubts and suspicions, or set at rest the inarticulate indignation prevailing in Mysore to which we have given expression here and at Calcutta.

E. B.

DIRECT TAXATION v. INDIRECT IN INDIA.

A DEPUTATION from Manchester has been worrying Major Baring, the new Finance Minister for India, within the last month, with renewed protestations against the Cotton Duties (a subject pretty well thrashed out by this time), and the levy of Town Duties in India, a controversy not so well understood in this country. Major Baring very properly refused to give the deputation any assurance that the Government would abolish the only system of municipal taxation that is possible in our circumstances in India and endurable by its people, to humour the folly of such utter impostors as Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Richard Temple; for it is these two men more than all others who are answerable for the widespread discontent in India, begotten of the unwise attempt to raise money by *direct* taxation, in a country where there is no machinery whatever for its collection, that does not drive the people mad by its extortions.

The idea is entertained by Indian Civilians, that the masters of political science have pronounced themselves absolutely in favour of *direct* taxation, and that the practice of raising revenue by taxes upon commodities, or *indirect* taxation, as it is called, is held by them to be mischievous and unwise. The fact is simply—that political science teaches that were the world other than it really is, that were men generally truthful, and honest, and wise, and that in the Utopia of their residence it were needful to raise the vast revenues which the expenditure of modern times demands, this enlightened and virtuous Utopia would nerve itself to sustain the unpleasant, but really economic, method of *direct* taxation, in preference to any other. In other words, *direct* taxation, in Utopia, is the fairer and more economic method of the two; but in this actual world in which we live, move, and have our being, it is the most unfair and oppressive of all methods. Where *are* men generally truthful, honest, prudent, and wise? They are the reverse of all this, and because they are neither truthful nor honest, the only way of taxing them fairly is to tax them indirectly, in ways they cannot evade, since under the direct system the honest and truthful pay, and the dis-

honest and untruthful do not. So again, because men are neither wise nor prudent, it is necessary to accommodate ourselves to the fact, and to levy taxes in a way that neither their want of wisdom nor of prudence, can render abortive. Direct taxation very soon reaches its endurable limits, even in wealthy communities; while to attempt to raise a large revenue, by such methods, from the poor population of India is simple insanity. The school which sprang up some forty years ago in this country, calling itself the Liverpool Reform Association, succeeded for a while in impressing many persons with the notion that indirect taxation ought to be abolished altogether, and the expenditure of all countries met by direct taxes upon property, or income. Modern experience has shown in the most conclusive manner that direct taxation is unendurable when it becomes heavy. For many years, America was the great example to which we were pointed, but American financiers, than whom the world has seen none abler, were compelled to abandon the direct system, the moment it became necessary to raise a large income. In England we are all familiar with the objections which lie against the income-tax, a tax declared by its supporters to be odious, unjust, and oppressive "in the highest degree," while a Committee of the House of Commons has declared these characteristics to be inseparable from the tax. An attempt to raise £30,000,000 a year by an income-tax in England would be nearly impossible, while we raise £45,000,000 a year by taxes upon commodities without appreciably burdening anyone. And yet M. Thiers was fiercely assailed by the English press some years ago, for declining a task which even in this country would be declared impossible. In so far as he determined to trust mainly to *indirect* taxation, he showed sound practical wisdom, and adopted a course which we ourselves should have been compelled to adopt, in similar circumstances. A few years ago, however, certain political writers affected to regard a belief in *direct* taxation as the mark of men who were in advance of their times; and our leading men in India, unfortunately, in the last few years, have been full of these views, and have given a complexion to the course of legislation upon the subject. The most influential of them was Sir Bartle Frere, one of the weakest men that ever set foot in the country. His chief dread seems to be, that the world should hold him to be an inch behind the most advanced men of his time; and the influence of his counsels upon the course of official thought in India, is traceable to this day. He would have signed away the land revenue of the country, if abler men than himself had not stood across his path; while the island of Bombay owed directly to him, not only its financial collapse, but all the embarrassments brought upon it by the

Frere Municipal Act of 1865. Who, said Sir Bartle, could hear patiently of town duties in Bombay, while the towns of England were raising their revenues by direct rates on houses? A more superficial man never rose to power. He was weakness itself as an administrator. When he left Bombay, wiser men had painfully to undo his work, and encounter the odium of seeming to advocate a retrograde policy; the fact simply being that Sir Bartle Frere had committed the island to a course of stupendous folly.

Economists do *not* prefer direct taxation to indirect. It is the nameless sciolists of the science who do so. The masters of the science speak plainly enough upon the subject, and tell us that in the world in which we live, taxes upon commodities are the best practicable taxes we can levy. We lay stress upon this point, because the Government of India, down to this day, has the old leaven of delusion working in its Council Room. The attempt to substitute a house-tax everywhere for town duties, and the ill-concealed dislike with which the latter are regarded are owing to this error. You may lay it down as an axiom in India, that the direct presentation of a bill for taxes, by the machinery we are compelled to employ, means terrorism and disaffection; while it is impossible that such taxation should ever be productive.

Sir Bartle Frere's Municipal Act gave not merely a new constitution, but a new fiscal system to the island; and it was from this last error, that *all* its embarrassments arose. The Act repealed the old town duties of the island, and adopted what was erroneously supposed to be the English system of direct taxes upon houses, in their room. The gentlemen who drew the Act, and the exponents of its provisions in the Council Room, fell into the extraordinary error of confounding the levy of an income-tax upon house property, with the municipal rates levied in England upon the *occupiers* of such property. Believing with all their heart in the rate system which prevails in the parishes of this country, they thought they were imitating that system when they decreed that the municipal revenues should be derived from a tax upon house property in the island, of one shilling to two shillings in the pound. Misled by the term house-tax, they in fact decreed that the municipal expenditure of the island should be met by an income-tax upon one description of income only, viz., that derived from house property. Had they imposed fairly a *general* municipal income-tax, there would have been less objection to their course, but they exempted all incomes whatever; but this one special kind. That they did so in total ignorance of what they were doing, the debates upon the Bill show in the most conclusive manner. Sir Bartle Frere spoke

throughout of this income-tax upon house property, under the belief that it was the same thing as the English house-tax, the fact simply being that the tax he was imposing was a tax upon income, the income of a single class alone, while the English house-tax is a tax upon expenditure. Unfortunate and mischievous as this error was, he contrived to cap it by another, and that was the decree that in place of the old system of raising the municipal income by taxes upon commodities or town duties, these duties should be abolished altogether in favour of the system of direct rates. The error proved fatal to the peace of the community, and to the working of the Act. Had he made the least enquiry into economic facts as to the condition of the people, he would have seen at once that the attempt to raise the income required by the city, under a system of *direct rates*, was a gigantic fraud.

The dislike which is commonly avowed for statistics, springs in the great majority of instances from unwillingness to accept their teachings. We owe almost every social and economic reform of the age to this science, for it is the great weapon with which selfish ignorance is being everywhere overthrown, in favour of wise and disinterested legislation. That statistics may be carelessly compiled or disingenuously treated, so as to be useless in the one case and misleading in the other, is of course true; but to abjure their use or refuse their teachings, when they admit of verification or disproof, is the counsel of idleness or of dishonesty. The statistics of Bombay showed beyond the possibility of cavil, the error made by Sir Bartle Frere in attempting to wring the municipal income out of the pockets of the single class of house owners, and the absolute need there was of recasting the fiscal system of the island altogether. Let the reader look for a moment at the following statistics of the number of persons inhabiting each house in the United Kingdom and its principal cities, and compare it with the number of persons to each house, in the principal districts of Bombay:—

	Population.						Per house.
Dongree	60,250	83 persons.
Market	75,402	70 "
Dhobee Tula	71,795	58 "
Oomercarry	63,026	53 "
Mandree	41,152	48 "
Funnuswady	22,529	47 "
Chuckla	41,442	45 "

Now the direct rate system in this country, falls upon a population housed at the following rates:—

			Population.				Per house.
Birmingham	338,868	5·7 persons.
Leeds	227,180	5·2 "
Liverpool	482,469	7·6 "
London	3,070,000	7·8 "
Manchester	357,979	5·8 "
Glasgow	491,715	5·3 "
England, generally	18,954,444	5·4 "
Scotland	3,062,294	7·7 "
Ireland	5,764,543	5·0 "
Wales	1,111,780	5·8 "
Channel Islands	143,447	6·2 "

Thus, while in England the rates fall upon one person out of every five, six, or seven, that is, upon every family: in Bombay they fall upon one person out of every sixty, seventy, or eighty, or even in some cases 100 or 150. Even in England, it is complained that vast numbers escape contribution under this system who ought to pay; and our municipalities are anxious to discover *indirect* methods of taxation that may reach them. Even here, we say, the system is complained of as unfair, although it reaches one in every five or six of the population. In Bombay, it reached but one in fifty, sixty, seventy, and even eighty, while so unsuited was the system to the circumstances of the people, that it was still complained that the area of collection was too wide, and should be contracted. Instead of resorting to occupiers at all, there was such difficulty in collecting the police and lighting rates, that the Justices were repeatedly advised to go to the 15,000 *owners* for *all* the rates. The demand was simply an irony upon the situation to which Sir Bartle Frere had reduced the Executive.

Let us go a little more into detail, and show how the system worked in the great wards into which the city is divided. We take then the Mandvee and Market districts, a rich and poor one, lying contiguous to each other, and affording between them a fair illustration of the working of the system. Their population was as follows:—

			Population.				Houses.
Market	75,402	1,080
Mandvee	41,152	851
Chuckla	41,442	934
			157,996				2,865

There were thus seventy persons to each house in the Market, forty-eight in Mandvee, and 44·3 in its sub-division Chuckla, and the rates, according to the returns, fell exclusively upon 3,133 persons. That is to say, these 3,000 persons paid *everything*!

the remaining 150,000 nothing. The rates fell upon these men as follows :—

One person was taxed	Rs. 2,450
9 persons each	1,200
25 " "	840
140 " "	500
307 " "	280
340 " "	168
824 " "	100
1,354 " "	42
133 " "	14

3,133

Who can wonder that there were 7,000 distress warrants running at a time in the island, for rates levied in this cruel way? If we suppose that each man was married, and allot to him the average number of children to each family in the island—the population of Bombay being an adult population in the main—the 3,000 tax-payers in these districts represented but a total number of 8,366 men, women, and children. Thus the taxes fell with confiscatory violence upon the few, while the 150,000 never received a visit from the tax-gatherer at all. The 3,000 complained bitterly, and filled the town with their outcries. The tax-gatherer passed by the seventy persons, and fell with the weight of an avalanche upon the seventy-first. It was no reply to this disclosure to affirm that in one way or other, the rates percolated through these victims to the 150,000 beyond. As a matter of fact, they did *not*. But were it true, where did the community get the right to lay upon their victims the burden of collecting in seventy dribblets, the heavy assessment forced from them in a lump? The course was a violent injustice, without excuse, and without precedent. Were the percolation perfect and complete, the system would still have had to be condemned. We were at considerable pains to analyse the Census of the island, and found that the population was made up as follows :—

Merchants, Bankers, Civilians, &c., and their families	...	53,639
Shopkeepers and their families	...	170,767
Artizans and Labourers	...	317,545
Domestic and other Servants	...	94,116
Professions, Doctors, Priests, Writers, Teachers, &c.	...	53,750
Boatmen and Harbourmen	...	53,974
Soldiers, Policemen, Hamals, Ramoosees...	...	33,972
Prostitutes, Musicians, and Beggars	...	40,246

818,026

Look at that population, chiefly adult, and then affirm with Sir

Bartle Frere that the right way to tax them was by direct rates on the house owner, when the people were living sixty, seventy, and eighty in a house. There was no possible way of taxing such a population equitably, but by taxes upon articles of consumption. The taxation of the island was not heavy; it was exceedingly light; but most cruelly levied by Sir Bartle Frere's folly.

The direct rates constituted two-thirds of the municipal taxation of the city, or £200,000 out of £300,000, and as they fell upon 15,000 or 16,000 men only, what wonder that there was suffering. Sir Bartle Frere made these few thousand men pay the taxes of the whole island, upon the pretence that they percolated through the few to the many beyond. The pretence was a pure delusion. Thus there were about 100,000 domestic servants in the island, living in comfort, and all saving money, not one of them taxed a rupee. Now, it is an axiom of political science that a system of direct taxation, based upon the exemption of large classes, is confiscation, and nothing else. The house owners of Bombay, a mere fraction of the people, were grievously burdened, simply because the masses of the community were untaxed altogether.

And now, as to the appreciation of this rate system, even in England. It has been almost as much one of the questions of the day here as in India. It is the fact then that at the moment when Sir Bartle Frere was setting up this system in Bombay, it was being found intolerable in England, although it might reasonably have been expected to work here if anywhere. The *Economist*, a great authority, wrote concerning this very system of direct rates at the time as follows:—

The radical defect of the present system of local revenue is its dependence on a single source and its emphatic want of elasticity. The owners of property and the occupiers of taxable houses, are only a part, and not the larger part, perhaps, of the locality to be dealt with. *The thing to be sought after is a local revenue from several kinds of consumption, something corresponding to the excise and customs duties of the National Exchequer.*

The direct system was thus felt to be unjust and oppressive, in cities where the rates fell upon one person in every five or six; what must they have been when their weight was concentrated upon one person in every seventy, eighty, or hundred? Now this was one of Sir Bartle Frere's mildest blunders in India, made but a year or two before he retired.

Let us now see what economic authorities really do say about the respective merits of direct and indirect taxes. Mr. Mill says:—

In so far as the house-tax falls on the occupier, it is one of the fairest and most unobjectionable of all taxes. . . . But even a house-tax has inequalities and

consequent injustices; no tax is exempt from them; and it is neither just nor politic to make all the inequalities fall in the same places by calling upon one tax to defray the whole, or the chief part of the public expenditure.

Could human language more explicitly condemn what they are still doing both in Bombay and Calcutta, where we make the tax fall upon the owner, and are told that we ought to take every rupee we require, out of this one source of income. Observe again what McCulloch says in support of such taxes as the town duties:—

All attempts to assess individuals in proportion to their incomes, must necessarily miscarry, and will most likely be in the end productive of more evil than good. *Nothing therefore remains but to adopt the best practicable taxes, and these appear to be duties on commodities or on expenditure.*

Mr. Laing goes a great deal further, and says:—

Magna Charta is to the common man a trifle, a straw, compared to the great social right of paying taxes only for what he consumes. Exemption from *direct* taxation is the main point of difference between the taxation of the subject of a free and of a despotic State, a citizen and a serf.

Another authority, Mr. Greg, says:—

There is no tax to which objections do not apply: no tax which is not more or less inequitable in its pressure, injurious in its operation, and annoying in its collection. This objection, though from its universality not decisive against any particular tax, is decisive against making it the only one. *It is in a variety of imposts that we are to look for the solution of the great problem, how to make taxation equitable and endurable. . The apparent merits of direct taxation are apparent only.* Finally, taxation, whether direct or indirect, cannot be, and ought not to be, confined to a few; to approach this, verges upon confiscation; to recommend it, is to preach Jaquerie and spoliation.

What could more expressly condemn what they are still doing in Bombay, in spite of the reforms, carried mainly by the perseverance of the Editor of this paper, in making the weight of the taxes fall upon one in sixty, seventy, and eighty of the population, and where the mischievous folly is preached that the many ought not to be taxed at all, but that the house owner ought to bear all the burdens of the place? Adam Smith says that "the subjects of every State ought to contribute towards the support of the Government as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue, which they enjoy under the protection of the State; and that in the observation or neglect of this maxim consists what is called the equality or inequality of taxation;" while Mr. Dudley Baxter, in his book upon taxation, affirms: "No man who is able to labour ought to owe either his home or protection to the charity of others, or to throw upon them his fair

share of the burden ; but that *every* individual, in just proportion to his abilities, ought to contribute to the expenses of the State."

Economists do not even lay down the rule that we must not tax *necessaries* of life. In the salt-tax of India, we have a good instance of the fact that taxes upon necessaries may sometimes be the least objectionable taxes we can levy. So simple are the tastes of the people, so inartificial their mode of life, that we must either tax them through the necessaries of life, or let them go untaxed altogether. Accommodating ourselves to this fact, we raise a net revenue of £6,000,000 or £7,000,000 sterling a year from salt, and the man has no knowledge of India who will affirm that there is any other mode open to us, by which we could get that amount of revenue, against which ten times as many objections might not be raised. Again, a rag of some kind or other about the loins is a "necessary," but we tax piece goods for all that. The fundamental principle of all successful taxation is that it shall reach *the masses*, while the notion is fostered that the masses should go free, which means that we make up our minds to disease, filthiness, and death, since the few cannot "conserve" for the many. McCulloch even vindicates "a moderate tax on corn or other necessaries," and warns us against "laying stress in the matter of taxing necessaries on theoretical principles," and adds: "In truth, the practical influence of taxes on necessaries, depends principally on *their amount, and on the state of the country in which they are imposed.*" The Duke of Argyll again writes very distinctly on the same subject:—

I do not concur with those who speak of entertaining a very strong feeling as to the morality of taxing such an easily and widely produced necessary of life as salt. The justification which has been suggested as the only one for this tax is the only justification of any tax, namely, that the produce is spent for the benefit of the people, and that it is so levied as to be as little oppressive as possible on all grounds of general principles. Salt is a perfectly legitimate subject of taxation. It is *impossible in any country to reach the masses of the population by direct taxes. If they are to contribute at all to the expenditure of the State, it must be through taxes levied upon some articles of universal consumption.* If such taxes are fairly adjusted, a large revenue can be thus raised, not only with less consciousness on the part of the people, but with less real hardship upon them than in any other way whatever.

Town duties in India are defensible on the simple ground that they suit the condition, circumstances, and wishes of the people ; *they reach everybody, they oppress nobody* ; and are defensible on the very same ground as the tax on water at Manchester. Why should it be right and proper to tax water there, and wrong and improper to tax grain in India ? In London, we are levying a town duty upon coal, one of the first necessities of life, to £200,000, and Parlia-

ment has pledged itself not to reduce the duty for twenty years. The very same question which has been so debated in India was raised in Parliament in 1868, when it decided that it was better to tax this necessary of life five per cent. rather than raise the *direct rates* of the metropolis. And yet Adam Smith says: "In a country where the winters are so cold as in Great Britain, fuel is during that season, in the strictest sense of the word, a necessary of life, not only for the purpose of dressing victuals, but for the comfortable subsistence of many different sorts of workmen who work within doors, and coals are cheapest of all fuel." The very same arguments that are used against town duties in India, were used in Parliament against the coal dues. Mr. Candlish complained that these "coal duties were a tax upon one of the first necessities of human life, to the amount of 1s. 7d. per head per annum for each man, woman, and child, in the London district." Coal, too, he added, "was one of the raw materials entering into nearly all our manufacturing operations, and hence was a tax upon all our manufacturing processes." London, he said, "ought to provide for its municipal necessities by local taxation, and not by *octroi* duties." Parliament wisely refused to listen to Mr. Candlish, and would not be held back from levying the duties. Against every direct tax upon *the many*, there lies in India an insuperable objection in the way of its collection. It has been affirmed that for every rupee which finds its way into the Exchequer from these rates, five rupees are taken out of the pockets of the people, *by the machinery employed in collecting them*. Direct taxation of the masses never has been successful in India, and never can be. We could have no better authority upon the subject than Sir George Campbell, who says:—

All history and all experience show that direct taxes are unpopular in all countries, and that they are especially unpopular in India, where, even in a minute form, they have already, on some occasions, excited a popular resistance, usually foreign to the character of the people. That direct taxes, levied from a large proportion of the population, will be detested is, I think, unquestionable.

Concerning a house-tax in particular, he says:—

Unfortunately, it is everywhere most unpopular, and it is particularly so in India, as our experience of the small chowkeedar tax in towns has shown. I do not doubt that by a general house-tax, unflinchingly carried out throughout all India, a considerable sum might be realized. But the doubt strongly arises to my mind whether it would be worth our while to assess and collect an odious tax over so vast a surface. I do not think it would pay the soldiers required.

It may be laid down as a leading principle of Indian finance, that *direct taxes in India must ever be odious, oppressive, and*

dangerous, from the character of the machinery to which their collection is entrusted.

To make a gross collection of about £30,000 a year, they were sending out in Bombay, in 1868, under the Frere Act, some 50,000 bills, to be collected from 15,000 of the lower middling classes, whom they dignified with the title of house owners. And this absurdity was the outcome of Sir Bartle Frere's notion that everything Indian should be recast upon the English model.

We put the Municipal Controller of Bombay at the time to some trouble, by requiring him to furnish us with certain information concerning the distress warrants running at one time in the island, which it was necessary to obtain for the full understanding of the difficulty. We found then that these warrants were for the following amounts :—

4,699	warrants for sums of from	Rs.	1	to	10
1,310	"	"	"	"	10	to	20
820	"	"	"	"	20	to	50
178	"	"	"	"	50	to	100
59	"	"	"	"	100	to	800

Thus, under Sir Bartle Frere's statesmanship, six thousand men in the island were being constantly pursued by distress warrants for sums of from one to twenty rupees, and 820 more for sums below fifty rupees. We ascertained further, at the cost of a good deal of trouble to the Controller's office, that the number of house owners against whom these warrants were running was but 2,731, two-thirds of whom were so wretchedly poor that the sum which they were unable to pay did not, upon the average, exceed eleven rupees! Once more, we found that of the five hundred and thirty distress warrants running for wheel-tax, no less than 408 were against poor men keeping but one horse, presumably from necessity, while Sir Bartle Frere fastened upon this class a fine of 54 rupees a year for wheel-tax alone, under this system of rates. The whole thing was a scandal and utter folly. We succeeded, amidst great excitement, in 1868, in getting Sir Bartle Frere's error remedied in part, to the great relief of the island, but Sir Richard Temple at that time in the supreme Government of India prevented all adequate reform. It was owing to our own persistence alone, that the wrong was in part remedied. The same error has been repeated all over India. The people are blistered by direct taxes of all kinds that yield a minimum of return with a maximum of extortion and suffering.

INDIA BEFORE OUR TIME AND SINCE.

RESULTS OF ANNEXATION.—I.

AN old Bombay Civilian of some mark in his day, Mr. H. P. Malet, about three years ago addressed two letters to one of the Hampshire papers on the evils that have sprung from our rule in the Mahratta country. Writing from Florence to the *Salisbury and Winchester Journal*, after twenty years' retirement from India, Mr. Malet paints a very distressing picture of the ruin brought upon the districts of the Deccan, by the substitution of our rule for that of the Peishwa, in 1818. The same picture has been drawn over and over again in our time, and remains, unhappily, but too faithful a portraiture of matters as they are to-day. Mr. Malet is describing the very same districts as those in which the so-called "Deccan riots" occurred, that led to the appointment of the Deccan Commission of Inquiry. It is a delusion which Englishmen are under, that our rule has improved the condition of the people of India. Our desire has been to benefit and enrich them; and yet our rule has proved fatal to them, over wide districts of the country. It is true that we have put down internal strife and war, and delivered the people from the fear of the freebooter and the Pindaree; but it is also mournfully true, that the ryot who before our time reaped his harvest with the sickle in one hand and the sword (*tulwar*) in the other, never knew the abject poverty and bitter bondage to the sowcar that our peaceful rule has brought with it. It is not only useless, it is most unwise to shut our eyes to the fact, however disagreeable it may be to us, and however painful to admit it. Mr. Malet says:—

In former days, when roads were bad, and when there was a transit duty on grain, it was usual to find great stores of grain in the smallest villages. I have known it kept for four years. The transit duty was abolished in 1836, roads have been improved and railroads made, a ready market is obtained, and no grain comparatively is now stored. Of course, the country generally is improved by facility of carriage, and if a famine comes to any locality, it is easier now than formerly to supply it with food. The recurrence of natural famines cannot be prevented; but the second part of the question leads to subjects of great importance, to one in particular that is daily spreading a tarnish over the whole diadem, creeping on so slowly but surely, that outsiders in England are not aware of it, and the officials do not know how to remedy it. What will mitigate a natural famine? The answer is, money! "Why cannot the people buy? Land is assessed lighter in India than anywhere else; the cultivators ought to be rich

but they are poor, and are the first to suffer by famines. Why? The question involves us in most intricate social questions that have been before the Government of Bombay for more than forty years. The India Office in London is aware of them, but no solution has as yet been provided, and hence the intensity of the present famine.

We have repeatedly pointed out, as Mr. Malet here does, that the extreme lightness of the assessments in these Deccan districts makes it a simple absurdity to ascribe the present poverty of the people to the pressure of the land revenue. Over whole talooks of these districts, the assessments do not average a rupee per acre. They are sometimes as low as three and four annas per acre, over wide tracts of land under regular cultivation with *bajra* and *jowaree*, but so sterile or so exhausted as to yield but 70lbs. to 130lbs. of these coarse millets per acre. In spite of the poverty of their soil, the people lived and paid revenue on these lands under the Peishwa, in circumstances of comfort compared with their condition under ourselves; while the causes of this deterioration, as Mr. Malet justly says, involve us in "intricate social questions that have been before the Bombay Government these last forty years." To say that it is our rule which has disintegrated and changed everything, amongst the people, is the truth, but does not help us to the remedy. Mr. Malet says:—

When we gained possession of these Ryotwar districts, we carried on the revenue system of the Peishwa. The assessment was then about double what it is now, but then it was never collected in full. The nature of the soil and character of the season allowed an entire collection from some, while the same causes opposed collection from others. Our first Revenue officers endeavoured to realize the whole assessment, but never did it. In 1832 I was sent to the Sholapore districts to inquire into the outstanding revenue balances of ten or twelve years. This inquiry extended to every cultivator in every village, bringing me at once into the whole social system of the country. As far as the revenue was concerned, the condition was chaotic. Receipts had not been given, the collections in the village books did not tally with the revenue paid in. Ryots said they had paid, the officers said they had not. At the end of two years of very tedious and trying work, I gave in my report, showing what could be and what could not be recovered. I exposed an extraordinary system of rapine and extortion in our Native establishments, and showed how nearly all the cultivators were indebted to the money-lenders, who were at the same time corn-dealers, bankers, and pawnbrokers. Extortion, tyranny, violence, and torture, forgery, and perjury were the rules. The people flocked to my tents and waylaid me in my morning and evening rides. All had tales of misery to tell. I had to sift their truth. My report was circulated to all collectors of land revenue, a crusade was opened, and in four or five years the official exactions were corrected, order and regularity ensued, as far as the land revenue was concerned, but the rapacity of the bankers continued. From 1830 to 1857, the predatory mountain tribes of these districts were every now and then avenging their own wrongs, and the injuries of the cultivators on the bankers. Murder, arson, and mutilation kept these men in

some fear ; but the avenging gangs coming under the criminal laws, were shot in arms, or hung. The last were extirpated in the field by Souter, knighted by the Prince of Wales. These hill tribes are now disarmed, the old usury laws which permitted no claim after twelve years are abolished, and the bankers, fearing no Nemesis, and finding the civil courts can be converted to their sole benefit, have of late years harassed the cultivators more than ever.

Our own familiarity with the history of these districts, enables us to confirm Mr. Malet's story to the letter ; but he seems to have overlooked *what* it was under our rule that threw the cultivators so hopelessly into the bunniah's hands. Full of a belief in what we called, and really believed to be, "the principles of political economy," our first step was to substitute cash assessments for payment of the land revenue in kind. How could we connive at anything so barbarous as payment in kind ? The revenue, of course, must be paid in money. And without an inkling for long years afterwards, as to what the inevitable effects would be, we substituted cash assessments for the old Mahratta system of payment in kind in a country where there was no money ! The step was simply fatal.

Mr. Malet tells us, as we have seen, that before our time "it was usual to find great stores of grain in the smallest villages ; I have known it kept for four years." Mr. Malet goes on, very clearly, to specify some of the causes why these "great stores of grain in the villages" are no longer there. He tells us that "our roads and railways, and facility of carriage to ready markets," have drawn them all away. We can tell him something more than this. Roads and railways, and facility of carriage to ready markets, and the abolition of transit duties, should have enriched—not impoverished—the people. The great stores of grain in the smallest villages are no longer there, because the people are, by so much at least, poorer now than they were then. They would keep great stores of grain in their villages still, if they could. It is not the facility of carrying these stores to market, that has drained the villages of them, so much as the fact that the people are too poor to own them. So burnt into the Native mind is the dread of famine, that nothing but necessity ever makes the ryot part with a store of grain, sufficient to carry himself and his dependents over years of scarcity. No price will tempt him to part with this store. It is only the collector of the land revenue, or the Civil Court for his creditor, that forces the precious "store of grain" from his holding. He knows too well the horrors of famine ; and the gaunt spectre of it haunts the poor fellow's mind while the tehsildar (revenue collector) and the sowcar, are forcing it from his trembling hands.

MR. CAIRD AND THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

No. II.

I PROPOSE in the following remarks to complete my comments on the reply made by the Government of India to Mr. Caird's Report on the "Condition of India." Mr. Caird, in his report, draws attention to the appalling destitution of the cultivating classes throughout the larger part of British India, and more especially of the landless class of field labourers. He attributes this, in part, to the increased frequency in the recurrence of droughts. To this the Government of India makes reply as follows. The italics are mine :—

Of the laws which regulate the recurrence of droughts we know nothing, or next to nothing, and there is no reason whatever for supposing that the droughts are becoming more frequent. But as far as regards the condition of the people, and their ability to support themselves under such a calamity as an almost entire loss of their crops, we are satisfied that their condition is improving, and their ability to support themselves is increasing, and not the reverse. *The manner in which the North-western Provinces bore the severe drought of 1877 may be quoted in proof of this assertion.* There was, unhappily, much suffering and a great mortality, partly attributable, directly or indirectly, to famine among the poorest, i.e., the labouring classes. *But among those classes who have any rights or interests in the land, distress was slight, no unusual mortality occurred, and famine, in the common use of the term, cannot be said to have existed.* Yet these very classes suffered most severely in the famines of 1838 and 1868, when the loss of the crops was less complete than it was in 1877. *Again, terrible as the famine of 1876-77 was in Bombay and Madras, it is on record that in the year 1877-78 the land in occupation of the cultivating classes was slightly larger, instead of being less, than before the famine; whereas in the famines of 1803 in Bombay, and 1833 in Madras immense areas of land went out of cultivation, and villages were wholly depopulated, and remained deserted for many years.* No one can carefully study the comparative history of these seasons of distress without arriving at the conclusion that in its power of resisting famine and supporting itself under a disastrous failure of the crops the country has made considerable advances.

The cuttle-fish (so naturalists tell us) endeavours, when attacked, to seek concealment by a copious discharge of inky-coloured fluid.

The Government of India, in the foregoing paragraph, have manifestly taken a hint from the tactics of the cuttle-fish. The copious discharge of inky fluid is apparent to all men; the meaning that is shrouded in it, can only be dimly guessed at. Let us try to discover it analytically. "About the laws which regulate the recurrence of droughts" the Government of India "knows nothing;" but—apparently as a logical consequence of this blank ignorance—it is "satisfied" that "the ability" of the people of India to bear up against droughts "is increasing, and not the reverse." We will at once concede that if "the ability" be "increasing," it cannot also be "the reverse;" but by what process of reasoning does the Government of India arrive at this satisfactory conclusion? "The manner" (so it appears) "in which the North-west Provinces bore the severe drought of 1877 may be quoted in proof of this assertion." Of course, anything may be "quoted" in proof of any assertion; but it by no means follows that the assertion is proved in consequence. Now, "the manner in which the North-west Provinces bore the drought of 1877" was by losing 1,250,000 of its inhabitants, according to Mr. Caird, from hunger alone, while the surviving population was left so enfeebled, that in the year following they fell victims to as fearful an epidemic of fever as even India has ever known. In some of the districts 95 per cent. of the population are calculated to have had this fever; and the mortality during three months was nearly 1,000,000 above the average of ordinary years. Such are the facts which "satisfy" this remarkable Indian Government, that the Natives of India are possessed of an "increasing ability" to bear up against a season of severe drought. But the Government of India will say, these victims were only "the landless classes," the agricultural labourers; "among those classes who have any rights or interests in the land, famine, in the common use of the term, cannot be said to have existed." It is difficult to fix this slippery Government to any definite statement. First it affirms that "the people of the country"—meaning all India and all the people in it—are increasing in ability to bear up against drought, and quotes the occurrences in the North-west Provinces in 1877-78 as an example in proof. But, knowing that 1,250,000 people died in the North-west Provinces in 1878, it executes a silent and rapid change of front, and "the people of the country" become "those classes having rights and interests in the land." Among these, "famine, in the common sense of the term, cannot be said to have existed." Famine, then, in the uncommon sense of the term, existed even among these classes? The fact is, the Government of India is simply "shuffling;" it is endeavouring to conceal the facts

under a copious discharge of inky fluid. It knows that all but the wealthy landlords and the money-lenders suffered the worst extremities of famine in 1877-78. "A calamity," writes one of its own officials, "such as that of 1877-78 guts a district . . . and we shall find, as the famine clears away, a population reduced, greatly impoverished, disheartened, and dislocated; a proprietary loaded with fresh debt; and eventually an increase in the transfer of land from the agricultural to the non-agricultural classes."

But the Indian Government has not yet exhausted all its arguments. "Terrible as the famine of 1876-77 was in Bombay and Madras, it is on record that in the year 1877-78 the land in occupation of the cultivating classes was slightly larger, instead of being less, than before the famine; whereas in the famines of 1803 in Bombay, and 1833 in Madras, immense areas of land went out of cultivation, and villages were wholly depopulated, and remained deserted for many years." This passage constitutes a conundrum which, after much meditation, I have been obliged to give up as insoluble. The thesis which the Government of India has undertaken to prove is, that the people of India are increasing in ability to sustain severe seasons of drought, and it quotes the famine of 1876-77 as a fact in proof. Well, during that famine, despite of an expenditure of many millions by Government, despite of all that private munificence and the exertions of individuals could do, upwards of 5,000,000 of our Indian subjects are allowed to have perished of hunger. This surely is proof sufficient that the people of India have no ability whatever to bear up against seasons of drought, and there can be no degrees of more and less in the non-existent. As for the "record" that after the death of these 5,000,000 the survivors cultivated not merely the whole of the old area, but also broke up fresh land, it is a story fit for the marines, and other people whose credulity has been developed at the expense of their reason, but has no relevancy to the matter in hand. Whether or not a population is capable of enduring a season of famine, can only be proved by the manner in which they actually endure one. The fact that in 1833 "immense areas of land went out of cultivation, and villages remained deserted for years," whereas no such phenomena were observable in 1877, has nothing to do with the prosperity or otherwise of the agricultural classes. It merely shows that in those times migration to fallow and consequently less exhausted soils was practicable to an extent which is now impossible. And this circumstance is a strong argument in support of Mr. Caird's contention that "the available good land in India is nearly all occupied."

As regards the appalling misery and destitution which beset, at

the least, five-sixths of the agricultural population of India, I have, in previous issues of THE STATESMAN, adduced proof in abundance of the fact; and if more is needed, it can be found in the dreary record of Indian deficits, and the lamentations of Indian Finance Ministers over the inelastic character of the Indian revenue. These lamentations, and this lack of elasticity, are alike occasioned by the poverty of the agricultural classes. It is impossible, by either direct or indirect taxation, to raise an expanding revenue from a people without purchasing capacity. There is nothing to tax in India, because the purchasing capacity of the Indian agricultural classes is limited to the barest necessities of life. We are driven to tax their salt, in sheer despair of finding anything else to tax. Oudh is, beyond question, the richest province in India. A little more than twenty years ago it was incorporated in British India, on the ground that the (so-called) government of its Native sovereigns was no better than anarchy. What have been the fruits of this change of rulers to the great body of the people? Are they richer in worldly goods—better clothed, better fed? Is their struggle for existence, a less grievous one than in the olden days, when the Nawab and his Talukdars were engaged in chronic struggles for supremacy? A very noteworthy answer to these inquiries is given in Mr. Irwin's recently published work, entitled "The Garden of India." Mr. Irwin is a Bengal Civilian whose duties, for many years, have lain in the province of Oudh, and the following is the picture he draws of the agricultural classes there:—

Taking the province as a whole, it is scarcely too much to say that a large proportion of cultivators have neither food sufficient to keep them in health, nor clothes sufficient to protect them from the weather; that their cattle are miserably thin and weak from under-feeding; that they are hardly ever out of debt for twelve months together . . . and that, *except in specially favourable seasons, they are dependent on the money-lender for their food for from two to six months in the year.* . . . The Oudh tenantry and their families—men, women, and children together—do not, on an average, consume even so much as 20 oz. of food-grain per diem. Well-fed-looking men are certainly the exception among them rather than the rule, and it is notorious that the *able-bodied adult convict nearly always increases in weight after a few months on a gaol diet of 24 oz.* The condition of the Oudh cultivators might seem to be life reduced to its lowest terms. But there are hundreds of thousands all over the province compared with whom he, as Lear has it, is "sophisticated;" the landless village labourer is "the thing itself." Everywhere, in every hamlet, there is a residuum of half-clad starvelings, who have no cattle and no means of livelihood save, perhaps, a tiny patch of spade-tilled land; and their labour remunerated at the rate of 4 lbs. of coarse grain, or of three halfpence, or, at most, twopence farthing per diem. And even this wretched employment is not procurable all the year round. How, under-fed and almost unclothed as they are, they contrive to live through the cold

nights of winter, which they often spend in field-watching to keep off thieves, is a standing marvel.

If such be the state of things in an exceptionally fertile province, we can imagine what it is in the more barren parts of the country—such, for example, as the Deccan. The members of the bureaucracy which is responsible for this vast extent of human misery, when asked to account for it, will generally ascribe it with glibness to “the improvidence of the people.” This “improvidence,” according to them, is common to all the various races which live between the Himalayas and Cape Comorin. They all go on spending their money in marriage festivals, and borrowing from the money-lender, until not a man among them has anything he can call his own except a rag of dirty cloth round his loins. And therefore it is that, despite the extraordinary wisdom and beneficence of the Supreme Government—despite of the sagacity, justice, and pre-eminent governing capacity of the members of the Indian Civil Services,—the Indian peasantry do so little credit to the august wisdom which regulates their destinies. There is one thing which neither racks nor thumbscrews will induce the Indian bureaucrat to admit, and that is that any fault can lie with him. He will arraign the sun in heaven, and declare that it has “spots” which produce drought, rather than acknowledge any shortcoming in himself. No one is fitted to estimate the actual value of an official document emanating from the Government of India, who is not aware of this characteristic of the Indian bureaucrat.

The fact is that there is no more ground for asserting that “improvidence” is the cause of the misery of the Indian peasant than for asserting that “spots in the sun” produce Indian famines. The Indian peasant is not improvident. He is far rather a marvel of thrift, frugality, and industry. “We are,” writes Mr. C. H. Crosthwaite, “constantly told of the improvidence of the people. But in what do they show their improvidence? Can extravagance be alleged against the horsekeeper who, out of a monthly wage of ten shillings, contrives in six months to put by thirty? Are the Native soldiers improvident? Yet they are the sons and brothers of the men who till the soil. There is no more thrifty race in the world than the people of Hindustan. Their rural economy would put any of us to shame. There is not a straw let go to waste; not a weed, that is not poison, which has not its use. Yet we are told that they are improvident. Doubtless there are the Thakoors and others of once powerful clans, who do spend money. There are the robber clans, such as the Goojurs. But even against these it is a mistake to bring a sweeping charge of extravagance. The ordinary

peasant is the most thrifty and frugal of mortals. He is no glutton; he does not drink; his sole luxury is an extra bullock or two. Yet he is in debt; he is the slave of the usurer."

It is elsewhere than in this fiction of "improvidence" that we must look for the explanation of the misery and indebtedness of the Indian agricultural class. And the explanation, we affirm, is to be found in the character and nature of British rule. The Government of India suffers from chronic impecuniosity. It does so, in a large measure, because in India our Government undertakes to discharge a vast number of tasks which elsewhere are left to private enterprise. A double evil results from this. Every canal that is constructed, every *bund* that is thrown across a river, every bridge that is built, provides large salaries and chances of distinction to a number of officials. The consequence is that officials hungering for large salaries and chances of distinction are for ever concocting schemes for the accomplishment of all sorts of things, and urging them upon the Government by every argument their ingenuity can suggest. The primary object of all these schemes is to benefit the promulgators; the secondary, and quite subordinate one, to benefit the people of India. And when the scheme is taken in hand, there is no one whose interest it is to keep a steady and vigilant control over the expenditure. The Government of India cannot itself do so; and to the officials actually employed in the building of *bunds*, canals, bridges, or railways, as the case may be, it is a matter of entire indifference whether the work be a paying one or not. The only party whom this question concerns is the people of India, and they are no more consulted than if they were inhabitants of another planet. Hence the prodigious wastefulness of the Government of India; hence the almost incredible failures of its Public Works Department; and hence, finally, the insatiable craving for money. The ancient practice of the country gives the Government a right to a certain share in the produce of the soil, and there being a perennial hunger on the part of the Government to make that share as large as possible, a Revenue officer stands well with his superior authorities very much according to the greater or less magnitude of his Revenue returns.

The Government of India may speak of their moderation, of their earnest desire to advance the material well-being of the rural communities of India, but it is literally true that nothing so kindles the wrath of the Government as the report of any exceptional prosperity among these same rural communities. It immediately raises a cry that the Government is being cheated out of its "rights"—that an undue portion of the produce of the land is being left in

the possession of those whose industry has called it into existence. Revenue officers are reminded with menacing urgency that a spirit of leniency to the people of the country is not to be distinguished from a failure of loyalty to the Government, whose agents and collectors they are. Thus, for example, in the Oudh Revenue Report of 1872-3, we read :—

In some districts, notably Fyzabad, Gouda, Kheri, and parts of Sultanpur, at a time of supposed financial pressure, the revision of the assessment was hurried on, and a greatly enhanced demand was imposed before the Settlement officer had had time to adjust the rights and liabilities of the various sharers and under proprietors affected by the operation. It is not difficult to understand that a course such as this necessarily entails great hardship on the persons directly responsible for the Government revenue, and results in their frequent default.

“Results in their frequent default !” This is the official euphemism for saying that these people were ruined by the severity of the Government demand ; their lands being seized for arrears and put up to auction sale, and they themselves converted from proprietors into cultivating tenants at will. It is significant of the hard and mechanical manner in which the English bureaucracy rules India that *this* side of what is called “default” is not thought sufficiently important to be referred to in an official report. The harsh and arbitrary assessments are no otherwise a subject of regret than as they result in a failure to realize the full quota demanded. Still, it must not be imagined that the Government are the only sinners in respect of over-assessment. The Settlement officer is liable to sin grievously in like manner ; and his method of procedure, as well as its consequences, is described with great force and vivacity in Mr. Connell’s admirable book on “Our Land Revenue Policy in Northern India”—a work hardly less entertaining than it is instructive, and which ought to be in the hands of every one interested in our Indian Empire. Mr. Connell writes :—

Settlement officers, again, in the height of their zeal, peer with prophetic vision into the misty future, and they fix an assessment admittedly at the time above half assets, on the assumption that, after a certain period, the rental of the village will, from some defined cause, increase to double the imposed land-tax (the official theory being that the Government share is half the rental). They speculate that jungle-land will be brought under cultivation ; that a canal will soon offer more abundant facilities for irrigation ; that a railway or metalled road will give an easier and cheaper access to neighbouring markets ; that prices will rise ; that tenants will increase and multiply ; that the rents are abnormally and absurdly low ; that the land should pay much more ; that rents could easily be enhanced if the landowners would only properly exert themselves ; and in this pleasant belief they at once raise the Government demand to a rate admittedly far above half the existing rental, and this largely increased tax the land-

owners are at once politely admonished to pay. Can there be a more suicidal or more grossly unjust system of taxation than this? The Settlement officer calls on the landowner to pay up at once a half of that increase which can only be obtained after the lapse of some years, and after the expenditure of much labour and of a considerable amount of capital. The cultivation of waste land is, for instance, a slow and costly process; the jungle growth has to be cut and carted away; tenants must be invited; the soil must be dug up by hand; outlying hamlets must be built; the families of new-comers must be fed till the ripening of the harvest; and bullocks and seed must be provided: a season of heavy rainfall renders the mud huts uninhabitable, or a drought kills the crops; in a month or two the tenants have disappeared, the hamlets are deserted, and the land is again abandoned to grass and weeds. Two other manifest objections to such a system are that it operates injuriously as a tax on improvements, and compels the landowners to plough up all their pasture-ground. It seems to be forgotten that if the landowners are obliged in this way to cut every scrub of jungle, their cultivators, and they themselves, are left destitute of fuel; instead of using wood, they must now make all the manure into cow cakes; they also obtain a scantier supply of fodder for their cattle; and the kine, deprived of their grazing land, grow thin, sicken, and die.

In short, the growth of national wealth in India is simply impossible so long as the Government remains constituted as it is at present. Governor-Generals, Lieutenant-Governors, Chief Commissioners, and other high officials, having each but a brief tenure of office, are naturally desirous to signalize it by some achievement which they can style their own. Hence they are unceasingly engaged in the operation of killing the goose which lays the golden eggs. Instead of allowing the wealth of the country to fructify in the possession of its people, the instant that our bureaucrats see their way to getting a little more money out of their subjects, they immediately expend it in some showy and most probably mischievous enterprise. The Afghan War is a conspicuous, but by no means an abnormal, example of this peculiar practice. Here, we were to get a "scientific frontier," a "strong, friendly, and independent Afghanistan," and an Indian Empire absolutely secure from Russian menaces, at the trifling cost of £1,200,000. All these grand things were going so dirt-cheap that it was positively sinful not to invest in them. And the result is that, having spent upwards of £40,000,000, and sacrificed innumerable lives, we have not acquired so much as one of the objects for which we embarked in the speculation. Of course, it is but seldom that our Indian bureaucrats enjoy such a saturnalia of folly and extravagance as during Lord Lytton's Viceroyalty, but their method of procedure has been at all times the same. A scheme is floated, as the Afghan War was, by absurdly low estimates of what it will cost, and extravagantly high estimates of what it will return. For example, our Indian railways were, on

paper, estimated to cost no more than £10,000 a mile; but during the process of construction this estimate was first raised to £11,000, then to £18,000, then to £21,000, and was finally given up as a quantity incapable of definite specification. When, over a huge continent, a vast quantity of public works and schemes of all kinds are being carried on in this happy-go-lucky fashion, it is easy to understand why a "financial crisis" is an annual occurrence in India. As soon as a "crisis" is an established fact, a cry is raised for the suspension of all public works. The consequence of this cry is that a nominal saving is effected at an immense sacrifice. Enormous quantities of plant and material have either to be sold for a mere nothing, or are allowed to rot. The half-finished public works are either not resumed again, in which case the cost of their construction is so much money flung clean away; or, in the interval of "suspension," they fall rapidly into disrepair, and require a large additional outlay when they are again taken in hand. Departments which have been brought together with great trouble and expense, have either to be broken up, in order, at some future date, to be again organized at a like cost, or they are maintained doing nothing, at the public expense, until better times come round.

Over and above all this, there is a most mischievous confusion of thought in the way in which Indian public works are talked about. There is a constant effort to prove that this or that "public work" is "reproductive"—i.e., that it returns an adequate profit on the costs of its construction; and the impression appears to be that "reproductive public works" may be carried out by the Government to almost any extent without impoverishing the people. A very flagrant and dangerous fallacy lurks in this notion. It assumes that the same people benefit by the reproductive work, whatever it may be, who were originally taxed for the costs of its construction. This, of course, never is so. A canal, say, is constructed in the Punjab. The entire continent is taxed to contribute to the costs of its construction. For thirty years, say, this canal is either in process of construction or cannot be worked to a profit: it is clear that for that period it is a steady drain upon the wealth and industry of the country; nor will its reproductiveness at all recoup a generation which has passed away in sustaining it.

The truth is that our present system of governing India is so bad, that it is hardly possible to conceive of a worse. It is impossible that a spirit of individual enterprise should develop itself beneath its blighting shadow, because there is nothing which the jealousy of the ruling bureaucracy will permit an individual or a company to attempt. It is impossible that wealth should accumulate to any

considerable extent, because in the one great industry of the continent—the agricultural—the Government is ever on the watch for any such accumulation, to seize upon it for its own uses. The consequent depression and misery in this—the main—industry of India reacts upon all the other ordinary sources of wealth and indirect revenue. The operations of the Government revolve continually in a vicious circle. "It is continually laying new and new burdens on the Indian agriculturist, in order to make him prosperous. He is taxed for the construction of a canal; then he is taxed again to defray its working expenses; then his land is more heavily assessed because of the canal for which he has already been taxed; and having done all these things, our sapient Indian bureaucracy is astonished to find that, in the end, the Indian agriculturist is very much more miserable than at the beginning.

There is, however, a remedy, if we had but the courage to apply it. That remedy is—Decentralization; and the most valuable part, to my thinking, of Mr. Caird's "Report" is that which he devotes to this subject.

If Australia, New Zealand, or the Canadian Confederation desired to sever their connection with Great Britain and begin life as an independent country, there is no reasonable Englishman who would offer any opposition, under the impression that, thereby, the strength of Great Britain would be weakened, or her glory diminished. No greater glory can accrue to a nation than to become the mother of free nations; and it is obvious that in case of war our strength would be largely enhanced, if we were not responsible for the safety of remote and widely-separated colonial possessions. But I apprehend that the number of Englishmen is few who would reason in the same way as regards our Indian Empire. As a matter of theory, we all profess to be governing India in order to teach the people to govern themselves; but when asked to give practical expression to this theory, we are immediately seized with terror lest we should "lose India." Before it is possible to argue profitably *how* to govern India, it is essential that we should clearly determine for what end we are governing her. Is it for the benefit of the British bureaucracy at present established there; or is it to prepare the people for the work of self-government? In what I have to say I shall assume that we govern India for the latter purpose; and if so, the contingency that we shall "lose India" if we do this or that, may well be the best reason for doing it. For I assume that we intend to "lose India" as soon as her people are capable of managing India for themselves.

In its effects upon society, upon the happiness and well-being of

the people, our administration of India has been a miserable failure. Wordsworth's picture of

"Blind Authority beating with his staff
The child that might have led him,"

represents very accurately the relation which has existed between our English bureaucrats and the people they ruled.. But there is one idea of unspeakable value that we have succeeded in implanting in the Indian mind, and that is the idea of international law. We have succeeded in making both princes and people understand that there are victories to be won in times of peace quite as glorious as the achievements of war; and in this conviction, as I believe, lies the hope of a great future for India. What remains for us to do is to nourish this conviction into greater strength by giving it room for expansion and practical consequences. And the only way in which we can provide this room for expansion is by gradually withdrawing ourselves from the direct government of the country. At present, if a brilliant and able soldier, such as Mahommed Jan, had the misfortune to be a British subject, the highest military rank to which he could attain would be equivalent to that of a sergeant-major. Sir Salar Jung is incomparably the ablest man at present living in India—whether Native or English—yet were he a British subject, he would be without a field for the exercise of his great powers. As long as such a system prevails, it is mere hypocrisy to pretend that we are educating the people of India in the practice of self-government. We are, on the contrary, sedulously destroying whatever capacity they may possess in that direction. Now, assuming that India is at some future day to be the home of a free people, it is certain that it will not form a single homogeneous empire. It will be constituted as a confederation of States; and it should be the object of on-looking statesmen to pave the way for this result by relaxing the ties which at present bind the entire continent into an artificial unity. Decentralization is, obviously, the only way in which this can be done. But the Government of India objects to Mr. Caird's proposals, on the following grounds:—

The army, the railways, the Customs' duties, the opium and all the salt revenue, the Post-office, the relations with foreign States, whether feudatory or beyond the confines of India, must always be directed by some central authority. The management of these branches of public affairs cannot be parcelled out among the several Governments.

Why not? The Government of India prudently abstains from giving any reasons in proof of these assertions. As for the salt-tax, if decentralization, accompanied by representative government, were

carried out in India. I am satisfied it might be dispensed with. As for the armies of Madras and Bombay, the Indian Commander-in-Chief has, at this moment, only a nominal control over them ; and there is no reason why a Provincial Government should not look after its railways and its Post-office, quite as well as a distant Supreme Government. As for our "relations with foreign States, whether feudatory or beyond the confines of India," it would be an immense gain if the control of these were taken out of the hands of a secret and irresponsible bureaucracy, and entrusted to a Secretary of State responsible to Parliament. In no part of its multifarious duties, from the times of Clive and Warren Hastings up to the present day, has the Government of India sinned so deliberately by tyrannous oppression and blundered so disastrously, as in its conduct of these same "foreign relations."

But it is, financially, that the largest benefit may be expected to accrue to India from a policy of decentralization. The present financial system is very truly described by Mr. Caird :—

Under the present system, the whole of the Provincial revenues are swept into the Imperial Treasury, and doled out again according to the views of the body of distinguished men who constitute the Government of India, who are far from, and necessarily unacquainted with, local peculiarities and requirements. They live at as great a distance from most of the provinces as if the government of this country, the regulation of its railways and public works, and the disposal of the finances were directed by a committee of eminent foreigners sitting at Rome or Madrid. Their idea of financial responsibility would appear to be that the provinces should pay into their central exchequer all revenues derived from the land, excise, and customs, and be content, for the wants of the provinces, with such grants as the authorities at Simla can spare, raising by local taxation whatever more may be required.

It is due to this preposterous system, that the surplus wealth of rich provinces is, year by year, drawn away from them and expended in barren efforts to enhance the fertility of less productive lands. Thus, ever since its annexation, £900,000 have been yearly abstracted from the people of Oudh and expended elsewhere, with the results we saw in the extract from Mr. Irwin's book. The abolition of a central Government, and a larger measure of decentralization, would put an end to this grievous hardship. The various Indian provinces would be compelled to limit their desires within the compass of their natural resources, and the wealth of each province would go to enrich those whose labour had produced it.

Mr. Caird further suggests that each provincial Governor should be assisted by a representative assembly, to which (I would add) all legislative proposals should be submitted, and which should possess

a veto on expenditure. There will be no great or lasting improvement in the material or intellectual condition of India, until the British nation has the courage to insist upon adequate reform. The admission of Natives into the Civil Service is, without it, a delusion and a snare. Even assuming that the Civil Service becomes entirely Native, we should only have substituted an Indian bureaucracy for an English one; whereas, what we are endeavouring to educe in India, is a free and self-governing population. Representative assemblies such as Mr. Caird proposes would bring to Governors of provinces what they have never yet had the advantage of—knowledge, at first hand, of the wants and desires of the people. Having a veto on expenditure, they would be able to stop wild projects of so-called improvement, the advantages of which are most doubtful, the costs most certain. Lastly, they would have a powerful influence in reforming the modes of government in, and awakening political aspirations among, the inhabitants of independent and feudatory States.

I am well aware that, by nine out of ten of our English Civilians, both Mr. Caird's suggestions and my anticipations will be condemned as chimerical. But there is nothing chimerical about them, unless we are prepared to assert that the inhabitants of India are, one and all, bereft of their senses; and that none among them know the needs of their country or the desires of their fellow-countrymen so well as Englishmen who have no knowledge of either the one or the other, except what they pick up from the people themselves.

ROBERT D. OSBORN.

“HABET.”

“If every form of official propriety is to be stripped off, every restraint of literary decency cast aside, and open attacks on the policy and proceedings of Government—such as have appeared in *THE STATESMAN* regarding the affairs of Mysore and Hyderabad—are to be circulated in India, embellished by extracts from papers that ought always to have been considered as private and confidential, one of two things will be inevitable—either Imperial supremacy must be given up, or the semi-independence of our feudatory States must be put down. It will be impossible for any Resident or Political Agent to maintain his proper position at a Native Court, or to make sure of gaining attention and acquiescence to the views of our Government, if all the details of discussion and negotiation are to be dragged before the public eye, worked up into a sensational story by means of highly-coloured misrepresentation.”

SAVING our own judgment as to “literary decency,” and setting aside the charge of “misrepresentation,” which we challenge as absolutely unfounded, the apprehensions of the eminent “Political” officer from whose recent letter we quote the above extract by permission, are by no means visionary. It has been our aim and hope from the outset, to make the present system and course of Calcutta bureaucracy and “Political Agency” impossible for the future, and to rouse the conscience of the nation, to the deeds that are done in its name. We are equally convinced that the ordinary practice of the Anglo-Indian Resident, and of the “Foreign” department which instructs him, cannot endure “the public eye,” and that it is not really consistent with “the views of our Government.” The Home Government is, in fact, kept in the dark, and our cry is for “more light.”

And while our cry is for more light, we claim to have ourselves thrown some light into several obscure passages—to have, at least, pointed out some dark places, from which the contents must be dragged before the Imperial Government can know the whole truth about them. We have published facts on more than one subject, that are still officially withheld from the India Office, and have placed others in orderly array that have been officially disarranged

and distorted. It has been part of our mission to explain, and to illustrate by instances, how the decisions and orders of the Secretary of State, and even of the Viceroy, are evaded and impeded by the passive and systematic disobedience of a chartered *bureaucracy*—how the policy of Her Majesty's Ministers, and the principles approved by Parliament, are made of no effect by private understandings between local authorities and their "covenanted" brethren at head-quarters, carried out by "office-notes" and a nice derangement of papers. A strict inquiry into some past workings of the system we deprecate, would reveal its extent and its mischievous efficacy. If from some special cause, a Secretary of State and a Viceroy, harmoniously combined, should become intent on enforcing a measure which the covenanted guild abhor, it may, by unremitting vigilance and firmness, be done at last; but in many cases it will be too late, will be done in form only, and conducted to predetermined failure.

Of course, this is just the sort of imputation that will be indignantly denied and repudiated, in every grade of the official hierarchy. How could it be otherwise? Contrition and confession in such matters are quite inconceivable. Moreover, we can well understand that the indignation might not all be simulated, but even have a sort of sincerity in it. The malpractice of a class, a department, or a corporation, consecrated by routine and precedent, does not easily touch the conscience of an individual. Every official who has ever written a private letter on public affairs, is probably under the firm conviction that he never did so in his life except for the purpose of facilitating business. Something, also, that has been stretched into a general sanction, is to be found in the not unfrequent *demi-official* correspondence, under orders, between Secretaries or heads of departments and local Governments. But all such letters ought to be filed. Nothing should be reserved from the supreme and responsible authorities, by their ministerial subalterns or their consultative colleagues. Private correspondence on public affairs between the Viceroy, the Secretary of State, and the Premier, is admissible, and indeed indispensable; but in every other range of the public service, with the doubtful exception of personal requests for promotion, leave, and so forth, private communications ought to be absolutely forbidden. The discretion to be used in the construction of *précis* and "office-notes," and in the selection of papers for the settlement of important cases, ought to be carefully regulated and restricted, and, for some time at least, jealously watched.

The practice of misleading the counsels, and setting aside the instructions of the Home Government by indirect agency, and by

means ostensibly subordinate, more particularly and more frequently prevails in what is called the Foreign and Political Department, where professional prejudices against anything like the pretence or display of administrative success in a Native State, or the assertion of any originality or independence of mind by a Native statesman are too likely to meet with sympathy, even in the Viceregal closet more especially if the Viceroy has had a few years to become infected by the influences and atmosphere around him. It was the decided expression of public opinion at home, pronounced on all sides in Parliament, and authoritatively formulated in Her Majesty's Proclamation of 1858, that put an end to the policy of annexation; but the contemptuous and arrogant spirit of that policy, fostered and fortified by the interests of "the Service," has never died out in the Foreign Office of Calcutta.

There is a plan very familiar in the mouths of Anglo-Indian Councillors and Secretaries, when trying to dispose of some troublesome political appeal, which, in a secret minute or a confidential despatch, open to no challenge or contradiction, has proved extremely effective. It is the plan of discrediting the cause, by boldly asserting the acquiescence or indifference of the principal party, who is represented as a poor passive creature or a good-natured imbecile, of whom turbulent agitators or interested intriguers have made a tool and a prey. Thus in the Parliamentary Papers printed in April 1860, which revealed to him the preposterous prevarications by which he was deprived of his inheritance, Prince Azeem Jah, the rightful Nawab of the Carnatic, found himself represented to Parliament and the public, as "perfectly understanding and acquiescing in his new position," as having "abandoned the chimerical idea of the restoration of the Nawabship, and accepted his position as the first Native nobleman of Madras."*

Two years later, the Secretary of State, Sir Charles Wood, in a despatch to the Government of Madras, of the 8th of April, 1862, writes as follows: "I learn with regret from these papers, that the Prince has not, as I had been led to believe, 'accepted his position as the first Native nobleman of Madras,' but is still seeking the restoration in his person of the Nawabship of the Carnatic." In this case, the Government of Madras professed to have attached some importance to Prince Azeem Jah having "cordially responded" to an invitation to a ball given by the Governor "in celebration of Her Majesty's

* "Carnatic Papers" (1860), p. 53.

birthday." Far from acquiescing or submitting, the Nawab continued pressing his appeal until it had been six times brought before the House of Commons, and kept it up until he obtained moderate compensation by his annual stipend of £15,000 being raised to £30,000, and half of it settled in perpetuity on his descendants, while, to the great perturbation of Heralds' College, the hereditary title of Prince of Arcot was conferred on him by an unprecedented and unique patent, and a sum of £150,000 was granted for the payment of his debts.

Again, the favourite argument of the "acquiescence" of his ancestors was brought against the Nawab Nazim of Bengal, when he was protesting against the disendowment of his family, in a despatch from the Government of India to the Secretary of State, dated the 29th of July, 1870. It is therein argued that the Nawab Nazim must have quite "overlooked" a certain "inference" when he adduced documentary proof of the princely rank and prerogative of his ancestors, "and that is that the higher he raises their position the more weight does he attach to the acquiescence of himself and his ancestors to the arrangement under which they lived." As a matter of fact, the Nawab Nazim's ancestors never did acquiesce in the diminution of their privileges and revenues. Their acquiescence is officially asserted in defiance of the truth. Referring to the reduction of the stipend promised to the Nawab Nazim Mobaruk-oo-Dowlah, under the Treaty of 1770, the following statements are made in paragraph 8 of the despatch above mentioned: "The Company, having reduced the Nawab Nazim's stipend during his minority, continued to pay the reduced amount for the rest of his life, and long after his minority ceased." "The Nawab Nazim, on his part, quietly accepted his altered position, and the present Nawab Nazim's father, his grandfather, his grand-uncle, and his great-grandfather received the reduced payment for a period of forty-five years, apparently without complaint."* It is really painful to have to say it, but all this is utterly untrue. All the persons mentioned did complain. They had no means of resistance, hardly any means of remonstrance, especially during minorities, when speculation and petticoat influence were content to be left alone; but they never acquiesced, and constantly complained. There is ample written evidence in the archives of the Foreign Office of the annoyance and embarrassment that was caused by the inquiries and requisitions of the Nizamut, and of the intermittent efforts made by more than one Governor-General to come to a final understanding.

* "Nawab Nazim" (116 of 1871), p. 4.

We have lately ascertained that this miserable plea of acquiescence and indifference has been employed to cast a dark shade over the efforts of the Nawab Salar Jung and his co-Regent, the late Ameer-i-Kabeer, to obtain the restitution of the Berar Provinces, a case of which we have discussed the merits at some length.* We have explained in a previous article how in 1877, in order to harass and hamper the eminent statesman at the head of the Administration of Hyderabad, he was unevenly yoked with a colleague with whom it was known to be impossible that he should work harmoniously. With such a partner as a thorn in his side, and with the help of minor and incidental acts of petty annoyance, such as deporting his Private Secretary, and paying him marked inattention at the Delhi Assemblage, it was calculated that, even if not intimidated, he would for some time be impeded in his importunate appeal. But it was also desirable, in order to give a finished appearance and a more equitable aspect to this grand political success, to throw doubt and discredit over the past history of the protest. The Nawab Salar Jung, since the death of the late Nizam, and during the minority of his son, the present reigning Prince, had always, as we have described in previous articles, represented, with the cordial support of his colleague, the Ameer-i-Kabeer Shums-ool-Oomra, that it was the sacred duty of the co-Regents to endeavour to restore the territorial integrity of the State, in accordance with the latest injunctions of their deceased Sovereign.

This is all stuff, argue the Resident and his Assistants—knowing what will please the Secretariat at Calcutta—the restitution of Berar is a mere fancy of Salar Jung's, a fancy of his, with a great foundation of self-interest. He has known all along that he was not the chosen Minister of the Nizam—he knows that his reforms and his whole scheme of administration render him unpopular with the nobles and higher classes, and that but for the countenance and support of the British Government, he would long ago have been driven from power. He has always, therefore, felt the want of some apparent aim and object that would seem desirable in the eyes of the Prince and the Court, and which should appear more likely of attainment through his mediation than any other's. And this he saw in the appeal for the Berars. He knows very well himself that the request will never be granted, but he sees his own advantage in maintaining an agitation. He thus upholds his own credit not only as a true and loyal servant of the Nizam, but as an indispensable

* "Restitution of Berar," STATESMAN, No. 2, July, 1860, pp. 162 to 185, and No. 5, October, 1860, pp. 448 to 466.

agent for regaining the lost provinces. And if, by any happy change of policy on the part of the Imperial Government, the provinces should be restored, he would then have secured all the honour and glory of the restitution, and would be secure for life in the post of Minister, and probably be enabled to establish his son as his successor. Of any such improbable result, however, neither Salar Jung nor any one of the nobles or high functionaries of the Hyderabad Court has ever had any real hope. The agitation on the subject is almost entirely factitious and factious. Such has been the line of argument, partly urged in official despatches, partly in demi-official and private communications, that has emanated from the Hyderabad Residency, for the solace and comfort of the Calcutta Foreign Office. It is a line of argument based entirely on imaginary assumptions, and utterly destitute of any reasonable justification. But we are very much misinformed if there is not now in the Foreign Office at Calcutta, and perhaps in the India Office here, a secret and confidential despatch very much to the above effect, written since the death of the late co-Regent, and embellished by a posthumous pretence of his having acknowledged his personal indifference. "These are Imperial arts, and worthy thee!"

But a justification has been sought for it. So long as the late Ameer-i-Kabeer lived, he co-operated with the Nawab Salar Jung in pressing for the restitution of the Berar Provinces. He joined in every application that was made; he signed every despatch as co-Regent. But he is dead; he died in 1877; he can no longer speak for himself. He is now represented by his brother, formerly known as Wikar-ool-Oomra, who, on account of his intrigues against the honour of the British Resident, was consigned for eight years to "complete political extinction," and was only pulled out of obscurity to be set up in opposition to the Nawab Salar Jung. This creature, backed by another corrupt person, whose name we will not mention at present, is brought forward to calumniate his honourable and respected brother, and to declare that the late Ameer-i-Kabeer did not seriously or willingly join with the Nawab Salar Jung in pressing the restitution of the Berars on the consideration of the British Government; that he merely signed the despatches as a matter of form, and to avoid a rupture with his colleague, but that he neither believed in the practicability and advisability of the restitution, nor cared about it at all. It was merely a pet grievance of the Nawab Salar Jung, who had his own object in it. The late Ameer-i-Kabeer was really indifferent about the Berars, and in his heart acquiesced in their retention under the charge of a British Commissioner.

If there should be in the Foreign Office at Calcutta, and, perhaps, in the India Office in London, a secret and confidential despatch containing some such unworthy misrepresentations as those we have here shadowed forth,—even though a Resident and an Assistant Resident were to add their testimony to alleged admissions wrung out of the deceased Ameer-i-Kabeer at a private interview,—we should still denounce the moral worthlessness and the argumentative nullity of such allegations. The man is dead; the witnesses cannot be cross-examined. Conversations may be misrepresented, but the written despatches are on record. This is but one specimen of the sort of secret and confidential gossip, made to order, or made for a purpose, that too often passes current between the Calcutta Secretariat and its Political Agencies, and by which, in a revised and finished condition, the counsels of the empire are darkened.

SIR RICHARD TEMPLE.

THE morning the Prince of Wales arrived in Calcutta (December 24, 1875) the *Indian Daily News*, one of the leading newspapers of India, appeared in mourning, to the equal surprise and indignation of the city. The community forgave the step, however, almost immediately. The journal had simply sought to draw the attention of his Royal Highness in this way, to the exasperated feeling of the community towards the Lieut.-Governor of Bengal, our friend Sir Richard Temple. The whole of the non-official Justices had sent in, or were on the eve of sending in, their resignation of the Commission of the Peace, refusing to serve the Crown, while Sir Richard Temple remained Her Majesty's representative. And this resolution was come to from a deep and overpowering sense of his profound immorality as ruler. It was the open complaint of all classes, that he did not seem to know what sincerity or truthfulness even meant. And to-day, this gentleman, having come home, hopes to win the confidence of the English public, by diligently courting our Missionary and Bible Societies, presiding at their meetings, and lecturing wherever he can obtrude himself into the position of an authority upon Indian affairs. We warn the English people not to be imposed upon by him. It is a far cry to India, and Indian officials who have risen as high as Sir Richard Temple, manage to survive exposures that would be fatal to any other of our public men. Thus a civilian collector at Chittagong, Kirkwood by name, had ordered a Native gentleman of that city, who held Her Majesty's Commission as a Justice of the Peace, and who was one of the Municipal Commissioners, to mount guard as a constable over the public "latrines" of the town! Now this gross and scandalous outrage was offered to this Native gentleman, for no other reason whatever than that he had dared to disapprove of, and oppose, certain proceedings of Mr. Kirkwood, as Chairman of the Municipal Commission. The case excited great indignation, and the attention of the Supreme Government being drawn to it, Sir Richard Temple, as Lieutenant-Governor of the province, was called upon for a report of the matter. In the

usual Civilian way, the report was made "secret and confidential;" and in making this report Sir Richard Temple falsified, absolutely and without excuse, the very heart of the incident. An intelligent Native writer, through whose hands this secret and untruthful report passed, saw its importance and disclosed it to the press, when the whole community saw for itself the true character of the man who was railing them. He was instantly and openly charged with "the falsehood;" and had Lord Lytton done his duty, Sir Richard Temple would have been compelled to resign his appointment. But who ever heard of an Indian Civilian of his standing, being allowed to come to grief by the Government of India? The charge against him was clear and explicit, and its truth manifest. To screen Kirkwood, he had sent in an absolutely untruthful statement to the Government of India. And over and over again during his brief administration of Bengal, was he denounced publicly for his immorality as an official; while to-day the Missionary Societies are taking him up, as an eligible chairman, and the impression is sedulously propagated that he has been a very successful Indian administrator. He contrived, for he is amazingly clever, to get a public dinner given to him in Bombay, when he was coming home to offer himself as representative in Parliament for East Worcestershire. And now let our readers observe what the Indian newspapers of all classes of the community were simultaneously saying of him. The extracts we shall give represent faithfully public opinion in India regarding Sir Richard Temple's character as a ruler and statesman:—

Bombay Review.

We entertain as high an opinion of Sir Richard Temple's abilities as do any of his reasonable admirers; but we perceive his fatal tendency to autocracy, his invincible dislike to real freedom of discussion, his inclination to sacrifice principle to expediency, his readiness to subordinate the interests of the people to the official policy of the day, to postpone the genuine claims of India to pseudo-Imperial exigencies, and, as Bishop Meurin, with perhaps unintentional frankness, remarked, his facility of "becoming all things to all men."

Indian Daily News (Calcutta).

We cannot conceive of a fairly free and independent constituency in England sending to Parliament a man like the ex-Governor of Bombay. There was no flourish of trumpets, no dinner, no address, no lined streets, when Sir Richard left Bengal. There might not be much to hope in the way of improvement, but the province was at least rid of an official, who would not hesitate to subordinate the interests of India, and the most cherished rights of Englishmen, if, by so doing, he could only add to the glory or advancement of Sir Richard Temple.

The Dnyanodaya.

The address to Sir Richard Temple was voted last Friday afternoon, at a meeting calling itself a meeting of the inhabitants of Bombay, but really consist-

ing of a few Europeans, largely official, and some Parsees; and it was read to his departing Excellency by a dutiful delegation of admirers on Saturday morning. It is, we think, the feeblest and falsest document of the kind we ever saw.

Native Opinion.

Such a career as that of Sir Richard Temple, is not calculated to elevate the character of the high dignitaries in India. It does not inspire the populace with confidence in their Governors. We therefore say that instead of being the pillar of the empire, he has been the means of doing much injury to the noble fabric. Let the electors of Worcestershire look to this before they elect him for their representative.

The Indu Pradakash.

Sir Richard Temple's career as Governor of Western India, has abruptly come to an end on account of the dissolution of Parliament. He left by Saturday's mail for England, to be able to canvass for votes in his favour as a candidate for East Worcestershire, and he has left amidst circumstances which are of a strangely novel character. Some of the citizens of Bombay held a meeting on last Friday and voted an address to Sir Richard and also an equestrian statue. The fact that what was called a public meeting was held, may show at first to anybody that we are saying what we are not warranted by facts to say; but it deserves to be known that not more than 300 persons were present at the meeting, and most of those persons were young Parsee boys. The meeting itself was got up under very unpleasant circumstances.

The Dnyan Prakash (Poonah).

From the moment when he first came out to this country, in 1848, as a member of the Bengal Civil Service, to the day when he resigned the Governorship of Bombay, Sir Richard Temple has been nothing more or less than a loyal and faithful recorder and executor of the orders and views of his master and chief for the time being; and we are afraid that whatever the future career before him may be, he will continue to be up to the end of his life, we mean public life, nothing more or less than what he has been for the last thirty-two years of his life—the loyal recorder and executor of his master's decrees. We think it is not in his nature to act independently, for nature never meant him to be in independent charge of a province or an empire.

The Rast Goftar.

His Excellency is a master of the art of multiplying friends by sweet words. He conferred honours and dignities on prominent men; he brought the sons of well-known gentlemen to public notice; he gained over Europeans by kind treatment. Thus extending his flattery far and wide, Sir Richard facilitated his way to the honour of a statue. But that these men should undertake to raise a statue in honour of Sir Richard Temple because he raised them to high dignities, or that certain English officers who regulated themselves at Ganesh Khind (the Government-house at Poona) as the Governor's guests, should combine in a body to stifle public opinion, is not merely improper, but positively degrading. Our duty is fulfilled if we render due honour to Sir Richard Temple in the same sweet language with which he flattered us so long. What more has Sir Richard Temple given us than sweet words, what great and permanent benefits has he conferred upon this country, what political improvements has he devised, what beneficial policy has he introduced, what important rights has he conferred upon us, that he deserves to be honoured with a statue, and to stand in the rank of Lord Wellesley, Mountstuart Elphinstone, or Lord Canning? It is more important to examine what Sir Richard Temple has not done than what he has done.

Instead of effecting any momentous improvements, instead of inaugurating some new line of policy, instead of rendering any permanent service to the country, Sir Richard has inflicted such serious injuries on the people, as will continue to harass and oppress them for a long time to come.

Brahma Public Opinion.

No doubt Sir Richard has many sterling qualities, and the Indian world had a very good opinion of him, till the Simla atmosphere reduced him to the level of a mere autocrat. His career thenceforward may be said to have been halting, and he began to be taken at his true worth. Above all, his servile obedience in chiming in with the policy of the late Viceroy, as to the sufficiency of the one pound ration. . . . And sensible people, both European and Natives, took his "bunkum" speeches, his sensational rides, his rigmarole minutes which measured by yards, his honeyed but empty compliments (including the hideous "blue-blood"), for what they were worth.

Indian Spectator.

Sir Richard Temple has always been, and perhaps still is, a popularity-hunter. He was, while here (Bombay), always liberal in his promises, but exceedingly niggardly in his actions.

Any one who knows Bombay, knows that the journals from which these extracts are taken, represent faithfully the opinion of the educated Native community. When he retired from the Government of Bengal in January, 1877, he did not dare to face the obloquy he had incurred in Calcutta, no one knowing when he left it. His career has been that simply of a self-seeker, from its outset to its close. Endowed with real abilities and great physical energies, they were placed, without hesitancy and without scruple, at the command of those who were in power. He was as ready to squander millions upon a travesty of Lord Northbrook's famine policy in 1874, as to starve millions to death under Lord Lytton in 1877-78; ready to be an enthusiastic promoter of a dozen Afghan Wars if they were but ordered, and then to defend with infinite plausibility and untruthfulness, what had been done. He has done enormous mischief in many ways in India; but, happily, he has been found out. It is men of his type and character, the men who never protest, but obey orders without remonstrance, let their character be what they may, and who systematically minister to the flood-tide of such evil courses as Lord Lytton's—that are destroying our Indian Empire. They are not Englishmen; they do not believe in being Englishmen. They have adopted an Oriental facility in so shaping their courses as to keep themselves on the top of the tide of promotion. Sir Richard Temple would have been a great man, if he had been a good one. Wanting moral greatness, he has wanted everything of value, and has failed. Should Exeter Hall take him up and attempt to rehabilitate him, it will but make him more offensive still to men of upright minds.

THE CURRENCY QUESTION.

THE reader who takes an interest in this question should consider for himself whether any currency whatever, the expansion or contraction of which depends upon the temporary scarcity or abundance of any one commodity or article of merchandize in the country, as our own does, can possibly be a right system. The currency—in other words, the money—of a country must, in the nature of things, if it is a wise system of currency, depend not upon the scarcity or abundance of the commodity in which it is expressed, but upon the extent of the operations that have to be carried on by means of it. Surely this simple proposition is axiomatic, if we will but attentively consider it. Any currency whatever, we say, the expansion or contraction of which depends upon the temporary scarcity or abundance of the commodity in which it is expressed, *must* be an unsound and unwise one. Were our currency adapted to our needs, it would expand or contract in exact proportion to the extent of the exchanges to be made by means of it. Instead of this, we contrive by law to enact that the currency of the country shall expand and contract as the supply of gold bullion in the country happens to become greater or smaller. Nay, the framers of the law pride themselves upon the very fact that is its condemnation. They tell us that our currency now expands and contracts just as it would if it consisted of gold only. They simultaneously allow that the exchanges of the country are so vast, as long since to have outstripped the possibility of their being conducted in metal. Any attempt to do what the apologists of the Bank Act declare the Act does, would result in an instant stoppage of all exchanges in the kingdom. The mass of our exchanges have long since been made by means of mere instruments of credit, the amount of gold used for the purpose being fairly comparable to the power of a donkey engine, beside the great 1,000-horse power machinery of credit by which the work goes on. But, says Carlyle:—

Not the least admirable quality of Bull is, after all, that of remaining insensible to logic; holding orass for considerable periods, ten years or more, as in this of the Corn Laws, after all arguments and shadow of arguments have faded away from him, till the very urchins in the street titter at the arguments he brings. Logic, the "art of speech," does indeed speak so and so clear enough, nevertheless Bull still shakes his head.—*Past and Present*.

The country has stood in almost the same attitude for the last twenty years towards its Currency Laws, that it so long occupied towards the Corn Laws. It has a latent conviction that there is something wrong with them, but as they have not yet brought us to ruin, we will stand by them a little longer, lest the heavens should fall, if we begin to examine them in earnest. And so the nation staggers on under a weight to which it has been long accustomed; and is not even conscious of the wide-spread paralysis with which it strikes the industry and trade of the country. The many will never discern the injury until the evil has been swept away by a wiser legislation than that of 1819, supplemented by the folly of 1844. It is the great blot upon the late Sir Robert Peel's career as a statesman, that he should have persuaded himself that views so superficial, and so hastily formed, as his own, upon this intricate subject were even likely to be sound. As a fact, he had no knowledge of the subject whatever, and mistook the thin, but clear, insight which he had into the superficial aspects of the matter for a mastery of its principles.

We have chosen the precious metals to be our standard of value under the belief that *in the long run* they vary less in value than any other commodity. But the precious metals, like all other commodities, have two distinct values—(1) the fluctuating, temporary market value; and (2) their normal, enduring value, determined by many varying facts. With a perversity almost incredible, we take for our standard in both countries, not the normal, enduring value of the metals, but *their momentary market value*, which frequently fluctuates in the most violent manner. Under such a law, the precious metals become ineligible for the standard altogether; and until our statesmen will patiently look into the matter, instead of bowing down before the legislation of Sir Robert Peel, as the final embodiment of human wisdom, the industry of the nation will be held in a bondage, the effects of which will only be fully discerned in the light of future freedom. The silver difficulty arises from this very error. What, we ask, ought to be our standard? (1) The normal, enduring, average value of silver over long periods of years; or (2) its momentary market value, affected, as silver has been of late years, by the operations of Germany in the metal? It is now admitted that it is not increased production, but the unwise action of Germany, that produced the fall. We pointed that out from the first. And the question is: What are we to say of "legislation" so contrived, that we have no means of checking such aberrations of value in the national standard? Surely every one ought to see that a "law" which makes the standard reflect one value to-day, another to-

morrow, and again another a month hence, is a law condemned by common sense and common honesty. What should we say to a law that allowed the pound avoirdupois to be 16 oz. to-day, 12 oz. to-morrow, and 20 oz. a month hence; or to a yard measure that was 36 inches to-day, and 30 to-morrow? And yet this is what we permit with our standard of value. The silver difficulty is the direct outcome of the legislation of 1844; and when our intensely artificial legislation has produced this enormous mischief, we are adjured to leave the solution of the difficulty to the operation of time and Providence. But natural law has been excluded from the sphere of operations by our own legislation; and as long as this legislation lasts, it is impossible to speak of the standard as under the dominance of natural law. There is the strongest reason to believe that gold, instead of being (as the Act of 1844 assumes) invariable in value, has been fluctuating with the utmost violence in the last thirty years. But the Bank Act is so constructed that it is impossible to ascertain the fact. Everything being measured by a standard of weight (so much gold), its fluctuations in *value* appear, of necessity, to be incidental to other commodities only, gold seeming to be stable. The patent blunder of the law is the making the fluctuating market value of the metals our standard, instead of the normal, enduring, average value of the metal over long periods of time. Mr. Mill caught sight for a moment of the error, but unfortunately let it slip. Thus he wrote:—

When the value of a metallic, or of any other currency, is spoken of, there are two points to be considered: the permanent, or average, value, and the fluctuations. It is to the permanent value of a metallic currency that the value of a paper currency ought to conform; but there is no obvious reason why it should be required to conform to the fluctuations too. The only object of its conforming at all, is steadiness of value; and, with respect to fluctuations, the sole thing desirable is that they should be the smallest possible. . . . To discover, therefore, what currency will conform the most nearly to the *permanent* value of the precious metals, we must find under what currency the variations in credit are least frequent and least extreme. Now, whether this object is best attained by a metallic currency (and therefore by a paper currency exactly conforming in quantity to it) is precisely the question to be decided. If it should prove that a paper currency, which follows all the fluctuations in quantity of a metallic, leads to more violent revulsions of credit than one which is not held to this rigid conformity, it will follow that the currency which agrees most exactly in quantity with a metallic currency is not that which adheres closest to its value; that is to say, its permanent value, with which alone agreement is desirable.

The distinction here drawn by the great economist between the two values of the precious metals—that is, their permanent or normal value, and their fluctuating market price—wanted but “the silver difficulty” of the last five years, to have shown Mr. Mill how great was

its import to the nations that have made this metal their standard. We feel that we are calling attention to a matter that is vital not merely to India, but to the civilized world. Gold and silver have been chosen by all as their standards of value, and have been so chosen on the ground that their permanent or normal value is less variable than that of any other commodity. It is entirely overlooked that they have another value altogether, and that in common with all other commodities, their market value varies incessantly from the permanent or average value. Now every currency student knows that the legislation itself of this country occasions fluctuations in the temporary market value of gold so extreme, as to unfit the metal to be a standard at all. The extraordinary thing is that any one should fail to see it, and that the nation should permit itself to be the victim of so false although plausible a system. The law is, unfortunately, so contrived that the variations in the price of gold are made to appear incident to the commodities against which gold is measured; and so, when a scramble for gold sets in, instead of seeing at such times that the standard of value is rapidly "appreciating"—running up, in point of fact, from 77s. 9d. per ounce to no one knows what—the attention of every one is rivetted upon the ruinous "depreciation" in the price of the produce, stocks, shares, &c., that must be sold to obtain "gold." The phenomena of the silver market during the last five years, should put an end to the legislation of 1844, and we still trust will do so. Every one can now see, that instead of "silver" being invariable in value, it fluctuates so violently, that the nations are everywhere considering whether they should not abandon it as a standard altogether. No more fatal step could be suggested, from the ruin that it would bring upon every commercial and industrial interest in the world. The strange thing is, that neither our statesmen nor publicists seem to suspect that, for anything we know to the contrary, the fluctuations in "gold" are even more extreme than those in silver. We have repeatedly indicated the remedies that are in our hands to meet this silver difficulty. The truth is that English statesmen and publicists have so long tabooed all discussion of currency matters, that their speeches and writings show clearly that they have no understanding of the subject whatever. And so Mr. Goschen's *Theory of Exchange* has come to be accepted as an unanswerable defence of the Act of 1844, and an essay that simply expounds the mischievous working of the Act, is held to be an unanswerable defence of it.

INDIAN EXCHANGE.

WE pointed out in our last issue that the India Office indefinitely depresses the Indian exchange, by drawing for the Home Charges from London, instead of having the amount "remitted" from India. It is most strange how seldom Government departments show any real business aptitudes in the conduct of commercial matters. No private person, no business man in India, who has to make remittances to this country, ever dreams of effecting them as the Government of India does, by telling his agents in England to draw upon him for the amount, if he can possibly send the money from India. He can *remit* at far better rates of exchange than his agents can ever *draw* at, except very occasionally, and for the following reason. There is always, a more or less urgent demand in India for rupees to pay for the £60,000,000 of produce that annually leaves the Indian ports; and, on the other hand, there is seldom any great demand for rupees in London, because it is a small percentage only of this £60,000,000 of produce, namely, the profit thereon, that has to be remitted to India. Now the India Office is a seller of rupees, and instead of selling them in the dearest market, which is India, it persists in selling them in the cheapest, which is London. No one in India who has remittances to make to this country, ever dreams, I say, of telling his agents in London to draw upon him for the amount if he can help it; because he can get an indefinitely better price for his rupees by offering them in India, than he can get for them in London itself.

The India Office persistently adopts the "rule of contrary" in the matter. All that it can do to depress the rate of exchange, that is the price of the rupee, it does, by selling its silver in a market where there is little or no demand for it. What the India Office should do is,—keep its exact wants secret, and provide for them in advance, by buying bills in the ports of Bombay, Calcutta, Rangoon, and perhaps China. When the export season opens at each port, there is a very urgent demand for rupees. Every shipper has bills to sell upon London, for the jute, indigo, rice, opium, and silk he is

shipping. Now it is at these periods that the Government should remit its Home charges, watching the London money market carefully however, to take advantage of any casual demand for silver therein, that may make it profitable to draw upon the Indian Treasury therefrom. Were the financing of the Home Charges put into the hands of any really able exchange broker, he would take care that the Council drafts should never come, as now, into competition with the price of silver, to the indefinite depression of both. He would shut the Exchange Banks up to the necessity of remitting in silver, giving them no choice in the matter, when we should see silver rise as well as exchange.

The India Office has literally thrown away £10,000,000 sterling in the last five years, by the perverse and perfunctory way in which it finances its wants. The Government ignorantly takes every step in its power, to lower the value of the revenues it receives in silver, and then wonders at, and laments over, the long-continued depression in the price of the metal. The old East India Company were never chargeable with such folly, nor would the India Office be so, but that the motive of self-interest is wanting to awaken its intelligence. I appeal to every merchant and banker in the city of London whether what I have now said is not the language of common sense. The Indian revenues are wasted by sheer administrative incapacity, and any private concern whatever, administered in the same way, would end in bankruptcy, let its resources at starting be what they might. There is little or no demand in London for rupees, except when very large profits have occasionally been made upon Indian produce, and these profits have to be remitted. The demand in London is for *gold*, to pay the exporters of piece goods, metals, &c., to the East, while the India Office aggravates this demand to the disadvantage of silver. The demand in India is for silver, from one year's end to another; in London for gold only. And although the Government rupees are *in India*, where there is a constant and urgent demand for them, the Government idly prefers, for mere convenience' sake, to sell them in London, where gold only is in demand, and where it must accept whatever price the Exchange Banks choose to offer for them. It should offer its silver for sale in India itself, where the shippers of £60,000,000 of produce are always ready to compete for its possession. The India Office has but to send down to the City to-day, to ascertain for itself, from the men whose whole lives are passed in the transaction of exchanges, that the system on which the Secretary of State "finances" the wants of the Home Treasury, violates every maxim by which the private merchant or the Exchange Banks guide their operations. The highest authority upon Exchange

probably in the world, formulated in my presence only the other day, the following common-sense propositions thereon :—

I. The Indian Government are dealers in Exchange with this disadvantage, that their rivals and customers know their hand, and make their own game accordingly.

II. The East India Company were more wise in their generation ; they kept their own counsel, and worked the Exchanges from both ends. When it suited them, they sold bills on India in London ; and when it did not they bought London bills in India.

III. A judicious action now on these principles, would soon bring Exchange up to 2s., and the value of silver would rise in proportion.

IV. No man in any trade takes the world into his confidence. The Indian Government victimizes itself hopelessly by its own action.

Another great authority, an Exchange banker at the head of his profession, writes to us simultaneously :—

It is altogether unreasonable to expect that the withdrawal of such a large amount of money from India as is required, can be effected on any than the most unfavourable terms, so long as the state of account between the Governments at home and in India *is kept constantly before the public* ; because the success of such operations depends almost wholly on the secrecy with which they are conducted.

The practice of intimating the requirements of Government, and inviting tenders for their bills, ought to be discontinued, as it affords undue facilities to private interests which have to place funds in India, while it is wholly adverse to Government, and to all who have to receive money from that country.

Now, all this has been pointed out, over and over again, in the last five years. The private merchant or broker, who should act as the Government does, would be deemed insane. If the action of our officials resulted in their own private loss as individuals, they would discern instantly the un wisdom of the course they are pursuing, but the loss being public, it is a matter of no concern to them. Were the Exchange question left to be dealt with by myself, I would undertake to bring it back to something like normal rates within twelve months, and with it the price of silver, with nothing but gain to all classes. With £60,000,000 of produce leaving the Indian ports every year, and with a State Rental of £20,000,000 to receive every year from the soil of India, the Government can think of no way whatever of obtaining its £15,000,000 of Home Charges but by the ruinous method of drawing for the amount from London ; in other words, selling its Indian revenues in a market which does not want the metal in which they are paid.

The silver market in London has two great sources of supply—namely, the American mines, which produce the virgin metal, and

send their out-turn here for sale; and the Indian Treasuries, which hold £16,000,000 sterling of silver every year, that have to be sold and converted into gold, to meet the Home Charges of the India Office. The supply from the mines comes forward in the usual way of trade from America, but the importers, instead of being allowed to make the best they can of the market, find themselves confronted every few days by a public announcement that the Government of India is going, within a fortnight, to put £500,000 sterling of silver, that it has lying in the Calcutta Treasury, *up to auction*. Every merchant is familiar enough with the stereotyped advertisement:—

INDIA OFFICE, 15th December, 1880.

THE Secretary of State for India in Council hereby gives notice that the amount for which TENDERS for BILLS of EXCHANGE on Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, will be received at the Bank of England, on Wednesday, the 22nd inst., on the terms stated in the advertisement issued from this Office on the 3rd November, 1880, will be Rs. 50,00,000.

The dullest mind can see that this is a sale by auction. The India Office says, practically, to the merchants and bankers in Lombard Street: "We have (Rs. 5,000,000) five millions of rupees lying in the Indian Treasuries that we *must* turn into gold to meet our engagements here. What will you bid for them? Going—going—gone! 1s. 7½d., 1s. 6½d.—anything!"

That business of such overwhelming importance should be conducted in this ruinous and reckless manner, nearly strikes one dumb. How can silver ever rally, ever regain its normal value, under a system that offers the metal in *masses*, every week or every fortnight, at any rates whatever, that speculators therein—who are, in the main, the Exchange Banks—choose to bid for them? It is this competitive sale by auction, that is keeping silver at its present low rates, and it only. Not a Council draft should ever be offered for sale in this way. The operations of the Secretary of State for India, his necessities, and his intentions, should be kept as completely secret as the Exchange Banks keep theirs; and until intelligence is shown in the conduct of this simple matter, it will be very exceptional circumstances only, that will raise the price of silver materially. The India Office and its fortnightly "auction" of silver, sit as an incubus upon the market, to the indefinite injury not only of all interests in India, public and private, but of every nation in the world; America, of course, first of all, as the great silver-producing country.

Pliny tells us that India and the East had ever been the sink of

the precious metals. It has always been so, and is so to-day more conspicuously than ever. The fountains of silver are in the far West; Europe is the great lake into which the metal flows; India, the far distant East, to which the stream overflows, and in which it finally disappears, burying itself in the land. Silver is normally at its cheapest price in the producing districts of the far West; at its dearest in the far East. The Indian rupee is the most costly form which the metal ever puts on; while the India Office, which is its great possessor in this shape, insanely offers it for sale therein, and in enormous masses, at the half-way market in Europe (London). The blunder is so obvious, so patent, that I suppose we must count upon twenty years' exposure of it, before the "official" mind wakes up to its existence. It is a cruel wrong, meanwhile, to private interests. The writer of this article, has been made poorer every year, for years past, by about £600 a year, by this Governmental incapacity, and his case is but one of ten thousand. America, in particular, has vehement cause of complaint against a course of action so injurious to her industry, while so suicidal to India, which is systematically sacrificing £2,000,000 a year in the Remittance account alone, by this fatal unwisdom. Rightly looked at, it is not Germany so much as the India Office that has destroyed the silver market. The operations of each are practically identical. They thrust "currency" coined silver in masses upon the London market to the destruction of the normal trade in the metal.

Correspondence.

A ROYAL COMMISSION FOR INDIA.

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE STATESMAN."

SIR,—IN THE STATESMAN for September you support the demand for a Royal Commission, in order that, as you express it, "Civilianism" may be put on its trial. And you propose that Lord Derby should be the President of the Commission, with members like Mr. Fawcett, Professor Caird, Sir A. Hobhouse, Sir Erskine Perry, Sir D. Wedderburn, Sir L. Mallet, and Mr. S. Laing. So far, so very good. The demand is one which every friend of India must cordially approve. Unfortunately you recommend that the Commission should sit in London. But if so, how is the trial to be carried out? Who is to furnish the materials for the indictment? And how are the Native witnesses, who must prove the inculpatory and exculpatory facts, to be produced? If the Commission sits at Westminster, nine-tenths of the witnesses will be European officials, and nine-tenths of the matter brought in evidence will not be facts but opinions, based too often on prejudice and misconception. But what we want is not to register and perpetuate these class "opinions"—which have been the cause of so much disaster. On the contrary, we want to correct them; or rather to substitute for them solid conclusions arrived at by a Commission of independent public men upon facts drawn from the evidence of the people themselves.

Now in order that the facts may be obtained at first hand, it is absolutely essential (1) that this evidence should be taken in India, on the spot; and (2) that the inquiry should not attempt to include too large a local area. As regards the first point some good practical arrangements should be made in order that trustworthy evidence may be forthcoming. Before therefore the Commission arrived in India, the Secretary should publish a clear statement showing the exact scope of the inquiry; the headings and sub-headings under which evidence will be taken; and the position and qualifications of the witnesses whose evidence is required. Full protection should be assured to all persons, official and unofficial, willing to give evidence. And they should be invited to hand in a written memorandum, stating concisely the facts known to them with regard to one or more of the published headings. These memoranda would be arranged and digested by the Secretary, who would make known to the witnesses the dates on which the several headings would come on for consideration; so that when the Commission began its sittings it would already possess a good foundation of facts in writing; while the witnesses would be in attendance to furnish explanations, and to submit to cross-examination on their written statements. Next (2) as regards the "venue," I would pro-

pose the Bombay Dekkhan as one at least of the local areas selected for inquiry. *Expede Herculem*. And the vicissitudes through which this unhappy province has passed during the last five years, would furnish ample materials for a judgment regarding the success of our administration. The agrarian riots; the famine; the forest enclosures; the collection of revenue arrears; the dacoities; the incendiary fires; the Agriculturists' Relief Act: on each and all of these topics, the approved official view differs profoundly from that held by the Native public. The Commission, on an examination of the facts, would decide which view is the correct one. Its head-quarters should be at Poona, which is a centre of Native intelligence and public spirit.

Last but not least, it is absolutely necessary that the Commission should include several Native members, not mere nominees of Government, but men of character and independence who possess the confidence of the public. The selection of a Secretary is also important. He should be independent, well acquainted with India, capable of marshalling the figures and of placing the report before the public in clear and forcible language. And I know of no one who fulfils these conditions more completely, Mr. Editor, than yourself. A Commission so constituted and with its work so defined need fear neither the terrors nor blandishments of any official clique.—I have, &c.,

INDIAN CIVILIAN.

December, 1880.

NOTE.—The writer of this article is a very able Civilian officer of fifteen years' standing in India. He endorses the main contentions of *THE STATESMAN* as being mournful facts of our Rule that cannot be truthfully denied.—ED. S.

PARLIAMENTARY REFORM.

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE STATESMAN."

SIR,—I have read with great interest and pleasure your articles on Parliamentary Reform, and agree in the main with the principles on which they are founded. But in my opinion the combination of a number of small towns to form borough constituencies is carried too far. In the manufacturing districts, where a town is surrounded by villages all engaged in the same pursuit—one in interests, and constantly extending towards one another—the plan is most suitable. For instance, in the case of Dewsbury, referred to at page 346, I would not only attach to it the subsidiary places named, but simplify the matter by drawing one boundary line to enclose the whole system as one district. It is otherwise in agricultural localities, where, with few exceptions, the towns are small, with little enterprise, and no interests really distinct from the surrounding country.

Probably no satisfactory re-distribution can be effected without local knowledge, and I may therefore be allowed to refer in detail to my native county. Your allocation of towns in Wiltshire scarcely carries out the principle so well laid down at page 401, "that the places allotted to one member should have, if possible, some topographical and industrial connection." Devizes, for instance, has hardly more connection with Salisbury and Wilton than if they were in Hampshire. I would leave only two borough members to Wiltshire. One should

be given to Salisbury, which is an important and improving place, and to which might be added the neighbouring Wilton; the other to Trowbridge, Bradford, Westbury, and, I should like to add, Frome, which, though just outside the county, is part of the same manufacturing district. The population of these four towns, according to your figures, amounts to 32,000. If it were found necessary to retain all the existing boroughs, I would group Devizes, Chippenham, Calne, Malmesbury, and Marlborough, and add Swindon, making a population of 42,000. Lord John Russell's scheme of combining small towns, however, did not meet with favour, and I am inclined to think that the small boroughs would have as much objection to the extinction of their individuality as to being actually merged in the county, which is the plan I should prefer. Perhaps the two plans might be combined, by giving the four county members each a separate division, so arranged as to group the towns fairly. It is only upon such a principle that there can be any ground for the retention of such a borough as Cricklade. The town itself is insignificant, and the so-called borough is simply an agricultural district, including Swindon and numerous villages.

In regard to London, I think it would be absurd to retain the present unwieldy metropolitan boroughs, which have so little coherence or community of interests. I would form the metropolis into a much larger number of electoral districts, divided, not arbitrarily, but with some reference to the character and interests of the population. The same principle might be followed in a few of the largest towns, but only to a limited extent, as they have municipal unity.—I am, Sir, yours faithfully,

A WILTSHIREMAN.

NOTE.—We shall keep this great subject prominently before the country in future issues.—ED. S.

A CRY FOR REPRESENTATION.

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE STATESMAN."

SIR,—Allow me through the medium of your journal to lay before your readers an Indian's view of the question of allowing the people of India a voice in the administration of their country. To the motion of Sir D. Wedderburn, in the House of Commons, pointing out the desirability of conferring on the people of India a share in the representation of the Council, the objection was raised that the time has not yet come. This is utterly incomprehensible to us in India, unless we are forced to think that such a concession, however just, will never be made to a subject race by a Government so deeply imbued with bureaucratic ideas. Of course, we Indians have little sympathy with the party contests in the electioneering campaign in England. To us it is immaterial whether it is the Whig or the Tory party which gains the upperhand in the Administration. But at least the people of India have a right to demand a just and equitable Government. Millions of pounds are levied from a poor people, many laws are enacted every year, and a great many questions affecting the interests of upwards of 200,000,000 of Her Majesty's subjects, are decided; and yet there are people at the head of affairs who are unwilling to allow the people a voice in the Administration. Even the most barbarous of hill tribes, such as the Khasias and Nagas, are possessed of representative institutions. It is a mistake, therefore, to suppose

that the time has not yet come. If it has not now, it will never come. Free municipal institutions have been successful so far as they have been conceded. That they have not succeeded so well as could be desired, is because they have not had a fair trial. The Acts have been so framed that they may with ease be turned into engines of oppression and tyranny, and we cannot help the suspicion that the framers of the Acts were never sincere in their desire to make the concessions. To rule 200,000,000 of people, alien in feeling, customs, and religion, by a few strangers invested with power, without the aid of representative institutions on the part of the ruled, is to tyrannize over them. The fact that the opinion of the people is consulted on important questions, is a strong argument in favour of the necessity and propriety of giving a voice to the Natives, instead of leaving the head of the Administration the power to seek or disregard such advice when given, at his own sweet pleasure. We appeal to the conscience of every Englishman uncontaminated with the official bias, whether it be just for him to tolerate such a state of things. That representative institutions, if conceded, will be highly valued, and will, in a great measure, help to allay the widespread feeling of discontent now pervading the land, is certain. The want of such institutions, and the impunity with which the people are oppressed, help to keep open the breach between the rulers and the ruled, fostered as it is by a sense of haughty supremacy on the one side and of sullen indifference on the other. If Englishmen at home are honestly desirous of making fast their hold on India, they must ensure a just rule, and strive to enlist the sympathies of the people on behalf of the rulers. A concord such as this would help to strengthen England's position in the East immeasurably more than any "scientific frontier" which strategists may define, or armaments that modern ingenuity may devise. If England wishes to have a firm footing, her greatest stronghold must be the gratitude and affection of the people. A consummation so devoutly to be desired cannot be brought about without mutual confidence; and the best mode of promoting that is by conceding to the subject race a share in the administrative representation. True, India is not strong enough to wrest from an unwilling Sovereign, privileges which every human being has a right to demand; but England used to pique itself on her magnanimity. The divers nations that she rules will minimize any danger that may be thought to stand in the way of such concessions. Englishmen at home are lulled by rose-coloured reports, circulated by interested parties. The deep feeling of discontent and estrangement now lurking in the minds of the people throughout the country, is a source of greater danger than any Russian nightmare. In virtue of our being sincerely desirous of the permanence of British rule, we trust that the English will awaken to a true sense of their responsibility. What England has won by strength and courage, she should secure and retain by just concessions to the liberties of the people. It is a shortsighted policy that would hinder the riveting of this link between the two countries. If the reiterated avowals that India is to be ruled wisely and well have any sincerity in them, let Englishmen grant this concession to justice, and recognize the rights of a people however backward in civilization. If representative institutions succeed in savage communities, we fail to see any reason why India, after more than a century of enlightened British rule, should be considered unequal to such privileges. Of course, any concessions now made must be partial, and we doubt not that increased privileges will be conceded as facts develop themselves. Centuries of Asiatic despotism have ill fitted the people for responsibility; but unless the thing is taken up now and gently fostered, the happy solution will be as far off as ever—nay, hopelessly retarded. To say that the time has not yet

come, is to confess incompetency or want of ability to deal with the question; and the nation has a right to demand that they should make room for abler, if not more honest, men. We trust the friends of India, both in and out of Parliament, will not fail to agitate the question. It remains to be seen whether Englishmen will longer tolerate the present state of incipient danger which Ministerial perversion is unable to detect. Until England shows by deeds the magnanimity she owes, in virtue of her position as the first country, the eradication of the cancer of discontent among her Indian subjects is an impossibility.

AN INDIAN.

THE MONTENEGRO OF AFGHANISTAN.

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE STATESMAN."

SIR,—Amidst all the discussion of Afghanistan and its affairs, in speeches, in the press, and elsewhere, comparatively little has been said about the interesting region of Kafiristan, which, from its history and geographical situation, might well be termed the Montenegro of Afghanistan. Now that Abd-al-Rahman has been recognized as Ameer of Afghanistan, and it has been decided not to send a British Resident to Kabul, the question of the future of Kafiristan has assumed a new and increased political importance. On looking over a good map of Afghanistan, the strategical importance of this district will be at once readily acknowledged. Lying to the north of the province in which Kabul and Jelalabad are the chief cities, and adjoining the rich and important provinces of Badakshan and Wabhan beyond the Hindoo Koosh, its position dominates those portions of Afghanistan which are of the most vital importance to the Indian Empire. It is the one spot, perhaps, in the whole country where the English could rely upon the friendship of the inhabitants. These have been described by the very few Europeans who have visited them as animated by the most friendly feelings towards the "Feringhes," whom they describe as their "consins," on account of a supposed similarity of complexion and general appearance. They are said to be a fair-haired race, and their women are famous for their beauty. The Afghans make raids into the country, for the purpose of supplying their harems with these beautiful infidels. No Kafir is considered to have proved himself a man, until he has slain an Afghan with his own hand. No doubt much of their friendliness towards the English arises from their traditional and irreconcilable hostility to their Mohammedan neighbours, who, surrounding them on all sides, have hitherto isolated the country, preventing all intercourse of its inhabitants with the outer world. Some travellers have supposed these tribes to be descended from Greek colonists placed in this region by Alexander the Great and his successors. Others assign to them a still higher antiquity, regarding them as representatives of the early Aryans before their dispersion to the south and west. In any case a study of their language, customs, and manners would certainly yield most interesting results. Their religion is supposed to be a survival of ancient paganism, with possibly many of the rites and ceremonies of the old Greek religion. A British Resident would be in all probability welcomed by these deadly enemies of the Afghans with the utmost enthusiasm; and such an appointment would certainly afford a good opportunity for solving the vexed question of the possibility of keeping a

look out over the affairs of Afghanistan without at the same time imperilling the life of the British Resident. It is very doubtful if even the most intelligent and trustworthy Native agent can perform political functions as satisfactorily as a trained British officer. He may understand the Natives better, but it is certain that he will not thoroughly comprehend or enter into the spirit and aims of their European rulers. In many respects, too, Kafiristan is better suited for a British Residency than Kabul. The chief, if not the only, reason given for the necessity of this step is, that the movements of Russia on the Oxus must be watched, and regularly reported to the Indian and Home Governments. Unnecessary interference with Afghan internal politics is deprecated by all parties. For this reason, Kafiristan would be a more suitable situation for an envoy than any of the cities of Afghanistan proper. Now that the Maharajah of Cashmere has advanced his frontiers with British permission to the Cheitral, the tribes of Kafiristan will soon be necessarily brought into more intimate relations with the representatives of British authority, and the Indian Government may find itself compelled, by the course of events, to extend its protection to them. They would form an admirable police for the new frontiers, for keeping in order the Afreedees, the Mohmunds, the Shinnarries, and other turbulent and treacherous Mohammedan tribes. Now that the power of the two most fanatical states of the Mohammedan world, Bokhara and Kabul, has been effectually broken, and the wall or partition which for so long had separated Eastern and Western Asia exists no longer, the question arises, What can be done to introduce peace and civilization into these countries? If the Afghans are to be weaned from their habits of war, and the country is to be saved from a state of perpetual anarchy, we must make it worth their while to cultivate the arts of peace. At present they find war more profitable than peace.* Commerce, which often leads to wars among civilized nations, is not seldom a band of union and peace between barbarous and semi-civilized peoples. Many parts of Afghanistan, including Kafiristan itself, are supposed to be rich in mineral wealth. From a curious passage in Plutarch's "Life of Alexander the Great," one might infer that deposits of petroleum are to be found in the countries adjacent to the River Oxus. In Langhorne's translation (date 1823) we read:—"A Macedonian, named Proxenus, who had the charge of the king's equipage, on opening the ground near the river Oxus, in order to pitch his master's tent, discovered a spring of a gross oily liquor, which after the surface was taken off came perfectly clear, and neither in taste nor smell differed from real oil, nor was inferior to it in smoothness and lightness, though there were no olives in that country. It is said, indeed, that the water of the Oxus is of so unctuous a quality that it makes the skins of those who bathe in it smooth and shining." When we remember the immense extent of the petroleum trade in America, and the great demand for fuel throughout the countries of the East, the above curious passage assumes a more than merely antiquarian interest. With steam launches on the Oxus, the Helmund, and the Kabul rivers, and the development of the new frontier railways, a trade ought soon to spring up which would speedily convince the Afghans that peace would be far more profitable to them than war. Such simple produce as the fruits of the country, and the ice which can always be procured from its mountains, would find a ready market in India. Gold is said to exist in some parts of the country, and if this is so the smiths of Kabul would soon be better employed than in making clumsy imitations of British guns and rifles. To return to Kafiristan:

* See STATESMAN, Feb. 14, 1880.

if an archaeological diplomatist like Sir H. Layard or the late Baron Bunsen could be made Resident there, in addition to the political advantages arising from such a step, there is every probability that scientific discoveries of the deepest interest would abundantly reward his researches.

The late rising in Cashmere, in the neighbourhood of Gilgit, has been attributed to the influence of the Khan of Badakshan, and it is reported that the present ruler of Bokhara is contemplating a revival of his claims upon Balkh, and other regions of Afghan Turkestan, thinking that the present condition of affairs in Afghanistan affords a favourable opportunity for the assertion of this claim. The safety of Afghan Turkestan is really of more moment to England and India than the condition of the southern provinces; and if Candahar is handed over to the present Ameer, he might reasonably be required to surrender in exchange for that rich district, now in British possession, the nominal suzerainty over the independent and non-Mohammedan tribes of Kafiristan.

J. M. SINYANKI.

[NOTE.—We publish our Correspondent's letter, but should think the Government insane that attempted to establish an Envoy where he suggests—in Kafiristan.—ED. S.]

HOME AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

It is impossible to listen without a strong feeling of contempt to the hysterical shrieks which rise up daily from Tory journals and Tory politicians on what they are pleased to call "the break-down of law and order in Ireland." What has broken down in Ireland is not a rule of law and equity, but a lawless and arbitrary system of despotism, whereby the legitimate rights of an entire population have been sacrificed to the interests of a few hundred absentee landlords. We are aware, of course, that all Irish landlords are not "absentees," and that all Irish landlords are not indifferent to the well-being of their tenantry; but then it is not for these or by these that the system which has now so disastrously broken down has been preserved. It was for the benefit of that small section of landlords known as "absentees," and in consequence of their inflexible opposition to all change; and now the very men who have profited by this monstrous state of things are shrieking for coercion, in order that it may continue unchanged, and they also continue to profit. In other words, the normal action of the law is to be suspended in Ireland, and every tax-payer in Great Britain is to contribute from his earnings, in order that a single small class of landlords should collect their rents with ease and celerity. What is "Boycotting" when we look at it otherwise than through the spectacles of a Tory landholder? It is nothing more than this. Hitherto in Ireland the landlord has been allowed to raise his rents to any extent he chose, and if the tenants would not or could not pay them, he had the power (the British Empire having engaged to assist him) to turn them out of house and home, destitute on the highway. The number will never be reckoned up of men, women, and children whom this arbitrary process has thrown penniless on the world; and as often as not, from no failure on their part to pay the rack-rent demanded of them, but because some absentee landlord, living luxuriously in London, had come to the conclusion that by their eviction his Irish estates would minister more abundantly to his pleasures. "Boycotting" is no more than a reversal of this process. After having waited for centuries in the vain hope that "the law" would do something for them, the Irish tenantry have resolved to protect themselves. They have insisted upon fixing their own rents; and in the nature of things, there is no greater injustice in the farmer fixing the rent than in the landlord. What the rapid spread of "Boycotting" has demonstrated is the unreal and artificial character of the system which we have been upholding in Ireland. The Irish landlords constitute what the Tory journals call "the party of order," as opposed to "the party of disorder," represented by the "Boycotters;" and this "party of order," it appears, is so small and insignificant—their well-being or their ruin is of so slight importance to the population at large—that in their season of distress they have not a friend except the soldiers and the constabulary. All other classes are either "Boycotters," or the obedient agents of those who desire to "Boycott." Shipping companies, hotel-keepers, tradesmen, car-drivers, all obey

the sovereign behests of the "Boycotters," because they perceive that if Irish landlordism were abolished root and branch, they would not be a penny the worse in consequence of its extinction. The Irish landlord is, in fact, an imported British article, and, as recent events have proved, a mere excrescence upon Irish soil. Naturally, this is a fact which men of the type of Mr. Bence Jones are slow to admit. Mr. Bence Jones evidently regards "a landlord who tries to do his duty" as, out of all compare, "the noblest work of God," and himself as a remarkably perfect specimen of these noble creatures. "Boycotting" in his case may be regarded, like the Apostle's thorn in the flesh, as a salutary experience, lest this very self-satisfied gentleman should be exalted beyond measure.

In dealing with Ireland, what Englishmen ought never to forget is that hitherto we have always been in the wrong. The Irish Parliament consented to its own dissolution, and the legislative union of the two countries, on a solemn pledge from the English Prime Minister that the glaring grievances under which Ireland was suffering should be removed. That pledge was never fulfilled. Justice to Ireland, instead of being accorded in the frank and ungrudging spirit which honour and expediency alike required of us, has been wrung from a British Parliament, literally, inch by inch, and hardly ever except when the alternative to concession was civil war. The land difficulty in Ireland is altogether an English creation. We deliberately crushed the manufacturing industries of Ireland, under the inhuman and insensate conviction that England would be enriched thereby, and thus we obliged the entire population to seek their sustenance from the soil. But Irish soil was no longer the property of Irish people. British law and British force had robbed the Irish people of the inheritance which was theirs by nature, and conferred it upon a few thousand landlords, the greater part of whom did not so much as reside in Ireland. Thus the Irish people became, without hope of escape, the serfs of the landlords. They depended upon their mercy for every morsel of food they ate; and very cruel, in general, has that mercy shown itself. All that the Irish people now demand at our hands is that this servitude should cease. Those who object to the methods in which the Irish are forcing this demand on our attention ought first to point out some other way which would have been half so effective. Last session the House of Lords rejected, with the utmost contumely, so small a measure of consideration for Irish suffering as the Compensation for Disturbance Bill. They decreed, in opposition to the Government, that the Irish landlord should continue to receive his pound of flesh, full weight, though an entire family had to perish in paying it. This session they will hardly decline to pass a wide and sweeping Bill cutting at the very roots of landlordism. And if so, what will it be which has wrought this most salutary change? "Boycotting."

The declaration of an independent Republic by the Boers of the Transvaal will surprise no one who has followed the action of the late Government and its congenial agents, Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Theophilus Shepstone, in that part of the world. It is the beginning of a trouble in which the honour of this country is very deeply concerned; and, seeing how rapidly current history passes into oblivion, it will be well to state briefly the circumstances under which the Transvaal was annexed. The annexation of this independent Dutch Republic was held by the late Government to be indispensable to Lord Carnarvon's luckless scheme of Cape Colonial Confederation—the source of so much crime and blood-shedding. The Boers of the Transvaal were at that time at war with the Kaffir chief, Sekokoeni; and Sir Theophilus Shepstone—a fitting agent for the business entrusted to him—was sent from Natal, ostensibly to mediate between

the Boers and the Kaffirs, actually with a commission in his pocket authorizing him to annex the Transvaal, and govern it in the name of the Queen as Commissioner. This disgraceful act of treachery he completed shortly after his arrival at Pretoria. The Boers vehemently protested against the dishonourable proceeding, but their protests were concealed from the British Parliament and nation, and a false report was sent to this country that a large majority of the Boers approved of the annexation. But Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Theophilus Shepstone knew that the veritable feeling among the Boers could not long be concealed from the knowledge of this country; and, first, the iniquitous Zulu War, and next the hardly less iniquitous war with Sekokoeni were fought, in the hope that the massacre of their ancient enemies might reconcile the Boers to the loss of their independence. The calculation proved to be a mistaken one. The Boers were not reconciled. Sir Bartle Frere made a progress through the Transvaal; he addressed sugary speeches to every Boer he had a chance of speaking to. All was of no avail. Whatever be the faults of the Transvaal Boer, it is to his merit that he saw completely through the bland but stony-hearted High Commissioner, whose eminent Christian virtues have so endeared him to the Archbishop of Canterbury and Lord Shaftesbury. It is greatly to the credit of the Boer that for Sir Bartle Frere he feels the profound aversion which that gentleman ought to arouse in all men who care for genuineness and sincerity. Such was the state of things in the Transvaal when Lord Kimberley became Colonial Minister. The political path before him was straight and obvious to all eyes save those of the professional politician; and *he* holds that he cannot show the ability of a statesman except by turning aside from a straight road and falling headlong into an open ditch yawning at the side of it. Lord Kimberley, without hesitation, adopted this ancient constitutional practice, which, as all true Englishmen are aware, is the efficient cause of our greatness and prosperity. Instead of withdrawing promptly from a false and dishonourable position—instead of granting to the Boers the independence of which they had been deprived by an act of shameful treachery—he determined to hold on to the Transvaal. The Boers have never concealed what, in such an event, they were resolved to do. They would, they declared, fight for their independence, and this, it would seem, they are now about to do.

It is greatly to be deplored that Parliament is not sitting at this moment; for if the Liberal party do not take prompt action, we shall find ourselves involved in one of the least defensible of our many indefensible little wars. Lord Kimberley is far too weak and wavering a man to be at the Colonial Office in times like these. His tenure of office has been remarkable for persistent blundering. It is due to his weakness of will and his singular capacity for falling into open ditches that we owe the Basuto War; and unless Sir Wilfrid Lawson, Mr. Courtney, or some other fearless Radical, will take the matter in hand, and unless the Liberal party will back them in no uncertain voice, Lord Kimberley's vacillations will involve us in another war in the Transvaal.

Lord Lytton last month emerged from his retirement to make an exhibition of himself which displays in a very remarkable manner the sense of official propriety and the gentlemanly feeling which so conspicuously characterized the Indian Viceroyalty of this personage. It is not difficult to imagine the howls and invectives that would have issued from all the Jingo journals if, when Jingo was king, a Liberal politician—say Lord Northbrook—had addressed a speech to a Volunteer regiment, denouncing the warlike propensities of the Government. He would have been proclaimed a national traitor by his own confession. Nor

will any one deny that, for once, the Jingo organs would have had a small substratum of truth on which to base their denunciations. The unwritten law which excludes party politics from speeches addressed to any part of the national army needs no justification. Its propriety is evident on the face of it. The duty of that army is to obey, without question, the orders of the Executive; any attempt, therefore, to weaken the loyalty of the army to the Executive, by holding up the latter as an object worthy of its aversion, is nothing less than a sowing of the seeds of mutiny. We do not accuse Lord Lytton of desiring to raise a mutiny in the ranks of the West Middlesex Volunteers, but a man who had himself held high office ought to have seen the extreme impropriety of what he was doing. Also, quite apart from this, a very little gentlemanly consideration for the feelings of others would have sufficed to save Lord Lytton from a reprehensible exhibition of himself. No gentleman thrusts his political opinions upon those whom they are sure to offend, under circumstances where they have neither the right to reply nor the power to escape from hearing them. In the ranks of the West Middlesex Volunteers there must, we presume, be many Liberals—at any rate, Lord Lytton could not know there were not—and the extreme probability of this would have deterred any man possessed of a spark of courtesy from making such a speech as that of Lord Lytton's. Lord Lytton's reply to Mr. Childers' quiet remonstrance is merely a still more offensive exhibition of the late Viceroy's lack of that ordinary courtesy which ought to control the conduct of an English gentleman in his intercourse with his fellows. No one cognizant with Lord Lytton's career in India will feel any surprise at these proceedings of his; on the contrary, the surprise would have been great indeed had he exhibited himself in any other way.

The speech was, in part, an eulogy of Sir Frederick Roberts, and our advice to that much-banqueted General is not to place himself in the way of many more such eulogies. They are filled with statements which provoke replies, and which, having only a partial resemblance to the facts, are, when investigated, calculated to do much injury to the cheaply won honours of our Afghanistan hero. Thus, speaking of the battle of Peiwar Kotul, Lord Lytton said: "They (*i.e.*, the Middlesex Volunteers) were probably not aware that it was by a plan of attack, conceived and carried out with the rapid accuracy of a rare insight, under the very fire of the enemy, and upon ground of which the immense difficulties were then for the first time fully revealed, General Roberts succeeded in capturing, with wonderful rapidity and the smallest possible sacrifice of life, a position rendered almost impregnable by nature, and skilfully strengthened by the most powerful artillery placed in the most inaccessible positions and served with admirable accuracy of range."

All this is pure fiction. What happened at Peiwar Kotul was this. General Roberts came upon the Afghans, strongly posted; attacked, but failed to dislodge them. He had to draw off, pelted by the cannon-shot of the enemy, and amid the derisive cheers of the Afghans, exulting in their first success. There was "no plan of attack conceived with the rapid accuracy of a rare insight and carried out under the very fire of the enemy." Indeed, but for an accident, General Roberts would have renewed on the following day the same plan of attack which had already failed. The accident was this: Captain Rennick, a political officer with General Roberts, had in his employ a servant who happened to be a native of the Kurram Valley, and this man undertook to lead a force, by an unfrequented path through the hills, to a point whence the Afghan position could be attacked in the rear. This was carried into effect the following day, when

the Afghans, finding their position no longer tenable, abandoned it, leaving their guns behind them. The General who won the fight at Peiwar Kotul was not Sir Frederick Roberts, but Captain Rennick's unknown servant.

Again, speaking of General Roberts' advance on Kabul, and the battle of Charasiab, Lord Lytton said: "But let him tell them that all the military difficulties and dangers of that march were greatly aggravated by the treacherous intrigues and snares of our professed ally, and that the success of the operation was quite as largely due to the diplomatic sagacity, as to the military genius with which it was conducted."

This Afghan War, from its inception onwards, was on the English side an unbroken series of shameless falsehoods and base trickeries, and the reference here is to one of the most disgraceful of these episodes. General Roberts' march to Kabul lay through the country of the Ahmedzye Ghilzyes, the chief man among whom was Padshah Khan, who was also the Wazeer of the Ameer Yakoub Khan. To this chief General Roberts addressed a letter, stating that as he was marching to Kabul in order to afford assistance and relief to the Ameer, he expected that Padshah Khan, as a minister of the Ameer, would render him all the assistance in his power. Padshah Khan loyally responded to this appeal, and there is hardly a doubt that but for his intervention the force under General Roberts would have been destroyed in the attempt to reach Kabul. He supplied General Roberts with the camels and ponies without which the force could not have moved, and later on he rendered us a yet more important service. At Charasia our readers will remember that while the British troops were engaged with the Afghan army in their front, the hills on either flank were covered with thousands of Ghilzyes, who, had they swept down, would have overwhelmed the small British column by sheer weight of numbers. But they made no attack. Why? Because their chief, Padshah Khan, was in the British camp as the ally and friend of General Roberts. Now we come to the disgraceful part of the story. As soon as General Roberts was established in Kabul, the Ameer, to "render assistance and relief" to whom had been the ostensible object of his march, was made a prisoner and deported to India, and the payment which had been promised to Padshah Khan and his tribe for the invaluable services they had rendered was withheld from them. The attack, a little later on, upon the cantonments of Sherpur, where the grievous mismanagement of General Roberts placed the force under him in imminent danger of total destruction, was the Afghans' reply to this double act of treachery and bad faith.

It would be easy to go through the whole of Lord Lytton's eulogy on General Roberts, and, taking it point by point, show how absurd and fantastic are the statements it contains. Our readers are aware that we have no admiration for General Roberts either as a man or a general. We know too much of the war in Afghanistan to allow of any such feeling; but it is not against him that the foregoing remarks have been directed. What we desired was to adduce another illustration of that recklessness of statement—that entire disregard of truth—which still continues to characterize the utterances of the Ministers and agents of the late Government. No matter on what subject these gentlemen elect to open their lips, their remarks have one characteristic common to them all. They invariably assert the thing that is not. In this very speech Lord Lytton speaks of the crime of abandoning the "*Peiwar Kotul, which commands both Kabul and Ghuznee*;" although he knows perfectly well that it commands neither the one nor the other, because between it and these places rises the Shutirgurdun, which, for six months of the year, is so deep in snow as to be im-

passable. Happily for the nation, these fictions are at present impotent for evil—nay, they may possibly do a little good in still further discrediting the character and destroying the reputation of those who indulge in them so freely. The Government, we rejoice to know, is not to be turned aside from the plain path of right and expediency by the opposition of such a man as the late Viceroy of India. If the general testimony of the Indian papers is to be received as valid, orders have already been issued for an evacuation of Kandahar at the earliest possible date.

Lord Lytton is not the only noble lord who has succeeded in making an exhibition of himself during the past month. The mild and relaxing climate of the island of Madeira would seem to have had a deleterious influence upon the reason, judgment, and memory of Lord Carnarvon. If there be one public man more than another whose political sympathies and convictions are known to all men, that man is Mr. John Bright. To gravely remonstrate with him, at this time of day, upon their general character and tendency, would seem to argue either a marvellous lack of occupation of any kind, or an equally marvellous confidence in one's powers of persuasion. Lord Carnarvon is a man whom men of all parties respect, and what should have persuaded him to address to Mr. Bright the very illogical letter that has lately appeared in the papers baffles conjecture. Lord Carnarvon has been moved to profound indignation by a statement of Mr. Bright's to the effect that by far the larger number of the political calamities which have afflicted mankind have been due to "sovereigns and statesmen." The statement is, indeed, a truism. Except where popular government has prevailed, "sovereigns and statesmen" have, of necessity, been the chief dispensers of human weal and woe; and the horrible mess they have made of their business is recorded in every page of the world's history. But Lord Carnarvon is under the extraordinary delusion that this obvious truism can be destroyed, overthrown, obliterated, by setting up against it a second truism equally obvious, to this effect—that sovereigns and statesmen have also done some good—*e.g.* (this is his own illustration), the codification of Roman Law during the reign of the Emperor Justinian. But more amazing still than the manner of this refutation is the inference which Lord Carnarvon draws from the position of Mr. Bright. He considers that Mr. Bright and all other men who hold that the political calamities which have afflicted mankind have been, in the main, the work of "sovereigns and statesmen," are thereby debarred from holding office under a constitutional monarchy. According to the noble lord, a British Minister, before taking office, must hold as an article of faith, that our constitutional fiction that "the Crown can do no wrong" is an expression of truth applicable to "sovereigns and statesmen" all over the world, and from the beginning of history. Or is it only the "nearly all" which chokes Lord Carnarvon, and would he allow a British Minister to believe that "some" calamities have been caused by "sovereigns and statesmen," without exacting resignation as a penalty for this monstrous belief? And if "some," how many? How nearly may an Englishman approach to the "almost all" without being found guilty of official incapacity? Enough, however, of this letter. It has not been written by Lord Carnarvon clothed and in his right mind, but by Lord Carnarvon panic-stricken at those things that are coming on the earth.

And assuredly, for those, like Lord Carnarvon, who dread the obliteration of ancient landmarks, the times are ominous of change. It is due to our English method of procedure that questions demanding immediate answers seem, as it were, to be sprung upon the Legislature without any anterior preparation. We

never undertake a reform until the institution which requires reconstruction is actually falling into ruins about our ears. At heart, nearly all of us are well aware that the institution has no promise of durability about it, that it represents a system of things that is fast passing away. But there is a tacit agreement that no public confession of this conviction is to be made. If a man here and there will insist upon pointing out that this or that institution is unsafe, or fast crumbling into decay, we all with one consent denounce him as a dark and dangerous Radical, who is bent upon the destruction of all law and order. This is what has happened to the institution of Landlordism in Ireland. The landlords, headed by that hysterical gentleman, Mr. Bence Jones, are crying out for the Government to come and help them, not perceiving that they pronounce their own condemnation by the violence of their outcries. An institution which can only be upheld by measures of coercion and the suspension of the regular course of law, is clearly an institution which ought not to be upheld at all. Another question which seems all at once to have ripened for solution is the connection between Church and State. It is, of course, only "seeming," and to candid and unbiassed minds it has long been apparent that the existing anomalous relations between the Church and State could not endure. A National Church presupposes a national religion; for if there be a diversity of religious convictions among a people, how is it possible that a single organ of expression should adequately represent them? The moment, therefore, that Nonconformity established itself in England, the (so-called) National Church became a fiction; and with the spread of Nonconformity, the fiction became more open and palpable. Try as hardly as men may, sooner or later a fiction becomes absolutely intolerable—a grievance which no man can endure; and such, it appears to us, is the feeling which is now evoked by the Church of England as by law established. A Church that is simply the creation of a Parliament composed of men of all creeds and no creed, is a contradiction in terms. The Dean of St. Paul's, in his recent letter to the *Times*, appears to us to be quite in the right when he says, "If this is a true account of the Church of England . . . then all that is found in the books of our greatest masters of religions teaching, in all Churches and sects, about the nature of the Christian Church is ranting nonsense." Unhappily, Dr. Church, having laid down this obvious proposition, pursues his inquiries no further. If the Church of England be a Christian Church, it is no less a "Church as by law established;" and how in this, its legal character, it is to escape being other than the creation of that Parliament which is the source of law, Dr. Church does not explain. The fact is that the Established Church is the surviving product of an extinct state of national feeling; and the "martyrdom" of Mr. Dale in Holloway Gaol, and the internecine conflict between the Church Union and the Church Association, are due to a non-recognition of this fact on the part of both Church and State. The Ritualist and Evangelical have both sound reason on their side. No one will deny the contention of the Ritualist that neither Lord Penzance nor the British House of Commons has any jurisdiction in matters spiritual that is binding on the reason or conscience. On the other hand, the Evangelical occupies a position equally impregnable when he asserts that the minister of a "Church as by law established" is bound to obey the decisions of the Ecclesiastical Courts established by Parliament. But it is because both parties are so entirely in the right, that any termination of the quarrel is hopeless, until the surrounding conditions are changed. At the same time, it is well to understand clearly the vast claims which the Ritualists are making upon the nation. They still desire to remain "established"—i.e., they

desire to remain under the control of the vast property of the Established Church, of its cathedrals, abbeys, churches, chapels, parsonage-houses, &c., and at the same time to be emancipated from the control of Parliament. Their modest request is that the British nation should place this enormous wealth and power under the irresponsible control of that small section of the English clergy which is willing to yield implicit obedience to the Rev. Mr. Mackonochie. They are, at present, contending merely for the right to wear certain vestments in opposition to the decree of certain Ecclesiastical Courts, but the ground on which they make this contention covers the entire doctrine, teaching, and internal discipline of the Church. In brief, sacerdotalism, in its most extravagant form, is what the Ritualist clergy desire to revive in England.

